The Heroism of Romanian Soldiers from Comarnic, Prahova, During the First World War

Romanian Journal of History and International Studies

Vol. IV No. 1 2017

Faculty of History

Department of International Relations and World History

ISSN 2360 – 638X ISSN-L 2360 – 638X

2017 Academic Board

Bogdan Antoniu - University of Bucharest Ovidiu Bozgan - University of Bucharest Constantin Bușe - University of Bucharest Ioan Chiper - Nicolae Iorga Institute of History, Romanian Academy Adrian Cioroianu - University of Bucharest Marusia Cîrstea – University of Craiova Marian Cojoc – Ovidius University of Constanta Laurențiu Constantiniu - University of Bucharest Rudolf Dinu - University of Bucharest Manuela Dobre - University of Bucharest Mihail Dobre - University of Bucharest Alexandru-Murad Mironov - University of Bucharest Christian Năsulea - University of Bucharest Daniela Osiac – University of Craiova Nicolae Panea – University of Craiova Marian Ștefănescu - University of Bucharest

Editorial Board

Alin Matei, PhD (Editor-in-chief) – University of Bucharest Dragoş Becheru, PhD student (Editor) – University of Bucharest Diana Spînu, MA student (Editor) – University of Bucharest Beatrice Nicolle Crețu, PhD student (Editor) - University of Bucharest Mihnea Zigarov, MA student (Associate Editor) – London School of Economics

Romanian Journal of History and International Studies is biannually published in collaboration with the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies by the Department of International Relations and World History at the Faculty of History, University of Bucharest.

Bd. Regina Elisabeta 4-12 Sector 5, cod 030018, Bucharest Tel: 0213145389, Tel/Fax: 0213100680 E-mail: [email protected] Web: rjhis.ro

RJHIS is published with the financial support of PORTAL RESEARCH SRL portalresearch.ro

Media partner: International Relations Report (ir-report.ro)

Copyright © RJHIS 2017 All rights reserved. The publisher bears no responsibility for the editorial content. The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher.

ISSN 2360 – 638X ISSN-L 2360 – 638X

Table of Contents

Vol. IV No. 1 2017

Milad Doroudian The Romanian Intellectual, Christian Orthodoxy, and Identity in connection to Iron Guardism ...... 7

Fidelis Achoba African Traditional Religion in Igaland, Nigeria (c. 1000 – present) ...... 35

George Koukoudakis Authoritarianism in Turkey: From “Kemalism to Erdoganism” via Democratic Reforms and Economic Development ...... 63

Elena Cazacu Ion Antonescu’s regime during September 1940 – June 1941. Measures taken to regain the lost provinces in the summer of 1940 ...... 103

Maria Cristina Ilincuța Angela Năsulea The Heroism of Romanian Soldiers from Comarnic, Prahova, during the First World War ...... 125

Valentin Costa Shaping Public Diplomacy through Social Media Networks in the 21st Century ...... 139

Book Reviews ...... 155 Ionuț Filipescu Frédéric Pichon, Syria – Why the West Got It Wrong, Bucharest, Corint Publishing Group, 2016.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

The Romanian Intellectual, Christian Orthodoxy, and Identity in connection to Iron Guardism

Milad Doroudian*

Abstract: As the second part of a two part series, this article explores the confluence of Romanian intellectual culture and the rise of fascism in the interwar period, with a distinct concentration on the particularity of Romanian identity and its transformation amid the changing rhetoric of plurinationality. Ultimately, the process by which a concrete Romanian identity was formed within the rhetoric of intellectuals was the result of elements of differing views of nationality, the Romanian peasantry, and Christian Orthodoxy, all of which were salient elements of Romanian society during the rise of extremists groups such as the Iron Guard. In this second part, I explore the way that the Jewish population and Jewish identity in Romania was used by intellectuals to define Romanian identity by positing that in fact it was the complete opposite of ‘Romanianism’ as it was defined by the rhetoric of the intelligentsia, which manifested itself in the rise of Iron Guard. The ideals of ‘race,’ and ‘ethnicity’ were therefore paradoxes for many Romanian thinkers and writers.

Keywords: identity, intellectuals, Mihail Sebastian, Otto Weininger, Iron Guard

* Milad Doroudian, a historian of the holocaust, is a graduate student at Simon Fraser University in B.C, Canada. He works as a journalist, has authored a book, and is currently the Senior Editor of The Art of Polemics Magazine. E-mail: [email protected]

Milad Doroudian RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Introduction

In my previous article "The Precarious Nature of Romanian Identity and Nationality: The Intellectuals’ National Identification Process through Youth, Peasants, and Jews in the Interwar Period,” I discussed the means by which Romanian identity was a complex mechanism within which Romanian intellectuals managed to formulate their own ideological underpinnings against the backdrop of an ever changing socio-political landscape in 1930s Romania.1 This article will serve as a continuation of the main argument I put forward, that Romanian identity was inherently unique and used binary systems to promote, at times mythologized versions of its character through numerous publications and their authors. There was undeniably a link between the philosophical ideal of “totality,” and the understanding of Christian Orthodoxy by Romanian intellectuals, which played a salient role in the numerous colourful configurations of a projected identity.2 The elevation of Jewish intellectuals in the interwar period, within the incessant and anti-semitic atmosphere produced a few individuals, such as Mihail Sebastian, who consistently debated their own identities as Jews or Romanians.3 The particular case of Sebastian, however, is most

1 Milad Doroudian, "The Precarious Nature of Romanian Identity and Nationality: The Intellectuals’ National Identification Process through Youth, Peasants, and Jews in the Interwar Period”, in Romanian Journal of History and International Studies, Vol. 3, no. 2, Nov. 2016, pp. 114-144. 2 Mihai Murariu, Totality, Charisma, Authority: The Origins and Transformations of Totalist Movements, Munster, Germany, Springer, 2016, p. 248. 3 Leon Volovici, Nationalist ideology and antisemitism: the case of Romanian intellectuals in the 1930’s, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Pergamon Press, 1991, p. 73.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 interesting, mainly due to the fact that he was very much connected to Nae Ionescu, and other leading thinkers of the time.4 Although throughout the 1930s he consistently promoted anti-liberal ideas, and even supported fascism as was the trend amid his generation, he kept a very prolific diary in which he noted his incessant humiliation at the hands of the others because of his Jewish origins.5 The recently published For Two Thousand Years is a small compendium of some of the hundreds of his diary entries in the 1930s, which show the difficulty of being Jewish in Bucharest, yet it omits the rather paradoxical nature of his ideological thought.6 He was a contributor to Cuvântul - a less extremist but still conservative publication where he, along with Mircea Eliade, wrote on the peculiarities of Romanian culture and tradition. In 1937, he is mentioned in a publication entitled Lanuri, where he was said to be a “great critic” of Romanian literature - as lot of his writing outside his plays was the critique of literature, with an emphasis on the spiritual aspects of literature.7 Sebastian was only one of dozens of important Jewish thinkers who were stuck in an identity crisis amid an increasingly intolerant government, and society. The works of those such as Avram Axelrad, Victor Rusu and many others usually dealt with the theme of Jewish identity and assimilation - yet what is interesting is not only the rejection of their ideas based on the fact that they were Jewish, but the intelligentsia, as those as

4 David Auburn, The Journals of Mihail Sebastian, Chicago, Dramatists Play Service, 2004, p. 11. 5 Ibidem, p. 50-51. 6 Mihail Sebastian, For Two Thousand Years, UK, Penguin, 2016, p. 1-2. 7 ***, “Lanuri” 1937, no. 2, Biblioteca Centrală Universitară, p. 69 [accessed March 27th, 2016].

Milad Doroudian RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Nae Ionescu, who consistently believed that their ideological presence undermined the solidification of Romanian identity in currents of thought.8 In a way, the presence of Jewish writers, poets and playwrights, many of which were influenced by the undercurrents of Dadaism and liberalism presented a problem, one that was in complete opposition to Romania’s spiritual character and anti-materialism.9 It was not just the literary movement, where most Jews supported modernism, which presented a danger to Orthodoxism, but also the new forms of art that became preponderant at the time - such as the artistic circles of Tristan Tzara for instance. Despite these liberal elements however, Jews were still taking part in some right-wing ideological circles and strains of through until 1937 when such a thing became institutionally impossible. Both directly, yet also indirectly Jewish intellectuals posed a problem not just through their presence, but also their works on Romanian identity, which was increasingly becoming more connected to Orthodoxism on a cultural level.10 The nature of the left in Romania after the First World War, unlike other countries, did not include virulent anti-Semitism, neither in the few left-leaning intellectuals nor politicians, mainly due to the fact that most

8 Leon Volovici, “Romanian Literature”, in YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe, New York, YIVO, 19 November 2010, p. 1 [accessed 15th April 2016]. 9 David Berry, The Romanian Mass Media and Cultural Development, Bodmin, Cornwall, Ashgate Publishing, 2004, pp. 8-9. 10 Radu Cinopes, Nationalism and Identity in Romania: A History of Extreme Politics From the Birth of the State to EU Accession, London, I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2010, pp. 52- 53.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Marxists were in fact Jewish or non-Romanian.11 Socialism, or truly any variants of leftist doctrine was very much in the minority not only in the government, but also in the intellectual circles of universities, mainly due to the anti-Bolshevism that was rampant in the polity, but also due to the mass urbanization of minorities such as Jews, Hungarians and Germans in Romania.12 Katherine Verdery infers that the Jews and peasants became central to the Romanian identity in the post-war period, which led, of course, to a dichotomy between the populations.13 In essence, Jews were more prevalently active in Marxist movements due to their urban character, in contrast to Jews living in rural areas that were usually isolated and apolitical.14 On the other hand, Romanian peasants and youth became more systematically involved in the populism exhibited by groups such as the Iron Guard. Marxist doctrines, although present in the works of those like Tudor Bugnariu, along with their personal and national “identity dilemmas”, did not take centre stage in Romanian politics and society, as fervently as nationalism. 15 The issue of class however is a crucial one, especially in regards to the intelligentsia which was preponderantly identified with the middle, or

11 Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building & Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 2000, pp. 248- 252. 12 Ibidem, p. 256. 13 Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's Romania, Berkley, University of California Press, 1991, p. 21 and 31. 14 Ibidem, p. 34. 15 Ștefan Bosomitu, Becoming in the Age of Proletariat. The Identity Dilemmas of a Communist Intellectual Throughout Autobiographical Texts, Case Study: T. Bugnariu, in History of Communism in Europe 5:17-35, Bucharest, Zeta Books, 2014, pp. 17-18.

Milad Doroudian RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

“entrepreneurial” class, in contrast to the largely non-proletariat populace of the country.16 What is intriguing is the fact some elements of the left such as the movement known as Poporanism, advocated populist ideals in the name of the ‘peasant’ - not in traditionalist Marxist models, but in the same way that the right-wing promoted Romanian culture.17 The synthesis of class, and right-wing principles upheld by Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea, is a telling example of the traditionally nationalist quality of all political movements regardless of their positions on the political and ideological spectrum.18

Extremism and ‘Totality’ Materialized

In the case of Romania, there is no need to find the esoteric and arguable connections between the extremist ideas of intellectuals and those populist leaders through long winded analyses of each other's writings, as they were both very much intersected especially in the 1930s.19 Between 1932 – 1934, many intellectuals joined the Legion of the Archangel - the most prominent members being Nichifor Crainic and Nae Ionescu.20 Although historians have studied these relationships, the way that they

16 Maria Bucur, Eugenics and Modernization in Interwar Romania, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010, p. 125. 17 Ana Maria Dobre, Roman Coman. România și integrarea europeană, Bucharest, Institutul European, 2005, p. 66. 18 Ibidem, pp. 71-72. 19 Radu Ioanid. The Sword of the Archangel: Fascist Ideology in Romania, Bucharest, East European Monographs, 1990, p. 98 and 132. 20 Roland Clark, Holy Legionary Youth, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2015, p. 104 and 109.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 affected the general movement and the rise of right-wing extremism as a whole, it is beneficial to understand how those such as Codreanu and the thousands of “young intellectuals,” as they were called, viewed Romanian identity and to what extent did those views which were impacted on by past intellectuals of the old and new guards precipitated the nature of their anti- Semitism and Orthodoxism.21 It is without a doubt a fact that the Iron Guard, also known as the ‘Legion,’ was the materialization of all the ideological tenets of past intellectuals, yet the question remains whether their movement was a reaction to the realization of a non-solidified Romanian identity and perhaps their own answer to it as well? The link between the Iron Guard’s ideological framework, Orthodoxism, and the populist idealizations of the Romanian peasant are salient in understanding the motivations of the movement and, of course, Codreanu, who, although, was not in any terms really an intellectual, his relationships with those such A.C. Cuza, and Nae Ionescu placed him in the midst of the exchange of ideas - many of which he took as early as 1927 and simplified them through propagandistic mechanism in order to propagate his own pseudo-nationalist manifesto.22 The interesting aspect however, was that, although influenced to a great extent, he, perhaps more than any other prominent individual in interwar Romania, took on the ideological concept of ‘totality’ and applied it from his cult of personality to the very aesthetics of his character. The Sword of the Archangel, as it was

21 Irina Livezeanu. op cit., p. 277. 22 Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, For My Legionaries, London, Black House Publishing, 2015, p. 29.

Milad Doroudian RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 sometimes called, propagated the myth of “the new man”, which went beyond even the identity of the Romanian at times, which implied a truly spiritual ‘form’ based in Christian Orthodoxy, but also found in the purity of the racial body.23 Even here, however, Codreanu lacked originality, as his conceptions of the Romanian peasant’s centrality could easily be identified to those along the lines of Iorga. It is no mistake that scholarship has always referred to his movement as a ‘fascist-type’ group, rather than blatantly fascist, due to the odd mystical character and, at times, anti- rational and contradictory precepts of Iron Guardism.24 A great deal of the educated youth amid its ranks subscribed to the ideas of Gândirism and Trăirism - taking from them not only conceptual models, but even existential answers to the “Romanian” question.25 The Iron Guard, unlike the Nazi Party, the fascists in Italy or other right-wing groups in Europe, was very much concerned with the existential crisis of Romanian existence, and its pseudo-intellectual elements consistently propagated that ‘totality’ - dogmatism and all-encompassing faith - were the answers to all of the national problems. In one of its many hymns, the “call to death” for purification was sung as an honourable practice, also seen through the numerous cult-like gatherings symbolized by make-shift crucifixions and religious imagery.26 The movement was defined

23 Radu Ioanid. op cit., p. 81. 24 Zigu Ornea, The Romanian Extreme Right: The Nineteen Thirties, Boulder, Colorado East European Monographs, 1999, p. 265. 25 Roland Clark, Holy Legionary Youth, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2015, p. 139. 26 Diana Dumitru, The State, Antisemitism, and Collaboration in the Holocaust: The Borderlands of Romania and the Soviet Union, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2016. p. 74.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 by religious rebirth and “regeneration”, which advocated not a return to Orthodoxism, but a new type of religious affinity that played a role in every aspects of one’s life.27 Emil Cioran and Mircea Eliade, who both partook in Legionary organizations and even praised the movement, would later denounce or even hide their association, yet at the time for many intellectuals such as themselves the movement provided an ‘answer’ to their philosophical and ideological problems. In other words, it was the material manifestation of their philosophies, and as what they saw the answer to ever present dilemma of Romanian nationality. The success that Codreanu enjoyed until his assassination in the late 1930s, however, lay in his ability to amass and influence the youth of the Romanian nation, where most of his targeted recruiting grounds were university campuses.28 The reason for this is because university students were usually introduced, mildly, to the ideas of Romanian nationalism, Orthodoxism, and even the long standing anti-Semitism, which were propagated in the lecture halls by those such as A.C. Cuza. In 1927, after the first outburst of violence in places such as Oradea and Iasi organized by Codreanu on university campuses, students usually took expeditions to the countryside in order to try and spread the message of Iron Guardism to the ill-educated peasants, which usually took easily to the religiosity of

27 Paul A. Shapiro, “Faith, Murder, Resurrection: The Iron Guard and The Romanian Orthodox Church”, in Antisemitism, Christian Ambivalence, and the Holocaust, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2007, p. 154. 28 ***, Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, November 2004, USHMM, p. 31.

Milad Doroudian RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Legionary Youth.29 In this case we see the Romanian ‘youth’ and the ‘peasant’ brought together by their ‘old religion.’ John Lampe and Mark Mazower attribute the rise of Codreanu as a charismatic leader to the “identity vacuum” present in Romanian society, at the time brought on by the hardships of the unification of all three principalities and adjacent territories - yet they fail to look at the importance of the Romanian intellectual in regards to this “vacuum.”30 Relevant example would be the salient intersections between the long evolution of ideologically-defined Romanian identity and its reality, in regards to how it was manifested in the minds of the right-wing and even the moderately conservative. In the end, it was not the Iron Guard that won political power in Romania, but rather the conservative nationalist forces of those such as Ion Antonescu and Mihai Antonescu. The Iron Guard posed a danger not only to Hitler’s objective in Romania, but also to the nation’s cultural and nationalist structures were too extreme, which of course led not only to the rejection of Codreanu, but also his successor Horia Sima.31 As this ‘battle’ was taking place in the intelligentsia and on the political stage in regards to Romanian identification in the 1930s, the realities of what Irina Livezeanu termed “cultural politics” in Romania were shaping the true nature of the dictatorship that would take hold of the nation in 1940.32 The historical and

29 Diana Dumitru, op. cit., p. 74. 30 John Lampe, Mark Mazower, Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth- Century Southeastern Europe, Budapest, New York, Central European University Press, 2004, p. 31. 31 Jean Ancel, The History of The Holocaust in Romania, Jerusalem, University of Nebraska Press, 2011, pp. 42-44. 32 Irina Livezeanu, op. cit., p. 14.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 political contexts of the interwar period in which individuals sought to define Romanian identity are just as salient in the way that both the most extreme and moderate nationalists responded to this “anxiety.”33 As aforementioned, the inclusion of Transylvania after the Alba Iulia proclamation in 1918 opened up a new problem both for the Romanian polity and intellectual. The inclusion of vast numbers of minorities brought into question Romanian identity, in tandem with the problematic nature of allowing for certain rights. It is in this context, Nae Ionescu and Nichifor Crainic promoted the synthesis of Orthodoxy and race, which even extended to the other parts of society such as medicine - as made evident by Iuliu Moldovan categorization of the biopolitical state.34 Although there are no direct links between the eugenics movement in Romania, as argued by Maria Bucur, and the extreme right, both sought to provide an answer to the way that Romanians categorized themselves.35 A great deal many thinkers, mostly doctors, who were proponents of eugenics in Romania, sought to maintain the “authentic” character of the Romanian body, both in terms of its racial but also cultural nature.36 Even in the sciences, therefore, the traditionalism that was so characteristic at the time found its way in the discourse of doctors. Bucur argues that, unlike other eugenics movements in other parts of the world, the fascination that doctors held with race and body did not lie solely in preservation, but also in the definition of

33 Radu Cinopes, op. cit., p. 44. 34 Maria Bucur, op cit., p. 61. 35 Ibidem, pp. 65-68 and 160. 36 Ibidem, p. 69.

Milad Doroudian RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Romanian racial and physical attributes.37 In other words, one of their objectives was to try and find out what was unique about the Romanian body, not so different from how for instance Vulcănescu tried to define the Romanian mind, in his The Romanian Dimension of Existence.38 Even outside literary and scientific circles, this fascination with identification was present, as the ‘Romanian’s’ state of being was in constant analysis.

