SG Rev Inc Rep Final
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Russland–Analysen
www.laender-analysen.de/russland Nr. 403 | 08.06.2021 Russland–Analysen • Duma-Wahlen • Repressionen ■ KOMMENTAR Schrumpfende Freiräume für Russlands Medien 25 Die Duma-Wahlen 2021: Hochmut kommt vor dem Fall – oder doch Esther Somfalvy (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa an der Universität nicht? 2 Bremen) Boris Ginzburg und Alexander Libman (Freie Universität Berlin) Russland drosselte Twitter, um Inhalte zu zensieren 27 Informationskriege, Oppositionskoordination und die Dumawahl Natalia Krapiva (Access Now) im Jahr 2021 4 ■ Regina Smyth (Indiana University und Woodrow Wilson Center, DEKODER »Hätten wir eine andere Wahl gehabt? Nein.« 30 Washington D.C.) Konstantin Gaase und Leonid Wolkow Wird das Putin-Regime überleben? 6 ■ DOKUMENTATION Andreas Heinemann-Grüder (Universität Bonn) Repressive Gesetze, die von Wladimir Putin am 30. Dezember 2020 Vorbereitung auf die Parlamentswahlen 2021 8 unterzeichnet wurden 35 Andrei Semenov (Zentrum für vergleichende Geschichts- und Politische Strafverfahren nach den Protesten im Januar 2021 37 Politikwissenschaft, Staatliche Universität Perm) April-Chronik der Repressionen: Der Journalist Ilja Asar hat Buch geführt 40 Vor den Dumawahlen weitet Russland die elektronische Überblick: Hochverrat, Spionage und Staatsgeheimnisse 47 Stimmabgabe aus – warum und mit welchen potenziellen Folgen? 10 »Haben Sie Angst vor…?« Umfrageergebnisse Stas Gorelik (George Washington-Universität, Washington D.C. / des Lewada-Zentrums 48 Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, Bremen) Teilnehmende an den Protesten aus Solidarität mit Alexej -
Typologies of the Use of Preventive Measures of Financial Institutions for Crime Detection and Risk Assessment
ЕВРАЗИЙСКАЯ ГРУППА по противодействию легализации преступных доходов и финансированию терроризма EURASIAN GROUP on combating money laundering and financing of terrorism EAG TYPOLOGY PROJECT TYPOLOGIES OF THE USE OF PREVENTIVE MEASURES OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FOR CRIME DETECTION AND RISK ASSESSMENT TYPOLOGICAL STUDY REPORT 2021 Contents General ....................................................................................................................... 3 Preventive Measures and Suspicious Transaction Reporting in the EAG members 3 Approaches Used by FIUs for Analyzing Incoming STRs and Service Denial Reports ....................................................................................................................... 9 Feedback on STRs ................................................................................................... 16 Trends and risks in the spread of COVID-19 .......................................................... 21 Impact of COVID-19 on AML/CFT supervisory activities and implementation of preventive measures ................................................................................................ 24 Summary of recommendations following the results of the study: ......................... 26 General Application by entities engaged in transactions with funds or other assets of preventive measures as well as identification of suspicious transactions and submission of suspicious transaction reports (STRs) to the financial investigation units (FIUs) is one of the most important measures aimed -
RUSSIA INTELLIGENCE Politics & Government
N°66 - November 22 2007 Published every two weeks / International Edition CONTENTS KREMLIN P. 1-4 Politics & Government c KREMLIN The highly-orchestrated launching into orbit cThe highly-orchestrated launching into orbit of of the «national leader» the «national leader» Only a few days away from the legislative elections, the political climate in Russia grew particu- STORCHAK AFFAIR larly heavy with the announcement of the arrest of the assistant to the Finance minister Alexey Ku- c Kudrin in the line of fire of drin (read page 2). Sergey Storchak is accused of attempting to divert several dozen million dol- the Patrushev-Sechin clan lars in connection with the settlement of the Algerian debt to Russia. The clan wars in the close DUMA guard of Vladimir Putin which confront the Igor Sechin/Nikolay Patrushev duo against a compet- cUnited Russia, electoral ing «Petersburg» group based around Viktor Cherkesov, overflows the limits of the «power struc- home for Russia’s big ture» where it was contained up until now to affect the entire Russian political power complex. business WAR OF THE SERVICES The electoral campaign itself is unfolding without too much tension, involving men, parties, fac- cThe KGB old guard appeals for calm tions that support President Putin. They are no longer legislative elections but a sort of plebicite campaign, to which the Russian president lends himself without excessive good humour. The objec- PROFILE cValentina Matvienko, the tive is not even to know if the presidential party United Russia will be victorious, but if the final score “czarina” of Saint Petersburg passes the 60% threshhold. -
Draft Agenda
