The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan

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The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan: A study of transnational transnational of Astudy Afghanistan: in insurgency Taliban The In partial fulfilment of requirements the for the degree of Master the Arts of CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY EUROPEAN CENTRAL Supervisor: ProfessorFumagalli Matteo

By Mohammad Wahdat Wassel Wahdat Mohammad By Department of Political Science Central European University Budapest, Hungary Submitted to factors 2012 i

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In the Name God,of the Most Compassionate, ii

the Most Merciful

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I dedicate this thesis to myson Elias, who just has started to crawl. Omar. Nader and Iam myinterviewees grateful all to exer I whoSpecial always my thanks to me and prayed for parents made that sure Iinsightfulalso wantYama comments thankfriend onthe to my forwrite Wida his andI patientwas when busy Iwant to express tremendous gratitu have would not materialized. support his Without thesis I this before acouplequestion a reached ofconclusion. times supportivepatient me andwith also stimulatingtremendously but First ofI all, am Iand study supportof conducted this the several have with help people. Acknowledgements: c ise during busy times. d duringtimes. busy grateful

to mywho Matteoto was Fumagalli, only not supervisor, Professor researching or writing for hours. or researching for writing de my to Mina. Shehassupportive extremely wife been iii

as I , as changed my research research my changed

well and and well ate - up.

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AFGHANISTAN MAP OF iv

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REFERENCE LISTREFERENCE B Appendix A Appendix CH INSURGENCY TRANSNATIONAL TALIBAN’S THE FOUR: CHAPTER TH CHAPTER REVIEW LITERATURE TWO: CHAPTER INTRODUCTION ONE: CHAPTER ABSTRACT ListFigures of Tables of List CONTENTS TABLE OF Findings Introduction Section Five: Extraterritorial Bases: Four:Section Bisected ethnic groups Section Three: Refugees in neighboring country Section Two: Weak Neighbours One:Section Rival neighbors Research Methodology 3. Transnational Insurgency ‘Motivationof theories’ Insurgency2. 1. Insurgency 2. TheArgument of this Thesis 1. The Context and Parameters of this Research Limitations 3. Argument Research and Questions APTER FIVE:CONCLUSION APTER Why can it not be settled? Extraterritorial bases and support External opportunities in a andrival weak neighbouring state Grievance- The ever ‘Opportunity theories’ and insurgency Circumstance- Greed Extra Framework brief in Refugees and ethnic- - -

territorial Sanctuaries ...... based literature on Afghanistan

...... -

...... expanding insurgency endured has for a long period

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based literature on Afghanistan on literature based ...... REE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS AND METHODOLOGY RESEARCH REE: based literaturebased on Afghanistan

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alike groups groups alike neighbouringin the state ......

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...... TABLE OF CONTENTS ......

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...... viii vii 89 87 81 32 28 91 82 81 75 50 64 61 39 32 18 10 70 10 65 17 13 15 22 30 28 27 24 21 vi 1 v 9 9 1 5 5

CEU eTD Collection AfghanistanTable Ethnic Groups 3: in Table 2001- Pakistan Aidto U.S. 2: Table 1: Civilian Casualties 2006

- 2011 2012

...... List Tables of ...... vi

64 39 3 CEU eTD Collection Figure and Afghanistan the Map region 1: of Figure 19: Taliban logistical roads LoyaInsurgentsFigure and in Paktia Tribes 18: Figure 17: Growth in AOD attacks Figure AOG 16: Groups attacks initiated Figure Opposition Afghan 15: –Countrywide Figure group ethnic Afghanistan 14: map 2005 Pakistan, in Figure of Census 13: Afghans RefugeeFigure for UNHCR 2011 12: Statistics countries Figure produ Toprefugee three cing 11: Figure flows, refugee 1979- Afghan 10: calledFigure lands disputed collectively as Map Pashtunistan. 9: the showing FigureFATA and NWFP Map 8: showing Figurefor Pa to travel Reasons 7: Figuremap of Afghanistan Topographical 6: Figure 5: Political and military indicators, Pakistan Pakistan indicators, economic and Social 4: Figure FundFigureregional for map 3: Peace 2011 Data Index States Failed 2: Figure

- initiated attacks, 2006 kistan

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...... - List of Figures of List

1990

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...... 33 71 71 75 46 41 41 48 74 63 58 54 53 52 47 44 42 42 70

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the to Taliban insurgents being provided sanctuary Taliban if ways onlyarefound neutralize supportand to the possible becomes extraterritorial Th state. party a hijacked third is government by insurgents between and Afghan Taliban the track negotiation adyadic where process negotiation ajammed in trapped is Afghanistan that coercive the evade can Taliban the because Afghanistan in failed repeatedly have efforts reconciliation Afghanistan two million Afghan insurgents comes from Pakistan’s intelli Taliban insurgents find Taliban insurgents foreign policy thesis is that an interaction between t of case typical a is insurgency borders along bisectedgroupsneighbouring neighbouring international in state, ethnic refugees state, bear exogenous on factors which Throughanalysisand of of a protraction five insurgency qualitative Afghanistan. in onset the affected have factors extraterritorial of array awide how I investigate thesis In this , e power of U and extraterritorial sanctuaries for insurgents for sanctuaries extraterritorial and

underlying message of the thesisis that negotiation message and reconciliationunderlying with the Pakistan border.–Pakistan T rivalry .S groups bisectedalong the ethnic Pashtun refugees and Pakistan in the towards Afghanista towards /NATO forces by forces ./NATO extraterritorial ransnational insurgency. One of the main finding theOne main insurgency.ransnational of his study emphasizes thatpeace studyhis emphasizes negotiations and the the state weakness in Pakistan in weakness state Taliban – insurgency ABSTRACT sanctuary and support. The support for The support and support. sanctuary gence (ISI) organization n, India and the n, retreating viii

to to

their sanctuaries in Pakistan. I argue Pakistan. in sanctuaries their

– U.S. U.S. I that demonstrate rival neighbouring state, weak rival neighbouring state, has allowed the the allowed has on the other, ,

as well from nearly as the on the one hand,

the Taliban Taliban the the Taliban Taliban the : the host : s

and of this this of its CEU eTD Collection The Taliban are are Taliban The Pashtun by primarily Arabia majority in Afghanistan and sizeable in P in sizeable and Afghanistan in majority m the old Mujahidingroups (Johnson 2007). The group drawsits foot sold from commanders iers and religious the early 1994(Ferguson, 2010:23). The Taliban is a group ofextremist Sunni Muslimfighters that emergedfrom 2011:32- the and devastation the to response in movement resources and maintaining a consistent organizational structure including hiring and firing of personnel of firing and hiring including structure organizational consistent a maintaining and resources ofcapable strategicmaking, decision coordination, communication

2 1 escalation 2006and of in insurgency also as a result of fighting between pro- 2009; Ferguson 2009; Rashid al. et 2011; Giustozzi 2009; country (Salehyan scholars insurgencyborders what call the into domestic a turned structures al organization processespolitical Afghani in however, devastating had and war come conflict end. to The irony of the U.S. barbarismand democracy tranquillity peace, to between and 2005were 2001 December of clear a signs Taliban regime wa the Afghan 7,2001, againststarted the resistance Taliban, onOctober movement The- U.S. Taliban After 9/11 the attacks, United the Statesand its international allies decided to overthrow th ContextParameters Research1. The this and of

The current Taliban movement is a well currentmovementThe a is Taliban The word the the in adrassas , and and , The Taliban found sanctuary in neighbouring Pakistan, revived and reconstituted its reconstituted and revived Pakistan, sanctuaryneighbouring in The found Taliban 36). , 1 include former Mujahidin commanders who fought and helped defeat the Soviet army in Afghanistan. Afghanistan. in army Soviet the defeat helped and fought who commanders Mujahidin former include

and the people Afghan still suffer greatly

regime in Afghanistan was was

led military intervention Taliban

the the from mentoring ). Today, alas, the situation continues to deteriorate in many parts of the the many deteriorate of to in parts alas, continues Today, the situation 2009). that itneither eliminated Taliban the leadership its most ofits with ofPakistan, areas tribal means means s officially toppled in December 2001.The December toppledin nation- officially s ‘ stu , andback. hit the the (for ethnicity dents INTRODUCTION ONE: CHAPTER Pakistani Intelligence Services (ICG 2008:3 (ICG Services Intelligence Pakistani stan.

’

, in Arabic, existence group effective into in Dari. The came Pashto in and which harboured alwhich harboured

akistan. akistan. , - conducted organized and coherent and organization (Doronsoro, 2009:9)organized which is ethnic composition of Afghanistan of composition ethnic T T lawlessness of the Mujahidin regime of 1992 of regime Mujahidin the of lawlessness hese sanctuaries and across opportunities national he Taliban 1 , in coordination with the Northern Alliances, Northern coordinationin the with Alliances, and the Afghan people hoped that decades of the thatdecades Afghanand of hoped people financial assistancefinancial coming from hard

’s initial rise to power to rise initial ’s from the Taliban insurgency - Qaida leadershipontheir and soil. its transition fromtransition war, dictatorship and ,

deployment of financial and human Rubin 2007) Rubin , nor reconciled reconciled nor ;

‘transna RAND Online).RAND leaders Their

is considered to have ,

see building processes . tional insurgency’tional t 2 - able 1), which 1), able a are

led intervention, Since the major major the Since it with - 1995 -

line g (Doronsoro overnment overnment rs in rs

(Ferguson (Ferguson . the new the new and the

Saudi Saudi e e n

e a

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4 3 billion civilian and military are lives taken every dayandsocial andinfrastructural progress worth 2011:7) al. et (Rabasa Kabul capital the in attacks spectacular country, areas infiltrated have the in north, managed of take to major of portions control territoryand theeastern in southern of the parts insecurity still p Army successful beencoalitionforces have and operations the conductedbythe billion killed been have foreign troops Afghanistanin against fightingthe insurgency (Traynor the with growingimpatient numberown soldiers being of their Afghanistan in killed t (see 2006–201 forcesgroups, Afghan and insurgent civilianfatalities reached 12,780during the period to expectations to the Taliban still maintains a maintains still the Taliban End Year’s by Withdrawal Afghanistan large central command linked Quetta to Shura councils commission. and Exceptions aside, is there no confusion or final say (Doronsoro, 2009:10). Organizational resilience has been a major advantage Organizational has beenfinal a 2009:10). resilience say (Doronsoro, mobilization. Local commanders are delegated high level mobilization. delegated are commanders Local drug traffi to restructure, regroupreappoint and new commanderswhile praisingmartyrdom the of the old one ismovement able the country, in the forces Afghan and by NATO attacked are strongholds and in the battlefield high then and now every that fact and ZakerMullah in and Qayom 2010), (arrested MullahAkhtar Osmani (killed in 2006), Mullah Beradar (killed 2007), in Mullah Dadullah (killedin 2007), (Doronsoro, 2009:

structure Although is there command acentralized and control structure France, for instance,will pull out its 3,500 combat troops by the end of 2012(see ‘ - should should or control in is who to as fighters their commanders Taliban scale the among or rivalry , s of s s

which which of international a of international cking and enter and cking 2010; 2010; dollars is being destroyed. ruthlessly , t he movement has further strengthened with the passing of time. of passing the with strengthened further has movement he have have 10). Primeexamples the are killing arrest or of theirmilitary supreme commanders such as Schwennicke revail citizens Moreover,ablen countries 1). and the coalitio their citizens killed hundredskilled fighters, of Taliban ongoing theis insurgency and s into local into

recent In 2011). (Ferguson recent theacross country huge degree of flexibility and diversity in its in diversity and flexibility of huge degree id id - ranking Taliban commanders are arrested or are commanders Taliban killedranking spent in fighting the Taliban insurgency the Taliban fighting spent in been have

2010) - level agreements with communities with agreements level ’,

there there , CNN . 3

As of January 2012, there are 129,895 foreignAs of soldiers are January2012,there 129,895 Mullah Obaidulla 19 May 2012) (Livingston and(Livingston O’Hanlon and have sophisti and carried several out 2

, s

and since October more than 3,000 2001 of autonomy to network with criminal groups, tax .

h (arrested in 2008) (Roggio, 2010:2). where in

tion decisions are taken, taken, are decisions tion opera major all ,

while preserving their loyalty to the the to loyalty their while preserving .

4 activities

At the moment of writing

: 5,11). 2012: , serious, losses incurred are years the Taliban have have Taliban the years for ,

both both

the group. Despite the the Despite group. the Hollande Sticking to to Sticking Hollande Afghan National in in operations and operations and are are , and many many and cated and and cated Although Although growing

Contrary Contrary have the the have s ,

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9 8 7 6 http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/aug/10/afghanistan- 5 the of because lasting peace, also fuelled but the resurgencethe Taliban ofacross the country. underestimating the importance of serious political settlement not only failed to bring a c 2007).(Rubin However, exerted Government Afghan countries also the and coalition international regime. the Subsequently, of thegovernmentremnants Taliban havewanted the with dominatedAfghan talks the newto international communityAlliances)Taliban’s (thenor former thefoes Northern who fuelled conflict the ( commandersmanyand formerto Jihadi warlords fromTaliban the andnew their2001and Afghanin sympathizers the return setup of too For such some experts, as Afghanistan in Source: UNAMA Mission from Adapted UN 1:Civilian CasualtiesTable 2006 http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/20120204_afghan_civilians_deaths.pdf

Available online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2011/12/111201_k01_bonn2_brahimi_iv.shtml at online Available http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2011/12/111201_k01_bonn2_vendrell_iv.shtml at online Available Vendrell 2004. to 2002 from Afghanistan to envoy UN the was Brahimi at line on is available report The Total Year 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 every every

was the EU envoy Afghanistan to fromto 2007. 2002

effort to eliminate the climate of overwhelming success success overwhelming of climate Civilian fatalities BBC Persian 2012a BBC 12,780 3 2 2 2 1 , , , , , 929 021 777 412 118 523 the the efforts through all counterinsurgency hannelling Lakhdar Brahimi

2011 remaining pockets of Taliban 8 ; BBC 6

3 and Francesec Vendrell Francesec and following following Persian 2011

power were the mistakes initial which

civilian the the 2012 U.S. - casualties 9 ). At that neither time, the 5

intervention and the near intervention resistance in Afghanistan Afghanistan in resistance , 7 - statistics

the exclusion of thethe exclusion ; see also; .

military and In addition, . .

CEU eTD Collection example, advanced communication devicessuchmobile as s phone their media centres in Pakistan (i.e. al (i.e. Pakistan in theirmedia centres speeches (Doronsoro, 2009:11), they havemastered use the of the night letter newspaper, radio, traditional

10 Cross territory. abilityeasily to evade NATO and Afghan military op against the Taliban in Afghanistan have failed to eliminate them, the global the in impact asignificant had has comeback Their has movement, the momentum a bygone phenomenon. and considered ignored totally was movement the Taliban regime, the Taliban defeattotal of place place become superpowers and the communityAfghans and the had road tactics recent their and coordinat (Johnson, 2007:337 and Doronsoro, 2009:11), organizing pertiseex in developing improvised remarkable explosive shown have devices they (IEDs) and roadside bombs when frequent instanceswhere Taliban groups have called for instantaneous backup support from across the borders Th country. the outside cells leadership to performance battlefield report and country the inside managehave alreadynationwide imp an logistics, and mistakes, and quick are weaknesses the exploit to of their adversaries.They buildinga parallel are government, reliab and observations complex operations.mobilize coordinated have and to able equip They large been have shown shown have the country. Doronsoro (2009:5) gives thefollowing conclusion in one ofhis papers,

Throughout their operations, the Taliban have shown high level of professionalism, bra professionalism, of level high shown have Taliban the operations, their Throughout Taliban remains relevant as a political entity in Afghanistan. Massivemilitary operations - profound effects they have encountered disproportional attack from the NATO or Afghan government side. Furthermore, Furthermore, side. government Afghan or NATO the from attack disproportional encountered have they side mines against national troops and international side against mines in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Pakistan. returntheand Taliban Afghanistanin ofto Despite the fact that the Taliban is often considered a considered often is Taliban the that fact the Despite

ing http://alemarah1.org/english an issuefor the glo a the simultaneous attacks (suicide) the in great throughandmedia activism their offlineonline deal of propaganda. - border infiltration, in which in border Taliban infiltration, can effortlesslyfind sanctuaries in le evidence suggest that the Taliban havele learning evidence are from suggestefficient leadership, that Taliban the an their the In otherof the words, from thecountries NATO. issue

on on

–

such as commando suicide bombings, the concern the raising the political process, e, be,

alike (Doronsoro2009).

- ) the events strictly speaking only take take only speaking although strictly at the momentevents the S .

seem ahab) and broadcast them s , and and e d audio and video messages distributed on cell phones and public

to be on their side since their resurgence in 2006. resurgence in their their side since beto on capital and the Kabul in 4 , radios and s ressive intelligence network ressive massiveone in jailbreaks like the and Kandahar, 10

to a global audien global a to This success has show

Internet. They produce their own videos in in videos own their produce They Internet. – erations by slipping into Pakistani haveworld attentionand attracted atellite phones to coordinate operations operations coordinate to phones atellite political arena

provinces. In addition, the Taliban Taliban the addition, In provinces. - the battlefield as insurgents style attacks, and the use of and attacks, style the use ‘small guerrilla’ the insurgents’ the insurgents’ of because

number ce on their their on ce s

of the international the international of . ’ very and knowledge of of knowledge and very

Taliban fighters use use fighters Taliban offighters all around In addition to to In addition n , websites ( websites the world that inginvolv the ‘ On Taliban Taliban ere have been haveere been

and weak weak and - the - see ground ground using , for for , has has ,

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11 stronger bargaining as power opposed when to they are boundto whichIrely in this dissertation, teach on opportunities, and insurgency political ontransnational areeliminated. The scholarship reconciliation theNegotiation only is endviable to the option Taliban insurgency; 2. The Argument of this Thesis a major survival tactic. Pakistan 2011; 2005; conventional underscore analyses a that of long internal factors range and the meddling state. host of their Afghanistan and the Taliban insurgents are unviable because ofbargaining Taliban’s power negotiation trap dyadic where conventional negotiations peace between the government of country,enjoy Afghanista the neighbouring Taliban insurgents the in that sanctuaries My main argument in this dissertation extraterritorial is thatthe of because Questions Research and 3. Argument . trap negotiation clearly are concessions the unless reconcile and negotiaterobust pressurebargain, to theyno theirareinside under country. Thus, supporters, logistic funding and enabling mobilize to them insurgents

Internal factors refer to those factors that are unfolding within the boundaries of Afghan territory.within Afghan Internal factorsunfolding Therefore, of factors boundaries refer the those to that are

Saideman McAdam 2006; and later and with will

an opportunity evade to the coercive power of their state of origin while 2001;

re in neighbouring P neighbouring in sanctuaries Taliban the if possible become only - to resume their resume to anti- Afghanistan enter

These cros These ty’s mismanagement of aid or military operations inside Afghanistan is also also is Afghanistan inside operations military or aid of mismanagement ty’s Scherrer 2009; Salehyan 2002 ; 2008,

Sikkink 2005). Sanctuaries in neighbouring countries provide 2005). neighbouring Sanctuariesin Sikkink

- the focus of this thesis. this focus of the are activities border surgency drastically departs from from departs studyThis drastically Afghan ofsurgency in

us that rebels that us with extraterritorial bases possess 5 t o their advantage.I a jammed this call al support government operations, ha

Tilly 1978; their own country ( 11

both from and outside both

in thein prolongation of

and and Tarrow 1994, 2005, Tarrow 1994,2005, n is in a jammed negotiation and

Lischer Lischer akistan akistan s

been been CEU eTD Collection

12 and beliefs about the nature of insurgency reconciliation and the with Taliban, 2009; et (Masadykov casualties civilian Afghan of conflict the unemployment, . Three jammed negotiation trap that Afghanistan is in. , resurgence Taliban the helped objectives interviews prime had two C group southern in current Taliban of members negotiation and reconciliation fronts with the Taliban insurgents? protraction the of and resurgence the explain factors extraterritorial rs thesis: the of What chapte developments I and endurance of the Taliban insurgency a regional To from address perspective. these 2005; UN 2006; a ofaid, internati accountability lack of mistakes of the international aid community as inefficient such and ineffective international 2007 Jonson information on my interviews. on information international organizations foreign or embassies. See Chapter Three (methodology) andAppendix for B more special representatives in office Kabu at EU the frommyAfghanistan job in had thatnetwork I contacts already the of importantly,used established I cross Afghanistan (Pounds 2006; B 2006; cross (Pounds Afghanistan

hapter hapter The intervieweesThe were on based their selected expertise and involvement inAfghan current politics. Most

Keling I I n my interviews n my n allI conducted 9 the duringI the both that raised questions The ). Three

– ; such as flawed U.S. flawed as such Giustozzi and Orsini2009 ; et al. al. et

the the Asia Foundation 2007). Instead, I take a step back and look at the resurgence at the and look step back a IInstead,take 2007). Foundation Asia two overarching research questions to guide to research questions the twooverarching following propose economy and the Taliban insurgency; and ); ); 2010

the interviewees the

interviews in

institutional and political problems in l from to 2007 2008. The interviewees are current former or staff of and /NATO /NATO audienville and Davinaudienville 2008; to to have opportunities howout extraterritorial find to : lack of capacity of s of capacity of lack onal agencies and disproportionate aid distribution aid and distribution disproportionate onal agencies 12 explore theexplore effects onthe of these opportunities Rubin 2007; Rubin counterinsurgency

Kabul and 4interviews another outsourced with had the opportunity to express their own feelings theirexpress own opportunity to had the al. al. 6 ; 2010 regions of Afghanistan (see methodology in (seemethodology Afghanistan in of regions Why has there been deadlock a on the Chapter Chapter in set out Interview are questions

Doronsoro 2009; Lafraie 2009 Lafraie

strategies tate (Rashid 2007; institutions

literature review and my my and review literature OECD 2006; OECD ;

the the or 2010); Giustozzi ,

Afghanistan such as such Afghanistan Dressler 2009; Dressler e specially in the case case the in specially

World BankWorld and they

Ruttig the the

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dissertation. Williamson (1995:18)dissertation. Williamson defines reconciliation (Merriam I theuse term sanctuary a provides sanctuaryinsurgents offor as a the the neighbouring statereferred is to the state(s) that theychallenge’ groupsopposition by classed not , are instance t two between Clashes insurgency. of element acrucial is conflict the in country) the note to important thatthe involvementof the state (and foreign its supporters stationed inside ofdefinition insur deaths conventional criterion for defining a situationa as civil war is the demonstration that 1,000 organized nongovernmental violent, gro thatclaimups political ends for their violence. The ha throughout dissertation. Here, this are and insurgency war,I Civil rebellion present. argumentsunderstanding analysis and of the research. methodology of this the in answers their framed nd the state whose another insurgentsin are located country called is the s

state state ‘are defined as armed armed Salehyan as (2009). transnational him According to defined insurgents ‘are lost control (orlost is here here directly as a result of the battle in a year 2001:17). battleaMy in result of(Kaufman as the a directly occurred have , bargaining terms The When IWhen Definition of key terminolog state that that state The state. another to cells leadership their relocating by attacking are they - Webster 2012). 2012). Webster treated broadly similarconcepts;as they are use use

whose operationswhose are the to geographic confined not territory of the nation- gency is congruen is gency transnational insurgents the term transnational losing control) over a significant part of its territory to oneor more

insurgency in this paper. this in insurgency an as safety where one is immune from arrest arrest from immune is one where safety or refuge of place a mean I

(Salehyan

negotiation way Chapter they Three wished.