New Interpretation of Anti-Semitism and Orthodox Mysticism

The obsession of both Romanian intellectuals and society with identity, in the precarious interwar period, placed the ‘Jew’ as the necessary antipode in the process. In other words: one of the elements which were used as a contradiction to Romanian traditionalism and its ‘spirit.’39 In reality, of course, Jews, especially in Bucharest and other urban centres were very much assimilated and part of society despite their historic inclusion.40 What I am referring to in this context is the conceptual understanding of Jewry and Judaism as abstraction and the opposite of Romanianism. The construction of this dichotomy was prevalent, especially in the works of those such as Nichifor Crainic, which consistently referred to Jews as “materialistic” and “feminine.”41 Crainic, in this particular article

37 Ibidem. pp. 75 and 145. 38 Lucian Boia, History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness, Budapest, Central University Press, 2001. p. 147. 39 Nicolae Iorga, “Spiritul Istoric”, in Cuget Clar (33-36), p. 497. 40 Jean Ancel, op cit., pp. 22-23. 41 ***, “Sărăcia spirituală a evreilor” in Gândirea, no. 10, 1937, Biblioteca Centrală Universitară, pp. 1-2.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 in Gândirea, does not attribute Otto Weininger, nor is there any evidence throughout Crainic’s work that alludes to him; these ideas are very much the same as those in Sex and Character.42 Although there are no direct links, the same ideals found in Weininger seemed to reverberate through the works of writers such as Crainic. The point remains that the ‘Jew’ perhaps played a far more substantial role as an element of self-identification - thus pushing away from Jewry as an abstraction, while also using it as something to direct the ‘anxiety’ found in the precarious nature of the process. This of course is merely one complexity that can only be attributed to the intellectual milieu, but plays an important role to explaining the many facets of the virulent anti-Semitism in Romania as even remarked upon by Hannah Arendt.43 This one factor, however, is merely an explanatory model that infuses the rhetoric of thinkers with the national atmosphere of the nation and should be used as a part of understanding the relationship between nationalism and anti-Semitism. The traditional understanding of anti-Jewish sentiments and violence in Romania, as those put forward by Ryan D. King and William I Brustein, also remain exceptionally salient - namely the fact that the large population of Jews, as well as the economic deterioration of the country led to increased anti-Semitic actions.44 In this case study which

42 Otto Weininger. Sex and Character, London, William Heinemann, 1906, pp. 184-185. 43 William Oldson, A Providential Anti-Semitism: Nationalism and Polity in Nineteenth Century Romania, Volume 193, Philadelphia, The American Philosophical Society, 1991, p. 2. 44 William Brunstein and Ryan King, “Anti-Semitism as a Response to Perceived Jewish Power: The Cases of Bulgaria and Romania before the Holocaust”, in Social Forces, Vol. 83, no. 2, Dec. 2004, p. 704.

Milad Doroudian RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 was compared to Bulgaria, I am inclined to argue that the identity crisis in Romania was more of a unique nature, as a result of the inclusion of so many new minorities in Transylvania and Bessarabia after the First World War - while in Bulgaria anti-Ottomanism seemed to be more at the forefront of public rhetoric. The anti-Masonry that also became prevalent in Romania in the 1930s had the same patterns of exclusions, but also attributes and projections of opposition - in many cases Judaism and Freemasonry were lumped together as the same elements.45 It is also for this reason why Orthodoxy, in terms of religiosity became such an important characteristic of self-identification. The mystical elements of Christian Orthodoxy that can be traced to those such as A.C. Cuza all the way to Antonescu himself, who swore his allegiance to the Romanian people in a church in 1941 and proclaimed a “sacred war” on Bolshevism, is telling of its importance to Romanians in the time period.46 Nicolae Iorga was right when he proclaimed the unbreakable bond between the Romanian spirit and the Orthodox Church - practiced in its purest form by the peasant.47 Not so different from how Greeks identified themselves through their religion in their quest for independence and national consolidation, the Romanians also found it difficult to understand themselves as anything but Orthodox Christians. In

45 Roland Clark, “Anti-Masonry as political protests: fascist and Freemasons in interwar Romania”, in Patterns of Prejudice, Volume 46, 2012, pp. 41-42. 46 Maria Bucur, Heroes and Victims: Remembering War in Twentieth-century Romania, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2009, p. 8. 47 William Oldson, The Historical and Nationalist Thought of Nicolae Iorga, Boulder and New York, East European Quarterly, 1973, pp. 58-61.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 fact, the fabrication of historic memory, in which Nicolae Iorga is included, made connections between the Byzantine past and the present - where ‘Latinity’ was not only a racial component but a spiritual one.48 It seems, however, that this played a substantial part in opposing what was considered its Jewish ‘opposite.’ On one hand, the Jewish component was used in order to define Romanianism, while Orthodoxy was used to concretize it fully - as, after centuries of division, the precarious nature of Romanian identity could only, in the eyes of many intellectuals, be identified through Christian Orthodoxy. The terse overview provided, as well as the basic framework in regards to the identification process, is only a small step to understanding the sheer complexity of Romanian ‘thought’ that spearheaded many of the cultural and social bearings at the time. It is essential to remember that the socio-political atmosphere was excessively turbulent between 1927 and 1940, when the increase in nationalist parties and their power in government made it obvious that the tendency of Romanian politics was to be generally far more right-wing. The power of the LANC in the late 1920s and Codreanu’s split from its main body to create the Legion of The Archangel Michael came about in stormy period. The excessive popularity of Codreanu and the Iron Guard was perhaps what has been attributed for Antonescu’s rise during his National Legionary State with Horia Sima, and his pragmatic yet also opportunistic use of Hitler’s power in Europe to

48 Nicholas Nagy-Talavera, Nicolae Iorga: A Biography, Bucharest, Centre for Romanian Studies, 1998. p. 92.

Milad Doroudian RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 become sole dictator in 1941.49 Amid the political realities during this period, however, there is validity to understanding the way that the men of letters responded to these national changes, as they were influential amid the elite. The historical, yet also philosophical model of ‘totality’, as argued by Martin Jay, but also based on the formulations of Hegel, are an important consideration to understanding the example of the Romanian intelligentsia.50 The need to encompass a ‘black’ and ‘white’ binary of the world - existentialist or not - amid the intellectuals of the period, as to be able to identify the characteristics of Romanian identity remains salient. In other words, the fragile character, as Sorin Mitu calls it, of Romanians at the time, seems to have been an important reason as to why the totality of Orthodoxy, in the cases of Nae Ionescu and Nichifor Crainic came about.51 In the case of Iorga and Xenopol, their views on Romanian culture, encompassed some elements of ‘totality,’ yet nowhere to the same extent. The oversimplifications of those such as Codreanu and other popular pseudo-intellectual agitators perceived the ‘peasant’ attribute of the Romanian ‘spirit’ as the ideal method of existence.52 It must be said that when studying the historical background of the right-wing in Romania, it is necessary to also understand the existential crisis that was occurring at the

49 Jean Ancel, op. cit, p.173. 50 Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984, p. 16. 51 Sorin Mitu, National Identity of Romanians in Transylvania, Budapest, Central European University Press, 2001, pp. 24-26. 52 Leon Volovici, op. cit., p. 69.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 time - the one which easily translated to Legionary youth taking trips around the rural parts of the country where peasants lived to sing religious and patriotic hymns in their honour.53 The largely illiterate masses of Romania responded solely to their agrarian problems, always in relation to the Orthodox Church - issues which were pivotal in the discourses of writers that sought to project and represent the Romanian “soul.” The historiography that has dealt with nationalism and anti- Semitism in interwar Romania in the last few decades has made great leaps in trying to frame the salient relations between intellectuals and the realities on the ground. Namely, Volovici (1991), Ornea (1999) and Ioanid (1990) have shown intrinsic associations both in the literature of Romanian thinkers and the political trends that were taking over the nation, yet they do not analyze the importance of Romanian identity in this precarious period in relation to the rise of xenophobia in depth. Although Bucur mentions that within the medical community the question of identity was very much at the core of the rise of eugenics in the 1930s, she does not associate the same concept to the intellectual class.54 This framework however has the potential to add another layer of complexity, but also to illuminate the understanding of the rise of nationalism, conservatism, fascism, and anti- Semitism in Romania, which have all been dubbed as “unique” by historians.55 With this in mind, it is also important to place the Jewish community at the time within this narrative, as to understand not only the

53 Diana Dumitru, op cit., p. 74. 54 Maria Bucur op cit., pp. 65-68. 55 William Oldson, op cit., p. 109.

Milad Doroudian RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Romanian reaction to the agitations of the time, but that of the Jews as well - however such a consideration is beyond the scope of this article. The problematic nature of trying to discern links between thinkers, intellectuals, and scholars through their works, and their lives, and attribute whether that was the general consensus amid society at large is, without a doubt, vast. In Romania, however, these links were obvious by the fact that most of these thinkers either borrowed or were influenced by others, but also the fact that they were in constant communication through numerous literary magazines. Whether this was the major consensus can be answered by the positive reactions of the populace to the Iron Guard and Codreanu, who simplified these notions, to accommodate the religious and provincial quality of Romanian society. Anti-Semitism was so accepted and open, that in most cases there is no need to dig deep in the interpretive minutiae of literature and scholarship - but the task remains to try to identify its innate uniqueness which lay in its potency. It was a factor which undoubtedly lay in the national preoccupation with identity, which is still very much alive to this day. In an October 1936 issue of Gândirea, Nichifor Crainic published an article entitled “Spirituality and Romaniaism”, in which he explains that being Romanian is in fact a spiritual state of existence.56 Although only one example, the thousands like it produced by the literary class is indicative of the notion of “completeness” that they sought after. It is not, however, the case that this was the sole reason for the virulent anti-Semitism during the

56 ***, “Spiritualitate și Romanism”, in Gândirea. no. 8, Oct. 1936, Biblioteca Transilvania, p. 377.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

1930s, as I am inclined to argue that the socio-political factors as expressed by those such as Brustein were just as salient. Yet there is an interesting correlation to the process of national identification which merits further exploration. Namely, the fact that scholars have attributed the origins of anti-Semitism to the “rich cultural traditions that accompanied the unification of the principalities” is in itself a simplification, as it might have been truly in the creation of rich cultural traditions, in order to consolidate an identity.57 Although not connected in totality to the rise of anti-Semitism and all other complexities put aside, the only other nations in Europe which experienced such an extreme form of fascism in the 1930s were ones which went through national unification in the 19th century, such as Italy and Germany. Of course the nature of the anti-Semitism in each polity was very much based own specificities. This is a mere simplification, but it is interesting to find out in greater depth how a nation’s fascination with its own identity affects its rationalization of exclusion, even if only conceptually. In the case of Romania, generations of intellectuals in the country’s turbulent inter-war period, as well as popular and literary culture, were fascinated with trying to define not just their nationality, but also their national identity. The ‘Jewish Question’ was therefore, at least in the hyperbole of intellectuals, connected to the Romanian one. With this in mind, as scholarship has made progress on trying to discern the severity of

57 ***, “Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania”, 2004, USSHM, p. 2.

Milad Doroudian RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Romanian anti-Semitism, the task now lies in understanding its reciprocity to Romanian identity.

Extremism and ‘Totality’ at the core of Identity

There is a great deal of misunderstanding when it comes to the rise of ideological extremism amid Romanian intellectual circle - the cogs of rightist thought were already perplexingly present amid Romanian academia, but more so amid the fringe writers and professors that made up the nomenklatura of small intellectual groups.58 Still their connections were not only found amid relationships, but also in the intertwining of ideology. The fascination with fascism, and more precisely the Iron Guard, by some such as Mircea Eliade, albeit perplexing, was in fact rooted in the sense of ‘totality’ that the Iron Guard provided at a pure ideological level.59 As aforementioned, the Iron Guard was not a direct materialization of extremism but rather the result of different mechanizations of intellectual culture present in Bucharest and Iasi. In the long memories of Michael Sturdza, the former foreign minister of Romania, there is an interesting appreciation for the rise of the Iron Guard, not as a political necessity, but rather as an ideological one - the culmination of the total character of the

58 Paul Hiemstra, Alexandru D. Xenopol and the Development of Romanian Historiography, New York, Routledge, 14 April 2016, pp. 5-6. 59 Horst Junginger, The Study of Religion Under the Impact of Fascism, Boston, BRILL, 2008, p. 35.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Romanian body politic.60 In here lies a small window in the through processes of politicians that took hold of Romania’s somewhat backward political systems.61 Yet it is only telling that Prince Michael Sturdza, despite his subtle appreciation, chose to nickname the book that would hold his memoirs The Suicide of Europe. The Romanian character and its confluence with the people’s ‘soul’, as argued by Codreanu, was inherently the result of, paradoxically, both the love of European values but also their repudiation.62 The Romanian intellectuals embraced the “virtues” of fascism, as they viewed them, in order to create, or better said, consolidate a rather frail identity during a European era espoused in national significance. Therefore, for many such as Codreanu, it was not solely ‘blood’ and ‘land’ that defined and unity of the Romanian people, but in his view their spirits and their affinity to Christian Orthodoxy. It is mainly for this reason why Nichifor Crainic’s Ethnocracy although argued for the creation of a ‘pure-breed’ Romanian, also argued that blood was nothing without the Romanian spirit.63 The definite paradox of Romanian identity, as perceived by leading intellectuals was that it was both rooted in ethnicity, but not necessarily – which, of course, was a testament to thousands of years of occupations from the Roman settlement of Dacia, to the Slavic incursions, to the Ottoman occupations. The multi- varied and plurinational character of the Romanian people, therefore,

60 Michael Sturdza, The suicide of Europe: memoirs of Prince Michel Sturdza, Western Islands Publishing House, 1968, p. 36. 61 Ibidem, p. 36. 62 Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. op. cit., p. 96. 63 Ibidem, p. 272.

Milad Doroudian RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 revealed itself even in the mindset of radical fascists such as Codreanu, with a tinge of pragmatism, which differentiated its insecure notion of “totality” both in physical manifestation, and as a pure Hegelian historical concept.64 This same characteristics can be found from “Neamul Românesc”, the early nationalist pamphlet published by Nicolae Iorga, to the early published articles on eugenics in academic circles of the 1930s.65 In other words, a varied and irregular view of identity, that was not so much rooted in race, as in the interconnected nature of ‘blood’ and ‘spirit,’ as put forth by numerous writers such as Nichifor Crainic and even Mircea Eliade. The ultimate significance of this lies in the fact that identity, which was moulded by the characteristics of the Romanian peasantry, youth and Jewry, as argued in my previous article, was also found in a dichotomy of paradoxes, as most of Romanian history is, in which the intellectual culture of the 1930s grappled to a terrifying level with its complexity.66 The best examples being the work of those such as Emil Cioran, who flip-flopped from flirting with fascism to at times promoting liberalism.67 The Romanian intellectual, therefore, as the most distinct generalization, was stuck in contending with the paradox of ‘Romanianism’, as was the concept itself. In a small opinion article in the famous “Cuvântul” (The Word) newspaper, entitled “Scrisoarea Despre Un Alt Paris” (A letter about

64 Martin Jay. op. cit., p. 16. 65 ***, “Cum se apară o țară”, in Neamul Românesc. Year 11, N-I 43, 2 November 1911. 66 Milad Doroudian. op. cit., p. 114-115. 67 Emil Cioran, The Romanian Transfiguration, Bucharest, Bloomsbury Academic, 2015, p. 26; Emil Cioran, A Short History of Decay, New York, Skyhorse Publishing, 2012, p. 170; and Emil Cioran. “Constiința politică a studențimii”, in Vremea, no. 463, 15 Nov, 1936 [accessed March 3, 2016].

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 another Paris), published in 1930, Mihail Sebastian wrote about the beauty of Parisian architecture.68 Yet within this seemingly innocuous article, you can see at the most base level, his reiteration of the importance of identity, even if not his own. The same can be seen in the numerous publication, from left wing to right wing newspapers, to literary periodicals, and even simple political pamphlets. Only three years later, as the irredentist fascist movements of Europe were taking over, especially after the rise of Hitler to the chancellorship, a small article entitled “Fascismul” (Fascism) was published in the “Cultul Patriei” (Cult of the Nation) newspaper by Nicolae Bălănescu.69 In it, one can see a fairly simplistic explanation of the main tenets of fascism, but interestingly Bălănescu introduces the concept of identity and its connections to the violent and ‘adventurous’ nature of fascism.70 Albeit these are only a few examples, they are not singular, but can be found in the rhetoric of the intellectual class during the period. It is no mistake that next to that article, a piece titled “Nationalism Românesc” (Romanian Nationalism) was printed to fit the right-wing rhetoric of the publication, and the general trend of rhetoric of intellectuals in the pre- Second World War period.71 All of the paradoxes which I have shed some light on this article are meant to play a part in the explanation of why Romanian fascism, both at the political and social level in Romanian society, was in fact statist, as

68 Mihail Sebastian, “Scrisoarea Despre Un Alt Paris” in Cuvântul, Bucharest, 10 April 1930. 69 Nicolae Bălănescu, “Fascismul” in Cultul Patriei, Bucharest, 23d May 1933. 70 Ibidem, p. 1. 71 G. Mărculescu, “Naționalism Românesc” in Cultul Patriei, Bucharest, 23d May 1933.

Milad Doroudian RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 described by Dylan Riley, rather than civic or invariably collectivist as in Italy and Spain.72 What is meant by this is that Romania’s government, at least the Liberal Party, was more adamantly closer in its framework to the National Socialism of Germany - a reason why perhaps Antonescu, although for pragmatic reasons, became such a close ally of Hitler.73 A part of this was rooted in the Romanian intellectual class, which was made up of Romanians, yet some Jews as well. There is a striking resemblance to the way that Japanese fascism manifested itself, namely the Iron Guard represented the forces of fascism from the bottom up, while Antonescu’s statist fascism, from the top-down took control and squashed its opposition.74 Yet such a critical comparison is beyond the scope of this article.

Conclusion

Over the course of the 1930s, Romania’s intellectual class began to move away from the idea of liberal nationalism as espoused by the old guard - namely Nicolae Iorga - to a paradoxical understanding of fascism and extremism. One which became so radical in its physical manifestation of the Iron Guard, that Adolf Hitler and his German aides in Bucharest had to put a stop to the movement for fear of being unable to control the

72 Dylan Riley, The Civic Foundations of Fascism in Europe: Italy, Spain, and Romania 1870-1945, Baltimore, JHU Press, 2010, p. 20. 73 Ibidem, p. 20. 74 Alan Tansman, The Culture of Japanese Fascism, Durham and London, Duke University Press, 2010, p. 37.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Romanian government under Antonescu and have access to the Ploiesti oil fields and to the one million men which would later participate in the eastern front.75 Invariably, that radicalism most likely stemmed from the peculiar nature by which Romanian intellectuals morphed Christian Orthodoxy into an arbiter of Romanianism, coupled with an odd view of ethnicity. The conceptual framework of “totality” saw a salient shift from old 19th century styled nationalism to the energetic promises of fascism in the 1930s, styled in a Romanian fashion.

