Muggah, Zyck, Downes 2012 Editors Foreword. Stability, 1(1): 1-3. DOI: STABILITY http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ak.

Editors’ Foreword Robert Muggah, Steven A. Zyck and Mark Downes*

The international policy community is pre- luster in the Middle East, North Africa, and occupied by a purported rise in fragility, elsewhere. conflict, and violence around the world. The The West´s engagement with stabiliza- World Bank´s 2011 World Development Re- tion emerged in the wake of experiences in port cast a spotlight on the many ways col- Afghanistan and Iraq. As is well rehearsed in lective violence undermines governance and the global media, both countries have long socio-economic development. Likewise, the been graveyards for empires as well as hastily Organization for Economic Co-operation rendered approaches to counterinsurgency, and Development (OECD) has been working recovery, reconstruction, and state-building. closely with the so-called g7+, a constella- In spite of massive aid allocations, the secu- tion of 19 fragile countries, to re-evaluate the rity outlook in both countries remains bleak. terms by which security and development Indeed, there are some signs that develop- assistance is issued. Yet amidst all this focus ment assistance may have actually exacer- on instability, there is less critical reflection bated local tensions and entrenched conflict. on practical policies and applied practices These and other experiences have given ‘sta- to promote stability. In other words, we are bility’ and ‘stabilization’ something of a black starting to appreciate the factors that induce eye – and rightly so. A narrow range of coer- fragility but know rather less about how to cive interventions combining military force engender safety and security on the ground. with dubious civilian assistance was never Now is an opportune moment to critically likely to work. Indeed, many proponents of reflect and interrogate concepts such as sta- stabilization in Afghanistan and Iraq failed to bility. Most United Nations member states appreciate that security comes not from ‘win- have acknowledged the interplay of security ning hearts and minds’ through self-serving and development and are searching for new quick-impact projects but by prioritizing jus- ideas and innovations to ensure that they are tice, economic opportunity, political rights, mutually reinforcing. The Arab Spring also and access to non-violent means of pursuing providing a historic and turbulent critique of dignity, equality, and change over the long the many ways in which factors such as social term. and economic exclusion, weak governance, And while some commentators in the West and geo-strategic interests are shaping the believe that stabilization – as a set of ideals, security and development environment. In- practices, and outcomes – is dead or dying, deed, the ‘authoritarian bargain’ that denied there is ample evidence to the contrary. human rights and political participation at Indeed, it is flourishing – albeit under dif- the expense of ‘stability’ has lost much of its ferent guises and labels – in many parts of the world. Global economic uncertainty has also generated a crucial change in the cal- * [email protected] culations of some governments. The era of 2 Muggah, Zyck, Downes/ Editors’ Foreword

large-scale military interventions is coming ity intends to challenge the artificial distinc- to a close. Meanwhile, public agencies, mul- tions between conflict, crime, and violence. tilateral organizations, non-governmental While accounting for political and economic entities and the private sector are forced to approaches, Stability also endeavors to deep- cut-back, re-prioritize, and figure out how to en the dialogue across disciplines, pulling in do more with less. In the process, many insti- sociologists, anthropologists, geographers, tutions have sought to forge linkages across psychologists, criminologists, historians, law- defense, development, and diplomacy – the yers, and others involved in trying to under- so-called 3Ds – and establish whole-of-gov- stand what works and what does not when ernment, whole-of-system, and ‘comprehen- it comes to the business of security and de- sive’ approaches. All of this has given rise to velopment. Technical specialists in engineer- a new alphabet soup of multi-agency institu- ing, agronomy, public health, public admin- tions such as Canada’s Stabilization and Re- istration, policing, and other ‘applied’ topics construction Task Force (START) to the UK’s will also be solicited to contribute in order Stabilisation Unit and the US State Depart- to extend and amplify the practitioner voice. ment’s Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization. Too often complex subjects such as corrup- Meanwhile, the real and potential sources tion, aid financing, and civil service reform of instability are also evolving quickly. In- are treated simplistically and not by experts deed, ours is a world where a thirty-second that have conducted an audit, overseen a cyber-attack on a stock exchange can prove procurement process, or grappled with hu- more destructive, at least in certain respects, man resource procedures. than a conventional terrorist attack. Like- A comparative advantage of Stability is wise, new forms of transnational organized the way it assembles voices from academic, crime and urbanized armed groups are also policy, and practice communities in a single forcing their way on to the international venue. Scholarly research can usefully inform agenda. More conventional actors such as policies and practices, and the knowledge pirates roam the oceans, wreaking havoc on and experience gathered by ‘doers’ – from sophistical maritime security arrangements. elected officials to civil servants, aid workers, Deep-seated sectarian and ethnic tensions diplomats, entrepreneurs, and military offic- continue to periodically flare up while land ers – can in turn shape research agendas and and water rights continue to trigger highly dissemination strategies. Stability thus seeks localized and urbanized forms of disorder. to meld a practical focus with the academic Throughout the world, persistent sexual excellence of a top-rated and peer-reviewed and gender-based violence, discrimination, journal. Hence, submissions from profes- and other forms of inequality continue to sional researchers are welcome alongside generate thousands of deaths that seldom contributions from experienced practition- generate meaningful responses or the levels ers, whether as full research articles, shorter of public attention and condemnation they practice notes or poignant commentaries deserve. Indeed, violence is increasingly inte- (the specifications for which are outlined in grated, simultaneous and overlapping, forc- the ‘Call for Papers’). Research articles will be ing many in the security and development peer reviewed to ensure that they genuinely establishments to rethink their normative advance theory and understanding regarding and practical frameworks of engagement. stability and related issues, though reviewers This journal – Stability – was launched will particularly comprise scholar-practition- precisely to engage with these critical de- ers who can understand that evidence can bates. Stability is not like any other journal, take many forms and that the perfect need attempting to carve out a specialized niche not be the enemy of the good. in the academic market place. Rather, Stabil- This journal explicitly tackles one addition- Muggah, Zyck, Downes / Editors’ Foreword 3 al barrier — that which prevents researchers time. Instead, each article will be published and experts in developing and fragile set- electronically as soon as it has been finalized, tings countries from contributing to and thus ensuring that information is accessible accessing international publishing outlets. as quickly as possible. However, every four Stability therefore is actively reaching out months — with Stability being published to Southern contributors, particularly those three times per year — articles will be pack- in war-torn and violence-affected societies. aged into a full issue and labeled as such. Ac- It is deliberately tailored to this audience cordingly, this journal aims to comply with and intends to facilitate inputs from non- the principles and practices of open-access native English speakers and those who find publishing, a movement which is thankfully it difficult to have their work recognized in gaining speed as the grasp of for-profit pub- traditional journals. We feel that it is by en- lishers over journals is rightly being ques- gaging with and promoting these voices that tioned and loosened. new and effective approaches to stability Finally, we are delighted that this inaugu- will emerge. Overcoming barriers to ensure ral issue reflects the energy and creativity of Southern contributions is a signal objective a number of individuals. First and foremost of this journal. We are pleased already to are the article authors, who contributed have attracted interest from authors in Latin to this issue and embraced its themes and America, Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Af- publishing model. In addition, the found- rica, whose pieces appear in this inaugural ing Editorial Board members, each of whom issue and whose work will feature in future has a distinguished record as a scholar-prac- issues. titioner, helped to steer the journal to its Stability is fully and formally registered as launch. Their inputs, from the journal´s early an academic publication in the same way as conceptualization to its delivery, have been any respected print journal. But we will not instrumental. Ubiquity Press, an innovative be printing issues. Instead, articles will be publisher working to promote open-access released electronically, as webpages and PDF scholarship, has provided technical support files. Doing so is environmentally responsi- for the website and for the design and for- ble and cost effective while also reflecting matting of the journal itself. Its commitment the basic fact that few people access bound to open-access principles bodes well for its editions of print journals. Unlike a ‘tradi- future and the future of academic publish- tional’ journal, all content published in Sta- ing. bility will be free of charge and available to We hope you find this inaugural issue in- all without a subscription. We do not charge formative regardless of whether you are an readers, and we do not charge authors un- academic, a policymaker or a practitioner. less funds specifically for publishing have al- All of us at Stability look forward to your ready been allocated by a generous research thoughts on our work and your contribu- sponsor. Furthermore, after this first issue, tions to future issues. S articles will not generally be released at one Felbab-Brown, V 2012 Slip-Sliding on a Yellow Brick Road: Stabiliza- STABILITY tion Efforts in Afghanistan.Stability, 1(1): 4-19. DOI: http://dx.doi. org/10.5334/sta.af.

article Slip-Sliding on a Yellow Brick Road: Stabilization Efforts in Afghanistan Vanda Felbab-Brown*

The ongoing transition process in Afghanistan will deliver three shocks in the com- ing few years: foreign forces will complete the handover of security responsibility to their Afghan counterparts, aid volumes and international spending in the country will decrease and, lastly, the political dispensation will be upended by presidential elections in which President Hamid Karzai is not supposed to run again. These chal- lenges are mounting at a time when, due to inconsistent international approaches and a lack of appreciation for the Afghan context, Afghanistan is dealing with rising insecurity, dysfunctional governance, rampant corruption, and ethnic factionaliza- tion within the society and the domestic security forces. Based upon a review of the security sector, governance, social and economic conditions, regional relations and negotiation efforts with the insurgents, this article finds that fundamental ques- tions about the efficacy of stabilization efforts in Afghanistan continue to lack clear answers. Regardless, significant room for improvement – both in policy and execu- tion – appears to exist. It remains to be seen whether, as many Afghans fear, a civil war will engulf Afghanistan once again in the post-transition period or whether the international community will take those steps – re-energizing governance reform ef- forts, maintaining financial support and continuing to strengthen the Afghan army and police – which could help to bolster stability.

After a decade of fighting – starting with Security Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan will the relatively easy victory over the Taliban hand over responsibility for Afghanistan’s in 2001 and then featuring an increasingly security, economic development, and gov- tough counterinsurgency campaign against ernance over to the Afghans. This transfer the reemergent Taliban – the growth of the of responsibility is taking place already via Afghan security forces has become the lynch- a so-called “Transition” process.1As yet, how- pin of the US and NATO strategy to achieve ever, the Taliban and its jihadi cohorts – the success in Afghanistan and extricate them- Haqqanis and Hezb-i-Islami – remain en- selves from the Afghanistan war. At the end trenched and robust. Although degraded by of 2014, NATO’s International Assistance the 2010 “surge” of US military forces, they still exercise substantial sway over large parts of Afghanistan. The Afghan National Security * The Brookings Institution, Forces (ANSF) are clearly making progress. 1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, DC 20036, USA But they still continue to be dependent on Felbab-Brown / Slip-Sliding on a Yellow Brick Road 5

NATO’s assistance for critical assets and ca- reduced, but international financial flows pacities; and dangerous ethnic rifts and com- – whether direct foreign aid or economies peting patronage networks continue to run spawned by the presence of the large for- through the ANSF. eign military5 – will also inevitably decline Despite the improvements of Afghan secu- with the drawdown of NATO forces military. rity forces, few Afghans believe that a better For a country that it still overwhelmingly future is on the horizon after 2014. NATO and dependent on foreign aid and illegal econo- US officials remain by and large cautiously mies for its revenues, the outcome will be optimistic about the success of the counter- a massive economic shrinkage. Although insurgency and stabilization campaign, even various efforts are now under way to cushion if acknowledging that progress is hard.2 Am- the shock, such as pledges by international bassador Ryan Crocker, who headed the US donors at the Tokyo conference in July 2012 Embassy in Afghanistan between July 2011 to provide $16 billion in foreign aid to Af- and July 2012, for example, stated at the ghanistan between 2013 and 2016, they are time of his departure that he considered the unlikely to be sufficient to offset the revenue outbreak of another civil war in Afghanistan losses. There are no easy ways to generate after 2014 unlikely.3 Yet many Afghans fear revenues and employment in Afghanistan there will be a renewed outbreak of civil war over the next three years, despite Afghani- after 2014 when the NATO presence is much stan’s mineral riches. reduced.4 Moreover, 2014 is also the year of anoth- Worse yet, Afghans have become discon- er presidential election and hence of major nected and alienated from the national power infighting, whether or not President government and the country’s other power Karzai will seek to remain in power. The fight arrangements. They are profoundly dissatis- over the remaining rents of the ending po- fied with Kabul’s inability and unwillingness litical dispensation and the need to consoli- to provide basic public services and with the date one’s support camps in anticipation of widespread corruption of the power elites. the shaky future, and hence to deliver spoils They intensely resent the abuse of power, im- to them in order to assure their allegiance, punity, and lack of justice that have become will not be conducive to consensus decision entrenched over the past decade. The initial making and broad-based good governance.6 post-Taliban period of hope and promise did A country’s government can maintain stabil- not last, as governance in Afghanistan be- ity without legitimacy purely through repres- came rapidly defined by weakly functioning sion as long as it has a sufficiently effective state institutions unable and unwilling to repressive apparatus. But given Afghani- uniformly enforce laws and policies. Charac- stan’s existing war and intense ethnic ten- teristically, official and unofficial powerbro- sions (that also permeate its security forces), kers issue exceptions from law enforcement Afghanistan does not have such a repressive to their networks of clients, who are thus apparatus. Yet the government’s legitimacy able to reap high economic benefits, and can too has been steadily declining for years, and get away even with major crimes. Murder, ex- most Afghans consider the government and tortion, and land-grabbing, often perpetrat- associated powerbrokers to represent a ve- ed by those in the government, have gone nal, abusive, and exclusionary mafia rule. unpunished. Many Afghans believe that they live under unaccountable mafia rule. Washington’s and the International The culmination of the Transition in 2014 Definition of the Mission will bring about a triple shock to Afghani- From 2001 on, the US government and other stan and its current political dispensation. members of the international coalition have Not only will ISAF forces be substantially struggled with how to define the mission in 6 Felbab-Brown / Slip-Sliding on a Yellow Brick Road

Afghanistan. For the allies, the question for toward President Karzai’s early requests that years was whether to characterize the effort Washington disempower the warlords, pro- as a peacekeeping operation (which many gressively led him to seek accommodation chose to do despite the level of insecurity in with them and gutted his will to challenge the country and a lack of peace to keep) or them. a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism The Barack Obama administration inherit- mission. For the United States, the question ed the war at a time when the military situa- was whether to set the objective as state- tion on the battlefield was going very poorly. building or as limited counterterrorism that The Taliban and Haqqani insurgencies had could be accomplished without ensuring that ramped up, and the quality of Afghan gov- a stable Afghan government was in place. ernance was progressively deteriorating.10 The George W. Bush administration vacil- And during his presidential campaign Barack lated between the two labels of the mission’s Obama emphasized Afghanistan as the im- scope. It conceived of and resourced Opera- portant, yet unfinished “war of necessity” un- tion Enduring Freedom as a limited military like the “war of choice” in Iraq he promised to intervention, confined to the removal of the terminate as fast as possible. Taliban government in order to destroy al But despite the election rhetoric, from the Qaeda’s capabilities and deprive it of a safe moment it took over, the Obama administra- haven. But the Bush administration ulti- tion struggled with some of the very same di- mately recognized that it could not just leave lemmas that perplexed the Bush administra- the country merely after driving the Taliban tion. Since al Qaeda was the primary source from Kabul. Moreover, the need to generate of terrorist threats against the United States, public support in America for the war, even was it also necessary to continue combating in the wake of 9/11, led the Bush administra- the Taliban? Could an effective counterter- tion to adopt much broader rhetoric about rorism mission be prosecuted essentially just its goals in Afghanistan, including bringing from the air and off-shore? Or was it neces- democracy to a brutally oppressed people sary to defeat the resurgent Taliban on the and emancipating its suffering women. At ground and build up a stable Afghan govern- the same time, however, it continued provid- ment? Should the US military engagement ing slim resources for the military and eco- be intensified – with the all blood, treasure, nomic efforts in the country, inadequate for and domestic-support ramifications that either responding to the growing insurgency would entail– or should the US military en- or for effective reconstruction.7 The under- gagement be significantly scaled back? resourcing deepened as the White House These competing definitions of the objec- shifted its focus to Iraq.8 tives embodied very different policies, force Moreover, even while the effort in Af- postures and military strategies, and civilian ghanistan came to take on the trappings of components such as economic development a state-building effort, the policies adopted programs. They were premised on very dif- did not sufficiently focus on promoting ferent behavior on the part of the Afghans good governance. Instead, the lack of US and created different expectations in Kabul, and international military resources, and Afghanistan, and Pakistan and among the the consequent reliance on warlords with a Western publics. The persistent oscillation long record of serious human rights abuses among them continued to complicate the in fighting the Taliban, strongly empowered Afghanistan campaign even in the Obama these powerbrokers and weakened Kabul’s administration. already tenuous writ.9 The visible embrace of After several rounds of policy reviews the warlords by the US military, and the lack on Afghanistan and Pakistan,11 the Obama of responsiveness on the part of Washington administration ultimately did decide to in- Felbab-Brown / Slip-Sliding on a Yellow Brick Road 7 crease the amount of military and economic – in some form – in at least 90 percent of resources devoted to the war, and its rhetoric all operations and leading some 40 percent about the goals in Afghanistan became far of operations, even if these were mostly the more circumscribed than that of the Bush less complex operations.13 The ANA Special administration. The strategy consisted of a Forces are the most capable component of broad counterinsurgency effort, which was the ANSF and are closest to standing on their to include a strong agricultural program. Yet, own. With much of the pre-2014 transition despite its multifaceted and comprehensive being about the gradual shift in ISAF’s mis- approach, the policy was couched in narrow sion from “combat to support,” the growth of counterterrorism terms, emphasizing mainly the ANSF is very important. But much about the need to prevent al Qaeda safe havens in its capabilities remains unknown as yet. Afghanistan. 12 Afghan National Army Security Sector The ANA has grown to 195,000 personnel. The Obama administration counterinsurgen- The current cost of the ANA and the Afghan cy strategy was embodied in a plan designed police is about twice as much as the cur- by the then-commander of ISAF forces in Af- rent GDP of Afghanistan, and for years be- ghanistan in the fall of 2009, General Stan- yond 2014 Afghanistan will depend on the ley McChrystal. The White House endorsed US and international community to foot the plan in December 2009 – albeit with far the bill for the ANSF. Also for many years to fewer resources than the general had recom- come, certainly well beyond 2014, the ANSF mended. Also over objections from the mili- will continue be deficient in several critical tary, the White House stipulated timelines domains. These include command, control, for the withdrawal of US forces. The result intelligence, air support, medical evacua- was a 30,000 US troop surge lasting through tion, logistics and maintenance, contractor August 2012 and bringing the number of for- management, battle-space integration, and eign troops in Afghanistan to approximately other specialty enablers. Without them, the 150,000 at its peak. The plan assumed that Afghan Army will be severely hampered. Cur- by the time ISAF would be transferring Af- rently, Afghan forces frequently know how to ghanistan to Afghan forces, large parts of the fight and win battles at the tactical level, but country would have been secure. Four years they yet have to learn how to fight and win later, some real progress had been achieved campaigns. The latter requires the develop- – such as in central Helmand and Kanda- ment of logistical systems, ability to combine har, both of which used to be either intense arms, and strengthened command and con- battle zones or strongly under the Taliban’s trol at the strategic level. sway. But as this article goes to press, the The 2012 spate of the so-called “green-on- territory cleared of insurgent forces that is blue attacks,” later renamed “insider attacks,” being handed over to the Afghans is much has generated pressures on limiting partner- smaller than had been projected. ing and restricting interactions between ISAF The growth of the ANSF – particularly the and ANSF forces as well as between interna- Afghan National Army (ANA) – has been one tional civilian advisors and Afghan govern- of the brightest spots of the transition pro- ment officials. In September 2012, ISAF an- cess of creating Afghan capabilities. The size nounced the end – at least temporarily – of of the ANSF has been expanding rapidly – to partnering below the battalion level. But it just over 350,000 combined, and the quality is of course below the battalion level where of military skills of the Afghan forces has also the vast majority of counterinsurgency op- been growing. As of the summer of 2012, erations, including village patrols, take place. Afghan soldiers or police were participating Such restrictions can potentially dangerously 8 Felbab-Brown / Slip-Sliding on a Yellow Brick Road

reduce the quality of training and advising police units continue to function essentially by international forces. Although NATO has as militias. Increasingly, ANP commanders, stressed that many of these attacks have been especially at the local level, are prone to reach conducted by disgruntled ANSF recruits with out to the Taliban in their areas to establish personal grudges rather than Taliban infiltra- ceasefires and hedge their bets. tors, the Taliban has been keen to appropri- The ANP critically continues to lack an ate the attacks as a purposeful component of adequate anti-crime capacity, and the anti- its insurgency strategy. crime training it receives is minimal, border- A disturbing big unknown is whether the ing on nonexistent. Instead, for a number of ANA will be able to withstand the ethnic reasons, the ANP is more of a light counter- factionalization that is already fracturing insurgency and SWAT-like counterterrorism the institution. The NATO Training mission force. Yet crime – murders, robberies, and in Afghanistan (NTM-A) has worked hard to extortion – is the bane of many Afghans’ bring the ethnic balance among the Afghan daily existence, which the Taliban is happy officer corps closer to what is believed to be to exploit to its advantage. Traditional infor- ethnic composition of the overall popula- mal justice mechanisms – themselves often tion. Apparently up to 2008, 70% of Afghan weakened by decades of war – have not been kandak commanders were Tajiks, a situation able to cope with the rise of crime, and are of that was resented by Pashtuns.14 In 2012, eth- particularly limited usefulness if crime is per- nic distribution within all senior positions – petrated by government officials and power- kandak commanders through generals (ISAF brokers. The inability of the Afghan govern- does not separate out kandak commanders ment to respond to crime such as land theft, in its latest records) – were: 42% Pashtun, extortion, and murder (as well as its own par- 29% Tajik, 13% Hazara, 8% Uzbek, and 8% ticipation in crime, of course) allows the Tali- others.15 NTM-A has also been striving to ban to impose its own brutal forms of order make the entire force ethnically balanced. and justice and develop a foothold in Afghan And while overall that is indeed the case, the communities.20 And a bigger problem yet is ANA still manages to recruit disproportion- that the ANP have been and remain notori- ately low numbers of southern Pashtuns. The ous for themselves being the perpetrators of factionalization problems within the Afghan many crimes. force, however, are more serious than merely the ethnic balance. Deep ethnic fissures and Afghan Local Police and other patronage networks run through the Afghan self-defense forces military, with segments of the force loyal to As extending security via regular Afghan se- particular top-level commanders rather than curity forces became elusive in large parts of to the institution overall or – more impor- the rural areas, ISAF has increasingly sought tantly – the government in Kabul.16 to compensate the security deficiencies by standing up irregular self-defense forces. The Afghan National Police latest version of the effort is called Afghan The Afghan National Police (ANP) has of Local Police (ALP). Numbering about 16,000 course been notorious both for such intense as of August 2012, it is slated to generate at ethnic factionalization and patronage frag- least 30,000 recruits. mentation and for general corruption.17 Its The effort is nothing new: the Soviets in the desertion rates, retention problems, illiteracy 1980s resorted to raising tribal militias when rates, and levels of drug use are much higher they realized that they were not winning in than within the ANA.18 So is the theft of equip- Afghanistan and used the militias as part of ment. Logistical problems remain acute.19 Of- an exit strategy. Indeed, Afghans overwhelm- ten under sway of local powerbrokers, many ingly associate the militia program with the Felbab-Brown / Slip-Sliding on a Yellow Brick Road 9

Soviets’ defeat and see it as yet another sig- ry of turning their force on local populations nal of the US preparing to leave without a and engaging in predatory behavior toward stable order in place.21 Since 2002, various local communities, including the theft of versions of the militia option have existed, land and goods, extortion, and murder. In such as the Afghan Auxiliary Police, the Af- Kunduz, for example, after they defeated the ghan Public Protection Program (APPP), Vil- Taliban in their villages, they started extort- lage Stabilization program, and the Commu- ing the communities and demanding taxes nity Defense Initiative, also known as Local for themselves.27 Not infrequently, they also Defense Initiative groups in some areas.22 In turn and fight each other, instead of the Tali- some of these efforts, the self-defense forces ban. One notorious case of such infighting are not supposed to be paid; but many of took place in Uruzgan in 2010.28 them insist on some sort of payment, so the Although the ALP is supervised by the non-payment rule is often adjusted.23 A great Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI), the Min- deal of skepticism is warranted about such istry has often proved unable to control the efforts.24 Great variation in the quality of the self-defense forces. The MoI, long one of Af- ALP effort and its long-term consequences ghanistan’s most corrupt and ethnically-rift are to be expected. Only sometimes can the institutions, has also sought to legitimize militias reliably accomplish the tactical ob- and formalize other militias not vetted like jective of effectively fighting the Taliban – the ALP, raising worries about intensifica- Arghandab provides an example where the tion of predatory behavior by the militias. ALP seems to be a success.25 While the district police chief has authority Tribal structures in much of Afghanistan over the ALP, police chiefs in Afghanistan are have been deeply damaged, and the commu- frequently corrupt. Hence, the affiliation be- nity often is unable to resist the Taliban phys- tween the ANP chief and ALP does little to ically. Thus, the Afghans frequently hedge ensure accountability and effective oversight. their bets by paying off part of their income In the ALP’s case, three village elders are also – including from ISAF – to the Taliban to re- supposed to vouch for each militiaman.29 Yet duce its attacks and reach a modus vivendi not infrequently a powerbroker controls the with the Taliban. Indeed, such hedging is village elders, dictating his preferences in a typical of Afghan history, with local warlords, way that escapes international scrutiny. At khans, and tribes siding and making peace other times, the village elders have no prob- with those they sense would prevail in a lem vouching for the militia members as conflict, easily breaking deals if the situation long as they only extort a rival village. on the battlefield changes. Sometimes, such accommodation between the militias and Governance Sector the Taliban even results in temporary im- The lack of resolution of the debate over provements in security in the locale, such as whether effective counterterrorism in Af- along roads, and the community welcomes ghanistan requires state-building also has it. Logar province, where such an initiative involved continuing policy oscillation over is currently under way, presents a good ex- whether to combat corruption and how. A ample.26 But the reduction in violence often decade after the US intervention, Afghani- exists only at the mercy of the Taliban and stan has become the third most corrupt the deal collapses when the Taliban chooses country in the world after Somalia and North to renege on it. Korea.30 US and Western reliance on corrupt At the same time, the militias greatly com- and abusive warlords for intelligence, logis- plicate state-building efforts and efforts to tics, and direct counterterrorism operations improve governance in Afghanistan. Self-de- has often come at the price of ignoring gov- fense forces in Afghanistan have a long histo- ernance. Some of the most notorious power- 10 Felbab-Brown / Slip-Sliding on a Yellow Brick Road