‘insurgency’ y

and concepts used in this thesis is necessary for a clear a clear for necessary is thesis this in used concepts and t

the Such groups evade the 2009:15). with and this established scholarly criterion.It is also 7 reconciliation

is is r used refe to

I provided rely mainly onthe definition

as a participatory process aimed at at aimed process aparticipatory as

therefo are used interchangeably this in

to a situation in which in a ato situation re re further further used coercive powers of of powers coercive target state interchangeably elaborates elaborates host state host ribes . When state , the the for for ,

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transnational Two transnationalism onthe protraction of conflict by drawn the hypotheses testing C in of effects the and insurgency the of aspect transnational the I discuss that chapter Taliban onthe theoretical insurgency based framew limitations of the research. Chapter of Afghanistan.insurgency the in context Three Chapter transnational and insurgency subsequently up draw this review, literature Chapter subject conflict. the end to compromises accept and adeal strike parties those those whogreat have and influence on parties warring the which in process apolitical mean amicable relations after conflict.’ a Long (cited in Semple the wrongs, andstepsof restoring reach the relationship.’ next the toward broken collective, acknowledge to the past, mourn the validate losses, the pain experienced, confess opening up It recommendationsforon foralso long.provides future so studies. . Finally, the concluding chapter will , and presents the presents , and This studyfiveThis chapters. Chapter dividedinto is Two

‘ the the of aspect the social space that permits and encourages andaspace and societies individuals the as social thatpermits

is dedicatedthe to reviewis theories of of Based insurgency. ona

chapter aims to examine the existing debates on the theories of of theories the on debates existing the examine to aims chapter

:6) define reconciliation as 2010:6) reconciliation define research question and the methodology the t research and question Taliban movement Taliban

When I refer to bargainingI to refer When Four

continuation continuation and resurgence the analyses provide , 8 but also why the Taliban insurgency has has insurgency Taliban also why the but ork C in sketched the readers with readers the a One ‘returning to peace, harmony, or or harmony, peace, to ‘returning conceptual framework to study study to conceptual framework

discusses the methodology and ,

introduce negotiation hat I will useIwill to approachhat it.

a grasp not onlya not grasp of the hapter hapter s

the audience the the to

or or Two reconciliation . It. is in this

Bre cke and and cke sizable of of hapter hapter gone gone the the , I , CEU eTD Collection

causing andlives causing security groupsopposition find it relatively easythe government destabilize to threaten and national whe ruling conte used a in often Insurgency most regime altogether is 2011:2). (Rabasa al. et insurgency can striking be afor deal a power government, be i parties engageinsurgency in Political and movements 1. Insurgency strategy, insurgency transnational territory; 2005:21 of the state (Staniland they are hiding in unrealistic, and they themselves Insurgencies can entirety. its in of the insurgents accommodate the demands to ready neither is state the where situations in prevalent mostly are insurgencies Protracted It is in this last sectionI that draw my hypothesesfor the Four case study in Chapter of discussion holistic theories to explain the conflict.In this sectionIargue that motivation theories failgive to a insurgency general brief in oninsurgency discussion a with starts chapter The insurgency. transnational on literature the I review In chapter this re

the conventional mechanism of communications and mechanism fail negotiations conventional of communications the

, while evad explanation explanation , as well as well as ,

transnational insurgency theorie

t for political, economic reforms.In fort or social political, some

, until damage infrastructural rough terrain or terrain rough ing regarding regarding

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW the existingthe literature on the Afghanistan case which

may may Insurgencies state. the of powers coercive the the the or years or high are too demands the insurgents’ when for last are unreachable by the state military forces military state by the unreachable are , which makes protracted rebellion feasible. rebellion protracted makes which , causation andcausation endurance ofLastly,I the conflict. a present

outside the sovereign outside cells, or located are underground

Salehyan 2009:19). Quite often it is the latterSalehyan is it Quite often 2009:19). , , and , nor able to dismantle the insurgent organization organization able the dismantle insurgent to nor s 9 ,

which which - the warring parties reach a negotiated deal. anegotiated reach parties warring the sharing government topplingsharing of or the the

I then review ‘motivation theories’ of I theories’review ‘motivation of then itself on‘opportunity is built theories’. bargaining bargaining of away as instances, the purposeinstances, of

continue

, uses motivation either because because either s

and armed armed and .

with , cost ing the the xt xt

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13 grievances cause They insurgency. argue thatwhen a group find ofs people (cited in Collier and Hoeffler Ted Grievance theoriesmotivation of insurgency ‘greed’ are ‘grievance’, and ‘circumstantialism’. engage get state insurgency in parties from to concessions which theories several are There Insurgency of 2. ‘Motivation theories’ theories majo and the (and insurgencies theories’ explain attemptto schoolsof andthought are ‘opportunitytheories’ twomajor that unrestrictedauthority cont to and power fail legitimate andwith puzzling why states on.Furthermore,NorthernIreland is and it so globenumerous around the despite the highand risk ofdeath, defeat rebellion at th should the (i.e. violence monopoly of own the for they which This is because statesare responsible for maintaining order(at least) their within jurisdiction continued struggle, bearmed it or otherwise, manifests the sta by (Hardin 2001). Olson 1995; Thesegroups are insurgentand defeated dismantled sometimes authority struggle to promote their demands.

The question is why insurgency and violence is em is violence and insurgency why is question The Rober te power. Insurgent activities Insurgent relative relative - t onAfghanistan based literature

Gurr (2007:23), Collier Collier (1970), and Hoeffler (2006:11) and Hirshleifer order be threatenedgroup byany the in society.It therefore is that puzzling In cases, other these groups contentious to other social organizations in a in society, othergroupsto social organizations insurgent including r literature on the Afghanistan case with case Afghanistan the on literature can can

politics in general). BelowI first brieflyreview motivation Rwanda, Iraq,Rwanda, Afghanistan, Myanmar,Turkey, Kashmir, 2006:11) occur despite the that states fact have power superior and become groups become why as to explain attempt to

address address 10 ain and defeat insurgent groups. ‘Motivation braced, as opposed to conventionalmeans of political last so longlast thatthe the the still use use best occurs of of - weakness of the state authorities. authorities. state the of weakness discussedgroup theory onhow in this domain. this in coercive force) coercive , and . 13

examples are are examples that indeed T ir he t he

mere existence and and mere existence hree ov hree ,

to be deployed deployed be to

violent and violent itself erarching erarching least least , CEU eTD Collection we (

determining factors in the emergen the in factors determining Union’ss invasion Soviet and the framed by Taliban the way in a the evokes that insurgents. Theseandtakeand the Taliban rankmistakesare file join military uparmsof the and perceivedIntimidation regions atrocities of Afghanistan. are thought , the population Afghan manner abroad 14 Afghanistan’s history…’ Itnever in has happened Europe. pieceof andof a immorality stronghold turned a to young makinggirls openly and boys are sex of Kabul. onstreets Our Kabul now beloved is societ Afghan began insurgency i ( Younus such and asand war Reuter holy insurgency. Afghans Afghanistan religious and or whe advantaged a in society, Hoeffler feels subordinated theory Livingstone and O The Economist

According to American military figures, civilian deaths in air strikes grew from 116 in 2006 to 321 in 2007 321 to in 2006 from 116 grew strikes air in deaths civilian figures, military American to According re approximately 530(UNAMA 2012:24). spread huge number of civilian casualties civilian of with number the huge ) argues that challenges to religion can inspire collective action collective inspire can religion to challenges that argues ) (1997 andFox 2005 , Other scholars ( scholars Other ( Guantanamo Bay Guantanamo

large A large 2004:563). and the the of , and the resurgence n Ghazni province of Afghanistan started to take shape when local Mullahs local when shape take to started Afghanistan of province Ghazni n

, August 28, 2008). From 2007to 2010, civi ing tortur political aspiration y . They quote a local Mullah alocal quote They .

propaganda against thepropaganda ‘infidel’ ’ e and, Hanlon

at at U.S. e.g. e.g. south and eastern eastern and south the of population Pashtun among the specifically s

ubsequently ), the In(2009:103). the fact,

2012:15; O’ 2012:15; have - Wood 2006) argue andWood moral grievances thatemotional can be number of scholars (Masadykov et al. 2010; et (Masadykov scholars of number controlled prisons either in Afghanistancontrolled in Bagram either prisons (i.e. or Prison)

s re (Doronsoro 2009). , also

the l the ce of insurgent and consolidation action. collective there is a disjunction betweena the various disjunction is there

, been factors that have contributed to the grievances of of grievances tothe contributed have that factors been eas they become predisposed insurgency to they become (Collier and Hanlon; 2009:141 Taliban. In arbitrTaliban. this, to addition t

advantaged most (or ’s 11

sermon duringFridaysermon Prayer

’sAfghan memory population foreign forces and how they ha lianfigures,from strikes, UN to deaths air according 14

Taliban’s information campaignsTaliban’s ( information resultant from U.S. in Giustozzi 2009) elaborate how the

Dressler 2009) connect grievance grievance connect 2009) Dressler discriminated /NATO in operations

- 2012:40 Munoz to drive Afghans to driveto to Afghans ary detentions of :

- ‘Do you ‘Do know groups’ social, groups’ social,

against of the Britishof the d denigrated denigrated ) group ) group I n night night like 45; s

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aspirations and interests of the Af of the interestsaspirations and DoronsoroIt 2009). believed is internationally 2008; Waldman Afghanistaninto grieved the have flowing of dollars billions news of constant aid expenditure despite of accountabilitylack of military andcivilian contracts to warlord MacCulloch(Horowitz 1985; Murshed 2004; and Gates 2005). dissatisfaction and antagonism, and ultimately tensions the may the pave way insurgency for primordial roots.HeTaliban maintai insurgency ns has ( ‘invasion’ the of failures highlighting extremelypublications) haveletters, the successfulin advocacies been and old historyold of contention. Durrani leader leadernotorious agree cannot or each other fear race, and language region insurgency occur because communities with distinctreligion, blood, primit as ive such bonds theories ). Semple 2012:60 1737, The rivalryand animosityas which to tribe should rule Afghanistan dates back as far as back Hutchinson and; Smith1996:8 the first time Ghilzai the tribe Likewise, income inequityand the way different soc U heading of the the of heading nder the of of

of by Afghanistan ‘non- conflict and insurgency. Primordialist theories believe that conflicts and conflicts and theories that believe insurgency.conflict and Primordialist

, international community in deliveringaid The current conflict, on this view, is meant to be rooted in this this in be to rooted view, meant is onthis current conflict, Shah.The Ahmad backed Afghan governmentAfghan support the insurgency and backed 2007; (Rashid

–

OECD OECD the the from come Karzai Hamid and

R eport 2006:9) is ghan is people, Fearon 1999:3). Johnson that aid is that aid is wasted reflect do not onprojects that the locate locate also can we thesis grievance Muslims’ ’ Afghan population ( population Afghan s representative, Mir Wais, was overthrown was MirWais, bythe representative, s s and a specific specific a and s Afghans . Therefore, Afghans 12

(ICG 2008; (ICG focused on major cities only (World Bank (World only cities focused onmajor Ghilzai and respectively. Duranni Ghilzai tribes group that Mullah Omar , their

ial classes are structured lead structured are classes ial

B see also Foxley also see (2007:323- on power on audienville and Davinaudienville 2008; of NGOs (Pounds 2006), and (Pounds NGOs of have oppose to the started

Aid ineffectiveness,giving military mistakes - 34) argues thatthe sharing governmentsharing the the

–

‘primordialist’ - 2007:2 the Taliban the , and the 8 s and

to to ’s

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conflict and insurgency significance of the highlightpirates. the scholars Numerous generating profits from looting Grossman (cited in Collier andHoeffler ais benefit for those engaged the in action (see also Smith benefit.Instead, they argue that collective action bygroup members materialize former warlords and particular Jihadi networksthe political in andadministrative institutions 2007). The emphasis here onthe inclusion is ( well the group not ofis abehind theaction collective thatthe mainmotive Hoeffler: 13) 2006: suggest (1996; 92), Michael example, For looting. through themselves enrich to opportunities create the believe motivatedbygreedare thatrebels wrongsabout concerned righting not whi It thefor desire is profit ‘greed’ scholars, For other some Greed insurgent (UNinto Report- movements 2006:2 recruiting in rs facilitato considered as joblessnessare still Bank Poverty and 2007:1). has had not ; (Waldman 2008:3 be spread’, ‘Afghanistan aid must world’ fundsthe ofin USAID recipient fifth largest as wouldrank the state, it provinces. Wal Disproportionalityaid some expenditureprovinces in radicalized of of has rival Afghanistan 2005:i) - based literature onAfghanistan literature based , - or or being th of is is Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2006: 3) and Weinstein (cited in Collier and and Collier in (cited Weinstein 3) and (2006: andHoeffler Anke Collier Paul an impact onthe of lives the population major outside cities (see also World mostly abused by a circle of new Afghan elites in the capital and provinces. theelitesAfghan in capital circle of new bya abused mostly ‘If Helmand province (population 800,000) was a was 800,000) (population province Helmand ‘If writes that (2008:12) dman

Rubin 2007) argue thatthe amountof aid is inadequate at

group,

in Afghanistanin (Rashid ch ch its , thus treating insurgents , leads to the formation ofleads rebelThese the to formation scholars movements. rights, socialconditions or attainment of any o for main is the motivefor ‘grievance’, than rather

Financial Times Financial

: 564) explains models explains 564) 2004: 13 3;

Giustozzi and Orsini 2009)Giustozzi of or exclusion Asia Foundation 2007). 2007; , 19 March 2007). In addition, others In others addition, 2007). , 19March

Johnson Johnson as as indistinguishable from or bandits ‘greed’ thesis in the current current the in thesis ‘greed’ 2007; and Hutchinson 1996:9).

of rebellion as a way of of way as a rebellion of

Foxeley Foxeley

in the sense that it that sense the in s 2007; ,

insurgency. insurgency. but seekbut to when there there when ther public public ther

(see also also (see Hechter Hechter

Rubin youth ;

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government the di ; 2010:12 the mainsources for the of Taliban support ( insurgency reinforcement moneyand the ministry have literally the inside level or provincial at chiefs the traffickers.police frombribe drug Corrupt money secured commanwhonow have ders former Jihadi documents that (2007:8) Rubin example, For administrative corruption at both local and top levels of the state institutions (Ruttig 2009). international funds (Lafraie2009); Doronsoro 2009); 2010: 11, Johnson 2007). 11,Johnson 2010: play to achance Taliban the given local to population governmentAfghan (Johnson 2007). resentment often This and has disappointment thattheyextent Taliban rule find the their in areas moretransparent and just, fair than that benefits marginallyor not at all from the inte companies and return in allowoperate. themto onthe part While of the ordinary population parts of the country the internationalgetsfrom whoto contracts community base’ ‘tax sproportionality of the division of orsproportionality ministerial other the division high of , local rivalries and jealousy among NGOs, private companies and tribes as and tribes companies private NGOs, among and jealousy rivalries , local Meanwhile high

Ghufran for the Taliban insurgents. for the Taliban , - where it is argued is where it have thatPashtuns been (Vendrell 2011; underrepresented ranking positionsat the MinistryInteriors of ( 2008; lack of capacity of Afghan state institutions in (effectively) disbu support t support , especially themoney the Talibanfrom in south, construction extort caused the failure of- million

M 4). Rubin (2007:8) calls the illicit drug (2007:8)aotlagh callseconomy the illicit 4). 2006:2 Rubin insurgency insurgency Taliban he of illegal networks and smugglers are considered to be one of one are consideredbe to and smugglers of illegalnetworks slow economic growth 2007) economic slow (Rubin on these grievanceson these of (Giustozzi the population Afghan

14 have rnational have aid, resentments (Doronsoro dollar counternarcotic have have police - 2010:61 Schmidt also also 2009; fuelled ) extract huge) extract amount

Rashid 2007) Rashid - ; ranking seats in the in ranking seats

and the pandemic of the pandemicand of

violence. In several several In violence. s

projects. Drug 67, grown to the grown the to Giustozzi ,

or have have or led the the led rsing rsing

s the the

of of

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something happens and provoke insurgency (Hempeland insurgency provoke it is ‘ which result interests in different 2001:19). Oncetake up these individuals insurgency becomethe starts to only choice insurgency; Lynn (2004: Hempel Circumstance - circumstance of Advocates intrudinggover forces the including engage action collective order armed in in themselvesproperty protect and to their from other rather insurgency; groups initiate not and individuals do so make make the and need own for security so provide their to andIn administration control thegovernment absence(Doronsoro of 2009:19). people, has only million 1 home more to is Province, than Kunduz which ineffective in mee judges non- number lowin or Afghanistan.international in demonstrate community only that not are Studies police training pr in institutions government 2007). GhufranRubin (2008:154- Afghani in forces security – that is districtand village level contexts and conditions s rather

- in in based literature onAfghanistan based literature their oject and judicial reform have been considered the biggest failures of the offailures the consideredbeen the biggest judicialreform have and oject ting needs local (Foxley 2007:1; , itis the circumstances that people put into specific positionssuch that

and 4) 4) ing pursu ways. Thus, suggests a situation emerges a situation the the made have stan the the based theories of insurgency posit that the absence of local absence level of thatthe of posit insurgency theories based ’

existent their which provision of basic services Kabul. outside Furthermore, the tha –

157) documents the incapacity and ineffectiveness the incapacity157) of documents and 2004: government administration, law enforcement organs and and lawadministration, organs enforcement government t rebellion itself interests there is a chronological twist accounttherechronological on this a is

make individuals materialistic (in an aggressive way) nment (Mason and Krane 1989; Goodwin 2001). (Mason Goodwin 2001). and Kranenment 1989; at at 4). A variation of c of variation 4). A district level, those

, 15 through insurgency through

insurgency more successful (MacDonald 2010; successful more insurgency

and and (see also Wolff also them(see for specific positions, theystart viewing

Rubin 2007; 2007; Rubin 2007).Johnson For instance, then the the not is

local accommodations with insurgent with accommodations local but but individuals are awaken are individuals , there are situations where groups where are situations there , they they ircum primary . The latent argument. is that arealso deeplycorrupt and s tantialist theor factor

2006:75; Kaufman2006:75; 1,000 policemen 1,000 policemen

that instigates ed ed , people feel police and in a way way a in y

: is is

their First that

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resurgence and protraction of the conflict the of protraction and resurgence domestic factors ( However,Pakistan. way the of Areas Tribal Administered Federally the of parts and Peshawar Quetta, from operates Taliban leadership thatthe acknowledge 2009) Doronsoro 2007; Rashid 2007; Rubin 2006; conflict, this thesis does draw not projects Afghan governmentablenot spend to was66% of the aid money for received development it the and incapacity (Waldman yetfeeds insurgency another thatindirectly bottleneck services is ofprovision basic government budget in disbursement and ministries Afghan Furthermore, of the the incapacity from change bring tangible and leadershipsupportto government the to risupport them.The solution and has Taliban the against war the that believe people Afghan many that emphasizes Sharia of forms movements who have filled the vacuum of power their in localities with parallel or alternative explanation of transnationalexplanation insurgenc key to also can that factors or variables which lead insurgency, to they fail incorporate to the factors domestic or internal , fear the grip of Although theories a substantial motivation offer resolving resolving (Rubin 2007:12). (Rubin ing