Bibliography

***, "Cum se apară o țară” in: Neamul Românesc, Anul 11, N-I 43, 2 November 1911. ***, “Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania”, November 2004, USHMM. ***, “Lanuri” 1937, no. 2, Biblioteca Centrală Universitară, p. 69, accessed March 27th, 2016. ***, “Sărăcia spirituală a evreilor”, in Gândirea, 1937, no 10, Biblioteca Centrală Universitară. ***, “Spiritualitate si Românism,” in Gândirea, Oct. 1936, no 8, Biblioteca Transilvania, p. 377. Ancel, Jean, The History of The Holocaust in Romania, Jerusalem, University of Nebraska Press, 2011. Auburn, David, The Journals of Mihail Sebastian, Chicago, Dramatists Play Service, 2004. Bălănescu, Nicolae, “Fascismul”, in: Cultul Patriei, Bucharest, 23 May 1933.

75 Robert Kaplan, In Europe's Shadow: Two Cold Wars and a Thirty-Year Journey Through Romania and Beyond, Random House Publishing Group, 9 February 2016, p. 134.

Milad Doroudian RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Boia, Lucian, History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness, Budapest, Central University Press, 2001. Bosomitu, S., Becoming in the Age of Proletariat, The Identity Dilemmas of a Communist Intellectual Throughout Autobiographical Texts, Case Study: Tudor Bugnariu, in History of Communism in Europe 5:17- 35, Bucharest, Zeta Books 2014, pp. 17-18. Berry, David, The Romanian Mass Media and Cultural Development, Bodmin, Cornwall, Ashgate Publishing, 2004. Bucur, Maria, Eugenics and Modernization in Interwar Romania, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010. Bucur, Maria, Heroes and Victims: Remembering War in Twentieth- Century Romania, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2009. Brunstein, William and King, Ryan, “Anti-Semitism as a Response to Perceived Jewish Power: The Cases of Bulgaria and Romania before the Holocaust,” in Social Forces, Vol. 83, No. 2, Dec, 2004. Cinopes, Radu, Nationalism and Identity in Romania: A History of Extreme Politics: From the Birth of the State to EU Accession, London, I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2010. Cioran, Emil, A Short History of Decay, New York, Skyhorse Publishing, 2012. Cioran, Emil, The Romanian Transfiguration, Bucharest, Bloomsbury Academic, 2015. Cioran, Emil, “Constiința politică a studențimii”, in: Vremea, no. 463, 15 Nov. 1936. Clark, Roland, Holy Legionary Youth, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2015. Clark, Roland, “Anti-Masonry as political protests: fascist and Freemasons in interwar Romania”, in Patterns of Prejudice, 46:1, 2012. Codreanu, Corneliu Zelea, For My Legionaries, London, Black House Publishing, 2015. Doroudian, Milad, "The Precarious Nature of Romanian Identity and Nationality: The Intellectuals’ National Identification Process through Youth, Peasants, and Jews in the Interwar Period," in The Romanian Journal of History and International Studies, Vol. 3, no. 2, Nov. 2016. Dobre, Maria A.; Coman, R., România și integrarea europeană, București, Institutul European, 2005.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Dumitru, Diana, The State, Anti-Semitism, and Collaboration in the Holocaust: The Borderlands of Romania and the Soviet Union, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2016. Hiemstra, Paul, Alexandru, D., Xenopol and the Development of Romanian Historiography, Routledge, 14 April 2016. Jay, Martin, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas, Berkely, University of California Press, 1984. Junginger, Horst, The Study of Religion Under the Impact of Fascism, Boston, BRILL, 2008. Kaplan, Robert, In Europe's Shadow: Two Cold Wars and a Thirty-Year Journey Through Romania and Beyond, Random House Publishing Group, 9 February 2016. Lampe, John and Mazower, Mark, Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth-Century Southeastern Europe, New York, Central European University Press, 2004. Livezeanu, Irina, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building & Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930, Cornell University Press, 2000. Marculescu, G., “Naționalism Românesc”, in Cultul Patriei, Bucharest, 23 May 1933. Mitu, Sorin, National Identity of Romanians in Transylvania, Budapest, Central European University Press, 2001. Murariu, Mihai, Totality, Charisma, Authority: The Origins and Transformations of Totalist Movements, Munster, Springer, 2016. Nagy-Talavera, Nicholas, Nicolae Iorga: A Biography, Centre for Romanian Studies, Bucharest, 1998. Ornea, Z, The Romanian Extreme Right: The Nineteen Thirties, Boulder, Colorado, East European Monographs, 1999. Oldson, William, A Providential Anti-Semitism: Nationalism and Polity in Nineteenth Century Romania, Volume 193, Philedelphia, The American Philosophical Society, 1991. Oldson, William, The Historical and Nationalist Thought of Nicolae Iorga, Boulder and New York, East European Quarterly, 1973. Riley, Dylan, The Civic Foundations of Fascism in Europe: Italy, Spain, and Romania 1870-1945, Baltimore, JHU Press, 2010 Shapiro, Paul A, “Faith, Murder, Resurrection: The Iron Guard and The Romanian Orthodox Church”, in Anti-Semitism, Christian Ambivalence, and the Holocaust, Indiana University Press, 2007.

Milad Doroudian RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Sebastian, Mihail, “Scrisoarea Despre Un Alt Paris”, in Cuvântul, Bucharest, 10 April 1930. Sebastian, Mihail, For Two Thousand Years, UK, Penguin, 2016. Sturdza, Michael, The suicide of Europe: memoirs of Prince Michel Sturdza, Western Islands, Publishing House, 1968. Tansman, Alan, The Culture of Japanese Fascism, Durham and London, Duke University Press, 2010. Ioanid, Radu, The Sword of the Archangel: Fascist Ideology in Romania, Bucharest, East European Monographs, 1990. Weininger, Otto, Sex and Character, London, William Heinemann, 1906. Volovici, Leon, Nationalist ideology and anti-Semitism: the case of Romanian intellectuals in the 1930’s, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Pergamon Press, 1991. Verdery, Katherine, National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's Romania, Berkley, University of California Press, 1991.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

African Traditional Religion in Igalaland, Nigeria (c. 1000 – present)

Fidelis Achoba*

Abstract: This study examines various aspects of African traditional religious beliefs in Igalaland which have been largely neglected by indigenous scholars, the objective being to bridge the gap in the historiography from c.1000 to the present. The period marked the beginning of Igalaland as a territory with central authority. This study adopts the use of primary and secondary sources: data was obtained from in-depth interviews with traditional priests, elders, archive documents, historical sites, textbooks and journal articles. For research purposes, it is imperative to note that the root of African traditional religion in Igalaland goes back to primeval times. The Ifa oracle played a vital role, as it dictated the reverential and sacrificial life of the people, by which they were cleansed of their abominations and gained the aid of divinities. Belief in the spirit of the departed was also of high importance. Unlike Western society, religion permeates every aspect of life in Igalaland.

Keywords: African traditional religion, Igalaland, Ifa oracle, divinities, God (ojo).

* Dr. Fidelis Achoba was born on 9th October 1965 at Idah, Kogi State, Nigeria. He got his PhD in History at Ibadan, Nigeria, 2014, his M.A. in History at University of Lagos, Nigeria, 2003, his B.A. in History and International Studies at Lagos State University, Lagos, Nigeria, 2001, NCE (Advanced level) History/Social Studies, 1997, among others. He has lectured in the Lagos State University External System (2006-2014), University of Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria (Sandwich Programme) at Lagos (2012-2014). Currently, he teaches History and International Studies at the Federal University Lokoja, Nigeria. His research interests include: pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial intergroup relations, religious studies, conflict and peace studies and Nigerian History. Contact details: Department of History & International Studies, Federal University, Email: [email protected]

Fidelis Achoba RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Introduction

In 1942, J.B. Danquah stated that “the spirit of God is abroad even in Akan of the Gold Coast”1. In his book, he was making a case for African religion and for the belief in a Supreme Being. Describing religion itself, K.A. Dickson saw it “as a search for God and an organised attempt to escape from him.2 To E.B. Idowu, traditional religion is man’s concept of deity and the idea of morality towards worshiping or serving the almighty God known as Oludumare in Yoruba. He states further that there is no religion where the principle of continuity and discontinuity is not manifestly in operation.3 Whichever way it is seen: religion exposes the belief in a supreme being seen as the creator of heaven and earth. The Igala people believed in the Supreme God called Ojochamachalla. There is much evidence to suggest a clear awareness of such a Being among many African peoples. This is followed by the belief in varieties of deities based on environmental circumstances and the veneration of the spirits of their departed ancestors. Many African peoples consider the lesser gods sons of the Supreme Being. Thus, African religious practice involved a constant keeping in touch with spiritual reality often through sacrifice. This comes as a result of the myth which sees man as being alienated from God because of

1 J.B. Danquah. The Akan Doctrine of God, 1966, London, Frank Cass, p. 187, cited in K.A. Dickson, “Religion and the Theologian”, The Ghana Bulletin of Theology, Vol. 4, No. 8, 1973, p. 2. 2 K.A. Dickson, “Religion and the Theologian”, The Ghana Bulletin of Theology, Vol. 4, No. 8, 1973, p. 2. 3 E.B. Idowu, Oludumare God in Yoruba Belief, London, SCM Press, 1962, p.145.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 disobedience and waywardness. In spite of being considered lesser divinities, they were approached as ends in themselves. The people believed that, after death, the spirit of the departed lingered on and was able to help their descendants. The Attah, who was the central head of the kingdom, was believed to have a direct link with the ancestors. As such, the Attah was looked upon as a divine being or a quasi- god. In the immediate Idah south, the pouring of libation formed part of their religious life. It involved mainly the use of native gin and sometimes refined local gin known as Ogogoro or kaikain, as well as palm wine.4 The pouring of libation was mostly used in ceremonies such as marriages, burials and chieftaincy titles; coronations, outdoor ceremonies, puberty rites and other festivals. They were poured on the ground for their ancestors or for any object of worship. The purpose of this was to obtain blessing from the spirit world. Sometimes, among the riverine Igala, libation was poured on water to appease the water god or goddess, as the case may be. It could be done by the individual or the community as a whole. It was also done in the event of an outbreak of epidemics to bring an end to such calamities.5 The Igala people believed in the existence of a variety of spirits in rivers, trees, land, rocks and mountains. These spirits were also believed to move about late at night to see to the needs of their clients, while some could be on harmful expedition. This was the reason pregnant women were not allowed to move about at night, especially in the riverine part to avoid

4 Amposah Kwabe, Topics on West Africa Religion, Vol. 2, Cape Coast, Mfamtsaimen Press, 1975, p. 49. 5 Interview held with Hadizah Ahmadu, aged 80, retired politician and woman leader at Idah, 12 July 2015.

Fidelis Achoba RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

the wrath of the wicked spirit hovering around.6 This practice persists in present day Igala. The worship of an ancestor was primarily individual, although it was sometimes collective. The spirit of the dead is usually embodied in a calabash filled with ash and bound with a piece of cloth or string. This was known as Itu, Egu or Ibegu. A household may have many of these. A man would have one representing his dead father, another one called Iye representing his late mother and the third one, where available, called Oja representing his late father’s wives. These were treated with great respect as continual sacrifices were offered to them through oracle (Ifa) and dream revelations. This practice was so strong in Igala society that the Attah would sometimes leave the Achadu’s compound, going through Egbe, where the Achadus were buried; he halted there to make a propitiatory sacrifice to the royal burial ground at Ojaina. He presented himself at the house of the Ugwolla (the keeper of the tombs), where he remained in close seclusion for eight days. During this period, he was shown the graves of his predecessors and was supposed to commune with their spirits. On the eighth evening, he would be presented with a garment made in the form of a child’s shirt by the Ugwolla. He proceeded that same night to Ofukolo, regarded as “the birthplace”. There he would be joined by the senior wife of the late Attah, before whom he had to display his nakedness and with whom he had to co-habit that night. At the end of this rite, the title of Iye- amone, now known as Iye-oja, was conferred on her and she became the

6 Interview held with Priest Mohammed Alfa Aruwa, aged 81, Onubiogbo’s clan head at Idah, 12 July 2015.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Chief Wife in his compound. Culturally, she was supposed never to be intimate with the Attah again. The explanation given for this is that the relationship linked the Attah with his predecessor so that the line remained unbroken. It has its parallel in the Jukun ritual where intimacy was practised between the Aku and the departed Akus.7 Though he is head of the people’s belief and spiritual wellbeing, the Attah delegated some powers to his subordinate chiefs, such as village and clan heads – Onus, Gagos and Madachis. He was the spiritual head of the people because it was believed that the Attah was a direct descendant of Ojo (God), as claimed by the Attah himself. His forefather, Aganapoje, was said to be born directly from God. It was based on this assumption that successive Attahs have always claimed that “God made me after His own image: I am all the same as God: He appointed me a king”.8 In Igala society, the Attah had his priests, especially the earth priest in charge of the earth shrine. For instance, during the early phases of Igala settlements, the heads of the homestead, apart from other responsibilities, were in charge of the earth shrine.9 As a matter of fact, in the pre-Christian and Muslim missionary era, for any settlement to be successful, the earth god had to be appeased and worshipped. Each hamlet, village, town or community had an earth god whose worship was presided over by its priest. The significance of its worship were: (a) for the fertility of the soil, so that it could yield

7 Interview held with Priest Mohammed Alfa Aruwa, aged 81, Onubiogbo’s clan head at Idah, 12 July 2015. 8 Schon and Crowther, Journal of Expedition up the Niger 1841, London, Frank Cass 1970, p.115. 9 J. N. Ukwedeh, History of Igala Kingdom, Kaduna, Arewa House, Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2003, p. 63.

Fidelis Achoba RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

good produce; (b) to avoid the wrath of the earth god, manifested via infant mortality and high death rate; (c) for peaceful settlement among members of the community and (d) to avoid invasion by enemies.10 On every occasion of the worship of the earth god, no one in the community was allowed to work on the earth or to use iron tools for anything. This worship usually took place either on Ukwo or Eke market days. However, there were very small number of villages who observed the worship of the earth god on Afor or Eke market days. Sometimes, depending on the level of urgency, it was necessary to propitiate with animal sacrifice an angry earth god, who must have been offended by moral decadence in the society as revealed by the Ifa oracle.11 There are two broad categories of spirits, namely: the good and the bad spirits. The people use charms to keep the bad spirits away. The good spirits were usually implored to become personal gods or guardians known as Ojomi – (my god) in Igala. The dead ancestors also function as good spirits. The people believed that the good spirit enhances blessings of all types such as fertility, high crop yield, wealth and good health,12 while the bad spirits do havoc to farm crops or ruin the ones in the store and even cause insanity. By and large, spirits were generally messengers of the gods and of powerful magical men who sometimes invoke them for a particular assignment. Some of these spirits possessed trees, rocks, mountains, animals, streams and human beings. They also believed that people use the powers of evil spirits for witchcraft; the aim being to harm their fellow

10 Ibidem, p. 63. 11 NAK SNP 17/2445, Miles Clifford: Notes on the Igala, Ndoma and Okpoto, p. 22. 12 J. N. Ukwedeh, op.cit., p. 62.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 human beings, including their property, if they so wish. This aspect of belief was mainly individual and not centrally controlled or managed by the king. In the field of medicine, herbs were principally used for curing all kinds of deadly and periodic diseases like measles, small pox and chicken pox. Besides, there were medicines for diseases such as venereal diseases, infertility, fever, headache, stomach pain, wounds and anaemia among others. Some herbal medicines were family heritage and the knowledge was passed from generation to generation or to another family through blessing, or dependent on favours received or service rendered. The significance of medicine men in Igalaland was very important to the people. They had accumulated experience as ritual practitioners, hunters, warlords and naturalists who employed divination as a basis for treating serious illnesses.13 Such terrible diseases include snake bites, broken bones, swollen joints and chronic infections believed to be spiritual. Closely related to the above is the use of magic. Magic enabled people to achieve what they could not achieve naturally. It was used to control unseen forces. Its medium was through religious articles and incantation. In Igala society, magic was used for various purposes, especially for protection and defence.14 This practice is, however, not peculiar to Igala. It was a common practice among traditional African peoples in different places and societies before the coming of the Europeans.

13 Ibidem, p. 63. 14 A. O. K. Noah (ed.), Fundamentals of General Studies, London, Rex Charles Publishers, 1997, p. 340.

Fidelis Achoba RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Within the royal house and society at large, the practice of totemism formed an important aspect of religious belief. This resulted from a myth that traces imperative royal ancestry to an anthropomorphic leopard in a legend that states:

The first ruler had a daughter who went daily from the capital to collect firewood in the groove that is now called Ojaina. As she was visiting this groove, she met a leopard there who took the form of a young man. He wooed her and was accepted. So the young girl was going daily to meet her lover in the bush. He killed game for her and made presents of buffalo and other animals to her parents who began to be curious about the mysterious lover. When the girl told the leopard of the situation, the leopard promised to appear and fixed a time at which he would show himself to her. But when the leopard came out of the bush, the girl’s parents ran away in terror. So the leopard ran and hid himself again in the thick bush at Ojaina and went into the ground there. His lover later delivered a child named Abutu Eje, who was the founder of the royal clan. The Ojaina groove is the spiritual centre of the royal clans and forms the final resting place of all deceased Attah.15

Based on that event, the leopard became a sacred animal to all Igala people until today. So much that in hunting, its name must not be mentioned, as this act was supposed to be enough to defile the hunting medicine that protect hunter against wild animals, especially the carnivorous ones. Besides, if its presence was seen or felt in the bush, the hunting had to be abandoned as a mark of respect, refusal of which portended danger. If a leopard died, its death was mourned in the same way as a member of the royal clan and the mourning period would not end until a member of the royal family had been sent from Idah to collect the pelt for

15 J.S. Boston, The Igala Kingdom, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press, 1968, pp. 15-16.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 the Attah who supervised the ritual burial of the leopard’s body.16 The eating of leopard meat is forbidden so as to not invite doom. Other aspects of totemism in Igalaland are found in the riverine areas where certain animals were taken to be quasi-divine as a result of metamorphic assistance in the past. For instance, in Ogwu-Ajah, the crocodile was worshipped and is still paid homage to this date. This is a result of an oral tradition which claimed that at a time when the people of the community were in danger on the river Niger during heavy tide and their canoe capsized, a crocodile came and turned itself into a big canoe, salvaged the situation and took them across the river. The crocodile then became their god, receiving obeisance and homage from them. This kind of belief cuts across most riverine Igala people who had similar oral tradition. The belief in totemism is substantial in Igalaland and, as such, eating of such animals is forbidden. In confirmation of the place of totemism in Igala society, Madam Edeh Okoliko (late) stated that:

a crocodile had saved her from drowning at the Ido-Okoliko water side near the market when she went to fetch water in the morning. She explained that her clay pot had slipped from her hand into the deep part of the water. She had gone after the pot only to slip further. Then, suddenly, a big crocodile threw her and her pot unto the bank. Looking back, she saw the big crocodile swim back into the deep.17

She further explained that because of the assistance of such an animal in those days, no indigene of Idah ever drowned in the river right

16 Ibidem, p. 50. 17 An account narrated by Madam Ojah Ede Okoliko (late) aged 82, at Idah, 20 June 1993.

Fidelis Achoba RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

from Ocheche to the villages along the left bank of the Niger.18 However, Islam and Christianity have changed the attitude of Igala people towards totemic deities. The possibility of being saved by a crocodile or any object in present day Igala is ruled out, as some people have started eating the forbidden animals. In the plains of Idah, people worship some features of the environment. These they see as tutelary spirits or protective agents. The most conspicuous are mountains and rocks. The belief here is that spirits possessed environmental features and, if worshipped, could give refuge. The Udi hill range of Igalaland was worshipped for this reason.19 Human sacrifice was the highest and last resort to avoid massive disaster. In this case, the victim became a sacrificial lamb to redeem his / her people and, as such, is later worshipped as a god or goddess. This type of sacrifice was done as a condition for the gods to come to the aid of the people in critical situations like war, epidemic and so on. The victims of such sacrifice were usually undefiled persons such as a virgin or chaste person. Thus, in the light of the above, it is obvious that the Igala people of old believed in quite a number of totems and deities through which they venerated the Supreme Being. But today, Christianity and Islam, which became prominent in the late nineteenth century, have changed the attitude of the people, as well as reduced the value of these deities.

