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Original Research Article

A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

Abraham Tsehay Jemberie

Debre Berhan University, Debre Berhan, Ethiopia

ABSTRACT

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), a German philosopher, is considered as the father of modern ethics and one of the great philosophers in the history of philosophy. He wanted to establish firm foundation for moral philosophy. He contributed something new to modern ethics which was not attempted by earlier ethicists. He wanted to show by using reason that morality is based on a single supreme universal principle, which is binding to all rational beings. Precisely, Kant wanted to establish the first principle of morality which neglects all consideration of self-interest and even particular human problems. In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claimed that his intention is to seek out and establish the supreme principle of morality, and that supreme principle is the categorical imperative. He puts the supreme principle of morality or the categorical imperative in at least five ways. These are formula of universal law (FUL), formula of universal law (FLN), formula of humanity (FH), formula of humanity (FA), and formula of realm of ends (FRE). However, Kant affirms that there is one canonical and general formulation of the categorical imperative and it is the FUL. For him, the other formulas are not distinct ethical principles; rather they are the reformulations or variant formulations of the single categorical imperative. Kant put this position in his works, The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. So, in this paper, I will mainly concentrate on the fundamental doctrine of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. As I have tried to make clear before, Kant‟s aim in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is to search for and establish the supreme principle of morality (i.e., categorical imperative). He attempted to do this at the end of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. But, to me, the way he attempted to justify the categorical imperative is problematic. Thus, in this paper, I argue that Kant did not put the categorical imperative or morality on a solid ground.

Keywords: Categorical Imperative; formula of universal law (FUL);Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals; Immanuel Kant; Morality; Supreme Principle of Morality.

INTRODUCTION consideration of self-interest and even According to Paton, [1] Immanuel particular human problems. Kant, a German philosopher, is considered We can find Kant‟s most influential as the father of modern ethics. He wanted to position in his works, The Groundwork of lay unshakable foundation for moral the Metaphysics of Morals (we call it philosophy. His contribution to ethics is Groundwork hereafter) and developed his totally new. He wanted to show, by using views in his later works. In this paper, I will reason, that ethics and morality is based on mainly focus on the foundational doctrine of a single supreme universal principle, which the Groundwork. I will also consider some is binding to all rational beings. In precise of his other books in case situations impel words, Kant wanted to establish the first me. principle of morality which neglects all

International Journal of Research & Review (www.gkpublication.in) 54 Vol.4; Issue: 3; March 2017 Abraham Tsehay Jemberie. A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

In the Preface of the Groundwork, Kant‟s good will is. For Kant, the defining feature intention is to seek out and establish the of an action performed from duty is that the supreme principle of morality, and that agent performs the action because he supreme principle is the categorical considers that it is the right thing to do. This imperative. This is, Kant argues, one and defining feature of actions done from duty only one supreme principle for all fields of lies in the maxim upon which it is done. morals. [2] Kant holds that an agent who acts from duty However, as Ellington reminds us, or from good will considers his maxim as Kant does not insist that he discovered having the form of a law. The principle of a categorical imperative. Because Kant thinks good will is, thus, to perform only actions that this supreme principle is a working whose maxim can be conceived as having criterion used by any rational agent to make the form of a law. [2] their choice and judgment although they do In section two of the Groundwork, not explicitly formulate it. [3] In other words, Kantarrives at the same conclusion but as discussed by Allison, [4] Kant aimed at through different way. He chooses a exposing the moral principle which is philosophical starting point that leads him to implicitly used by the pre-philosophical a more complete and precise formulation of understanding of morality. He insists that the moral principle. He analyses the concept although in pre-philosophical understanding of unconditional necessary action to of morality any ordinary good man used this uncover a principle similar to section one. moral principle to judge moral actions, he Unconditionally necessary actions are moral was unable to make it clear for themselves. actions. If an action is unconditionally Thus, in section one of the Groundwork, necessary, the agent considers that doing the Kant starts from the analysis of our ordinary action is something required of him moral views to determine the supreme regardless of other things. Thus, the maxim principle behind it. As a result, he argues upon which it is done should be conceived that the only thing good without as a law. But, since the action is qualification is a good will. The good will is unconditional, the will cannot be bound to a good through its willing; that is, only a good particular law. As a result, it is the idea of will and actions that express this will have law that is universal that binds the will. This unrestricted or unconditional value. takes us to Kant's first formulation of According to Korsgaard, to ascribe categorical imperative, formula of universal unconditional value to an action, for Kant, law (FUL). [4] Korsgaardin her book entitled we have to know the motivation on the basis Creating the Kingdom of Endsremind us, of which a person acts. Thus, what makes us for Kant, to determine whether one wills his attribute unconditional value to a morally maxim to be a universal law, he can good action is the motivation behind it. This consistently will it as a law of nature. [6] suggests that if we know how actions with According to Paton, analysis of the unconditional value are willed, we can concept of moral obligation shows that the know what makes them morally good. If we FUL is its principle. But, it is impossible to know what makes actions morally good, we show how it is binding on the will through can determine which one is morally good mere analysis of the concept of moral and what the moral law tells us to do. To obligation. Kant postpones this job to determine what the moral law tells us to do, section three of the Groundwork. In Kant attempts to find out the principle on preparation to resolve this problem, Kant which a person of a good will acts. [5] has to show the kind of motivation that an For Kant, a person of a good will agent who acts from categorical imperative performs from the motive of duty. has. He insists that since every action has an Consequently, if we analyze the concept of end, morality become possible if there exists duty we can show what the principle of a an objectively necessary end. Kant

International Journal of Research & Review (www.gkpublication.in) 55 Vol.4; Issue: 3; March 2017 Abraham Tsehay Jemberie. A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals introduces humanity as the only end which than itself. Because if so, they would be is an end in itself. This enables him to just laws of natural necessity. If the laws formulate another version of the categorical under which free will act are not other imperative, namely the formula of humanity imposed, they must be self-imposed. But, (FH). [7] this is what does mean by autonomy. Since, As discussed by Timmermann, Kant for Kant, autonomy is the principle of comes up with another formula of the morality, a free will is under moral laws. categorical imperative by combining the Therefore, morality follows from the previous two formulas (FUL and FH). He concept of free will. [7] takes the idea of legislation from FUL and Since morality is valid for all the idea of self-determination from the FH rational beings, it is impossible to base our to establish autonomous legislation in the notion of morality on the concept of free realm of ends. For Kant, one might be will if it is impossible to prove that all motivated to obey the law either rational beings have free will. It is heteronomously or autonomously. Since a impossible to prove this issue from person who acts heteronomously is experience. However, it is possible to motivated to respect the law by some assume that a being is really free if it thinks interest, the imperative from which his of itself as free when it acts. This is because maxim is drawn is hypothetical. However, a being with reason and a will must think of the moral imperative is categorical. A itself as free. [2] person who is motivated by it, acts However, Kantcannot be satisfied by autonomously. This implies that the laws of this argument because it is circular. He morality must be laws that a person imposes attempts to avoid this problem by on himself. Kant suggests that any establishing an independent ground to autonomous action must be governed by consider the will as free. The distinction moral laws. The moral law just tells a between the noumenal and phenomenal person not to act on a principle that he does world enables him to establish this not will to be a law. It restricts a person to independent ground. He insists that the will act in accordance with his autonomy. As a is part of both the noumenal and the result, Kant suggests that the categorical phenomenal world. He says it is only in the imperative is the law of autonomy. [8] phenomenal world that human being is According to Patonin section one causally determined. But, as parts of the and two of the Groundwork, Kant only tells noumenal world, the will is free. [2] us, through analysis, what morality is if it As I have tried to make clear before, really exists. He does not tell us that Kant‟s aim in the Groundwork is to search morality really exists. Kant shows us this in for and establish the supreme principle of section three of the Groundwork. To do so, morality. He attempted to do this in section he uses a synthetic argument. Kant insists three of the Groundwork in which he that, as rational beings, we must consider affirmed that the noumenal world makes ourselves as possessing a free will. We freedom possible since the idea of freedom cannot consider our actions as causally makes any moral agent to be responsible for determined by outside forces. This is a his act; moral obligation is real. But, to me, negative conception of freedom. Thus, it is the way he attempted to justify a categorical uninformative. However, this negative imperative is problematic. Thus, in this concept of freedom is important to know the paper, I argue that Kant does not put the positive one. Kant leads to the positive categorical imperative or morality on a solid concept of freedom in such a way that a ground. lawless free will is self-contradictory. Thus, This paper is composed of three a free will would act under laws, but these parts each of which deals with a specific laws could not be one imposed upon it other part of the paper. In the first part, I will