brokers, such as Ahmed Wali Karzai, Matiul- to remotely-delivered airborne counterter- lah Khan, and Gul Agha Shirzai, know how to rorist strikes could permit working through get things done to facilitate the operations of the local warlords and powerbrokers, instead the international community in Afghanistan. of being obsessed with the means they used Moreover, the large influx of Western money to acquire their power and their criminal en- disturbed with an eye toward fast burn rates tanglements and discriminatory practices.33 and without the ability to monitor the spend- Meanwhile, absent a coherent policy on ing generated its own extensive corruption. corruption, the Obama administration and Unlike the Bush administration that most- ISAF have failed to develop mechanisms and ly put anti-corruption in Afghanistan on the structures to work around and marginalize back burner,31 the Obama administration the problematic powerbrokers and often early on accorded greater importance to continues to be dependent on their services. fighting corruption in Afghanistan: build- The international community’s strategy has ing up various civilian structures, such as thus oscillated between tolerating corrup- the Major Crime Task Force, and ultimately tion for the sake of other goals – with the similar equivalent units within ISAF, such as justification that Afghans are used to corrup- its anti-corruption task force, Shafafiyat. But tion anyway– or confronting it head on, but it often demanded reform with an intensity with little effectiveness. Ignoring corruption that ignored Afghan realities and political is often justified as prioritizing stability, but complexities – a system in which the high- since corruption and the lack of rule of law est government officials as well as the lowest are key mobilizing mechanisms for the Tali- ones, line ministries, banking centers, and ban and the source of Afghans’ anger with most international contracts are pervaded their government, it is doubtful that stability by corruption.32 The Obama anti-corruption can be achieved without addressing at least campaign thus secured dramatic promises the most egregious corruption. from President Karzai to tackle corruption, with little actual follow up. Moreover, the Social and Economic Sectors lack of prioritization as to what corruption Health and education sectors have registered needs to be addressed first and definitively, some of the greatest improvements since often ignores the political debts President 2002, albeit from an extremely low baseline. Karzai owes and his internal entanglements Their continuing massive problems and de- and dependencies. Karzai thus often seeks ficiencies notwithstanding, the number of (and many times succeeds) to reverse the health facilities (however extensive the fa- anti-corruption efforts, such as indictments cilities are) in Afghanistan has grown from of powerful corrupt officials or the develop- an estimated 498 in 2002 to 2,136 in the ment of anti-corruption and anti-crime insti- spring of 2012,34 expanding access to basic tutions which the internationals are trying to health services for millions of Afghans. In stand up. 2002, only about nine percent of the popula- But as the Obama administration decided tion had such access; in 2008, the number to scale down its military presence in Af- reached an estimated 85 percent.35 The Basic ghanistan, US officials started vacillating Package of Health Services, delivered by the once again in their determination to take Afghan Ministry of Public Health, has helped on corruption. Many in the US government to reduce the infant mortality rate during the have begun to argue that tackling corruption 2001–2008 period from 172 to 77 per 1,000 is a luxury the United States can no longer live births and the mortality of children un- afford; instead it needs to prioritize stability. der the age of five from 257 to 97 deaths per This school of thought holds that limiting 1,000 live births. Maternal mortality rates the military mission in Afghanistan mostly also declined significantly, from 1,600 to 327 Felbab-Brown / Slip-Sliding on a Yellow Brick Road 11 per 100,000 births.36 Still, one in ten Afghan employed so that economic necessities do children dies before the age of five, and one not drive them to join the Taliban, and to Afghan women dies every two hours due to secure the allegiance of the population who, pregnancy-related causes.37 The number of ideally, will provide intelligence on the in- children enrolled in schools (mostly primary surgents. Although US government officials ones) is at eight million students – more than emphasize that these stabilization programs ten times the number of children enrolled in have generated tens of thousands of jobs in 2002.38 Between 2002 and 2010, the Unit- Afghanistan’s south, many of the efforts have ed States provided close to $800 million in been unsustainable short-lived programs, health assistance to Afghanistan and close such as canal cleaning and grain-storage and to $680 million in education assistance.39 Ef- road building, or small grants, such as for forts to improve the administrative capacity seeds and fertilizers. Characteristically, they of line ministries have also registered some collapse as soon as the money runs out, of- notable accomplishments, such as those of ten in the span of several weeks.41 Adequate the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and De- consideration has not been given to the de- velopment. And in some Afghan districts of velopment of assured markets; consequently intense Western supervision, service delivery much of the produce cultivated under the has improved. USAID-contracted programs will possibly not The Obama administration set out to pro- find buyers and rot. And there is no robust mote rural development, allocating about and systematic evidence that the stabiliza- a quarter billion dollars a year to the effort. tion programs have secured the allegiance of Particularly in the contested south, the ef- the population to either the Afghan govern- forts focused on providing vouchers for ment or ISAF forces, nor have they resulted wheat seed, fertilizer, and tools as well as in increased intelligence from the popula- cash-for-work programs and small grants tion on the Taliban.42 to cooperatives. Yet especially in southern Nor have these programs yet addressed the Afghanistan where counterinsurgency has structural deficiencies of the rural economy been strong, the economic development pro- in Afghanistan, including the drivers of pop- grams were plagued by vacillation between py cultivation, and Afghanistan continues to two competing understandings of the pur- be the world’s largest producer of opium.43 pose of economic development projects. Is And the latter – such as the lack of legal mi- their purpose to buy off the population and crocredit, inadequate rural infrastructure, wean it from the insurgents? Or are the pro- and no processing facilities for legal crops jects designed to produce long-term sustain- which might make them profitable – also able development? persist.44 In particular, CERP-funded and PRT- The buy-off concept – called “economic- implemented programs have tended mostly stabilization programs” – built upon the to replace government capacity rather than so-called Quick-Impact Projects (QIPs) first to grow it.45 The economic “stabilization” implemented via the Provincial Reconstruc- programs often created expectations on the tion Teams (PRTs) in 2003 and funded by the part of the population for cheap handouts US Department of Defense money from the from the central government and interna- Commander’s Emergency Response Program tional community without the programs (CERP).40 Designed to start with temporary being economically viable and sustainable economic injections, often short-term cash- in the long run and without requiring com- for-work activities, the programs were meant mitments from the local community. The re- to last weeks or at best months, and only lat- sult: persisting deep market deficiencies and er to be switched to more sustainable efforts. compromised rule of law. Overall, the vision Their goals have been to keep Afghan males of economic transformation of Afghanistan 12 Felbab-Brown / Slip-Sliding on a Yellow Brick Road

through agriculture growth has produced his government within two years, a goal re- few tangible outcomes over the decade,46 iterated at a donors’ conference in Tokyo in with over a third of the population still at July 2012, but not yet achieved.49 extreme poverty levels, and another third Even with robust security persisting after only slightly above poverty levels – no doubt, 2014 and better donor policies, Afghanistan is however, it takes a long time to reduce pov- heading toward dire straits economically – for erty levels.47 at least several years. Much of the money com- Moreover, persisting insecurity also threat- ing into Afghanistan has been associated with ens the short-term “stabilization” programs. the large presence of foreign military forces. In 2011 and 2012, for example, even in high- That money will inevitably shrink dramatically profile areas, such as Marja and Arghandab, as a result of foreign troop reductions. And so the Taliban strongly intensified a campaign will the entire economy of Afghanistan – at to assassinate Afghan government officials, least in the short term. The World Bank esti- contractors, and NGOs who cooperated with mates that even under favorable assumptions, ISAF and the Afghan government. Both the Afghanistan’s real GDP growth may fall from implementers and Afghan beneficiaries of the 9% a year over the past decade to an es- the economic programs were killed. This timated 5-6% during 2011-18.50 The total in- intimidation campaign scared off some Af- ternational current annual aid (estimated at ghans from participating in the programs. $15.7 billion in 2010) approximately equals Thus, for these stabilization programs, as for Afghanistan’s GDP and cannot be sustained. any economic development efforts, security Yet it has been foreign aid that has funded is a critical prerequisite. the delivery of essential services such as edu- A constant challenge and dilemma has cation, health, and infrastructure as well as been whether to provide money through the government administration. Afghanistan’s Afghan government – “on budget” – or di- fiscal capacity will be particularly badly hit: rectly from the international community to The World Bank projects a 25% GDP financial “the people.” In theory, channeling outside gap in Afghanistan by 2021-2022, or about financial aid through the national govern- a $7 billion annual deficit.51 Closing the gap ment is highly desirable since it can increase requires that foreign donors deliver about fiscal capacity of the state and link the popu- $7 billion annually for several years – about lation more closely to the state, building ac- $4 billion for the ANSF and another $3 mil- countability.48 Yet, the Afghan government lion for the non-security budget. At the Tokyo at its various levels has turned out to be too conference in July 2012, donors did indeed corrupt and too lacking in capacity to pro- pledge $16 billion in non-military assistance cess the money (at least what has been left for 2013-2016. Long-term economic sustaina- after the international community’s “over- bility, such as by developing a mining sector – head” deductions). Bypassing the national Afghanistan is believed to have mineral assets government and channeling money directly worth at least $1 trillion52 – or by becoming a or through NGOs has resulted at times in the new regional trading hub and resurrecting a money reaching the ground faster (though New Silk Road,53 depends on security and, in not necessarily in a less corrupt manner). But both cases, is a long way off. it also has undermined the government’s au- thority and capacity and often has strength- Regional Efforts ened local powerbrokers. At the July 2010 For two decades now, Pakistan’s government donor conference in Kabul, President Karzai (or at least parts of it) has been coddling the won a pledge from the international commu- Afghan Taliban, Hekmatyar’s groups, and the nity in which at least fifty percent of all eco- Haqqanis. Its relationship with the Haqqani nomic assistance will be channeled through network has been particularly tight. More Felbab-Brown / Slip-Sliding on a Yellow Brick Road 13 than merely allowing the groups to enjoy and economic aid to Pakistan,57 whether safe havens in the Federally-Administered defined as a transactional payment or the Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber-Pashtunkwa, undergirding of a strategic partnership, the Baluchistan, and Karachi – and fundraise in United States received little systematic and Pakistan – the ISI has also provided logistical committed cooperation from Pakistan in support, armaments, and technical and plan- return, even on key issues. For dealing with ning advice to the insurgents.54 the Pakistan-based al Qaeda and other anti- As in the case of Afghanistan, the Obama American militants in the Afghanistan war, administration inherited a deteriorated secu- the Obama administration was basically left rity situation in Pakistan. The country’s struc- with the option of intensifying its drone tural problems had also deepened, its polity strikes across the Afghanistan-Pakistan bor- was fractured, and after decades of misman- der. Although purportedly highly effective in agement the state had been hollowed out. decimating al Qaeda’s leadership structure, And the strategic trust deficit plagued the the policy also came with the cost of further bilateral relationship. But in Pakistan US lev- alienating the Pakistani leadership and pub- erage was considerably more limited than it lic from the United States.58 was in Afghanistan. President-elect Barack Obama and his for- Negotiations with the Taliban and eign policy advisers had hoped to launch a Post-2014 Stabilization Efforts in new initiative to embed the Afghanistan ef- Afghanistan fort in a regional security framework that In and after 2014, Afghanistan will face a tri- included Pakistan and India. That effort was ple earthquake: an economic shock, a likely quickly thwarted both by the Mumbai at- security rupture, and a political crisis as high- tacks in November 2011 perpertated by Paki- ly contentious (and in the last round in 2009 stani Lakshar-e-Taiba and linked to Pakistan’s highly fraudulent and illegitimate) presiden- intelligence services, the Inter-Service Intelli- tial elections are to take place. The United gence (ISI) and by India’s desire to be treated States and the international community have by Washington on its own terms and not in pledged not to abandon Afghanistan after conjunction with Pakistan.55 2014; yet many questions surround the level Nor was the Obama administration suc- and type of US and international level en- cessful in persuading the Pakistani leader- gagement. The precise nature of US and ISAF ship that the US wanted to be a genuine military support for the ANSF after 2014, long-term partner of Pakistan. Indeed, the for example, has not yet been exactly deter- location of bin Laden’s compound – so close mined. In May 2012, at the signing of the to Pakistan’s military and intelligence instal- US-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement, lations in the heart of Pakistan – only raised President Barack Obama spoke of “steady further suspicions in Washington that Paki- military reductions”59 in US troop levels in stan’s duplicity was so great as to undermine Afghanistan after the end of 2012. President top US government priorities (e.g., the cam- Obama also stated that the US military forces paign against al Qaeda and bin Laden). Even remaining in Afghanistan after 2014, pend- though he had sought for years to build up ing the signing of a US-Afghan Bilateral Se- a positive relationship between the United curity Agreement, would focus on only “two States and Pakistan, the former US Chairman narrow security missions” – counterterrorism of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mul- and training of ANSF.60 But if the post-2014 len, felt compelled before retiring to call the mission is narrowly focused on counterterror- Haqqanis “a veritable arm of the ISI.”56 ism operations, any remaining mentoring ca- Overall, after a decade of some $21 billion pacity will be severely undermined, as likely in defense assistance and reimbursements will be the overall ANSF capacity.61 14 Felbab-Brown / Slip-Sliding on a Yellow Brick Road

A US and ISAF rush out of Afghanistan, the many debts to the global jihadist movement. US-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agree- The death of bin Laden may have weakened ment notwithstanding, will also increase some of the networks, but reneging on these chances that the negotiations with the Tali- debts to their global jihadi brothers will be ban will produce a bad, unstable deal that costly. The Taliban can agree to many things, compromises whatever progress has been but what will it uphold? The lesser and more achieved in Afghanistan and one that the narrowly-defined the presence of the inter- Taliban will violate. Determined to avoid ne- national community after 2014, the lesser its gotiating from a position of weakness – and capacity to roll back any violation of the peace waiting for the Taliban was degraded on the deal. And such violations do not have to be battlefield first62 – the United States hesitated blatant takeovers of territory – after 2014, as a long time before reluctantly agreeing to be- now, the Taliban can exercise a lot of influence gin them in 2009. But the ensuing talks with through a far more subtle intimidation. the Taliban (and reportedly also at least feelers Meanwhile, the negotiating processes have with the Haqqanis) have mainly amounted to so far produced far more fear than confidence. talking about talking despite repeated feelers President Karzai has felt extremely threat- from the various factions of the Taliban.63 The ened by the Taliban preference to negotiate Taliban’s willingness to seriously negotiate with the United States. Despite Washington’s has also been lukewarm and conflicted. It has extensive efforts to bring Kabul to the table repeatedly called for faster confidence-build- and reassure the suspicions of the Arg Palace, ing measures, such as the release of Taliban President Karzai has not trusted Washington prisoners by the United States, some of which not to leave him high and dry by signing a may be currently under way.64 separate deal with the Taliban. Ironically, as Too much is unknown at this point about much as the Arg Palace is suspicious of ne- what the Taliban could settle for. Certainly, gotiations, so are Afghan minority groups it will be loath to give up any influence it extremely leery of any negotiations with the already has in large parts of the country. It Taliban. Memories of the Taliban’s brutal rule may also be leery of simply being allowed to of the 1990s and the Northern Alliance’s fight participate in elections, especially at the local against the Taliban loom large in their minds, level. Its strengths often lie far more in being and they also fear the loss of military and eco- a spoiler than in delivering good governance nomic power they accumulated during the beyond order and rough justice. The Taliban 2000s. Key northern leaders may prefer a war faces some tough dilemmas in agreeing to a to a deal that they would see as compromising compromise with Kabul, such as accepting their security and power. Many in the north the Afghan constitution. Such a prospect and are actively arming and resurrecting their pa- an overt power sharing deal with Kabul will tronage networks and militias. Many civil soci- discredit the group in the eyes of many of its ety groups, including women’s organizations, fighters as well as in the eyes of the broader equally lament being left out of the process.66 population to whom it appeals on the basis of Few are satisfied with the performance of its claim to be fighting against Kabul’s venal, the High Peace Council that President Karzai predatory, and unjust rule. Similarly, whether designated to integrate the various Afghan the Taliban will be able to abide by the inter- voices into the negotiations and to promote nationals redlines, including breaking with al a broad-based societal reconciliation. Under Qaeda, is still a major question mark. the current circumstances, negotiations with Elements of the Taliban, especially the Kan- the Taliban are not likely to prove a strategic dahari ones, may well have learned that their game-changer. association with al Qaeda ultimately cost Fundamental questions about Afghani- them their power,65 but the group also owes stan stabilization thus continue to be unan- Felbab-Brown / Slip-Sliding on a Yellow Brick Road 15 swered. It yet remains to be seen whether it 6 That is, a system of rule broadly accept- is the fears of many Afghans that another able to the population and based on its civil war is coming or the optimism of the informed consent. international community that Afghanistan 7 For excellent discussions of the limited re- is strong enough to withstand the post-2014 sources, increasing ambitions, and mount- shocks that will turn out correct. But one ing challenges during the Bush years see thing is clear: The faster the international Dov Zakheim, A Vulcan’s Tale: How the community rushes out of Afghanistan eco- Bush Administration Mismanaged the nomically and militarily and the more it con- Reconstruction of Afghanistan (Washing- tinues to underemphasize the need to im- ton, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, prove governance in Afghanistan, the more 2011); and Ronald Neumann, The Other likely it will be the former. S War: Winning and Losing in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: 2009). See also Bob NOTES Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002); and James Dobbins, 1 The term “Transition” is at times used After Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghani- differently by various stakeholders in Af- stan (Washington: Potomac Books, 2008). ghanistan policy. NATO frequently uses 8 Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires the term in a restricted sense as a military (New York: Norton, 2009). phase to be followed by Redeployment. 9 Kathy Gannon, “Afghanistan Unbound,” For- The United States government often uses eign Affairs, 83(3), May-June 2004: 35-47. the term more broadly as one pillar of a 10 For the increase in international military larger political engagement with Afghan- casualties, Afghan civilian casualties, and istan. And President Karzai sometimes the number of insurgent attacks from uses the expression to denote the period 2001 through 2008, see icasualties.org; through 2014, after which he talks about and Ian Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, Transformation. When I use the term in Afghanistan Index, July 31, 2012, http:// the article I mean more broadly the en- www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/ tire process – before and after 2014 – of foreign%20policy/afghanistan%20in- handing responsibility for security, po- dex/index20120731.pdf. litical, and economic affairs over to the 11 For the administration’s internal debates Afghan government as well as any result- and deep continuing rifts within it on Af- ing changes in the security, political, and ghanistan policy, see Bob Woodward, Oba- economic order in Afghanistan the pro- ma’s Wars (New York: Simon and Schuster, cess will produce. 2010); and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little 2 Interviews with ISAF officials, Kabul, April America: The War Within the War for Af- 2012 and with US officials, Washington, ghanistan (New York: Knopf, 2012); and DC, March and April 2012. Michael Hastings, “The Runaway General,” 3 Deb Riechmann, “AP Interview: Afghan Rolling Stones, June 22, 2010. Civil War Unlikely, US Says,” Associated 12 For details, see CQ Transcript Wires, “Oba- Press, July 12, 2012. ma Announces New Afghanistan, Paki- 4 Interviews in Afghanistan with Afghans stan Strategies,” Washington Post, March from all walks of life, Kabul, Nangarhar, 27, 2009. Herat, Balkh, and Baghlan, April 2012. 13 Michael O’Hanlon, “Afghan National Se- 5 These include, for instance, spending on curity Forces: A Glass 55% Full,” Testimo- construction and logistical services which ny before the Subcommittee on Oversight have been major sources of employment and Investigations of the House Armed and taxable revenue for the Afghan gov- Services Committee, June 29, 2012. ernment. 16 Felbab-Brown / Slip-Sliding on a Yellow Brick Road

14 Antonio Giustozzi, “Afghanistan’s Na- 22 For details on the Afghan Population tional Army: The Ambiguous Prospects of Protection Program, see Mathieu Lefèvre, Afghanization,” Terrorism Monitor, 6(9), “The Afghanistan Public Protection Pro- May 1, 2008. gram and the Local Defense Initiative,” 15 Communication with NTM-A officials, in Martine van Bijlert and Sari Kouvo, July 2012. eds., Snapshots of an Intervention: The 16 Interviews with Afghan military officers, Unlearned Lessons of Afghanistan’s Dec- Kandahar, Baghlan, and Kabul, Fall 2010. ade of Assistance (2001-2011) (Kabul: Af- For ethnic rifts in the ANA, especially at ghanistan, 2012): 74-79. the command level, see, International 23 See, for example, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Crisis Group, A Force in Fragments: Re- “U.S. Training Afghan Villagers to Fight the constituting the Afghan National Army, Taliban,” Washington Post, April 27, 2010. Asia Report No. 190, May 12, 2010. 24 For a strong endorsement of the pro- 17 See also International Crisis Group, Re- gram, see, for example, Maj. Jim Gant, forming Afghanistan’s Police, Internation- “One Tribe at a Time,” Small Wars Jour- al Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 138, August nal Blog, http://www.stevenpressfield. 30, 2007, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/ com/2009/10/one-tribe-at-a-time-4-the- media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghani- full-document-at-last/. stan/138_reforming_afghanistan_s_po- 25 Luke Mogelson, “Bad Guys vs. Worse Guys lice.pdf; and Andrew Wilder, Cops and in Afghanistan,” New York Times, October Robbers: The Struggle to Reform the Af- 19, 2011. ghan National Police, AREU Issues Paper 26 Author’s interviews with maliks from Series, July 2007, http://www.areu.org. Logar, September 2010. af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/717E-Cops%20 27 See, for example, Dexter Filkins, “Afghan or%20Robbers-IP-print.pdf. Militias Battle Taliban with Aid of U.S.,” 18 Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Tal- New York Times, November 21, 2009. iban Governance, Security, and US Policy, 28 Author’s interviews in Afghanistan in Congressional Research Service, May 3, September 2010. 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ 29 Kim Sengupta, “Allies Target Lapsed Tali- RL30588.pdf: 36. ban as They Set Up Own Militia,” The In- 19 Department of Defense, Report on Pro- dependent, October 25, 2010. gress toward Security and Stability in 30 Transparency International, 2011 Corrup- Afghanistan, April 2012, http://www.de- tion Perceptions Index, http://cpi.trans- fense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_Sec- parency.org/cpi2011/results/. Def_04_26_10.pdf: 32. 31 Heather Barr, “Settling for Nothing: In- 20 See, for example, Sarah Chayes, The Punish- ternational Support for Anti-Corruption ment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After Efforts,” in Martine van Bijlert and Sari Taliban (New York: Penguin Press, 2006); Kouvo, eds., Snapshots of an Interven- Stephen Carter and Kate Clark, “No Short- tion: The Unlearned Lessons of Afghani- cut to Stability: Justice, Politics, and Insur- stan’s Decade of Assistance (2001-2011) gency in Afghanistan,” Chatham House, De- (Kabul: Afghanistan, 2012): 181-186. cember 2010, http://www.chathamhouse. 32 For an extraordinary case of corruption org/sites/default/files/public/Research/ even by Afghan standards, see Dexter Asia/1210pr_afghanjustice.pdf. Filkins, “The Afghan Bank Heist,” New 21 Author’s interviews with Afghans from Yorker, February 14, 2011. all walks of life about the militia pro- 33 See, for example, interview with un- gram in Kandahar, Kabul, Nangarhar, and named US officials in Greg Jaffe, “U.S. to Baghlan, September 2010 and April 2012. Temper Stance on Afghan Corruption,” Felbab-Brown / Slip-Sliding on a Yellow Brick Road 17

Washington Post, September 4, 2010; tion, 2009); and Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Af- and Greg Miller and Joshua Partlow, “CIA ghanistan Trip Report VI – Counternarcot- Making Secret Payments to Members of ics Policy in Afghanistan: A Good Strategy Karzai Administration,” Washington Post, Poorly Implemented,” The Brookings Insti- August 27, 2010; and Dexter Filkins and tution, May 10, 2012, http://www.brook- Mark Mazzetti, “Key Karzai Aide in Cor- ings.edu/research/opinions/2012/05/10- ruption Inquiry Is Linked to C.I.A.,” New counternarcotics-felbabbrown. York Times, August 25, 2010. 44 Interviews with US and Canadian govern- 34 Department of Defense, Report on Pro- ment officials and representatives of the gress: 84. international development companies 35 World Bank, “Building on Basics in Health charged with the economic stabiliza- Care,” June 2009, http://web.worldbank. tion programs, Kandahar, Helmand, and org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ Nangarhar, Spring 2009, Fall 2010, and IDA/0,,contentMDK:21289162~menuPK Spring 2012. :3266877~pagePK:51236175~piPK:4373 45 Barbara Stapleton, “A Means to What 94~theSitePK:73154,00.html. End? Why PRTs Are Peripheral to the Big- 36 Department of Defense, Report on Pro- ger Governance Challenges in Afghani- gress: 85. stan,” Journal of Military and Strategic 37 Ibid. Studies 10 (1), Fall 2007. 38 Ibid.: 86. 46 Paula Kantor and Adam Pain, “Rethinking 39 Majority Staff Report, Committee on For- Rural Poverty Reduction in Afghanistan,” eign Relations, US Senate, Evaluating U.S. AREU Policy Note Series, October 2011, Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan, June http://www.areu.org.af/UpdateDownloa- 8, 2011: 28. dHits.aspx?EditionId=564&Pdf=1127E- 40 In 2010, approximately $1 billion was ap- Rethinking Rural Poverty Reduction in propriated to CERP. See Colin Cookman Afghanistan PN October 2011.pdf. and Caroline Wadhams, Governance in 47 United Nations Office of the High Com- Afghanistan: Looking Ahead to What We missioner for Human Rights, Human Leave Behind, Center for American Pro- Rights Dimension of Poverty in Afghani- gress, May 12, 2010, http://www.ameri- stan, March 2010, http://unama.unmis- canprogress.org/issues/2010/05/pdf/ sions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20 afghangovernance.pdf: 30. rights/Poverty%20Report%2030%20 41 Interviews with US and Canadian govern- March%202010_English.pdf. ment officials and representatives of the 48 For such an argument, see, for example, international development companies Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing charged with the economic stabiliza- Failed States (Oxford: Oxford University tion programs, Kandahar and Helmand, Press, 2008). Spring 2009 and Fall 2010. 49 Karen DeYoung and Joshua Partlow, 42 Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder, Win- “Karzai Pledges Reforms in Exchange for ning Hearts and Minds? Examining the International Backing at Afghan Confer- Relationship between Aid and Security ence,” Washington Post, July 20, 2010. in Afghanistan, Feinstein International 50 World Bank, Transition in Afghanistan: Center, Tufts University, January 2012. Looking Beyond 2014: Executive Summa- 43 For details on Afghanistan’s opium econ- ry, November 18, 2011, http://siteresourc- omy and efforts to counter it since the es.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/ 1980s, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Resources/305984-1297184305854/AF- Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Transition.pdf:1. Drugs (Washington, DC: Brookings Institu- 51 Ibid: 2. 18 Felbab-Brown / Slip-Sliding on a Yellow Brick Road

52 James Risen, “U.S. Identified Vast Mineral erine Tiedemann, The Year of the Drone: Riches in Afghanistan,” New York Times, An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strike in Paki- June 13, 2010. stan, 2004-2010, Counterterrorism Strat- 53 For a strong endorsement of such an ap- egy Initiative Paper, New America Foun- proach, see Frederick Starr and Andrew dation, February 24, 2010; Peter Bergen Kuchins, “The Key to Success in Afghani- and Jennifer Rowland, “CIA War Drone stan: A Modern Silk Road Strategy,” Central in Pakistan in Sharp Decline,” CNN. Asia- Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Paper, com, March 28, 2012, http://edition. May 2010, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/ cnn.com/2012/03/27/opinion/bergen- new/docs/silkroadpapers/1005Afghan. drone-decline/index.html?iref=allsearch; pdf. For the continuing regional frictions, and Avery Plaw, Matthew Fricker, and see Marvin Weinbaum, “The Regional Di- Brian Glyn Williams, “Practices Makes mension in Afghan Stability,” in Beata Perfect?: The Changing Civilian Toll of Górka-Winter and Bartosz WiŚniewski, eds. CIA Drone Strikes in Pakistan,” Perspec- Afghanistan in Transition: Crafting A Strat- tives on Terrorism, 5(5-6), 2011, http:// egy for Enduring Stability (Warsaw: PISM, www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index. 2012): 81-92. php/pot/article/view/practice-makes- 54 See, for example, Matt Waldman, “The perfect/html. Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between 59 President Obama, “Address to the Na- Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents,” tion from Afghanistan,” May 1, 2012, London School of Economics, Crisis http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- States Research Center, Discussion Paper office/2012/05/01/remarks-president- No. 18, June 2010, http://www.aljazeera. address-nation-afghanistan. com/mritems/Documents/2010/6/13/ 60 President Obama, “Address to the Na- 20106138531279734lse-isi-taliban.pdf; tion from Afghanistan,” May 1, 2012, and Steve Coll, “Letter from Afghanistan: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- War by Other Means,” The New Yorker, office/2012/05/01/remarks-president- May 24, 2010. For background on how address-nation-afghanistan. and why Pakistan’s policy of using non- 61 See David Barno and Andrew Exum, Re- state militant actors to prosecute its for- sponsible Transition: Security U.S. Inter- eign policy evolved, see Deadly Embrace: ests in Afghanistan Beyond 2014, CNAS, Pakistan, America, and the Future of December 2010, http://www.cnas.org/ Global Jihad (Washington, DC: The Brook- files/documents/publications/CNAS_Re- ings Institution, 2011). sponsibleTransition_BarnoExum_2.pdf. 55 For background on this policy, see Ash- 62 See also Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “’Little ley Tellis, “The Merits of Dehyphenation: America’: Infighting on Obama Team Explaining U.S. Success in Engaging In- Squandered Chance for Peace in Afghani- dia and Pakistan,” Washington Quarterly, stan,” Washington Post, June 24, 2012. 31(4), Autumn 2008: 21-42. DOI: http:// 63 On the various efforts so far see, for ex- dx.doi.org/10.1162/wash.2008.31.4.21. ample, International Crisis Group, Talk- 56 Elisabeth Bumiller and Jane Perlez, “Paki- ing about Talks: Toward a Political Set- stan’s Spy Agency Is Tied to Attack on U.S. tlement in Afghanistan, Asia Report No. Embassy,” New York Times, September 221, March 26, 2012. 22, 2011. 64 Interviews with high-level ISAF officers, 57 Susan Epstein and Alan Krondstadt, Paki- Kabul, April 2012. See also Stephen Had- stan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, Congression- ley and John Podesta, “The Right Way out al Research Service, Washington, DC, 2011. of Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, 91(4), 58 See, for example, Peter Bergen and Kath- July-August 2012: 41-53. Felbab-Brown / Slip-Sliding on a Yellow Brick Road 19

65 Michael Semple, “‘Al Qaeda Is a Plague’: Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970-2010 A Remarkable Insight into the Mind of (London: C. Hurst & Co.: 2011). a Senior Member of the Afghan Taliban 66 For a cross-section of Afghan societal Movement,” New Statesman, 141(5114), attitudes toward the negotiations, see July 16, 2012: 32-35; and Alex van Lin- Hamish Nixon, “Afghan Perspectives on schoten and Felix Kuehn, An Enemy Achieving a Durable Peace,” USIP Peace- We Created: The Myth of the Taliban/al brief No. 94, June 3, 2011. Mac Ginty, R 2012 Against Stabilization. Stability, 1(1): 20-30. DOI: STABILITY http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ab.

article Against Stabilization Roger Mac Ginty*

This is a polemic against the concept and practice of stabilization as practiced by leading states from the global north in peace support interventions. It is not an ar- gument against stability. Instead, it depicts stabilization as an essentially conserva- tive doctrine that runs counter to its stated aims of enhancing local participation and legitimacy. It is an agenda of control that privileges notions of assimilation with international (western) standards and mainstreams the military into peace-support operations. As a result, the value of peace is undercut.