18 An account narrated by Madam Ojah Ede Okoliko (late) aged 82, at Idah, 20 June 1993. 19 Unanimous oral tradition collected at Ajaka and Adakpa, 7 June 2015.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Belief in the Obutu Spirit

Another important religious belief in Igala society was the belief in the Obutu spirit. An oral account has it that there arose a period of famine in Igalaland and the people cried to Ojochamachalla, the Supreme Being. In response to their cry, Ojochamachalla told them to take some Iroko Wood, burn it and put the resultant charcoal or ashes in a small vessel, promising to send a spirit to live there who will increase the fertility of the soil or land. He called the spirit Obutu, which means whirlwind or dust devil. He instructed the people to offer him food and, when the new crops were harvested, to give him some before eating themselves. The food must be cooked and placed on the vessel. This was said to prevent any sickness. The Obutu spirit thus becomes the god of fertility in Igala society. The Obutu can be consulted by going to the Obabo, or Diviner, who was approached through the Atama, the man in charge of the Obutu. The method generally used by the Obabo was to throw the ‘Ifa’. Sometimes kola nuts or cowries were used and thrown like dice from a calabash. The meaning was usually read from the way they fell, which determined fortune or misfortune on the land.

The main Ifa oracle

Ifa has its origin in Yorubaland and forms part of the argument that the Igala originated from the Yoruba people or that they were Yoruba who migrated southwards. It is an instrument of divination practiced by those

Fidelis Achoba RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

mastered in it. It constituted another religious belief in Igala society. It consists of four strings, on each of which are four Kawo strings separated from each other by seven or eight cowries. The Obabo throws these out in pairs so that all four strings lie more or less parallel. The message is interpreted by the way the seeds fall, flat or round and it is read across thus:

Round flat, flat round, Flat round, flat round, Flat flat, round round.,

Before throwing the Ifa, he lays the four strings on the ground and goes through a sort of invocation with the Ingono. This is a small instrument made from a goat’s horn, bone and the bone from the fin of the Kurungu fish which is considered best. Its length is between four to seven inches. The Obabo’s assistant first touches the Obabo’s mouth with it, and then draws it across the strings from right to left touching each of the seeds, saying:

If you are sleeping, wake; if you see palm oil tell me; if you see blood, tell me.20

The invocation may vary, though he also asks what he shall give the spirit world to cure sickness – or whatever is the case before. A fowl or goat may be demanded if need be. Its blood is then poured on the ground. The person consulting the Ifa may be asked to provide white lime that will be used to rub the inside of the kawo seeds if more consultation was required.

20 NAK/SNP172445, Anthropological and Historical Note On Igala, p. 3.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Having made the invocation, the Ifa priest touches the ground three times with the point of the Igono. This is to drive any evil spirit into the ground. He thus puts the base of it to his mouth and would repeat the request for whatever information was desired. He then draws the base across the strings, touching each seed as he did before with the point. He then lays the Igono on the ground to the right of the Ifa and throws the strings two at a time again and again, repeating the request for clearer information, saying: “Let the spirit of Ogbe Okala come here and tell me what I want to know”. In the story of the Ogbe Okala, he was a fair chief justice who was killed by violence so many years ago. In Igala belief, the name of any just man who had died a violent death would do the same. After saying this, he again taps the seeds. If the bottom row of the seeds face downwards, this is usually a very bad sign, and some great misfortune, such as the death of an influential person may occur.21

Belief in the Thunder god

Another religious belief that prevailed in Igala society was the belief in the god of thunder, known to the Yoruba as Ogun. This is yet another evidence of a Yoruba-Igala relationship. The god of thunder is known as Akpabana in Igala society. Akpa means hard tree, while bana means split. Akpabana thus implied breaker of strong trees, which signified the violent nature of the god. Some say it is the messenger of Ojochamachalla, as it carries out orders from the Supreme Being and kills whom he decrees to

21 NAK/SNP 17445, Notes on the Igala, Idoma and Okpoto and Customs and History, p. 3.

Fidelis Achoba RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

die. It can also be manipulated by a powerful thunder priest when he strongly hates the accused and thus attempts to prove his guilt by sending a lightning bolt to strike him during rain fall. The Igala people believe that Akpabana contains a spirit, given to it by Ojo. It is also used in administering an oath, and anyone swearing falsely on it is expected to be killed when the next ‘Rains’ come.22 The god of thunder naturally killed the evil doers in society in the pre-Christianity and Islamic period. Thus, during rain evil doers were usually afraid of being in the open air for fear of being struck by a thunder storm. To a great extent, it was a cleansing god, except that in some cases it could be manipulated. However, there is a specific tree known as Obobo in Igala language that diminishes the power of thunder. Anywhere the tree is, it swallows lightning when it attempts to strike at something else.23 In Yorubaland, this thunder god was a mystical human being who spat out fire when speaking. He is known as Ogun. Unlike in Igalaland, his worshippers put on red clothes signifying blood and fire.

Belief in Ancestors as Protection against the Enemy

In Igala society, belief in ancestors was almost a way of life. People believed in the ability of their ancestors to protect and defend them. Hence, they worshipped them religiously and at times offered sacrifices to them. Ambegu are the spirit of the dead. In other words, it is the name given to the spirit that attends to the fortunes of families. Allegedly, some have the

22 Ibidem, p. 5. 23 Field work in the Ibaji area of Igalaland, 7 August 2008.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 power to kill evil doers or trespassers on family property. They also make the adulterer to become sick or die, if she refuses to confess. As for the men, they were traditionally polygamous and, as such, were not punished by the ancestors when they had extra marital affairs, except with somebody’s wife. This was due to the fact that the ancestors kept the same tradition which was common to most African societies, where polyandry was absolutely forbidden. In the case of atonement for such sin, Ifa was usually consulted on what to use to appease the spirit of the ancestors. A common symbol or juju which attracted the spirit of an important ancestor was an iron spear, about five feet in length, possibly longer originally and intended to be the height of a man. This was thrust into the ground leaving half of the blade exposed and a cloth called Awkwa was wound round it or tied to it. This also was used for oath taking, and, if anyone subsequently died who had sworn on it, he was alleged to have sworn falsely. A year was generally allowed as the time limit for the oath attached to the spear to take effect and any charm the victim may have worn was taken and tied to the spear. A small hut was usually built for the juju spear.24 A common form of prayer to Egu on a personal matter, after sacrificing a black cock, is: “with this spear, kill my enemy in the night”.25 If success was achieved when such curse was pronounced, a white cock is sacrificed. There appears to be a distinct connection of white with good and black with evil in the Igala mind, which seems to correspond to the old English idea of white and black symbols.

24 NAK/SNP 17445, Notes on the Igala, Idoma and Okpoto and Customs and History, p. 5. 25 Interview held with Atabo Omede, traditional priest, at Idah, 12 July 2015.

Fidelis Achoba RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Belief in the Invocation of Royal Ancestors through the use of a Cognomen

The royal ancestors comprised four ruling houses in Igalaland. In the beginning, there were the three direct sons of Attah Ayegba: Akumabi, Akogu and Ocholi. Akumabi succeeded their father, Ayegba, whereas his younger brothers, Akogu and Ocholi, succeeded him accordingly. However, two of Akumabi’s sons succeeded Ocholi respectively and this made the ruling lineages become four ruling houses, as Akumabi’s lineage split into two. Thus, any of the offspring of these ruling houses who ascended the throne has the right for the invocation of the royal ancestors through the use a cognomen. The cognomen consists of poetry praising the past and present Attah princes and their supporters based on their historical achievements and weaknesses. Through the use of a cognomen by an incumbent Attah, he can implore the spiritual assistance of a particular late Attah by invoking the power of Otutubatu, the royal ritual staff. One can also interpret the political history of Igala through these specific praises and proverbs attached to the past Attahs of the Igala kingdom. Some notable Igala cognomens are as follows:  Ayegba, akp’onu Apa ki a kp’onu Ichi [“The one that kills the Jukun king (Chief of the north-east) will also kill the Ichi king (Chief of the south-west)”]. As Ayegba Oma Idoko conquered the Jukun and established political independence for Igala, he will further do the same for Igala in case of

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

external aggression. Apa in Igala refers to Jukun, who were conquered by Attah Ayegba during his military campaign, while Ichi refers to the people situated in the west of Igala, who were conquered by Attah Ayegba during his expansionist military campaign. The people here referred to the immediate neighbours in the south-west. The religious implication was the alleged power of the past Attah to save the kingdom any time he was invoked, especially at the time of adversity.  Imotoru, le Omi Kafu Kerebo [“A child runs from rain but the wind storm that follows the rain catches up with him”]. This is the second praise name of Attah Ayegba Oma Idoko, the protodynastic royal ancestor, represented by Otutubatu staff. Metaphorically, it refers to the king’s position of greater challenges that befell him when compared to his father, from whom he took over. This level of invocation was usually done at the peak of challenges in the kingdom in reference to how Attah Ayegba surmounted similar events in his time.  Ayegba Obaka, ela ina abotifi gonogono: this literarily means “Ayegba, the sacred animal that has long tail”. In this context, he is identified with the leopard, the mythical beast of the royal lineage. Thus, the leopard is called Omataina to this day in Igalaland. It is revered, adored and worshipped. Its name remains sacred and must not be mentioned on

Fidelis Achoba RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

hunting expeditions; leopard sightings send hunters home for the day. This praise signified Ayegba’s royal descent power. Though he was not the first Attah, the power of this cognomen was really manifested in him as the founder of Igala dynasty.  Aji ina ki da ane Idoma: “The sacred great stream that is in Idoma land.” This is spoken praise of Idoko and it refers to the tradition that he died in river Benue. Idoma, in this regard, was the ancient Idoma kingdom whose headquarters were immediate north of Benue, now the Doma in the Nasarrawa State of Nigeria. This praise helps in terms of danger from water spirits.  Aku Otemeje, Oma Idoko, Kwu, Ka, Oma Wu, Meji, Mu, Do Onu [“Aku the mighty son of Idoko died and two of his sons succeeded his throne respectively”]. This praise signifies the breaking of the royal houses into four, apart from the hitherto three ruling lineages which were the Akumabi, and Ocholi and Itodo ruling houses. This cognomen is usually used by the forth ruling house of the Itodo lineage to invoke its royal ancestral power at the time of need and also in remembrance of its ruling house.  Amocheje Ideji ti’ikwu ka ayi, lo be’ekata – it means “Amocheje took two of the heirs and tied them up to make the third one afraid”. This praise name is associated with the war in which he fought two ruling opposing houses that

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

made the third one afraid before he secured the throne. This praise poetry is usually used by his lineage in the face of succession dispute, when the heir apparent of his ruling house is facing challenge to secure the throne and while he is being threatening on the throne.  Onu Okpaku kiya bi Ona – this cognomen refers to Ayegba’s eldest son Akumabi, who fortified Idah, the capital of Igalaland, by building ditches and walls round the city against enemy aggression. This verse is therefore used only by the succeeding Attah for the fortification of the kingdom and to re-enact such power on himself for victory at every challenge.  Oguche kekele, Oma, akoji Baba – the young child that represented his father, this refers to the situation in which the young heir apparent succeeded when it was his ruling house’s turn, being the only direct son of the immediate past king of that lineage. The invocation usually takes place when the Attah is facing a serious threat by other senior elders. He, therefore, asks for the intervention of the Oguche spirit for wisdom to deal with such a matter.26 It should be noted that there are some other cognomen used in Igala in the Attah’s palace which were not mentioned above. It is also an ongoing phenomenon based on the achievement of any of the past Attah(s). They are, indeed, used to express political and social superiority and

26 J.S. Boston, op. cit., pp. 200 – 201.

Fidelis Achoba RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

belongingness to the past Attah. In the case of the present Attah, its cognomen is used by his subjects to attract spiritual boast. However, the subchiefs in Alubi’s royal descent of the Ibaji district of Igala, invoke the cognomen usually by thrusting a spear into the ground with a charm and a piece of red cloth for the human sacrificial lamb.27

Belief in Transmigration and Transfiguration (lycanthropy)

The concept of reincarnation is a common phenomenon in most African beliefs. It has manifested in such names as Makedono, Abimaje, Acheneje, Iyabo, Babatunde, Nnenna, Nnnanna, and so forth. The belief in life after death is thus a part of the culture of African societies’ especially primitive and pre-colonial communities. The Igala share this belief with other African peoples, that the spirit of an ancestor is reborn in a child. As part of the concept of reincarnation, they believed that a child born within a certain period, especially after the death of a loved one, will be named after him. The belief here is that the dead relative can come back to this world by re-incarnating into the family that showed him or her love, while he was spending his / her first life on earth. There is also the common belief in lycanthropy known as edida in Igala language. In this case, the living person is temporarily transformed into an animal, such as buffalo, hippopotamus and so on. The change was effected through a charm. These charms vary; in some cases they were a

27 Interview with Joel Etika aged 69, at Festac Town, Lagos, 3 December 2011.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 sort of magic draught, in others it could be some concoction such as the ones made by old witches from various ingredients. In a comparative analysis, C.K. Meek narrates his experience as follows: A Bunu once reported to me that he had accidentally shot his sister-in-law. She had turned herself into a bush-pig. He came across her in this form and shot her with a poisoned arrow. When shot she immediately resumed her human form. (Investigation into the case showed that the man had gone out hunting. His sister-in-law followed later to collect palm-nuts, and as she was bending down he saw her and mistook her for a pig). Some Tangale change themselves into birds when they wish to reconnoitre the enemies’ defenses. An Idoma husband recently accused his wife of sitting on the top of his house in the form of an owl. Yoruba sorcerers commonly attack people in this guise, and if the owl can be caught and injured a corresponding injury is done to the sorcerer’s body.28

In addition, he also offers another report:

A British officer stationed among a hill-tribe recently set a rifle-trap for a hyena which had been troubling his compound at night. The hyena was shot. Its pug-marks suddenly became those of human footsteps, and streaks of blood were traced to the compound of the Galadima – a principal chief of the town. The villagers next day taxed the British officer with the death of the Galadima, who was known to be a wer-hyena.29

Lycanthropy or transmigration was quite a common spiritual power in pre-Christian, pre-Islamic and pre-colonial African societies. Some animals were and are still associated with certain African families and villages. For instance, the hippopotamus was associated with the Bachama people and, as such, its consumption was forbidden.30 This, of course, is a

28 C.K. Meek, The Northern Tribes Nigeria, Vol. 1, London, Frank Cass & Co., 1971, pp. 183 - 184. 29 Ibidem, p. 184 30 Ibidem, p. 185.

Fidelis Achoba RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

common phenomenon in Africa: that people do not eat the animal into which they can allegedly transform.

Belief in Witchcraft

The phenomenon of religion is so pervasive in the life of Igala society and so inextricably bound up with their culture that it is not easy to isolate what is purely religious from the other aspects of life. The belief in witchcraft or the use of malevolent spirits was very prevalent among the Igala, like other primitive African societies such as the Akan of the Gold Coast (now Ghana). Certain people were believed to have second sight. This power was believed to be in-born and enabled them to see and communicate with spirits. A very successful man who was able to make money and seemed very prosperous was believed to have dealings with a spirit. This was irrespective of the occupation of the man or, in minor cases, woman. An individual with second sight may choose to have dealings with evil spirits so that he could do harm to his fellow men and such an individual becomes a witch.31 He was then capable of taking the form of any object or animal. A man or woman who was believed to have these supernatural powers and who used them for good, that is, to give good advice to the chief – the Attah Igala – and to detect evil or wicked witches, and to heal the sick, or to make sacrifices so that undertakings may be successful, was

31 E. Hirst, “Some Religious Practices of the Lokos of Kalangba”, in The Ghana Journal of Theology, vol. 1, no. 5, 1958, p. 5.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 called a witch-doctor or perhaps a more accurate translation in many cases would be “seer” or “prophet”.32 Thus, in Igala society, a man or a woman will not go on a day’s journey without consulting some spirit through the Diviner, or fortune teller, in order to avoid being negatively affected by witchcraft. So, in every event of their lives, appeal was made to the unseen, the aim being to settle their course of action and to help them in earnest, as well as save them from evil or witchcraft. It was believed that wicked witches cause sickness which may lead to death. In some cases, people actually confessed using witchcraft to cause sickness or death to relatives.33 When rampant sickness or a number of deaths occurred in a family, witchcraft was at once suspected and a good witch-doctor, otherwise called Diviner, was consulted by the family head, Onuefunyi. Sometimes, the whole household or all in the compound accompanied the family head to the Diviner, known as the Obabo. He would then present the Obabo with a white cock and some lime. He would also give him four kolanuts and some small red alligator pepper (‘ata’). With this, the Diviner consulted the Ifa and the Ebbo on which it had been placed.34 On the next day, the Obabo would go back to the Diviner to seek the cause of death or sickness. If the Ifa revealed that the cause was witchcraft, the family members were called together and the Onuefunyi would deliver the message to the guilty person who would be called upon to

32 Ibidem, p. 6 33 Interview held with Omale Amaga aged c.82 at Egumeh. 7 April 2011. 34 NAK/SNP 17445, Notes on the Igala, Idoma and Okpoto and Customs and History, pp. 9-10.

Fidelis Achoba RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

confess to the crime. Failure to confess would normally bring grave consequences on the guilty by the gods. In the event of no confession, a description of the witch or witches was sought by the family head through another Obabo. The Igala word for witch is ‘Ochu’, which means somebody possessed by an evil spirit with the intention of causing harm. Igala tales on witches are comparable to those of Medieval Europe. In both epochs, witches are said to possess charms or potions to make an enemy mad, blind, deaf, or sick in any way desired. In Igala society, a man could obtain from the Atama an image made from black mud in the shape of a man. This he would torture in any way he wanted with some incantation, firmly believing that his enemy would suffer in the same way. It was similar to the wax doll used for the same purpose in medieval Europe.35 While not discarding the system, it could be argued that what really happened was a calculated effort of a group to create psychological fear in the mind of those who were not aware. Many people in modern day Igala see them as mere superstitions which indeed achieved the desired effect.