International Journal of Research & Review (www.gkpublication.in) 56 Vol.4; Issue: 3; March 2017 Abraham Tsehay Jemberie. A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals briefly discuss and analyze how Kant, in the explicitly state this principle, we have to Groundwork, arrives at the first formulation know more about “a good will” and “good of the supreme principle of morality by without qualification”. [1] analyzing ordinary moral beliefs. In the By “good without limitation”, Kant second part, I will analyze how Kant means that it is only a good will which is reaches the various formulation of the good in any context. That is, its goodness categorical imperative by taking more does not change along with the change of philosophical stand point. In the third, I will contexts, desires and ends. Thus, Kant analyze how Kant attempted to establish the concludes that good will is an absolute and notion of categorical imperative in the unconditioned good. It is also the only thing Groundwork and I will also show how his which is good in itself and independently of attempt is unsuccessful. Finally, in other things [4] conclusion part, I will briefly show how the Kant does not mean that a good will reason he used to establish the validity of is the only good. Ruther, he divides all the categorical imperative, in the goods into two: “gifts of nature” and “gifts Groundwork, is insufficient. of fortune”. Although Kant does not deny THE GOOD WILL AND THE that all “gifts of nature” and “gifts of SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF fortune” are good in many respects, he does MORALITY not confirm that they are good without THE GOOD WILL limitation. He claims that, on the contrary, In section one of the Groundwork, they can be extremely bad or evil when they Kant‟s project is “to proceed analytically are used with a bad will. This implies that from common moral cognition to the they are good within certain conditions. determination of its supreme principle.” [2] Thus, they are conditioned good and are not Korsgaard tells us that Kant starts from our absolutely good. [7] ordinary ways of thinking about morality Moreover, Kant believes that the and moves into discovering the principle goodness of the good will is not derived behind it. Although Kant, in this section, is from the good result it produces. But, it just analyzing ordinary moral view, he is not attaches a distinct, conditioned and qualified justifying that human beings have moral good that does not have any influence on its obligation. He is rather merely identifying inner nature. Sometimes, a good will might what is essential to prove that moral be combined with defects of the mind or bad obligation is real. [5] qualities of temperament. In this case, it “The common cognition from which may fail to achieve good results. But, a good Kant starts his argument is that morally will continues to have its inner absolute good actions have a special kind of value. A value although it fails to achieve the result it person who does the right thing for the right aims to achieve. [9] reason evinces what Kant calls a good will.” A GOOD WILL AND DUTY [2] Thus, Kant's analysis of ordinary views of Kant discusses the concept of duty to morality begins with the thought that “It is further clarify the concept of a good will. not possible to think of anything in the His main claim is that the concept of duty world, or indeed out of it, that can be held to “contains that of the concept of a good will be good without limitation except a good though under subjective limitation and will.” [2] hindrances, which far from concealing it Here, the objective is to identify the and make it unrecognizable, bring out by principle that ordinary good man is contrast and make it shine forth all the more supposed to use in judging his action brightly”. [2] This passage, as Paton tells us, although he does not explicitly formulate it. is incorrectly interpreted by many readers of Kant‟s intention is to derive it by analyzing the Groundwork, but Kant‟s intention in this of the concept of a good will. Thus, to passage is that a will which acts for the sake

International Journal of Research & Review (www.gkpublication.in) 57 Vol.4; Issue: 3; March 2017 Abraham Tsehay Jemberie. A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals of duty is a good will. However, Paton actions done from duty. [2] The term “moral suggests, it should not follow from this that worth”, “do not refer to just any sort of a good will is necessarily one that acts for value morality might attach to actions, but the sake of duty. To understand this, we designate only that special degree of worth have to make clear the concept of duty. The that most conspicuously elicits esteem from very idea of duty involves the overcoming common rational cognition”. [9] However, if of desires and inclinations. On the other an action lacks moral worth in this sense, it hand, a completely good will or “holy” will does not follow that it is worthless from can manifest itself without overcoming moral point of view. In fact, all actions that natural inclinations. So, a good will as such conform to duty have value from moral would not act for the sake of duty since it point of view, but they do not just have a includes a holy will that manifests itself special degree of value that goes beyond without being constrained by duty. such mere moral approval and elicits esteem However, man‟s will is not holy since in from common rational cognition. [9] finite creatures such as man, there are Kant‟s second proposition about certain “subjective limitations” or obstacles. duty is that: “an action from duty has its Thus, a will that acts for the sake of duty is moral worth not in the purpose to be a good will under human conditions. This attained by it but in the maxim in also implies that the concept of a good will accordance with which it is decided upon, as such is broader than the concept of a will and therefore does not depend upon the that acts for the sake of duty. Thus, a will realization of the object of the action but which acts for the sake of duty is a special merely upon the principle of volition in form of a good will that overcomes accordance with which the action is done subjective limitations and hindrances. It without regard for any object of the faculty manifests itself in duty under adverse of desire.” [2] In the first proposition, we situations. [1] According to Wood, Kant have seen that an action has moral value takes us to this special form of a good will, only if it is done from duty. The above because the good will‟s unlimited worth is proposition adds that the moral value of shown more brightly to common rational such an action does not stem from the result cognition in this conditions and it is under that the action produces or seeks to produce. this condition that a good will is different [2] If the moral worth of the action cannot be from other conditional goods, and then its derived from any inclination of achieving higher value becomes clear. [9] something, then it cannot be derived from According to Paton, Kant elucidates the result it is sought or produced. [1] the concept of duty by three propositions of The idea so far has been negative; which he explicitly states only the second the source of moral worth is not the result and the third propositions. But, his that the action in fact produces or aims to suggestion that the third proposition is the produce. So, it is uninformative. It is consequence of the last two propositions necessary to make this doctrine more impels commentators to search for the first positive. If an action from duty does not proposition. The most appropriate candidate derive its distinct value from the result it of the first proposition, although he does not achieves or seeks to achieve, it must more explicitly state it, seems like: an action has specifically be from the motive of duty. [1] moral worth or value only when it is done Kant expresses it in such a way that an from duty [7] and then Kant compares it with action done from duty gains its moral worth actions that conform to duty. An action is from a maxim, and the maxim is not a said to conform to duty if it complies with maxim of producing results. [2] what duty requires regardless of the Patonremind us that, for Kant, a motivation for doing it. Kant ascribes true maxim is a particular principle (in a loose “moral worth” or “moral content” only to sense) that one follows to perform a certain

International Journal of Research & Review (www.gkpublication.in) 58 Vol.4; Issue: 3; March 2017 Abraham Tsehay Jemberie. A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals action. It is considered as a purely personal good action is motivated out of this kind of principle to the agent. It is subjective, unique feeling, it is convincing to say that a because it is a principle that a rational agent morally good action is performed out of follows to accomplish a certain action. reverence for the law. [7] Subjective principles are valid only for an Having discussed a good will under agent who chooses to act upon it. [1] human condition as one which acts for the Thus, Kant‟s technical term for this sake of duty, and duty as “the necessity of subjective principle is a “maxim”. It is actions from respect for the law”, the next different from an objective principle since it possible question would be the nature of this is not valid for all rational agents. It is also law by which a good will has its unique and not the same as a motive, because it is more absolute value. Thus, according to general than a motive, and that is why it is Timmermann, [8] Kant‟s analysis is yet to be called a principle. So, maxim includes both completed since we do not still know the the action and its motive. It is not, however, law that inspires reverence and motivates considered as valid for everyone else, like morally good actions. objective principle, and it can be good or According to Timmermann, in bad. [1] describing the nature of the law by which a Kantidentifies two kinds of maxims: person of a good will performs his action, material maxim and formal maxim. Any Kant presents us with the first version of the moral action does not have its moral worth supreme principle of morality which is from a material maxim. It rather has its officially, for the first time, called moral worth from a formal maxim or categorical imperative in section two of the principle of performing ones duty whatever Groundwork in the following way: to realize that duty might be. [2] a specific end, we have to follow a certain The third proposition of Kant about command that enables us to use specific duty is that “duty is the necessity to act out laws. However, morally good actions are of reverence for the law”. [2] Paton discussed not actions done for the sake of some end that, for Kant, the maxim of a morally good that one wants to fulfill. If so, all laws used action is formal maxim. If so, it must be a to realize a particular end cannot be maxim of acting on a law which is valid for candidates of moral law. That is, these laws all rational beings irrespective of their cannot inspire reverence and motivate particular interests. It is true that human morally good actions. Thus, if these specific beings are fallible. As a result, this law must laws are discarded, the only possible be presented in the form of duty that orders candidates of the moral law must be law us to be obedient. Since this law is abidingness or “the universal conformity to considered as an imposed one on us, it must law as such”. [8] Kant argues that if there is arouse a feeling which is akin to fear. On something by the name moral obligation, the other hand, having realized that this law then we have to recognize that our wills are is imposed on us by our own self, it must directed by this principle: “I ought never to arise a feeling akin to inclination. By act except in such a way that I could also inclination, it is to mean a delight that will that my maxim should become a results from the awareness of the imposition universal law”. [2] “The necessity of an comes from our own free and rational will. action from reverence for this law is duty, It is this kind of feeling that Kant calls the condition of a human will that is reverence. This feeling does not arise from essentially good beyond everything else. any kind of sense stimulation. It is rather Thus, the concept of the good will is from being conscious that the will is connected with that of the law through the subordinated to a universal law which is concept of duty.” [2] free from sensuous impact. From this, one Kant claims that his analysis fully can understand that as long as a morally agrees with ordinary human reason. That is,