; 2008:16 ,

their with thewith help of international community - based local administration an (Giustozzi it.

return, feel obligedreturn, havethe to with insurgents relations or even most of whichmost I summarized above insurgency (Roberts weak Afghan state). Afghan weak Considered in the round, Considered the in Rubin s 2007;

t ofout the insurgency thatthey propose are contribute to insurgency contribute to

on sing of view point thatthefrom Afghan insurgency is this see also Lafraie 2009 and Jones 2008 on institutional 2008oninstitutional Lafraie Jones see 2009and also motivation y , and, unlikemany of studies the Afghanistan other

2010; , Take in large part by reference to the to by reference part large in explained be can 16

motivation theoriesa holistic provide donot for instance theory Jones 2008; Jones to to the lives of the people and release them them release and people the of lives the , . Some scholars (Johnson and scholars. Some Mason (Johnson should beshould given adequate resources

d Reuter (2007:17) 2011:2). Rashid – ) . They do not believe that the that the believe not They do . degree degree and and ,

the year which, in the 2006 Rubin 2007; which, therefore, may also be also be may therefore, which, of of illumination as to the largelyfocused on

ICG 2008:iii). been lost external external directly directly the the

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of insurgent costgroups) of collectivgeneral and in e action (Tilly 1978; such as t factors integration of diverse the damages those ncy alive also but insurge prolongs and the keeps only not that factor crucial a remains of face the in steadfast dilemmaand groupsovercome remain to theaction collective for order argument in this dissertation is that motivation must be coupled withity opportun take The above factors summarized motivational begroups can driving factors important to in insurgency‘Opportunity theories’ and Taliban ofstudies the conflict. insurgency theory to the Taliban case is what distinguishes this studyfrom mainstream emergence the to re Taliban has contributed rebellion of aspect the transnational of how the view of of role. Chapteraassigns Thus,in significant them insurgency the of part amarginal as Pakistan Taliban’s Tarrow 1994, both both eliminate them by evaluating the capabilities and limitations of the government forces. calculateengage it:theyalso in whether the not or opportunity that holds theory transnational insurgency theory

state military action against them. Opportunity for rebellion conflict. opportunity What understanding action theorythe is of adds the insurgent to up domestic and international circumstance portunities for collective action, survival and growth can arise from growth can survival forandThe action, collective insurgents’ opportunities arms and engage in insurgency; however, motivation alone enough. not The motivation is insurgency; in prime and however, engage arms

sanctuari and protraction of theapplica Talibanand The insurgency. protraction

bargaining, negotiation and reconciliation programs that are aimed at settlingare aimed programs andthat bargaining, reconciliation negotiation ; 2005, 2011 treat treat studies Numerous the outside country. es

; KitscheltMcAdam 2001; is, 1986;2005). That Sikkink insurgent groupscalculate the before cost of rebellion they . This thesis primarily looks at the situation he possibility of success, cost of risking lives (on behalf risking behalf cost success, of(on lives heof possibility

17 s

. In the domestic realm domestic In the . overall Four

Iattempt to fill this gap ; yet any Icould find not that study ; government is able to suppress and and suppress government to able is , the the , of motivation regardless Taliban Taliban tion of transnational of transnational tion , opportunity theory

from the point

sanctuaries in in sanctuaries Popkin 1979 help with the help

in in rebel to

- ;

CEU eTD Collection transnational’. applicable or cannot explaininsurgent groups thatuse political opportunities outsidenational borders and ‘go movements, civil society organizations and corporat

thesis I thesis focus donot on internal opport insurgency transnational is it domestic insurgency: conventional nolongeris a insurgency and minimize the groups that giveinsurgen rise transnational cy to hypothesis thatcan be from drawn opportunity theor 16 15 borders (Staniland domains 2005:21 both in are missed - Actors focus. without theirthe forefront of to conflicting countries relationship between the ofbulk theon studies international wars bring theand nature characteristic the the other hand, phenomena.On of such growth and rise contributinginternal the factorsto longevity movements and of sustainability affectsborders the Tarrow on (2011:282) elaborates ; 2005:151 insurgent movements (Sikkink of success and structure emergence, the on factors exogenous of impact the emphasize Porta cited Burca in ; 2009:5 of the state undertake to democratic reforms(Tarrow; 2011:282 maintai the uniformlyand ning territory,capabilities its throughout repressive and in services of basic the in provision capacityboth weak state includes of the notion have have Existing 3. Transnational Insurgency framed are others of his papers).

The hypotheses considered in this chapter benefithugely from schol the Muchwork of the by current the advocates of opportunitytheories and transnationalismis focused on social a internal and external opportunities thatt external opportunities and internal the encounter

the the on impact crucial studies of rebellion, insurgency, ofstudies rebellion, and conflicts focus revolutions purposes of the purposes c the for

risk

Herbst 2000). importantly,Most opportunity a theories s destabilization of the

The case of Afghanistan Afghanistan of of case being by power. targeted state The how availability the of influentialallies national across ase study in Chapter Four Chapter in study ase unities . In sectionsfollowing the . Wahlstrom and PetersonWahlstrom ion. This does not however mean that the theory is not not is theory the that mean however not does This ion. 18 look , but y

is that rebellion occurswhen thatrebellion motivated is 22). insurgenc Transnational mainly target stat target .

arly research of Salehyan (2009, andSalehyan (2009, researcharly of heycan tap to sustain their at at , the external opportunities . five specific hypotheses specific five

Kaufman 2001: e (country of origin of of of(country origin e 15 :364). For instance, 2006:364). instance, For

In sum, the general general the sum, In largely on the the on largely . unwillingness Thus, i Thus, 34; s

ies of of

n this Della

that the the lso lso 16

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endogenous endogenous such combinationof or a the ground for the the demarcate to are boundaries a 2009:27), scenarios is the inability statesof to exercisemilitary power beyond measures such of in counterinsurgency the failure argued reasonfor earlier, the prime enoughfor their stop themto confined bythe explanatory (Salehyan power 2008and2005). Staniland B 2009; inability state economic of a situation country, cleavages, inequality, political ethnic corruption, fundamental insurgency. There is still a these have contributions However,makers. policy for a focus new and among scholars debate new engendering a transnational aspect of conflicts to the 1998, Rothchild , 1999 authors Kaldor instance (for some of violence. contributions remarkable The internat focusedon have Indeed, studies few ignored understudied the in contemporary or and peace conflict literature 2009:6). (Salehyan insurgents)and spill simultaneously detrimental have without se without cross a What is unique about is What transnational thatit is insurgency calls into question the Although states have full authorityAlthough exercise statesfull to have their inside power national border (Herbstnational 2000) border vis riously endangering inter this - à claims of theories ofor insurgency antagonism thatpos - vis vis rise of insurgent activity. While transnational insurgency does arise from these from arise does insurgency transnational activity.While insurgent rise of power geography of theorigin, country of policyreformsare rarely service provision (Rabasa et provision - 2011:2 al. service Lischer 2005, is is blurred and restricted when lot to be to explained. lot only antagonism, nor robustmilitary can deter them operations just begun just make to headway legal, judicial andpolitical jurisdictions of state - Saideman 2001 state relations.

fore the in . fact This is ors, 19 ional factors in

because of international purposes the prime its its conflict resolution field have been crucial in crucial resolutionfieldin been have conflict

ir the transcends ce and persisten growth - and over effects on the host state have been been have state host the on effects over wants wants state the

Scherrer 2002 4) 4) and analy regarding regarding ecause these actors are not not are actors these ecause preparing the the preparing as forth so sing to to it ) bringing in the

their borders (Salehyan (Salehyan borders domestic political

exercise authority authority exercise this categorythis of the the own territory own territory deteriorating s . Although . Although Lake and and Lake attractive . As As .

CEU eTD Collection of Israel’s invasion of southern Rwandan’s Lebanon and invasionZaire of clear examples are (Salehyan 2009). policing the occupied territories and responding to local uprisings are too high (Staniland 2005:25). Case st insurgents, the offinding the costs weaker state, a of the territory inside insurgents transnational after going between the and targetstate states, intervening exceptions are the to norm. ev But

17 , origin countryactivities the outside of borders of their domestic environment, insurgent groups may the on attacks U.S. the example, state can have repercussions (i.e. serious inter an anotherinto considered is bordersare still highly and ter business globalization to to than the insurgent disproportionately higher firstly circumstances: such under havens neighbouring in opportunity borders an fopower national provides its outside state. target external organization state order in or evade to the coercive powers and repressive of the opportunities of sovereigntyviolations harm can Limited2006). cross forms of aggressiveanother interference (Weber by state is immune one of from military territory sovereignty, sovereign where the any or other This

Humanitarian interventions, or other kinds of intervention where there is a clear asymmetry of military power military power of asymmetry clear is a there where kinds ofintervention other or interventions, Humanitarian undefeatable and allows and them to undefeatable them make is rootedis in That is, the inability a of state

for insur may have drastically changed changed may drastically have Khmer Rouge Khmer neighbouring in ms, in political terms classic Hobbesian and Weberian concepts of state sovereignty or territorial territorial or sovereignty state of concepts Weberian and Hobbesian classic

drone attacksthe Cambodian and onTalibanPakistan, in strongholds - border counterinsurgency operations do occur from time to time to operations time border counterinsurgency dooccur from gent groups.Ingent sense a broader

by the militaryor securityforces the of onestate incursion by relevant. An state(s) in order to regroup to order in state(s)

act of aggression of act , , although the military powerthe of state may be and when comes it to the exercise , under normal circumstances, unleash to coercive diplomatic relations. T group the traditional concept of borders economic in

20 use this opportunity this and theiruse bases relocate to -

the the to costly be can and war) state continue iolation of the violation sovereignty, and of another Thailand. However, even suchThailand.even small However,- ’

s and redeploy the inaccessibility of these fighters tend fighters these of inaccessibility , the

, - 1958:212 in the context of a repressive or risky risky or arepressive of context the in enlisting on for years. By going transnational, . Two issues become obvious become issues . Two obvious 213, and Kahler213, and and Walter the support of a sympa the support r rebel groups find safe to r rebel his immunity provides en in the case the in en of a strong state of coercive powers, powers, coercive of invader. thetic scale scale : udies udies

f or or 17

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receive states research Bapat’s community. the international aidover from receiving endurancecivil of war (2009:77). insurgencies studyIn a of in fact, disputes. international or other border(i.e. irredentism) policy pressure put to tool onthe neighbouring by state undermineto that a keepi state thatthe host hasobvious some interest in orcovertlyIn is either is theirand overtly them.case, presenceit supporting operations or neighbouring a of territory sovereign Instate. if fact, insurgency a takes A rival neighbouring opportunit External s the case be to via assessed proposed, are hypotheses testable may that factors target transnational insurgents thrive dyad a to –insurgent astate from changes violent activities and conducting organization their maintaining costsof groups the insurgent reduce drastically relations and civil wars draws attention to several motivations for a neighbouring insurgent group from Indeed, state host Byman the 2005). rival

ling state’s R ecent ecent

position. A state canposition. harbour ,

territory. Interritory. the following - sub Salehyan Salehyan explores a new dimension ofdimension rivalry a explores new (2009) Bapat by research a

transnational insurgen the to longevitytransnational cies contribute of

hyan 223; 2007: (Sale tremendous amount of internationaltremendous aidorder in fight to transnational ies

state can become a become can state ring state uring andweak arival in neighbo find the the fuelling s target state state target

that rival neighbours on

the the the the transnational form and rebel groups make form and ba rebel transnational country fighting a proxy war with the help of help of the with war proxy a fighting as seen be can the external provided opportunities for the themoutside

insurgency, insurgency, insurgents of an opponentinsurgents neighbouring Salehyan 2009:10). Secondly, the natureconflict2009:10). Secondly, Salehyan of the (Midlarsky literatureoninternational 1992). The from the target target the of from transnationalhotbed insurgents target state section I section 21 ,

this

state or gain or state

have neighbouring use the insurgents as a foreign foreign oras a itmay the insurgents use –insurgent ng the insurgency alive (Regan 2000; (Regan alive insurgency the ng discuss

the the on effect significant

tudy in C in tudy

a stronger position in possible in a position stronger and the external and opportunities

–host state triangle.In sum, rival state is either ignoring hapter Four hapter . In each sub each In . indicates indicates , namely

state in order order in state transnational transnational

state to take .

ses onset and onset and that host that host - section

rivalry in the the in ,

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state in asserting territorial control and forreceivingprograms. counterinsurgency aid international statehost has a stake keeping in alive the insurgency once and for the eradicates that operation and thatasuccessful insurgency thus and terrorism, in in a factor times of domestic distress or when there is a threatgovernment ofrepression. A sizeable groups can 2004; Hoeffler and (Collier informal networks directly that state or indirectly target contribute the toin the violence beyond socio transnational makes What Refugees andethnic Chapter Four in study case the for literature above the from avoid regardless hotspot the of weakness their of areas remote control to able not are Rebellion is more 2: is Rebellion by likelyHypothesis theweak statebordered occur when to is a Hy ex s Another the the

pending fight to resources the for insurgent terrorist and groups (Salehyan; 2009:45 Rebellion is more is Rebellion by likely 1: therival statebordered occur when to is a pothesis

weak states which states weak of the existence anumber of transnational insurgency.are There of of boundaries a state single of receive receive

in all is not in whether , different, means that uncontrolled or weaklyhost that state areas controlled means become - sanctuary and support from their counterparts fromsanctuary their and support alike groups in the state in neighbo groups uring alike state. state. state

host states confirm or groups, deny theyhost theof presence insurgent . the best interest best the analysis assumes that

Staniland Staniland - political actors peculiar is that activists and supporters are m evict , drawn drawn In. the be following sum, can twohypotheses 2005; andthey that are tied together in s

of the aid the of ing 22

Sandler Sandler

from groups from insurgent the incapability and weakness of the hostweaknessthe incapability and territor - - receiving country (2009:303 , 2003; but underbut control ies

- (Rotberg 2002:127 Shelly 1995) Shelly Rice 2003). In Rice 2003). such situations

across the border across during a neighbouring , various . in orderin keep to Bisected ethnic 128). This insurgency 304). The formal or or formal

state state i s ,

CEU eTD Collection communities are antagonistic towards their country oforigin. country their towards antagonistic are communities abroad for home material

2006; sanctuaryproviding insurgents with 21 20 19 18 camps and isolated localities refugee in offew refugeespurpose opportunities productive thousands who forhave the Lischer 2005, home and country TannerSalehyan 2003; (Stedman 2010:1 support due and thelosses to violence, p ease t from away further recruitment and support especiallyfor reasonscountry thosepolitical whofled have their neighbouring social) may by be not bound border literature on international conflict demonstrates that, may move their leadership over the border. leadership their may move ethnic opportunities internally opportunities political of expansion for the 2005). become or insurgency support automatically to have not do refugees thesis. this of focus the not is this

This is what Tarrow calls ‘ calls what is Tarrow This However, this does not mean that transnational insurgents do not engage in propaganda and receive moral, moral, receive and propaganda in engage not do insurgents transnational that mean not does this However, For instance For It It is worth acknowledging that depending on the receiving state’s capabilities, motivations and intention and motivations capabilities, state’s the on receiving depending that worthis acknowledging

of conducting

, groups Sheffer Sheffer Migrant Migrant financial and resources fromhuman support continents across (Bayan et al ,

in the past wehaveseensupportthe ofthe Tamils,in Kurds, past I state (Chazan state such as such (Salehyan- 2009:89 - Loescher 1993) Loescher 2003; country opposition insurgent groups. However, it is not here not is it However, groups. insurgent opposition country iasporas in the neighbouring the in diasporas

he t he combat operationscombat

sanctuary in and sanctuary support of sources Lyons

externalization to to attractive are state, arget for insurgent groups

1991; . 21

2006;

, and 86). Carment 1995). and Domestic James actors s,

’; ’;

Adamson 2006); diasporas and refugee communities, s and the people may ideologies and of goalsa with share (Salehyan 20 (Salehyan see Tarrow, 2011:438. Where they are suppressed inside their own state, t own state, their inside are suppressed they Where the for the support uch

from them. er 18 themselves thattheysecution themselves

. 23 19

state(s) can further strengthen insurgency insurgency further strengthen can state(s) N eighbouring

09: 79; 09: 20 transnational insurgents because of the unlike states, other actors (political or

Diaspora communities mayDiaspora communities provide

,also may see Lischer this, on more (for militarized

see also Salehyan and Gleditsch Gleditsch and Salehyan also see insurgency may give a sense of sensegive a of mayinsurgency the territorythe neighbouringof -

2; rish and other diaspora communities countries, as opposedcountries, states to as

; 2005:22 Staniland

seek external political political external seek , argued that all diaspora .

s of of s source become 2001:93- have faced in their their in faced have , while pushing while pushing 95). However,

see also also see hey hey co by by - ,

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remain general in organization remain Afghanistan in losses heavy despite instance, this fall these be no may are there insurgents theinside territory another sovereign of state (Staniland 2005:22). For transnational hugely is counterinsurgency circumscribed operation of how well here, the militar bydefinition, territory as concept the ones The theywith. warare fighting of international diffe ma warpartiessituationall toconflict the are confined to the territorial areasof onestate. There conflict: civil war and international war. Unlike transnational insurgency, in a typical civil markedly differ Transnational insurgencyan rebellion d Extra international borders neighbouring y be supportor foreign meddling, but - Hypothesis 4: Ethnic groups thatareanHypothesis international near borderare more located Refugees 3b: rebellionHypothesis to are if theyare more contribute to located likely in refugees are there when occur to likely more is 3a: Rebellion Hypothesis territorial Sanctuaries considerations, above From the The a with core the problem of - equipped and trained and its equipped

state and one hypothesisand onthestate effect ofethnic bisected groups a is

the organization based a in theneighbouring blowto organization small aonly likely to rebel. states. rival or weak in neighbouring states. can be be can drawn

ies concrete frontiers but many strongholds are the parties the of twoorare more states

intact Chapter Four Chapter in ofstudy the case purposes the for

army is, the government’s ability to conduct an effective an conduct abilitygovernment’s to army the is, rebellion that spans national bordersrebellion thatspans is the onthe two related hypotheses precisely precisely the fighters and their leaders reside in the same same the in reside leaders their and fighters the

proper because Afghanistan. they in are not by , the Taliban leadershipand the

from twoother commontypes of its inability operations to conduct to the conflict the to effect of refugees in in refugees of effect , and even if some of some evenof , and if ,

. regardless regardless state. For For state. rs .

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, state the over counterin the of failure the demonstrate to able are they because state the from and more highergroups demand Rebel and programs. reconciliation bottlenecks for counterinsurgency and political settlement mechanisms such as negotiation their national 2007:222).(Salehyan Sucha borders whereabouts and organizational structures insurgent ofgroups transnational thatare outside face states Furthermore, However, once the prefshould group insurgent and the government the both normal(SalehyanUnder circumstances 2010:7). resolution is the impediment to ofoperations counterinsurgency theto failure conflict of transnational resolution,however, transnational rebellion is weak (Mason transnational insurgency involved is leads failure. to Firstly, resolutionmechanism conflict (Salehyandelegitimized 2009:47) or its international partners withdraw. the not prefer reconciliation insurgents will intelligence. of transnational information and The insurgents the to lack due military power becauseit underestimates or miscalculates the strength may rel state The negotiationprocess. the hand in give an upper previous them section) potential Conflicts canConflicts be when ended the the state insurgents, over the wins insurgents win There are two prime reasons prime two are There et al. 1999). The prospect al. et of the insurgency er a peaceful settlement of the conflict instead of fighting a better bargain in the future once the state is further weakened or or weakened further is state the once future the in bargain better a for or deal a political negotiated is reached for of power some form insurgency .

