sign in sign up
<<
Home , A Theory of Justice, John Rawls, Metaphysics

Hume and Rawls on the of Research by Yasmina Aspinall, Department of Political and Supervised by Professor Victor Muñiz-Fraticelli, Department of Political Science and

Background Method Structure of the Argument This project begin with a close reading of Rawls’ “”, “Political ’ canonical theory of justice is an ambitious ” and his major essay. Then, it will proceed to a literature review of the topic PART II attempt to reconcile two conflicting of justice : of Rawlsian metaphysics. Finally, a close reading of Hume’s “Political Essays” and “A Treatise and equality. The ensuing theory is known as “Justice of ” will be done in order to provide an alternative view on the metaphysics of 1) This section begins with the suggestion that Rawls could as Fairness”, in which a well-ordered is governed justice. look to ’s account as an example of a coherent according to a of principles that all rational actors would political theory and that does not make choose behind a veil of ignorance, given the of reasonable the same metaphysical appeals . The first , which takes precedence over the 2) Exposition of Hume’s of metaphysics, which second, is that citizens have “the same indefeasible claim to a follows from his fully adequate scheme of equal basic , which scheme is Important Terminology 3) Exposition of how Hume builds a theory of political compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all” (JF, 42). Metaphysics : “theories of which or ground other facts or propositions, and liberalism rooted in The second principle, which addresses social and economic which facts or propositions hold ‘in ’” (Fine) 4) Analysis of why Hume’s basis for liberalism is strengthened inequalities, upholds two conditions. The first ensures that Moral : investigates “human functioning in moral contexts, and 5) Possible objections or concerns Rawls might raise, namely social and economic inequalities are permitted only if the asks how these results may impact debate in ethical theory” (Doris) on the topic of social union and cooperation worst off will be better off than under an equal distribution. Political Liberalism : Theory of justice which does not impose a theory of the onto its 6) Response to those concerns Second, all public offices and positions of power must be open citizens, as does. However, unlike , it does provide a theory of the under fair conditions of equality of opportunity. This is right with respect to the structure of society. especially important if there are socio-economic inequalities.

What is distinct about Rawls’ seminal theory of justice is that “Briefly, the is that in a constitutional , the public it is “political, not metaphysical”. Rawls did not view political conception of justice should be, so far as possible, independent philosophy as applied moral philosophy, as many do. While in of controversial philosophical and religious doctrines. Thus, to principle, metaphysical or epistemological beliefs may be formulate such a conception, we apply the principle of relevant, they are not prior to his discussion. He maintains to philosophy itself: the public conception of justice is to be that, in practice, moral and political theorizing can be done political, not metaphysical” (223, JFPM, Rawls) independently from metaphysical and epistemological speculation. This is an interesting point of departure from one of his greatest influences, . It is important to note that Rawls would have likely defended Kantian metaphysics, but as a , chooses to be “Rawls’ retreat from metaphysically agnostic. In other words, Rawls his a metaphysical to a theory of justice can stand independently from metaphysics. It political theory of is this apparent neutrality that is the of this project. justice is a partial recognition of the point. 'Political' is meant to avoid metaphysics, thus Thesis letting argument about the merits of Rawls’ metaphysical agnosticism in his theory of justice is public policy proceed untenable. While some have proposed to adopt more robust without having to Kantian metaphysics in an effort to resolve this issue, I propose settle questions of instead to reject metaphysics as the grounds for political in .” liberalism and instead follow Hume in building a political theory John Rawls David Hume (Bellamy, Hollis) of liberalism based in convention.

Structure of the Argument PART I

1) Defining the terminology 2) Exposition and analysis of the relationship between Rawls’ conception of justice and Conclusion metaphysics. His conception of justice not only imports Kantian metaphysical As it has been argued by a number of scholars, Rawls’ such as ‘personhood’ and ‘’ , but also follows from -ethical assumptions on metaphysical agnosticism is an untenable position. However, the validity and objectivity of political judgments and political constructivism. His rather than committing to more metaphysics, Rawls has good conception of justice requires a clear metaphysical stance and cannot be neutral. to be metaphysically atheist. David Hume’s political 3) Exposition of some of the literature that objects to Rawls’ metaphysical agnosticism, philosophy, often overlooked in favour of his moral philosophy, which in turn recommends adopting a fuller metaphysical basis for his theory of justice presents an interesting and coherent basis for political 4) Analysis of previous objections to Rawls’ metaphysical stance, which correctly identify liberalism. The account is sufficiently adaptable to accommodate certain weaknesses, but then in turn adopt difficulties of their own concerns about social union and cooperation. It is, in short, an 5) The section concludes with a suggestion that Rawls could instead, in colloquial terms, attractive alternative. “bit the bullet” and fully reject the Kantian metaphysics underpinning his account.

Selected References Bellamy, Richard, and Martin Hollis. “Liberal Justice: Political and Metaphysical.” The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), vol. 45, no. 178, 1995, pp. 1–19. This project was graciously supported by the Arts Internship Award (ARIA) at McGill ’s Art’s Internship Office. The funding for this award was generously provided by Doris, John, Stich, Stephen, Phillips, Jonathan and Walmsley, Lachlan, "Moral Psychology: Empirical Approaches", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) the Maldoff family. I would also like to extend my gratitude to my supervisor, Victor Muñiz-Fraticelli, for all his valuable and kindness throughout this internship. Fine, Kit, 2001, “The Question of Realism”, 's Imprint, 1: 1–30 Rawls, John. “: A Restatement” [JF], E. Kelly (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Press. 2001. Rawls, John. “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical.” [JFPM] Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 14, no. 3, 1985, pp. 223–251.