International Journal of Research & Review (www.gkpublication.in) 59 Vol.4; Issue: 3; March 2017 Abraham Tsehay Jemberie. A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals although the ordinary good man does not beings. The only difference is that for holy establish the above principle in abstraction, rational beings they appear as descriptive he really uses it in evaluating particular laws, whereas they appear as prescriptive moral matters. [2] laws for imperfect rational beings. [4] THE BACKGROUND OF For Kant, to act according to one‟s CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE representation of laws means acting RATIONAL AGENCY AND according to recognized norms which is IMPERATIVES taken by Kant as equivalent to “acting on According to Allisonin section two principles”. [4] of the Groundwork, Kant continues to the In the above passage, Kant also exposition of the supreme principle of claims that if one is governed by this sense morality to show that this principle has the of law, he is said to have a will. He defines characteristics of absolute necessity. will “as the capacity to act according to the Because it is impossible to show this by representation of laws”. In this case, he claiming that it is implicitly found in identifies will as practical reason. Allison common human reason. He accomplishes maintains that Kant applies this this by analyzing the concept of rational identification to rational agents in general agent as such particularly finite rational that includes both perfect and imperfect beings. [4] rational agents. However, Kant also holds Allison also tells us that Kant makes, that reason determines the will. [2] For however, the situation more complicated by Allison, when Kant claims that practical deriving additional formulas to what he reason determines or fails to determine the names a single categorical imperative to will, he is talking about only in relation to fully construct the concept of categorical imperfect rational agents. In order to make imperative. [4] this point clear, Kant provides us with two Kant begins his analysis of rational agent ways in which reason determines the will. with the following passage: “Everything in The first kind of will is the holly or nature works according to laws. Only a perfectly rational will which is infallibly rational being has the capacity to act determined by reason. In this kind of will, according to the representation of laws, that there is no any competing force that dictates is, according to a principle, or a will. Since it to go out of the right track. We can find reason is required for the derivation of this kind of will in perfectly rational agents. actions from laws, the will is nothing other [4] According to Kant, these beings than practical reason.” [2] necessarily act according to laws of reason. The above passage gives rise to For them, actions which are recognized as different interpretations. The first question objectively necessary are also subjectively is about the nature of laws according to the necessary. But, in the second case, we can representation of which rational agents act. find a will such as human will in which According to Allison‟s reading, the context reason fails to invariably determine it within which Kant‟s analysis is undertaken because it is subject to subjective obliges us to take objective practical inclinations. As a result, for this will, principles as the most genuine candidate of actions which are identified as objectively “laws” according to the representation of necessary are not subjectively necessary, which rational agents act. [4] Timmermann [8] rather they are subjectively contingent. and Willaschek [10] also affirm this reading. Consequently, this kind of will is By objective, Kant means that they are valid necessitated by the objective laws of reason. for all rational agents as such. [2] Since these [2] principles are valid for all rational beings, Since the human will and every they can be applied both to perfectly other finite will are categorized under the rational agents and imperfect rational second group, they are subject to

International Journal of Research & Review (www.gkpublication.in) 60 Vol.4; Issue: 3; March 2017 Abraham Tsehay Jemberie. A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals necessitation. This takes us to the idea of beyond the subject concept and search for a imperatives. According to Kant, [2] all third term that enables us to attribute the imperatives are expressed by the word predicate to the subject concept. [7] “ought”. “Ought” indicates the necessitation For Kant the possibility of that holds between an objective principle hypothetical imperatives does not need any and imperfectly rational beings. special explanation because all of them are Perfectly rational beings necessarily analytic propositions. That means, they are act on objective principles which are grounded in “Whoever wills the end also imperative for imperfectly rational beings. wills (in so far as reason has decisive They manifest the same kind of goodness influence on his actions) the indispensably manifested when imperfectly rational beings necessary means to it that are within his act based on imperatives. Thus, these power”. [2] Kant seems to assume that, as objective principles are necessary but they Patonsuggests, the end is always a result, are not imperatives for them. [2] and for an end, it has one means which is After discussing the nature of considered as some possible action of the imperatives, Kant discusses the distinction agent. If so, we can say that in the concept between hypothetical and categorical of willing an end, there is contained the imperatives. The distinction between them concept of willing the action which is the is made by the way they command. [4] To means to the end. Thus, the proposition that command hypothetically is to command “to will the end is to will the means is a under certain condition. By contrast, to theoretical analytic proposition”. [1] command categorically is to command Now the issue is how this theoretical unconditionally independent of any analytic proposition becomes practical calculated end. For Kant, it is only analytic proposition and hypothetical categorical imperative which is considered imperatives. According to Paton, to fill this as imperatives of morality. [2] gap, we have to remember the above After discussing the different kinds objective principle of practical reason. of imperatives, Kant raises the question: Although this proposition is still analytic, it “How are these imperatives possible?” [2] In appears imperative for us since reason does this question, Kant wants to consider how to not have a decisive influence although it understand the necessitation imposed upon exists in us. Thus, it can be given the form the will by imperatives and also how it is “if any rational agent wills the end, he ought possible for finite rational beings to be to will the means”. [1] motivated upon them as rational commands Kant notes that to know the means of their will. [4] of the proposed end, we have to use To understand the argument that synthetic propositions. We are required to Kant uses to answer the above question, we know the cause of a certain desired effect must understand the distinction between and it is impossible to know what the cause analytic and synthetic propositions. The of a certain effect through mere analysis of predicate of any analytic proposition is the effect itself. These synthetic contained in the subject concept of it and it propositions are theoretical. However, the can be derived by mere analysis of the imperative is still analytic as far as willing is subject concept. Thus, to justify any analytic concerned. [2] proposition, it is not necessary to go beyond The above kind of justification is not the subject concept. By contrast, in any applicable to categorical imperative. synthetic proposition, the predicate is not Categorical imperative is unconditional and contained in the subject concept and hence does not refer to an end that the agent seeks it is impossible to derive it by mere analysis to attain. [2] To justify a categorical of the subject concept. Thus, to justify a imperative, one has to show that “a fully synthetic proposition it is a must to go rational agent would necessarily act in a