, because of lack o lack of because huge limi ,

especially when the host state is uncooperative. There is more more is There uncooperative. is state host the when especially

s a take . The additional factor that complicates the task of conflict task of the factor thatcomplicates additional . The negotiations, dialogue and multi tations in collecting intelligence about the activities,

why

transnational form transnational several (discussed the in factors

f state winningstate over t political settlements in most cases where of the

urgency (they are i 25 lack of crucial information creates creates information crucial of lack than just the territorial limitations n a relatively safe relatively a n the the in he insurgents - layered political processes processes political layered state security apparatus apparatus security state unrealistic concessions unrealistic

of of the the protracted war. war. protracted transnational

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in their host nations while retaining while the theirnations in possibility host confined 2009:24). (Salehyan First, as stated earlier, groups transnational insurgent safe feel to solve theto regional conflict. whole the betweenalsothat focusmiss and onthe solely state relationship the host state the target success of a peace deal 2009:56). (Salehyan Secondly, those conflict resolutionmechanisms ability to find sanctuary peace potential economic supportcan demanded be stick orderto in to the state target fromconcession the In (Cunningham). 2006:875 on its soil as leverag observer or facilitator) further complicates the issue.The state host might use the insurgents state. Obviously of another the party inclusion insurgentyieldgroup fail tangible to t results due of the of origin the government group the in state that concentratethe insurgent and onthe reconciliationgroups states political may in insurgent be, transnational or ignoring their host of transnational the task of insurgency. bargaining, difficult Howsoever ne the implications above for resources abundant are patience and time , population government’s side because incapability continuing of security its provide to ; (Staniland 2005:22 stat target operations the in

strike e latter case, the underestimation of the transnational insurgent group of insurgent In the transnational underestimation case,e the picture. th latter When insurgentsWhen the mobilizeoutside territory their of a better bargain in political negotiations tha deal largely will state on the depend host Salehyan not whileis time 2007:218).onthe Second, national , strikinga deal toconflict endthe becomes extremelydifficult in cases e to insert to e on its soil. Therefore, soil. on its demands the e to pressurize, destabilize and discredit the national government andnational discredit the destabilize e pressurize, to the the , and case of rival rival of case its own interests in host state weak host is the where 26 at at neighbours exclusion of a major party: the host party: the a major of o the exclusion the negotiation table as a real player (not (not player areal as table negotiation the

of conducting sporadic and conducting sporadic of n ’ s commitment to end the transnational insurgents. Because of Because of insurgents. transnational to when when

of state the host are the broader reconciliation deal deal reconciliation broader the , the host state can ask for a a for ask can state host the , original state, they

conditions of the deal. Any the the , funds and other forms of formsand of other funds insurgency is nationally nationally is insurgency gotiation and crucial in the the in crucial ‘ may be able able may be hit insurgent’s -

and for its its for - fails run ’

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Chapter Four Chapter in study case hypothesisfor drawn is the – dialogue dyadic a only approachesconventional on focuses that negotiation failure ofsanctuaries, and the drawnis section from this connected is the to e processes,settlements and a not conflict viableThe is that resolution option. hypothesis alas, for analysis for To conclude chapter, transnational this insurgencytheories the framework issuein following Framework brief in the research and the methodology its limitations explains chapter next The Chapter account across borders. drivers insurgency national intention here is to approach the insurgency from a holistic regional angle that takes into instead thegendogenous beseeevaluatin only cannot studied factors; Afghanistan in by can we ones the like insurgencies protracted that I believe dynamics. regional on focuses that account com these state. host Taking of the theengagement activeandwithout support teach us that negotiations and reconciliation for political settlements are not successful st target insurgentgroups operating from national outside territory power evade the repressive of the insurgents Conflicts will endure longer when rebels have access to extraterritorial extraterritorial to access have rebels when longer endure will 5: Conflicts Hypothesis I the test hypotheses attemptto drawn chapter this in thecas in Afghanistan , bargaining power. Lastly, transnational insurgency theories theories insurgencyLastly, transnational their power. bargaining increase thus and ate Four pts lean ad studyopts this approach that the find sanctuaryand of sources a supportin :

and see to what extent we can explain the weTaliban whatand to explain insurgency extent can see th e potentialfor insurgency occur to endure higher and becomes between that is, between

bases. bases.

the the target and the insurgents. state Thus,the following 27 ndurance of due extraterritorial the to conflict s

towards .

neighbouring a mechanism of conflict analysis analysis conflict of mechanism .

state. Instate. addition, through plexities into that lens.

when e in e in CEU eTD Collection

analysed through semi contributed the to Foundation Survey of 2011. and (ANSO), Office Safety NGO Afghan (IWPR), Research Peace and War Institute of International Corporation, (ISAF),Reports, Force RAND Assistance Security including collected, also were sources secondary Other the of literaturereview on Afghanistan. I Methodology Research thesis. The last part of chapter the explains the limitations of this research. in writing adopted author this on the thatthe research chaptermethodology This elaborates 23 22 you ‘How their organizational are included; doexplain questions ‘Who the Taliban?’, to giveIgovernment official interviews prepared that approached was Afghanistan from int - face detailed new able use to I the material gathered thesis. this in DuringI April and May 2012, conducted ten the Afghan conflict. Howeve and Ministry offoreign affairs ofAfghanistan. They both declined to comment. mid and Program) Strategy Reduction Poverty Afghan (the Strategy Development National enableme to bring up new questions based on the information and argumentsmy interviewees provided.

have have I believe this is because of the sensitivity of the research question. I appro sensitivitythe question. research the I of believeof I because is this Semi erviewees included five staff of international agencies (including one Political Officer Officer Political one (including agencies international of staff five included erviewees the the the the CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS - structured interviewsstructured were i mainly used qualitative research methods to collect myd collect to methods research qualitative used mainly First face U.S. the documents published and ofInsurgency reports Afghanistan Assessment - - handabout the datacauses of the on- t ( o- see see

the twocurrentembassy), the and scholars, face interviews interviews face Appendix to Taliban insurgency in 2006 in insurgency Taliban the of escalation major - face, telephone/face, - structured interviews structured

B detailed for r,I due achangemy to in drastic research focus been not have

ntentionally selected as the interview format to allow for flexibility and and flexibility for allow to format the interview as selected ntentionally I conductedenriched my of of the understanding complexities Skype

names, names, andemail interviews with experts in the field. My . 22 28

My 2011research June in Afghanistan to trip designations going insurgency which and factors director newspaperfamous of one in

and dates of interviews of dates and ata. Initially, I conducted a ached a staffer of the Afghanached astaffer of the

we . 23 - re gatheredre and level staffer of the the of staffer level

My interview The Asia Asia The

) . No No . CEU eTD Collection

25 24 researcher were methods research Qualitative I for main questions researcher the my following were designed interviewing The insurgents datagathering. considered be this can in to be a success modest provinces Helmand and Kandahar from members intervieweenext the previous from one members, my snowball sampling, sourceused finding UN Office Kandahar in province (seelimitations the‘How to Talibanan weinsurgency?’. end can bring ‘Isnegotiate the with Taliban?’, and going there process on?’ a negotiation/reconciliation Government Afghan thecan’t and why are the ‘Where Taliban support thatTaliban?’, ‘How dothatstate/states movement?’, Taliban country the there supporting neighbouring any ‘ Afghanistan?’, in attacks Taliban the you ‘Docauses?’, you ‘What group thean consider Taliban insurgentdo group?’, about think the are what resurgence, Taliban a been has there ‘If one?’, successful a been has Afghanistan you that think the ‘Do defeated?’, ‘AreU.S. structure?’, Taliban the

These are areasThese are in Pakistan allegedlyharbour that Taliban. Meanwhile ask to was he encouraged follow 7) 6) 5) 2) 1) 3) 4)

What will happen to Taliban if Pakistan forces them to go out of their soil? happen go will to TalibanWhat to of ifforces Pakistan out their them soil? TalibanDo most travel Pakistan? to and back forth How? theDo Taliban? Afghan support refugees fightersAre the outside How country? many? aof there Taliban lot youHaveuring country a the livedin or in p foreign neighbo Who supports the supports Taliban?Who Khybar Pakhtunkhwa power in is the in federallyWho areasBaluchistan and (FATA), administrated tribal I outsourced interviews with currentwith I of members interviews outsourced they want to express to want the they in manner of the participants get the opinions to ?

Is government there control?

mainly for study. this used Such - up questions. up How are ‘Is the Taliban survival?’, managing their . All in all he interviewed four active Taliban 29

below . In a context of war and especially especially and war of context a In .

contacts contacts

the the ). For interviewwith active Taliban

Taliban to a former staff former a to Taliban

: for for 24

ast? Which one? one? Which ast? and information about hisand information

techniques e techniques

intervention in

nable the nable the er

of of them the the . CEU eTD Collection

27 26 T m Given the critical situation in Afghanistan, Limitations my influenced have and thecauses membersother MPs relevant oforganisations. ofPTS, with insurgency Ininsurgency. capacity, this Union capturefull the meanings of their comments on this complex situation. wi contact close I established interviews Talibanreconciliation their and answers the they with framed the interviewees had the opportunity their express and to own feelings beliefs about another and beliefs opinions person’s (Kirton enables obtainpotentially by the to researcher richer andgoing deeper information into useful is research qualitative data, numerical research quantitative Unlike fighters Kandahar,in Omar, Mr.conduct Naderto direct interview insurgency d who scholars native several subject of theand in exploration objective beattention to impartial

herefore I herefore See Appendix for B more information on Nader Omar. From 2007 embers of the Taliban ( Taliban the of embers 26 Being Being My .

27 me enabledme Afghanistan in explained in detail to Mr. to Omar. detail Thein explained and questions purpose of were the interview

and this g , and this

to 2008 previous work experience as Political Affairs Assistant at the office of European European of office the at Assistant Affairs Political as experience work previous enlisted

a ictim of decades of devastating conflict may may conflict devastating of of decades national of and Afghanistan a victim , the author worked as Political Assistant for the Office of European Union in Afghanistan. in Union European of Office the for Assistant Political as worked author the

a formera colleague andformer political officer of United Nations Office s perception a ve me the opportunityve any offer analysis to my without bias. i.e. , which mainlywith deals statistical analysisand interpretation of iscussed on and elaborated I

insurgents was involved in interactions involvedin was and the regarding reconciliation

in a way which could leadwhich to way a in to formulateto the causesof important about questions th the interviewees and formulated new questions to to new formulated questions and theth interviewees ) in order to reflect) orderto in this in their research. opinions I author wasauthor unable interview reach to and active 30 for invest for - :149 2011

igating opinions, values, feelings, and and feelings, igating values, opinions, 150). For example, in my150). in example, For interviews the proximate andthe root proximate cause s

with

as a bias. However, However, bias. limited number of Taliban

they wished.

, and I also I have During the

met withmet s

of of

paid the the

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Chapter Two hypotheses presentedChapter in reflected onthe causes local opinions people’s of insurgenc interpretation this To fill gap, and analysis. the author used vari for information richer with study this provided have could indeed giving insurgents to shelter K and as Helmand such Afghanistan, or zones southern of provinces living thewar in actual andahar. Interviews with local people and most importantly localInterviews people peopleandahar. local w and with most those Another limitation comes from author’s the inability to traveland to interview people .

31 y. The next chapter tests the the tests chapter y. next The s relevantous reports which ho are are ho CEU eTD Collection

28 behaviour neighbours. of Afghanistan’s interacti yetAfghanistan and its are not neighbours. Based rivalries, onthe concept the of complex in peace and war in stakes highest the have that states the are These Russia. and India allies), Powers 2011:1). Therefore in my caseI study include the United States (and its NATO conflict andlong between allparties includes persistent issues, alignments, or dispute joiner dynamicswhich in there is an active threat of militarized nation three least at of group ‘a as defined two- go to aValeriano(2011) and simple beyond Powers rivalry theAfghanistan conceptof complex neighbours and also borrow but its dyadicfocus rival on the only not I Afghanistan, to are rivalanalyse neighbours (Comras states 71). 2010: Towhether these (2,430km),Pakistan (744km) Tajikistan(1,206km), Turkmenistan Afghanistan shares countries six with borders (see figureIran 1);(76km), China (936km), O Section in sight. programresolution conflict foreseeable no is there , where trap anegotiation into jammed Afghanistan led have sanctuaries these how and border the across sanctuaries from benefits sepa I eachexamine hypothesis Two, In chapter,the theoretical based this on and framework Chapter hypotheses in out drawn

This

H1: refer CHAPTER FOUR: FOUR: CHAPTER

on of third parties in the in regionon of parties third relationship effect and has tremendous onthe Rebellion is more likely to occur when the state is bordered by a rival state. state. arival by bordered is state the when occur to likely more is Rebellion s ne

to : neighbors Rival

a rivalry twostates. between TALIBAN’S TRANSNATIONAL INSURGENCY TRANSNATIONAL THE TALIBAN’S

rately and thereby explain how the Taliban insurgency insurgency Taliban the how explain thereby and rately

relationship - states states 32 whose relationships are bycommon whose relationships linked 28

(Diehl and Goertz(Diehl 2000) between and - term interactions’ (Valeriano and state rivalry.Complex rivalry is

and Uzbekistan (137km)Uzbekistan and

from from me

CEU eTD Collection chinese_takeout?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full) (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/15/ construction ( construction http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/limitsinseas/IBS089.pdf available paper at Department State, of ina (U.S. Ch and Afghanistan between agreement

For adetailed analysisFor afch http://wsws.org/articles/2012/jan2012/ http://www.indiandefencereview ( 31 30 29 – U.S. the consider we rivalrywhere complex perspective FromAfghanistan. the military in NATO forces and byU.S. environment provided fairly business secure a construction mining and worth both contractsin of dollars’ billions obtaining Afghanistan, in peace stability and from hugely owned) benefit and Afghanistan could be considered as rivals. evidence From startChina. We with a dyadicI can find nowritten perspective, and Afghanistan the Mapregion 1: of Figure http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011

he issue issue the In addition, The only dispute that is referred inliterature the was over marking, border was and settled in 1963through an The number of contracts that Chinese companies have won in Afghanistan is tremendous is Afghanistan in won have companies Chinese that contracts of number The http://www.andrewgrantham.co.uk/afghanistan/tag/china/ was

, not raised during the interviews I conducted. I interviews the during raised not

see

.com/geopolitics/China

Aziz ‘ Huq, - 09/21/content_13745143.htm - j10.sht ml Chinese Takeout Chinese

) . The sum total of the contracts exceeds 6 billion dollars. dollars. billion 6 exceeds the contracts of sum total The . 33 - leads . 30

reas.

- - state and (private companies Chinese Great ).

31 -

Game ; free is China In fact ’ ) to copper) mines ,

Foreign Policy - in - Afghanistan.html see also see , , 15June 2010 telecommunication telecommunication - 29 riding in the ) ,

from from why China and oil (see r ailway ailway

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32 infiltrate their so Afghanistan remains andintact, long so the U.S. does not as the waveof democratization theyFromof cooperation view,and these of.a dream friendship, neutrality triadic states wi restoration of the Central Asian Caliphate by toppling all current regimes – which supported, establishing a moderate government Afghanistan in and eradicating Taliban regime the – Indeed, 166;Islamic 2009: (Rubin Naumkinradical organizations 2004; 2003). Weitz Turkmenistan, Tajikistanand both suffer Uzbekistan from struggles protractedby (armed) over effects of fundamentalism to their territories.In fact, the with exception of reasoningon pragmatic regardingfears the spill 2011:1).are Theirbased the(Witter present the extremism and fundamentaliand in rulethe Taliban during their promotedregime sm by cooperative Afghanistan.relationships with these countries of All been have threatened by eviden are thein country friendlyand its both Afghanistan relationship with government U.S. and the - government the with U.S. would it the country than benefits more frompresence the U.S. the of militaryAfghanistan in andthe stabilization of Ineconomic etarguments al. 2007:188). (Rumer Both power areChina implausible. fact securinga military presence in Af thattheby U.S., lineofis neighbourhood.argumentation military its The in presence second militaryU.S. forces Afghanistan. in Analystsspeculate threatened is thatChina bythe U.S. Afghanistan whilenow also http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/myazdir.asp?id=2291 (see movements separatist its and Region Autonomous

Insurgency, radicalism and war in Afghanistan c Afghanistan in war and radicalism Insurgency, The three neighbouring central Asian have countries fairly stable, non- ce against considering China a rival to Afghanistan.aagainst ce rival considering to China China triad there triad —China areof specula twodomains - called authorita forIslamic instance, the Movement of Uzbekistan which at aims the led intervention Afghanistan, in reconstruction in engagement its from the lack it. of

rian regimes. ghanistan, is attempting to contain growing Chinese growing Chinese contain to attempting ghanistan, is ould ,

which has been demandingseparation from Chinafor a 34

32 have drastic sp

The continued cooperationThe of the continued Chinese , Bovingdon 2002 , i tion. The thetion. firstpresence is of ll-

over effects on the Xinjiang Uyghur Uyghur Xinjiang the on effects over

and Lo 2004:296) is precisely what what precisely is rival and and rival .

th th -

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http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ rls/rm/182317.htm http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ 34 33 with relations from trade benefiting IndeedIran vastly is rivalry. dyadic or dispute Iranhave countriesfrom nosignificant ofexpulsion overrefugeesissues Afghan the two the Apa USA 2011:93). (IBP the Taliban fall sinceof the administration Afghan the role cooperative with a played andhas it Islam 2004:4), and Suhrke (Strand jurisprudence of Afghanistan during deteriorated the Taliban regime, only the which Sunni recognized political parties, namely Wahdat,Hezbi HarakatIslami andIts others. relations with Afghanistan in great during warcivil ofpolitics influence Shia deal bysupporting the AfghanistanU.S./NATO. or the there nosignificant is dyadic rivalry or complex between any these countries of and (CSIS 2012). the Caucasus’ and Central Asia Afghanistan Russia, via commercially establishing the Northing Network Distribution – the Afghani beyond csmonitor 2014’, Afghanistanin beyond the current plan 2014withdrawal (see‘Russiaurges stay to NATO March and (Danreuther Islam the in region radical of the revival and Afghanistan in fears U.S./NATO operations engagement in its central Asian backyards,it still contributes tremendously to the economic deep and military presence the U.S.’s does welcome not states. Russia Although between the and(Kuchins Pakistan U.S. et al. 2009). Pakistan the along

This route wasThis route specificallyestablished supply after were the disrupted U.S./NATO convoys several times Available online at http://csis.org/program/northern at online Available rivalry complex complex thewith rivalry The interaction Russian Iran, however, has a complicated relationship with Afghanistan. Iran had secured a secured a Iran Afghanistan. with had relationship complicated aIran, has however, stan intervention is further strengthened through its deep engagement in engagement deep in further its is intervention strengthenedthrough stan - based logistical arrangements connecting Baltic and Caspian ports with with ports Caspian and Baltic connecting arrangements logistical based - pply route either due to insurgency or because of heightened political tension tension political heightened of because or insurgency to due either route pply su Afghanistan

2010). Russia has repeatedly emphasized that NATO should remain remain should emphasized thatNATO 2010). has Russia repeatedly , 19 April 2012). Indeed, cooperative Russia’s , 19April 2012). respect with to stance

, and Kuchins et al. 2009. 2009. al. et Kuchins and ,

35 a new supply is similar to thecentral three Asian - distribution

33 - network

route and ‘a series of series ‘a and route 34

Thus, IThus, argue that - ndn ; see also see also ; rt fromrt minor

CEU eTD Collection

35 asand a Baluchistan, buffer were constituted between zone British interests. and Russian (FATA), Pakhtunkhwa Khybar India,Afghanistan the and Federallycurrently the then Administrated Tribal named Areas the spheresfix twostates of ( influence of the an India British colonial between agreement Inborder, betweenand Pakistan. as thea line, Durand Afghanistan result of 1893, an drastically contribut interstate rivalryliterature itis wellestablished that Afghanistan interaction play. when themilitary with U.S. the comes presence into it in its interest to support a moderate Afghangovernm ent, rivalry complex a ithas with end, however, has- been non Iran the economy. Afghan upnearlyrelations make of with Afghanistan. half Economic ( ofsupplies and mines ammunitions and training, and treating Taliban insurgents ontheir soil soldiers, to U.S. kill to range payments Taliban Afghanistan. cash to allegations from The insurgents in the elementsTaliban of some supporting covertly been services have (Rais 2009:100) here evident could use its military in Afghanistan bases attack to withcomplex ease. A rivalry situation is Iran, with In real.case ofthe U.S. war military and Afghanistan, the is in the presence threat superpower masqueradingIran aspolice the force. international threatened feels bythe U.S. IranIsrael.Likewise, c the to especially region, and to threat Iran a be to considers government U.S. thatthe fact established an It is problematic. The the U.S./NATO with interaction twocountries, however, the relationship makes http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/09/afghanistan- see ‘ see

Iran Afghan officials quoted in Huffington Post The perplexing most andIn problematic of Afghanistan neighbour Pakistan. is the

pays

the

Taliban e to interstate to e rivalry(Vasquez

to existent or merelyexistent In nature. in journalistic while Iran sum, finds . There been have reports numerous thatthe Iranian intelligence

kill

(formerly known as North West Frontier Provinces (NWFP)) Frontier Provinces (NWFP)) as North West (formerly known U.S.

soldiers d the Afghan Amir, the Durand line was drawn to to drawn linewas Amir,Afghan the Durand the d 36 Bajoria trade ’ , Sunday Times - deal

and Leskiw 2001). There is a Leskiw disputed and There is 2001).

2009). The uncontrolled area between area between 2009). The uncontrolled - onsiders the U.S. to be an imperial theto U.S. onsiders iran_n_1504062.html territorial concerns and disputes disputes and concerns territorial , 5/9/2010). Evidence to that Evidence to , 5/9/2010). , 9 May 2012 May 9 .

CEU eTD Collection May 2012.

interviewees 38 37 36 –Afghanistan U.S. concerns the track second The India (Verma 137). 2011: and Kashmir the of FATAand Pakhtunkhwa, Khybar territory:parts claim the hugeits Afghanistan chunks of Pakistan’s neighbourhood,in feels Pakistan itself encircled bystates at once, two which finding the government’. in Afghan seats wassupporting further exace the Taliban all. at Afghanistan and Inthreatens Pakistan. does Pakistan not welcome fact, the friendly betweenIndia relationship India’ss friendly relationship theirPakistan; disputes over the Kashmir region have ledseveral to between conflicts them. all India the is 2010:53). Ferguson and 2011:41 Peterson Siddique 2011:1, first one is its rivalryIndia,with thus creatingIndia an territory.disputed what is does Pakistan want. This not might s it beto Durand able which in agreement the review of ademand able wouldbeto Afghanistan and secure stable,fears strong thata desperately is Pakistan fighting lose their not to grip ontheIn Taliban.’ Pakistan addition, why that’s close, is wait2014 long, have to not do they believe In thinking us. with their force Cohen 2011:9) and 2010:52; ultimatelyorder (Ferguson demands escalatebargaining to its recognition. has Pakistan and time againAfghanistan agents in provoke to crisis sponsored in territories wellbeyon Afghanistan the lineas doesDurand recognize not Budapest.