This is not an argument in favor of instabil- of stabilization locating much of the expla- ity. Instead, it is an argument against the nation in the fallout of the War on Terror. The specific policies enacted under the name thrust of the article raises an important ques- of ‘stabilization’. In particular, this polemic tion: why is so much international interven- discusses why western states and organiza- tion based on the notion of control and sta- tions have fetishized control and order with bilization rather than notions that promote consequences for peace, liberty and localized emancipation, autonomy, and dissent? It autonomy. Our interest in stability, and the seems that stabilization is axiomatically con- often draconian stabilization policies pur- nected with foreign policy stances that tend sued in societies emerging from conflict and to prioritize national interests. As a result, an authoritarianism, says much about us. internal contradiction (and therefore failure) The article is offered in the spirit of debate rests in the heart of stabilization. and reflection. It begins by noting how the concept of peace has been side-lined in re- Whatever happened to peace? cent years and has been supplanted by ‘sta- One doesn’t need to be a disciple of Foucault, bilization’, ‘security’ and other concepts that Bourdieu or other dead French philosophers are based on ideas of control. The article then to realize that words matter. The fortunes of charts how the term stabilization has entered the word ‘peace’ seem to be at a low-ebb. This the peacemaking and peacebuilding lexicon. is not to romanticize the term peace. Human The term lacks definitional clarity and is of- history has seen enough instances of victors’ ten found alongside a broad range of security peace to know that ‘peace’ is often won on and peace-related terms. The article explains the battlefield or enforced through a secret the ascendancy of the term, and the practice police. In the first century AD, the Roman historian Tacitus observed the following in * University of Manchester, Oxford Road, the aftermath of the Roman subjugation of Manchester, M13 9PL, United Kingdom. ancient Britain: ‘The Romans created a de- [email protected] Mac Ginty / Against Stabilization 21 sert, and called it peace’ (Mac Ginty 2006: Iraq, Haiti, Cambodia, Burundi and Sudan 12–32). If we fast forward two millennia languish near the bottom of Transparency In- then we can see other instances in which cit- ternational’s 2011 Corruption Index despite ies have been razed and populations cleared being recipients of significant international to secure ‘peace’. Colonel Jeffrey Martindale attention (Transparency International 2011). of the US Army noted the results of the 2010 The chief point is that the results of interna- military surge in Afghanistan thus: ‘We just tional intervention have been patchy at best obliterated those towns. They’re not there despite the expenditure of blood, money and at all. These are just parking lots right now’ prestige. The cumulative experience has had a (cited in Partlow and Brulliard 2010). Similar series of impacts on the ambition and optimism strategies have been used to pacify Grozny associated with international intervention. and Aleppo. While both ancient and modern Recent policy documents by international leaders have used force to make ‘peace’, in re- organizations underscore this new realism. cent years there have been further erosions There has been a rowing back from a rigid of the term ‘peace’. acceptance of western statebuilding and In part this might be because of a punc- governance norms. The term ‘good enough turing of the hubris surrounding the liberal governance’ has crept into the governance interventionism of the late 1990s and first lexicon, suggesting minimally acceptable decade of this century. The quagmires of Iraq standards rather than an exhaustive list of and Afghanistan, and the global financial cri- institutional standards fragile contexts are sis, have tempered the optimism of would- expected to meet (Grindle 2005). There has be interventionists. The appetite for open- also been a recognition of the utility and le- ended overseas interventions is very much gitimacy of forms of governance that admit diminished. There is a greater understanding the importance of indigenous, customary or that conflicts cannot be easily ‘solved’, and traditional decision-making processes (Mac that ameliorative efforts are required to be Ginty 2008). The 2011 New Deal for Engage- multidimensional and long-term. Interna- ment in Fragile States lowers expectations by tional organizations and bilateral donors noting how ‘basic governance transforma- show a more nuanced understanding of con- tions may take 20–40 years’ and that ‘overly flict and its links with development (see, for technocratic’ interventions have failed to example, World Bank 2011). make sustainable connections with popula- A quick survey of states that have experi- tions in societies undergoing post-conflict enced post-conflict and post-authoritarian transitions (OECD 2011). The United Nations international interventions shows that many Development Program’s 2011 Governance lag in indicators on democratization and for Peace report also moves away from top- transparency. This is despite substantial and down prescriptive rigidity by observing that sustained international peace-support, tran- ‘responsive institutions are close to the peo- sition and governance interventions. The ple and so the emphasis is on local govern- 2012 Freedom House indicators list Afghani- ance’ (UNDP 2011). The World Bank’s 2011 stan, Cambodia, Côte d’Ivoire, Iraq, Rwanda, World Development Report recognizes the South Sudan and Tajikistan – all states that importance of ‘best-fit approaches appropri- have received substantial international assis- ate to the local political context’. In a break tance – as being ‘not free’. All five states in from the prescriptive tone of the World Bank which the UN Peacebuilding Commission has in the 1990s, the World Development Report been active (Burundi, Central African Repub- cautions ‘Don’t let perfection be the enemy lic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra of progress – embrace pragmatic, best-fit Leone) are ranked as ‘partly free’ (Freedom options to address immediate challenges’ House 2012). Nepal, Angola, Afghanistan, and highlights the importance of ‘inclusive 22 Mac Ginty / Against Stabilization

enough coalitions’ and ‘local participatory was the period of inclusive peace processes practices’ (World Bank 2011). in which combatants were urged to come in Indeed, the phrase ‘good enough’ has ap- from the cold and negotiate. It was, as John peared with increasing frequency in relation Darby (1996) observed, a time for the ‘weak to Afghanistan. The former British Defence smile and a hard swallow’: De Klerk met Man- Minister, Liam Fox, noted that Afghanistan dela, Arafat met Rabin, Adams met British gov- could expect ‘good enough security’ (cited in ernment ministers. The decline of Cold War BBC 2010). In 2012, the White House, State proxy conflicts allowed international actors Department and Pentagon were all reported space in which to encourage negotiated set- to be using the phrase ‘Afghan good enough’ tlements, for example, Angola, Mozambique, as a shorthand for a lowered benchmark Guatemala and El Salvador. The 1990s saw a that would enable a swifter exit (Cooper and massive extension of the number and remit Shanker 2012). of internationally-supported peacebuilding In one respect, this ‘good enoughery’ sug- operations. While not an era of sweetness gests that lesson learning exercises have and light, it did seem as though negotiated taken root in diplomatic capitals and in the settlements were internationally-condoned. headquarters of international organizations. Virtually all of the peace accords recorded by Policies are being linked more closely to the the Peace Accords Matrix involved some sort capability of international actors to deliver of international recognition or verification of and expectations are being managed. Yet, implementation (PAM 2012). there is another reading of this new realism: The events of and response to 9/11 that there has been a significant retreat from changed international (mainly US) attitudes the essential goals of international interven- to inclusive peace negotiations. The interna- tion and a refocusing on liberal internation- tional space that had encouraged combatants alism-lite, or a stripped-down budget version to investigate negotiated settlements became of intervention. In some cases, it as though more closed. The War on Terror ushered in the exit strategy has become the central a renewed Manichean era of them versus us plank of the mandate. It is worth re-stressing (see, for example, Bush 2001). This had ob- that none of this is to romanticize a golden vious and well-documented impacts in Af- era of international intervention in which ghanistan and Iraq. Many other regimes, from pure notions of peace were pursued. Such Nepal to Zimbabwe, saw the opportunity to an era never existed. The pursuit of peace use the War on Terror narrative to their own has always had to contend with the prosaic advantage (Falk 2003; Darby 2012). Counter- realities of the facts on the ground, limited terrorism and counter-insurgency were used budgets, shifting policy priorities and demo- as smokescreens to deny rights and avoid graphic conundrums that pit communities negotiations. The concepts of neutrality and against one another. humanitarian space became constrained. The Yet if peace has always been unfashionable line between combatants and non-combat- among foreign policy elites, it has become ants has always been blurred, but the armed even more so in recent decades. Multiple fac- humanitarianism of the Provincial Recon- tors account for this. The world is no stranger struction Teams in Afghanistan blurred this to Manichean worldviews, with individuals line even further. For many Iraqis and Afghans and societies often reaching for oppositional the United Nations was just another part of a binaries to understand social phenomena: western coalition, with the result that attacks good versus evil, rational versus irrational, and on UN and humanitarian personnel have in- modern versus traditional etc. Yet, there were creased markedly over the past decade. signs in the 1990s that Manichean worldviews The chief point is that peace became sub- were eroding in western capitals. The 1990s jugated to other concerns such as winning Mac Ginty / Against Stabilization 23 the War on Terror or acquiring quiescent al- Department to pool knowledge from the lies. Of course, the term ‘peace’ and the sub- Iraq and Afghanistan experiences. In 2011 discipline of Peace Studies have always been the State Department established a Bureau regarded with some suspicion; something of for Conflict and Stabilization Operations into a hippie holdout while others got on with which S/CRS would be folded. the serious business of policy and ‘solutions’. The S/CRS mandate was to ‘lead, coordi- Yet by the mid-1990s peace based on nego- nate and institutionalize US Government tiations was about as fashionable as it was civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for possible for the awkward kid to become. A post-conflict situations, and to help stabi- quick perusal of the list of Nobel Peace Prize lize and reconstruct societies in transition winners in the 1990s attests to the interna- or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable tional affirmation of negotiated settlements path toward peace, democracy and a market (FW de Klerk and Nelson Mandela; Yassir Ara- economy’ (Pascual 2005). The mission state- fat, Shimon Peres, and Yitzhak Rabin; John ment is interesting in that it does not explic- Hume and David Trimble; and Carlos Filipe itly mention military actors. The mandate is Ximenes Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta). expansive in that it encompasses on-going conflicts and transitions, as well as conflict Enter Stabilization prevention. The S/CRS invocation of peace, democracy and a market economy is reveal- The term ‘stabilization’ has crept into the ing as it locates stabilization firmly the ‘lib- governance and intervention parlance eral peace’ paradigm. The liberal peace is steadily since the mid-1990s. The term was taken as short-hand for the dominant form commonly used in relation to economies of peacemaking favoured by leading states, undergoing the shock doctrine of rapid lib- international financial institutions and inter- eralization and the sweeping away of state national organizations. It uses a language of support (Klein 2007). Stabilization, in this re- liberalism (hence the phrase ‘liberal peace’) spect, was about controlling hyperinflation, and emphasizes the importance of democ- paring back the state and ensuring that post- ratization, transparent institutions, and Soviet sphere states were integrated into an free markets. ordered, open economic system. In relation But stabilization is by no means a US pre- to peace and conflict, the term truly ‘arrived’ serve. Two United Nations missions have with the establishment in January 1996 of adopted the phrase ‘stabilization’: the UN the Stabilization Force (SFOR) for Bosnia and Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) Herzegovina. Its association with the military and the UN Organization Stabilization Mis- alliance NATO is telling; it was inflected by sion in the Democratic Republic of Congo a military paradigm of security rather than a (MONUSCO). The UN-affiliated Peace Op- more optimistic peace paradigm. ‘Stabiliza- erations Training Institute in Turin offers a tion’ was embraced in the US policy commu- ‘Stabilization and Reconstruction Manage- nity. In 2003 the US Army Peacekeeping Insti- ment Senior Course’. The Government of the tute was renamed the US Army Peacekeeping United Kingdom has a cross-departmental and Stability Operations Institute (Schultz Stabilization Unit, comprised of personnel and Agoglia 2006: 23). Peacekeeping had be- from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, come a domestically unpopular term. Stabili- the Ministry of Defence and the Department zation was further internalized by the policy for International Development. It defines community with the publication of a new US stabilization as ‘the process of establishing Army Field Manual on ‘Stability Operations’ peace and security in countries affected by (US Army 2009). In 2004 an Office of the conflict and instability. It is the promotion of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabili- peaceful political settlement to produce a le- zation (S/CRS) was created within the State 24 Mac Ginty / Against Stabilization

gitimate indigenous government, which can nition has to be quite broad: an international serve its people. Stabilization often requires endeavour to stop conflict, embed peace and external joint military and civilian support’ routinize a functioning state that operates (Stabilization Unit 2012). In 2000 the Euro- according to strictures of good governance. pean Union established its Community Assis- Most definitions mention the input of local tance for Reconstruction, Development and actors in conferring legitimacy to a stabilized Stabilization (CARDS) scheme for the west- dispensation. What definitions like this fail ern Balkans. This was followed by a process to do, and what this article seeks to address, of Stabilization and Association Agreements is the underlying ideological and power dy- for countries of the region. While much of namics that underpin stabilization. the focus was on economic stabilization and The ascent of stabilization needs to be ex- preparing the way for eventual EU member- amined within the wider context of the se- ship, the EU conceptualization of stabiliza- curitization of aid and peace-support inter- tion includes an interest in security (Council vention. Securitization is the prioritization of the European Union 2000). of security and the security lens, especially In one respect there is a good deal of com- in the development and aid spheres where forting optimism within the definitions of traditionally notions of empathy and moral stabilization, and the term ‘peace’ retains a compassion held sway. Securitization, or a se- position in many of them. What is noticeable curity-led paradigm, is not new and certainly is that many of the definitions lack precision predated 9/11 and the Afghan and Iraqi de- and resemble a hodge-podge of words around bacles. US support to authoritarian regimes the general areas of peacebuilding, security in Central and South America in the 1980s and development. A number of explanations can be regarded as an era of securitization in of stabilization carelessly elide into terms that which workers and indigenous rights move- have distinct definitions. Siegle (2011: 2) for ments were viewed through a Cold War prism example, refers to peacekeeping ‘and other as threats to be extirpated. The War on Terror forms of stabilization’. NATO refers to ‘stabi- encouraged a renewed emphasis on secu- lization and reconstruction’ or ‘S&R’ (Nelson ritization, and commentators have declared 2006). Our interest in definitions is not to en- many areas of life as being ‘securitized’: the gage in terminological prissiness. The labels body, food, the environment (Martin 2010; used by states, international organizations Gueldry 2012). The literature on the securiti- and their proxies matter a great deal. Making, sation of the humanitarian sector is particu- keeping and building peace are clearly politi- larly insightful, with Mark Duffield (2002: cal projects. Yet it helps that there are some 89) charting how development and security attempts to maintain non-political, humani- have elided over the past two decades: tarian and impartial space within these pro- ‘A metropolitan consensus has jects. This is often difficult to achieve, and has emerged that holds that conflict is the not been helped by the continued blurring of result of a developmental malaise in distinctions between combatants and non- which poverty, resource competition, combatants (Hancock and Mitchell 2007). The environmental collapse, population danger is that the terminological imprecision growth, and so on, in the context of surrounding ‘stabilization’ creates a meta-cat- failed or predatory state institutions egory; full of buzzwords but empty of mean- is fomenting non-conventional and ing. Moreover, there is the danger that peace criminalised forms of conflict. Instead becomes subsumed by a range of other terms of seeing a Third World as a series of more closely associated with security. states constituting a site of strategic So is it possible to reach a widely agreed alliance and competition, the world’s definition of stabilization? Yes, but the defi- conflict zones have been remapped in Mac Ginty / Against Stabilization 25

the representational form of the bor- The story behind the development of a derlands.’ political economy and technocracy that re- gards stabilization as a norm to be achieved These borderlands were to be kept at bay, is complex. Crucial in this story is the inver- controlled and securitized. Conflict and soci- sion of the notion of liberalism that has tra- etal emergencies were exceptionalized and ditionally underpinned much peace-support exoticized: something that happened over international intervention. In the widely there, far away from metropolitan center and accepted view of liberalism, the individual something to be defended against. Thus, for has the potential to become an empowered example, Haiti, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone citizen who, along with other rational self-in- and many conflict zones were ‘othered’ and de- terested citizens, can steer the polity towards scribed as hopeless or ‘anarchic’ (Kaplan 1994). peace and economic success. In this view, in- As Duffield and others point out, we have ternational peace-support interventions seek seen the establishment of a transnational to empower citizens (through democratiza- and international form of securitization in tion, restraints on centralized states and civil which it is associated with entire sectors society enhancement). (humanitarianism and development), re- David Chandler’s International Statebuild- gions (the Horn of Africa) and phenomena ing (2010) constructs a powerful critique of (AIDS, migration etc.). Securitization has this ‘liberal peace’, arguing that we inhabit a become systemic, embedded within the world of ‘post-liberal intervention’ in which structures and discourses that frame and re- key ideas of liberalism (that have tradition- spond to conflicts. ally guided peace-support interventions) have been discarded. Instead we have en- Explaining Stabilization tered a post-liberal paradigm that privileges One can quite easily identify a series of proxi- difference over universality, intervention mate factors that have encouraged states, over autonomy and governance over govern- international and multilateral organizations ment. So notions of universal human values and others to adopt the securitization lens. and aspirations (foundational principles in The already mentioned reaction to 9/11 and classical interpretations of liberalism) are the Iraq and Afghanistan imbroglios are the subjugated to meaner ‘agent centred’ views most obvious explanations. Yet proximate that locate ‘the problems of international so- factors can only go so far and must be seen ciety with those who have the least access to in unison with structural factors that provide global wealth and resources and are held to an ideological milieu and political economy have blocked themselves from achieving this in which stabilization (and an aggressively access, through the conscious choices and securitized version of stabilization at that) is decisions of the people and/or their political regarded as a legitimate and mainstream ac- elites’ (Chandler 2010: 191). Stated bluntly: tivity. In the post-9/11 period we have seen ‘You’ve got conflict? That’s your problem.’ the internalization of a security-dilemma in This framing of international problems lo- the technocracy of a number of states and in- cates the necessity (and blame) for interna- ternational organizations (Booth and Wheel- tional intervention with the poor choices er 2007). Sophisticated political economies of the inhabitants of the conflict area and of risk identification and ‘management’ have justifies statebuilding and good governance become institutionalized. In a classic case interventions that manage difference. of epistemic closure, social, economic, po- The second presumption of the post-liber- litical and cultural phenomena are regarded al paradigm is the privileging of preventive through a security-lens and security-led pre- intervention over autonomy. Chandler notes scriptions are recommended. how autonomy has been transformed from a 26 Mac Ginty / Against Stabilization

sphere of freedom and non-intervention in nian revolutions spring to mind. This article is the classical liberal canon to a sphere that a critique of the concept of stabilization and calls for intervention in the post-liberal para- how it has been conceptualized and enacted. digm. Hence forceful intervention in Iraq, In particular, the article is concerned about the Afghanistan and Libya, but also sanctions re- logic of control that lies behind stabilization. gimes against Iran and Syria. ‘The starting as- An argument made in defense of stabiliza- sumption is that external intervention is nec- tion is that it is an emergency interim meas- essary as a precondition for social harmony, ure required when the security situation rather than that intervention is an exception does not allow a more expansive, civilian- or reaction to the breakdown of social peace’ focused international mission. This ‘institu- (Chandler 2010: 192). In this view, the auton- tionalization before liberalization’ argument omy of post-liberal states is regarded as po- has plausibility, but only in a limited sense. tentially problematic and must be countered The author would contended that control by the threat of preventive intervention. and securitization are so hard-wired into con- The third presumption in the post-liberal temporary peace-support operations that is framing of society, conflict and the need difficult for them to adopt a laissez faire at- for international intervention is that gov- titude to local autonomy. ernments have limited capability. Govern- Four points can be made by way of conclu- ments, and the formal institutions of sov- sion. Firstly, stabilization – as a concept and ereign states, are not to be viewed as active practice – lowers the horizons of peace and agents that deliver services. Instead, they are peace interventions. It moves us away from stripped down into facilitators and modera- the realm of emancipation towards the realm tors. ‘The post-liberal paradigm tends, in fact, of control. It is, of course, prudent to manage to reject policy goals and is concerned more expectations. The peace-support interventions with processes of engagement, held to em- of the 1990s and beyond have been marked power the other, enabling them to pursue by interventions in which public expecta- their goals safely and within a framework tions (especially in terms of the provision of of international constraints’ (Chandler 193). public goods) were left unfulfilled. This has This has profound implications for what the left a number of situations, Kosovo and An- inhabitants of war-torn societies can expect gola being good examples, in which there is from statebuilding exercises. They can ex- significant public disaffection in the political pect governance rather than government: sphere. Many people are unable to see a link ‘the tasks of international statebuilding are between involvement in formal political ac- understood as those of the export of good tivity (such as voting) and an improvement governance rather than the tasks of direction in their material conditions. Yet, while expec- or control’ (Chandler 193–4). tation management is sensible, stabilization The cumulative impact of this post-liberal risks extinguishing the optimism that many paradigm is a context in which stabilization transitions require. The term suggests a con- is justified as both a means and an end. servative exercise of maintaining a controlled environment rather than emancipation or Concluding Discussion liberation. Profound social change (and it is worth remembering that the societies that It is worth restating the opening remark that experience civil war tend to have shocking dis- this article is not an argument against stabil- parities of wealth and power) requires trans- ity. Much human development and social pro- formation across many levels of society. Such gress has depended on stability, security and transformation is likely to have unforeseen ordered change. Indeed periods of rapid and consequences, many of which might challenge uncontrolled change are often associated with western norms and sensibilities. It requires high death rates; the French, Chinese and Ira- Mac Ginty / Against Stabilization 27 social entrepreneurship, risk-taking and indi- international stabilization programs are often viduals and communities operating outside of a diet of compliance and discipline. traditional roles. All of this is anathema to the A second concluding point is that the notion of stabilization which emphasizes con- mainstreaming of stabilization has resulted trol, order and institutions. Indeed, it is worth in a hollowing out of peace in international noting how statebuilding is the central plank approaches to intervention. Peace still plays of most peace-support interventions. Statist a role, rhetorically at least, in the statements and institutionalist methods and ends are pre- of international organizations. Yet, with sta- ferred by the international guardians of peace. bilization, it has to share a billing with secu- Such an approach risks excluding creativity, in- ritized and institutionalized order. Again, it is novation, dissent, resistance and pluralism; all worth restating that there is nothing inher- indicators of agency and of a vibrant polity. ently wrong with security and order; many It is worth asking when reviewing stabi- basic societal functions require security and lization operations: where does power lie? order. Most expansive definitions of peace, Certainly, many stabilization missions men- however, emphasize the emancipatory as- tion local legitimacy, participation, empower- pects of peace such as fulfilling human po- ment and consent. Yet the use of a corporate tential. The elision of peace with security, and plastic language often does not equate which is a recurrent theme in most defini- to a fundamental re-ordering of power away tions of stabilization, undercuts the distinc- from national and international elites. The tive value of peace. The danger is that peace primary aim of stabilization is usually ordered is relegated to just another glib buzzword transition, with the transition bounded by that is empty of meaning. strictures set down by international financial A third concluding point is that the con- institutions and diplomatic conventions. In cept of stabilization further normalizes the cases where people power has challenged in- role of the military and aligned security ternational order (whether Palestinians voting agencies into peacebuilding. As seen by for Hamas or Icelanders reneging their debts) both the US and UK, stabilization is about established actors from the global north have harnessing civilian and military know-how, branded these activities as ‘irresponsible’. and institutionalizing the working rela- An argument can be made that stabilization tionships between the two sectors. This is missions are revolutionary, and provide op- not to impugn the military sector. Many portunities for an expansion of human free- militaries contain highly professionalized dom. This is certainly the narrative employed and ethical personnel, and they provide by the stabilizers. There can be no doubting the security that is often essential so that that international actions have helped topple public goods such as medical assistance despots and have introduced significant socio- can be supplied. Yet, the principal role political change in a number of societies. Yet of militaries is to fight. They are trained, such change is bounded by essentially con- equipped and conditioned to operate servative parameters that reinforce interna- through a security lens. The routine and tional order, the primacy of state sovereignty, institutionalized inclusion of the military and the dominance of the market economy. in peace-support operations endangers ex- The World Bank and others have worked to pansive notions of peace that are based on limit the economic autonomy of post-war the fulfilment of human potential, imagi- and post-authoritarian states. International native and creative expressions of political financial institution strictures to pare back and cultural desires. So the argument is the state, trim welfare, keep inflation low and not against the military per se. Instead, it open (usually fragile) economies to outside is against the normalization of a military competition are rarely empowering. Indeed, role in peace-support, which has profound 28 Mac Ginty / Against Stabilization

consequences for issues of impartiality and ties undergoing peace-support interventions consent. Indeed, the ease with which NATO in which international and local dynamics moved from stabilization to combat in Af- combine to produce a fusion polity. Inter- ghanistan underscores how the embedded national statebuilding or good governance nature of military forces in peace-support inputs are often adapted to suit local needs missions allows the military dimensions of and mores. Many societies reach some sort of missions to be stepped up (Suhkre 2008). equilibrium whereby interest groups accom- The final concluding point is to ask: what modate one another, and civility rather than does the emphasis on stabilization say about civil war is the norm. This is not to roman- us, in the global north? It has been argued ticize all things traditional and indigenous, here that stabilization is essentially a con- nor to underestimate the very real human servative doctrine that lowers the horizons hardship that emerges from pogroms and of peace and normalizes a military role in ethnic cleansing. It is, instead, to point to the peace-support operations. It is about control prevalence of everyday diplomacy and civil- and ordering the transition of states emerg- ity in many societies. This may not be pretty ing from civil war and authoritarianism. and may not conform to western, legally en- Many of the criticisms levelled at ‘the liberal shrined notions of pluralism. Yet, in many peace’ (Campbell, Chandler and Sabaratnam societies, it operates at the village, street and 2011; Roberts 2011) remain valid for stabi- workplace levels as a form of social capital lization: it is an attempt to create compli- that acts as a conflict retardant. The heli- ant, market-friendly any-states that do not copter parenting of stabilization interferes threaten the international order. The privi- with the tendency of many post-war socie- leging of stability is manifest in multiple ties to reach a ‘natural’ equilibrium. It often peace-support and statebuilding programs. privileges some groups and systems of gov- Whether military mentorship or good gov- ernance over others, and creates a political ernance reforms, the underlying ethos is economy of prestige and resources around one of control: the alignment of governing the newly built or reformed state. systems in the post-war society so that they It should be stressed that the argument in meet international (read ‘western’) norms. favour of ‘equilibrium’ should not be seen This isomorphism reflects a significant inse- as a charter for ethnic cleansers and those curity on the part of leading states, interna- who wish to impose their will. Instead, it is tional organizations and international finan- an argument for more circumspection with cial institutions. It suggests an intolerance regard to international peace-support inter- towards dissent and an over-eagerness to vention and the range of activities that com- depict it as ‘resistance’ or something malign prise the intervention. It is an argument that (Mac Ginty 2012b). stabilization diminishes the ability of fragile While it is sensible for leading states to societies to understand themselves, their minimize risk, there has been a fetishiza- conflict, and the ways in which sustainable tion of control. Yet, it is worth asking if it is accommodation can be achieved. This is de- possible to micro-manage transitions. The spite the language of ‘local participation’ and nannyish instincts of stabilization underval- ‘local legitimacy’ that often heavily features ues the agency that national elites and local in the stabilization literature. S communities have in interpreting, delaying, modifying and mimicking inputs from inter- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS national peace-support and statebuilding ac- The author is grateful to the anonymous ref- tors (Bhabha 1980). All societies are ‘hybrid erees for their comments on an earlier draft political orders’ (Boege, Brown, Clements of the paper. and Nolan 2009), none more so than socie- Mac Ginty / Against Stabilization 29

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article From Insurgency to Bureaucracy: Free Aceh Movement, Aceh Party and the New Face of Conflict Mohammad Hasan Ansori*

The settling of the 32-year Aceh conflict not only transformed former members of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) into administrators, constructing a new circle of elites, but also created opportunities and new spaces for economic and socio- political competition and contestation. Hence, this transformation sowed the seeds of an emerging conflict in Aceh. This study investigates the emerging conflict pat- terns along with their causes and the actors involved. Three patterns of conflict have emerged during the post-Helsinki Peace Agreement period: (i) a conflict among the former GAM elites, (ii) a conflict between the former GAM elites and the for- mer GAM rank-and-file combatants, and (iii) a conflict between the ethnic Acehnese majority and the diverse ethnic minority groups. While the first and second conflicts are primarily induced by individual self-interest, the third is specifically triggered by social and political discrimination as well as by under-development.