International Journal of Research & Review (www.gkpublication.in) 61 Vol.4; Issue: 3; March 2017 Abraham Tsehay Jemberie. A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals certain way, not if he happens to want through which you can at the same time will something else, but simply and solely as a that it becomes a universal law”. [2] rational agent". [1] This proposition is not According to Timmermann‟s analytic because its predicate is not discussion, Kant holds that the above contained in the subject concept „rational formulation is the one canonical and general agent‟ and it cannot be derived by mere formulation of the categorical imperative: analysis of the subject concept. Thus, this there is only a single categorical imperative proposition is synthetic. Moreover, it is an and it is the above principle (FUL). Other assertion of what any rational agent ought to unconditional imperatives are either variants do. As a result, it cannot be justified by of this principle or individual „categorical appealing to experience. Hence, the imperatives‟, i.e., particular applications of categorical imperative is not only synthetic this principle. The formula of laws of but also a priori. And it is very difficult to nature, which immediately follows the justify it. [1] Kant postpones this task to present formulation, is the first of three section III of the Groundwork. variants. [8] THE FORMULATION OF THE The above test, however, is abstract CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE and Kant thinks that it may be difficult to As noted earlier, Kant announces apply it. He realizes that it is easier to apply that he postpone the question of the the test to a maxim if we consider it not as a possibility of categorical imperative to normative law but as a law of nature, a section III of the Groundwork. However, universal rule against which it is causally although the justification of this standard as impossible for everyone to act. [9] the objective principle of rational agents In the Groundwork, a few lines after cannot be derived from its very concept, it is stating FUL, Kant suggests that “Since the possible to derive its content or what it universality of law in accordance with enjoins from its concept. [8] which effects take place constitutes what is We said that categorical imperative properly called nature in the most general is unconditional. The constraint imposed sense (as regards its form) - that is, the upon the will is independent of any end existence of things in so far as it is presupposed by the agent. Otherwise determined in accordance with universal expressed, it just commands us to act (to laws - the universal imperative of duty can adopt maxims) in conformity with objective also go as follows: act as if the maxim of principle. Laws are equally valid for all your action were to become by your will a rational agents as such and they are universal law of nature.” [2] universally and unconditionally valid According to Allison, Kant in the constraints on action. Thus, the conformity Critique of Pure Reason conceives of nature of maxims to universal law as such follows formally and materially. When nature is from the mere concept of categorical conceived formally, it is the existence of imperative. [2] However, the maxim of finite things according to universal laws. Kant rational beings can conform to universal implicitly wants to claim that this concept of laws only if such agents can also will them nature is used to show the conformity to as universal laws. What is important is the universal law assumed in the categorical compatibility between the material maxim imperative. He makes the transition from and the thought of the same maxim as FUL to formula of law of nature (FLN). universal laws. From this idea, one can According to Allison, this immediately understand that a categorical imperative gives rise to the question: “How can the idea requires that an agent adopts only the of conformity to laws of nature represent the maxim that he can at the same time wills as idea of conformity to laws of a completely a universal law. This can be expressed in the different type, specifically, law of freedom? formula: “Act only according to that maxim [4]

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Paton tried to address this question “The will is thought as a capacity to in the following way. In FUL, Kant informs determine itself to acting in conformity with us that the maxims on which we act ought to the representation of certain laws. … . Now, conform to universal law as such. He then what serves the will as the objective ground continues to tell us that in nature, every of its self-determination is an end… ”. The event takes place according to universal latter sentence brings about the second law, particularly the law of cause and effect. fundamental feature of all actions. That From this, we can understand that nature means, any rational action, in addition to and moral action have the same form having a principle, sets an end before itself. although the law of freedom and the law of [2] nature are not the same. This indicates that According to Kant, ends might be there is analogy between universal law of either subjective or objective. Subjective freedom and universal laws of nature. It is ends are based on desire or inclination. through this analogy that Kant assumes that Since different agents have different the universal law imposed by the categorical inclinations, these ends are not based on imperative is represented by the law of reasons which are valid for all rational nature and goes from FUL to FLN. [1] agents. They have a relative value and In Critique of Practical Reason, Kant conditioned. So, these ends are only ground affirms that since FLN contains the key idea for hypothetical imperatives. [2] of universality, it is characterized as a But, objective ends are, unlike “typic” of FUL. By this, he means a model subjective ends, based on reasons that are or a symbolic representation by which we valid for all rational agents. They have also apply FUL to a particular maxim in moral unconditional and absolute value. This deliberation. [11] implies that these ends cannot result from To use FLN, Kant tells us to imagine mere human action since ends that result ourselves as a creator of a world to which from mere human action do not have we are a part. The most important point to unconditional worth; instead they have to be be clarified here is, whether the proposed an already existent end or ends in course of action is taken as a law of nature themselves. Thus, these ends could be the in which the agent is a member. The idea of ground of categorical imperative. [2] being the law of nature expresses the idea of After having made clear the nature universality required by the categorical of ends that grounds the categorical imperative. [4] imperative, Kant suggests that it is only However, as Allison suggests, there rational beings or persons that can be ends is ambiguity with regard to the precise in themselves. Since only persons have function assigned to the FLN by Kant. Some unconditional value, it is not right to use of Kant‟s claims suggest that it is intended them merely as means to an end its value is to function as a self-standing source of only relative. If there is no such end, there duties while suggests that the function of would be no unconditioned good, FLN is to rule out maxims that violate each categorical imperative for human beings. of the four types of duties. [4] Thus, the peculiar end which is required for Allison notes that Kant moves to the the categorical imperative to be possible is FH by enriching his previous idea of persons or rational beings. [2] To derive the rational agency. As noted before, he holds FH, Kant uses the idea that rational agents that rational agents are beings with the are ends in themselves. Thus, the FH looks capacity to act according to their like this: “So act that you use humanity, representation of laws. He equalizes this whether in your own person or in the person capacity with the possession of a will or of any other, always at the same time as an practical reason. [4] Kant re-expresses this end, never merely as a means.” [2] The term idea in slightly different words by saying:

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“humanity” refers to the rational capacities when one considers himself as an of human beings. [8] autonomous agent, he is at the same time The other formula is the formula of think of himself as a law-giving member of autonomy(FA). It is formulated based on the the realm of ends. To understand this idea idea that a rational will makes itself the law more properly, it is essential to know what that it obeys. [1] The formula is expressed as Kant means by “a realm of ends”. [4] Kant follows: “So act that your will can regard defines realm as “a systematic union of itself at the same time as making universal different rational beings under common law through its maxim.” [2] This formula is laws”. [2] The term “systematic” indicates the most important formulation of the that the various members live harmoniously supreme principle of morality because it and also support one another. When we leads to the idea of freedom. [1] apply this conception to ends, the realm of Kant tries to arrive at the FA in ends is one in which the members are ends many ways that he does not clearly in themselves. [4] differentiate one another. Among others, Having discussed the realm of ends, one way that shows how Kant formulates let me proceed to spell out the formula of the FA is that he derives it from the essence the realm of ends (FRE). This formula, of categorical imperative. We said that the along with the FA, is the most vital moral imperative is categorical and formulation of Kant‟s categorical unconditional. Thus, it avoids any interest. imperative. It can be expressed as: “Act in The preceding formulas implicitly show accordance with the maxims of a member this. Now, the FA explicitly avoids any giving universal laws for a merely possible interest. In suggesting that a moral will realm of ends.” [2] Kant introduces this makes the law that it obeys, it is already formula in combination with the FA and, in suggesting that it is not determined by any some passages, Kant even seems to consider interest since a will determined by interest is FRE as expressions of FA. [2] Moreover, heteronymous. If will were determined by FRE can be derived by combining the ideas interest, it would be subject to the law that it of previously mentioned formulas of does not make, and ultimately to natural categorical imperative. Thus, this enables law. For Kant, all philosophers that the mentioned formula to be more adequate determine moral obligation by any kind of in expressing the spirit of the supreme interest make the categorical imperative principles of morality. [9] inconceivable and dismiss morality THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE altogether. These philosophers advocate the FORMULAS OF CATEGORICAL doctrine of heteronomy rather than the IMPERATIVE doctrine of autonomy. Thus, this kind of Kant says that: “The aforementioned three theory does not give rise to categorical ways of representing the principle of imperative, rather it gives rise to morality are at bottom only so many hypothetical. [2] From this we conclude, “If formulas of the very same law, and one of there is a categorical imperative, the moral them of itself unites the other two in it.” [2] will which obeys it must not be determined Although this sentence is single, it contains by interest, and therefore must itself make two claims that require a separate treatment. the universal laws which it is The first claim is that these formulas are the unconditionally bound to obey.” [1] expressions of the same law. As Allison Kant‟s notion of autonomy further suggests, the law represented by the three leads to another closely connected world, formulas (FLN, FH and FA/FRE) are the i.e., the realm of ends. He considers the single categorical imperative that first stated realm of ends as an idea by which one can and till now has been referred as FUL. We construct for himself the conception of saw before that Kant characterized autonomous agency. Otherwise expressed, categorical imperative as single. Thus, the