Belief in Love Potions

Marital strength or weakness stems from the interaction between attractions, barriers and alternative rewards to a relationship. The degree of cohesiveness experienced is, in most cases, a function of the partners’

35 Interview held with Atabo Odibo aged c.85, Chief Priest at Egume. 7 April 2011.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 positive attraction to each other.36 It is as a result of this that most African societies, especially within the period of this study, believe that marriages between men and women with different social characteristics seem to encounter greater difficulty than marriages between more similar persons, and would do anything for their sons and daughters to marry within their community. One instrument employed in this respect was the love potion. Love potions were widely acknowledged and used in Igala society. These could be obtained from the Atama and were of various sorts. For example, one such potion was smeared in the young man’s hand, with which he grasped the wrist of the reluctant woman, who thereafter became more yielding. Another method was that the Atama could make a charm which he put in the horn of an animal. It was employed as a way of attracting a young lady to a young man. This was especially used when the young man desired to marry a disinterested lady. Having done this, the Atama would then call the name of the woman three times and would place the horn in the sun on the roof of the young man’s house (it could also be placed on a tree). After this has been done, the young man proceeded to the girl’s house after the Ifa has been consulted to confirm her response. Love charms in the Igala society were made mostly using red feather. It was usually taken from a parrot’s tail and tied to a small piece of white cloth with some other ingredients. It was then hung on the roof of the young man’s house for a period of time. At the expiration of the period, the

36 W.M. Kephart, The Family Society and the Individual, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1961, p. 19.

Fidelis Achoba RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

young man took the charm, sneaked into the girl’s house and dropped it into her drinking water.37 More so, a young man could add a concoction called ‘ideju’ into his bath water. After the bath he would eat some kolanut and expectorate some of it into the small bag in which he carried the charm along with him to see the young woman. The belief in charms thus became a way of achieving what they could not attain by natural or normal means. Magical devices helped accomplish things regarded as difficult in favour of an individual who needed assistance.

Conclusion

The traditional beliefs of the Igala people are governed by superstitions, myths or legends and ancestral spirits. Religion is central to the people’s wellbeing, so much so that they relate everything about life to their religious activities. The Ifa oracle, to a great extent, dictates the people’s response to personal and communal events, as well as their sacrificial life. The people are, therefore, polytheist, as they had many gods, but recognized the almighty God as supreme. Thus, they believe in the law of retributive justice. Hence, this belief enhances their righteous living and, as such, reduces evil activities in the society. The Igala religion adopted anthropomorphism, fusing three ideas of nature, animal and man especially in the concept of the god king and the supernatural aspect of some men. So its religion, similar to those of other African societies, has ethical content,

37 NAK/SNP 17445, Notes on the Igala, Idoma, Okpoto and Customs and History, p. 11.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 as well as objects of worship. In this case, there were and still are many taboos associated with various polytheistic aspect of worship.

Bibliography

Boston, J.S., The Igala Kingdom, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press, 1968. Danquah, J.B., The Akan Doctrine of God, London, Frank Cass, 1966, cited in Dickson, K.A., “Religion and the Theologian”, in The Ghana Bulletin of Theology, vol. 4, no. 8, 1973. Hirst, E., “Some Religious Practices of the Lokos of Kalangba”, in The Ghana Journal of Theology, vol. 1, no. 5, 1958. Idowu, E.B., Oludumare, God in Yoruba Belief, London, SCM Press, 1962. Kephart, W.M., The Family Society and the Individual, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1961. Kwabe, Amposah, Topics on West Africa Religion, vol. 2, Mfamtsaimen Press, 1975. Mbiti, J.S., Introduction to African Religion, London, Oxford University Press, 1991. Meek, C.K., The Northern Tribes Nigeria, vol. 1, London, Frank Cass & Co., 1971. National Archives Kaduna (NAK), SNP 17445, Notes on the Igala, Idoma and Okpoto and Customs and History. NAK, SNP172445, Anthropological and Historical Note On Igala. NAK, SNP 17/2445, Miles Clifford: Notes on the Igala, Ndoma and Okpoto. NAK, 37/1929, Customs and Beliefs of the Igala Tribe. NAK, 212/1930, Igala History, Rites and Ceremonies – Notes. NAK, Lokoprof, 216/1922, Pagan Priest Appointment to Chieftainships. Noah, A.O.K. (ed.), Fundamentals of General Studies. London, Rex Charles Publishers, 1997. Okpe, N.O., Social and Cultural Identity of an African Society, Kulthurelle Communications, 2004.

Fidelis Achoba RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Okwoli, P.E., A Short History of Igala, Ilorin, Matanmi Publishers, 1973. Schon and Crowther, Journal of Expedition up the Niger 1841, London, 1970. Talbot, P.A., Peoples of Southern Nigeria, vol. 1, London, Longman, 1969. Temple, C.L. (ed), Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States of Northern Nigeria, 2nd edition, London, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. 1965. Ukwedeh, J. N., History of Igala Kingdom, Kaduna, Arewa House, Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2003.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Authoritarianism in Turkey: From “Kemalism to Erdoganism” via Democratic Reforms and Economic Development George Koukoudakis*

Abstract: During the 1990s, Turkish society experienced political instability and freedom deficiencies that were followed by a financial crisis in 2001. The socio-political and economic conditions were quite similar to those that sparked the Arab uprisings in late 2010 and, thus, they could have well led Turkey to disarray. The reforms introduced by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) during the 2000s are considered the main reasons why the Turkish state was “rescued”. Since then, however, a series of governmental policies have reversed this process and given rise to a situation where Turkish politics are reminiscent of “old Turkey”, albeit under a different ideological veil.

Keywords: Turkey, reforms, democratization, authoritarianism, dead-end

Introduction

From today’s point of view, one could suggest that the Turkish state would have been in jeopardy during the first years of the 2000s if it were not for the injection of more democratic elements into its political culture by the AKP. During the 1990s, social, economic and political conditions in Turkey were very similar to those of other states in the Middle East which eventually collapsed as a result of the social uprisings that broke out at the

* Dr. George Koukoudakis is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Military Academy of Greece. His most recent publication is entitled “Explaining the Endurance of Greek-Turkish Rapprochement”, Turkish Journal of International Relations, vol. 11, no. 44, 2015. Contact: [email protected].

George Koukoudakis RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

end of 2010 and have been dubbed the “Arab Spring”. However, recent developments in Turkey and its vicinity have raised serious concerns about the country’s political stability and economic development while threatening the achievements of the AKP’s 13 years of administration. During its third term in office, the AKP enacted a series of conservative laws and demonstrated authoritarian rule on a number of occasions that were perceived negatively by a large part of the Turkish society and the international community. As a result, the national parliamentary elections that were held on June 7, 2015 denied the AKP the necessary majority to rule alone for a fourth term. Two more points are worth mentioning regarding the results of these elections. The first is that the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) won 13% of the vote. The second is that, for the first time since the AKP’s rise to power in 2002, an election failed to lead to the formation of a government by the constitutional deadline. This implied that elections had to be re-run in November 2015. This time though, the AKP would regain its previously lost majority in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey – i.e. the parliament. Moreover, a cause for concern is the fact that, in late July 2015, Turkey put an end to peace negotiations with the Kurds, responding to terrorist attacks by the militant Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) with air- strikes and arrests. Simultaneously, Turkish warplanes targeted the so- called Islamic State of the Levant and al-Sham (ISIS) in Syria. Furthermore, on 15th July 2016, a failed military coup against President Erdogan claimed at least 267 lives and came close to killing Erdogan himself. Therefore, the

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

question that remains to be answered is twofold. Firstly, will this toxic and polarized political climate within Turkey lead to further instability and economic collapse and hinder the social, political and economic benefits that Turkish citizens enjoyed during the last decade? And, secondly, can this political polarization bring the Turkish State back into jeopardy? In what follows, this article points out the similarities between the socio-political and economic conditions that sparked the Arab uprisings in late 2010 with the equivalent situation in Turkey during the 1990s. Then an effort is made towards demonstrating that the reforms that have been introduced by the AKP during the 2000s resulted in the rescue of the Turkish state. In its last section, this study argues that, over the last years, Turkish politics have been similar to those of the 1990s, albeit under a different ideological veil. Before concluding, this study also tries to examine whether this situation can be reversed or could lead the Turkish state once again in jeopardy.

Social Uprisings in the Middle East and Turkey

In February 2011, a social uprising in Tunisia overthrew the dictatorship that was ruling the country for decades. This historical event was clearly a people’s revolt and inspired millions of Egyptians, Yemenis, Bahrainis, Libyans and Syrians to do the same. Despite the claims put forward by many scholars and commentators, those uprisings did not start as religious rebellions. They were simply reflecting the severe desire of

George Koukoudakis RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

most of the Arab world for democratic reforms and for social, economic and political modernization.1 At the same time, the Arab revolts sent a clear political message not only to the Arab world and its political system and tradition, but also to foreign policy-makers in the developed world. The message was that nobody with political authority can formulate and exercise policy without the consent of the people, the body politic.2 Against this background, the break-out of the revolts has been attributed to the following main causes: a) high unemployment, especially among the educated and globalized youth; b) authoritarian governments characterized by corruption, abuse of power, lack of political transparency and incapability of understanding the changing nature of their societies; and c) economic hardship and high rates of poverty. According to 2011 estimates, approximately 140 million Arabs – 40 per cent of their total population – live below the poverty line.3 On top of that, 2010 saw a 40 per cent rise in food prices.4 Furthermore, the spread of the revolts was attributed to two additional factors: a) the availability of

1 Mariz Tadros, "Arab Uprisings: Why No One Saw Them Coming," The Guardian, 5 February 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/feb/05/arab-uprisings- egypt-tunisia-yemen; Mardo Soghom, "What's Inspiring the Arab Revolt?", Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 28 January 2011, http://www.rferl.org/content/whats_inspiring_the_arab_revolt_commentary/2290533.html [accessed on 20 June 2016]. 2 Marina Ottaway, "The Middle East in Transition-to What?," Insight Turkey, vol. 13, no. 2, 2011, p. 2. 3 Chandra Muzaffar, "The Arab Uprisings: 12 Questions and 12 Answers," CounterCurrents, 7 February 2011, http://www.countercurrents.org/muzaffar070211.htm. [accessed on 20 June 2016]. 4 Robert Danin, "The Arab Uprisings: Initial Observations", Council on Foreign Relations 2011, http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/eni-enrico-mattei-chair-middle-east- africa-studies-arab-uprisings-initial-observations/p35047 [accessed on 15 July 2016].

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

modern means of communication and b) the well-educated young masses.5 In addition, it is worth mentioning that almost 50 per cent of the Arab world’s population is under 25 years of age. From this perspective, “while underlying socio-economic indicators… differ considerably throughout the region, it seems to have been the shared demographic realities,” in conjunction with the revolution in information technologies and communication means, “that made the revolt so contagious.”6 Generally, Timo Behr and Mika Aaltola argue that the social uprisings in the Arab world can be best described, at least in their beginning, as uprisings for democracy and dignity or as the result of three key deficits of the Arab world: “an economic deficit,” “a freedom deficit” and “a dignity deficit.” These three deficits, as opposed to a more ideologically-charged and divisive political agenda, allowed for more cohesive and massive social movements.7 This three-dimensional deficit that caused the social uprisings in the Middle East was also evident in Turkey throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s. As a result, the Turkish state came very close to collapse when the severe financial crisis of 2001 broke out. Thus, in what follows, 1990s Turkey is explored through the lens of these three deficits and then the study turns to the changes that came about in the 2000s.

5 Alper Y. Dede, "The Arab Uprisings: Debating the 'Turkish Model'", Insight Turkey, vol. 13, no. 2, 2011, p. 24. 6 Timo Behr, Mika Aaltola, "The Arab Uprising: Causes, Prospects and Implications," The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, FIIA Briefing Paper 76, 2011, pp. 6-7. 7 Ibidem, p. 4.

George Koukoudakis RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Turkey in the 1990s

The 1990s were a rather tumultuous period for Turkey. The end of the Cold War brought about drastic transformations in Turkey’s surrounding environment. The ethnically driven civil war in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus, the first Gulf war as a result of the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait, the drastic transformation of the European Economic Community with the Maastricht Treaty (1992), and the emergence of a new security environment with emphasis on low politics were the basic characteristics of this new order. Domestically, political instability was the main feature of Turkish politics. During the 1990s, eight coalition governments and two five-month single-party governments were formed. The coalition governments resulted, among other things, in frequent replacements of ministers. There were, for example, nine different foreign ministers between July 1994 and June 1997 alone.8 This is indicative of the political instability and uncertainty in Turkey, not least at a time of external geopolitical shifts and emerging zones of conflict. This context made for a very challenging decade on multiple levels. In applying the previously-mentioned framework of the three deficits at the domestic level, this study first looks at Turkey’s economic, freedom and dignity deficits during this decade.

8 Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the End of the Cold War, London, Hurst & Company, 2003, p. 64.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

The Economic Deficit in the 1990s

Throughout the 1990s, Turkish society was facing the consequences of the lack of homogenous economic development. Income disparities within Turkey were great, “with the population in the southeast having less than half the average national income and the large rural population generally being much poorer than the urban population.”9 Furthermore, absolute poverty was eight per cent (8%), the rate of the population under risk of poverty by basic consumption needs was 25.4% for rural areas and 21.7% for urban areas.10 Life expectancy in 2000 was 69.8 years, the illiteracy rate among the Turkish population was 16.8% in 199711 and spending for education was only 2.7% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).12 Furthermore, per capita GDP was at around 3,400 United States Dollars (USD)13 throughout the 1990s and military expenditure increased by 74%.14 Indicative of all these

9 Pantelis Sklias, "The Political Economy of Turkey’s Accession to the Eu: A Comparative Analysis", in Constantine Arvanitopoulos (ed), Turkey's Accession to the European Union: An Unusual Candidacy, Berlin, Spring, 2009, p. 198. 10 UN, "Country Profiles - Turkey", United Nation's Commission on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg Summit, 2002, p. 11 11 UNDP, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 150. 12 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economic Surveys: Turkey, Paris, 2001. 13 İbrahim Öztürk, "Political Economy of Erdogan's Success Story in Turkey", Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2011, p. 3 14 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance. 1999/2000, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 300.

George Koukoudakis RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

figures is that Turkey ranked 85th in the UN’s Human Development Index for the year 2000.15 At the same time, Turkey demonstrated population dynamism. Turkey doubled her population every 32 years. The annual growth of the Turkish population during the 1990s was 1.7%. In 1990, the median age of the Turkish population was 22.2 years and, in 1995, 66.8% of the Turkish population was below 29 years old.16 This demographic characteristic is very similar to the countries that were involved in the Arab Spring. In addition, the earthquakes that struck the industrial city of Izmir on 17th August and 12 November and the wider region of Marmara in 1999 made the situation worse. According to the Organization for Economic Co- Operation and Development (OECD), “the wider earthquake region accounts for 35% of national GDP and half of the nation’s industrial output.”17 The death toll from the earthquakes was huge, with an estimate of 18.000 deaths, more than 50.000 injured of which around 20.000 were left permanently disabled. In addition, 113.000 “housing units and business premises were completely destroyed”, while another 264.000 were damaged. In total, 600.000 people were dislocated and around half of them ended up homeless or living in tents. Furthermore, great parts of social infrastructure like schools, hospitals, roads, electricity and telecommunication lines, water pipes and gas pipelines had suffered serious

15 UNDP, Human Development Report 2000, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 158. 16 Gigdem Balim, Turkey: Political, Economic and Social Challenges for the 1990s, Leiden, Brill, 1995, p. 7. 17 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, op.cit. p. 144.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

damages.18 According to estimates from the Turkish government, the economic consequences in fiscal terms of the two earthquakes that struck the Marmara region in 1999 amounted to 1% of Gross National Product (GNP) in 1999 and 2% in 2000, a total of 5.9 billion USD.19 The devastating earthquakes of 1999 also had a political and social impact. Most of those affected by the earthquakes were middle class citizens, the majority of which used to vote for the Republican People’s Party (CHP), founder of which was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself (the founder of the Turkish Republic). At the same time, the inefficient response of the Turkish state to the disaster caused acute public disappointment and prompted the Turkish press to exercise severe criticism on their leaders. For many it seemed that the Turkish state system had collapsed. The public discontent had increased greatly when “expert evaluations of the post- earthquake devastation confirm[ed] that much of it could have been avoided with proper sitting and construction practices.”20 It is worth noting, however, that contrary to the state’s inability to respond efficiently to the devastation, Turkish civil society proved to be very proactive. Volunteers from all sectors of Turkish society, various organizations and students organized the delivery of goods needed in the region. Alongside this, helpers arrived immediately from all over the world and neighbouring countries like Greece with which Turkey had problematic relations.21

18 Ibidem, p. 138. 19 Ibidem, p. 153. 20 Ibidem, p. 138. 21 Kerem Öktem, Angry Nation: Turkey since 1989, London & New York, Zed Books, 2011, p. 114.

George Koukoudakis RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Two years after the earthquakes, a homemade severe financial crisis destroyed the positive political atmosphere that was created as a result of the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate country for European Union membership. İbrahim Öztürk describes the bad economic environment of the 1990s that actually led Turkey to its biggest economic crisis in 2001, as having the following characteristics: 1) low and unstable growth; 2) low per capita GDP, at around 3,400 USD and very low productivity in all economic sectors; 3) an unsustainable fiscal and financial instability in public and private sectors; 4) absence of price stability that led to two decades-long inflation of almost 70%; 5) and “wide-spread corruption, lack of competitiveness, and massive unemployment” at around 10%.22 The constantly deteriorating condition of the Turkish national economy throughout the decade justifies to a large extent the characterization of the 1990s as a “lost decade” for Turkey. The root causes for the 2001 financial crisis manifested in 2000. In November 2000, a liquidity crunch arose in the country that first discredited Turkey in the eyes of foreign investors and the domestic ones, leading to a series liquidity crisis in the financial sector.23 Behind these reasons, however, lay some deeper causes. On the one hand, the coalition governments that dominated Turkish political life throughout the 1990s were not strong enough to pursue the necessary reforms. Political instability was the main feature of Turkish politics. On the other hand, there were the military’s interventions against the required

22 İbrahim Öztürk, op.cit., p. 3. 23 Serkan Sahin et.al, “Turkey’s economy from 2001 to 2011: stronger, steadier and safer”, http://www.turkishreview.org/tr/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=223078 [accessed on 1 March 2011].

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

reforms, as it deemed such measures dangerous for Turkey’s national security. The consequences of this financial crisis for Turkey were great. More than a million of people lost their jobs, thousands of small and medium sized enterprises declared bankruptcy, large quantities of capital left the country in an instant, people who still had their savings in the Turkish lira lost half of the value of their money and real wages were reduced by more than 20 per cent.24 Within a day, the Turkish people became poorer by a third as the Turkish lira was devaluated by 30%. At the same time, the number of people who committed suicide in the first quarter of 2001 increased disproportionally in comparison to previous years.25 All in all, the economic deficit of the Turkish state was evident among Turkish society, not only as a result of the 2001 financial crisis but also due to the bad economic performance during the 1990s.

The Freedom Deficit in the 1990s26

However, on top of that, for a long period which dates back to the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Turkish society has been facing a freedom deficit. Kemal Ataturk had envisioned a westernized and democratized Turkish state as the end product of the implementation of his ideology. In other words, “the Ataturkian thought was an outlook, it did not

24 Kerem Oktem, op. cit., p. 117. 25 Ibidem, p.17. 26 The section on “The Freedom Deficit” draws on a paper by George Koukoudakis and Moritz Pieper, “Turkish Political Culture From Kemal Ataturk to Tayyip Erdogan”, Hellenic Center for European Studies, Research Paper, 2014, pp. 12-17.

George Koukoudakis RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

intend to impose a close system of thought on polity and society in the long run.”27 His successors, however, did not manage to turn his ideology into a democratization mechanism. On the contrary, “the bureaucratic elites converted Ataturkian-thought as an ideology in the shilsian sense that is a closed system of thought.”28 In other words, the military, the bureaucratic and the judiciary elites of the Turkish State endorsed Kemalism as their own political culture,29 depriving it from its dynamism and the ability of direct contact with the needs of Turkish society. This wrongly conceived political culture and ideology, as the political behaviour of these elites has demonstrated, was the main cause of the freedom deficit that Turkish society faced at least until the end of the 1990s.