Introduction in a large number of casualties, the dete- The story of Aceh is that of a human trag- rioration of infrastructure and psychological edy which unfolded over successive phases. harm. However, after a series of failed peace The Acehnese first fought against the Dutch efforts, the Government of Indonesia and colonialists (1873–1903) and then against the GAM made a historic and dignified step the central government after Indonesian by signing a peace agreement on 15 August independence. The battle against the Indo- 2005 in Helsinki, ending the violent conflict nesian state involved the Darul Islam rebel- after more than three decades. lion (1953–1962) as well as the Free Aceh The biggest challenge for the GAM in the Movement (1976–2005), which is commonly post-Helsinki period involved transforming referred to as the GAM.1 The conflict resulted itself from a rebel movement into a political party.2 Given that the Helsinki Peace Agree- ment required the GAM to disband itself, * Director of the Center for Strategic former GAM rebels turned their separatist Transformation in Indonesia; organization into a democratic and peace- Assistant Professor, Islamic State University ful one3 called the Aceh Party (Partai Aceh), of Jakarta, Ir. H. Djuanda Street, Ciputat, Banten, Indonesia which was later re-named the GAM Party [email protected] (Partai Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) and, finally, 32 Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy

the Independent Aceh Movement Party (Par- process of establishing a sustainable peace tai Gerakan Aceh Mandiri).4 The party, which in the region. In this regards, this study ad- was founded in June 2007 in Banda Aceh, dresses the following questions: What are the the provincial capital, is largely administered general patterns of conflict appearing in the by the former leaders of the independence post-Helsinki period? What is the root cause movement. For instance, Muzakkir Manaf, of each pattern of the conflict? And who are the former supreme commander of the Aceh the actors involved in each conflict pattern? National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasioanl In responding to these questions, I first il- Aceh/TNA), the GAM’s military wing, was lustrate the historical dynamic of the GAM, elected as the chairman of the party after providing the background to the protracted serving as the province’s deputy governor. Aceh conflict. Then, I examine how the Gov- Allowing GAM members to compete for ernment of Indonesia and GAM success- political power in the province – fully in- fully reached a historic deal by signing the dependent of existing Indonesian political Helsinki Peace Agreement. Finally, I explore parties – was one of the vital parts of the the emerging patterns of conflict which peace deal. Hence, combatants re-invented emerged as former GAM rebels transformed themselves as politicians, administrators, themselves into bureaucrats. The data pre- businessmen and contractors.5 This transfor- sented here is primarily drawn from several mation was facilitated by the victories of key open-ended interviews with former GAM candidates affiliated with Aceh Party, Irwandi members, Acehnese scholars and ethnic and Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar, in the succes- religious leaders. sive 2006 and 2009 provincial election; oth- er candidates nominated by the Party were Free Aceh Movement: The Emer- selected as the mayors of Acehnese regen- gence, Leadership, and Revival cies, including Aceh Jaya, Sabang, Pidie, Pidie The GAM came into being in December Jaya, Bireun, North Aceh, Lhokseumawe, East 1976, following the issuance of its “Decla- Aceh, West Aceh, and South Aceh.6 In addi- ration of Independence of Aceh-Sumatra”. tion, the Party collected 33 seats (48%) out of The movement also became internationally the 69 available seats in the Aceh Parliament known as the ASNLF (Aceh Sumatra National (DPR Aceh).7 Liberation Front) or NLFAS (National Lib- Although peace has been attained and eration Front of Acheh-Sumatra). The GAM the Acehnese people have now returned to began when the movement’s “founding fa- a more normal life since the 2005 Helsinki ther”, Teungku Hasan di Tiro, declared Aceh’s Peace Agreement, levels of violence remain independence. Like other Acehnese people, high.8 Reaching the peace agreement did not Tiro was also a supporter of the Indonesian automatically cement the peace and elimi- nation and dreamed of an Indonesian fed- nate potential for further conflict. The tran- eration.9 Tiro moved to New York, where he sitional period in Aceh has produced a new worked part time at the Indonesian mission social arena for competition and created par- to the United Nations. However, he left his ticular patterns of conflict. post to support the Darul Islam rebellion in While a number of studies have been con- Aceh in 1953.10 He later served as an overseas ducted concerning the post-Helsinki peace- representative of the Islam-based rebellion.11 building process (e.g. Aguswandi 2008; Tiro’s active engagement in the Darul Islam Askandar 2007; Aspinall 2008, 2009; Barron rebellion had made him “become openly 2008; Feith 2007; Iyer & Mitchel 2007), less critical of Indonesia” and Indonesian forces, attention has been paid to the emerging con- which he later accused of genocide.12 flicts in the province. This article dissects those In addition to Tiro, the GAM’s leadership conflicts, which could seriously threaten the comprised relatively privileged elites, includ- Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy 33 ing Mukhtar J. Hasbi, Husaini M. Hasan, and rhetoric, methods, and strategy.21 GAM then Zaini Abdullah. The initial leadership of the experienced the first major revival by resur- movement mainly consisted of young profes- facing in 1989. sionals and intellectuals, such as doctors, en- The movement re-emerged with a greater gineers, politicians, and businessmen. Many number of better and more organized sol- of its followers had fought in the Darul Islam diers due to their military and ideological Rebellion (1953–1962).13 At the outset, the training in Libya, which started in 1986.22 movement was weak and small, probably in- Upon their return to Aceh, the trained volving no more than 200 active members fighters vigorously renewed their activities, moving around in the mountains of Aceh.14 trained local volunteers, and purchased bet- The declaration of Acehnese independence ter military equipment, reportedly with Lib- in 1976 probably involved only 24 leaders.15 yan assistance.23 With weapons purchased During this period, the GAM’s activities were from Indonesian soldiers or, later on, taken primarily concerned with producing and dis- off of captured troops, the “Libyan gradu- tributing pamphlets which outlined their ates” started a military campaign by attack- aims and ideals.16 Since its establishment, a ing isolated police and military posts, camps, large number of Acehnese people had been and installations. The attacks were often con- members of the Diaspora, or were refugees, ducted to capture weapons from the Indo- abroad and contributed to the GAM. For in- nesian troops and to signal the movement’s stance, in 2001, the Acehnese Diaspora was resurgence.24 estimated to consist of between 2,000 and To counter this new threat, the Govern- 3,000 people in Malaysia and another 8,000 ment of Indonesia quickly responded by de- permanently residing in Thailand, Australia, claring Aceh as Daerah Operasi Militer (a Mil- Europe, and North America.17 itary Operations Area, or DOM) in 1989. The The Government of Indonesia quickly re- declaration of Aceh as a DOM by the govern- sponded to Aceh’s declaration of independ- ment was a response to the sudden increase ence with the mass arrest and killing of GAM in GAM’s strength, and the classification was members.18 At this stage, since the GAM pos- intended to counter its renewed capacity and sessed few weapons and members, it was propensity for violence. It was claimed that very easy for the strong and well-equipped by the end of 1991, or somewhat later, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) to Indonesian troops had successfully crushed suppress the movement quickly.19 As a result, the rebellion and killed or captured most of by 1981, ten of the original 24 signatories to its top leaders and commanders.25 As of late the declaration of independence had been 1996, the Government of Indonesia official- killed by the TNI in an attempt to crush and ly announced that the counter-insurgency wipe out the movement before its ideals and operations had effectively destroyed GAM ideology could take hold. The 1976 crack- (Global Security 2006). The declaration of the down by the Indonesian military made GAM DOM in Aceh reportedly generated casual- members go underground or move abroad ties. The DOM status was accompanied by in- (Kingsbury & Fernandes 2008, p. 96). The terrogations, intimidation, arrests, and indis- movement seemed to have been crushed by criminate or mysterious civilians killings.26 1982, with most of its leaders either killed, in Despite such setbacks, the movement en- exile, or in prison.20 joyed its second revival in 1999 with a drastic While living in exile, Tiro and other GAM increase in membership and an expansion leaders consolidated and solidified the move- of its territorial base.27 The ending of Aceh’s ment by sending their members to Libya for DOM status in 1998 – largely due to the Asian military training, lobbying the international monetary crisis of 1997 – was accompanied community, and developing their ideological by the substantial withdrawal of Kopassus 34 Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy

(the Indonesian Special Armed Forces). The Mediation proved to be effective in peace- authoritarian New Order regime in Indone- fully resolving the protracted Aceh conflict. sia collapsed in 1998, thus bringing about a The historic peace talks, which took place period of transition. Indonesia’s transitional in Helsinki between 28 January and 12 July period, which was marked by a relatively 2005, were mediated by the Crisis Manage- open political atmosphere, brought huge op- ment Institute. In particular, Marti Ahtisaari, portunities and enabled GAM members to the former Finnish prime minister and the express their discontents and unhappiness director of the institute, was appointed as with Jakarta, strengthen their demands for the principle mediator of the peace negotia- independence, and consolidate their activi- tion.34 Ahtisaari was convinced that the Aceh ties and strategies.28 However, it is important conflict should be treated as an asymmetric to underline that the GAM’s 1999 second re- conflict.35 Ahtisaari believed that the Gov- vival was also possible given the failure of the ernment of Indonesia would never accept central government to address the underly- the GAM’s demand for independence and ing economic and social grievances in Aceh urged the GAM negotiators to accept “real- by 1998.29 ism”. As a result, rather than discussing the GAM’s demand for independence, Ahtisaari The Dynamics of the Helsinki Peace was immensely engaged in realizing a pack- Agreement age of special autonomy.36 He openly pushed the GAM delegation to accept the package The signing of the Helsinki Peace Agreement and threatened them with the withdrawal of on 15 August 2005, ending the approximate- international support for the movement if ly 32 years of armed conflict in Aceh, was a they did not.37 Ahtisaari’s strong leadership crucial part of the history of the GAM and during the negotiation process played an offered a ray of hope for Acehnese people. important part in the overall success of the Diverse expressions, such as the “courageous peace negotiations. and constructive step”, the “peaceful solu- The issue of independence was not set tion with dignity for all”, and “the best and aside until the negotiation came to the third most effective vehicle to embody the dream round. During the five rounds of the peace of Acehnese”,30 have all been used to describe talks, the establishment of local political par- the peace agreement. ties for Aceh had grabbed most of the par- A number of prominent scholars have ticipants’ focus. The GAM delegation particu- recognized the effect of the Indian Ocean larly believed that the establishment of local tsunami of 26 December 2004 on the suc- political parties in Aceh was crucial since the cessful peace deal in Aceh.31 The natural Indonesian national parties are mostly con- disaster flattened the province, resulting trolled from Jakarta and thus cannot repre- in huge casualties and widespread destruc- sent their interests.38 It was strongly held by tion. Aceh was broadly known as the worst the GAM delegation that the establishment hit area by the earthquake-triggered tsu- of local political parties would not only sym- nami. It is reported that between 150,000 bolize their identity but would also safeguard and 200,000 Acehnese people died or went their dignity.39 missing, while the survivors were left in Relative to the previous failed peace ef- desperate need of food, shelter, and basic forts, the Helsinki Peace Agreement is often medical facilities.32 The natural disaster also seen as more comprehensive and reflective. It helped give rise to the 2005 Helsinki Peace offered a more comprehensive political solu- Agreement. The magnitude of suffering felt tion to the conflict rather than just focusing by the Acehnese people helped GAM and on the cessation of violence on the ground. the Indonesian government to agree to re- For instance, the disarmament, demobiliza- turn the negotiating table.33 Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy 35 tion, and reintegration of the ex-combatants GAM elites’ self-interests became more and emerged as an important element which was more manifest in the post-conflict environ- eventually captured in a Memorandum of ment. They greatly benefited from their po- Understanding (MoU). In addition, it estab- sitions in the movement’s hierarchical struc- lished complete special autonomy for Aceh ture.42 Through the Aceh Party, the elites within the Republic of Indonesia and allowed captured the top positions in Aceh province GAM’s transformation into a political party.40 and became active in various business sec- tors backed by their freshly acquired political Aceh Party and the Emerging New positions and connections. Pattern of Conflict This conflict emerged as the GAM sought to divide the spoils of war. For instance, Nur The Helsinki Peace Agreement had a tremen- Djuli, the senior GAM negotiator at the Hel- dous effect on the lives of the former GAM sinki peace talks, is currently chair of rebels. Through the new political Aceh Party, Badan (the Aceh Re-integration a number of the former rebels have occupied Reintegrasi Aceh Agency) and therefore receives a high in- various prestigious and strategic political and come and other special privileges provided social positions and won many lucrative con- by the Agency. Nurdin Abdur Rahman, an- tracts during the post-conflict reconstruction other GAM negotiator and the former GAM process in the province. The new emerging leader in Malaysia and Australia, is currently circle of power and the social structure in the acting as the director of Aceh World Trade province have given rise to internal antago- Center (AWTC). Muzakkir Manaf, the former nism and social conflict. In particular, the supreme commander of TNA (the armed establishment of Aceh Party by the former wing of GAM), became CEO of , a rebels is specifically viewed as also having Pulo Gadeng major contracting company. Sofyan Dawood, produced conflict among former GAM mem- the former TNA commander in North Aceh bers. In short, conflict in post-Helsinki Aceh and GAM’s spokesperson, has won several follows three common patterns. The first high-value contracts.43 This overt and self-in- pattern is related to the economic competi- terested competition has generated conflict tion and political contestation among the among the former elites. Mundhir, a former former GAM elites. The second one involves GAM elite, who became an important admin- antagonism and anger between former GAM istrator in Aceh, observed how the embed- combatants and elites. The third pattern in- ded self-interests generate conflict among volves ethnic hostility between the dominant the GAM elites: Acehnese ethnic group, who were prominent supporter of the GAM, and the diverse non- “I could not deny that many also Acehnese ethnic groups, who were generally fought for their self-interests, which opponents of GAM. The following sections might take diverse forms, positions, delve further into the three conflict patterns properties, favorable economic activi- along with the causes of each. ties, etc. Many might also wish that they could become Pegawai Negeri Among the former GAM elites Sipil/PNS (the governmental civil The first conflict – struggle and rivalry servants), Camat (sub-district head), among the former GAM elites – originates in Bupati (district mayor), or Dewan the personal interests of the former top GAM Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh/DPRA (Aceh officials. The competition among the elites Provincial Parliament) and many oth- over political positions, privileges, facilities, ers. Whatever goals and intentions business activities, and contracts with major they had in their minds did not have state-owned enterprises41 have been a major to be a problem for GAM as long as source of factionalism and antagonism. The they struggled and made significant 36 Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy

sacrifices for GAM and finally brought younger members refused to support them about the victory for the movement. given that they had entered into a coalition The split and conflict among a few with a national political party, the United GAM elites after the peace agreement Development Party. Two other former GAM was probably just the ripple effect of elites took advantage of the division to an- the self-interest competitions among nounce their intent to contest the top posi- them. However, a large number of us tion. Ultimately Hamid and Abdullah were were ignorant about our self-inter- selected as the governor and the deputy gov- ests; and thereby were not really in- ernor of Aceh (2007–2012). While they have volved in the split.”44 been supported, even among younger and grassroots members, the incident showed Figure 1 summarizes some of the former the extent of competition among the former GAM elites’ currently collected rewards/ben- GAM elites.45 efits that are often considered to be equiva- The elite conflict does not only take place lent to their positions in the movement’s in the political sphere but also involves eco- past hierarchical structure. nomic competition over high-value tenders In addition, the appointment of the GAM- and contracts linked to the post-conflict re- aligned candidate running for the provincial- construction process. The competition for level executive election has caused a further the projects generates antagonism and even rift between the generations of GAM elites. hostility among the former GAM elites. As Ahmad Humam Hamid, a prominent lo- Sulaiman, one of the former GAM members cal academic affiliated with the national who used to get involved in competitions for (Indonesia-wide) United Development Party lucrative post-conflict reconstruction pro- (Partai Persatuan Pembangnan), ran for the jects, stated: provincial executive position with Hasbi Ab- dullah, a fellow academic and former politi- “For example, there were five people cal prisoner. The men’s candidacy was widely backed by the GAM elites competing supported by the old GAM generation. How- for a project tender. The winner of ever, the GAM’s military commanders and the project tender was often opposed

Position in GAM Post-Helsinki Position GAM spokesperson The governor of Aceh (2007–2012) The GAM Minister of State and the GAM peace The governor of Aceh (2012–2017) talks delegation leader Civil/Ideological Trainer Deputy Governor of Aceh (2007–2012) Supreme Commander of TNA (Aceh National CEO of Pulo Gadeng Holding Company; re- Armed Forces) cently elected to be Deputy Governor of Aceh (2012–2017) GAM spokesperson Recipients of valuable contracts for post-con- flict reconstruction projects GAM negotiator Chair of Badan Reintegrasi Aceh (The Aceh Re- integration Agency) GAM negotiator Director of Aceh World Trade Centre GAM negotiator Prominent private sector figure Fig. 1: Translation of GAM Authority into Post-Helsinki Privilege Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy 37

by the 4 losers. As a result, their GAM- Between the former GAM rank-and-file based friendship was further turned combatants and the former GAM elites to be an antagonism and resentment The next conflict pattern involves the emer- between the losing and the winning gence of resentment among former GAM GAM members. It was always the way combatants of the movement’s elites. The the project tender worked on the conflict is generally produced by the inequi- ground. Those who won the projects table distribution of the rewards between the often possessed close political or per- elites and the rank-and-file combatants in the sonal networking and connections post-Helsinki period. Former elites appear with specific GAM elites, such as Ga- ignorant of or unconcerned with the living jah Keng people or other command- condition of former rank-and-file combatants, ers, although their project proposals most of whom are unemployed and living in were not qualified enough. A Darus- poverty. The political economy of the post- salam person joining a project tender conflict period in Aceh has yielded rewards for in Sigli was supposed to be backed GAM elites but not for the former rank-and- by the GAM elites based in Sigli. file combatants. This gap in benefits has led to Otherwise, he/she would lose in bid- a newly emerging conflict rooted in inequal- ding for the project. Once somebody ity. As Masnan, a former combatant based in won a project, he/she was supposed East Aceh Regency, stated: to share the revenues of the project with the GAM elites who previously “My former commander had some backed the project. It seemed to be a construction projects. Sadly, he never common rule for every project com- shared with me and other members. petition in Aceh. It was almost impos- He had already forgotten his mem- sible to win a project in Aceh without bers once he had the project. We all having the GAM elite’s support and together fought the TNI (the Indone- backing.”46 sian National Armed Forces) and lived in the same camp during our guerilla The entry of a large number of GAM mem- war. During the conflict, we all often bers into bureaucracy, following the incred- shared only one peace of cigarette ible winning of Aceh Party in the provin- and also shared the foods since we cial election, has created a new circle of had no more in the jungle. He en- power and lucrative patronage networks in joyed himself all the money, owned Aceh,47 thereby deconstructing the existing many exclusive homes and rode a lux- constellation of political power in the prov- urious car. He did not care about his ince. The newly crafted circle of power then members any longer. I think most of steers economic opportunities to former the commanders did the same thing. GAM elites. Moreover, the project bidding They did not care about the former system in Aceh, which reflects the local cul- GAM rank-and-file members. I was ture of nepotism and corruption (that long very sad and frustrated. If only the predated the Helsinki Peace Agreement), conflict happens again, the rank-and- has produced a new sort of horizontal con- file members would not be willing to flict and antagonism among former GAM go to war again since they had been elites. That is, the transition from war to very disappointed.”48 peace provided new economic and political resources for the Acehnese people and, in Some former GAM rank-and-file members, the process, generated a new structure of especially those who still illegally kept their conflict. weapons, engage in criminal acts such as kidnapping, intimidation of foreign workers, 38 Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy

and thievery. The criminal acts are primarily tried to normally mingle with the intended either to attract the elites’ atten- Acehnese people, we felt that we tions or to taint the elites’ public images and were not Acehnese because of their reputations.49 During the conflict with the discriminations. Other Alas peo- Indonesian government, solidarity among ple also felt the same thing when GAM members was maintained through they were in Banda Aceh, the capi- mutual support. However, once the conflict tal. When I was a child, I was often ended, the solidarity among the elites and told by my parents that we were not ordinary combatants broke down. Acehnese. If there were Acehnese people here, they would be isolated. Between the ethnic Acehnese majority The similar situation applied in Pidie. and the various ethnic minority groups Some of the Alas people were isolat- The last emerging conflict pattern in the ed there. We were always frustrated post-Helsinki period involves ethnic an- if we had some administrative duties tagonism and hostility between the ethnic to do in Banda Aceh. We were just ig- Acehnese, who were the major supporters nored and inappropriately welcome of the GAM, and the various ethnic minority if we could not speak Acehnese. The groups, including Gayo, Alas, Tamiang, An- officers there would not serve us if euk Jamee, Kluet, Singkil and Simeulue eth- we used Indonesian Bahasa. My Alas nic groups, who generally opposed the GAM friends often asked my help if they in the past. This conflict predates the sign- had some affairs to manage in Ban- ing of the peace agreement. Ethnic Acehnese da Aceh as I could speak a little bit make up about 80 % of the total population Acehnese.”51 of Aceh and are concentrated in the regen- The ethnic tensions have been transmitted cies located in the north coastal areas of the across generations in the province. They province. have also manifested themselves in politics. Ethnic stratification in Aceh, which also As Nurdin, one of the Gayonese ethnic lead- occasionally appears on other Indonesia’s is- ers and academics, pointed out: lands, has produced a specific situation that places one ethnic group as more privileged “When the Acehnese were betrayed and prioritized than the others. Ethnic division by Jakarta for the first time in the in Aceh has created some prejudices and, in 1950s, they started behaving discour- most of the cases, resulted in antagonism and teously and meanly towards the non- hostility between the ethnic Acehnese majori- Acehnese ethnic groups. They treated ty and the various ethnic minority groups. The us in the Aceh province like the way minority ethnic groups in Aceh, particularly Jakarta treated them. They obviously Gayo, Singkil, and Alas people, have long been adopted the way Jakarta discriminat- socio-politically marginalized and isolated by ed them for marginalizing us. Their the ethnic Acehnese majority,50 a fact which discriminatory measures and policies led them to oppose the GAM. Najmuddin, one especially included the restriction of the prominent leaders of Alas ethnic group, and/or the reduction of the budgets shared his experience: of the local governments of the vari- ous ethnic minority groups’ regen- “The Acehnese people often treated cies. They also often assigned the us like we were not part of Aceh ethnic Acehnese people as the district province. They often looked down heads or mayors of the [minorities’] and disvalued the ethnic minority regencies. The method was very much groups by using various methods. similar to the way Jakarta appointed When we were in Banda Aceh and Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy 39

the Javanese people as mayors in only the distribution of the economic and po- most of the Aceh’s regencies.”52 litical rewards among the GAM members but also gives rise to new patterns of conflict in Unfortunately, the issue of ethnic discrimi- the post-Helsinki period. Clearly, reaching a nation in Aceh is poorly covered either by peace deal does not automatically eliminate 53 the mass media or scholarly research. The all forms of conflict; rather, it brings “the old media’s coverage of the Aceh conflict con- conflict” to an end and marks the starting cealed the issue and used the word Acehnese point of new conflict patterns. Such conflicts to refer to residents of Aceh without differ- are potentially detrimental and costly and, in 54 entiating among the various ethnic groups. the long run, may undermine the process of Studies of Aceh tend to view Acehnese as a seeking a sustainable peace in the region if singular group of people living in the Aceh not managed well by the province’s leaders 55 province, thereby failing to portray the through existing democratic institutions. S ethno-political structure of conflict in the post-Helsinki period. NOTES Socio-political marginalization has frus- trated ethnic minority groups and, as a 1 A body of works have largely discussed the consequence, led them to demand for the nature, trajectory and the root cause of the establishment of administrative sub-units.56 conflicts, including Edward Aspinall, Islam The idea of Aceh Leuser Antara Province (ab- and nation: separatist rebellion in Aceh, breviated as ALA) is primarily designed to in- Indonesia, (Stanford: Stanford University clude Central Aceh, Bener Meriah, Gayo Lues, Press); and the historical and political back- Southeast Aceh, Subulussalam and Aceh ground to the Aceh conflict. In Askandar, K. Singkil Regencies, where the ethnic minori- & Chee, A.M. (eds.), Building peace in Aceh: ties of Gayo, Alas, and Singkil are concentrat- problems, strategies, and lessons from Sri ed. Moreover, the proposed Aceh Barat Sela- Lanka, and Northern Ireland, Proceedings tan Province (abbreviated as ABAS) includes of the International Symposium, (Bang- Aceh Jaya, West Aceh, Nagan Raya, South- kok: Mahidol University, 2004), p. 31–42.; west Aceh, Simeulue, and South Aceh Regen- Kamarulzaman Askandar, The Aceh con- cies, which are home to other ethnic minori- flict: phases of conflict and hopes for peace. ties. The increasingly emerging demand for In Tan, A.T.H. (ed.), A handbook of terrorism the regional partitions in Aceh is not a trivial and insurgency in Southeast Asia, (Massa- issue; it is indeed a serious challenge for the chusetts: Edward Eigal Publishing Limited, process of seeking a sustainable peace in the 2007), p. 249–265; Kirsten E. Schulze, The region.57 Demands for such provisions reveal Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a horizontal ethnic hostility – and the poten- Separatist Organization, in Policy Studies tial for conflict – between the majority and 2, (Washington: East West Center, 2004); the minority ethnic groups. Michael L. Ross, Resources and rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia, In Collier, P. & Sambanis, Conclusion N. (eds.). Understanding civil war: evidence and analysis, (Washington: The World Bank, Resolving the Aceh conflict resulted in the 2005), p. 35–58; Michelle Ann Miller, Re- emergence of new social and political op- bellion and reform in Indonesia: Jakarta’s se- portunities and competition over them. The curity and autonomy policies in Aceh, (New transformation of the GAM elites into an ad- York: Routledge, 2009); C. van Dijk, Rebel- ministrative, political, and private-sector elite lion under the banner of Islam: The Darul Is- has created a new circle of power in Aceh, lam Indonesia, (Leiden: Koninklijk Instituut which situates the former GAM leaders at its Voor Taal-, Land-en Volkenhunde, 1981) center. This new circle of power enables not and many others. 40 Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy

2 Kamarulzaman Askandar, The Aceh con- 16 Jhon Martinkus, ibid., p. 44; Tim Kell, flict: phases of conflict and hopes for ibid., p. 66. peace. In Tan, A.T.H. (ed.). A handbook of 17 Michael L. Ross, Resources and rebellion terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia in Aceh, Indonesia, In Collier, P. & Sam- (Massachusetts: Edward Eigal Publising banis, N. (eds.). Understanding civil war: Limited, 2007), p. 257. evidence and analysis, (Washington: the 3 See Edward Aspinall, Pemilihan umum: kon- World Bank, 2005), p. 39. solidasi perdamaian. In Aguswandi & Large, 18 Damien Kingsbury & Clinton Fernandez, J. (eds.). Accord: rekonfigurasi politik proses Indonesia: Aceh. In Fernandes, C. (ed.). damai Aceh (London: Conciliation Resources Hot Spot: Asia and Oceania. (Connecticut: Publication, issue 20, 2008), pp. 50–54. Green Wood Press, 2008), p. 91; Geoffrey 4 Berita Sore, May 22, 2008. Robinson, Rawan is as Rawan does: the 5 See Edward Aspinall, Combatants to con- origins of disorder in New Order Aceh, In tractors: the political economy of peace in Anderson, B.R. (ed.). Violence and state in Aceh. In Journal of Indonesia. (Cornell Suharto’s Indonesia, (New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, Vol. 87, April University Press, 2001), p. 216. 2009), pp. 1–34. 19 Edward Aspinall, The historical and po- 6 Aspinall, ibid., p. 9. litical background to the Aceh conflict. 7 Media Indonesia, May 4, 2009. In Askandar, K. & Chee, A.M. (eds.). Build- 8 See, for instance, International Crisis ing peace in Aceh: problems, strategies, Group, Aceh: Post-Conflict Complications, and lessons from Sri Lanka, and Northern (Asia Report, Number 139, October 4, Ireland. Proceedings of the International 2007); Patrick Barron, Getting reintegration Symposium. (Bangkok: Mahidol Univer- back on track: problems in Aceh and priori- sity, Chulalangkorn University, Tamma- ties for moving forward, a paper prepared sat University, etc), p. 35; Pushpa Iyer & for the conference “The Peace Process in Christopher Mitchell, The collapse of Aceh: the Reminders of Violence and the peace zones in Aceh. In Hancock, L.E. & Future of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam”, Mitchell, C. (eds.). Zones of peace. (West (Harvard University, October 24–24, 2007); Hartford: Kumarian Press, 2007), p. 139; International Crisis Group, Aceh: So Far So Kamarulzaman Askandar, ibid. p. 251. Good, Asia Briefing, Number 44, December 20 Robinson, ibid., p. 216. 13, 2005); World Bank/DSF (Decentraliza- 21 Jhon Martinkus, ibid., p. 59; Damien tion Support Facility), Aceh Conflict Moni- Kingsbury & Clinton Fernandes, ibid., p. toring Update, (September 1–30, 2007). 96; Kirsten E. Schulze, ibid., 2007, p. 197. 9 Jhon Martinkus, Indonesia’s secret war in 22 See Kirsten E. Schulze, ibid., 2004, p. 4; Aceh, (Sydney: Random House Australia, Damien Kingsbury & Clinton Fernandes, 2004), p. 55. ibid., p. 96; Kamarulzaman Askandar, 10 Kirsten E. Schulze, ibid. 2007, p. 154; Jhon ibid., p. 251; Michael L. Ross, ibid., p. 43; Martinkus, ibid. p. 156. Jhon Martinkus, ibid., p. 62; Geoffrey 11 Kamarulzaman Askandar, ibid., p. 250. Robinson, ibid., p. 217. 12 Jhon Martinkus, ibid., p. 56. 23 Kirsten E. Schulze, ibid., 2007, p. 201. 13 Kirsten E. Schulze, ibid. 2004, pp. 10–11; 24 See Jhon Martinkus, ibid., p. 62; ibid., 2007, p. 194; Edward Aspinall, ibid. Kamarulzaman Askandar, ibid., p. 251; 2009, p. 61. Michael L. Ross, ibid., pp. 42–43; Kirsten 14 Kamarulzaman Askandar, ibid. p. 250. E. Schulze, ibid., 2007, p. 201. 15 Tim Kell, The roots of Acehnese rebellion 25 Geoffrey Robinson, ibid., p. 217; Dam- 1989–1992. (New York: Cornell Modern ien Kingsbury & Clinton Fernandes, Indonesia Project, 1995), p. 65. ibid., p. 97. Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy 41

26 Michelle Ann Miller, Konfilik di Aceh: policies in Aceh. (New York: Routledge, konteks, pemicu, katalis. In Aguswandi 2009), p. 2; Kirsten E. Schulze, ibid., 2007, & Large, J. Accord: rekonfigurasi politik pp. 216–218; Edward Aspinall, ibid., proses damai Aceh. (Issue 20. London: 2009, p. 221, and many others. Conciliation Resources Publication), pp. 32 Rizal Sukma, ibid., p. 5; Kamarulzaman 12–16; Majelis Pertimbangan GAM, Why Askandar, ibid., p. 255; Kirsten E. Schulze, Aceh Wants Independence from Colonial- ibid., 2007, p. 216. ism of the Republic of Indonesia. (A docu- 33 Hamid Awaluddin, ibid., p. 236. ment prepared by the Executive Council 34 Ibid., pp. 1–10. of the Free Aceh Movement, 1999); Dam- 35 Muhammad Nur Djuli & Nurdin Abdur ien Kingsbury & Clinton Fernandes, ibid., Rahman, Perundingan Helsinki: sebuah p. 96. perspektif dari juru runding Gerakan 27 Kirsten E. Schulze, ibid., 2004, p. 16. Aceh Merdeka. In Aguswandi & Large, J. 28 Kamarulzaman Askandar, ibid., p. 252; (ed.). Accord: rekonfigurasi politik proses Konrad Huber, Jalan berliku menuju per- damai Aceh. (London: Conciliation Re- damaian Aceh. In Aguswandi & Large, J. sources Publication, 2008), p. 29. (ed.). Accord: rekonfigurasi politik proses 36 Hamid Awaluddin, ibid., p. 83. damai Aceh. (Issue 20. London: Concilia- 37 Ibid., pp. 239–253. tion Resources Publication), p. 17; Damien 38 See Damien Kingsbury, The best choice for Kingsbury & Clinton Fernandes, ibid., p. 97. Aceh and Indonesia. In the Jakarta Post, 29 Geoffrey Robinson, ibid., p. 239. July 13, 2005. 30 See Hamid Awaluddin, Peace in Aceh: 39 Hamid Awaluddin, ibid., p. 199. notes on the peace process between the Re- 40 Rizal Sukma, ibid., p. 3. public of Indonesia and the Aceh Freedom 41 Patrick Barron, Mengelola sumber daya Movement (GAM) in Helsinki. (Jakarta: untuk perdamaian: rekonstruksi dan pen- CSIS, 2009); Crisis Management Initia- ciptaan perdamaian di Aceh. In Aguswan- tive, 2006. di & Large, J. (ed.). Accord: rekonfigurasi 31 Those scholars include Rizal Sukma, Re- politik proses damai Aceh. (London: Con- olving the Aceh Conflict: the Helsinki Peace ciliation Resources Publication, 2008), Agreement. Retrieved from: http://www. pp. 65–66. hdcenter.org/datastore/Mediators%20 42 See Edward Aspinall, ibid., 2009, p. 11. Retreats/Background%20Paper%20 43 See Edward Aspinall, ibid.; Patrick Barron, 4a%20Aceh.doc, on January 12, 2009; ibid. Judith Large & Aguswandi, Penempaan 44 Confidential interview, Banda Aceh, Octo- identitas, keniscayaan suara politik dan ber 20, 2010. hak asasi manusia. In Aguswandi & Large, 45 See Edward Aspinall, ibid., 2008, pp. J. (eds.). Accord: rekonfigurasi politik 50–51; Sidney Jones, Menjaga perdama- proses damai Aceh. (London: Conciliation ian: keamanan di Aceh. In Aguswandi & Resources Publication, Issue 20), pp. 6–7; Large, J. (ed.). Accord: rekonfigurasi politik Konrad Huber, Jalan berliku menuju per- proses damai Aceh. (London: Conciliation damaian Aceh. In Aguswandi & Large, J. Resources Publication, 2008), pp. 79–83. (ed.). Accord: rekonfigurasi politik proses 46 Confidential interview, East Aceh, Novem- damai Aceh. (London: Conciliation Re- ber 11, 2009. sources Publication, Issue 20), pp. 16–17; 47 See International Crisis Group, Aceh: post- Kamarulzaman Askandar, ibid., p. 248; conflict complications, (Asia Report, No. Hamid Awaluddin, ibid., p. 31; Michelle 139, October 4, 2007), p. i. Ann Miller, Rebellion and reform in In- 48 Confidential interview, East Aceh, Febru- donesia: Jakarta’s security and autonomy ary 10, 2010. 42 Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy

49 Zulfikar, one of the former GAM rank- damai Aceh (pp. 56–57). Issue 20. London: and-file members, confidential interview, Conciliation Resources Publication. Lhoksumawe, November 14, 2010. Ansori, M H 2011 Between self-interested and 50 See, for example, Stefan Ehrentraut, Di- socio-psychological motivations: the com- viding Aceh? Minorities, Partition Move- plexity and dynamic of ethnic conflict deci- ments and State-Reform in Aceh Province, sion in Indonesia. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Asia Research Institute Working Paper University of Hawaii at Manoa, USA. Series, No. 37, Aceh Working Paper Series, Askandar, K 2007 The Aceh conflict: phases No. 6, May 10. of conflict and hopes for peace. In Tan, A 51 Confidential interview, Southeast Aceh, T H (ed.) A handbook of terrorism and in- November 21, 2009. surgency in Southeast Asia (pp. 249–265). 52 Confidential interview, Central Aceh, De- Massachusetts: Edward Eigal Publishing cember 12, 2009. Limited. 53 Michelle Ann Miller, ibid., 2009, p. 142, Aspinall, E 2009 Islam and nation: separa- also noticed this issue as stating that “one tist rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia. Stanford: under-reported dimension of the con- Stanford University Press. temporary conflict in Aceh has been the Aspinall, E 2009 Combatants to contractors: sometimes strained relationship between the political economy of peace in Aceh. In Aceh’s ethnic minority groups and the Journal of Indonesia, Vol. 87, April 2009, ethnic Acehnese majority”. See also Ste- pp. 1–34. Cornell Southeast Asia Program. fan Ehrentraut, Dividing Aceh? Minorities, Aspinall, E 2004 The historical and politi- Partition Movements and State-Reform cal background to the Aceh conflict. In in Aceh Province, Asia Research Institute Askandar, K and Chee, A M (eds.) Building Working Paper Series, No. 37, Aceh Work- peace in Aceh: problems, strategies, and les- ing Paper Series, No. 6, May 10. sons from Sri Lanka, and Northern Ireland 54 Edward Aspinall, Islam and nation: separa- (pp. 31–42). Proceedings of the Interna- tist rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia. (Stanford: tional Symposium. Bangkok: Mahidol Uni- Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 4. versity, Chulalangkorn University, Tamma- 55 Michelle Ann Miller, ibid. sat University, etc. 56 See International Crisis Group Report, Aspinall, E 2008 Pemilihan umum: konsoli- 2005; Michelle Ann Miller, ibid.; Matt dasi perdamaian. In Aguswandi and Large, Davies, Indonesia’s war over Aceh: last J (eds.) Accord: rekonfigurasi politik proses stand on Mecca’s porch. (New York: Rout- damai Aceh (pp. 50–54). Issue 20. London: ledge, 2006), p. 52. It is also worth noting Conciliation Resources Publication. that the group often call themselves as Awaluddin, H 2009 Peace in Aceh: notes on Galaksi movement, an acronym of Aceh’s the peace process between the Republic of Gayo, Alas, Kluet and Sinkil indigenous Indonesia and the Aceh Freedom Movement ethnic minorities. (GAM) in Helsinki. Jakarta: CSIS. 57 See Aguswandi, Proses politik di Aceh: se- Azra, A and Salim, A 2003 The state and buah awal baru?. In Aguswandi & Large, shari’a in the perspective of Indonesian J. (ed.). Accord: rekonfigurasi politik proses legal politics. In Azra, A and Salim, A (eds.) damai Aceh. (London: Conciliation Re- Shari’a and politics in modern Indonesia. Sin- sources Publication, 2008), pp. 56–57. gapore: Insitute of Southeast Asian Studies. Barron, P 2008 Mengelola sumber daya REFERENCES untuk perdamaian: rekonstruksi dan pen- ciptaan perdamaian di Aceh. In Aguswan- Aguswandi 2008 Proses politik di Aceh: se- di and Large, J (ed.) Accord: rekonfigurasi buah awal baru?. In Aguswandi and Large, politik proses damai Aceh (pp. 62–66). Is- J (eds.) Accord: rekonfigurasi politik proses Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy 43

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Kingsbury, D 2005 The best choice for Aceh kepentingan dan upaya penyelesian. Jakar- and Indonesia. In the Jakarta Post, July 13, ta: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia. 2005. Parsons, J 2008 Modeling Syariah in Aceh. Kingsbury, D 2006 Peace in Aceh: a personal Available at: http://www.insideindonesia. account of the Helsinki peace process. Sin- org/edition-91/modelling-syariah-in-aceh. gapore: Equinox Publishing. Regional-compas.com Irwandi kumpulkan Large, J and Aguswandi 2008 Penempaan para mantan panglima GAM, (Februray 16, identitas, keniscayaan suara politik dan 2012). Available at: http://regional.kom- hak asasi manusia. In Aguswandi and pas.com/read/2012/02/16/13012093/ Large, J (eds.) Accord: rekonfigurasi politik Irwandi.Kumpulkan.Para.Panglima.GAM, proses damai Aceh (pp. 6–11). Issue 20. [Last accessed March 13, 2012]. London: Conciliation Resources Publica- Robinson, G 2001 Rawan is as Rawan does: tion. the origins of disorder in New Order Aceh. Liechty, M 2003 Suitably modern: making In Anderson, B R (ed.) Violence and state middle class culture in a new consumer in Suharto’s Indonesia (pp. 213–241). New society. New Jersey: Princeton University York: Cornell University Press. Press. Ross, M L 2005 Resources and rebellion in Martinkus, J 2004 Indonesia’s secret war in Aceh, Indonesia. In Collier, P and Sam- Aceh. Sydney: Random House Australia. banis, N (eds.) Understanding civil war: Media Indonesia, May 4, 2009. evidence and analysis (pp. 35–58). Wash- Miller, M A 2008 Konfilik di Aceh: konteks, ington: The World Bank. pemicu, katalis. In Aguswandi and Large, Schulze, K E 2007 The conflict in Aceh: strug- J (eds.) Accord: rekonfigurasi politik proses gle over oil? (pp. 183–224). In Kaldor, W et damai Aceh (pp. 12–16). Issue 20. London: al (eds.) Oil wars. Ann Arbor: Pluto Press. Conciliation Resources Publication. Schulze, K E 2004 The Free Aceh Movement Miller, M A 2009 Rebellion and reform in In- (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organiza- donesia: Jakarta’s security and autonomy tion. In Policy Studies 2, East West Center, policies in Aceh. New York: Routledge. Washington. Available at: http://www. MP Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 1999 Why eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/ Aceh Wants Independence from Colonial- pdfs//PS002.pdf [Last accessed July 6, ism of the Republic of Indonesia. A docu- 2010]. ment prepared by the Executive Council Serambi Indonesia, June 3, 2010. of the Free Aceh Movement. Available at: Serambi Indonesia, June 2, 2010. http://acehnet.tripod.com/why.htm [Last Sukma, R 2005 Resolving the Aceh Conflict: accessed June 13, 2010]. the Helsinki Peace Agreement. Available Mulia, S M and Cammack, M E 2007 To- at: http://www.hdcenter.org/datastore/ ward a just marriage law: empowering In- Mediators%20Retreats/Background%20 donesian women through a counter legal Paper%204a%20Aceh.doc [Last accessed draft to the Indonesian compilation of Is- January 12, 2009]. lamic law. In Feener, R M and Cammack, M World Bank/DSF (Decentralization Sup- E (eds.) Islamic law in contemporary Indo- port Facility) 2007 Aceh Conflict Monitor- nesia, pp. 128–145. Cambridge: Harvard ing Update, September 1–30. University Press. Yanggo, H T 2007 Civil rights of women Muhammad, R A 2003 Revitalisasi syari’at from the Islamic law perspective. In Boyd, Islam di Aceh : problem, solusi, dan imple- J (ed.) Civil rights and the position of wom- mentasi. Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu. en in Aceh: opportunities and challenges, Nurhasim, M, et al 2003 Konflik Aceh: Ana- pp. 17–36. Jakarta: Good Governance in lisis atas sebab-sebab konflik, actor konflik, Population Administration (GTZ). Colletta, N J 2012 Interim Stabilisation in Fragile Security Situations. STABILITY Stability, 1(1): 45-51. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.aa.

Practice note Interim Stabilisation in Fragile Security Situations Nat J. Colletta*

The Challenges of Conventional tations (Colletta and Muggah 2009; Berdal Stabilisation 1996). On the one hand, there is widespread For more than two decades a conventional ap- acknowledgment that such activities are dif- proach to security promotion has been widely ficult, perhaps more so than originally an- applied by multilateral and bilateral agencies ticipated. The specific determinants of socio- during war-to-peace transitions. Advocates of economic reintegration of former fighters this approach typically recommend a combi- into a productive civilian life (DDR) and their nation of disarmament, demobilisation and effective integration within security institu- reintegration (DDR) and security sector re- tions (SSR) are as complex as they are insuf- form (SSR) to consolidate peace-making and ficiently understood (Humphreys and Wein- peace-building processes (Colletta et al 2009, stein 2005). This is often the case during the Muggah 2006). Notwithstanding the broad early phases of the transition from war to acceptance of such activities – and the theory peace when conditions on the ground, par- that underlies them – there is little evidence ticularly popular confidence in security in- that such interventions have contributed to stitutions and labour market opportunities, any enduring solution to conflict and fragility frustrate conventional post-conflict security (Muggah 2009). Indeed, analysts have come to promotion activities. The knowledge gaps recognise that the political, economic and so- and routine operational dilemmas surround- cial pre-conditions for DDR and SSR – includ- ing security provision during fragile transi- ing a relatively functional government, a rea- tion processes further complicate matters. sonably stable labour market and a minimum Policy makers and practitioners confront a level of social trust – are seldom in place. Even number of questions when it comes to pro- when these ambitious pre-requisites have moting security in the aftermath of armed been achieved, it is not clear that they are suf- conflict. How can they deal with poorly edu- ficient for DDR and SSR to take hold. Never- cated and unskilled former combatants and theless, these orthodoxies persist in security mid- and upper-level commanders in an promotion policy and practice. economy with very limited labour absorp- Policy research has endeavoured to deter- tion capacity? How might they restructure mine why conventional approaches to secur- a security sector while simultaneously inte- ing transitions so often fall short of expec- grating large numbers of minimally-trained combatants? How should they deal with the risks of a security vacuum in the context of a shaky political settlement? How can civic * New College, 5800 Bay Shore Road, Sarasota, FL 34243, United States. trust be re-established (or established for the [email protected] first time) following decades of violence, of- 46 Colletta / Interim Stabilisation in Fragile Security Situations

ten in the context of extreme uncertainty? a reliance on “hard power” to a more stable How can they implement comprehensive reliance on “soft power” rooted within good security transition programmes given weak governance and social and economic pro- government capacities? Ultimately, the key gress within a civilian society and economy preoccupation of such actors is ensuring (Colletta et al 2008). both short and long-term stability in high- Yet international actors’ frequent reversion risk, low-trust, insecure and unpredictable to past strategies and boilerplate approaches environments. Such efforts must be pursued often emerges, and trade-offs between expe- amidst unsettled issues such as political and diency and efficacy are decided without fully economic power sharing and elite positioning. understanding the local context and the con- There is growing recognition that DDR and cerns of all stakeholders. Doing so has the SSR processes often fail because the political tendency to create “spoilers” out of those and economic context – to the extent they whose interests and perspectives are set aside are reflected in the programme design – are (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Steadman 2005). In not ripe at the time of a ceasefire agreement the interest of short- and long-term stability or the signing of a peace agreement, nor it is important that all peace-building, state- fully settled during the initial implementa- building and stabilisation measures reflect tion stages (Colletta and Muggah 2009). For the local context and overcome the rever- example, Libya, Somalia and South Sudan are sion to boilerplate approaches. Policymak- indicative of settings where, in spite of the ers and practitioners must invest heavily in emergence of an interim government and po- understanding the key contextual factors litical settlements, political elites, local mili- that shape security transitions in fragile situ- tias and commanders still contend for power. ations. A closer reading of a country´s politi- What is lacking in such settings is not so much cal economy is essential in order to prepare a politico-technical solution to DDR and SSR the ground for short-term stabilisation and but rather the requisite time and space to re- successful long-term peace processes. This build livelihoods and facilitate a modicum of requires investments in diagnostics to better mutual trust and confidence between the key apprehend the nature of the armed conflict, parties and the wider polity. More specifically, including its underlying structural dynam- transitional mechanisms are required to allow ics as well as the motivations and character- the necessary economic opportunity, trust istics of the fighting parties. Furthermore, and confidence to be established while the those designing stabilisation strategies must situation gradually ripens to the point that also assess the level of trust and confidence control over armed groups can be realistically in political commitments amongst parties pursued and eventually established. and between social groups. This is typically captured in an analysis of the nature of the Context is King peace, that is, the manner in which the con- flict ended (i.e., whether imposed, negoti- Policymakers and practitioners confront a ated, or mediated by a third party). Under- host of trade-offs when promoting security standing the nature of peace also requires an in the early aftermath of armed conflict. They analysis of those factors that either helped need to balance short term stabilisation im- bring about the resolution of the conflict peratives with long-term peace-building and or which enable it to persist in the fraught state-building goals while also considering post-ceasefire environment. ways to balance the political aspirations of Other factors that shape successful stabili- local elites against the real day-to-day con- sation efforts are fundamentally connected to cerns of (formerly) armed groups and vulner- the political and economic circumstances on able populations. There is also a need to en- the ground. For example, the governance and sure that conflicting parties can move from Colletta / Interim Stabilisation in Fragile Security Situations 47 administrative reach and capacity of the state, tate political settlements between opposing particularly the ability to provide public secu- parties. However, their focus is less on engi- rity and access to justice along with other ba- neering socio-political change and “winning sic services, is a key determinant. Likewise, the the hearts and minds” of populations than on state of the economy or, more specifically, the providing former combatants with an unam- ability to absorb unskilled labour, is critical for biguous “peace dividend”. It should be stressed smooth transitions. Finally, the character and here that interim stabilisation is not being cohesiveness of communities and combatants proposed as a mandatory first step during the and the degree of social integration is also cru- peace-building process. Nor is it conceived cial to understand when designing transition- here as a necessary precondition for or com- al strategies linked to DDR and SSR. Indeed, ponent of DDR and SSR processes. Rather, the the level of ethnic and religious homogeneity intention is to identify a number of concrete at the community level are important medi- ISMs that may be available – should they ap- ating variables informing conflict resolution pear necessary or beneficial – during the secu- and peace-building. rity transition between the signing of a peace agreement and its eventual implementation. Enter Interim Stabilisation Measures ISMs seek to facilitate the transformation of former military groups into quasi-civilian International actors’ attempts to match in- organisations. Such arrangements can prove terventions to local contexts have repeatedly effective both from a collective and an in- been wanting. As indicated by Colletta and dividual perspective. When carefully imple- Muggah (2009), there is a wide range of se- mented, ISMs can enable and sustain social curity promotion activities in post-conflict control, social cohesion and mutual support settings that do not easily conform to con- among former combatants under civilian ventional DDR or SSR approaches. Policy- command structures. As noted above, they makers and practitioner must be aware of can also help open up the time and space the options available to them in order to needed for the political process and early re- ensure that they can identify and adapt the covery efforts to yield tangible progress. At most appropriate approaches to the nuanced the same time, they can enable individual circumstances at hand. Alongside what are combatants to ease into a productive civilian termed stability operations such as those de- life rather than experience a sharp transition scribed in a forthcoming volume edited by in both their livelihoods and their identi- Muggah – Stabilization Operations, Security ties. There are a wide range of ISMs which and Development (2012) – are so-called “in- can be organised according to a basic typol- terim stabilisation measures” (ISMs). While ogy. These include: (i) civilian service corps; not necessarily described as such, these ISMs (ii) military or security sector integration; (iii) are often mobilised during security transi- transitional security forces; (iv) semi-auton- tions (Downes and Muggah 2009). They in- omous and decentralised local community clude “measures that may be used to keep forces; and (v) combined military integration former combatants’ social cohesiveness in- and civilian reintegration programmes. Sev- tact within a military or civilian command eral of these are elaborated below in order and control structure while creating space to provide a more tangible understanding of and buying time for political dialogue and ISMs and their roles within transitional con- the formation of an environment conducive texts. to military integration and/or social and eco- . Civil Service Corps are nomic reintegration” (Colletta et al. 2008). Civil Service Corps typically made up of an organisation of indi- Interim stabilisation interventions mirror, viduals who work together on a voluntary or to a greater and lesser degree, conventional paid basis for a period of time. For instance, stabilisation efforts that seek to quickly facili- 48 Colletta / Interim Stabilisation in Fragile Security Situations