International Journal of Research & Review (www.gkpublication.in) 64 Vol.4; Issue: 3; March 2017 Abraham Tsehay Jemberie. A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals above sentence strengthens Kant‟s claim explains that the law must unite all rational that there is only one fundamental principle beings as ends in themselves into a of morality. [4] Kant warns his readers not to harmonious organic system. In this way, take the various formulas as distinct ethical FA/FRE not only goes beyond FLN and FH, principles, rather they are the reformulations considered individually, but also unites or variant formulations of the single them. This also implies the interdependence categorical imperative. [8] and collective completeness of the three The second claim contained in the formulas. [2] single sentence mentioned above is that one Kant indicates that there is a progression of the three reformulations unites the other from one formula to another and the three two in itself. It is in this context that Kant formulas complement one another in their talks about the mutual relation between the practical application. [2] various formulas of the categorical The three formulas refer to imperative. In order to show which formula complementary ways when moral principle contains within itself the other two, and applied to maxims. FLN refers to the thereby to explain the mutual relation universal validity of each maxim; FH directs between them, Kant claims that every us to the many rational beings that must be maxim has a form, a matter (end) and a treated as ends in themselves; and FA in the complete determination. He suggests that guise of FRE presents these ends as a every maxim has the form of generality in harmonious commonwealth. [9] the sense that it is a general principle by There is a progression from FLN to which it is done. From this, Kant concludes FH and then to FA/FRE. The FLN, as the that “in this respect the formula for moral legislative form of a maxim, leads to the imperative is expressed thus: that maxims search for the objective end which must be chosen as if they were to hold as represents this legislative form. This end is universal laws of nature”. By the law of found in rational beings as ends in nature, he equates it with FLN which themselves. Thus, FLN progresses to FH. specifies the formal condition that a maxim The combination of FLN and FH provides must fulfill that in turn enables to conform FA/FRE in the sense that the worth of to the moral principle. In the same way, he rational nature which grounds FH and argues that every maxim has a matter to conceived as the idea of a rational will is which the action is done. [2] From this, he considered as the author of laws derives the FH in such a way that “a presupposed in FLN. [9] rational being, as an end by its nature and Finally, as Timmermann reminds us, hence as an end in itself, must in every Kant recommends the strict method of FUL maxim serve as the limiting condition of all in practical purpose or for moral appraisal, merely relative and arbitrary ends”. [2] Thus, but the three formulas (FLN, FH and FH identifies the moral principle by FA/FRE) come to secure acceptance for the objective end and this end is the existent end moral law or to bring the FUL to intuition of humanity as an end in itself. This end through analogy. [8] serves as a motive for a will that follows a As we have seen so far, in the first categorical imperative. However, “complete two sections of the Groundwork, Kant determination” does not apply to an describes the procedure he used as analytic. individual maxim; rather it is a necessary [4] In section one of the Groundwork, Kant condition of an entire system of moral starts from analysis of ordinary moral legislation that governs the conduct of a beliefs and arrived at a version of the rational agent. [9] The FA formulates the categorical imperative. He then argued that moral law in terms of this system. This the condition for moral action, at least for becomes obvious when FA is expressed in finite rational beings, is obedience to a the guise of FRE, because this formula categorical imperative. In section two of the

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Groundwork, he formulates the categorical opposed to natural necessity, a causality imperative in at least three ways and he attributed to non-rational beings. [2] Non- completed the first of the two tasks that he rational beings can act causally only so long wanted to accomplish in the Groundwork, as they are caused to do so by something i.e., to search for and formulate the supreme else other than themselves. [1] principle of morality as it is found in “If the will of a rational agent is conceived common human reason. [1] as free, this must mean that we regard his Section three of the Groundwork is causal actions, or more precisely his devoted to the second task that Kant wanted volitions, as not determined by causes to accomplish; that is, to establish the external or alien to himself.” [1] objective validity of the supreme principle Kant holds that since his initial of morality through deduction. This requires characterization freedom as a complete to demonstrate its unconditional bindingness independence of natural determination is for all finite rational beings. [4] So, let me merely negative, it is not informative into its discuss section three of the Groundwork in nature. However, if this negative concept of detail. freedom is rejected, it would be impossible THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE to justify the positive concept of freedom. In CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE fact, the positive concept of freedom THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM AND follows from the negative one. [2] AUTONOMY OF THE WILL To show freedom is equivalent to We have a clear concept of autonomy, Kant needs to move from the autonomy, a defining property of moral will, negative concept of freedom to the positive in the last section of the Groundwork. one. Having defined will as a kind of free Section three of the Groundwork is causality, he attempts to do this by the concerned with justification that human concept of causality. Kant asserts that the beings have a will that has this property. concept of causality implies the concept of Kant claims that the concept of freedom laws in accordance with which through provides the key for this endeavor. [2] This is something which we call 'cause' something because freedom is a necessary condition else namely, the effect must be posited. for its possibility. Freedom is not merely a Thus, a causality characterized not by necessary but also a sufficient condition for natural necessity but by freedom cannot be autonomy and thus of morality. [8] lawless, but must accord with unchanging Let me go to the detail of Kant‟s laws of a special kind. Otherwise a free will argument. Kant begins section three of the would be a logical absurdity. [2] However, as Groundwork with a new definition of a will. Paton shows, the ground for this assertion is Initially, he defined will as “the power of a inadequate. Because, the law to which Kant rational being to act in accordance with its talks about appears to be a law that connects conception of laws, i.e., in accordance with causes and effects. Thus, we can apply this principles”. [2] But, he now considers it as “a only to natural necessity. It is difficult to kind of causality of living beings in so far as pass from this to a law of freedom. Because they are rational”. [2] Will is considered as a the law of freedom is a law of causal action kind of causality, because it is the power of considered in it self. [1] a rational being to produce effects in the According to Paton there is a more world experience. However, “If we strong force in the assertion that a lawless conceive the will to be free, we must mean free will is an absurdity. However, this view in the first place that the will is a power to is not derived from any necessary produce effects without being determined or connection between causality and law. It caused to do so by anything other than rather comes into being from the fact that a itself.” [1] Freedom is a quality attributed to a lawless free will would be governed by special kind of causality. As such, it is

International Journal of Research & Review (www.gkpublication.in) 66 Vol.4; Issue: 3; March 2017 Abraham Tsehay Jemberie. A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals chance so that it cannot be regarded as free. by a mere analysis of the concept of [1] freedom. However, to justify the moral As Paton says, if Kant‟s doctrine is principle, only describing the characteristics based on the argument that presupposes the of freedom which must be present in a will necessary connection between laws and if it is to be considered as free is not causality, it is fallacious. Paton holds that enough. Rather, we have to show that every the argument is “as superfluous as it is rational being with a will is, and indeed weak”. It is because there is no need to must be, free in the way explained before. make a connection between free will and This is because “in as much as morality law on the basis of the concept of causality. serves as a law for us only in so far as we [1] Kant holds that the very definition of will, are rational beings, it must also be valid for as given before, is “the power of a rational all rational beings. And since morality must being to act in accordance with its be derived solely from the property of conception of laws, i.e. in accordance with freedom, one must also show that freedom principles”. If so, a lawless free will is a is the property of the will of all rational self-contradiction; it cannot be a will at all. beings”. [2] As Paton discussed, Kant at this It is useless to appeal to the stage, is not attempting to justify that a will experience of human action to show that the is free. But, he is just showing how a free will of every rational being is necessarily will, if there is such a thing, would be free. This is because experience of freedom, conceived. [1] It is obvious that a will if it were possible (indeed impossible), governed by laws of natural necessity is not gives only a fact rather than a necessary free. Because, in nature, the law governing connection between the will of every causal action is not self-imposed but rational beings and freedom. [2] imposed by something else. This is what is As Paton discussed it, Kant argues called heteronomy. Thus, if a free will is not that we can show that a rational agent as lawless, its laws must be special kinds of such can act on the presupposition that he is laws which differ from laws of natural free (Under the Idea of freedom). That necessity. The only way to distinguish laws means, so long as we are rational beings, we of freedom from laws of nature is to necessarily act under the idea of freedom. suppose that laws of freedom are self- The justification of this necessary imposed. Thus, the causal action of free will presupposition would be enough to justify is conducted by self-imposed law. But, this the moral law. If a rational agent must act is what does mean by autonomy. A free will on the presupposition that he is free, he must be autonomous will. Moral law is the must act on the presupposition that he is law of autonomous will. Thus, a free will under moral law. [1] must be conceived as acting under the moral To justify the presupposition of law. Kant concludes that a free will and a freedom, Kantbegins with theoretical reason will under moral law are one and the same than just practical reason. He claims that thing. Thus, Kant holds that if we could “We cannot possibly conceive of a reason as presuppose the concept of freedom, the being consciously directed from outside in concept of autonomy and thus morality regard to its judgements.” If a rational being follows, through mere analysis, from the were conscious of any such external concept of freedom. [2] influence, he would consider his judgement FREEDOM AS A NECESSARY as determined, not by reason, but rather by PRESUPPOSITION impulse. Reason must, if it is to be reason at According to Kant, if freedom could all, consider itself as the author of its own be established in the way described before, principles and capable of functioning in the concept of autonomy and thereby the accordance with these principles supreme principle of morality would follow independently of external influences. [2]