Interview with Najla, staffer of an international organization in Ka organization of an international staffer with Najla, Interview Email interview with staffer of an international organization in Kabul who wished to remain anonymous, 17 17 anonymous, remain to wished who Kabul in organization international an of staffer with interview Email Interview with Dr. Mirwais Rahimzai Chief of Party of University Research Co/CHS, 20 April 2012 20 Co/CHS, University Research Party of Chief of Rahimzai with Mirwais Dr. Interview

Afghanistan into accepting the Durand line asborder. Durand the international accepting the line into Afghanistan From perspective rivalry tracks a complex follows.The thatPakistan are there two

argued, waiting is negotiate and to time conditions forpeace ‘Pakistan a better d it( d In interview, Dr. Rahimzai argued that ‘Pakistan’s tendency in ), while Pakistan), 2011:6 Brasseur on its insistsinternational , huge and deep commitments

38 rbated with elements of pro

With IndiaWith findinga strategic andstrong partner 37 ecure some concessions, if not the if not whole ecure some concessions,

the bul, Afghanistan,bul, 13 May 2012, by email.

–Afghanistan international border and claims borderclaims international and involvement - Indianelites Afghan –Pa with kistan triad ( 36

- As one of myAs one of time rivaltime of Afghanistan Afghanistan see see

in in – CEU eTD Collection

39 Afghanistan. rivala of complex consideredaand is In Pakistan dyadic sum, the Taliban both insurgency. was playing: onthe war joining hands onterror while covertlyuring and harbo reconstituting international community and NATO were totallyfooled by the doublePakistan gameat th Two accelerate but will lose this aid the once problem terrorism of ceases, host states have little incentive to are provided with tools the to pacify their territoryonly terrorist if campaignsare ongoing, argues that‘US military Babat (2011:303) phasessuppressed initial its in 2004- in gained after the momentum collapse of their regime 2001,or in had the insurgency been dollarsbillion of aidhave wouldnot been givenPakistan to uncontrolled the and madrassas territories Pakistan modernizing schools). The (religious 16 insurgents, building military capabilities to eradicate terrorist and Taliban cells from institutions of Pakistan (see table has ofbeen 2),of which the most purpose fighting for the of dollarsaiddifferent in to governmentgiven billions ‘war has the U.S. onterror’ U.S. Pakistan triad. There is no political rivalry involved in this complex in the way there is in the 2012, staff of an international organization in Kabul, Afghanistan. in Kabul, organization staff an international of 2012,

Email Email –Afghanistan 39

of the several experts Iof the several 2009the experts interviewed for researched thatupuntil this reiterated interviewwith Rahmani fromRAND Corporation 4May 2012, and Interviewwith Najla, 13May the demise of terrorist groups’. This is exactly what we see in the case of Pakistan. Pakistan. of case the in see we what exactly is This groups’. terrorist of demise the

– Iran triad; rather, rivalry the ishere financial. Since the beginning the of

5. In5. a comprehensive terrorism studytransnational of

aid creates a moral hazard problem. If host states states If host problem. hazard a moral creates aid 38

had the Taliban insurgency not CEU eTD Collection

economic, political, social and security indicators. The approach I congruent is The with follow approach andeconomic, security social political, indicators. stat weak of measure aproxy as measure I state of weakness Failed the Fund borrow latest index 2011from for States Peace To state. weak neighbouring a of presence the and insurgency transnational of occurrence the I explor state. aweak is them of any whether assess hypothesisTo this test Iofneighbouringagain Afghanistancountries at look allthe and Section Two Section has indeed neighbours Rival supporting doplay occurred. in a role the insurgents. HypothesisU.S.. 1thereforeaboveInsurgency supported is bytheanalysis. Afghanistan in i Pakistan Afghanistan’s are neighbours Iran rival states. engaged is a in latent rivalry while U.S., with ITo conclude section, ofneighbouring this out six argued that have states, twoof So - 2001 Pakistan Aidto U.S. 2: Table urce: 2012,Congressional EpsteinandResearch Kronstadt Service Rebellion is more likely to occur when the state is bordered by a weak state. state. aweak by bordered is state the when occur to likely more is Rebellion H2: s boths a direct rival of Afghanistan and engaged rivalry complex in India with and u : WeakNeighbo rs

es. The index is compiled fromes. is The 12variables index thatinclude 2012 39 e whether there is a correlation between between acorrelation is there e whether

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and Turkmenistan, 75 39 ranked are Uzbekistan the global stronger ranking, 23points makingit than while Pakistan, Tajikistanand the weakest neighbouring country of (see Afghanistan figureIran 3). re 40 see performsoneach howindic it domain of the30failed top is statesPakistan. index Thusthe country requires a closer to look neighbouring the which in Afghanistan is I thatthecountry only above conclude ranking states. failed re cross thatmakeand extraordinarya insurgency have weakstatetransnational bordercontrols might andguarding the capabilities of these states; this is to account for cases in which, Furthermore, asindicator another of a weak neighbouringI state borderexamine protections grounds for breeding fertile that‘failedSalehyan’s claim and states, can therefore, doprovide (2009:90)

For an interactive grid of the index visit visit index the of grid interactive an For flective of previous years, ranks Pakistan number 12 out of 177 in the global ranking of globalranking the in of 177 years, 12out number Pakistan ranks previous of flective - border infiltration unviable (Schilling 1970; Bennetunviable (Schilling 1970; 2005). border infiltration The failed states index (FSI) data for 2011 (figure 2), which is also very much also is 2), which (FSI) 2011(figure The for index failed data states

40 rebel organizations’, whetherrebel these are organizations’, their own orneighbouring of a state.

Pakistan’s status is indicated as being in the ‘Alert’ category, which makes it th , are categorized as close to ‘moderate’ to the in FSI From the index. close as , categorized are th , 27 points better than Pakistan (see figure 2). China, rankedChina, better, 27points than (seefigure Pakistan 72 2).

ator. http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi

- ceives 35 ceives grid2011 .

for instance, for instance, th

position in nd , CEU eTD Collection

States Failed Peace, for Fund from Adapted Source: 3: Figure Source:Indexfrom for Adapted Fund 2011 Peace, FailedStates 2: Figure Fundregional for map Peace 2011 Data Index States Failed

41 Index 2011

CEU eTD Collection

Adapted from Fund for Peace, Country Profile Pakistan, FSIAdaptedFund Country Pakistan, fromfor 2011,p.5 Peace, Profile 5:Political and military indicators,Figure Pakistan FSIAdaptedFund CountryPakistan, fromfor 2011,p.4 Peace, Profile Pakistan indicators, economic and 4:Social Figure Afghanistan.in resulted Afgha in and otherwith variables,has motivations weakness, combinedelaborate state how this fertile ground forIn insurgency. transnational later parts chapter of this (seeI section five) at the same a and time neighbour of provides Afghanistan, a world the in states weakest of the one is which thatPakistan, demonstrable is it look inside an fromperspective and 41 5 and 4 figures (see indicators FSI that index constit the ute of 9out the 12 for has‘poor’ ThatPakistan onallother received possible is, indicators. ofexception three identified as indicators ‘weak’, 12 rank Pakistan that 12indicators at the A close look indicator from the other. from the indicator

Please note that the coloring in both figure 4 figure in both coloring that the note Please

n insurgent groups using territories on its soil to conduct to insurgent soil activities onits groups using n insurgent territories

and and 42 5

does not signify

the country has received the worst ranking the worstthe ranking country has received

on the FSI 2011 reveals that, with the the that,with 2011 reveals on the FSI ).

41 anything anything

In from both a sum, holistic more than to to than more

identify each each identify

CEU eTD Collection Association, 13May 2012, by phone.

45 44 43 42 Uzbekistan)of and borderstates. because bythese protection casein of and China, rivers with separating the countries the in case of Tajikistanand I but because extremelyimpossible, both is atargue th it geography (mountainous of difficult these is five states to I concludeillegalbordercrossing do not identified. Therefore, that vulnerabilities are as the as aresoon but intercepted mostly doexist crossing points Illegal and visas(Margesson 2007:12). documents travel valid requires always circumstances these reported countries widely 2008:27), is (UNODC a constitutes supra Although trafficking, which drug systems in place (interview with Alavi forth. toimpossible guard borders, the and presumably so for infiltrate insurgents to back and high the mountains and thealtitudeof itis nearly snowfall countries. heavy Because of hard and terrain mountainous (seefigure 6). nopass There or is road connecting the two (B insurgentgroups evade to domestic pressure find safe and havens national borders beyond non because andborderguards pr IThe second indicatorweakness that ofstatethe lack useais measure to the neighbouring of border with China. with border wherementioned authors interviewees cross or

See for instance, repo ISW by email. 2012, May 5 Kabul, in embassy U.S. at officer political senior Bakhshi, with Kanishka Interview During the course of the literature review and the interviews I conducted, there was not a singlenot instance was a interviews the there the literature conducted, I and reviewofDuring course the Sayyid Alavi, former UN political officer and current head of Jehad Danish Cultural DanishCultural Alavi,former political and Sayyid current Jehad officer head UN of with Interview ennet 2005:25). ennet 42

inaccessible the The startChina. most is We with China borderwith one, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,Iran Turkmenistan and have border and tight policing controls - existent borderexistent controls or porous borders provide an opportunity obvious for

otection from illegal infiltrations. ThereasonIrely on this variable is rt at at rt http://www.understandingwar.org/turkmenistan

- border movement, let alone insurgency, along the Afghanistan Afghanistan the along insurgency, alone let movement, border 43 ; interview 43 -

national network, from Afghanistanfrom to national network, with Bakhshiwith 45

crossing the under borders normal

- and 44 ; IWPR report; 2006). - afghanistan .

due the to

CEU eTD Collection 2012.

46 Torkham Boldak and Spin border(Altai Consulting2009,cited crossings in respectively the using Pakistan between and Afghanistan commute peopleand 225,000 estimated 400,000 has longedrecognize to the lineas Durand the struggled official not week,an border.Each ofthe those loss territories and Pakistan to the local and Pashtun Baluch tribessides, onboth territories of FATA,PakhtunkhwaThe Khybar andgovernment, Afghan Baluchistan. fearing freedom freedomThis the linkedto history ofis movement. of movement of the disputed control trucks and other vehicles which cross from either side,usually pedestrians have existe Boldak (also known as Chaman) also along but the Afghan border,are –Pakistan However, borderonly not controls, at official bordercrossing Source 6: Figure

The view was reiterated strongly during an email interview with Rahmani, doctoral fellow at RAND, 4 May May 4 fellow RAND, at doctoral with Rahmani, emailinterview an during strongly viewwas reiterated The

nt fornt : Google Maps, 2012 Topographical map of Afghanistan Topographical

people of both countries (Giovanni countries 2008) of both people

46 . Although Pakistani the authorities - points likeTorkhampoints and Spin literally non

- CEU eTD Collection

49 48 47 stage. later a at back infiltrate and pressure, military Afghanistan whenever Pakistan to theyare under it.’ I need case in just well as IIID crossing feelresource. when border. Pakistan have jihad. card And noproblem join the II feelatfeelam home an here. immigrant. don’t that give food, They human money, st all major Taliban from the border has Pakistan keeping been Rahmani elaborated that freedom movementand to from of (seeBajoria Pakistan the tribes given effect figurehasshown in in as7.This forreasons Grare various 2011:1), and Maley told Nader that, ‘I am talking to you Nadertold from amto talking Chaman that, ‘I Afghanistan. 2012).

rongholds unchecked. Pakistan to Email Interview on 4May 2012. Chaman is awell May 9 to (7 Uruzgan and Kandahar Helmand, for commission of head Akhund, Mansoor with Interview

Taliban derived insurgents real have opportunity from benefits this move to from and anyone else disguised under tribal and ethnic identities the capacity secure to the identities and ethnic tribal under disguised else anyone and

- populated town in Baluchistan province of Pakistan that borders Kandahar province of of province Kandahar borders that Pakistan of province Baluchistan in town populated

In interview, Mansoor Mullah a Akhund telephone 45 49

right now. Pakistan is ourright is second Pakistan house. now.

2009). In an interview with me, In me, an with interview 48

CEU eTD Collection

50 The governmentFATA describes followingwebsite: region of as ontheir the official and 9). These in are the regions thathavePakistan turned Taliban into hotbeds Areas (now NWFP (FATA), known as Khybar and Pakhtunkhwa) Bal authority inareas the bordering Afghanistan, namelyFederally the Administrated Tribal welcomed Here throughoutI or accommodated Pakistan. government the analyse strength of Taliban.It is a misunderstanding to assume that the Taliban insu precisely onthose chunks of territory thathave Pakistan in become safehavens for the I focus part In this state. aweak is Pakistan because viable become has rebellion transnational In the last part of this sectionI move beyond a simplistic analysis according to which Source: AltaiConsulting,2009,p.33 for Pakistan to travel 7:Reasons Figure

http://fata.gov.pk/ .

46 uchistan (see figures 8 figures (see uchistan rgency uniformly is

(ICG 2006:i) 50

CEU eTD Collection

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:NWFP_FATA at available Wikipedia Source: FATA and NWFP Map 8: showing Figure othercountry. parts of the pr development the of terms in priority same the accorded been not FATA has Pakistan, theof independence even Since today. continues it with andtraditions internal independence. inheritedsystem Pakistan this and more or less of effective Political Agents and tribal elders,while leaving their with people the Afghanistanwith Line. Durand called Theythe area controlled through a combination fromstatus the British times since 1849.However, 1893,a in demarcation was raised e andFATA, uniqu traditionally administrative a historically both had andpolitical

ocess being undertaken in .svg

CEU eTD Collection

defines the relationship between Islamabad and FATA as ‘live and let li let and ‘live as FATA and Islamabad between relationship the defines Ispahaniagents’ thinking merely (Margesson 2007:7). is Bajoria wishful in (cited law FATA ( in Incodes and traditional institutions. there sum, nogovernment, is military police, or rule of administrative, judicialand policing aremade authority. Judgements based primarily ontribal asemi FATA retained has http://www.icosmaps.net/pashtunistan/015_map/iframe_3 Source called lands disputed collectively as Map Pashtunistan. 9: the showing Figure Bajoria

2009). Islamabad’s claim that it governs FATA through ‘political FATA through ‘political governs that it Islamabad’sclaim 2009). - autonomous status status autonomous whereby the tribal leaders the constitute 48

ve’, where sides both

2009) 2009) CEU eTD Collection

51 existence. into come also have movements Taliban Pakistani not where FATA region, the of radicalization parts ofresulted most in has stateThis weakness systematic and historicadministrative and political arrangements with Pashtun the tribes. some parts of Khy insurgents(ICG- 2007:1 andempowering nationalist separatistPashtun of movementsanetwork transnational by new Baluch and the countered neutralized and also has it FATA, but and Quetta insurgents in India Taliban byharbouring and U.S. Afghanistan, with agenda rivalry pursuePakistan its leaders an based thenot is capitalaccident. is Quetta, Notonly in of Baluchistan, does autonomeconomic demanding and political rich province Baluchistan, of where the militarygovernmentfighting is Baluch militants and strategically unabatedresource as ‘violence continues important follows: Pakistan’s in yearshaveICG forautonomy.An for fighting rep been such describes the ort situation (2006) Afghanistan, does enjoy not same autonomy the FATA as does. However, the Baluch people of Kandahar and provinces the Helmand which Pakistan, borders Baluchistan of province situation along the Afghanistan describes the (2006:11) report USIP A each other. affairs of the interferingrefrain in from the ‘ contended that the and suicide attackers in the Pakistani territory and send them to Afghanistan via North Waziristan North via Afghanistan to them send and territory Pakistani the in attackers suicide and

In my email interview with Bakhshi, Bakhshi, with interview my In email

only the Taliban have Afghan found sanctuaryand of sources support, major frontiers ethnic groups of network war, the classic is and livelihood smuggling of the borderlands; of both the andTrafficking otherarms, including items, el drugs,people, in an is important milita parallel and bytransnational provided protection for which pays ofprofit, part pursue to statehood the weaknessin region actors and illegitimacy exploit of and (transit criminalized trade) economies region. of economic the The transnational (drugs criminal forland bridge the a already become have from The it. borderlands ry and political forces political ry and ISI provides assistance to the training camps that function and generat and function that camps training the to assistance provides ISI bar Pakhtunkhwabar regions Pakistan in weak is or non- 15) –

- the Taliban. To conclude, government control in FATAandgovernment in control conclude, the Taliban. To Pakistan borderPakistan follows: as a .

senior political officer at at officer political senior – Pashtuns and Baluch – andPashtuns Baluch y’. The fact that the Taliban’s highest council of of council highest Taliban’s the that fact y’. The 49 U.S.

embassy in Kabul in embassy gain their income much of existent because of of because existent e Taliban insurgents insurgents Taliban e , 51 5 May 2012,

.’ - spin but

ement ement off off

he he - ) CEU eTD Collection

re than 3 million Afghan refugees refugees Afghan map belowIran showsthatboth million 3 and received Pakistan than re mo that overthrew Daud the regime Mohammad April 1978 (Grare in Maley and 2011:2). The communist Iran theand since Pakistan in living been of AfghansMillions have : Refugees Three in neighboringSection country insurgency. behind the pretextstate of weakness whilemaintaining truth in the case of Pakistan, the intelligence andmilitary circles of Pakistan government hide blunt a weakness is although state Iargue that five), (seesection H5 testing officers. While of int a shadowy throughnetwork Talibancontrol insurgents degree onthe of Pakistan’s governance weak is the in mentioned threeretains regions, the a state vigorous I this into transnational look insurgencyanother from argue perspective and thatwhile Baluchistan their extraterritorialIn provide bases establish to and training camps. five section oppor and uncontrolled move borderto back and forth as they they but have please, also used the resurgence movement. Notonly of the Taliban from the have Talibanthe porous benefited weakn state that and provided evidence and the arguedis thatPakistan weakest state neighbouring Afghanistan, weaknessI their rebellion aconduct in Afghanistan. neighbouringin country to have the way explain Taliban tapped insurgents have state the into extent alarge to can H2 tunities thatthe weaklytunities such administrated as regions FATA, Pakhtunkhwa Khybar and H3b: RefugeesH3b: are morelikely to contribute to rebellion if they are locatedin moreH3a: is Rebellion likely are occur when to neighbouring in states. there refugees The analyses in this section of the chapter thus strongly support H2. In ofThe thewords, chapterstrongly analyses section thus other this supportH2. in

ess in Pakistan hasess Pakistan in dramatically contributed growth the to revival, and rival states.

firm control onthe Talibancontrol firm - led revolution weak or or weak elligence elligence

CEU eTD Collection their hoststate,hasnot this been the in case Paki closing downAfghan the refugeecamps and2011:2). Maley (Grare

56 55 54 53 52 insurgency refugees decades the neighbouring in past four in hasstates. upon drawn n every Afgha almost otherwise, or refugees camped/settled from Whether Pakistan. in buyproperty even or rent houses families, theirwith extended refugees currentlylive t as residence of place own their choose to able general in were refugees Afghan the addition, camps 42% constituted of the Afghan in refugees 2002 in Pakistan (Margesson 2007:4). - 2002:55 (Terryfew Baluchistan Pakistan in in 2002: a and Pakhtunkhwa, FATA andin Khybar camps large several hundred have placedin been section.Pakhtunkhwa, The which majority wererefugees describedthe in previous of the concentrated been have refugees Afghan of majority whereareexactly the of the map side Pakistan Lischer onthe has made (2006:50) that blackfigure plots The triangular 10). (see of 1990 1979to period during turmoil the armed struggle of thei Mujahid (Younes tribally in regions and of Duplatcontrolled thatlater 2008:2) Pakistan fed the into AfghanIran refugees and in Pa (Abbasi Tehran capital the and cities big in dispersed largely were refugees Afghan the however, Iran, In the the during organizations Afghanseveral insurgent the one of of need seek to protection andwar the reminder and conflict of purposes; it provided an easy opportunityfor incursions back intoAfghanistan P government. Pakistani with or joined to one of the seven Afghan resistance parties of the time. the of parties resistance Afghan seven the of one to joined or with registered refugees to only aid giving of conditionality the imposed Pakistan of government the when 1980s heyMaley and (Grare wanted 2011:4).

See also R Unlike countries refugees other some in where forcefully they legally and specific are to confined localities by Afterfrom the immense international pressure especially community, U.S., the Pakist Amstutz (1986:229)writes howAfghan refugeeswere dragged into taking part in theAfgha The choicewherewasThe been ofshould established strategic the provinces have decisionby camps a the 82 a AND - 2005:44 Lischer nd

presentation online at online at presentation - Shavazi et al.- 2005:2 Shavazi lacing theAfghanlacing refugees close theto border withAfghanistan served two important 1980s (Harpviken, 2008:5).

kistan. In kistan. fact wasconcentration it this of refugees camps in n against the Soviet http://www.fathom.com/course/21701739/session4.html 72) and now fuels the Taliban insurgency. Refugees in in Refugees fuels insurgency. the Taliban and now 72) 9). This has been the major difference between the the between difference major the been has This 9). 54 stan.