consider the case of the South African Service ing the integration of former rebels into the Corps (SASC) (Lamb and Dye 2009). Following national army (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; the end of apartheid, former combatants of Mills 1992). Military integration and rede- South Africa’s conflict who did not meet the ployment of armed groups as “transitional requirements of the South African National security forces” may generate some security Defense Force (SANDF) were to be demobi- dividends. Likewise, keeping intact groups lised and reintegrated into civilian life. Two of former combatants who are subsequently options were provided to beneficiaries. The given civilian policing duties and provided first option included a social and economic with life-skills training and/or socio-psycho- reintegration package consisting of a cash logical support is another. transfer and a voluntary, two-week counseling Transitional Security Forces. Transitional se- programme. The second option was to join curity forces represent a pragmatic form of the South African Service Corps (SASC) for a ISM intended to prevent a security vacuum maximum of 18 months.1 The SASC was de- in fragile and conflict-affected situations. signed to train close to 22,000 combatants, Transitional forces can address the immedi- primarily from Azanian Peoples Liberation ate occupational and income needs of for- Army (APLA) and Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK) mer combatants while temporarily main- resistance forces, between 1995 and 2001 taining the social control and cohesion of (Williams 2005). While innovative, the SASC intact command and control structures. In inevitably encountered difficulties. Poor plan- Kosovo, for instance, the security transition ning and management undermined the cred- was at least partially achieved through the ibility of the organisation, which was further shift of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) tarnished by the perception that it would not into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a help combatants obtain employment (Mashi- civilian emergency response organisation ke 2006). Despite such difficulties, the SASC while maintaining the cohesion, command nevertheless provides an instructive example and control of the former KLA. Members of of an ISM designed to buy time for the labour the KPC were precluded from holding pub- market and communities to receive returning lic office or from actively engaging in politi- soldiers with limited skills and few employ- cal affairs. All inhabitants of Kosovo ethnic ment prospects. For all of its limitations, the societies, including Kosovo Serbs were eligi- SASC shows how the creation of a “halfway ble to join, though interest among groups house” for former combatants who are not eli- other than the Kosovo Albanians was weak. gible, or unwilling, to join the national armed The formation was modeled after the French forces, can be used as a strategy to ease their Sécurité Civile while in practice the organi- transition into a productive civilian life. sation basically retained the military struc- Military Integration. The concept of mili- ture of the KLA, including weapons, military tary integration is widely known and often uniforms and ranks.2 Importantly, the KPC pursued as part of a wider SSR strategy. It subsequently transitioned into a leaner na- is typically defined as the incorporation of tional army combining a demobilisation and non-statutory armed groups (e.g. local mi- reintegration program with the conversion litia, insurgents and revolutionary groups) to the Kosovo National Army (KNA) of the into a statutory security framework (e.g. na- newly independent entity of Kosovo. Thus tional police, army, reserve corps). Military the KPC provided a functional interim tran- integration is increasingly common in peace sitional security institution in form if not processes and in the post-conflict recovery function, buying time and space for econom- process. Indeed, one third of all documented ic and political progression to a legitimate peace processes since 1990 have featured KNA. The KPC, then, is illustrative of how the some form of military integration, includ- interests of relative stability and alternative Colletta / Interim Stabilisation in Fragile Security Situations 49 civilian livelihoods can be combined through ISMs provide important options to “ripen” transforming one or more military groups a situation whether employed as military, and redirecting them towards civilian tasks. civilian or hybrid civ-mil tools. The use of Transitional Local Autonomy Forces. Another ISMs will depend very much on specific con- ISM entails the granting of a level of local au- textual factors, especially how the conflict tonomy and/or decentralised security capacity ended, the degree to which reconciliation within an overall national security framework has progressed and the relationship between during a transitional period. A prominent various combatant groups and the broader example of such a scheme is the agreement society. And while offering a strategic op- between the Hun Sen led Cambodian govern- portunity for policy makers and practition- ment and the Khmer Rouge (KR) in Cambo- ers, it is important to stress that there is still dia initially after signing a cessation of hos- comparatively limited empirical research on tilities agreement in 1996.3 In 1996, Hun Sen how contextual factors are likely to influence announced his Win-Win Policy to bring the different kinds of ISMs.8 There also remains a Khmer Rouge back into the fold of the state. relative paucity of knowledge regarding the While a complex and multi-faceted policy, the most appropriate implementation arrange- Win-Win strategy included three levels of rein- ments (e.g., vetting procedures, management tegration: (i) military integration4, (ii) adminis- processes, sequencing of activities) for differ- trative reintegration5 and (iii) socio-economic ent ISMs (Colletta and Muggah 2009). reintegration.6 By offering a win-win scenario, A common aspiration of all ISMs is to tem- the Cambodia People’s Party was able to lay porarily hold former combatants in cohesive out concrete incentives to Khmer Rouge de- structures and maintain basic security and fectors. Defectors were ensured a guarantee of social supports in order to “buy time” and personal and family safety, safety of property “create space” for other pertinent conditions and opportunities to continue the professions on the ground to coalesce. The over-arching previously held. They were also allowed to goal, of course, is to prevent and reduce the maintain a degree of social cohesion, often a onset and severity of organised violence at factor explicitly rejected in conventional DDR war´s end while also reducing the likelihood and SSR interventions. What is more, the pro- of spoiler violence. ISMs can thus generate cess allowed Khmer Rouge followers to more a host of opportunities in post-conflict set- gradually integrate into formal administrative tings such as: (i) facilitating the continuation structures and be exposed to sensitisation. of political dialogue; (ii) enabling the settle- The scheme also underlines the need to tie ment of outstanding power sharing issues in transitional measures into longer-term peace the political and security arenas; (iii) building building strategies, including, as appropriate, trust and confidence amongst parties to en- reintegration and national reconciliation pro- able a political settlement; (iv) constituting grams (Colletta and Cullen 2000).7 provisional administrative structures and legal instruments to promote security and What Next for Interim Stabilisation? safety; (v) promoting the absorptive capac- ity of different economic and social sectors Conventional security promotion activities of society; (vi) sensitizing communities in such as DDR and SSR are often ineffective be- advance of more formal DDR and SSR activi- cause the political, economic and social cir- ties; and (vii) enhancing socio-psychological cumstances on the ground are not ripe. This adjustment of combatants as they gradually is especially the case in early post-conflict set- move towards a fully civilian life or integra- tings when ceasefires and peace agreements tion into the security services. have not been signed and when transitional There are inevitably a number of risks as- governments have yet to coalesce. This prac- sociated with ISMs. As we have seen in the tice note has shown that, in certain cases, 50 Colletta / Interim Stabilisation in Fragile Security Situations

brief examples presented above, ISMs run 4 All Khmer Rouge defectors were inte- the risks of: (i) reconstructing oppressive grated into the Royal Cambodian Armed structures or maintaining rebellious units; Forces. The mid-level commanders contin- (ii) providing impunity from justice; (iii) fa- ued to lead their soldiers under the Cam- cilitating criminality and maintaining ille- bodian Armed Forces structure. gal networks (e.g. drugs, money laundering, 5 The Khmer Rouge leaders were allowed to etc.); (iv) promoting the continuation of ille- either keep their old positions or accept gitimate control over natural resources; and alternative civilian government positions (v) inadvertently de-legitimating the state in their own communities. by maintaining a separate and semi-intact 6 The Government granted these Khmer source of potential authority and coercion. Rouge areas autonomous economic de- Like other peace-building efforts, ISMs also velopment zone status: no taxes for three- run the risk of creating new dependencies years and permission to open a number of or becoming isolated from other main pil- ’Border Economic Gates’ with Thailand to lars of the peace-building and state-building promote trade. The economic development processes. These are of course valid concerns helped create social harmony, which was that require management and mitigation. of crucial importance in the reintegration They are also common to many interventions process. Land was fairly distributed within during war-to-peace transitions. A key strat- the autonomous zones. Each combatant egy is ensuring that ISMs are implemented and his or her family were provided with under an accepted and largely legitimate two cows, five hectares of land and 5,000 civilian authority and are, from day one, ac- Baht. Many still live peacefully on this land. companied by clear and transparent time- 7 This case also highlights the importance lines and sunset clauses. Ultimately, high-risk of not closing the door on future justice strategies can also yield high gains that may processes dealing with crimes commit- justify the trade-offs entailed. S ted during the conflict. The singling out of specific crimes of genocides as excep- NOTES tions to the Law to Outlaw the Democratic Kampuchea Group has allowed for recent 1 The SASC was instituted within the South arrests of former Khmer Rouge leaders African National Defense Force (SANDF) and has finally allowed the launch of an in September 1995 (Williams 2005). international criminal court on unique hy- 2 The KPC was to be allowed 2,000 weapons brid terms (a mixture of International and of which 1,800 would be “held in trust” Cambodian Jurists) on Cambodian soil. in KFOR secure weapons facilities. The re- 8 Even so, research indicates that there are mainder would be available for the guard- likely a number of favorable pre-conditions ing of installations and security when that may influence the direction, shape units were deployed. Note, this is not and impacts of interim stabilisation meas- unlike the dual key locked box method ures. For example, Glassmyer and Samban- of placing weapons in third party trust as is (2007) have singled out factors that posi- part of an acceptable Northern Ireland (de tively and negatively shape the outcomes Chastelain 2004). These were precondi- of military integration or transitional civil- tions of the KLA to accept the terms (Pe- military mechanisms. Examples include tersen 2005; ICG 2000). the extent of economic opportunity; clear 3 Another example would be the de facto military victory or a negotiated peace set- maintenance of the “Pesh Merga” in Kurd- tlement; and the existence of a broad mul- istan within the larger newly formed na- ti-dimensional peace processes. tional army in Iraq following the Ameri- can occupation. Colletta / Interim Stabilisation in Fragile Security Situations 51

REFERENCES Humphreys, M and Weinstein, J 2005 Dis- entangling the Determinants of Success- Berdal, M 1996 Disarmament and Demobili- ful Demobilization and Reintegration. Un- zation After Civil Wars. Adelphi Paper 303. published Manuscript. DOI: http://dx.doi. Oxford: Oxford University Press. org/10.2139/ssrn.984246. Colletta, N J et al. 2009 The Cartagena Con- International Crisis Group 2000 What tribution to Disarmament, Demobilization Happened to the KLA? Balkans Report 88. and Reintegration. Washington: The World Pristina: International Crisis Group. Bank. Lamb, G and Dye, D 2009 Security Promo- Colletta, N J and Cullen, M 2000 Violent tion and DDR: Linkages between ISMs, Conflict and the Transformation of Social DDR, and SSR within a Broader Peace- Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, building Framework. Washington, DC: The Guatemala, and Somalia. (Washington: World Bank. The World Bank). Mashike, L 2006 ‘Some of us know nothing Colletta, N J and Muggah, R 2009 Con- except military skills’: South Africa’s for- text Matters: Interim Stabilization and mer guerrilla combatants. In Buhlungu, Second Generation Approaches to Se- Sakhela, Daniel, John, Southall, Roger and curity Promotion. Conflict, Security and Jessica Lutchman (eds.) State of the Na- Development 9 (4). DOI: http://dx.doi. tion. Capetown: HSRC Press. org/10.1080/14678800903345762. Mills, G 1992 BMATT and Military Integra- Colletta, N J, Samuelsson Schjorlien, J and tion in Southern Africa. South Africa De- Berts, H 2008 Interim Stabilization: Bal- fense Review 1 (2). ancing Security and Development in Post Muggah, R (ed.) 2012 Stabilization Opera- Conflict Peace-Building. Stockholm: Min- tions, Security and Development: States of istry of Foreign Affairs, Folke Bernadotte Fragility. New York: Routledge. Academy. Muggah, R 2006 No Refuge: The Crisis of de Chastelain, J 2004 The Northern Ireland Refugee Militarization in Africa. New York: Peace Process and the impact of Decom- Zed Books. missioning. In: Bric, Maurice J. and John Muggah, R (ed.) 2009 Security, and Post-Con- Coakle (eds.) From Political Violence to flict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters Negotiated Settlement. Dublin: University in the Aftermath of War. New York: Rout- College Dublin Press. ledge. Downes, M and Muggah, R 2009 Buying Petersen, E 2005 The Kosovo Protection Time: How interim Stabilization can En- Corps in Search of a Future. Center for Eu- hance Security Sector Reform in Post-War ropean Studies. Settings. Stedman, S 2005 Spoiler Problems in Fearon, J D and Laitin, D 1996 Explaining In- Peace Processes. International Secu- ter-ethnic Co-operation. American Political rity 23 (2): 5–53. DOI: http://dx.doi. Science Review 90 (4) 715–735. org/10.2307/2539366. Glassmyer, K and Sambanis, N 2007 Rebel- Williams, R 2005 Demobilization and Rein- Military Integration and Civil War Termi- tegration: The Key to the South African De- nation. New Haven: Yale University. fense Transformation. In Fitz-Gerald, A M Hartzell, C and Hoddie, M Institutional- and Mason, H (eds.) From Conflict to Com- izing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil munity: A Combatants Return to Citizen- War Conflict Management. American Jour- ship. Cranfield: Global Facilitation Network nal of Political Science, 47 (2). DOI: http:// for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR). dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540-5907.00022. Nussio E and Howe, K 2012 What if the FARC Demobilizes? Stability, STABILITY 1(1): 58-67. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.aj.

practice note What if the FARC Demobilizes? Enzo Nussio* and Kimberly Howe†

Introduction equally fundamental, in this piece, we focus In September 2012, the Colombian govern- on this specific point and highlight some ment officially announced ongoing peace of the critical issues that might emerge if talks with the leftist Revolutionary Armed the peace process between the Colombian Forces of Colombia (FARC). This gesture was government and this guerrilla group is suc- the first of its kind since the failed negotia- cessful. The ideas presented here are based tion process with the same guerrilla group on several historical applications of former during the government of Andrés Pastrana combatant disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) as a peacebuilding (1998–2002) (see Villarraga 2009). The FARC remains the largest and strongest non-state activity. We particularly attempt to extract armed group operating in the country, and implications from the demobilization of the can be traced back to as early as 1964. Ob- paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of servers of the current negotiations are large- Colombia (AUC) between 2003 and 2006 ly optimistic about the prospects for peace (Nussio 2011a), the ongoing desertion and and the end of the decades-long conflict. reintegration of individual guerrilla mem- A jointly created document entitled the bers (Anaya 2007), and the accumulated ‘General Agreement for the Ending of Con- knowledge about the structure and history 1 flict and the Construction of a Stable and of the FARC (Pizarro Leongómez 2011). Al- Durable Peace’ (FARC and Gobierno de Co- though the peace process is likely to face lombia 2012) lays out the six points to be dis- many obstacles – and a complete failure is cussed during the negotiations. Point three possible – we nevertheless remain positive on this list – ‘end of the conflict’ – envisages about a negotiated settlement. As such, we the ‘abandonment of weapons’ and the ‘eco- reflect here on the critical issues that might nomic, social and political reincorporation need to be considered to support a sustain- of the FARC into civilian life’. While other able and peaceful outcome. elements of the peace negotiations may be What About Their Guns and Fighters?

* Universidad de los Andes, Depending on the source, the size of the Carrera 1 No 18A-10, Edificio Franco, FARC is currently estimated at 8,000 to Bogotá D. C., Colombia 10,000 combatants. How many of these [email protected] might eventually demobilize? The AUC de- † Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, 114 Curtis Street, mobilization process could provide some Somerville, Massachusetts 02144, USA indications; their leaders referred to some [email protected] Nussio and Howe / What if the FARC Demobilizes? 59

15,000 armed men during the negotiations, A crucial issue associated with the demo- but more than 30,000 demobilized in the bilization of combatants relates to child sol- end (CNRR 2010). The government claims diers. Data published in a recent study of the that the inflated numbers were a result of Colombian Family Welfare Institute (El Tiem- the demobilization of non-combatant mem- po 2012) indicate that about 50% of all FARC bers associated with the group, such as those fighters joined this group when they were who were in charge of logistics or acted as younger than 18 years of age and that youth informants. Critics state that the AUC delib- recruitment has increased dramatically in erately increased the number of participants recent years. It is difficult to calculate how in the demobilization process by recruiting many will still be underage at the moment of people who were not eligible but nonethe- demobilization, but this topic is critical both less sought to take advantage of DDR ben- in terms of providing differential assistance efits. Two top paramilitary leaders (Ever Velo- to former child and adult soldiers and given za, alias ‘HH’ and Freddy Rendón, alias ‘El that commanders responsible for the forci- Alemán’) have confessed to engaging in this ble recruitment of minors may face judicial practice (El Tiempo 2011a; El Tiempo 2011b). action. Given that the FARC has been in existence With respect to disarmament, we have for many decades, the group has large sup- evidence that the AUC kept a stockpile of port networks in areas where they have long weapons hidden during its 2003–2006 de- operated. According to the United Nations mobilization process. These weapons may be Integrated DDR Standards (United Nations in current use by post-demobilization armed 2006), people associated with the armed groups.3 The maintenance of secret arsenals group but who are not necessarily combat- will also be an issue for the FARC, as will be ants should be eligible for inclusion in the their use and possession of non-convention- DDR process. The actual number to demo- al high-impact weapons such as homemade bilize may thus be several times higher than explosive material and landmines. These the current estimate of FARC combatants.2 weapons should be explicitly included in the Regarding inflated numbers, it will be cru- disarmament process. In addition, a more cial to apply clearly defined eligibility crite- general parallel weapons reduction program ria more strictly than was done under the involving the civilian population – framed as AUC demobilization process. According to being connected to the FARC’s disarmament Decree 3360 of 2003, the government con- – might help to reduce the number of illegal sidered all persons appearing on the lists arms circulating in Colombia, thus contrib- submitted by AUC leaders to be entitled to uting to lower levels of violence in the post- demobilization assistance. Such a criterion conflict period (Muggah 2006). proved to be too simplistic and trusting in many ways and should be matched with ad- Will They Get Jobs? ditional controls and standards. The techni- The economic reintegration of former com- cal design of collective demobilization ap- batants has proven to be challenging in a plied for the AUC, including international number of DDR processes and will be so for oversight by the Organization of American the case of FARC soldiers. Many former AUC States (OAS), may offer a good model to rep- fighters and a significant number of guerilla licate, as long as it adopts a policy of non- deserters have moved to cities not only to tolerance and prevents false combatants find jobs but also to restart a more anony- from entering into the process. The broader mous life, free from social stigma and pos- involvement of international observers in sible threats from previous friends and foes addition to the OAS might give the process (Nussio 2011b). However, the rural identity more teeth. and skills of most FARC members should lead 60 Nussio and Howe / What if the FARC Demobilizes?

to a less urban-focused economic reintegra- in Colombia claim that they need to be an tion process. However, this will only be possi- active part of their communities in order to ble if rural development – including large in- feel completely ‘reintegrated’ (Departamento frastructure projects – become a priority for Nacional de Planeación 2010). According to the government. While the ‘rural question’ recent research conducted in Colombia, the is the first topic on the negotiation agenda, social opportunities offered to ex-combat- unequal land tenure, forcible displacement, ants in receiving communities are critical for and rural underdevelopment have proved to their participation in local organizations (Ka- be almost unsolvable difficulties in Colom- plan and Nussio 2012). Hence, an increased bia (UNDP 2011) A more rural-oriented DDR focus on the community should contribute process also implies that the Colombian Re- to a more positive experience for both ex- integration Agency (ACR – the organization combatants, who have been largely stigma- concerned with the reintegration of former tized in earlier processes, and for commu- combatants) needs to decentralize its ser- nity members, who have rightly complained vices away from urban centers. The contin- about an exaggerated focus on demobilized ued focus of service provision in urban areas people (Nussio 2012). could create an incentive for ex-combatants In addition to the creation of new networks, to move to cities. managing old networks will be a necessary One positive sign for economic reintegra- component of the FARC demobilization pro- tion comes from the participation of the cess. Most literature on DDR has called for Colombian Business Federation (ANDI) at a complete dismantlement of command and the negotiation table. In addition, the Fun- control structures due to the risk of remobi- dación Ideas para la Paz (FIP) has conducted lization, such as experienced with the Cor- research on the attitudes of Colombian busi- poración Democracia in Medellín (Guáqueta nesspeople and have identified that they are and Arias 2011). However, the former group interested in the peace process and support- dynamics might have a positive potential ing the economic reintegration of ex-com- as well, especially in the case of the FARC batants (FIP 2012). fighters who have a strong in-group identity. An additional proposal is to convert some Intentionally destroying this social anchor FARC fighters into a rural police and reinte- might lead to fragmentation and further in- grate others into the military forces, thus tak- crease their vulnerability to remobilization ing benefit of their existing skills. Experiences or engagement in illegal activities, as was the in Nepal and Kosovo may be instructive in case for former fighters in Afghanistan (Zyck this respect. However, both options will most 2009). Also, leveraging networks and con- probably face resistance in Colombia. When tacts among former fighters might facilitate debating the integration of the AUC into the the integration of ex-combatants into the job military forces, their massive human rights market (de Vries and Wiegink 2011). abuse history and involvement in drug-traf- ficking did not allow for the realization of such Will They Participate in Politics? a policy (Guáqueta and Arias 2011). Similar According to a survey conducted by the FIP reasons may be brought forward for the FARC. in 2008, half of the FARC combatants who have already demobilized attended ideolog- What About Their Old and New ical training sessions at least once a week Social Networks? when they were active. This finding can be Achieving the social reintegration of former interpreted as a strong indicator that the combatants is no easy task, but it is crucial FARC maintains a political dimension and for the ultimate success of any DDR pro- that they cannot be simply reduced to nar- cess. Approximately 97% of ex-combatants co-terrorists, as government officials have Nussio and Howe / What if the FARC Demobilizes? 61 often referred to them (see also Ugarriza And What About Security? and Craig 2012). Persistent or increased insecurity follow- Past experiences give a sense of what might ing the DDR of the FARC will be one of the be possible in the case of the FARC. The politi- largest concerns for citizens, practitioners cal reintegration model applied to the M-19 and policymakers. Demobilization does not and other guerrilla groups in the early 1990s always lead to better security outcomes, as was largely successful thanks to a widely held has been seen with the paramilitary process. perception that the M-19 was fighting for Research showed that immediately after the political ideals and not for private criminal close of the demobilization process with the interests (Palou and Méndez 2012). They par- AUC, rates of violence decreased (Restrepo ticipated in creating a new constitution, and and Muggah 2009). However, a longer-term many are important political figures today. view has indicated that the homicide rate is Regarding the demobilization of the AUC, increasing in areas where reintegration is oc- the political question was excluded from the curring, when holding constant other causes debate for various reasons–among them the of homicide (Howe, Sánchez, and Contreras highly criminalized character of the para- 2010). Violence has remained high in those militaries (Guáqueta 2007). A middle ground areas of the country where there are oppor- between the two extremes may be neces- tunities to extract illegal rents and where sary for a demobilization of the FARC. For local governance structures are weak (Howe ex-combatants, this would mean translating 2012). The principal threat to security in Co- some of their learned ideology into the po- lombia since 2006 has been the surfacing of litical sphere. However, direct participation post-demobilization armed groups, which might be limited to mid and lower-ranking are variously referred to as successor groups, ex-combatants. The conversion of top FARC neo-paramilitaries or criminal gangs (ban- leaders into congressmen could provoke neg- das criminals, or BACRIM for short). There is ative feelings amongst the population due to substantial evidence that these groups have FARC’s involvement in massive human rights a variety of linkages with the former AUC abuses against the civilian population. Also, (Massé et al. 2010). A similar outcome may their involvement ultimately depends on the emerge following the FARC DDR process de- transitional justice measures that will accom- pending on such issues as state capacity to pany DDR. Paramilitary leaders responsible for control FARC-dominated areas, the evolution atrocities received a reduced prison sentence of drug-trafficking, the role of former mid- under the Justice and Peace Law (Pizarro and level commanders in the peace process, and Valencia 2009). Creating similar legislation for recidivism among rank-and-file combatants. the FARC would make the involvement of top leaders in big-P politics impossible. However, State control over FARC-dominated the reintegration program might be well ad- territory vised to move the question of political reinte- The FARC has largely been located in ar- gration away from party politics and political eas outside the reach of government forces. roles for current FARC leaders, and instead fo- What will happen to these spaces from a cus on ensuring that FARC members are able governance perspective if the FARC demo- to become politically aware citizens who find bilizes? Again it is possible to draw some a place in the existing political spectrum (see inferences based on the experience of AUC Söderström 2011). The newly created leftist demobilization. The AUC, in the locations Marcha Patriótica movement, which is espe- where it was dominant, provided many state cially interested in the rural question, may functions, including protection, to the local become an important platform for politically population. It also controlled many of the lo- engaged former FARC combatants. cal state resources such as education, health, 62 Nussio and Howe / What if the FARC Demobilizes?

and politics as well as economics (Duncan directly managing commercialization and 2006). Their demobilization has lead to a export. Cocaine, in addition to kidnapping type of power vacuum whereby there is no and extortion, has kept the organization fi- legitimate legal actor with full territorial con- nancially afloat for several decades. Some trol. This dynamic has been linked to worsen- large landowners have benefited from FARC ing security in former AUC dominated areas presence and have paid them to provide since DDR (Howe and Nussio, under review). security and ‘discipline’ among peasants The FARC has been located in areas where (Gutiérrez Sanín 2004). However, these il- the state is weak or non-existent. The areas legal markets do not disappear with DDR, under their control need to receive a rapid as is evidenced by the paramilitary process. injection of genuine local governance, par- Paramilitaries were heavily involved in the ticularly in terms of protection while de- drug trade, charging protection fees to large mobilization is being rolled out. FARC ter- land-owners and multi-nationals, benefiting ritory, as a result of their market activities from governmental contracts, and running (described below), is a valuable resource shadow economies – to name just a few of that other existing armed actors may at- their illegal activities. Their dissolution has tempt to seize. A legitimate force must be not led to the collapse of illegal markets; installed in these locations to prevent post- instead, post-demobilization armed groups demobilization armed groups or successor have (re-)surfaced to extract these rents in groups that splinter from the FARC process largely the same areas where the AUC was from controlling this territory and beginning formerly operating (Granada, Restrepo, and violent operations. These assertions are sup- Tobón 2009). Special care should be taken ported by several studies in Colombia that to ensure that top-level FARC commanders link increased state presence (in the form of are not intending to sell their businesses like arrests per homicides) to a decreasing homi- ‘franchises’ to post-demobilization armed cide rate at the sub-national level over time groups, as occurred with the paramilitaries (Echeverry and Partow 1998; Howe, Sánchez, (Verdad Abierta 2012). and Contreras 2010). Policing may thus be a key activity to increase state presence and Mid-level commanders manage post-demobilization violence. How- One of the weaknesses of the DDR process ever, a whole range of post-conflict security with the AUC was that no special provisions policies under the labels of ‘interim stabili- were made for mid-level commanders. Mid- zation measures’ and ‘second generation ap- level commanders inhabit a special and proaches’ should be considered in Colombia powerful place in the ranks – both close to (Colletta and Muggah 2009). top-level commanders and influential over troops within the rank and file. They are the Drugs and illegal markets sub-group most likely to experience loss in In a context of limited state presence, the terms of status and economy as the result opportunity to extract revenues from illicit of a demobilization process, and therefore sources has contributed to elevated rates of should be recognized for their role as po- violence since the DDR of paramilitaries in tential spoilers (Stockholm Initiative 2006; Colombia (Howe 2012). Therefore, such il- Themnér 2011). Many of the leaders of post- legal rents should be a focus for authorities DDR armed groups are former mid-level as they consider the demobilization of the commanders of the AUC (CNRR 2010; Massé FARC. The FARC has been a major player in et al. 2011). It will therefore be important to the cocaine industry since the 1980s. They consider this special group of combatants have been involved in the setting of prices, during the FARC DDR process. The Program organizing markets, taxing production, and of Humanitarian Attention to Demobilized Nussio and Howe / What if the FARC Demobilizes? 63

People (PAHD) involves former mid-level etc.– goes directly back into the organization. commanders in preventing the recruitment Looting or any acts to obtain personal wealth of youth into armed groups and provides are strictly forbidden, even within the higher them with personal protection (Arias, Prieto, ranks. The personal risk of joining the FARC and Herrera 2010). Such initial ideas should is much higher than for the paramilitaries or be extended to the ACR and implemented regular army (Gutiérrez Sanín 2004; Gutiér- more broadly. rez Sanín 2008). Based on this type of organi- zation, we can hypothesize the conditions Recidivism and post-demobilization under which recidivism is likely to occur. If armed groups there is a clear intention and commitment to Will the foot soldiers of the FARC really stop disarm and demobilize amongst the mid and fighting? Or will they enter into the ranks high-level commanders, the rank and file are of the criminal gangs – the BACRIM – that likely to follow suit due to their history of fol- currently have a presence in 24 of 35 depart- lowing strict orders within a hierarchy. Their ments in Colombia and which are estimated risk of joining post-demobilization armed to have up to 10,000 members (CNRR 2010; groups is lower than that of ex-AUC because Human Rights Watch 2010)? These groups personal enrichment has neither been a part commit human rights abuses against civil- of their reason for joining the FARC nor a ians and use violence as a way to gain territo- part of their soldiering experience. In the rial control for drugs and other illegal mar- same vein, the vertical organization of the kets (Granada, Restrepo, and Tobón 2009). FARC makes a potential DDR process less For demobilized AUC fighters, an estimated vulnerable to dissident groups and remobili- 15 per cent have re-engaged in some type of zation than in the case of the AUC, which was illegal activity, often related to the BACRIM a rather network-like umbrella organization (CNRR 2010). A second source of post-DDR with strong regional leaders. While mem- violence could be splinter groups that do bers of the FARC may be pre-disposed to less not demobilize and which offer a place for recidivism than the former paramilitaries combatants who are unwilling to reintegrate considering their organizational history, the into a legal lifestyle. It is possible that rem- Achilles’ heel will be ensuring meaningful nant groups from the FARC might constitute political participation and employment for a an additional BACRIM or may integrate into largely peasant-based cadre. one or several of the existing organizations. The second issue, which affects both rates Alliances between the BACRIM and the FARC of recidivism and security, is the protection have been reported repeatedly throughout of individual ex-combatants. Former mem- the past years and would provide the neces- bers of the AUC have been disproportion- sary contacts for the period following con- ately targeted by post-demobilization armed flict (International Crisis Group 2009). groups, and their security remains precari- We identify three specific factors relevant ous (Munévar and Nussio 2009; Observato- for recidivism in the FARC process – one re- rio de Procesos de DDR 2010). Ex-members lates to the history and identity of the FARC of the FARC may be sought out by criminal and the other two are based on lessons organizations because of their particular learned from the DDR of the AUC. The FARC violent skill sets, connections, or intimate is a vertically organized structure with very knowledge of valuable illegal markets. Ex- strict codes of conduct. Soldiers sign up for combatants may also be targeted by other life, they are subject to tough disciplinary members of the community – including ex- measures, and desertion is punishable by paramilitaries and victims – who may seek death. All wealth accumulated – through violent revenge. However, insecurity related narco-trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, to continued illegal networks rather than re- 64 Nussio and Howe / What if the FARC Demobilizes?