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Kant holds that the above argument themselves). We know only appearances. which is valid for theoretical reason must However, we have to assume that behind equally be valid for practical reason (i.e., as appearances, there are things in themselves a rational will or as reason exercising even if we do not know these things in causality). [2] That means, a rational agent as themselves, but as they affect us. This gives such must, in action, presuppose his rational rise to a rough distinction between a will to be the source of its own principles of sensible world and an intelligible world. action and to be capable of functioning in The world of sense is given through sense accordance with these principles. To say and varies in accordance with the difference this is tantamount to that a rational being of sensibility in various observers. On the must act only on the presupposition that he other hand, the intelligible world can be is free. Only then can a rational being conceived but never known since consider his will as his own. This is the knowledge requires sensing and conceiving doctrine that Kant wants to establish and and it remains always the same. [2] from which the principle of morality follows Kantalso argues that this distinction applies analytically. Paton argues that, for Kant, to man‟s knowledge of himself. Man can freedom is a necessary presupposition for know himself only as he appears by means both all actions and thinking. This means of inner sense or through introspection. that a rational being can act, just as he can However, behind this appearance, he must think, merely on the presupposition of assume, there is an Ego as it is in itself. In freedom. A rational being implicitly so far as he is known through introspection, presupposes freedom both in his action and and in so far as he is capable of receiving thinking. If not, there is no anything as sensations passively, he must consider action and there is no such thing as will. [1] himself as members of the sensible world. THE VICIOUS CIRCLE On the other hand, in so far as he is capable Kant‟s argument seems complete. of pure activities without the influence of But, he worries that his argument for human sense, he must consider himself as members autonomy might contain a vicious circle. of the intelligible world. But, Kant suggests Morality was „traced back‟ to the idea of that we know nothing about this world. [2] freedom at the first subsection of section Kant claims that man really finds in three of the Groundwork, and in the next himself a pure activity which is free from subsection it was argued that freedom needs the influence of sense (a faculty of reason) to be necessarily presupposed if we are to affected by objects. [2] Here, as Paton noted, think of ourselves, as rational agents, bound Kant appeals to theoretical reason, as he did by moral laws. Thus, we have not yet been before. But, he now uses it in his own presented with an independent ground of the critical sense. [7] According to Kant, we have idea of freedom. As a way out of the vicious a spontaneous faculty of understanding. The circle, Kant introduces us to the doctrine of power of understanding along with other the two standpoints. [2] factors produces from itself concepts or THE TWO STANDPOINTS categories and it uses these categories to According to Kant, all the ideas bring the ideas of sense under rules. which are provided to our senses come to us Therefore, although the faculty of without our own volition. We assume that understanding is genuinely spontaneous, it these ideas come to us from objects. By is still bound up with sense. Without the use means of these ideas, we can know objects of sensibility, it does not do anything at all. only as they affect us. However, we do not On the other hand, reason is a power of know what these objects are in themselves. ideas. That means, it produces This leads to the division between things as unconditioned concepts that goes far beyond they appear to us (appearance) and things as what sensibility can offers. Reason, unlike they are in themselves (things in

International Journal of Research & Review (www.gkpublication.in) 68 Vol.4; Issue: 3; March 2017 Abraham Tsehay Jemberie. A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals understanding, can show a pure spontaneity freedom to the intelligible world, which is which is totally independent of sense. [2] directly opposed to the previous argument. In virtue of this spontaneity, Kant As we have seen so far, in the argues that man must conceive himself, Groundwork, Kant does not clearly show quaintelligence, as members of the whether he infers from the concept of intelligible world and regards himself as freedom to the intelligible world or from subject to laws that are grounded merely in being member of the intelligible world to reason. On the other hand, as long as man is the concept of freedom, or whether he is sensuous and known to himself through establishing a reciprocal connection inner sense, he must regard himself as between being members of the intelligible belong to the world of sense and regard world and the concept of freedom. For sure, himself as subject to laws that have their if Kant uses the last option, he does not grounds in nature alone. According to Kant, reject the vicious circle. these are the two equally legitimate HOW IS A CATEGORICAL standpoints from which man (a finite IMPERATIVE POSSIBLE? rational being) must regard himself. [2] To answer this question, Kant begins For Kant, the above doctrine of again by maintaining that a rational being theoretical reason is equally applicable to must regard himself as belonging to the pure practical reason. That means, since intelligible world. From this, Kant infers man, as a finite rational being, from one that a rational being considers himself as standpoint, can regard himself as belonging exercising causality and manifesting a free to the intelligible world, he can regard his will. According to Kant, man, as a finite will as free from the determination of rational being, must also regard himself sensuous causes and as obedient to laws from the standpoint of the sensible world. In grounded merely in reason. [2] This is connection to this, Kant argues that if I were tantamount to saying “As a rational being, solely a member of the intelligible world, all and thus as a being belonging to the my actions would necessarily conform to intelligible world, human being can never the principle of autonomy; if I were solely a think of the causality of his own will member of the world of sense, they would otherwise than under the idea of freedom; necessarily be exclusively subject to the law for, independence from the determining of nature. [2] At this point, as Paton properly causes of the world of sense (which reason mentions it, Kant inserts a strange argument must always ascribe to itself) is freedom”. [2] and at the same time confused in expression From this, there follows the principle of and difficult to interpret: [7] “The intelligible morality (the moral law) and the categorical world contains the ground of the sensible imperative. [2] As we understand from the world and therefore also the ground of its above argument, Kant‟s argument proceeds laws; consequently, the intelligible world is from being member of the intelligible world (and must be thought of as) directly to the idea of freedom. legislative for my will (which belongs The suspicion of the vicious circle, wholly to the intelligible world).” [2] From according to Kant, is now avoided. Because this premise which is itself problematic in “we now see that when we think of the sense that it needs a considerable ourselves as free we transfer ourselves into expansion, Kant infers that the law the intelligible world as members and governing my will as a member of the cognize autonomy of the will along with its intelligible world (from one standpoint) consequence, morality”. [2] But, when man ought to govern my will although I am also, regards himself as members of both the from another standpoint, a member of the intelligible and the sensible world, he can world of sense; [2] “I must regard the laws of recognize the moral law as a categorical the intelligible world as imperative for me imperative. [2] Kant, here, argues from and the laws conforming to this principle as