In the to camps,addition of huge Afghan numbers

55-

: namely, Baluchistan, FATA and Khybar Khybar and FATA Baluchistan, namely, : 51 82, Lischer - 2006:44 82, - backed Afghanistan in regime (Terry

72; Margesson 2007:4). Margesson 72; ,

and and an has gradually started started gradually has an was was also a persistent apersistent also n war during the the during war n .

In In 52

CEU eTD Collection

57 hypothesis 3athe high thatpredicts of likelihood rebellion when are refugees located a in 9 nearly is, That 12). figure in projection Iran(seeUNHCR data livein and 34% Pakistan of in themreside figure still At present is Afghanistan flows, refugee 1979 - 10:Afghan Figure

Registered refugees those to who referred are regist are ). From the more than 3 million registered1). the more From than 3million Afghan refugees 7% of Afghan those twoneighbouring livein of states. refugees Therefore,7%

the number one refugee Source Lischer, 2006:50 1990, Source 52 ered with UNHCR. withered UNHCR. - producing country in the in world (see country producing 57

worldwide, about 63%

CEU eTD Collection

58 RefugeeProduced Bank from 2011 Dataset World producing countries refugee three 11:Top Figure insurgency. feed the Taliban to states host used bythe strategically or are contribute insurgency, to largein numbers, twoneighbouring in In states. the followingI part thatthey demonstrate do exist, refugees do case of Afghan Afghanistan. ample theneighbouring supportin state finds

1000000 2000000 3000000 4000000 5000000 6000000 7000000 The DatasetThe is available at 0

1990 1991 Top three refugeeproducing countries 1992 1993 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG.OR/countries 1994 1995

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 53 2001

58 2002

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

2010 .

Iraq Afghanistan Somalia

CEU eTD Collection

59 as figures late in 2001, regime collapse Taliban afterPakistan of the the the to Talcontribution IranAfghan contribute to the in refugees to Taliban insurgency.and their refugees Afghan Here,I by start how rivalry analyzing state weakness and the paved ground Pakistan in for theweakcountry, only is Pakistan while neighbouring of Afghanistan,six countries I chapter thatamongtwo of the this elaborated andIn sections one rival astate.in weakor if they are located rebellion likely to contribute to more are I now movethe to second part of refugees the hypothesis (H3b) which that s hold G Source: Refugee forCR 2011 Statistics UNH 12: Figure

Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/jun/20/refugee at Available Although a large number of Afghan refugees returned back to Afghanistan from from returnedrefugeesAfghanAlthough number large Afghanistan to of back a June 2010 , June by Guardian the raph produced iban insurgency will be discussed in the last part of this section. iban the insurgencypart in last be of will discussed this

both Pakistan and Iran are rivals to Afghanistan. Afghanistan. to Iranare rivals and Pakistan both 54

- statistics - unhcr 1 - and data . 12

indicate

CEU eTD Collection madrassas thereafter. by the pool of orphan childrenwhose parentswere killed during the 1980s conflictwho and had been sent to

clothes (Ferguson 2010:65). In a poverty 2010:65). clothes (Ferguson been the only other institutions, than the extendedfamily, food, thatprovide lodging free and In (Ferguson Pakistan in 2010:69). madrassa addition, be thousandsof such schools to said are There learning. to exposed are children these that place only the been have schools religious madrassas and systems, education theformal absence Duplat of 2008:2). With andyears (Younes 18 under are children Pakistan in refugees Afghan offive the percent Fifty becannot ignored. insurgency and the Taliban refugeesAfghan for playsamong the such networks decades. for majority society, Pashtun andof of refugees, the been Afghan the thathave rest relying on among thedeeply vast very penetrated have ideologies, andExtremist culture institutions 60 packa scholarship full a madrassasas to kids surrendering their consequences The parties. hardlinerreligious political al such organizations as terrorist from international Theseactors. range actors being motivated bypolitically aid community provided has led to lack of the attention to Afghan refugee community byt Pakistan in thatthe persistent Duplat (2008:2) Afghanistan. in safety and argue the conflict Younes from own for their refugees Pakistan stay in to encouraged Afghan Talibanhas insurgency the In the esc gain to from Theyaddition, returning. little have refugees there. were born than 50% of those past twodecades;for more have Pakistan refugees in the livedthere living decades have arePakistan who developeddeeper during Pakistan the therootsin past four ones capitalIn cityKhybar prefer those fact, Afghan of Pakhtunkhwa. stay to who refugees in still more and Quetta, thanPeshawar, livein the refugees Afghan FATA, astill million

Ferguson (2010:65- The crucial ro crucial The of war in Afghanistan. Margesson (2007:3) documents that 80% of the documents Afghan that80% (2007:3) Margesson of Afghanistan. in war

68) argues that the first wave of the Taliban movement in 1990s was mainly constituted constituted mainly was 1990s in movement Taliban the of wave first the that argues 68) le oneradical, that independent religious institution –

- struck regionstruck majority the parents of 55 - Qaida, or domestic tribal leaders and and leaders tribal domestic or Qaida,

of such a trend have been dire. dire. been have trend a such of ge where not only they are they only not ge where he international the madrassa madrassa the 60

consider alating s have have s – - CEU eTD Collection iban receive from among the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Pakistan. in refugees Afghan the among from receive iban Tal that the ofsupport level May (see references 2012) for their designations),was there an unprecedented uniformityin their views on the

63 62 61 interview that‘70%Taliban. refugees our When of fighters supportthe the get injured the stated Nader to in AbdulAkhund,Mullah a Taliban group Kandahar, commander ofin the nation Mujahid the bless God there. treatment medical received and Quetta to I taken was hand. aI lost I and was injured ‘in 2008 that revealed has Nader, interviewed by Taliban insurgent injured Taliban fig insurgents need in of sanctuary,also helpfacilitating but in access medical to care for the Taliban for the food provide and lodging only not refugees Afghan of pools These vast Pashtuns. Sunni backgroundas the have Taliban: the same Pakistan in refugees Afghan the ethnicAfghanistanPashtun group of ( Sunni the predominantlyfrom come commandersand footTaliban soldiers leadership, the TalibanThere insurgency. a is rationa the andpresent.for 1990s 1980s, in 2000,until insurgent Afghan parties - 2011:27 (Ferguson beenreligious point refugees Afghan Pakistan madrassasin and of students the Taliban leadercommanders, fightersat and havesome the including notorious Omar, Mullah suicide andthemselves pride explode with the in name brainwashed made with without the love of their parents and are isolated from their communities; they are madrassas Madrassa( (Ferguson 2010:68). students receive religious fundamentalism and extremism from Sunni Islamic lessons in these youngstersas these well. The educated are of majority livelihoods for provided their but

Nader’s interview with the Taliban, 7 Taliban, with the interview Nader’s See also RAND p During the interviews I carried outwith Bakhshi2012), (5 May Rahimzai (14 May 2012), and Rahmani (4 of Afghanistan my whocare and took friends mePakistan.’ in of Safeand military haven direct offer supportare twoservicesrefugees to thatAfghan 34). 61

d as a breeding organization, providing recruitments providing a organization, breeding as d serve have madrassas The resentation online at online at resentation hters (BakhshiRahmani 2012). 2012; hters Rahimzai 2012; - up religious myths thatthey the to point ready commit become to

- 9 May 2012. http://www.fathom.com/course/21701739/ses ). As shown in figure 13, 81.5% of ). 13,81.5% 2007:317 Asfigure shownof in Johnson l and logical explanation for generosity. explanation this andl logical The

56 talib

of religion. Inof religion. the fact, majority of s,

as they are called) are raised raised are called) as are they

sion4.html 62

Mullah Sadiq, a Mullah 63

Furthermore, Furthermore, .

CEU eTD Collection

65 64 protection in these lawless territories. building of purpose the for thesimply insurgency assistance to Taliban FATA, in Khybar Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, refugees sometimes have offer to relations thatthey Taliban with have insurgents.However, of the becausedomination of the pursuing or Afghanistan because in offamilial ties, bonds personal or e are Taliban the that ‘Jihad’ the to commitments ideological to due offered are assistances frequently.’ the Jihad join even They food. us provide They us. refugees help Rahmani from Rahmani

Nader’s interview, ibid. interview, Nader’s I thank Rahmani for clarifying this angle of the refugee’s support for the Taliban ( Taliban the for support refugee’s the of angle this clarifying for Rahmani thank I

RAND Corporation, 4May 2012).

57 a relationship for self relationship a email 64 xtended tribalxtended

Most of theseMost interview with with interview - CEU eTD Collection

and Baluchistan – secessionist movements in territories borderingAfg by threatened is Pakistan earlier, elaborated As Pakistan. in refugees Afghan to comes it when manager of astrategic position the held always has agency intelligence Pakistani the contribute the to Taliban insurgency – to their freedom and of refugees Afghan the radicalization radicalreligious institutions, 66 If from look the we state from Margesson 2007:4 Source: Censu 13: Figure

The The Kashmir region includes another secessionist movement. However, it is not covered in this thesis. thesis. this in itis covered not However, movement. secessionist another includes Kashmir region Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, Government of Pakistan, p. 9. Obtained Frontier Government p.9.Obtained Regions, Pakistan, and of of States Ministry s of Afghans in Pakistan, 2005 Pakistan, in ofs Afghans collectively called Pashtunistan (Wolpert1982:120). calledcollectively Pashtunistan

- rivalry

angle, many of the developments – developments the of many angle, appear be to From intentional. a 58 hanistan: FATA,Pakhtunkhwa Khybar such as the prevalence of of prevalence the as such

holistic point of view 66

Detailing the

CEU eTD Collection mission with mission 1992-

68 67 contrast show thatin studies to non the from refugees of majority the are manipulation.’ this yet treating theas problemhumanitarian a concern when ithas fa to and security aiding regimes, and abettingwhen is it in manipulation its own security interests, Afgh groups. Grare(2011:9) and correctly Maley describe the strategic of on Pakistan position bycontinuouslyofIndiaU.S., anti elements and supporting the Afghanistan, to respect with one) section (see rivalries and pursuing in Pakistan interests their of government the for asset a strategic been have indeed refugees Afghan Therefore, time). Taliban i Mujahid Maley by the 2011:6), refugees, including Afghan against(promotionof Russia Jihad nationalist sentiments bydistracting the attention of the Pashtun communities (Grare and these pacify to card refugee Afghan the used in aga and time has Pakistan that is here relevant characteristics beyondmovements is of scope these However, thesis. of the what this is 2010:34- (Ferguson, Afghanistan through Pakistan and Asia Central between route trade a open to worked that convoy Mujahid was in the wak the in was pervasiveAfghanistan in in this period (JohnsonLeslie, and 2004:5, Lyon, 2006:165, Ferguson, 2010:23). It the 2006:164), the Jihadi commanders started to run their own position of the headstate of (Rashid, 2000:97, Goodson, 2001:74). U When wing military own its had which warlords. In less than four months four than less In warlords. 2001:73 and Rubin, 2002:274). Soon after thevictory ofthe Mujahid i 2009: 127). (Ferguson, 2010:36). These Kandahar - twenty then the of e nin capture to managed movement small this Pakistan, including the capital c the capital including

The Taliban were Taliban The barely After the collapse of the Soviet Union Soviet ofthe the collapse After illicit economy, banditry and road tolls (Sinno, 2009:62). Lawlessness and chaos not could havemore been 4 an refugees: ‘Pakistan has taken advantage for too long of the existing gap in the refugee refugee gap the in the existing of long advantage too for hasrefugees: taken ‘Pakistan an , until the Pakistani government chose a group of them from Kandahar Kandahar from them of group a chose government Pakistani the until , i Afghan refugees in Iran are of totally different demographic characteristics. Not only only Not characteristics. demographic different totally of are Iran in refugees Afghan 35). The mission was successful was mission The 35). n pol 68 n ), and against the ChristianJihad invaders (promotionof the Taliban for the second

67 . In the lastmonths Afghanistan of in 1994, the They ruledmore than 95% ofAfghanistan during the period September 1996 - iticalwere parties that by supported the United States and the Pakistangovernment (Goodson, lawlessness of the Mujahid the of against), Jihad the lawlessness e of these calamities that the Taliban movement came into being. into came movement the Taliban that calamities ofthese e ity of Kabul.

an organization that could be counted as a movement as counted be a that organization could an ,

startedwar a civil

- with the support of thousands of (Rashid, were Taliban (Rashid, take to able based over Kabul 1996 September in whole , ,

as these Taliban were able to fight off rival M fight rival to off were able Taliban as these the communist regime lost control of the country in 1992 to the to in 1992 ofthe country control lost regime the communist - family migration to Pakistan, the Pakistan, refugeesfamily to migration Iran are in - Pashtun HazaraPashtun or Tajik ethnicity, also several but

59 for

control of the capital and other major controlcities of the capital and and the other militia Pakistani government tasked them to protect a trade trade a them protect to tasked government Pakistani s

ey made from extortion, extortion, from made ey mon of help the with n , m

the several political parties the S fundingS dried up adrassa studentsfrom Peshawar of i

n era (promotion of the nine provincesAfghanistan of

during the the during province to carry out a small small to carrya out province ce the consequences of of consequences the ce - government insurgent government insurgent ujahidin forces and and forces ujahidin Afghan Afghan

after 1992(Lyon, October 2001 civil war civil ,

each of of each

in in ,

CEU eTD Collection there are reports of Iran supporting the Taliban insurgents. Taliban the supporting Iran of reports are there the to due chapter, this of 1 Section in explained As injured. get or Afghanistan (Abasi

refugees contributing to the Taliban insurgency. contributingrefugees to re or study single a been There has not al. 2005:27). et Shavazi (Abasi sector private the in employed are them of 84% that estimates Tehran in refugees unemploymentAfghanIran. among refugees an not issuein is case study Aof Afghan are among from drawn religiousstudents unemployed or there Afghan movement draw to supporters from among them.Furthermore, while the Taliban foot soldiers for themade Taliban extremely it area Afghan difficult (Margesson 2007:12) has border refugees Taliban) Pashtun vs. Ir also the but remoteness in of refugees Afghan 70 69 for has Pakistan the paved way with rivalry and weakness state between interaction an the case of refugees Afghan andIran. Pakistan in in not InI section this elaborated have how forbeenHypothesis only refugees. Afghan the plausible maindestination for 3bhowever is Iplausible).Iran, Asabove, and twoneighbouring states, demonstrated Pakistan have have is a (H3a neighbouringrefugees state in Afghan the from has benefited tremendously ad and recruiters Taliban for abarrier become Iran andrefugees geographic have location in of Afghan conditions background,and also (predominantly Shia k orwea non- the explains Taliban, recruitmentfor of are the bases whichPakistan, in the ones systems like madrassaeducation fundamentalistgeneration have to children Afghan exposed been not of A Stigter 2005; able send to Marsden remittancesback and Abbasi home2002; (Turton youngprimarily men Afghan who leave their families behind and seek labourIran in be to

My A study of Afghan refugees show refugees Afghan of A study

- argument et al. 2005:24) al. et Shavazi Based on the analysis provided in this section, I section, insurgencyBased this conclude in analysis provided thatthe onthe Taliban existent centres ofin supportforexistent Afghanistan. Jihad Notonlyreligious ideology Taliban cross Taliban include however not does bbasi 69 -

Shavazi and Glazebrook 2006; Margesson 2007). The fact that a that fact The 2007). Margesson 2006; Glazebrook and Shavazi refugees Taliban), Sunni vs. (Hazara ethnic composition and Tajik .

that 80% of the Afghan refugees in Tehran are from Shia jurisprudence jurisprudence Shia from are Tehran in refugees Afghan the of 80% that vocates. 60 -

come under come they when infiltration border 70

In sum, ideological, religious and ethnic religious In ideological, sum,

port thatport demonstrates Afghan rivalry Iran has with with has Iran rivalry - Shavazi et al. 2005; Shavazi fugees Pakistan, in an from the from the an pressure in in pressure the U.S. the -

CEU eTD Collection

2007:323) Taliban by insurgency led certain is tribes of ethnic the Pashtun group trend Afghanistanseveral in chapterI. On this in occasions have thatthe demonstrated a of such uniform occurrence a see I however, donot, rebel. likelyare more to enjoy, they international borders groups along ethnic (Salehyan that 2009:64) territory resources’ and external to access ‘greater the of because theories of transnational that insurgency, predicts (H4) thelight insurgencyin hypothesis, of onlyThis explains the Afghanistan. in partially Ethnicity playa huge does the in Taliban role insurgency; however, the above hypothesis Section Four rival statethe refugees has tapped not state. of the neighbouring why find out a to contradiction Further requiredscenariosresearch onthis is emerged. has Iran return in of the supportin form for provision of foot soldiers or otherwise. None of thes leadership positions within the Taliban movement for the Hazara and Tajik refugee elite in the between alliances againstJihad’ the U.S. invadersIt Afghanistan. in could have also created ‘war a‘new framed have and refugees Tajik and Hazara the among from leaders elite resistance cheap army wagea to proxy a war a as refugees Afghan have the Iranshould used onH3b, Based own. their an of insurgency AfghanIran refugees have in been not manipulated supportthe to Taliban insurgency or start Iranshown that a involvedin complex is rival ConsiderationIran of the case of contradict to Although hypothesis. this we tends have Afghan provide to refugees supportand sanctuaries for the Taliban Pakistan. insurgents in Ethnic groups that are located near an international b international an near located are that groups Ethnic H4: . As shown bythe demographic map of Afghanistan figure in 14 : Bisected ethnic groups ethnic Bisected : Taliban insurgentsIranTaliban Afghan andby in the refugees for bargaining gainst Afghanistan. the in U.S. haveIt created should new

61 ry relation with the U.S. in Afghanistan, order are more likely to rebel. to likely more are order

(see also Johnson (see table 3 table (see - below time’ e

CEU eTD Collection 2012 Association, 13May 2012by control

their demands Af andin engaging groupsadoptednon- a have the ethnic Taliban these insurgency, group which support ofgroups. ethnic the Unlike Pashtun theethnic segments among these (2001- and theTajikistan.In Tajikswith the period time of the insurgency thesis covered this in Uzbekistan with are Uzbeks neighbours adjacent Turkmenistan, to group directlywhile the is an entire nation) onthe other side of the border.As figure 14 Tajiks, who also livealongand borders who international alsoethnic have groups (or related when we take accountother into ethnic groupssuch as the Turkmens, the and Uzbeks the of the border. The complication real thatthe hypothesis meets the in Afghani side onthe other just are located tribes who Pashtun from other and support enjoysanctuary 73 72 71 labelling them terrorists by them from away taken completely were processes political the in participate to group the since the beginning- U.S. of the thein form of the Taliban movement, their exclusion from political processesAfghanistan in insurgencyPashtun case of the In the needed. is interactioncrucial variables not, other with ethnic groupsbecomeantagonistic, to are borders whether theycated near international lo or argueI thatfor dofeed insurgency, still groups ethnic underexplore circumstances what conclude Although implausible. own is thatH4 onits to beyond thesis is of the scope this it ethn for

Email interviewwith Semple, representative Michael formerspecial for Deputy Afghanistan, EU May 21 Cultural Danish ofJehad head current and officer political UN Alaviformer with Sayyid Interview I useI the ter

s 2012), Afghanistan has seen2012), noinsurge Afghanistan

on people crossing it. are are group the size) Pashtuns ic m ‘ soft - international border . This exclusion of a exclusion well. This

phone.

led intervention has been a for key opportunities factor. The ghan politics ’

because line the is border and are disputed there located near a soft near located 62 nt movementnt or supportfor insurgents from

(Alavi 2012 (Alavi - entrenched prior 9/11 movement,to which - international 72 , Semple2012 violent approach to couching couching approachviolent to shows, the Turkmen ethnic 71

border and they do 73 ) . Therefore, I is only limited is only limited stan case is is case stan CEU eTD Collection tical wings weretical arrested o poli military and oftheir little too and few casualties with strong regimewas A thatIslaminot r considered. map for the

Source http://www.mapsofworld.com/afghanistan/afghanistanSource group ethnic Afghanistan 14: map Figure found supportand of sanctuarythe Pakistan. in neighbouring state 74 controlle

Faizy

( interview 9May 2012) explainedme to that d more than 95% of Afghanistan, surely had consequences, of surely Afghanistan, had 95% d more than istan a hard core radical Pashtun voice that w radicalPashtunhard core voice a thatistan Afghan of future

u led the countryfor almost fiveyears disappearedwithin days ‘ during the first theduring basically conference Bonn that laid aroad 63 as - ethnic

represented by Taliban and Taliban Hezb represented by

- groups 74 r

killed.

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simultaneously have become the hostage of their host state. I thatreconciliation further assert state.host of thetheir hostage simultaneously become have and negotiations regards peace with to position bargaining agained strong have means or political settlement.I arguebecause that of the role an protracting in insurgencyeither long have through thatshould military solved been acrucial played has bases and sanctuaries transnational to access Taliban’s the that I establish groups have insurgent thedemonstrate Taliban that Itest above the hypothesis infollowing the manner:first the in part of thisI section Five Section Source: Dorronsoro Goodson 2001and 2005 Afghanistan Ethnic Groups 3: in Table Conflicts will endure longer when rebels have access to extraterritorial bases. extraterritorial to access have rebels when longer endure will Conflicts H5: : Extraterritorial Bases: Bases: Extraterritorial :

64 access to extraterritorial bases. Se bases. extraterritorial to access

extraterritorial bases the Taliban Taliban the bases extraterritorial

condly,

CEU eTD Collection regime of Dr. Najibullah in 1992and gained control ofmost parts of the country (Rubin 2002: x and 1). Pakistan.