Strasbourg, 9 May 2018 CDCT (2018) OJ1prov STEERING COMMITTEE ON COUNTER-TERRORISM (CDCT) 1st Plenary Meeting Draft agenda Strasbourg (France), 16-18 May 2018 Council of Europe Palais, Room 9 Opening at 10:00, Wednesday Closing at 16:00, Friday The agenda and the documents of the meeting are available on the website: www.coe.int/terrorism CDCT (2018) OJ1prov 2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 1. Opening of the meeting: Wednesday, 16 May - 10:00 2. Adoption of the draft agenda CDCT(2018)OJ1-prov Draft agenda CDCT(2018)OJ1-annotated Annotated agenda CDCT(2018)OB1 Order of business 3. Communication by the Chair and by the Secretariat CDCT-BU(2018)2 List of decisions of the 1st Bureau meeting CODEXTER(2017)9 Abridged Report and List of Decisions of the 33rd CODEXTER Plenary meeting 4. Future work and activities of the CDCT Extract from CM(2017)131-add CDCT Terms of Reference for 2018 - 2019 5. Council of Europe Counter Terrorism Strategy CDCT Strategy(2018)3 Draft Council of Europe Counter Terrorism Strategy (2018-2022) (Confidential) 6. Definition of Terrorism CODEXTER-BU(2017)5-rev Discussion Paper (Confidential) CDCT-BU(2018)1 The added value of a pan-European definition of terrorism for the (Confidential) 2005 Warsaw Convention 7. Links between terrorism and transnational organised crime (TOC) CDCT (2018) OJ1prov 3 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Conclusions Conclusions of the Conference on the fight against terrorism and organised crime (Malaga, 21-22 September 2017) CDPC(2018)5 Follow-up Activities to the 2nd Malaga Conference on Terrorism- TOC 2017 8. Terrorism and the Internet CODEXTER(2016)2 Discussion paper on Terrorism and the Internet CM(2016)10-final CoE internet Governance Strategy 2016-2019 CM/Del/Dec(2017)1296/1.6 Decision by the Ministers’ Deputies CDCT(2018)3 Proposal of the Secretariat for how to involve Internet companies and associations in the work of the CDCT 9. -
Financial Flows Linked to the Production and Trafficking of Afghan Opiates
FATF REPORT Financial flows linked to the production and trafficking of Afghan opiates June 2014 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an independent inter-governmental body that develops and promotes policies to protect the global financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The FATF Recommendations are recognised as the global anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT) standard. For more information about the FATF, please visit the website: www.fatf-gafi.org © 2014 FATF/OECD. All rights reserved. No reproduction or translation of this publication may be made without prior written permission. Applications for such permission, for all or part of this publication, should be made to the FATF Secretariat, 2 rue André Pascal 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France (fax: +33 1 44 30 61 37 or e-mail: [email protected]). Photocredits coverphoto: United Nations Photo UNODC Zalmai FINANCIAL FLOWS LINKED TO THE PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING OF AFGHAN OPIATES CONTENTS ACRONYMS ......................................................................................................................................... 2 KEY FINDINGS ..................................................................................................................................... 3 Observations ......................................................................................................................................... 3 Considerations -
Reporting/Intelligence Stage
ISSNISSN 1681-4789 2315-0807 Exer in vulla faci blamconse euis nibh el utat dip ex elestisim el dip utat nibh euis blamconse faci Exer vulla in Statistical working papers .POFZMBVOEFSJOHJO&VSPQF Rilis augiati siscilit venis nim Rilis augiati siscilit venis 2013 edition 2013 edition 2013 Statistical working papers .POFZMBVOEFSJOHJO&VSPQF 20120133 edition Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union. Freephone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (*)0H The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you). More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013 ISBN 978-92-79-22843-8 ISSN 2315-0807 doi:10.2785/415 Cat. No: KS-TC-13-007-EN-N Theme: Population and social conditions Collection: Statistical working papers © European Union, 2013 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 6 Table of contents Table of Contents 1. New developments at European Union and international level .............................................. 9 1.1. Short introduction to the fight against money laundering in a European context ............. 10 1.2. Background to the first publication of European statistics on laundering ......................... 11 1.3. The purpose and outcomes of this publication: a second vital step, but with moderate results ......................................................................................................................................... 12 1.4. The difficulty of interpreting data or the issue of comparability of statistics between Member States ........................................................................................................................... 15 2. Detailed information on selected indicators ............................................................................. -
MONEYVAL 2008 23 Russian Federation