International Journal of Research & Review (www.gkpublication.in) 69 Vol.4; Issue: 3; March 2017 Abraham Tsehay Jemberie. A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals duties.” [2] As we understand from his word, supreme principle of morality has implicitly Kant here introduces a metaphysical been used by any rational agents in order to argument from the superior reality of the make their choice and judgment. Thus, he intelligible world and the rational will. aimed at exposing the moral principle which Kant concludes his argument by has been implicitly used by the pre- saying that “categorical imperatives are philosophical understanding of morality. possible because the idea of freedom makes Although in the pre-philosophical me a member of an intelligible world. Now understanding of morality, any ordinary if I were a member of only that world, all good men used this principle to judge moral my actions would always accord with actions, they were unable to make this autonomy of the will.” [2] But, because I am principle clear for themselves. also a member of the world of sense, I Accordingly, in section one of the experience the moral law as an imperative Groundwork, Kant begins with ordinary or my actions ought to accord to it. This ways of thinking about morality and moves categorical “ought”, Kant tells us, presents a into exposing the principle that ordinary synthetic a priori proposition. Thus, to good man is supposed to implicitly use in connect this ought with my finite will and judging his action. Kant‟s intention is to by extension the will of any other rational derive it through the analysis of the concept being like me, a third term is needed. In of a good will. This is because any person other words, to establish the thesis that the who does the right thing for the right reason will of every finite rational being ought evinces a good will. Thus, through analysis always to act in accordance with the moral of the concept of a good will, Kant reaches a law, it is needed to combine the following version of the categorical imperative as the two separate concepts: (i) the human will principle in which a good will under human which is affected by sensuous desires and condition would act. inclinations and (ii) the principle morality. Kant holds that his analysis fully The third term that connects these two agrees with ordinary human reason. different concepts is the same will but Although the ordinary good man does not viewed as a pure will belonging to the establish this moral principle in abstraction, intelligible world. Consequently, the laws of he really uses it in evaluating particular the intelligible world (i.e., autonomy) must moral matters. Even in practical matters, be the condition of actions of human will ordinary human reason is more important which is affected by sensuous desires. [2] than philosophy. However, the deduction that Kant, in But, common moral cognition is pre- section three of the Groundwork, assumes to philosophical in its origin and it is a species be successful is problematic. To show the of innocence in its unreflective form. Thus, deduction or the justification of a it is incapable of protecting itself against categorical imperative is unsuccessful, it is evil. It will be easily seduced. Therefore, it crucial to consider at least three problems is subject not only to philosophical mentioned by Timmermann. I shall return to explication, but also to rigorous this issue later. philosophical criticism, correction, and rejection. CONCLUSION IN CRITIQUE FORM In section two of the Groundwork, In the Groundwork, the aim of Kant Kant continues to expose the supreme is to search for and establish the supreme principle of morality but now through principle of morality. Categorical different way. He explores it from a imperative is the supreme principle of philosophical stand point. Kant continues to morality in its imperative mood. However, expose the supreme principle of morality in Kant does not insist that he discovered the section two of the Groundwork, in order to categorical imperative. This is because the show that this principle has the

International Journal of Research & Review (www.gkpublication.in) 70 Vol.4; Issue: 3; March 2017 Abraham Tsehay Jemberie. A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals characteristics of absolute necessity. This The first formula of the categorical cannot be shown by claiming that it is imperative is the formula of law of nature implicitly found in common human reason. (FLN). This formulation states that an Because this may imply that this principle is action is only morally permissible if every grounded in human nature which in turn moral agent can adopt the same maxim of prevents it from possessing the action in a world in which he is a member characteristics of absolute necessity. without contradiction. In section two of Groundwork, Kant The second formulation of the begins his new argument with some analysis categorical imperative is the Formula of of rational beings. All things in nature act in Humanity (FH). Kant reaches this formula accordance with laws, but only rational by considering the motivating ground of the beings act according to the conception of a categorical imperative. Since the moral law law. The laws according to its is necessary and universal, its motivating representation finite rational beings act ground must have absolute worth. If we find bring the concept of imperatives that something with an end in itself, it would be constrain the will. the only possible ground of a categorical Kant suggests all imperatives imperative. Kant asserts that every rational command either hypothetically or being exists as an end in itself. categorically. To command hypothetically is The third formulation of the to command something under certain categorical imperative is the formula of condition. By contrast, to command autonomy. This formula is formulated on categorically is to command the basis of the idea that a rational will unconditionally. makes itself the law that it obeys. It takes For Kant, since the moral law, if it important elements from both the mentioned exists, must apply universally and two formulas. The first Formula (FLN) necessarily, it cannot be based on specifies the universality of laws, while the hypothetical imperatives. The imperative second formula (FH) is more subjective and related to the moral law must be a focuses on how you treat the person with categorical. Since the categorical imperative whom you are interacting. Thus, by applies to all rational beings regardless of combining the objective and subjective the various ends a person would have, it aspect of the two formulas, Kant leads to the could be the basis of the moral law. As we idea that every rational being is involved in know, a categorical imperative could not be making universal laws. based on a particular end. Thus, Kant holds Kant suggests that the notion of that the categorical imperative must be autonomy further leads to another closely based on the notion of a law itself. Laws by connected world, namely the realm of ends. definition, apply universally. From this, When one considers himself as an Kant derives the content of the categorical autonomous agent, he at the same time imperative that requires moral agents act thinks of himself as a law-giving member of only in a way that the maxim of their action the realm of ends. can be a universal law. And he calls it In relation to the realm of ends, Kant formula of universal law (FUL). The formulates the formula of autonomy in the categorical imperative is Kant‟s general shape of formula of realm of ends (FRE): expression of the supreme principle of act in such a way that your maxim could be morality in its imperative mood, but Kant a law in the realm of ends. [5] Since FRE can continues to provide three different be derived by combining the ideas of formulas of this general formulation. These previously mentioned formulas of the additional formulas refer to different stages categorical imperative, it could be more that in turn enable him to fully construct the adequate in expressing the spirit of the concept of the categorical imperative. supreme principles of morality.

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Kant asserts that FLN, FH and one. The positive concept of freedom is FA/FRE are not independent ethical autonomy. He leads to the positive concept theories. They are rather reformulations or of freedom through the concept of causality. variants of the single categorical imperative. Kant asserts that a causality characterized The single categorical imperative by natural necessity is governed by laws. represented by these formulas is the FUL. Thus, a causality characterized not by Thus, in saying this, Kant accomplishes the natural necessity but by freedom cannot be first of the second task that he aims to fulfill lawless because a lawless free will would be in the Groundwork, namely formulating the a logical absurdity. Thus, a free will must supreme principle of morality. act under laws. However, the way he asserts In section three of the Groundwork, this is inadequate. Because the law to which Kant attempts to accomplish the second Kant talks about is a law that connects project that he aims to fulfill in the causes and effects. Since we can apply this Groundwork, namelyto establish the only to natural necessity, it is difficult to objective validity of the supreme principle pass from this to a law of freedom. Because of morality through transcendental the law of freedom is a law of causal action deduction.In the last two sections of the considered in itself. From this problematic Groundwork, Kant claims that he is not premise, he argues that the laws of free will maintaining the truth of morality. What he could not be one imposed upon it by others. has done is that he has determined the If it is not other imposed, it must be self- condition of accepted moral beliefs through imposed. But, this is what does mean by analytic argument. If so, it is impossible to autonomy. Thus, a free will is equivalent to justify ordinary moral beliefs progressively autonomous will. Since moral law is the law from this ultimate precondition without a of autonomous will, a free will must be vicious circle. Thus, Kant has to establish conceived as acting under the moral law. these ultimate preconditions independently Kant concludes that a free will and a will through transcendental deduction. That is, it under moral law are one and the same thing. is required a transcendental deduction of the Thus, Kant holds that if we could supreme principle of morality. Its function presuppose the concept of freedom, the is to establish the possibility that moral concept of autonomy and thus morality judgements are valid. At present, Kant follows, through mere analysis, from the insists that it is an open question whether concept of freedom. morality and its condition on which it is However, if Kant‟s doctrine is based on the founded are not merely phantom of the argument that presupposes the necessary brain. connection between law and causality, it has To show that this worry is to be rejected as fallacious. As a result, Kant groundless, in section three of the fails to connect autonomous will and free Groundwork, Kant begins with a new will which is one of two connections he definition of a will. He considers will as a wants to fulfill in the Groundwork. causality of rational beings. Will is According to Kant, since morality is considered as a kind of causality, because it valid for all rational beings, justification of is the power of a rational being to produce morality depends on the connection between effects in the world experience. But, if the freedom and the will of every rational being. will were determined by laws of nature, it Although it is impossible to show this would not be free. Thus, a free will must be through experience, it is possible to show conceived as one free from any external that a rational agent as such can act on the influence. presupposition that he is free. That means, This is only negative concept of so long as we are rational beings, we freedom. But, this negative concept of necessarily act under the idea of freedom. freedom is important to know the positive The justification of this necessary