76 75 Omar sent athe to Taliban, message resist any to asking themnot and promising further, that Taliban the of collapse 2001. As the of intervention in months the initial during Kandahar cityof stronghold Taliban their into government draw activities and further foot s andNATO Afghan disrupt provinces, forces the thein Taliban of the current affairs of Afghanistan Caristrom2010). 2009:7, (Dressler The governors tasked manage to are then and replaces g shadow regularlyappoints Quetta Shura the sustain day to sub however, year; a times several happen meetings Shura in Quetta but still activelyleading the insurgency in Afghanistan (Gra core including leadershipcouncil, Omar, thebe leader,to believed hiding Mohammad who is the Taliban refers to Shura Quetta The (Doronsoro2009:9). law Emirate onSharia’ based back patiently will byforeigners, they Is ‘an overthrow to fight build and the regime Afghanistan from the Northern Alliance ideologi – leadership Taliban however,of Jihad, camefrom Afghanistan. outside hideouts baldly, it To put there a is core ag war declared and - re Taliban the defeat, their year a after than more Not bases andsupport Extraterritorial the interests of state thegroup. host and the insurgent secu to again and time failed have programs

Shura It was the alliance of Tajik (ethnicity) Mujahideen ( Mujahideen (ethnicity) ofTajik wasIt the alliance means The Quetta Shura emerged after theand U.S. the Afghan forces militia pushed the

cally driven, th cally driven, ‘ council - to ’ ainst the U.S./NATO forces and the Afghan government. The declaration Thegovernment. declaration the Afghan forces and theainst U.S./NATO -

day operationsday of the insurgency (Waldman 2010:6). Afghanistan The in in Dari and Pashtu languages Pashtu and Dari in the Quetta Shura at

leadership’s core argument is that they had gained thatthey in power leadership’s is core argument had

regime became imminent, Taliban the leader Mullah 76 75

in 1996, in and since the latter has now been brought (Giustozzi 2008:83) (Giustozzi re a peace deal because of not taking into account account into taking not of because deal apeace re oldiers for the movement the from communities. h , 65

oly fighters) commanders who overthrew the communist communist the overthrew who commanders fighters) oly and Quetta is the capital city of Baluchistan province of of province ofBaluchistan city capital is the Quetta and emerged onthe Afghan scene political overnors in most of the 34 provinces of the most 34provinces in overnors - committees meet more frequently

– and, a re and Maley 2011:4). re Maley 2011:4). and lthough may it be

lamic

CEU eTD Collection (2010:6)

80 79 78 77 and the meetings, for of safelocations Shura meetings, provision security Quetta of the includingQuetta Shura. the country side.’ establish parts of their supported by in certain elements andPakistan other rad groups,ical managed Taliban re to course, In due of border. side on other gain havens to safe managed command Taliban for and 2010:1). Waldman facilitated by Pakistan’s intelligence service (ISI) (Faizy Bakhshi2012; 2012 Rahi 2012; mzai A. Appendix in are listedthe Shura of known members Some (Dressler 2009:8). commanders’ Afghanistan in the to senior direct issues orders guidance,andQuetta sometimes direction, ‘provides in leadership Taliban the elements’: logistical manage facilitators whereas forces, Afghan Shura com fighters. Quetta and facilitators, foreign fightingindigenous units, composed Shura ‘of as Quetta describes the researcher 2010). One commanders movement (Caristrom the Taliban of (Maz Afghanistan reconstitute the Taliban resistance in Pakistan and initiate sporadic insurgent attacks in vanished theIt civilianyear into Omar population. lessthan a took regroup to and llahmovement, Mu including Omar,escaped the tocity Quettaof while the foot soldiers they wouldregroup fight and back Rahmani, 2012). (interview The with leadership of the th provides huge support in terms oftraining, as funding,“as clear munitions, is this words, their and In supplies. and groups, Haqqani and Taliban both to sanctuary gives it say They movement. the influences strongly designations). their list for reference (see 2012 April/May again in and in 2011 trip field a in Afghanistan

e sun in the sky” the in sun e Special advisor to the Centre for International and Strategic Analysis. Strategic and International for the Centre to advisor Special Waldman writes that a senior Taliban member revealed that three to seven ISI agents attend the Quetta Shura Shura Quetta the attend agents ISI seven to three that revealed member Taliban senior a that writes Waldman The views of Faizy,Rahimzai and Bakhshiwere obtained during interviews the author hadwith the Waldman (2010:1) also writes that ‘ . The sanctuaries Taliban for‘do Pakistan in the fall not from the sky’; they are

manders plan and lead offensive and defensive coalitionand andand against lead operations manders offensive plan 79

’

The ISIThe reportedly onallTaliban representatives councils Pakistan in has ol 2009). The majority of the Shura’s members are old leaders and and leaders are old members the Shura’s of majority 2009).ol The prime 77

During my interview Faizy, with 80 activities, which enabled them to reach remote out to villages on

Besi according to Taliban to according commander des this, the crucial most ISI role that plays the for is the 66 78

he argued that ‘the main chain of chain main ‘the that argued he s the ISI orchestrates, sustains and and sustains orchestrates, ISI s the

m in m in -

CEU eTD Collection blackmailed by the ISI to go to war or follow their interests (Nader followinterests war or their to go to the by ISI frequently blackmailed or pressurized are members Taliban that the implicitly reveal or explicitly Nader by interviewed insurgents the Taliban Association, 13May 2012, by phone.

85 84 83 82 81 Pakistani of the institutions of different involvement The safehavens. sanctuaries and ofthe regiona the proxy with help army. rests in inte national its secure to needs Pakistan ISI while the from arms and sanctuary needs convenience, of amarriage as defined be can government Pakistan the withdrawa also secretly supportingTaliban the in event the thatthey retake should power after NATO’s officer, Afghanistangiving andthemshel andShipman Drury has Pakistan directly been aiding 2012) insurgents in Taliban Afghanistan (as section in one). explained According a to recentreport NATO (cited in strategic national interests and rivalry Pakistan’s consideration into take we when Talibansense makes Afghan immunity the of militarythat the Pakistani cleanup operations target donot This Pakistan. in Taliban Afghan measures Taliban Pakistani Pakistan, in against Alavi Mekhennet 2010). Moreover, while the military Pakistan forces dotake counterinsurgency initiating pe member of the Quetta Shura,widely is be to an example reported of ISI for punishment prior approvalISI. The of arrest the of Beradar, Mullah a leading Taliban commander and insurgent group and transportation and handlingof members.

Interview by email. 2012, May 5 Kabul, in embassy U.S. at officer political senior shi, Bakh Kanishka with Interview (2010:6) Waldman by regime Taliban former the under minister deputy with Interview However, seems there be to a high degree ofmilitants hatred the among Taliban the towards All ISI. five of Interview with Sayyid Alavi, former UN political officer and current head of Jehad Danish Cultural DanishCultural Alavi,withformer politicalandSayyid Interview current Jehad officer head UN of 84 The insurgentgroup supportthatthe Taliban goes Pakistan in far receives beyond

Pakistan is playing roles: two beinga ally U.S. fight the against in terrorism,while with Sayyid Alavi Sayyid with l in 2014.The in l relationship betweentransnational movement theof the Taliban and ace talks with the Afghan government (interview with Bakhshi, 2012; Bakhshi, (interviewgovernment with the Afghan ace with talks chastises commandersseem who toengaging be activities in without , 21 April

2 012. ter in its territory. a According to former UN political

relationships with actors such as the U.S. and India and U.S. actorsas with in the suchrelationships

67 Inaddition, it maintains a firm grip on the 83

revealed me to during an interview 85 .

where the Taliban Taliban the where ,

5 May 2012). 82

Gall and Gall

CEU eTD Collection trained in Paki in trained such training, a south a training, such [2009 winter this training for Pakistan to gone had fighters where fig some 600 are how there his described in district, southern commander OneISI. bythe backed or run are that Pakistan in camps training attend fighters their of numbers significant that reported andmadrassas alarge of number that actively th encourage

would have been ‘Pakistan is a Mujahid nation [and]without their financial and military support the resistance In 2010:13). Waldman an interview conductedby the Taliban Nader, a of said member 88 87 86 (i resistance Taliban of backbone the have been soil, on all Pakistani facilities, care health emergency and machinery funds domestically from Gulfof and provision States, ammunition and transportation government border. circles insurgentsenjoy supportthatthefrom Taliban shows the across magnitude of passage, have but also been provided ‘covering with fire at the border crossing’. indeed This forces Pakistani alwith advance Taliban liaise in only insurgents not from NATO or AfghanIn forces Afghanistan. in interview, Rahmani reported thatescaping pressure under come fighters that event the in especially forces, military Pakistani the from In Taliban Afghanistan insurgents in addition, heavilytactical rely and ort supp onlogistical TalibanWaldman’s interviewswith commandersreveal (2010:16) the following: 89 schools and military training lesso training military and schools receives military training as well. military training receives

Interview by Nader for this thesis on 4May 2012. Interviewwith Rahmani, 4May 2012. ‘ T The interviews suggest that the ISI continues to sanction and support military training centers for insurgents insurgents for centers military training support and sanction to continues the ISI that suggest interviews The he line a between

fight in Afghanistan’. their Afghan andPakistani teachers were continually tellingour them,‘it wasduty to He two said ambush. IEDs, or attack military where training camp, techniques, they were taughtcombat such as howlay to 2,000- with madrassaPakistani 2008,de in One of the commanders from a central described province howyear he spent a a in stan’ – namely the ISI and mil ISI and the namely .’

Waldman (2010:15) - eastern commander fighters saideastern that,‘of 280 the our in district,were cent some per 80 4,000 people’ (although he believes it is nowIt muchincluded (althoughis 4,000 people’ smaller). a believes he it in a weak position.’ a in madrassa nterview with Rahmani, 2012; nterview Rahmani, with

and a training campand atraining

ns have been integrated in the sense that a a that sense the in integrated been have ns

scribing as ‘a it big camp, really likea big, university itary forces – forces itary 88

On the subject of training camps/madrassas, subject ofOn training the 68 - thirds of the students were Afghans, and that Afghans, were students the of thirds blurred in recent years. is, That has recent religious becomein blurred eir students to fight in Afghanistan. All commanders commanders All Afghanistan. fight in to students eir - 2010]. Emphasizing the continuing importance of in setting up training camps, 87

- 2008:221 see also Rashid madrassa ong the border for safe safe the borderfor ong

student automatically automatically student hters, around 70-

25 and and 25 raising 80 89

CEU eTD Collection (Ruttig 2009:61)

92 91 90 although,at the micro Taliba of the umbrella them under the Amir their as Omar accept and leader groupsgreat enjoy of a autonomy deal their in operations, they loyal are still the to Taliban limited in comparison the to Taliban in Afghanistan. Alth networks Afghanistan in and for Pakistan their activities. Their activities, however, are quite prewhich, althoughgroup the 70).Taliban Another- (Ruttigregime 2009:57 Taliban Affairsthe in Tribal as of minister Omar’s and1990s served of the Ha network active Nangarhar, is Kunduz, in and Kunar.Haqqani, Nuristan the Jalaluddin leader Islami. Paktya operative The is Network while Haqqani Hekmatyar’s Khost, and in Paktika, ideologically similar yet affiliated byloosely further supported is insurgency Afghanistan. Taliban The - retains of decision aindependent degree fair whic the Miramshahis Shura, exception only The Shura. Quetta or the council high of the decisions ofimplementation the Afghanistan (Ruttig 2009:61). Gerdi Jangaltwo other Shura and - Shura, which sustaining the is in south insurgency the Afghanistan, Miramshah Eastern in operations charge in is of which Peshawar Shura,

InterviewwithAbdussalamZaeef, Mullah former the Pakistan to ambassador Taliban’s a reconciled Talib and termThe means of ‘Commander the Fai Peshawar the is while capital of Pakhtunkhwa, Khybar and Jangal Gerdi Miramshah districts are FATA. in Other- high qqani network, has close ties with the Taliban. hasjoinedthe Haqqani Taliban network, close the with in ties qqani .

(Shuras) that are present in Pakistan are the the are Pakistan in present are that councils (Shuras) Taliban ranking

groups such as the NetworkHaqqani and Hekmatyar’s Gulbudin Hezbi affiliated insurgentgroup Hekmatyar’s is Islami Hezbi (Islam Party), ic - level, there are visible differences as to how they operate, their their operate, they how to as differences visible are there level,

- h is largely represented by the Haqqani Network, and which which and Network, Haqqani bythe represented largely h is dates the Taliban movement, relies onTalibandates largely support the Taliban 90 thful’ (Ferguson 2010:43).

Shuras for activities in north and in Shuras fornorth activities - - These councils areThese for mostly responsible the councils ul - momenin n insurgency and not as separate insurgencies, insurgencies, as not separate and n insurgency 69 making power in regards to their operations in their operations regards in making power to 91

eastern regions of Afghanistan, and the andAfghanistan, eastern the regions of or spiritual leader.

- spin ough these 92

In this thesisI treat eastern parts of of parts eastern off insurgent off insurgent

- CEU eTD Collection

2006, thereescalation a major was of the insurgency southern provinces, as Kandahar,In such Uruzgan et Zabul al. and 2010:2). (Masadykov (ICRC).InCross became 2005,the security 2004and frequentsome of in the more incidents Internatof the stafferan international DadullahMullah killed group ofby Taliban led a 2003,when was return March Taliban’s in The of first sign the ever The foun also have Islami Hezbi 93 Source: ANSO 2012:9 15:Afgha Figure attacks). AOG in increase percentage the of comparison yearly a for 5 figure also (see increased consistently has year each out carried have they attacks ten rgency almost insu onlyfor not continued has the Taliban accessible international to high organisations without risk.As we figures in see 15 - south southern regions, the including etc. strategies

the the on details For - expanding insurgency has endured for a long period along expanding for endured has insurgency 93

Beside the Taliban leadership, the main circles of the Haqqani Network and Network Haqqani the of circles main the leadership, Taliban the Beside specifi n Opposition Groups attacks initiated n Opposition –Countrywide ci

the ofthe ties d sanctuary in FATA and Khybard sanctuaryFATAand Pakhtunkhwa. in

Haqqani network east and west. This meant that these regions were not regions these meant This that west. and east 70 ,

seeWaldman 2010:16.

as attacks took place more widely in the placemoreas took attacks widelythe in

years thebut number of now, ional Committee of the Red

and 16, CEU eTD Collection

geographic and of the programmes disruption control by government and the Afghan of terms in objectively measured as clear, pretty is success movement’s Taliban The Source: ANSO 2012:9 17:Growth in AOD attacks Figure Source: ANSO1 2008: - AOG 16: Figure initiated attacks, 2006

- 2008

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military operations, it doesmilitary take not it the operations, Taliban central command long Pakistan in appoint to a they due time heavy to blow groups.from receive Although time 2009:211) haveGhor (seeGiustozzi Taliban provincesbeen insurgent deeply by infiltrated and Herat of and Badghis parts Nimroz, ZabulwalZabul 2009:179), (see Nuristan, Farah, (see Bijlert 2009:155), Kunar (see Kandahar KilcullenSm 2009:231), (see figure 19,Uruzgan control areasin of Taliban the depiction of asFurthermore shown bythe Helmand ‘the beenfiercest’province. economy insurgency in taxation, 2001has the since dr well from the the and province living of hugecontrolling theparts that with Taliban insurgents onlyprevalent became 2005(Coghlan in 2009:127). Coghlan (2009:151) argues frequentl occurredIED and explosions attacks centre. sporadic Although ofexception the provincial evolved from explodinga few literally 2003to in bombs the with allthe controlling districts Younus (2009:101- Furthermore, the leadershipnetworks.to unityand Reuter of insurgent theof top these power networks, large Loya). Despite domination Paktiaand the thepredominance insurgent different of insurgent Loya Paktya (Ruttigareas- pockets 2009:59 in of loyal to specific Jihadi commanders in Quetta. Furthermore,Islami the Hezbi party also holds region:group the Mansur the loyal to family, another directly Ruttig documentsaddition, thatthere aremoregroups three Taliban power holding this in semi the of control the under extent a large - south provinces the in Ruttig (2009:57)Loya writes thatthe which coversPaktikaand Paktiaregion, Khost Paktia, A international They community. and destabilized dominated have the entire southern part of fghanistan and much of the eastern and western parts of the country (Doronsoro 2009:7). country the parts of western eastern and the of andfghanistan much yprovince, Helmand in large 118) pre 118) - western regions of Afghanistan and is inhabited by Pa by and inhabited Afghanistan is of western regions scale rivalryscale rarely is and animosity groups reported among these due sent a clear picture of how the insurgency in Ghazni province province Ghazni in insurgency how the of picture a clear sent - scale coordinated attacks and resistance by Taliban by Taliban resistance and attacks coordinated scale 72 - autonomous HaqqaniIn Taliban. Network autonomous 88) (see figure 18 figure (see 88)

Quetta Shura, and the third Shura, andQuetta the third for illustrated an map of

to NATO and NATO Afghan to shtun tribes, is to to tribes, is shtun ith 2009:191), ug ug CEU eTD Collection

persistent growth of their presence and attacks in Afghanistan.persistent presence growthattacks of their and in In if one sum, characteristic of the Taliban insurgenc quote (2010:15): Walman rough of picture the and scale strength of Taliban Takhar and the(Yoshikawa provinces Azarbaijani 2010:1; dominated areas north Afghanistan, in Baghlan,Kunduz, especially Balkh, Badakhshan, able also been Taliban have In the addition, border. governors the the othernew forces fresh from commanders,andside andof send provincial manning costs alone would exceed $60 million a year. a exceedmanning $60million would costsalone per month, associatedTalib$150 average each costs with a Assuming month. ( Starkey…the Afghanas overreported byJerome may insurgency be 35,000strong, The Times The

[London],year 3 March 2010) and last launched620 attacks an of average

73 insurgency asI Afghanistan a in whole y overshadows the othersis it the

- to infiltrate pockets Pashtun of Moghaddam 2009:247). To giveMoghaddam a

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Source: Ruttig in Giustozzi 2009:63 LoyaInsurgents and in Paktia Tribes 18: Figure

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has been regards exactly in the case the to Taliban insurgency.00 international The 130,0 becauseminiscule ability of thefind insurgents safe to of havens neighbouring in states. This Two, through military defeat or reconciliation and political settlement. As pointed out in Chapter The Talibanhas insurgency endured of anow,noprospect ending with for decade either Why can itnot be settled? Source Doronsoro 2009:21 19:Taliban Figure

the chances that a transnational insurgency can be defeated through military means is is means military through defeated be can insurgency transnational a that chances the logistical roads

CEU eTD Collection GovernmentArabia in clearly Saudi exemplify fact. this Unit the by efforts uncoordinated recent The country. the in initiatives was established in 2005‘

or peace deals only if their demands are met. The challenge is the size of their demands their of size the is challenge The met. are demands their if only deals peace or Taliban leadership and eradicate Faizy, the(interviewwith 2012; insurgency and Germany, 200,000Afghan as well as and soldiers, have police dismantle to failed the 99 audience.html 98 97 96 95 94 national comebeforeto negotiationtable.’we to becomeready maintained the same criteria for negotiations: ‘all invading forces Afghanistan shoul leave d have Taliban the onset the from that see can we insurgency Taliban the of case the In Taliban. the to back Afghanistan countryentiregivingof the mean which instance, would,for of unrealistic long too objectives.’ out hold pursuit in inaccessi deliberately is It dealing. difficult of record track a long has Movement Taliban ‘the that elaborates sanctuaries and support,transnational insurgentshave a stronger bargaining Semple position. insurge whatconsistent with transnational negotiation fronts the with Taliban. and reconciliation andopened time community again international has the supportof the counterinsurgencyIn to addition operat al. 2010:9). than 50countries from more country,security drawn forces the in 2012. programmes reconciliation example, according t however communitywho asto should lead the reconciliation programs is beyond the scope ofthis thesis. Several authors

See Interview, 9May 2012 See For instance, t instance, For Elaborating Elaborating Email interviewwith Semple, Deputy Michael former special representative EU for Afghanistan, May 21

http://policyresearchgroup.com/newscomment/tri http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop , The fact that the insurgency has endured for almost ten The thatthehasalmost fact insurgency endured for

99 have highlighted the internal clashes as a challenge to negotiation and reconciliation as well. For For well. as reconciliation and negotiation to challenge a as clashes internal the highlighted have

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ed States in Qatar and the Afghan Afghan and the States Qatar in ed

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Association, 13May 2012, by phone. package and give conc further was established September in promote 2010to reconciliation a with wider reintegration ‘brotherhood’and endorsementof a recommendatorya High Peace paper. Council Moreover, the state thatharbours the insurgency, t side of Alas, the because initiative. Government’sAfghan peace and religious leaders, government officials other representatives and who supported the groupsTaliban. 1,500people Almost attended the including this and armed with reconciliation foraimedforward opposition negotiations at ways finding – Peace Jirga Consultative National ground. 2010,President Karzai Forevidence June convene in instance, onthe supported byapproach fail.’how shall creative regardlessis Alavi’s is ofit the argument accommodate to endis an and acknowledge the interests ofthe in Pakistan region. Any other 100 c 2009a) Sayyid Alavi failure unless ittakes into account Pakistan’s interests (see sectionIn one). my interview with to be thewill doomed to Taliban leaders and utterlynonsensical is join the peace to process initiatedthat is by thegovernment Afghan or theand U.S. its allies and which offers extends strategic managementthe of Taliban leadership andfighters on its soil. A political settlement 2011:1). Earlier I this in section the explored magnitu involvementinde of the Pakistan’s aof foreigninto tool the in region policyimplementation (Grare and beyond and Maley Taliban movement It has indeed the alive. insurgency turned thestakes Taliban keeping in earlierin I sections t demonstrated have process. of any negotiation the to successvital is of nation the host and the participation roletransnational insurgencies Inwasanother role Chapternoted ofthatin state. complication: the Two host it ould have ended the ongoing insurgency. insurgency. ongoing the ended have ould

Interview with Sayyid Alavi, former UN political officer and current head of Jehad Danish Cultural Danish Cultural Jehad head of and current officer Alavi,UNformer political with Sayyid Interview .