Strasbourg, 11 July 2008 MONEYVAL (2008) 23 EUROPEAN COMMITTEE ON CRIME PROBLEMS (CDPC) COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE EVALUATION OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING MEASURES AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM (MONEYVAL) DETAILED ASSESSMENT REPORT on the RUSSIAN FEDERATION ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM Adopted by the MONEYVAL Committee at its 27th Plenary Session Strasbourg, 7 - 11 July 2008 Memorandum prepared by the Secretariat Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs (DG-HL) All rights reserved. Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, save where otherwise stated. For any use for commercial purposes, no part of this publication may be translated, reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic (CD-Rom, Internet, etc) or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system without prior permission in writing from the MONEYVAL Secretariat, Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, Council of Europe (F-67075 Strasbourg or [email protected]). TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE - INFORMATION AND METHODOLOGY USED FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.......................................................................................................................5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY......................................................................................................................7 1. GENERAL ......................................................................................................................................15 -
ENGLISH Only GREECE
FSC.EMI/82/12 11 April 2012 ENGLISH only GREECE Information Exchange on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security Section I: Inter- State Elements 1. Account of measures to prevent and combat terrorism. 1.1 To which agreements and arrangements (universal, regional, sub- regional and bilateral) related to preventing and combating terrorism is your State a party? For prevention and suppression of terrorism, Greece follows the procedures determined by the E.U. strategy on the fight against terrorism, within the framework of work and decisions of the Council of JHA Ministers. Also, Greece participates and cooperates with the U.N., INTERPOL, EUROPOL, SIRENE National Bureau of E.U. Member States, SECI (South Eastern Cooperation Initiative), SEECP (South Eastern Cooperation Process), BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation) and Adriatic-Ionian Initiative. Furthermore, for the same purpose, Greece has concluded bilateral Police Cooperation Agreements with (20) countries (EGYPT, ALBANIA, ARMENIA, BOSNIA- HERZEGOVINA, BULGARIA, ISRAEL, ITALY, CHINA, CROATIA, CYPRUS, LITHUANIA, MALTA, UKRAINE, HUNGARY, PAKISTAN, POLAND, ROMANIA, RUSSIA, SLOVENIA and TURKEY). 1.2 What national legislation has been adopted in your State to Implement the above-mentioned agreements and arrangements? Implementation of the above Agreements is always done through confirmatory Acts passed by the Greek Parliament (e.g. South Eastern Cooperation lnitiative- 2865/2000 Act, BSEC-2925/2001 Act), while further arrangements and enforcing protocols are put in force after respective Presidential Decrees, as provided by the relevant confirmatory Act (e.g. Implementation of the Decision SA 1671/2006 through the P.C. 87/2007). 1.3 What are the roles and missions of military, paramilitary and security forces and the police in preventing and combating terrorism in your State? The Hellenic Armed Forces do not have counter terrorism powers or jurisdiction. -
Money Laundering EU Law in an International Context
Library Briefing Library of the European Parliament 24/10/2012 Combating money laundering EU law in an international context SUMMARY Money laundering is a global In this briefing: phenomenon, the scope of which cannot be Context reliably estimated. It takes a plethora of forms, characterised by varying degrees of sophistica- How money is laundered tion. Elements of the global AML regime Prevention is a crucial element of anti-money International AML efforts laundering (AML) actions, which are not only in the domain of the state, but have EU legal framework increasingly involved the private sector. Further reading Checks on the identity of customers, keeping relevant records and reporting suspicious Context transactions to competent authorities are the cornerstones of modern AML systems. As long as the proceeds of crime remain Having started with offences related to the outside the regular financial system, tracing proceeds of trading in illegal drugs, regulators them is very difficult for law enforcement have gradually criminalised money laundering agencies. However, as soon as use is made with respect to a now extensive catalogue of of such funds - e.g. the perpetrator pays crimes. cash into a bank account or buys a car – the Their collaborative efforts within such fora as money becomes visible to the state which the United Nations, the Council of Europe and may then intervene by seizing or the Financial Action Task Force (an informal confiscating the assets. organisation set up by the G7 countries) have For this to happen, however, money has to led to the drafting of widely acknowledged be attributed to the crime it originated from. -
Russia 2019 Human Rights Report