The Role of the Turkish Army

In the 1990s, the military, having already overthrown elected Turkish governments three times (1960, 1971, 1981), continued its undemocratic role as the self-proclaimed ‘guardian’ of the Kemalist state.30 To put it differently, until that time, the army in Turkey had developed a

27 Heper Metin, “Towards a New Pattern: Transition to Democracy in Turkey”, in Heper Metin and Ahmet Evin (eds), Politics in the Third Turkish Republic, Boulder, Westview Press, 1994, p. 19. 28 Ibidem. p. 19 29 Arend Lijphart, "Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1971, p. 6. 30 See William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, London, Routledge, 1994.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

political culture according to which it had the indisputable right to intervene in politics when its leaders deemed that national security was endangered.31 The army could exercise great influence even after it was withdrawing to its barracks. The mechanism that enabled it to do so was the unelected National Security Council (NSC), which was established in 1961 after its first coup. The NSC’s decisions, where the army had the majority, had to be considered with priority by the government. “Hence the NSC, although not responsible to the Grand National Assembly (the Turkish Parliament), had almost become the ‘highest, non-elected decision making body of the Turkish State’”.32 At the same time, the NSC had the right, accorded by provisional Article 4 of the 1982 constitution, to review the formation of all political parties. This right has been invoked many times since the founding of the Third Turkish Republic. Free formation of political parties is considered to be a prime feature of a functioning liberal democracy because they provide a channel of communication between the state and civil society. They enable the different sections of a society to pursue their interests in a meaningful way and their existence is an indication of a pluralistic society. Indeed,

Political parties are the effective intermediary structures in liberal democracies, as political and organisational linkages between state and society. They provide the most important test of exactly how far these systems

31 Heper Metin, “Introduction”, in Heper Metin and Landeau Jacobs (eds), Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, London, Tauris, 1991, p. 5. 32 Gerassimos Karabelias, "The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-War Turkey, 1980-95", in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1999 p. 135.

George Koukoudakis RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

are pluralist. And, furthermore, they are central to the acquisition of legitimacy by new democracies.33

The acute freedom deficit of Turkey in the 1990s can also be seen after looking at the political parties that have been banished following military suggestions through the NSC. These parties were in opposition to Kemalist ideology or legacy. The People’s Labour Party, for example, founded in 1990, was closed down in 1993 because it tried to promote the political and cultural rights of the Kurds. Its successor, the Democratic Party, was also closed down in 1994 and eight of its deputies have received jail terms of three to fifteen years. Moreover, Turkish electoral law requires a 10% threshold for a party to get in parliament. Consequently, the political representation of small ethnic minorities which live in Turkey is almost impossible. It should be mentioned, though, that the European Court of Human Rights has judged in 2007 that the 10% threshold does not violate political rights. It can be argued, therefore, that the Kemalist ideology-legacy, aiming at the creation of a homogenous state under the arrow of nationalism, was still in evidence throughout the 1990s:

Preventing the development of an ethnic Kurdish cultural and political movement has been a priority of the Turkish state since the Kurdish-laid Shaykh Said Rebellion of 1925.34

33 Pridham Geoffrey, “Political Parties and their Strategies in the Transition from Authoritarian Rule: The Comparative Perspective”, in Gordon Wightman (ed.), Party Formation in East-Central Europe: Post-Communist Politics in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria, Vermont, Edwards Elgar, 1995, p. 1. 34 Nicole F. Watts, "Allies and Enemies: Pro-Kurdish Parties in Turkish Politics, 1990-94", in International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, 1999, p. 639.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

The influence of Kemal’s legacy became also evident with the banishment of the Welfare Party in June 1997. The Welfare Party was leading a coalition government under its leader Necmedin Erbakan as its Prime Minister. During its time in power, the Welfare Party attempted to enable Turkish citizens to express their religious feelings (mostly through clothing) within the state’s institutions and also tried to follow a pro- Muslim foreign policy.35 These policies were perceived by the army as a threat to the secular character of the Turkish Republic. Consequently, within a year, in June 1997, in what is called a ‘soft coup’ the Turkish military pushed the (Refah) Welfare out of office. In 1998, the Refah Party was eventually dissolved by a ruling of the Constitutional Court on the ground that its activities were contrary to the principle of secularism which is enshrined in the constitution of Turkey.

The Press in Turkey in the 1990s

The army’s negative contribution to Turkey’s freedom deficit of the 1990s is also apparent when looking at the press. The army, through its control of the NSC, at least until 2001, by evoking security reasons was able to close down TV radio stations as well as newspapers. In November 1997, for example, “the NSC called on the supreme Radio and Television Board to crack down on the burgeoning number of private Islamist radio

35 Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy under Erbakan," in Survival , vol. 39, no. 2, 1997, pp. 129-149.

George Koukoudakis RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

and television stations.”36 At the same time, journalists who have tried to report on the Southeast Kurdish conflict in Turkey have been persecuted or murdered. Human Rights Watch states that:

from 1992-95, twenty-nine reporters were murdered in Turkey, the overwhelming majority in the Southeast or for reasons connected with the conflict there. Many (18) of those ‘actor unknown murders’ worked for Kurdish-nationalist papers.37

In addition, two main holdings, the Dogan and Sabah groups, were controlling 75% of Turkish Media throughout the 1990s. This monopolization was enabling the Turkish State to control its press more easily. Nazmi Bilgin the head of the Ankara Journalists Association stated that,

there is a certain kind of censorship connected with the monopolisation. Two groups control 75% of readership. Monopolisation is the twin sister of censorship… There is a certain level of self-censorship because of the relationship of owners and the state.38

Bearing that in mind, it can be argued, that the press in Turkey at least during the 1990s was not performing the role that is usually expected in a liberal democracy. In other words, the Turkish press was not able to defend the autonomy of civil society and hold the government to account.

36 Human Rights Watch, Turkey: Violations of Free Expression in Turkey, USA, 1999, p. 34. 37 Ibidem, p. 37. 38 Ibidem, p. 28.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

The Kurdish Issue

Kemal’s main goal, as part of his modernization program, was to create a homogenous state. This can explain the oppression of Kurdish rebellions that took place throughout the previous century (1920, 1925, 1930, 1935, 1984). This goal was also manifested in the Turkish constitutions. In the face of homogenization measures, Kurdish nationalism has only strengthened. The broadening of languages restrictions imposed on the Kurds by the military regime in 1980, the violence against the Kurds in the Iran – Iraq war combined with the PKK strength resulted in the upsurge of the Kurdish national feeling. Thus the Turkish military adhered to Kemalist legacy, attempted to eliminate PKK, which constitutes a terrorist organization. As a result thousands of people died, including innocent civilians, villages have been destroyed and many Turkish citizens became refugees in their own country. The determination of the Turkish military to oppress the Kurdish uprising also became evident in the 1990s. Systematic murders called ‘actors unknown murders’ that were targeting Kurdish nationalists, intellectuals and journalists have been carried out or encouraged by Turkish security forces. The number of these murders, between 1992 and 1995, is estimated at over 1200.39 In March 1992 in particular, when the Kurdish people were celebrating their New Year (Nevruz) security forces killed more than 90 Kurdish civilians. “State-sponsored violence culminated in the Nevruz

39 Ibidem, p. 1.

George Koukoudakis RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

(Kurdish and Shi‘ite New Year) celebrations of March 1992, when more than 90 civilians were shot dead all over the Southeast.”40 This incident was another indication of the determination of the autonomous and powerful Turkish Military “to deny Kurdish or any other ethnic minorities within the territorial boundaries of the Turkish Republic claims for recognition.”41 At the same time it can be observed that during this period, as was mentioned above, the banishment of the pro-Kurdish parties took place. Consequently, a straightforward violation of civil and political rights took place, as outlined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations enacted in 1948 and which Turkey has signed. In addition, the banning of the use of Kurdish language by the generals in 1980 was another form of oppression against the Kurds. Up until 1991, the Kurds were not allowed to use their mother tongue in public to each other. Since 1991, though, Kurdish was allowed to be used publicly; it was not permitted, however, to be used in broadcasting, in teaching and in political campaigns.42 It was Law No 2923 that authorized the NSC to determine the languages allowed to be taught as foreign languages in schools and universities. The influence and power of the military was again highlighted. The Kurds were unable to express their identity as they were forced to use a different language than their mother tongue. This was

40 H. Barkey, G. Fuller, “Turkey’s Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed Opportunities”, in Middle East Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1, winter 1997, p. 69. 41 Gerard Chaliand, A People without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, New York, Olive Branch Press, 1993, p. 245. 42 Human Rights Watch, op.cit., p. 289.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

straightforward “cultural oppression.”43 In summary, during the 1990s, a minority, which constitutes more than 20% of the Turkish population, was not only politically and culturally oppressed but also physically threatened. Similar problems were faced by other minorities that live in Turkey like the Greek, Bosnian and Laz. It worth to be mentioned, however, that PKK fighters throughout these years have committed series of murderous terrorist attacks against innocent Turkish citizens and civil servants; this has caused public outcry and has resulted in the forceful reaction by Turkish security forces that has been mentioned above.

The Dignity Deficit in the 1990s

Without any doubt, Turkey’s economic and freedom deficit was creating a dignity deficit in Turkish civil society. Turkish citizens were denied basic democratic rights and the state apparatus, as proved by the murderous earthquakes and the financial crisis, was unable to cover their basic needs. All in all, throughout the 1990s, Turkey faced a three- dimensional deficit similar to that of the “Arab Spring” countries. In other words, Turkey came very close to a similar social uprising. As the Turkish Prime Minister at the time, Bulent Ecevit, stated, the financial crisis was actually “the crisis of the Turkish state.”44 Eventually, as the following section will try to demonstrate, the Turkish (Kemalist) state was rescued by

43 Gerard Chaliand, op.cit., p. 73. 44 İbrahim Öztürk, op.cit., p. 2.

George Koukoudakis RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

efficient economic and democratization policies that have been implemented by the AKP at the beginning of the 2000s.

AKP’s Rescue of the Kemalist State

The AKP was established on 14th August 2001 under the leadership of Recep Tayip Erdogan. The AKP was a product of the split of the National Outlook Movement, led by Necmettin Erbakan, and appeared more moderate and reformist than its Islamist predecessors.45 The rise of the AKP to power in 2002 by forming a solid majority government and the subsequent elections that it won (2007, 2011) gave new impetus to Turkey thanks to its charismatic leadership, its successful management of the economy and the injection of more democratic elements to the political culture of the Turkish state. This liberalization process, despite the fact that it was also encouraged and motivated by the European Union within the context of Turkish application for EU membership, gradually enabled the AKP to curtail the role of the military and thus implemented long pending reforms. At the same time, the political Islamic roots of the AKP, along with its adoption of a pro-western and pro-democratic rhetoric, had great appeal to the majority of the electoral body that wanted to punish the traditional political parties and their personnel that were deemed responsible for the crisis. This fact enabled the AKP to form a majority government strong

45 Hatem Ete, Eda Bektaş, "The Political Agenda of the June 2011 Elections," SETA Policy Brief 53, 2011, p. 8.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

enough to progressively eliminate the three-dimensional deficit that was mentioned above. The hybrid political ideology of the AKP - a mixture of democratic and conservative values (or rhetoric) - enabled it not only to avoid social upheaval within Turkey, but at the same time to turn Turkey into a healthy and fast developing economy.

The Curtailment of the Freedom Deficit

As was stated above, the characterization of Turkey as a candidate for EU accession at the Helsinki European Summit in 1999 had a great impact on the Turkish democratization process. The advocates of liberalization of the Turkish political system were reinforced. As a result, a series of reform packages, initiated by Bulent Ecevit’s coalition government and implemented by the AKP, were introduced. These reforms were revolutionary for the Turkish political system and political culture. They included the abolition of the death penalty, the extension of rights over the religious property of non-Muslim minorities (Greeks, Armenians and Jews) and legislation of broadcasting in languages other than Turkish. All in all,

this reform package brought up crucial challenges to the Turkish political system through securing the individual liberties, freedom of expression and the recognition of identities other than Turkish.46

As far as the freedom of the press was concerned, the abolition of the military representative of the NSC from the Supreme Radio and

46 Kivanç Ulusoy, "The Europeanization of Turkey and Its Impact on the Cyprus Problem", in Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, vol. 10, no. 3, 2008, p. 322.

George Koukoudakis RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Television Board paved the way for the strengthening of pluralism in Turkish media. The positive climate cultivated among the Turkish society was also reflected in opinion polls published by the Euro-barometer in 2002. According to those polls, 65% of Turkish public opinion held EU membership for Turkey as something positive and 73% held that Turkey will gain from accession.47 Especially as far as the Kurdish issue was concerned, these reforms “were enthusiastically welcomed in the Kurdish provinces.”48 Turkish national TV channel TRT-6 was broadcasting in Kurdish on a twenty four hours basis. The Kurdish language could also be taught in state educational institutions. At the same time, the banishment of political parties had become much harder than before. It is also worth mentioning that in his victory speech on 11th June 2011, Prime Mister Erdogan addressed the Kurdish minority with the following words: ‘We will work harder to end mothers' crying and end the bloodshed,’ he said. “We did away with assimilation policies... we say peace, freedom and democracy in the region.”49 At the same time civil-military relations were improved according to EU standards. This implied the reorganization and reconstruction of the NSC, which had been turned into an advisory body with its Secretary

47 Dimitris Triantaphyllou, Eleni Photiou, Τουρκική Εξωτερική Πολιτική Την Εποχή Του Ακρ: Προς Μια Pax Ottomana; [Turkish Foreign Policy in the Akp Era: Towards a Pax Ottomana?], Athens, Papazisi, 2010, p. 104. 48 Kerem Oktem, op. cit., p. 140. 49 Ivan Watson, Yesim Comert, "Turkey's Ruling Party Decisively Wins 3rd Term in Office," CNN, 13 June 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/europe/06/12/turkey.elections/ [accessed on 25 May 2016].

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

General being a civilian, and not a General and where the army did not hold a majority any more. Overall, at least until 2012, it was widely held that Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership brought about a liberalization process of Turkish society and its political culture.50 In other words, the freedom deficit of Turkish society had in many respects been curtailed or even eliminated. Erdogan’s election as President of the Turkish Republic, indeed from the first round, demonstrated its wide appeal to Turkish society and their consent for his policies and leadership style.

The Curtailment of the Economic Deficit

Along with politico-ideological changes within Turkey came economic changes as well. One of the central notions among scholars is that Turkey, under the AKP, has proceeded to economic reforms such as fiscal and banking restructuring that proved to be of vital importance for economic recovery and rapid development. “Particularly, a floating exchange regime, fiscal discipline and transparency, the strengthening of the independence of the Central Bank, and restructuring of the Turkish banking system were key success factors.”51 However, despite the fact that credit for the economy’s success in Turkey is totally attributed to the AKP management, credit should also been given to Economic Affairs Minister Kemal Dervis, who pushed through a host of reforms during the last months of Bulent Ecevit’s coalition government.

50 Ioannis Grigoriadis, Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Culture and the European Union, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 51 Rahmi M. Koç, "An Evaluation of Turkey's 2023 Targets from the Private Sector Perspective", in Turkish Policy Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 2, 2013, p. 17.

George Koukoudakis RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

A summary of the major results of the AKP’s implementation of economic reforms is as follows: 1) Turkey experienced its highest and longest uninterrupted real growth of almost 6.7% between 2002 and 2007.52 2) Despite fast population growth, GDP per capita tripled from $3.400 in 2002 to $10.500 in 2010.53 3) Despite rapid structural change and rising competition, statistics show robust improvement in income distribution. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) income inequality was reduced considerably.54 Turkey’s Gini coefficient (where 0 and 1 corresponds to complete income equality and inequality respectively) decreased from 0.403 in 2006 to 0.38 in 2010. Simultaneously, Turkey is categorized as an ‘upper-middle-income’ country by the World Bank (defined as having per capita income between $3.976 and $12.275).55 4) The inflation rate had decreased from 70% to 3.9% by April 2011. At the same time, the budget deficit narrowed below 2% and public debt receded below 40% of GDP soon before the

52 İbrahim Öztürk, op.cit., p. 3. 53 Ibidem, p. 3. 54 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economic Surveys: Turkey, Paris, 2011. 55 See Fadi Hakura, After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy, Briefing Paper, Chatham House, August 2013.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

global crisis of 2008-2009. Furthermore 1.4 million new jobs were created since 2009.56 5) As a result, Turkey was ranked as the world’s 16th largest economy. In other words, Turkish economy over the last decade grew by $383 billion and its exports rose from $63 billion to $135 billion.57 Furthermore, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute, in 2005 the income of the richest 10% was about 18 times that of the poorest 10%; this ratio has narrowed to 14 times by 2009. Simultaneously, according to statistical data provided by the World Bank, the proportion of Turks below the poverty line fell during this period from 20.25% in 2005 to 18.1% in 2009.58 Similarly, child poverty declined from one- third of children in 2006 to one-quarter in 2010.59 It can easily been argued that one of the main reasons of the AKP’s electorate victories both in general, local and presidential elections of 2014, alongside its democratization policies, was its success in the economy. This achievement maintained in large degree social cohesion in Turkey and prevented the Turkish state established by Kemal from collapsing.

The Curtailment of the Dignity Deficit

By largely curtailing freedom and economic deficiencies of Turkey, the AKP simultaneously contributed greatly to the curtailment of the

56 İbrahim Öztürk, op. cit., p. 6. 57 Fadi Hakura, op. cit, p.2 58 Ibidem, p. 4 59 Ibidem, p.4

George Koukoudakis RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

dignity deficit of Turkish society. At the end of the day, deficiencies in dignity are what lead to social uprisings and landslide political changes. The AKP administration, by promoting and implementing democratic changes and economic policies that contributed to political and economic stability, as well as the improvement of the living standards and the quality of life of Turkish citizens, eliminated this dignity deficit. This explains why AKP has won three general elections in a row and the first presidential election in the history of the Turkish Republic. Omer Taspinar, a Turkish political analyst with the Brooking Institution in Washington, while commenting on the third electorate victory of AKP in 2011, said that:

People voted overall for stability. It's the same rule in most democracies, 'It's the economy, stupid.' People vote on bread and butter issues. They vote based on their living standards. The fact that Turkey's economy is growing at 9 per cent. The fact that interest rates are low. People can borrow, people can spend. Consumption is very high.60

In other words, the AKP’s electorate success until 2011 is attributed to the fact that its policies and reforms had a direct positive effect on citizen’s daily life. This implies that, as long as the economic success of the AKP was continuing and Erdogan’s authoritarian leadership style was limited, Turkey was enjoying years of political and social stability that enabled it to plan its future on a more solid basis.

60 Quoted in Watson, Ivan, Yesim Comert. "Turkey's Ruling Party Decisively Wins 3rd Term in Office”, CNN, 13 June 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/europe/06/12/turkey.elections/ [accessed om 25 May 2016].

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Back to the 1990s?