venge among individual ex-combatants has face resistance and opposition. Political and been more common in recent years. Earlier social reintegration will continuously re- peace processes with guerrilla groups have open old sores, and remnant armed groups been accompanied by an upsurge of right- will persist, or new groups will emerge to wing paramilitary violence (Romero 2003). exploit illegal rents generated from drug- The legal political arm created by the FARC trafficking and extortion. during the peace process in the 1980s (the Despite these challenges, the chances for Unión Patriótica) was one of the foremost success are better than for previous demo- victims of such rightist violence. As a con- bilization processes. Most importantly, if sequence, effective protection mechanisms the negotiations come to a satisfactory end, for former FARC members must be put into the armed conflict will finally have been place in order to dissipate their accumulated overcome. This will dramatically reduce the fears. Research has shown that demobilized number of potential spoilers to the peace paramilitaries who face violent threats of- agreement, and will also allow for a clearer ten choose independent security strategies distinction between criminal and political vi- including rejoining armed groups. This deci- olence, a line that has been difficult to draw sion-making tactic stems from high level of in the past. Additionally, foreign govern- distrust in formal institutions. A lack of trust ments (including the US which qualifies the in legal protection mechanisms thus could FARC as terrorist organization) and interna- jeopardize the success of a potential FARC tional organizations have so far taken a very demobilization process (Nussio 2011b). positive stance towards the Colombian peace Third, continuous juridical insecurity for initiative following the official announce- both high-ranking and rank-and-file ex-com- ment of President Santos. This is in direct batants has contributed to remobilization contrast with the rather skeptical position for former AUC combatants. Breaking their (especially from the United Nations) during agreement with AUC leaders, the government the peace talks with the AUC. of Colombia extradited 18 of top AUC com- The DDR process with the FARC will de- manders to the United States on drug charges pend not only on the issues mentioned in (FIP 2009). An estimated 19,000 rank-and- this article but also on broader issues re- file ex-combatants have persisted in juridical lated to peacebuilding, violence reduction limbo for years (Palou and Méndez 2012). strategies, and wider development policies With the timely presentation of a constitu- (see Rettberg 2012). In fact, DDR will tap its tional amendment that passed congress in full potential only if embedded in a wider May 2012 (the ‘Legal Framework for Peace’), peacebuilding framework and if managed the Juan Manuel Santos administration seems with realistic expectations. However, there prepared to give the FARC demobilization a are some benefits DDR generates on its clearer and more stable juridical framework, own. According to a survey conducted by which may contribute to less recidivism. the FIP, for former combatants, the Colom- bian Reintegration Agency is the most trust- Conclusions ed of all state institutions. DDR is thus not only a technocratic tool to deal with experts If the FARC and the government reach an in violence, it may also have the potential agreement over the terms for peace in Co- to build trust amongst a significant post- lombia, the DDR process will certainly face conflict population. Especially for formerly a rocky road ahead. Disarmament might not antagonistic insurgents, the creation of in- be complete, and fake recruits are likely to stitutional trust is crucial for an enduring appear on the lists of demobilized people. peace. S Economic reintegration of ex-combatants will take time, and related rural reforms will Nussio and Howe / What if the FARC Demobilizes? 65

NOTES Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2010 Evaluación De Resultados De La 1 Between 2002 and 2010, around 52,000 Política De Reintegración Social y Económi- combatants demobilized in Colombia. ca Para Personas y Grupos Armados Al Some 31,671 of them belonged to the Margen De La Ley En Colombia. Bogotá: AUC and demobilized in a collective DNP, Econometría Consultores. process between 2003 and 2006 after Duncan, G 2006 Los Señores De La Guerra: negotiations were held between the gov- De Paramilitares, Mafiosos y Autodefensas ernment and the AUC leaders. The re- En Colombia. Bogotá: Planeta. maining 20,000 combatants were desert- Echeverry, J C and Partow, Z 1998 ‘Por Qué ers mostly to the FARC guerrilla and to La Justicia No Responde Al Crimen: El a lesser degree, the National Liberation Caso De La Cocaína En Colombia.’ In Cor- Army (ELN) and other smaller guerrilla rupción, Crimen y Justicia: Una Perspectiva groups and the AUC prior to its collective Económica, ed. Mauricio Cárdenas and demobilization. Roberto Steiner. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo 2 If the ELN decides to participate in the Editores. process, this number will be larger. Ac- El Tiempo 2011a ‘Narco “Gordolindo” Pagó cording to current estimates, the ELN 5 Mil Millones Para Desmovilizarse, Dijo counts on about 2,000 active members. In “HH”’, March 7. September 2012, ELN leader alias ‘Gabino’ –––2011b ‘Desmovilización Del Cacique announced the ELN’s interest to partici- Nutibara Fue Un Montaje: ‘El Alemán’’, pate in the peace process with the FARC. April 3. 3 Interview with a paramilitary ex-combat- –––2012 ‘Hay 18.000 Menores En Grupos Ar- ant in Bogotá, May 2010. mados y Bandas’, August 11. FARC and Gobierno de Colombia 2012 REFERENCES ‘Acuerdo General Para La Terminacion Del Anaya, L 2007 ‘Individual Demobilization Conflicto y La Construccion De Una Paz and Reintegration Process in Colombia: Estable y Duradera.’ Implementation, Challenges and For- FIP 2009 Extradition: An Obstacle in the mer Combatants Perspectives.’ Interven- Quest for Justice? The Uses and Abuses of tion 5 (3): 179–190. DOI: http://dx.doi. Extradition in the War on Drugs No. 1. Bo- org/10.1097/WTF.0b013e3282f1d036. gotá: Fundación Ideas para la Paz. Arias, G, Prieto, C and Herrera, N 2010 –––2012 Líderes Empresariales Hablan De La Mandos Medios De Las FARC y Su Proceso Paz Con Las FARC. Informes FIP No. 17. Bo- De Desmovilización En El Conflicto Colom- gotá: Fundación Ideas para la Paz. biano: ¿Una Apuesta Para La Paz o Para La Granada, S, Restrepo, J and Tobón, A 2009 Guerra? Informes FIP No. 10. Bogotá: Fun- ‘Neoparamilitarismo En Colombia: Una dación Ideas para la Paz. Herramienta Conceptual Para La Inter- CNRR 2010 La Reintegración: Logros En Me- pretación De Dinámicas Recientes Del dio De Rearmes y Dificultades No Resuel- Conflicto Armado Colombiano.’ In Guerra tas. II Informe De La Comisión Nacional y Violencias En Colombia. Herramientas e De Reparación y Reconociliación. Bogotá: Interpretaciones, ed. Jorge Restrepo and CNRR. David Aponte, 467–500. Bogotá: Pontifi- Colletta, N J and Muggah, R 2009 ‘Context cia Universidad Javeriana. Matters: Interim Stabilisation and Sec- Guáqueta, A 2007 ‘The Way Back in: Reinte- ond Generation Approaches to Security grating Illegal Armed Groups in Colombia Promotion.’ Conflict, Security & Develop- Then and Now.’ Conflict, Security & De- ment 9 (4): 425–453. DOI: http://dx.doi. velopment 7 (3): 417. DOI: http://dx.doi. org/10.1080/14678800903345762. org/10.1080/14678800701556545. 66 Nussio and Howe / What if the FARC Demobilizes?

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practice note Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention: Obstacles and Opportunities Steven A. Zyck* and Robert Muggah†

Introduction operations makes practical sense in a world Preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention facing a tumultuous economic slowdown and other forms of preventive action intend- (Gowan 2011). Yet as appealing as they may ed to stop armed conflicts before they esca- be, preventive diplomacy and conflict pre- late to widespread violence are the subject of vention continue to gain limited traction in intense debate. And despite their elevation policy and practice. While this partly stems to a norm in the United Nations, where they from the difficulties associated with antici- have been debated in the General Assembly pating future challenges, the lack of uptake and addressed in prominent reports from the is fundamentally connected with the chang- Secretary-General, preventive diplomacy and ing nature of violence. conflict prevention continue to face daunt- International diplomats and some practi- ing obstacles. Drawing from recent high-level tioners have been comparatively slow to come consultations on the topic, this piece consid- to terms with the way the global burden of ers some recurrent obstacles and emerging violence is changing and what this means for opportunities in relation to preventive ac- preventive diplomacy and conflict preven- tion (Muggah 2012). tion. This is because complex inter-state con- There is indeed a new appetite amongst flicts gave way to large-scale civil wars, which United Nations member states and agencies are themselves being rapidly overtaken by to invest in preventive action. It has a certain smaller rebellions and mid-sized insurgencies economic appeal. The idea of devoting a rela- large enough to cause significant damage on tively modest amount of resources to pre- a national scale but too small to draw urgent venting violent conflict rather than invest- diplomatic attention from United Nations ing in drastically more costly humanitarian, Security Council members. Yet these nasty, peacekeeping, reconstruction or stabilisation protracted conflicts have become increasingly entrenched and geographically spread, thus lengthening the length of the average armed conflict (Rangelov and Kaldor 2012). What is * PRDU, Derwent College, University of York, Heslington, more, the growing scale and significance of York YO10 5DD, UK chronic organised criminal violence, often † Instituto de Relações Internacionais, sustained by trans-national crime networks, Pontifícia Universidade Católica, has recently raised new challenges about the Rua Marquês de São Vicente, 225, Vila dos Diretórios, Casa 20, Gávea, definition of what constitutes armed conflict Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil and to what extent this can be cleanly dif- Zyck and Muggah / Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention 69 ferentiated from certain forms of criminality experts in Sub-Saharan Africa, preventive di- (Muggah 2012). plomacy constitutes the consensual resolu- The research community is beginning to tion of tensions and disputes while to others move beyond simple metrics of ‘armed con- in North Africa it indicates a more regressive flict’ as a measure of the number of deaths form of appeasement that allows underlying per year. Indeed, The Global Burden of Armed drivers of conflict to persist under a veneer of Violence by Krause, Muggah and Gilgen stability. The same holds true for conflict pre- (2011) provides a more sophisticated assess- vention, which certain diplomatic analysts ment of the temporal and spatial dynamics perceive as including preventive diplomacy of collective violence. It finds that nine out while development stakeholders commonly of every ten violent deaths today occurs out- perceive it as a form of conflict sensitivity or side of war zones, thus raising new questions peacebuilding, which are themselves con- about the appropriateness of the interna- tested concepts. tional community’s structure and standard These terminological disagreements crisis-response toolkit. It also points to new stretch back more than two decades. The and innovative violence-prevention and re- United Nations’ (1992) Agenda for Peace duction efforts in parts of Latin America and stated that preventive diplomacy specifically the Caribbean that involve new forms of me- refers to ‘action to prevent disputes from diation and pacification of criminal armed arising between parties, to prevent existing groups. It indirectly asks some tough ques- disputes from escalating into conflicts and tions: can narcotics trafficking networks in to limit the spread of the latter when they Latin America or Central Asia be addressed occur’. Then-UN Secretary-General Boutros through means similar to those applied to Boutros-Ghali differentiated preventive di- armed conflicts? What international legal plomacy from its cousin, peace-making, frameworks apply for such actors? What which he viewed as the resolution of large- kinds of international involvement would be scale conflicts through mediation and nego- most appropriate, and which sorts of stake- tiation, and from its distant relative, peace- holders or mediators are most likely to yield keeping. This early definition provides a core a positive resolution? And when is the inten- understanding of the goals of preventive sity and organisation of violent settings ripe diplomacy, which the United Nations and for preventive action, particularly preventive others have associated with a specific set of diplomacy? actions such as s good offices, facilitation, mediation, conciliation, adjudication and Defining Conflict Prevention and arbitration. Accordingly, it does not include Preventive Diplomacy what others refer to as conflict prevention, which primarily includes human rights, hu- Before proceeding further into the discus- manitarian and development assistance in- sion it is important to define preventive di- tended to ameliorate the underlying sources plomacy and conflict prevention, two con- of conflict by improving the quality of gov- cepts that we address under the rubric of ernance, social and economic conditions, preventive action. The absence of a shared equality and the management of shared definition amongst policy makers has in fact resources. That said, today conflict preven- inhibited policymaking and practice and gen- tion continues to comprise a crucial form of erated divisions between stakeholders, some preventive action which may have a role in of whom view preventive diplomacy as ‘soft’ creating local conditions which facilitate pre- mediation while other refer to ‘muscular’ ventive diplomacy. diplomacy which includes credible threats While we refer to both preventive diplo- of pre-emptive military action (see Zounme- macy and conflict prevention as preventive nou, Motsamai and Nganje 2012). To some 70 Zyck and Muggah / Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention

action, it may be more apt to view them The World Bank’s World Development Report not as concepts but rather as key elements 2011 highlights ‘fragility’ and ‘resilience’ as in what is increasingly referred to as ‘infra- themes, with the latter encapsulating coun- structures for peace’ or ‘peace architectures’ tries’ ability to channel chronic collective (Ganson and Wennmann 2012: 9; Muggah violence into less violent directions either and Sisk 2012). Such infrastructures are de- before armed conflict breaks out or in its af- signed from below and are intentionally em- termath. What is more, the World Bank’s new bedded in formal and informal institutions ‘Hive’ serves as a platform for the mitigation at the grassroots. They combine networks of fragility, conflict and violence and has im- of local community-based organisations, re- plications for conflict prevention, albeit not search and academic institutes, faith-based in the more orthodox diplomatic tradition. entities and political and social associations Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- engaged in actively monitoring disputes tion (NATO), the establishment of the Com- and sources of tension, drawing attention prehensive Crisis and Operations Manage- to signs of trouble so that they can be ame- ment Centre (CCOMC) in 2012, as discussed liorated via conflict prevention or resolved in Major General Andy Salmon’s piece in this through preventive diplomacy. According to issue of Stability, serves to both improve cri- such an understanding, they bring together a sis response and to enable what NATO (2012) combination of preventive action efforts and refers to as ‘crisis identification’. help identify appropriate responses to vari- Regional bodies have also increasingly ous forms of collective violence depending taken up the language of conflict prevention on their character and dynamic progression. and preventive diplomacy (Mancini 2011). In Africa, the African Union’s (AU) Peace and Se- A Renaissance for Preventive curity Council (PSC) has been highly active, as Action? have numerous other associated bodies such as the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Notwithstanding semantic disagreements Force (ASF) and the Continental Early Warn- over preventive diplomacy and conflict pre- ing System (CEWS). Sub-regional bodies such vention, norms, rules and institutions related as the South African Development Commu- to preventive action have proliferated since nity (SADC) and, in particular, the Economic Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld’s first Community of West African States (ECOWAS) utterance of the phrase ‘preventive diploma- have been particularly active in attempting cy’ in 1960 (Lund, 2008). In 2001, the United to settle disputes before and after they have Nations Development Programme (UNDP) turned violent. ECOWAS, for instance, played established its Bureau for Crisis Prevention a key role in mediation efforts in Guinea in and Recovery, and three years later the UN 2009 and 2010 along with the African Union Department of Political Affairs (DPA) stood and United Nations. The Association of South- up its Mediation Support Unit. Just last year, east Asian Nations (ASEAN) has established UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released a Regional Forum mandated with monitor- his report on Preventive Diplomacy: Deliver- ing and preventing conflicts. The Pacific Is- ing Results (2011) which highlighted the land Forum, Organization of American States growth of preventive diplomacy and called (OAS) and High Commission for National Mi- for more predictable and generous financial norities within the Organisation for Security support, enhanced capacity building and the and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have also formation of partnerships to strengthen the been closely engaged with regional preven- work of ‘preventive diplomats’. tive action initiatives. More recently, the Arab But the United Nations is not alone in League and Gulf Cooperation Council have advancing preventive action. Other inter- taken a strong step forward into this area, national organizations have followed suit. Zyck and Muggah / Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention 71 sending mediators to try and resolve political tive diplomacy and conflict prevention from crises in Syria and Yemen, respectively, since ideas whose time have come to highly effec- the start of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. tive practices. Indeed, the rapid emergence National initiatives have also proliferated. of new stakeholders focused on conflict pre- In the United States, the Obama administra- vention and preventive diplomacy has gen- tion’s National Security Strategy highlights erated challenges associated with coordina- the importance of preventing violent con- tion and quality control. While the diversity flict, and conflict prevention has been identi- and heterogeneity of these new players may fied as a priority for the newly established Bu- offer some exciting innovation, it also pro- reau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations duces challenges of cooperation and mutual (Williams 2012). Within the past year, the US awareness. Without better understanding government also began work on an Atroci- one another’s efforts, agencies may duplicate ties Prevention Board (APB) with a mandate efforts or worse, undermine each other’s at- to stop genocide-level violence and human tempts and generate conflict prevention fa- rights abuses before they begin. Other na- tigue. Indeed, there is a common complaint tional initiatives have also been developed among officials, civil society representatives, amongst developed and emerging econo- religious leaders and activists in countries mies such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, affected by chronic collective violence of be- China and South Africa). As the prestige as- ing invited to an endless array of workshops, sociated with conflict-ending or conflict-pre- trainings, conflict resolution forums. The venting mediation has risen in recent years, highly variable quality of the conflict preven- these countries—as well as increasingly im- tion ‘community’ – from local peacebuilding portant players such as Qatar—have put siz- groups to high-powered international me- able resources into preventive action. Many diation experts – has also generated nega- have also led prevention initiatives them- tive feedback on the ground and encouraged selves and financed a widening array of pri- calls for the development of standards. vate actors, particularly NGOs and for-profit What is more, progress in decentralising mediation firms (Eskandarpour and Wenn- preventive action to the regional and local mann 2011). Beyond more traditional peace levels has yielded successes but also under- and conflict-focused organsiations such as mined the likelihood that conflict preven- the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Safer- tion and preventive diplomacy will occur. world and International Alert, humanitarian Research has long rallied around the ben- and development agencies have also taken efits of localising preventive action – em- up the banner of conflict prevention. As with phasising the role of regional, national and gender, climate change and other transversal subnational stakeholders rather than inter- priorities, conflict prevention and resolution national experts with less familiarity of the have become core cross-cutting themes to be local context. This localisation of preven- addressed through a wide array of humani- tive action has been heavily supported by tarian and development programmes in frag- regional organisations, national authorities, ile and conflict-affected countries. scholars and civil society representatives in chronically violence-affected contexts. It has Obstacles Confronting Contempo- led to the proliferation of regional initia- rary Preventive Action tives by the AU, ECOWAS, ASEAN, OAS, GCC and others intended to prevent and resolve The resurgence of preventive action has violent conflicts. While a positive and long- helped compensate for the previously-limit- sought development, the increased role ed attention to these issues, but it has also of regional bodies has confronted certain engendered new ones. Certain obstacles re- challenges. For example, regional institu- main that will impede the shift from preven- 72 Zyck and Muggah / Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention

tions tend to primarily concerned with the gional bodies that express a desire to become interests of their member governments and involved despite having limited political will not necessarily non-state actors. They have to ultimately take meaningful action. thus strongly emphasised strict notions of Furthermore, the evidence base for pre- national sovereignty in which many forms ventive action – the data showing how many of prevention action are deemed to be in- conflicts have been averted and what meth- appropriate if not hostile. The UN Regional ods work best – remains weak and unlikely to Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central improve in the short term. Metrics of success Asia (UNRCCA), for instance, is only able to for conflict prevention are notoriously hard involve non-governmental stakeholders if to come by given that the optimal outcome national governments do not object (UNRC- – the absence of conflict – could hypotheti- CA 2012). At the same time, many regional cally have been achieved without any inter- bodies concern themselves primarily with vention at all. When stakeholders agree that situations that have already become a clear a conflict has been prevented, it is often un- regional security threat or which are occur- clear who ought to get the credit. Obtaining ring outside of the region and are, hence, evidence for what does and does not work re- ‘safe’. For instance, the Arab Lead and GCC mains complicated for practical as well as po- did not begin addressing political instability litical reasons. Research has suggested that until regimes in the Middle East were already confidentiality is crucial in some mediation rapidly deteriorating. processes, thus preventing researchers from The ASEAN Regional Forum (2012) ad- observing or fully understanding the fac- dressed North Korea, Syria, Afghanistan and tors which did or did not lead to successful nuclear proliferation at its most recent meet- conflict prevention. Yet macro-level studies ing in July of this year rather than the many of preventive diplomacy yield only general challenges within member nations. Its pre- findings regarding the types of actions, cat- ventive diplomacy agenda has, likewise, been egories of mediators or approximate timing steered away from drivers of violent conflict of effective interventions that correlate with and instead focused on disaster relief, mari- success or failure. What might work when time security and partnerships, with media- and under what conditions in a particular tion being one of several priorities, most of context – the types of questions practition- which bear little resemblance to preventive ers mediating highly nuanced conflicts need action (ASEAN 2001). There is a risk that re- to know – remains poorly understood. Of gional bodies close their eyes to problems course, research networks are increasingly within neighboring countries as part of an tackling such a challenge, and we provide implicit agreement that members of the club recommendations in the following section will not meddle in one another’s affairs. Not for bolstering the evidence base. surprisingly, regional bodies, whether due to political opposition among member na- Opportunities for Moving tions or capacity and resource constraints, Preventive Action Forward also tend to have fewer linkages with civil Each of the challenges above presents corre- society. They are state-centric and slow to de- sponding opportunities. Stakeholders that velop partnerships insofar as they are statu- are fragmented can be better coordinated. torily able to do so. This creates a situation The presumption that regional or national in which appropriate prevention activities entities are inherently better at conflict pre- may be delayed or undermined. The UN’s fo- vention than international actors can be nu- cus upon regional solutions may lead to the anced, and analyses of past experience and handing over of selected prevention activi- political arrangements can show where a ties, including preventive diplomacy, to re- regional or sub-regional body may be effec- Zyck and Muggah / Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention 73 tive and where either international or high- at play. Overly intellectual and prescriptive ly local (e.g., subnational) strategies may studies of violent conflict causes may have be warranted. Moreover, the evidence base analytical value but may not be as useful to can be strengthened. An array of informed mediators on the ground that are dealing not recommendations has emerged from the only with objective factors but with the local excellent work of the International Peace In- framing of those issues (Ganson and Wen- stitute, the United Nations, the World Bank, nmann 2012). It is the difference between the Folke Bernadotte Academy and others. identifying ‘ethno-political exclusion’ as a What follows is a collection of noteworthy driver of conflict and understanding that the recommendations, most of which emerge lived experience of this exclusion is shame, from the International Expert Forum event a denial of dignity and intense frustration. on preventive diplomacy and from the field Local narratives and connotations are crucial (Muggah 2012). to grasp in any conflict analysis or form of preventive diplomacy or conflict prevention. Share but don’t align conflict analyses A number of policy and research assessments Research drivers of peace separately from drivers of violence of preventive action begin with the presump- tion that coordination and collective action From the World Bank’s World Development will be facilitated by joint analyses of local Report 2011 to the Global Peace Index, there conflict and context dynamics (see, for in- is increasingly empirical and instinctual stance, UNRCCA 2012). They propose the understanding that factors which facilitate development of standardised frameworks peace or enhance societal resilience may be and alignment of analyses across national, markedly different from those which render regional and international agencies. While conflict and violence likely. Understanding sharing of conflict analyses can certainly help the drivers of peace, which are as contextu- distill possible interpretations of a violent ally-rooted as the drivers of conflict, is crucial conflict, aligning perceptions is certain to re- for preventing conflict recurrence or for es- sult in more generic and potentially flawed tablishing conditions – particularly through analyses. Multi-stakeholder conflict analyses infrastructures for peace – that make conflict tend to result in ‘shopping cart’ documents unlikely even amidst periods of political, so- which include numerous explanations yet do cial or economic turmoil. not actually prioritise the key proximate and underlying drivers of violence. Rather, more Study the micro-determinants of dispersed analysis can potentially increase success in preventive action the likelihood that someone will ‘get it right’. Research related to preventive action has By vetting and validating different analyses much further to go. The data limitations noted with stakeholders on the ground, it may also above make it unlikely that researchers will be be possible to help identify – imperfectly and permitted to observe, document and publish incrementally – elements of each analysis the factors which lead to a successful media- which may hold water and merit preventive tion effort. Nor are published accounts gener- or ameliorative responses. ally detailed or accurate enough, commonly representing one perspective from individuals Align conflict analyses to local promoting a particular narrative. Hence, the understandings and terminology ‘banner headline’ mediations may not be the Such analyses need not only be vetted with most fruitful subjects for research. Instead, ac- local stakeholders; they must also reflect ademics and scholar-practitioners may wish to their understandings of the conflict and the turn to subnational and local, even communi- language they use to describe the dynamics ty-level, conflict resolution and prevention ac- 74 Zyck and Muggah / Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention

tivities to understand what does and does not little notice. Hence, the formation of a dedi- work (i.e., the micro-determinants of success). cated, multi-donor trust fund for preventive Such studies can help close the gap between action which disallows earmarking for pet those who approach conflict and preventive countries or projects could present one way action as a science and as an art. forward which is gaining some momentum and attention. Begin a dialogue on coordination of preventive action The opportunities noted above could, if acted upon, improve the evidence base for The range of actors involved in preventive and quality of preventive action in violence- action is too diffuse and fragmented for any affected environments around the world. S coordination body to step in and impose a degree of order. The subject matter at hand REFERENCES is also too sensitive, and stakeholders would rightly be concerned about the ultimate ASEAN 2001 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) goal of coordination and the use of any in- Concept and Principles of Preventive Di- formation they might share. However, there plomacy. Jakarta: Association of Southeast is an opportunity for a trusted stakeholder, Asian Nations. likely a private foundation or widely admired ASEAN 2012 Chairman’s Statement of the NGO, to bring relevant groups together and 19th ASEAN Regional Forum. Phnom discuss questions such as the following: Do Penh: Association of South East Asian Na- you believe there is a need for increased tions, 12 July. coordination? What institution or set of in- Eskandarpour, A and Wennmann, A 2011 stitutions should host such a coordination Strengthening Preventive Diplomacy: The mechanism? What would be its purpose and Role of Private Actors. Geneva: Geneva goal? Who should be included and excluded? Peacebuilding Platform. How should sensitive information be safe- Krause, K, Muggah, R and Gilgen, E 2011 guarded? These are just an initial collection Global Buren of Armed Violence. Geneva: of questions to be addressed in an open and Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence participatory consultation process. Of course, and Development. the outcomes of any such dialogue would be Ganson, B and Wennmann, A 2012 Opera- far more meaningful if donors were willing tionalising Conflict Prevention as Strong, to allocate financing for future coordination Resilient Systems: Approaches, Evidence, efforts in advance. and Action Points. Geneva: Geneva Peace- building Platform. Ensure sufficient and flexible financing Gowan, R 2011 Multilateral Political Mis- for preventive action sions and Preventive Diplomacy. Washing- ton, DC: United States Institute of Peace, The question of donor agencies necessarily December. lends itself to a discussion of who pays for Lund, M S 2008 Conflict Prevention: Theory what and how. While donors have increas- in Pursuit of Policy and Practice. In Jacob ingly accepted the notion of preventive ac- Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and I. Wil- tion, funding generally remains limited and liam Zartman, eds, The SAGE Handbook of earmarked for specific activities in specific Conflict Resolution. Thousand Oaks, CA: countries. The ‘tyranny of the now’ means SAGE Publications. that resources are rarely set aside for poten- Mancini, F (ed.) 2011 Preventive Diplomacy: tial crises when current ones are wreaking Regions in Focus. New York: International havoc. Yet the notion of preventive action Peace Institute, December. is rooted in flexibility and in an ability to Muggah, R 2012 Conflict Prevention and Pre- put resources where they are needed with ventive Diplomacy: What Works and What Zyck and Muggah / Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention 75