International Journal of Research & Review (www.gkpublication.in) 72 Vol.4; Issue: 3; March 2017 Abraham Tsehay Jemberie. A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals presupposition would be enough to justify members of the intelligible world, he can the moral law. regard his will as free from any sensuous Kant‟s argument seems complete. determination and as obedient to laws But, he worries that his argument presented grounded merely in reason. From this, there so far might contain a vicious circle. As a follows the principle of morality and the way out this vicious circle, Kant introduces categorical imperative. Here, Kant argues the doctrine of the two standpoints. In the from membership of the intelligible world to Critique of Pure Reason, he suggests that all the idea of freedom although he rejects it in ideas which are provided to our senses come the next argument. to us from objects. Through these ideas, we To show that the suspicion of the vicious know objects only as they affect us, but not circle is avoided, Kant argues from freedom in themselves. This leads to the division to the intelligible world, which is directly between appearance and things in opposed to the previous argument and that themselves. This in turn leads to the shows his inconsistency and hesitation in distinction between a sensible world and an the Groundwork. He says, more specifically, intelligible world. The world of sense is that “when we think of ourselves as free we given through sense. But, the intelligible transfer ourselves into the intelligible world world can be conceived but never known. as members and cognize autonomy of the Kant applies this distinction to will along with its consequence, morality”. man‟s knowledge of himself. Man can know [2] But, when man regards himself as himself only as he appears through members of both the intelligible and the introspection. But, behind this appearance, sensible world, he can recognize the moral he must assume, there is an Ego as it is in law as a categorical imperative. itself. In so far as he is known through Thus, as it has been shown above, in introspection, he must consider himself as the Groundwork, Kant does not clearly members of the sensible world. On the other show whether he infers from the concept of hand, so far as he is capable of pure freedom to the membership of the activities without the influence of sense, he intelligible world or from being member of must consider himself as members of the the intelligible world to the concept of intelligible world. freedom, or whether he is establishing a Kant claims that man really finds in reciprocal connection between being himself a faculty of reason which is pure members of the intelligible world and the activity and free from the influence of sense. concept of freedom. For sure, if Kant uses Kant here is talking about theoretical reason the last option, he does not reject the vicious and applies this to practical reason. Thus, circle. Kant also repeats this inconsistency through the faculty of reason, man must or hesitation when he attempts to answer the conceive himself as members of the question “how is a categorical imperative intelligible world and regards himself as possible?” as it is shown below. subject to laws that are grounded merely in To answer the question “how is a reason. On the other hand, so far as man is categorical imperative possible?”, he begins sensuous and known to himself through by maintaining that “a rational being must inner sense, he must regard himself as regard himself as belonging to the members of the sensible world and as intelligible world, only then a rational being subject to laws grounded merely in nature. considers himself as exercising causality These are the two equally legitimate and manifesting a free will”. [2] A finite standpoints from which man must regard rational being must also regard himself from himself. The doctrine of theoretical reason the standpoint of the sensible world. At this is equally applicable to pure practical point, Kant inserts a strange argument and at reason. Thus, since a finite rational being, the same time confused in expression and from one standpoint, can regard himself as difficult to interpret: “The intelligible world

International Journal of Research & Review (www.gkpublication.in) 73 Vol.4; Issue: 3; March 2017 Abraham Tsehay Jemberie. A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals contains the ground of the sensible world world of sense, I experience the moral law and therefore also the ground of its laws; as an imperative or my actions ought to consequently, the intelligible world is (and accord to it. This categorical “ought” must be thought of as) directly legislative presents a synthetic a priori proposition. for my will (which belongs wholly to the Thus, to connect this ought with every finite intelligible world).” [2] From this will, or to establish the thesis that the will of problematic premise, he infers that the law every finite rational being ought always to governing my will as a member of the act in accordance with the principle of intelligible world ought to govern my will morality, it is needed to combine the although I am also, from another standpoint, following two separate concepts: the a member of the world of sense. In this humanwill or finite will and the principle problematic argument, Kant seems to morality. The third term that connects these introduce a metaphysical argument from the two different concepts is the same will but superior reality of the intelligible world and viewed as a pure will belonging to the the rational will. If he really uses a intelligible world. Consequently, the laws of metaphysical doctrines to establish the the intelligible world must be the condition principle of morality, indeed he does, Kant of actions of human will which is affected commits a fundamental error since it is by sensuous desires. impossible to deduce moral obligation from In addition to problems mentioned metaphysical considerations which has before, there is another fundamental error nothing to do with morality. In fact, Kant that shows the deduction that Kant, in himself seems to be aware of his mistake. section three of the Groundwork, assumes to The reason is that, at the preface of the be successful is failed. Groundwork, Kant holds that he has a plan That means, as I mentioned before, to publish a book entitled Metaphysics of Kant, in the Groundwork, attempts to justify Morals. The Groundwork serves merely as a the bindingness of the categorical preliminary to Metaphysics of Morals. But, imperative for finite will through deduction he first publishes Critique of Practical more specifically through transcendental Reason rather than Metaphysics of Morals, deduction. He ends this project in the way and some of arguments in the Critique of presented so far. But, it is unsuccessful. To Practical Reason are different from the show this, it is important to state at least Groundwork. This implies that Kant himself three problems mentioned by Jens seems to be aware of that in the Timmermann. [8] First, Kant claims that the Groundwork he has no sufficient reason to two concepts which are supposed to be establish the categorical imperative. connected in a synthetic judgement must be As we have seen above, to answer connected by a third element that contains the question “how is a categorical both of them. But, in the above case, the imperative possible?” he argues from idea of a pure will located in the intelligible membership of the intelligible world to world may contain the laws of autonomy freedom. But, when he concludes his (the moral law), but it is not obvious that it argument in asserting the possibility of the contains the idea of itself as a finite will or a categorical imperative, he argues from human will. Secondly, Kant, in the Critique freedom to membership of the intelligible of Pure Reason, thinks that the minimum world in such a way that “categorical condition for the objective validity of imperatives are possible because the idea of synthetic judgment is time. That means, a freedom makes me a member of an synthetic judgement cannot be objectively intelligible world. Now if I were a member valid if the „third something‟ is not provided of only that world, all my actions would in intuition of time. In light of this, the always accord with autonomy of the will.” deduction or the justification of the [2] But, because I am also a member of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork is

International Journal of Research & Review (www.gkpublication.in) 74 Vol.4; Issue: 3; March 2017 Abraham Tsehay Jemberie. A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals unsuccessful, since a pure will is not Metaphysics of Morals, J. W. Ellington, provided in intuition of time. Thirdly, some Ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing interest in moral behavior is needed to Company Inc.; 1993, v- xiii. conduct the connection in practice: 4. H. E. Allison. Kant‟s Groundwork for reverence for the moral law. But, the the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge possibility of explaining this interest lies University press; 211. beyond the boundaries of practical 5. C. M. Korsgaard. “Introduction to philosophy as Kant himself admits. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of In general, arguments that Kant uses, Morals”. In Groundwork of the in the Groundwork, to justify the binding Metaphysics of Morals, M. Gregore. Ed. character of the categorical imperative for and Trans. Oxford: Oxford University finite rational beings are problematic, Press; 1998, vii-xxx. obscure and inconsistent. As we have seen 6. C. M. Korsgaard. Creating the so far, some of the arguments in the Ground Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge work contradict with each other and others University Press: Cambridge; 1996. contradict with arguments in the Critique of 7. H. J. Paton. Introduction to the Moral Law or Kant‟s Groundwork of the Pure Reason. Thus, the existence of these Metaphysic of Morals: New Translation problems implies that Kant, in the with Analysis and Notes. London: Groundwork, does not have a sufficient Hutchinson‟s University library, reason to establish the categorical London; 1948. imperative. In other words, Kant, in the 8. J.Timmermann. Kant‟s Groundwork of Groundwork, does not put the categorical the Metaphysics of Morals: A imperative or morality on a solid ground. Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2007. REFERENCES 9. A.W. Wood. Kant‟s Ethical Thought. 1. H. J. Paton. The Categorical Imperative: Cambridge: Cambridge University A Study in Kant‟s Moral Philosophy. Press; 1999. Pennsylvania University of 10. M. Willaschek. “Practical Reason”, In Pennsylvania Press; 1947. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 2. I.Kant. Groundwork of the Metaphysics Morals, C.Horn, Ed.Berlin: Walter de of Morals. Trans., Gregor. M., Gruyter; 2006, 121-139. Cambridge: Cambridge University 11. I. Kant. The Critique of Practical Press; 1998. Reason. Trans., Pluhar. W., 3. J. W. Ellington. Introduction to Indianapolis/Cambridge Hackett Grounding for the Metaphysics of Publishing Company; 2002. Morals. In Grounding for the

How to cite this article: Jemberie AT. A critical analysis of Immanuel Kant‟s groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. International Journal of Research and Review. 2017; 4(3):54-75.

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