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at a standstill or has failed all in all. in all failed has or standstill a at contr reassert effortsto ruthless respondedwith and Pakistan the U.S., and governmentKarzai’s direct ISI with talks and bypasshold the the tried Taliban to figures had the ‘senior within influential member, in M 103 102 101 contro if not the in, ISIl over, role negotiating a the major had could only placeif take ‘were message intended send the to a both Taliban to and the United thatnegotiations States who Pakistan werein prepared negotiate to Kabul, with (2010:7) Waldman writes thatthey l Taliban several of ISI the by arrest the to Referring Taliban. the with talks of process Eide criticized Pakistanfor damaging UNAMA’s reconciliation effortswhile was he in the commanders Shura engage to of thatkind in but discussion, Pakistan’s recent arrest of the Taliban figures the in Taliban leadershipandpeople we who have also met the authority of the Quetta (Borger However, 2010a). Afghanistan, peace held Taliban secret Kabul commanders senior and with talks Dubai in Secretary of the UN Representative former2009 KaiSpecial Eide, the Afghangovernme and Pakistan Guardian ahead (see talks open to of Political the Borger, upcoming Office ‘Taliban Qatar’, in Qatar. the Taliban andthe regarding U.S. establishment the of the Taliban’s political office in 2011 of Rabbani, 2010). Despite productive some with talks senior Taliban, the assassinationSeptember in

See See In my email interview with Bakhshi (5 May 2012), he reportedBakhshi that with the Qatar negotiation track too interview has been email my In ol of any negotiations’ (Boone ofol any2011). negotiations’ , available, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world online News BBC - available, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world online News BBC - 103 Most recently at the international level, there have been reports about talks between between talks about reports been have there level, international the at recently Most

In support of this, the U.S. rele the U.S. this, In support of [London], 3January[London], 2012) harmed the reconciliation the harmed process’ Black (Doucet 2010; and Borger 2010). Kai 101

the head of the High and Peace Council, Arsala Rahmani, ay 2012, were major blows to the peace process. Many the to peaceay2012, were process. that majorbelieve blows these efforts failed and according to Kai Eide ‘we met senior senior met ‘we Eide Kai to according and failed efforts these

nts it was disrupted andparties. was discredited Earlier it in disrupted nts byboth . However, because the process circumvented both the circumvented the both because the process . However, ased several Taliban prisoners in order to build trust build orderto Taliban in prisoners ased several

78 asia south - 18049265 - asia - 14985779 .

- General in General eaders eaders 102

an an CEU eTD Collection sanctuary to hide it is very difficult for usfight for to difficult itis very hide to sanctuary that

madrassas and trainingwas camps initiated for the Mujahidin 2012. ( efforts reconciliation Afghan to challenge serious has become a and that this offrom border the side inflamed other hasthe been Afghanistanwar in some interest in the peace processes were killed by ISI by killed were processes peace the in interest some controlled by [and]we Pakistan saw several that in those Taliban occasions who showed 109 108 107 106 105 104 extraterritorial sanctuaries that the Taliban insurgents have in Pakistan. the protracted the Afghanistanbasisofevidence in the and conflict explains on robustly harbours the Taliban. day. t at be will Taliban change, parameters extra miles. these Once go believe few to not a thatthey they anycannot have reason from alternative sources, don’t are longreceive So broken. assupportfrom political they some states,and supplies money pipe and funds supplies game their until the their perception of change Taliban not will proxy army its of national interests, appeasing the concerns of state, the host in this case and Pakistan, accommodating their stake these of one ISI is Pakistan’s others: the by contemplated any deal - stake multiple conflictAfghan involves Ithat call the situation in Afghanistan trap a negotiation . As jammed ‘theSemple posits, – process.’

the high bargaining power of the Taliban insurgents and stakes of a neighbouring state – state a neighbouring ofand stakes insurgents the Taliban of power the bargaining high Skype Pakistanhas resources time invested and this develop to when asset since 1970s wave the first the building of Telegraph See Daily also Dean May Nelson,15 2012, Mullah Yahya Mullah Similarly, Say Similarly, Email interview with Mich Email interview ‘ ’ If PakistanIf expelsus. believe I But the government expel can’t us. powerf are We

109 Based on the above analysis I 5canBased ample with beabove concludethathypothesis supported ontheanalysis

interview, 4May 2012. In t sum, 104

Furthermore, Furthermore, , y a Taliban fighter in Helmand in, province fighter Taliban a id NajibullahHashimi, thehead of Hindokos

he trap is inescapable without winning the honest support of the state that of the state honest support the inescapable winning without is he trap . it would be irrational for the ISI and other Pakistani organizations to letgo to ISI wouldbeforandit irrationalother theorganizations Pakistani 107

Referring the to sanctuariesRahmani Pakistan, in ael Semple,ael former Deputy special representative EU Afghanistan, for May 21 in my interview with Dr. Rahimzai he elaborated that ‘Taliban are

e mail i ’ holders, all of whom have some capacityblockto some all of whomhave holders, nterview,15 April 2012) . Interview 7May 2012. 79

online, www.telegraph.co.uk.

Nader Nader by asked who fought the Soviet Army. Army. Soviet the fought who h News Agency, told the author that the proxy proxy the that author the told Agency, h News .’ 105

It is because of these complexities

. about

he negotiation table the next , replied , Pakistan in sanctuaries

- holders.’ ul. But if we don’t have have we don’t if But ul. 108

argues that ‘ that argues 106

Without Without lines the the

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gone long. so for Afghanistan onin insurgency she transnational of of the Afghanistan, theory the in context contradictions meetand H4 interactiongiven each with other the to conflict Although Afghanistan. momentum in H3b et support of similar and(H5) Taliban for insurgency extraterritorial the support neighbouring bases (H3), of state NeighbouringAfghanweakness(H2),(H1), of state neighbouringin rivalry staterefugees ever contributed the to In conclusion, then, I have demonstrated that several transnational factors have factors have severalI transnationalhave that demonstrated In conclusion, then, ds considerable light on the nature of the insurgency and the reason why it has reasonwhy it of theand insurgency the onthe considerable nature light ds hnic groups along the Pakistan border (H4) have all directly and in and in all directly have border(H4) groupsalong the Pakistan hnic - growing growing

strength of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Afghanistan. in insurgency the Taliban of strength 80 CEU eTD Collection

been frontsreconciliation the a with Taliban deadlockonthe and negotiations insurgents? there Why has and Taliban insurgency?; of protraction and the resurgence factors explain the following twooverarching shape to extraterritorial the thesis: research questions What sta host of meddling their andbargaining the power Taliban’s and insurgentsgovernment areof unviable the Taliban because of Afghanistan jammed negotiation where trap dyadic conventional peace between negotiations the neigh the in enjoy insurgents Taliban the that sanctuaries momentum. gained continuously has endured but only has insurgency not Afghanistan, Taliban the dollars ofand international unprecedented aid and economic infrast despite massive international involvement both militarilyand civilian,flow the of billions of fromit beinga brought to understandingholistic of the Taliban insurgency,and get to a clearer picture of what prevents much make to a the to theory contribution provide insurgency,to transnational a asmore of mainstream studies of the Taliban conflict. adopting in m My perspective ai this was so not of transnational insurgency theory to the Taliban case that distinguishes this studyfrom theIt application is of insurgencies. and perpetuation the to onset contribute factors can that onthe foundationsbuilds of ‘opportunity addresses theory’, extraterritorial external or the transnational causes mainly rebellion, insurgency or which domestic of oninternal theory, transnational theory. insurgency theories’ of Unlike insurgency, ‘motivation which focus of of view point from Afghanistan in the the TalibanI insurgency at thesis looked In this Introduction The puzzle from whichTheI puzzle my drew andthat argument is research thesis questions My main argument in this dissertation was that becausethe of extraterritorial conclusion. FIVE: CONCLUSION CHAPTER

81 te.

To address these developments I used developments To these address bouring country, Afghanistan a in is bouring country, ructural development in

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refug andTaliban resurgence movementAfghanistan. in the onthe Furthermore, effects of of Pakhtunkhwa. has StateweaknessPakistan in dramaticallygrowth the to revival, contributed FATA,Baluchistan Pakistan: and Khybar akness regions three in in mainly we state tapped Istate Pakistan. thatthe neighbouring Taliban is Afghanistan insurgents explained have hypothesis. Iranian the supportto Taliba Despiteexpectations. some allegationscontradicted of findings Iran’s case, the however, for fighting ‘terrorism’, and sabotage to India’s deeper Afghanistan. in and ties In influence other objectives: namely continueto to receive bill pursuingtwo is Line). Simultaneously, Pakistan Durand (the resolving the territories disputed Taliban insurgents soil to onwin its a betterfrom deal Afghanistan when the time comesfor IInAfghanistan. of Pakistan the the case country found that deliberately is direct rival of and rivalry’ Afghanistan engagedIndia ‘complex in with and thein U.S. Ira – are rivals neighbouring two six states, Afghanistan’s found of thatout came theseand five the conclusions. to following hypotheses international borders extraterritorial and sanctuariesIn for insurgents.Four Chapter groups along ethnic bisected neighbouring state,in state, refugees state, weakneighbouring eff the evaluating whereI transnationalreviewed insurgency the The scholarship. hypotheses involved Two, Chapter in drawn hypotheses of five the with help questions research theI answered Findings n is engaged in a ‘complex rivalry’ with the U.S. in Afghanistan, while Pakistan is both a rivalry’ both is Afghanistan, Pakistan in U.S. while thea with ‘complex engaged in n is ees in a neighbouring state on insurgency I found that Afghan refugees in Pakistan Irefugees Pakistan insurgency in found that Afghan state a on in neighbouring ees On the effects of a weak neighbouring state on insurgency I found that the weakest the weakest I that insurgency found on neighbouring state weak a effects of On the I ofendurance insurgency onset and the neighbouring state on rival a of On the effects

ects of fiveects exogenous factors onthe Taliban insurgency: rival neighbouring n insurgents, In insurgents, noreliable found data supportof in the 82 ions ofions dollars aid in from the U.S./NATO

Iran and Pakistan. Pakistan. and Iran

supporting thesupporting

I tested I tested CEU eTD Collection

Uzbeks are neighbours with Uzbekistan and Uzbekistan Tajikistan. Tajikswith areUzbeks with neighbours 110 trainingI from there. also demonstrated thatwhile the Taliban needs fund to Pakistan and of support also receivecouncils but amounts Pakistan, in huge leadership their I have only insurgents not the Taliban protraction insurgency. found that of rebel. they before necessary is state, neighbouring rival or weak as such variables, extraterritorial other likelynot I rather, what rebel; to contend thatthe interaction is ofethnic bisected groups with are borders along international groups livingethnic thatbisected from this I conclude do not their entire other have non- nation)side of onthe thepursued border their demands Tajiks, who also livealongand borders who international alsoethnic have groups (or related insurgency Othergroups Afghanistan. in as ethnic t such contributed the similarly to has bisected group thatis ethnicthe border,while noother ethnic group – IFourdemonstr Chapter predicted. Thatin is, as not theis hypothesis hereI but drawstudies conclusions. any donot could be aof departure point n. This Ira for future in refugees Afghan of case the in visible Taliban movement have contributed insurgency to Pakistan. in None of these three factors are colonies close the to border, and ethnic poor of ties living conditions refugees the with insurgency and whenI theyFrom donot. study this speculate t thatfurther is from this research as neededwhen out to is refugees find to contribute to we draw what can hypothesis, believeinvalidatesnot contradiction the however; thatthis human support,while the AfghanIranplay refugeesrgency. I in noroleinsu the in Taliban do theto Talibanandcontribute financial insurgency tremendously food,by providing shelter,

Turkmengroup Afghanistan ethnic in The last variable I evaluated was the effect of extraterritorial bases on the onset and and onset the on bases extraterritorial of effect the was I evaluated variable last The the finding alonggroups living borders ethnic international bisected of On the effects

the Pashtuns – the Pashtuns

has found sanctuary their co from - is directly adjacent to Turkmenistan,while the 83

he Turkmens, hat factors such as refugee refugee as such factors hat

ethnic counterparts across , protection and military 110

the and Uzbeks the ated that only one one onlyated that violently. CEU eTD Collection

beLastly, ended.spill the insurgency thecannot peace negotiations, their help in committed andwithout participation host state – the howmake to on offer to insights attempt study this not did lengthrestrictions, because of In addition, Iranand Pakistan. refugees in Afghan interview to I able been enormously had conclusions research. of this engaged conflict. in However,I think donot thatthis limitation invalidates the broad actively are who Taliban among research extensive conduct to I unable was insurgencies, res to pertain normally which concerns security the seetoo the Taliban’s mobility transnational strategic as a asset the in insurgency. And due to was unable to interviewrepresentatives of the military U.S. to determine to what extent they r resource and time to Due Pakistan. and Iran in refugees interview to unable was government officials,was so unable from and benefit their to perspectives.I Furthermore, or experts Pakistani with I nointerviews studyconducted this another; in however, allthe hypotheses theAlmost Taliban connectedway and Pakistan insurgency or some in insurgents. Taliban only becomes party:third In state. the host I thatnegotiation sum, have shown and the with reconciliation hijacked andis negotiation thegovernment AfghanTaliban bya insurgents between track argued Afghanistan that is tr power of U.S./NATO forces by sanctuariesI theirPakistan. in extraterritorial hiding have coercive the evade can Taliban the because failed repeatedly have efforts reconciliation national interests the in region.I Furthermore, also protect them in Pakistan, the Pakistani government needs the Taliban to implement its The of limitations this study are numerous; four particular in arementioning. worth

in this casein this Pakist an

possible if wayspossible neutralize to Taliban Pakistan’s supportto are found - over insurgency effects onneighbouring states, of Taliban apped in a jammed negotiation process where a dyadic where a dyadic negotiationprocess aapped jammed in , though, I believe – help solve the Taliban insurgency. I have only argued that arguedI that only have Taliban insurgency. solve the help 84 elaborated that the peace negotiations and and negotiations peace the that elaborated that thewouldhave thesis benefited earch onongoing and conflicts estrictions, I CEU eTD Collection

and their extraterritorial sympathizer –Pakistan. that thegovernment Afghan international and its partnersgive Taliban huge to concessions mean course of would This settlement. peace arealistic in accommodated are demands their I believe the conflict in Afghanistan is solvable if the main actors are cor focus to studies onthe effects states. insurgents ofonhost transnational emergencegeneration a of new radical of Islamist Pakistani movements.It will be for future as itsituation harbouring stands: had thatTaliban huge has incl costsonPakistan, benefits the from deriving unqualified not is thatPakistan demonstrated helpful have to on especially

Pakistan, have not been included in this study. For this study it wouldhaveit study. been this For study included been this not in have Pakistan,

rectly identified and and identified rectly uding the CEU eTD Collection

86 CEU eTD Collection

• Sheikh Abdul Mana Niyazi • Qari Talha • Mullah Abdul Jalil is the head of Taliban's the Interior Affairs Committee. • Maulvi Aminullah globalTaliban’s Hefrom supporters. chief servedas 2002- propaganda the Taliban's of local also operates Taliban the a against Jamal to from personnel. liaison citizens Afghan as Jamal Qudratullah • Maulvi Baradar. to successor considegovernorwhoTransportation, is Kandahar shadow andof former • Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansour November 2001. 1994until ruleHamdullah during Talibanfrom Kandahar ledDepartment in the Finance Insincea Omar’saides.considered 1994one of closest been Mullah have to • Maulvi Hamdullah Minister. Interior regime’s Taliban the as served also He Afghanistan. • Mullah Abdur Razzaq Akhundzada Shura. Agriculture for the Taliban regime. Mansur is thought to lead the Peshawar Regional Military ofMinister the ontheand formerPaktia, andMiramshah was He Khost. Shura serves • Abdul Latif Mansur advisers. closest Omar's of one was and secretary financial personal • GulIshakzai Agha Taliban. Mohammad• Mullah Rasul Khost. ofHe governor theNetwork. Haqqanialsoregional Paktika,Paktia,and the is Taliban’s of • Siraj Haqqani • AmirKhan Muttaqi Baradar. Mullah to successor in Mohtasim Jan • Agha aGuantanamoBay former facility of the detention detainee Cuba. in provinces) Zakir(Helmand ‘surge’Nimroz commander South. and and the Taliban’s in is • Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir reign the of Talib has beenas ‘shadow’. his governor wasKandahar described He the during ofprovince the • Mull ruleForeign Afghanistan. Taliban in Affairs during • Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund was the governorKandahar the of Minister of and as the Taliban’s intelligence chief. • Hafiz Abdul Majeed may list this members whilebe whosome listed, leaders areonthe not on nolonger shura. below ofThe consists the known list members Quettamay of Shura. additional the There be Known 1: activeBox of Shura the members Quetta - law of Mullah Omar. Mohtasim is a is law closebe ofto Mohtasim ofa confidant Omar Omar. Mullah possible and thought ah Mohammadah Rehmani Hassan

is the Taliban. chief is of Kabulfor operations the

is the leader of the Miramshah Regional Military Shura and the commander commander the and Shura Military Regional Miramshah the of leader the is an.

is the is Taliban Uruzgan commanderprovince. for

is the chief of the Finance Committee. He served as Mullah Omar’s Omar’s Mullah as served He Committee. Finance the of thechief is is the is foris TalibantheHamdullah Gulf representative region.

is the former is Finance Minister during the Taliban regime and son the isInformation the chief and Cul of the is the commander of the Abdul Latif is the commander the Abdul Mans of is the currentQuetta is of Regional Military the He leader served Shura.

was thepr governorNimroz of runsan investigative committee that deals complaints with is the Talibangovernorfor is shadow Herat province. is the headGerdi of the Jangal Regional Military Shura

is the former co former the is Appendix A is the former Minister of Civil Aviation and is considered is Omar,Mullah beand close to very to 87

rps commander for northernrps commander for ovince during reign of the

ture Committee. ur Network in Paktika, in Network ur

red to be to a possible red ddition, ddition,

2005.

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Source:LongApril, The 2012 accessed War Journal, 23 88 CEU eTD Collection

and current Center special to Internaitonal for advisor and Strategic Analysis,on9 ISAFInterview,civil to Faizy, Email formerAbdul Suboh advisor IList of conducted: interviews Project/USAID Improvement Care Health Co/(CHS) Research University Director) Mirwais Rahimz Mayand Harvard Center currentatHuman Fellow Carr University, forRights, 21 2012 Afghanistan for representative special EU Deputy former Interview, Email Semple, Michael May 2012 Kanishka Email Bakhshi, Email Rahmani, Idrees Association,head 13May2012. ofDanish Jehad Cultural Hashim Alavi, Phone remain anonymous 17May 2012 AQ, 2012 Email interview with staff of an international organization in Kabul who wished to

Afghanistan 20th April 2012 in Budapest April 2012in 20th Afghanistan ai, Interview Budapest, in MBA, (USA), MPH MD, Chief of (Country Party/ Interview with Sayyid former Alavi UN politicalofficer and current Interview with Rahmani from RAND Corporation 4th MayInterview4th RAND Corporation Rahmani from with 2012 Interv

iew, senior officer political iew, atembassy US Kabul in on5 Appendix B 89

ian chief in Afghanistan th

May May CEU eTD Collection

province – Yahya Mulla MansourMulla Akhund Kandahar Panjwayee, in commander AbdulAkhundMulla –district –group Sadiq Mulla Helmand commander in Province themselves.] haveanonymityinsurgents for Nader asked but not believes protect to aliases they that use the Taliban Although andcompetence. region the experience in past his because of Iand contactstask onthechose government both Afghan and the this Taliban. Naderfor side andcomesPashtun province Kandahar from but a only Office.not is Kandahar He Nations United to he movedon office. InKandahar 2007 Agency,Cooperation based I was andNader Afghanistan. in Kabul in worked the for NaderOmar the at [I used workwith to InterviewsNader:members Taliban conductedby with Interview,(Afghanistan), Email 2012 15April Interview, Email Sayyid Najibullah Hashimi, the headNews Agency of Hindokosh 13 May 2012 Najla, Email

Interviewwith staff International of an Organization Afghanistan Kabul, in on From Helmand, mid in charge of a commission in Helmand in charge–Kandahar– in –Uruz a commission of - level fighter and logistics coordinator in Helmand coordinatorin level and fighter logistics 90 same organization – same organization has maintainedahugehas network friends of

Japan International International Japan gan

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