RUSSIA 2019 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Russian Federation has a highly centralized, authoritarian political system dominated by President Vladimir Putin. The bicameral Federal Assembly consists of a directly elected lower house (State Duma) and an appointed upper house (Federation Council), both of which lack independence from the executive. The 2016 State Duma elections and the 2018 presidential election were marked by accusations of government interference and manipulation of the electoral process, including the exclusion of meaningful opposition candidates. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Investigative Committee, the Office of the Prosecutor General, and the National Guard are responsible for law enforcement. The FSB is responsible for state security, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism as well as for fighting organized crime and corruption. The national police force, under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, is responsible for combating all crime. The National Guard assists the FSB Border Guard Service in securing borders, administers gun control, combats terrorism and organized crime, protects public order, and guards important state facilities. The National Guard also participates in armed defense of the country’s territory in coordination with Ministry of Defense forces. Except in rare cases, security forces generally reported to civilian authorities. National-level civilian authorities, however, had, at best, limited control over security forces in the Republic of Chechnya, which were accountable only to the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov. The country’s occupation and purported annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula continued to affect the human rights situation there significantly and negatively. The Russian government continued to arm, train, lead, and fight alongside Russia-led forces in eastern Ukraine. -
Art & Finance Report 2019
Art & Finance Report 2019 6th edition Se me Movió el Piso © Lina Sinisterra (2014) Collect on your Collection YOUR PARTNER IN ART FINANCING westendartbank.com RZ_WAB_Deloitte_print.indd 1 23.07.19 12:26 Power on your peace of mind D.KYC — Operational compliance delivered in managed services to the art and finance industry D.KYC (Deloitte Know Your Customer) is an integrated managed service that combines numerous KYC/AML/CTF* services, expertise, and workflow management. The service is supported by a multi-channel web-based platform and allows you to delegate the execution of predefined KYC/AML/CTF activities to Deloitte (Deloitte Solutions SàRL PSF, ISO27001 certified). www2.deloitte.com/lu/dkyc * KYC: Know Your Customer - AML/CTF: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Empower your art activities Deloitte’s services within the Art & Finance ecosystem Deloitte Art & Finance assists financial institutions, art businesses, collectors and cultural stakeholders with their art-related activities. The Deloitte Art & Finance team has a passion for art and brings expertise in consulting, tax, audit and business intelligence to the global art market. www.deloitte-artandfinance.com © 2019 Deloitte Tax & Consulting dlawmember of the Deloitte Legal network The Art of Law DLaw – a law firm for the Art and Finance Industry At DLaw, a dedicated team of lawyers supports art collectors, dealers, auctioneers, museums, private banks and art investment funds at each stage of their project. www.dlaw.lu © 2019 dlaw Art & Finance Report 2019 | Table of contents Table of contents Foreword 14 Introduction 16 Methodology and limitations 17 External contributions 18 Deloitte CIS 21 Key report findings 2019 27 Priorities 31 The big picture: Art & Finance is an emerging industry 36 The role of Art & Finance within the cultural and creative sectors 40 Section 1. -
2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Volume II Money Laundering and Financial Crimes March 2016 INCSR 2016 Volume II Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Table of Contents ...................................................................................... i Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs ......... i Money Laundering and Financial Crimes ................................................ i Common Abbreviations .......................................................................... vi Definitions ................................................................................................ ix Money Laundering and Financial Crimes ............................................... 1 Legislative Basis for the INCSR ............................................................... 1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 3 Bilateral Activities ..................................................................................... 4 Training and Technical Assistance ......................................................... 4 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ............................. 5 Department of Homeland Security .......................................................... 6 Customs and Border Protection .............................................................. 6 Homeland Security Investigations ..........................................................