The AKP government, however, especially during its third term in office, resorted to a series of conservative measures and policies that raised serious concerns among Turkish civil society and abroad. For many, the AKP used the reforms within the context of Turkish candidacy for EU membership in order to curtail the influence of Kemalist elites and the military and thus control state institutions.61 Furthermore, over the last five years, interest for EU membership was lost not only from Brussels, but also from Ankara; as a result, liberal reforms have lost momentum within Turkey. On the contrary, this situation enabled Tayip Erdogan and his party to put forward the implementation of an Islamic conservative agenda. As a result, for many Turkey watchers in the west it became clear that the AKP was ‘employing its dominance of state institutions to ensconce itself in power, further its ideological agenda and ensure that its momentum becomes irreversible’.62 As a consequence, Turkey made steps backwards as far as its Europeanization is concerned. The European Commission (EC) in its 2015 report on Turkey’s progress towards accession warns against ‘the adoption of key legislation in the area of the rule of law, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly that ran against European standards’.63

61 See, for example, Svante Cornel et. al, Dealing with a Rising Power: Turkey’s Transformation and its Implications for the EU, Centre for European Studies, Belgium, 2012. 62 Ibidem, p. 23. 63 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Turkey 2015 Report, p. 4.

George Koukoudakis RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

This tendency brought about the reaction of a large segment of Turkish society. The excuse was given by governmental plans to modernize the Gezi Park near Taksim Square in Istanbul. As an act of protest, demonstrators occupied Gezi Park on 28 May 2013. When, however, the police intervened by using excessive force, the protest spread throughout the country. By the end of July, according to official government estimates 3.545.000 “people across 80 of Turkey’s 81 provinces had taken to the streets in solidarity with the Gezi Park protesters.”64 Those massive and violent protests cost the lives of eight people (civilians and policemen) and the injury of 8.163.65 Worth mentioning is the result of a survey that indicated that 58.1 per cent of protesters participated in the ‘Gezi Movement’ in order to defend individual liberties and only 4.6% for the protection of the trees at Gezi Park.66 In another survey, 92.4% of the protesters replied that the main reason for their participation in the protests was the authoritarian leadership style of Tayip Erdogan.67 Worth mentioning is that 63.6% of the protesters were between 19- 30 years old68 and that 69% of the participants were informed by social media about the events at Gezi Park.69 The similarities with the ‘Arab Spring’ movement, at least to this point, are obvious.

64 Alev Yaman, The Gezi Park Protests: The Impact on Freedom of Expression in Turkey, London, PEN International, 2014, p. 2. 65 Ibidem, p.2. 66 See http://www.KONDA.com.tr [accessed on 12 August 2015]. 67 Quoted in George Koukoudakis, Η Ενεργειακή Ασφάλεια της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και ο Ρόλος της Tουρκίας (European Energy Security and the Role of Turkey), Athens, Tourikis, 2015 p. 70. 68 Ibidem, p. 68. 69 KONDA, op. cit.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

The excessive use of police force in combination with the 5.300 arrests of participants and the persecutions of journalists, TV media owners and social media users, raised serious questions about the protection of basic freedoms in Turkey. According to the Journalists Union of Turkey, 845 journalists lost their jobs during the protests.70 In other words, ‘The Gezi Park protests represented a major test for Turkey’s democratic maturity and its commitment to upholding fundamental human rights.’71 For many observers and academics, the ‘Gezi Park’ demonstrations can also be explained as a reaction against a tendency towards the Islamization of Turkish daily life.72 This means that the ‘Gezi Park’ protests were also a reaction to the AKP’s pro-Islamic agenda and policies. Liberal segments of Turkish society perceived this tendency as a threat to their freedom. In other words, ‘what happened during the weeks of the Gezi Park demonstrations was actually a reaction of these people to the “official” trend of intensification toward religious morality in daily life and the public space’.73 The trend of Islamisation of the daily life of Turkish society was also confirmed by a survey conducted by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) in which 44.6% of responders considered being Muslim as a primary identity and only 29.9% defined themselves

70 Quoted in Alev Yaman, op. cit., p.3. 71 Ibidem, p. 5. 72 See George Koukoudakis, Pieper Moritz, Turkish Political Culture. From Kemal Ataturk to Tayyip Erdogan: From forced Secularism to subtle Islamisation to European Alienation, Research Paper, Athens, Hellenic Center for European Studies, 2014. 73 Tayfun Atay, “The Clash of Nations in Turkey: Reflections on the Gezi Park Incident”, in Insight Turkey, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2013, p. 39.

George Koukoudakis RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

mainly as citizens of the Turkish Republic.74 This finding denotes a polarization of Turkish society between supporters and non-supporters of the secular character of political and social life. This tendency within Turkey makes Serif Mardin’s argument of the late 1980s look relevant today. As he noted: “One cannot flatly deny the probability that there will arise two nations in Turkey, one secular, the other Islamic.”75

The Kurdish Issue

Additionally, of great concern is the fact that hostilities have reignited between Turkish security forces and AKP fighters. As was mentioned above, this put an end to two years of ceasefire and peace negotiations with the Kurds. This development makes the prospect of further political instability within Turkey more likely. It should not be forgotten, moreover, that the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) won 13% of the vote on 7 June 2015 elections and 10% in November 2015. This new round of hostilities may imply that it will not be willing to participate in any coalition government. Furthermore, the three bombing attacks that took place during HDP pro-elections rallies in June and October 2015 indicate a dangerous division of Turkey also along ethnic lines.

74 Angel Rabassa and Stephan Larrabbe, The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey, Rand, National Defence Institute, 2008, p. 23 75 Serif Mardin, “Culture and Religion: Towards the Year 2000”, in Turkish Political Science Association, Turkey in the Year 2000, Ankara, 1989, p. 185.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

In more details, the terrorist attack in HDP’s Diyarbakir rally in June 2015 and the Suruc attack of July 2015 against pro-Kurdish activists, combined with the deadliest terror attack on Turkish soil in October 10 of the same year, which left more than a hundred people dead and several hundred wounded, reminded many of the Nevruz New Year Demonstration attacks of 1992. The arrest of the HDP leaders and Members of Parliament in November 2016 under the allegation of supporting terrorist acts was also another worrying development. It should also be mentioned that the success of HDP in the elections of June 2015 is not only due to the fact that many Turkish nationals, mainly activists that support human rights and individual liberties, voted for it, but to the new demographic realities of Turkey. According to a survey, “the Kurdish community will be a majority in Turkey in 2038 since the average birth rate for Kurdish women is more than double the national rate for Turkish mothers”.76 Worth mentioning is also the fact that the Kurdish Issue – much like in the ‘90s – is directly related to the country’s democratization process, but is also seen as a national security matter intertwined with regional geopolitical dynamics. In other words, it is a complex and multileveled matter. It is exactly for this reason that the issue of the rights of the Kurdish minority and the secessionist guerrilla war of the PKK against the government has been influencing Turkish foreign policy-making. Turkey’s relations with Syria, Iraq, Iran, Israel and Russia are currently heavily influenced by the Kurdish issue. Turkish bombing of PKK

76 Fadi Hakura, op. cit., p.11.

George Koukoudakis RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

and Isil targets in Syria is such an example. Turkey seems to concentrate more on PKK units in Syria than on Isil. This implies the creation of problems for the western alliance against Isil. “Turkey’s military engagement with the Kurds is that it distracts attention away from the main (Western) coalition effort in Syria and Iraq: namely defeating Isil,” given that the “Syrian-based Kurdish groups… have been proved the most effective fighters on the ground against Isil”.77 It also means that Russian- Turkish relations may deteriorate given that Turkey has been accusing Russia of violating its airspace during its warplanes’ missions in Syria. On another occasion, President Erdogan took advantage of the privileged geographic position of Turkey for the transit of Russian gas to Europe and warned that this transit should not be taken for granted. On 24 November 2015, a Russian bomber was shot down by Turkish jets in Syria on the allegation that it was violating Turkish airspace. In retaliation, Moscow has tightened control on the import of Turkish goods and is threatening the rising of import tariffs and the suspension of major joint projects on energy. Furthermore, Russia has forbidden charter tourist flights to Turkey. In particular, as far as energy is concerned, Russia was also examining the possibility of suspending the construction of the Turkish Stream Pipeline that is going to transfer Russian gas to Europe via Turkey. It is also of great political significance that Arab uprisings have greatly influenced Turkey’s external relations with other countries. Over the

77 Con Cougling, “Turkey’s War Against the Kurds Only Helps Isil,” Daily Telegraph, August, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic- state/11796876/Turkeys-war-against-the-Kurds-only-helps-Isil.html [accessed on 20 October 2016].

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

last decade, Ankara has been developing very good trade relations with its Arab neighbours. For example, in 2008, its exports to Arab countries reached 25,000 million USD and its imports around 12,000 million USD.78 Arab revolts have put many of these achievements into jeopardy, as the cases of Egypt, Syria and Libya point out. This implies losses for the Turkish economy, given that bilateral trade volume with those countries was mostly referring to Turkish exports and investments to the aforementioned countries. In other words, the possibility of a stagnating Turkish economy as a result of its internal situation and of the geopolitical developments in its vicinity should not be precluded. The economic consequences of the failed coup against President Erdogan in July 2016 were great, especially in the tourist sector.79 It can be argued, therefore, that Turkey is in the brink of social, cultural and national polarization which might put all of its achievements over the last 15 years in jeopardy and bring it back to a situation similar to that of the 1990s. The AKP, despite its new impressive electoral victory of November 2015, is witnessing circumstances where some of its crucial supporters for the maintenance of its parliamentary majority, like the liberals, the leftists, ultra-nationalists, other political Islamists like the

78 Nader Habibi, Joshua Walker, “What Is Driving Turkey’s Reengagement with the Arab World?”, in Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Middle East Brief, no. 49, April 2011, pp. 2-3, http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB49.pdf [accessed on 25 February 2016]. 79 ***, “Turkey’s Economy after the Coup: Will the Turkish Economy remain resilient in the face of political upheaval?”, Aljazeera, 23 July 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/countingthecost/2016/07/turkey-economy-coup- 160723082548100.html [accessed on 20 October 2016].

George Koukoudakis RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Gulen fraternity and even secularists and Kurds, have turned against it. As Fuat Keyman notes:

Yet the New Turkey appears to be a highly polarized and fragmented society along secular, religious and ethnic lines, with a strong leader and weak opposition. This leaves us with a picture that points to risks and uncertainties in the areas of democracy, living together in diversity, and active foreign policy.80

Conclusions

All in all, from the above analysis it can be argued that the Turkish state founded by Kemal Ataturk in 1923 and developed alongside his ideology and political legacy, went through a severe social and economic crisis in 2001 that put its foundations and existence in jeopardy. The political stability that Turkey enjoyed from 2002 to 2015 enabled the AKP not only to successfully face and handle that particular crisis and its generating causes, but also to plan and implement reforms that allowed Turkey to emerge as a regional power and a well-functioning and export-oriented economy. This fact allows one to claim that the Kemalist state of that time was eventually rescued by the policies of a moderate Islamic party, the AKP. This rescue, however, might prove to be temporary due to the policies of forced Islamisation that the AKP has been putting forward over the last years. AKP policies over the last years seem to be leading Turkish political life in instability and Turkish society in a religious, social and

80 Fuat Keyman, “The AKP Dominant Party, New Turkey and Polarization”, in Insight Turkey, vol. 16, no. 2, 2014, p. 21.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

ethnic polarization. In that way, Turkey’s achievements during the 2000s in political, economic, societal and even in foreign policy terms seem to be in jeopardy. This would imply Turkey’s return to the ‘lost decade of the 1990s’, characterized by political instability, problematic relations with its neighbours and social unrest along ethnic and religious lines. Political realism at this stage demands that all parties involved demonstrate political will for mutually acceptable compromises that will balance the situation. This is in the interest not only of Turkey and its people, but in the interest of regional stability and prosperity as well. The mission, therefore, of the new AKP government that emerged from the elections of November 2015 should be the aversion of this tendency. The policies that enabled Turkey to achieve so much over the last fifteen years should be the guiding principles for the achievement of this goal. Implementation and continuation of democratic reforms in combination with a renewed interest for EU accession should be the right path to follow. Turkey can play a crucial role towards the handling of the immigration crisis that the EU is currently facing. This fact is bound to convince EU leaders that they should work closely with Turkey in that particular field. A ceasefire with the Kurds should also be pursued and peace talks should restart as soon as possible. As far as foreign policy is concerned, multilateral and co-operative action is required, truly based on the ‘zero problems with neighbours’ principle. Turkey should set a target to celebrate its 100th birthday in 2023 having achieved a lot of what is founder envisioned. Whether the actors of

George Koukoudakis RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

this success will be Kemal’s ideological successors or his ideological opponents does not really matter. What matters is included in what Kemal Attaturk once said: ‘Peace at home, peace in the world’.

Bibliography

***, “Turkey’s Economy after the Coup: Will the Turkish Economy remain resilient in the face of political upheaval?”, Aljazeera, 23 July 2016. Arvanitopoulos, Constantine (ed.), Turkey's Accession to the European Union: An Unusual Candidacy, Berlin, Spring 2009. Atay, Tayfun, “The Clash of Nations in Turkey: Reflections on the Gezi Park Incident”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2013. Balim, Gigdem, Turkey: Political, Economic and Social Challenges for the 1990s, Leiden, Brill, 1995. Barkey, H.; Fuller, G. ‘Turkey’s Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed Opportunities”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1, winter, 1997. Behr, Timo; Aaltola, Mika, "The Arab Uprising: Causes, Prospects and Implications," The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, FIIA Briefing Paper 76, 2011. Chaliand, Gerard, A People without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, New York, Olive Branch Press, 1993. Cougling, Con, “Turkey’s War against the Kurds Only Helps Isil,” The Daily Telegraph, August 2015. Cornell, Svante et. al., “Dealing with a Rising Power: Turkey’s Transformation and its Implications for the EU”, Centre for European Studies, Belgium, 2012. Danin, Robert, "The Arab Uprisings: Initial Observations," Council on Foreign Relations 2011. Dede, Alper Y., "The Arab Uprisings: Debating the 'Turkish Model'," Insight Turkey 13, No. 2, 2011. European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Turkey 2015 Report.

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Ete, Hatem; Bektaş, Eda, "The Political Agenda of the June 2011 Elections", SETA Policy Brief 53, 2011. Grigoriadis, Ioannis, Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Culture and the European Union, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Habibi, Nader; Walker, Joshua, “What Is Driving Turkey’s Reengagement with the Arab World?”, in Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Middle East Brief, No. 49, April 2011. Hale, William, Turkish Politics and the Military, London, Routledge, 1994. Hakura, Fadi, After the Boom: Risks to the Turkish Economy, Briefing Paper, Chatham House, August 2013. Human Rights Watch, Turkey: Violations of Free Expression in Turkey, USA, 1999. Lijphart, Arend, "Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration", in Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1971. Karabelias, Gerassimos, "The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-War Turkey, 1980-95", in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1999. Keyman, Fuat, “The AKP Dominant Party, New Turkey and Polarization, Insight Turkey, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2014. Koukoudakis, George, Η Ενεργειακή Ασφάλεια της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και ο Ρόλος της Ρουρκίας, (European Energy Security and the Role of Turkey), (in Greek), Athens, Tourikis, 2015. Koukoudakis, George; Moritz, Pieper, Turkish Political Culture From Kemal Ataturk to Tayyip Erdogan: From Forced Secularism to Subtle Islamisation to European Alienation, Research Paper, Hellenic Center for European Studies, Athens, 2014. Koç, Rahmi M., "An Evaluation of Turkey's 2023 Targets from the Private Sector Perspective", in Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2013. Konda Research and Consultancy, http://www.KONDA.com.tr. Muzaffar, Chandra, "The Arab Uprisings: 12 Questions and 12 Answers", in CounterCurrents, 7 February 2011. Metin, Herper; Evin, Ahmet (eds.), Politics in the Third Turkish Republic, Boulder, Westview Press, 1994.

George Koukoudakis RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Metin, Herper; Jacobs, Landeau (eds.), Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, London, Tauris, 1991. Mardin, Serif, “Culture and Religion towards the Year 2000”, in Turkish Political Science Association, Turkey in the Year 2000, Ankara, 1989. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economic Surveys: Turkey, Paris, 2001. Ottaway, Marina, "The Middle East in Transition-to What?", in Insight Turkey Vol. 13, No. 2, 2011. Öktem, Kerem, Angry Nation: Turkey since 1989, London & New York, Zed Books, 2011. Öztürk, İbrahim, "Political Economy of Erdogan's Success Story in Turkey", in Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2011. Robins, Philip, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the End of the Cold War, London, Hurst & Company, 2003. Robins, Philip, "Turkish Foreign Policy under Erbakan", in Survival, Vol. 39, No. 2, 1997. Sahin, Serkan et.al, “Turkey’s economy from 2001 to 2011: stronger, steadier and safer”, Turkish Review, 1 March 2011. Tadros, Mariz, "Arab Uprisings: Why No One Saw Them Coming," The Guardian, 5 February 2011. Soghom, Mardo, "What's Inspiring the Arab Revolt?", Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 28 January 2011. Tadros, Mariz, "Arab Uprisings: Why No One Saw Them Coming", The Guardian, 5 February 2011. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance. 1999/2000, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999. Triantaphyllou, Dimitris; Photiou, Eleni, Τουρκική Εξωτερική Πολιτική Την Εποχή Του Ακρ: Προς Μια Pax Ottomana; [Turkish Foreign Policy in the Akp Era: Towards a Pax Ottomana?], Athens, Papazisi, 2010. Ulusoy, Kivanç, "The Europeanization of Turkey and Its Impact on the Cyprus Problem", in Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 10, No. 3. UN, "Country Profiles - Turkey," United Nation's Commission on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg Summit, 2002. UNDP, Human Development Report 2000, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000.

100

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

UNDP, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002. Watson, Ivan; Comert, Yesim, "Turkey's Ruling Party Decisively Wins 3rd Term in Office", CNN, 13 June 2011. Watts, Nicole F., "Allies and Enemies: Pro-Kurdish Parties in Turkish Politics, 1990-94," in International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, 1999. Gordon Wightman (ed.), Party Formation in East-Central Europe: Post- Communist Politics in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria, Vermont, Edwards Elgar, 1995. Yaman, Alev, The Gezi Park Protests: The Impact on Freedom of Expression in Turkey, London, PEN International, 2014.

101

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Ion Antonescu’s regime during September 1940 – June 1941. Measures taken to regain the lost provinces in the summer of 1940

Elena Cazacu*

Abstract: The impact produced by events occurring in the international arena in 1939 were felt by Romania starting with the summer of 1940 when the country was forced to give up without a fight the Romanian provinces acquired in 1918. Consequences were not only social and economic, but also political, causing King Carol II abdication in favour of his son, Mihai and the investment with full powers to run the Romanian state of General Ion Antonescu. Understanding the impact produced by the summer raptures in 1940 among the Romanian population, Antonescu decided to establish as main objective for both the foreign policy and the domestic one the recovery of these territories. Given his decision to participate in the summer of 1941 in the war against USSR, the present study aims to present different measures taken by his regime during September 1940 – June 1941 to regain the lost provinces.

Keywords: Antonescu’s regime, Romanian provinces, territorial losses, administrative measures, Bukovina.

Preliminary considerations

The outbreak of the German aggression against Poland on the first day of September1 marked the beginning of a new world war based, this time, on the dissatisfaction of both winners and vanquished after the

* Elena Cazacu is a PhD candidate at Ștefan cel Mare University of Suceava. Her PhD thesis is on the actions taken by the Romanian administration in Southern Bukovina during 1944 and her research interests include the history of Bukovina, the Second World War, contemporary, oral, local & social history. E-mail: [email protected] 1 Timpul, year III, no. 839, 2 September 1939, p. 1.