Doesn’t? New York: International Peace In- United Nations 2011 Preventive Diplomacy: stitute, March. Delivering Results. Report of the United Muggah, R and Sisk, T 2012 Governance for Nations Secretary General. Peace: Securing the Social Contract. New UNRCCA 2012 Programme of Action, 2012- York: United Nations Development Pro- 2014. Ashgabat: United Nations Regional gramme. Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Cen- NATO 2012 New integrated NATO center sup- tral Asia. ports the Alliance with improved approach Williams, A 2012 Conflict Prevention in Prac- to emerging security challenges and crisis. tice: From Rhetoric to Reality. Canberra: Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- Australian Civil-Military Centre. tion, 4 May. Available at: http://www.nato. World Bank World Development Report int/cps/en/natolive/news_86912.htm. 2011: Conflict, Security and Development. Rangelov, I and Kaldor, M 2012 Persistent Washington, DC: World Bank. Conflict. Conflict, Security & Development Zounmenou, D, Motsman, D and Nganje, 12 (3). pp. 193-199. DOI: http://dx.doi.org F 2012 Southern Voices in the Northern /10.1080/14678802.2012.703531 Policy Debate: Perspectives on Conflicts and United Nations 1992 An Agenda for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Africa. Washington, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and DC: The Wilson Center. Peace-Keeping. Report of the United Na- tions Secretary-General. Salmon, MGen A 2012 Catalysts and Networks for Stability. Stability, STABILITY 1(1): 76-79. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ae.

commentary Catalysts and Networks for Stability MGen Andy Salmon

Operation Charge of the Knights in the Spring ond step we should take was to use our po- of 2008, which cleared extremist militias out sition and authority to enable the people of of Basra, created a strategic opportunity for Basra to connect with one another. Business building stability in that troubled Province. needed to engage with the people, civil so- Security had improved but the situation was ciety with provincial politicians, the military still fragile: attacks on Coalition forces were with the police and security forces with the common, essential services were poor, the citizenry. After that, he said we ought to leave City needed cleaning up and revitalising, and it to Basrawis to do the rest. Listening to and the people had to believe that the future was internalizing that advice led to a seminal shift going to be a better place than the present. I in the way we approached our campaign. We was about to assume command of Coalition became catalysts, both consciously and sub- Forces in South East Iraq in the Summer of consciously, and embarked on a campaign 2008 and my team and I were working out of connecting people in order to create net- how to seize this “Kyros”1 moment. works of stability. In working out possible campaign ap- We have witnessed since 9/11 – itself a proaches, ideally before any intervention, I series of coordinated attacks perpetrated by have always found it helpful to talk to people a network – a huge investment in security. who really understand the nature of the op- We have also seen that military power, when erating environment. So, with 2 months left applied in isolation, has limited utility in fos- to go, I found myself in a lecture room at the tering enduring stability. Fiscal austerity also London School of Economics, explaining our means that investment in military capabili- thinking and discussing ideas with a group of ties will decline, and governments will have Iraqis and Iraq experts, who had personal ex- less appetite to expend blood and treasure perience of Basra. A local businessman, who on endeavours such as Iraq and Afghanistan. had fled Basra with his family, calmly asserted With fewer military forces to go round, there that the first thing we should do was listen to is a greater need to work in an integrated and the people. He said that would be a great start collaborative manner while finding smart ap- and would mark a refreshing change. Given proaches to tackling instability. that insecurity had led to the fragmentation Those campaigns also underscored the bald of society and had made it difficult for com- point that the military can’t do it all on their munities to talk to each other, he said the sec- own. Accordingly, civilian, multi-agency and cross-institutional approaches are required that create new cooperative and collabora- * Former Commander UK Amphibious Forces and Commandant General Royal Marines; now retired tive compacts and networks. Myriad regional [email protected] and local actors are in the mix too, and, as Salmon / Catalysts and Networks for Stability 77

NATO Supreme Allied Commander Admiral human resources – diplomats and officers James G. Stavridis explained in a TED talk on who conducted key leader engagement, the ‘Open Source Security’, connections need to Provincial Reconstruction Team, contractors, be made between private, national and inter- USAID personnel, civil affairs experts and en- national domains which straddle the busi- gineers – and the results were dismaying. We ness, security, diplomacy and development estimated that no more than three percent communities. of the roughly 6,500 military and civilian NATO’s operation in Libya also highlighted a personnel from the United Kingdom and the campaign that had its origins in the way social United States had regular contact with peo- media spreads information and ideas, which ple and could theoretically influence the lo- can go viral fast. Smart phones and the Inter- cal population; even if they were doing their net enable connections and networks that jobs properly, they weren’t necessarily acting have created a new stability dynamic. While as catalysts. We had to change this equation high-tech in many respects, such technologies and maximise the utility of our force to shift also reflect the fundamental wisdom of the the campaign in the right direction. Baswari businessman who reminded us that The Consul General and I set about inviting we must continue to understand catalysts and Basrawis from all walks of life to seminars. networks in the 21st Century. For instance, we brought together teachers and industrialists. At one such meeting with Catalysts local businessmen, after three hours of listen- ing to a series of grievances and complaints, In science, a catalyst is a substance that ini- there was a realisation that there was a lot tiates a chemical change without changing to do and that they, the Basrawis themselves, itself. Leaders and people that facilitate and simply needed to get on with it. For some accelerate change – that oxygenate a room around the table, it was the first time they full of people, inspire by example and mo- had ever met each other. We learnt a huge tivate without telling – are human catalysts. deal from listening and connecting, and, in They typically have emotional intelligence, general, the Basrawis we met felt valued, re- which enables them to work collaboratively spected and empowered by doing something behind the scenes, to build trust and to lead for themselves. without necessarily relying on traditional We also imported catalysts. We created command and control hierarchies. The key mixed civilian-military and Iraqi Joint Recon- is to work out who they are, find enough of struction Action Teams (JRATs) to tackle es- them and to deploy them effectively, because sential services and get out amongst the peo- these people are good at creating close per- ple. One JRAT overseeing trash collection and sonal relationships and can create chain re- disposal, for instance, had a huge challenge actions that lead to irreversible momentum. ahead of it. But we found a waste manage- They are your connectors. ment expert from Miami with good emotional When we arrived in Basra we soon realised intelligence, who helped make an immediate that we needed to change the profile of the impact on the municipal rubbish collection. mission and help build a sense of optimism I’m not saying that the city of Basra looked amongst Basrawis about their future. We sparkling after a couple of weeks, but one per- needed more teachers, coaches and men- son made a big impact by being a catalyst. tors who could embed deeply within the The key is to find the right people, and Iraqi security forces – the police and mili- give them freedom and room to manoeuvre tary. More personnel who could work the and to work their magic. Chain reactions can street, touch elements of Iraq society and occur, and the results can be startling. This help improve the delivery of essential ser- can look loose and chaotic, and isn’t neces- vices had to be found too. We surveyed our 78 Salmon / Catalysts and Networks for Stability

sarily comfortable for conventional organi- rate better with partners and connect to a sations with linear approaches. Overall, the network of stakeholders to approach security levels of violence in the Spring of 2009 had and foster stability in a comprehensive way. reduced to 2003 levels, and the atmosphere This new Centre is a work in progress, but a in Basra city radically improved. The efforts docking station that is both virtual and phys- to catalyse provincial elections after the re- ical is being created and will bring a com- establishment of Iraqi sovereignty in January prehensive network to life during the next 2009 and to create a positive result also paid phase, which will be ready next year. Build- off. When we tried to understand what had ing on the successful experiment with the happened, we realised that by making con- Civil-Military Fusion Centre, we are examin- nections through catalysts we had created ing ways to harness smart technology and a web or a network of optimism that had information systems, to share knowledge, squeezed extremist networks. Although dif- coordinate and even collaborate where ap- ficult to scientifically and fully quantify, this propriate. Overcoming security caveats and helped make Basra a safer and more stable creating the right protocols to access infor- place for its citizens. mation are important for success. Openness and transparency are key as well, but having Networks the space for people to meet face to face, cre- ate confidence and build effective personal Networks existed as soon as man was able to relationships is what really engenders trust. forge human relationships. Now, social media This is networked and open-source security. sites like Facebook have enabled networks to grow exponentially and globally through the Internet – and we can measure them. Liby- Network Culture ans could tweet locations of tanks during the For conservative hierarchies like the mili- Summer of 2011. Through web platform ser- tary and large, pedestrian, multinational vices like Ushuhadi, Macedonians can report bureaucracies with stovepipes and silos, cases of corruption through the Transpar- giving free reign to catalysts and working ency Watch Project. But as Karen Stephenson across networks are both threatening and (2011), an authority on networks, states “We challenging. It means transforming culture. literally and figuratively live in a Milky Way When we stand in our learning room with of possible connections. The technological our teams and work out how to create net- connection is only a catalyst, not a driver.” worked security approaches, we map out When we create networks, there needs to be networks and quickly recognise the degree a rationale, social interaction, face-to face di- of interconnectedness. When you examine alogue, time to get to know each other and, the criss-crossing lines and concentric circles, most importantly, trust. you can’t help but realise that the traditional This needs to be taken into account when boxes and organisational layers of conven- we think of how to make concepts like the tional ‘organograms’ seem inefficient, slow Comprehensive Approach and Open Source and reveal some redundancy. Pointing out Security work. In Supreme Headquarters Al- such complexity is deemed heresy by some lied Powers Europe (SHAPE), the military and incomprehensible or too challenging by strategic headquarters for NATO, we have others. Acknowledging the complex nature built a new Comprehensive Crisis Operations of real-world networks highlights the need Management Centre. This is to assimilate for a transformation of culture, work-spaces, new tasks as a result of NATO’s Strategic Con- mind-sets and behaviours. cept of 2010, to improve the way (learning This is a 20th Century hierarchical struc- from Operation Unified Protector in Libya) ture rubbing up against a 21st Century cul- we anticipate and deal with crises, collabo- tural phenomenon, which we need to em- Salmon / Catalysts and Networks for Stability 79 brace and get used to. The challenge is not gies. They are the new generation of catalysts too dissimilar or even distant from increasing who are already shaping our future and need the utility of our forces in Basra when I was to reverse-mentor us, the older generation. there. The resources tied up in redundant With these catalysts, a dose of experience parts of any conventional structure need to and people like the businessman from Basra, be transferred to create more catalysts to we can create networks for stability. S connect and encourage networks. In looking for the people to do this, we have to turn to NOTES a younger generation, who have often inad- 1 Kyros meaning now is the time, as op- vertently put hours of practice into using posed to Chronos, which means this is smartphones, iPads, mobile apps, Playstation the time. and other inherently networked technolo- Trzeciak-Duval, A and van Veen, E 2012 Globalisation with a Twist: STABILITY Stability, Volatility and Fragility All in One. Stability, 1(1): 80-84. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ag.

COMMENTARY Globalisation with a Twist: Stability, Volatility and Fragility All in One Alexandra Trzeciak-Duval* and Erwin van Veen†

This article does not reflect the official views of autocratic regimes in Tunisia, Libya and of the OECD. Egypt springs to mind, enabled by powerful The process of globalisation1 has brought technological platforms and a sense of depri- the world innumerable improvements and vation fed by acute and detailed awareness of opportunities. Economically, for example, it circumstances at home as elsewhere. In iden- has vastly increased global trade and foreign tity terms, without the power of the Internet direct investment, opened up markets for and social media, al Qaeda’s or Boko Haram’s exports and often optimised allocation of efforts to position radical Islam as an alterna- capital. Politically, it has stimulated waves of tive response to ‘Western modernity’ could 2 regional integration and democratisation. In not have been nearly as global in scope. identity terms, it has connected cultures and In the main, the rapid growth in interde- worldviews as never before. pendencies and interconnections that has Globalisation has not, however, made occurred as a result of globalisation has cre- the world a more stable or equitable place ated vast opportunities for human progress (e.g. Yergin and Stanislaw, 2008; Judt, 2010; and simultaneously introduced new risks, Heine and Thakur, 2011). Economically, com- while highlighting vastly different national modity price spikes or crashes, often in part capacities to engage with both. In this vast transmitted through rapid changes in global panorama, it is increasingly recognised that demand and supply, frequently lead to food fragile and conflict-affected countries are riots. The Asian financial crisis (1997), the particularly vulnerable to the risks because of Argentine economic crisis (1999-2002) and their generally weak governance systems and/ the current European sovereign debt crisis or low capacity (e.g. World Bank, 2011). This are reminders of the costs that globalisation is of concern because conflict and fragility can rapidly spread and amplify. In the realm today constitute a global challenge. There are of politics, the swift, domino-like overthrow about 40 such countries (ca. 20% of UN mem- bership)3, which are home to approximately 1.5 billion people and which are unlikely to achieve most of the Millennium Development * Head of Policy Division, OECD Development, Co-operation Directorate, 2 rue André-Pascal, Goals. These countries also feature a signifi- 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France cant slice of today’s organized violence. † Policy Analyst on Peace and Security, OECD, In this brief contribution we explore two DAC International Network on Conflict and specific critical risks posed by globalisation Fragility (INCAF), 2 rue André-Pascal, for conflict-affected and fragile countries. 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France Trzeciak-Duval and van Veen / Globalisation with a Twist 81

Building on these, we subsequently advance conflict, it has acquired a strong and some- three elements of an international agenda times detrimental focus on holding elections. that could stabilise some of the volatility Worse, where the institutions and values re- these countries face as a result. quired for peaceful political competition From a conflict and fragility perspective lagged behind the pace of democratisation, the premier risk of globalisation is that it has it has on occasion fuelled violence. Similarly, enabled a vast expansion of the global mar- the case for the ‘export of liberal economic ketplace for illicit goods and services that policies and measures’ – generally argued rides on the coat-tails of its licit cousin and to be wealth- and growth-enhancing – is al- offers easy access to resources such as ideas, ready much less clear-cut, especially where funds, weapons, services, recruits and even it is rushed, ill-sequenced and insufficiently loyalty. It facilitates the use of violence as a attentive to risks for vulnerable groups. In tactic for political or commercial profit. The Kosovo, for instance, a straightforward pro- two marketplaces – licit and illicit – must gramme of economic liberalisation seems to not be conceived of as separate but as deeply have resulted, more than a decade after con- interwoven. Free trade can benefit both licit flict, in 43% unemployment, poverty rates of and illicit goods on a scale previously un- 48% and deep socio-political fractures set – known; while better controls are possible, incredibly – against a rising GDP. There are they also reduce trade, profit and jobs. Easy also much less benign ideas whose propa- and anonymous corporate registration even gation is greatly facilitated by globalisation, in the most developed and well policed coun- including aggressive forms of religious fun- tries attracts savvy entrepreneurs and dodgy damentalism, militarism and the notion that shell companies alike. The export of arms international law can be set aside when the and security services has become a thriving end justifies the means. business that, however, also enables and These two risks generate long-term volatil- perpetuates conflict. The symbiotic nature ity that manifests itself in cycles of conflict of the licit and illicit activities that globalisa- and fragility. A strong international agenda tion enables may partially explain the lack of to stabilise this dimension of globalisation concerted international action to, for exam- is desirable, both out of self-interest and out ple, better regulate the market for arms and of a notion of shared responsibility. Unfor- security services or to reduce money launder- tunately, both the nature of global govern- ing. Legality and illegality are intermeshed in ance and the global power distribution are such a way as to make it highly complex to subject to intense debate and competition combat illicit activities without impinging at the moment. The disappointing results of on licit ones. international conferences in Doha (trade), A second critical risk of globalisation from Durban (climate) and Rio (sustainability) of- a conflict and fragility perspective is that it fer some telling proof. has enabled dominant economic and politi- Hence, any stabilisation agenda needs to cal ideas to be more intrusively ‘imposed’ on cater to different sets of interests to take off. societies dependent on external support by We argue that a basic layer of common inter- powerful players with global reach but with- est is provided by the increasing realisation out either adequate fit or adequate consent. that the cost of violence and fragility are be- Such ‘exporting of ideas’ takes on different ing paid locally, regionally and globally as an forms that range from benign to uninten- inevitable consequence of the interdepend- tionally harmful or intentionally manipula- encies mentioned above. It is by no means tive and damaging. For example, the ‘export just fragile and conflict-affected countries of democracy’ is generally considered in a that suffer. One has only to consider the positive light. However, in the context of harmful effects of piracy, the drug trade, 82 Trzeciak-Duval and van Veen / Globalisation with a Twist

human trafficking, corruption and money livelihood of small farmers who have few laundering on the societies of developing, alternatives to make a living and pushes emerging and developed economies alike more people into poverty. (e.g. World Bank, 2011; OECD, 2011). A use- • The drug trade is profitable because the ful first action in support of such an interna- product commands an attractive, non- tional agenda would be to quantify the cost transparent price premium resulting of conflict and fragility for fragile, emerging from its illegality. As long as this remains and developed economies more rigorously. the case, drug enforcement activity alone Despite the inevitable educated guesses in- will be ineffective to reduce it. Given the volved, this would offer a healthy starting cost some OECD countries pay to fight point for debate and an incentive for change. crime, maintain public health, struggle In addition, we offer three elements for with non-state armed groups sustained such an agenda that, as a package, both cater by the drug trade (e.g. in Afghanistan) to different interest sets and could go a long and confront a range of other threats fi- way in helping fragile countries deal more nanced by drugs money, the search for effectively with some of the volatility that alternative policies is urgent. Joining the globalisation has brought to their doorsteps. call of Latin American countries for a se- Changing course in the current approach rious debate on the issue could reduce to the global war on drugs is the first element an important driver of violence to the of our agenda. Globalisation (economic and benefit of fragile, developing and devel- trade liberalisation in particular) has helped oped societies alike. the drug trade to become a truly global busi- The second element of our agenda is the need ness that links mostly OECD-based demand to halt the spread of radical Islam as a global via transit through Central America, West factor that fuels conflict. Modern commu- and East Africa and Central Asia with pro- nication technology, financial liberalisation duction in Afghanistan, Latin America and and easier travel have greatly facilitated the South-East Asia. The trade’s high profitability instantaneous dissemination of its ideas and and illegality stimulates organised violence enabled a real-time dialogue between leaders because it triggers criminal competition and followers. With an emphasis on violence, for profits and offers an attractive revenue social ‘exit’ and state overthrow, this ideology stream for groups engaged in conflict. At the has inspired a great many local conflicts from moment, the approach to drugs is character- Nigeria to Indonesia – significantly damag- ised by criminalisation and supply-side re- ing the image of Islam in the process. The duction (see e.g. the Global Commission on societies where radical Islam resonates often Drug Policy, 2011). But this approach faces feature weak governance, corruption, high two problems: poverty and ethnic diversity with little access • Because the drugs trade is a global busi- to education or possibilities for open debate. ness, the laws of supply and demand sug- This suggests that a more enlightened and gest that at constant levels of demand balanced approach is required than hunting a reduction of supply will first increase down terrorists and freezing assets. prices and subsequently encourage ‘new’ Capitalizing on the powerful imagery, market entrants. This easily leads to in- change and fear spread by the Arab Spring, creased levels of violence. With a death wealthy Gulf States might be subtly tempted toll of around 47,515 people killed in rela- to use their petro-dollars to reduce inequali- tion to organised violence since 2006, the ties both within their societies and to partner situation in Mexico illustrates this tragic with lesser endowed Arab states. This mo- dynamic (BBC, 2012). Worse, reduction mentum could also be seized to create new of supply often means destruction of the partnerships in higher education between, Trzeciak-Duval and van Veen / Globalisation with a Twist 83 for example, the EU and Tunisia, Libya and common interests in reducing conflict and Egypt that can work a long term influence fragility. Sustainably benefiting from the by creating platforms for debate, study and gains of globalisation requires addressing its reflection as well as skills acquisition. A more less savoury or unintended effects on the ba- Islam friendly discourse and migration poli- sis of shared responsibility and partnership, cies in OECD countries selectively aimed at in full recognition of the symbiotic nature of skills transfer could also help turn the tide. licit and illicit processes and their feedback None of this alone offers an immediate so- loops. The alternative is for such factors to lution, and vigilance remains required; but exercise their influence unchecked against over time such measures can reduce the ef- a deepening process of globalisation and a fects of this and similar violence-stimulating fragmenting international ability for effec- ideologies. tive governance. S Finally, better regulation of the interna- tional provision of security services forms a NOTES third element of our agenda. Catalysed by 1 We understand globalisation as the ac- the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, celeration of processes of political, social the security services industry has grown from and economic change due to increases a niche business to a global industry over the in international interdependencies and past two decades, which now provides ser- international access to goods, services, vices ranging from risk assessment to com- markets, people and ideas. Such increases bat support on a global commercial basis. are primarily enabled by the reduction of This would not have been possible without space and time as critical barriers to in- a global economy. At the same time – and teraction because of the falling cost and despite the tragedy at Nissour square in increased ease of transportation and com- 2007, the International Code of Conduct for munication (building on Wolf, 2005; Ye- Private Security Providers and the Montreux rgin and Stanislaw, 2008). document – the industry remains largely 2 The use of social media to spread alleged non-regulated. Yet, making security available inflammatory movies and images in the on a commercial and lightly regulated basis ethnic and tribal clashes in Assam (India) in societies characterised by inequality and offer another recent example of the pow- unaccountability creates serious risks of ag- er of digital platforms. See BBC (2012). gravating conflict; security itself can poten- 3 Depending on which fragility index one tially become a primarily private, rather than consults. a public, good and right. There is little reason why markets in security services, just like REFERENCES those in military goods, should not be guid- ed by a legally binding framework that estab- BBC 2012 ‘Q&A: Mexico’s Drug-related Violence’, lishes the principles and conditions under BBC. 30 May. Available at: http://www.bbc. which they can be provided and purchased. co.uk/news/world-latin-america-10681249 These three elements are interlinked and [Last accessed 26 August 2012]. can be complemented by many others. They BBC 2012 ‘India Targets Social Media Sites Af- suggest basic building blocks for an inter- ter Assam Violence’, BBC. 22 August. Avail- national agenda that can stabilise some of able at: http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/technolo- the volatile effects of globalisation on con- gy-19343887 [Last accessed 26 August 2012]. flict and fragility. Contrary to the stabilisa- Global Commission on Drug Policy 2011 tion agendas in Iraq and Afghanistan, these War on Drugs: Report of the Global Com- building blocks can incentivise and mobilise mission on Drug Policy (Rio de Janeiro: a range of countries to address mutual and Global Commission on Drug Policy). 84 Trzeciak-Duval and van Veen / Globalisation with a Twist

Heine, J and Thakur, R 2011 The Dark Side Wolf, M 2005 Why Globalization Works (New of Globalization (Tokyo: United Nations Haven, CT: Yale University Press). University Press). World Bank 2011 World Development Re- Judt, T 2010 Ill Fares the Land (New York: port 2011: Conflict, security and develop- Penguin). ment (Washington, DC: World Bank). OECD 2011 Supporting Statebuilding in Situ- Yergin, D A and Stanislaw, J 2008 The Com- ations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guid- manding Heights: The Battle for The World ance, Conflict and Fragility (Paris: Organi- Economy (New York: Free Press). sation for Economic Co-operation and Development). Ali, Z 2012 Book Review: Understanding Security Practices in South STABILITY Asia. Stability, 1(1): 85-86. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ai.

book review Understanding Security Practices in South Asia Reviewed by Zulfiqar Ali Understanding Security Practices in South Asia: Securitization Theory and the Role of Non-State Actors. By Monika Barthwal-Datta 2012 London: Routledge

This book seeks to explore the ways and many, mainly about military-political chal- means through which non-state actors lenges. However, for the common people (NSAs) in South Asia are engaged in secu- living in South Asia, life is riddled with inse- ritizing non-traditional security challenges, curities emerging from several issues which especially at the sub-state level. The writer are separate from the security concerns of the discusses the research gap in this specific state. For instance, high levels of deprivation subject area, explaining that although South have led to the perpetuation of a vicious cycle Asia is the epicenter of important interna- of conflict and made South Asia the battle- tional security challenges, the intricacies ground for some of the world’s long standing and complexities of the region’s security dy- religious, ethnic and caste conflicts. Yet, rather namics remain insufficiently researched. The than viewing these challenges from the per- vast potential for theoretical and empirical spectives of those who are most affected by investigations remains unexploited by schol- them, states in the region have mainly cho- ars within and outside the region due to the sen to focus on protecting the interests of the historic dominance of realist thinking and state rather than those of the people. the enduring rivalry between India and Pa- Barthwal-Datta further discusses securiti- kistan. While traditional security issues such zation theory, as proposed by the Copenha- as inter-state war, border disputes and the gen School, which continues to focus on the threat of nuclear devastation remain high on state level in identifying security responses. the agendas of policy makers and academics, Thus, the state continues to be the preferred both within and outside this region, non- security actor, and there is lack of clarity traditional security challenges merit greater about the role of the securitizing actor and attention and receive it in this book. the securitizing agent. South Asia has vast Monika Barthwal-Datta, in Understanding and active networks of NSAs operating in Security Practices in South Asia, observes that many non-traditional issue areas. The work security in the region remains, in the eyes of being done by these NSAs potentially pro- vide states and governments in South Asia with solid and durable foundations upon * PhD Scholar, University of the Punjab, which co-operative approaches to security 277/A, HBFC, Faisal Town, Lahore, may be further developed at the inter-state 54000, Pakistan [email protected] and regional levels. 86 Ali / Book Review

The book utilizes case studies to demon- July 1996, where NGOs helped them move strate and assess how various NSAs are influ- into seven different rehabilitation centres. encing and shaping security discourses in the In this instance, NSAs achieved what the region, and the author offers recommenda- state failed to do. They acknowledged and tions on how to tackle and resolve prominent gave expression to the state of insecurity in security challenges at the sub-state level. which the rescued group of Nepalese women Moreover, it offers a critique of securitization and children were suffering. Moreover, they theory and attempts to suggest a theoretical subsequently worked to provide them with approach which considers NSAs to be legiti- essential rehabilitative measures in order to mate security actors in order to resolve the help facilitate their reintegration into soci- security dilemma and the related challenges ety. Thus, it could be argued that these NGOs in the present South Asian context. effectively performed the role of security ac- The study has challenged the basic ration- tors in the absence of political will and action ale for continuing to follow realist thinking by the Nepalese state. in dealing with security issues in South Asia. To further strengthen the work, the au- It has pointed towards enhancing the role of thor may have also considered the efforts of NSAs with active support at the state level NGOs like Eidhi Trust, pioneered by Pakistani and channeling their efforts to meet the non- philanthropist Maulana Abdul Sattar Eidhi, traditional security challenges in the region. which is handling non-traditional security The research strives to re-invent the concept threats in multiple sectors to communities of security practices in the South Asian con- in South Asia. There are many such exam- text while dealing with non-traditional secu- ples of NGOs/NSAs contributing to security rity threats that are crucial today. It places in South Asia today. These include organisa- the security concerns of common people, tions such as the Ansar Burni Trust, which is who are struggling to survive in different securing the release of innocent prisoners countries of South Asia, at the heart of all se- in Indian and Pakistani jails who have been curity policies and practices, which has thus accidentally or mistakenly imprisoned as a far been lacking. result of continuing India-Pakistan hostili- A tangible example of an NSA dealing ties. Here too, there are a host of such NSAs with a non-traditional threat successfully is offering their meritorious services in manag- the book’s case study on human trafficking ing non-traditional security threats in the dif- in Nepal, which is a source of insecurity for ferent countries of this region. Of course, it women and children in particular. In Febru- would not have been possible for the author ary 1996, Indian law enforcement agencies in to capture every one of the positive exam- Maharashatra rescued 500 women and chil- ples available throughout the region, and the dren, including approximately 200 Nepalese book currently fills a crucial gap very well. nationals, from Mumbai brothels. The Nepa- Finally, the study could have given more lese government refused to repatriate them space to issues such as food security, which given that they could not provide their proof poses a major threat to international security of citizenship. As a result, these trafficking as well as to the poor in South Asia. Taking survivors suffered in public sector rehabilita- up the banner of human security could open tion centres in India for five months. At that new avenues for research into non-tradition- time, a group of Kathmandu-based NGOs re- al security risks and the myriad ways in which solved and chalked out a plan to repatriate NSAs address them. There is clearly much and rehabilitate the Nepalese victims. They room to build upon this excellent study of appealed to the Maharashatra High Court security practices in South Asia and the role for their release, and, subsequently, 124 of of NSAs. S the victims were returned to Kathmandu in