103

Elena Cazacu RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

conclusion of the peace treaties. The evolution of military operations on the European stage during 1939 – 1940, the lightning victories obtained by Germany in the North – western Europe, especially France’s capitulation2 made their mark on Romania starting with 26 June 1940 when the Soviet Union, through ultimatum notes, asked the cession of Bessarabia and northern Bucovina3. The collapse of its security system, the total political isolation and the military situation from that time of the Romanian army determined the government from Bucharest to accept the conditions impose by the soviets4. The acceptance provided by Romania and the way in which the U.S.S.R. acted created a precedent in reaffirming the territorial claims of Hungary and Bulgaria, thereby the series of territorial cedes continued with the Vienna Award (30 August 1940) and the Treaty of Craiova (7 September 1940) through which our country gave up the Romanian provinces acquired at the end of the First World War5. The impact produced by the ceded provinces for which generations of Romanians fought, led to the deepening crisis of the political regime, established by King Carol II in 19386. Alongside the pressure made by Germany over Romania led, eventually, to the abdication of King Carol II7

2 Constantin Kirițescu, Romania during the Second World War, Vol. I, București, Universe Enciclopedic, 1996, pp. 114 – 116. 3 ***, Diplomația cotropitorilor. Repercusiunile ei asupra Basarabiei și Bucovinei de Nord, Chișinău, Universitas, 1992, p. 134. 4 Mihai – Aurelian Căruntu, Bukovina in the Second World War, Iasi, Junimea, 2004, pp. 91 – 102. 5 Florin Constantiniu, Crossing the Dniester (1941). A controversial decision, București, Albatros, 1995, p. 30. 6 Dan Vătăman, Romania and international studies (1939 – 1947), Vol. I, București, Pro Universitar, 2009, p. 110. 7 Dan Vătăman, op.cit., p. 124.

104

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 in favour of his son, Mihai8 and the investment of General Ion Antonescu as president of the Council of Ministers on 6 September 1940, with full powers to run the Romanian state9. The crowning of Mihai I as king10 and the appointment as president of the Council of Ministers of Ion Antonescu11 represented the first step in establishing a new regime in Bucharest, approved by Germany. However, civil manifestations caused in the country by the Vienna Award12 determined the general to address the country, immediately after his appointment, asking that all protest be stopped, establishing peace and order among the population13. The first measures taken by Antonescu to create a working base for his new regime were: abrogating the Constitution and dissolving the Parliament14; the dissolution of the Crown Council (6 September 194015) and the Nations Party (9 September 1940), created by Carol II as a substitute for Frontul Salvării Naționale16.

8 Ioan Scurtu (ed.), A collections of documents and materials regarding Romania’s history (February 1938 – September 1940), București, Universității, 1974, pp. 282 – 283. 9 Ibidem, p. 280. 10 Curentul, year XIII, no. 4517, 8 September 1940, p. 1, also see Ion Antonescu, The foundation of the national – legionnaire state. 6 September 1940 – 6 October 1940, București, Monitorul Oficial și Imprimeriile Statului Imprimeria Centrală, 1940. 11 ***, On the brink of disaster. 21 – 23 January 1941, Vol. I, București, Scripta, 1992, p. 62. 12 Romanian Central National Archives (hereafter A.N.I.C.), fund Direcția Generală a Poliției, file 41/1940, f. 6. 13 ***, On the brink of disaster. 21 – 23 January 1941, Vol. I, București, Scripta, 1992, p. 70. 14 Universul, year 57, No. 245, 6 September 1940, p. 1. 15 Ion Antonescu, The foundation of the national – legionnaire state. 6 September 1940 – 6 October 1940, București, Monitorul Oficial și Imprimeriile Statului Imprimeria Centrală, 1940, p. 25. 16 Mihai Fătu, Contributions to studying the political regime in Romania (September 1940 – August 1944), București, Politică, 1984, p. 34.

105

Elena Cazacu RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

On 11 September, Ion Antonescu launched a new appeal for order and work to the Romanian people17. At a closer look, clues concerning the nature of this new regime can be found, the general’s purpose being not only the downfall of a system, `but the creation of another. A new clean life regime, a harmonious and brotherly regime between the leaders and the subjects`18. In spite of the actions made during the first days in office, Antonescu’s concern was to get together a new government that would receive the consent of the German Legation in Bucharest. His desire for forming a national union government that would represent all the political parties was abandoned with the start of negotiations for the new cabinet. Two major difficulties were experienced during these discussions, one of them was the Iron Guard members, who wanted to obtain a larger number of ministries19, and the German Legation, who opposed the idea of co- opting some members of P.N.Ț. and P.N.L., known for their Anglo – French sympathies20. In these circumstances, Antonescu’s decision regarding the co- opting of a political party to the government leadership became public, on 12 September 1940, through a call for the Legionnaires showing that `The country askes to begin together with me, without hesitation and without spare, in unity and love, work for straightening and rebuilding in which we

17 ***, On the brink of disaster. 21 – 23 January 1941, vol. I, București, Scripta, 1992, pp. 76 -77. 18 Ibidem, p. 76. 19 Dan Vătăman, op. cit., p. 129. 20 Ion Gheorghe, A unhappy dictator. Marshal Antonescu (Romania’s road towards a satellite State), edition and introductive study by Stelian Neagoe, București, Machiavelli, 1996, pp. 132 – 135.

106

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 started`21. In conclusion, a new government was formed on 14 September with key positions occupied by members of the Iron Guard22. Even so, the general managed to keep `in his hands` the Minister of Defence, and decided to name in the most important people from his trusted circle, such as: Mihai Antonescu – the Minister of Justice and Dragomir - Economy23. Forming a government with the Iron Guar had as consequence the signing, on 16 September 1940, by King Mihai I of decree no. 3151 which stipulated that: the Romanian state became national – legionnaire; the Iron Guard, the only movement recognised by the new state, was charged with lifting morally and material the Romanian people and Ion Antonescu became the leader of the state and the chief of the new regime24. Understanding the impact produced on the public life in Romania by the monarchy, and the potential opposition that would appear in the case of abolishment, general Antonescu decided that it would be in his interest to use it. In this context, King Mihai I was advanced to general of Division at 14 September 14025, and in `Call to the nation`, from 15 September, the general showed that: `The Royal Family from here on, will be an example

21 ***, On the brink of disaster. 21 – 23 January 1941, vol. I, București, Scripta, 1992, p. 80. 22 Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler, King Carol and Marshal Antonescu: the German – Romanian relationships (1938 – 1944), București, Humanitas, 2007, p. 98. 23 Ion Gheorghe, op. cit., p. 144, also see ***, On the brink of disaster. 21 – 23 January 1941, Vol. I, București, Scripta, 1992. 24 Universul, No. 255, 16 September 1940, p. 1. 25 ***, On the brink of disaster. 21 – 23 January 1941, vol. I, București, Scripta, 1992, pp. 83 – 86.

107

Elena Cazacu RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

of morality, sobriety, righteousness, modesty, civic conscience and patriotic behaviour`26, thus becoming a symbol for the Romanian family27. Like any other new regime that acceded to power, Antonescu tried during the first days not only to consolidate his position, but also to gain popularity among the Romanians. Measures like: controlling the fortunes of former officials28; monitoring funds used for equipping the army; decreasing the number of ministers29; abolishing the function of Regal advisor30 made possible promoting the image that Ion Antonescu was an incorruptible person and the defender of law.

Ion Antonescu’s regime during September 1940 – June 1941 and the national legionnaire state (September – December 1940)

The instalment of the new regime at Bucharest produced changes not only in the domestic politics, but also in the foreign one. Such was the case of Romanian’s decision in getting closer to Germany, initially adopted by Carol II regime, continued by Antonescu31 with the exception that none of the treaties and agreements signed before his appointment were not

26 Ion Antonescu, To the Romanians… Calls-speeches-documents. At the crossroad of history, București, SOCEC & Co, S.A.R., 1941, p. 37. 27 Ibidem. 28 Universul, year 57, No. 251, 11 September 1940, p. 1, also see: Ion Antonescu, The foundation of the national – legionnaire state. 6 September 1940 – 6 October 1940, București, Monitorul Oficial și Imprimeriile Statului Imprimeria Centrală, 1940. 29 Universul, year 57, No. 246, 9 September 1940, p. 11. 30 Universul, year 57, No. 247, 8 September 1940, p. 3. 31 Ioan Scurtu, Constantin Hlihor, Plot against Romania. 1939 – 1947. Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and Hertza in the whirlpool of the Second World, București, Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, 1994, pp. 36 – 38.

108

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 considered available32. Therefore, putting an end to the lack of sincerity in foreign politics33, according to Alexandru Constant34. Considered a free country that had its external politics founded on consolidating and developing its connections with the Axis Powers, fact suggested by Antonescu’s statement during the Council of Ministers on 21 September 1940, `Facing the Axis, I told you: we are going 100% together, till death, with the Axis. Either we triumph with the Axis; either we fall with the Axis`35. Taking into consideration this decision together with guaranties offered by Hitler and Mussolini after signing the Vienna Award, we can affirm that this was the first measure taken by the new government from Bucharest to recover its lost provinces from the summer of 1940. This together with the impact produced by the rapture of the Romanian territories on the national military system, more precisely on its capacity to defend its self in case of an attack36, determined Antonescu to transmit on 17 September, after a brief consultation with general Kurt von Tippelskirch37, to the German authorities from Berlin a request regarding the possibility of sending a German military mission in Romania38. This

32 Curentul, year XIII, No. 4542, 3 October 1940, p. 10. 33 Curentul, year XIII, No. 4538, 29 September 1940, p. 8. 34 Alexandru Constant – sub secretary of state at The National Ministry of Propaganda (Curentul, year XIII, no. 4538, 29 September 1940, p. 8). 35 Gh. Buzatu, Marshal Antonescu facing history, vol. I, Iasi, 1990, p. 121. 36 Al. Duțu, M. Retegan (ed.), The liberation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina (22 June – 26 July 1941), București, Fundației Culturale Române, 1999, p. 52. 37 Gen. Kurt von Tippelskirch –the 4th Headquarters chef of the General State of the German dry Army arrived on 15 September 1940 in București (Aurică Simion, The political regime in Romania during September 1940 – January 1941, Cluj-Napoca, Dacia, 1976, p. 122). 38 Dan Vătăman, op. cit., p. 143.

109

Elena Cazacu RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

appeal also contained an extensive project regarding reorganising the national army and getting funds to equip its soldieries, materialised after extensive discussions carried out with the German officials from Bucharest which pointed out that raising the level of instruction of the Romanian soldiers and a general reform weren’t enough39. A positive response concerning the Romanian request came on 20 September 194040. The order stated that the real mission of these troops, which didn’t have to be obvious neither for the Romanian troops, neither for the German ones, was: defending oil fields in case of an attack or its destruction; making the necessary plans, according to Germany’s interests, for the Romanian army and, not the less, preparing German and Romanian troops in case of a war with Soviet Russia41. Realising the diplomatic implications of sending a military mission in Romania on German’s foreign policy, especially with the Balkan countries, on 10 October 1940, the German commanders were informed that they should avoid giving the appearance of military occupation of Romania, and give more the impression that it was `a transfer of German units in the country`42. After this moment, the first German military units occupied their posts on Romanian soil on 10 October 194043. A protocol was signed on 22 October

39 Ion Antonescu, The foundation of the national – legionnaire state. 6 September 1940 – 6 October 1940, București, Monitorul Oficial și Imprimeriile Statului, Imprimeria Centrală, 1940, pp. 35 – 83. 40 Gh. Bădescu, Al. Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, Constantin Bușe (ed.), International relationships in acts and documents (1939 – 1945), Vol. II, București, Didactică și Pedagogică, 1976, pp. 65 – 66. 41 Ibidem, p. 66. 42 Ibidem. 43 Aurică Simion, The political regime in Romania during September 1940 – January 1941, Cluj–Napoca, Dacia, 1976, p. 127.

110

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 regarding the rules for the German troops that were supposed to station and function on the Romanian territory, originally not foreseen in the first orders given by Hitler44. Aligning Romania’s policy towards the Axis Powers, the entry of German troops on Romanian ground, together with the signed protocol between the two countries was confirmed officially by the signing, on 23 November 1940, of the protocol of admitting Romania in the Tripartite Pact, also known as the Berlin Pact45. On 4 December, a Romanian – German collaboration for reconstructing the Romanian economy was signed46. Considering these actions taken by Antonescu immediately after being appointed, we can affirm that entering the Tripartite Pact represented a prime effort in getting back the lost provinces. Fact sustained by Antonescu himself in a letter addressed to Iuliu Maniu on 22 June 1941 in which he showed: `Our accession to the Tripartite Pact wasn’t made for warranting our actual boarders, because these were truly guaranteed through the note exchange intervened with the Vienna arbitration. It was made […] precisely to offer us the possibility of putting in discussion in due time our rightful claims; the present regime doesn’t recognise the current crippled borders and understands to present, as it did until now, the legitimacy of the Romanian claims, which contain reuniting its torn boarders`47. This action marks the debut of military, political and diplomatic arrangements made for

44 Dan Vătăman, op.cit., pp. 147 -154. 45 Gheorghe Tătărăscu, Confessions for history, București, Enciclopedică, 1996, p. 418. 46 Ion Antonescu, The infernos epistolary, notes by Mihai Pelin, București, Viitorul Românesc, 1993, pp. 63 – 64. 47 Ion Calafeteanu (ed.), Iuliu Maniu, Ion Antonescu. Opinions and political confrontations.1940 – 1941, Cluj-Napoca, Dacia, 1994, pp. 66 – 67.

111

Elena Cazacu RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

recovering through war, the only plausible way against the Soviets, the lost territories. Simultaneously with these events, general Antonescu tried to obtain from the new border lines and the lost territories information necessary in evaluating correctly the consequences made by the evacuation in 1940. Standing as evidence in this case are numerous memoires forwarded to the Prime Minister’s Office by different persons regarding the refugee’s situation48 together with various acts and statistics send by institutions, containing information’s regarding employees engaged in evacuating these territories49. After analysing petitions sent to the Prime Minister’s Office, we can affirm that the first months of Ion Antonescu’s governing lacked of real measure for improving the living conditions of refugees from Bessarabia and northern Bucovina fact sustained by `Memoire about the agricultural owner’s refugees from Bessarabia, northern Bucovina and Dorohoi`50. This document is opened by criticisms made by agricultural owners to the government which in the sixth months after losing the north-eastern provinces suffered `all the shortcomings and all the sufferance`, without seeing any measures taken by the authorities to integrate economically, politically and socially the evacuated persons51. The list of compunctions reveals that discrimination was made by the regime concerning the way the evacuation and relocation of people from the ceded territories in June –

48 A.N.I.C., fund Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri, file138 / 1941, ff. 166 -175. 49 Idem, fund Inspectoratul General al Jandarmeriei, file 10/1940, ff. 30 – 40. 50 Idem, fund Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri, file 138 / 1941, ff. 166 -175. 51 Ibidem, f. 166.

112

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

September 1940. Despite the people’s disappointment towards the attitude showed the administration, the memoir presents some suggestions and recommendations relevant in helping individuals to integrate in the society becoming a productive element52. A rather interesting aspect found in this document is the awareness of these simple people, marched at their turn by a terrible drama, of the impact products by these territorial losses on the internal life of Romania53. Nevertheless, why didn’t Antonescu’s regime managed to take actions in helping the refugees from the Bessarabia and Bucovina territories? The answer can be found in the relationship between the general and the Iron Guard which from the first days in office started not only a collaboration, but also a fight in seizing the power. Thus, the instalment of the new regime meant on the one hand the care of Antonescu to re-establish order and discipline in the country and on the other hand how the Legionnaires considered their position as a way of getting revenge for all the sufferings caused by different political personalities against them54. This `competition` became evident to the public eye starting with 11 September when during a `Call for order` the general mentions the commotion produced by some anarchic movements, as well as the warning that `General Antonescu does not threaten anyone, and does not hesitate`55. Despite Antonescu’s requests, the Legionnaires misconduct continued, culminating in the night of 26 to 27 November 1940 with the

52 Ibidem, ff. 170 – 173. 53 Ibidem, f. 174. 54 Dan Vătăman, op.cit., pp. 158 – 159. 55 Ion Antonescu, To the Romanians… Calls-speeches-documents. At the crossroad of history, București, SOCEC & Co, S.A.R., 1941, p. 33.

113

Elena Cazacu RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

shooting, in Jilava Penitentiary and in the police post from the capital, of over 70 former officials and functionaries56. The series of political assassinations continued with that of Nicolae Iorga and Virgil Madgearu57. In spite of Antonescu’s declarations during the meetings of the Prime Minister’s Office on 2758 and 28 November59, his threats remained only at a theoretical state, the fight between the two being postponed until the perfect moment both internally and externally60. Because of this decision, the general tried to obtain during the next month support from Hitler – externally, and from people – internally to impose a new order and discipline in the nation61.

The beginning of the military dictatorship (January – June 1941)

The conflict between the general and Legionnaires reached new heights starting with January 1941 when the main goal of everyone was obtaining Hitler’s support and eliminating their competition. In this context, the efforts made by Horia Sima and Ion Antonescu concluded with an opened invitation from the German Fuhrer on 12 January, but only one – the general decided to accept it62. The effect of this meeting, on 14

56 Dan Vătăman, op.cit., p. 162. 57 ***, On the brink of disaster. 21 – 23 January 1941, Vol. I, București, Scripta, 1992, pp. 186 -188. 58 Gh. Buzatu, Marshal Antonescu facing history, Vol. I, Iași, 1990, pp. 163 -165. 59 Ibidem, pp. 166 -168. 60 Dan Vătăman, op.cit., p. 163. 61 A. Simion, The political regime in Romania during September 1940 – January 1941, Cluj-Napoca, Dacia, 1976, p. 236. 62 Dan Vătăman, op.cit., p. 166.

114

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

January63, was felt upon the internal situation right after his return, on 15 January64, when in an open letter to Sima, Antonescu denounces and criticises the abuses, robberies and crimes committed by the Iron Guard65. The way he decides to conclude the letter, `Do you want to go ahead, go alone, but not with general Antonescu […] He entered the political arena to save the nation, not to lead it to an even greater disaster`66 shows us the final decision made by Antonescu after obtaining Hitler’s permission. Without reactions from the Iron Guard and its leader, Horia Sima, towards Antonescu’s letters and declarations, in conjunction with actions taken against them culminated on 21 January with a legionnaire rebellion in the entire state67. Antonescu decided to offer 24 hours as a term for re- establishing the order in the nation, affirming that `I was not yesterday and do not want to be until tomorrow an instrument of tyranny, nor a bridge for anarchy`68. The acts of violence committed during these days made victims even among the civil population, according to figures published in the newspapers more than 236 citizens from the capital lost their life’s, and another 254 were injured69. As a result, after gaining military support, on 22

63 Gh. Buzatu, Marshal Antonescu facing history, Vol. I, Iași, 1990, pp. 174 – 176. 64 Ibidem, pp. 177 – 180. 65 Ibidem, pp. 181 – 184. 66 Ibidem, p. 184. 67 Mihai Fătu, Ion Spălățelu, The Iron Guar – a fascist terrorist organisation, București, Politică, 1971, p. 349. 68 Ion Antonescu, To the Romanians… Calls-speeches-documents. At the crossroad of history, București, SOCEC & Co, S.A.R., 1941, p. 125. 69 Universul, year 58, no. 43, 12 February 1941, p. 1.

115

Elena Cazacu RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

January, from the German troops dislocated in the capital70 on the night of 22 to 23 January began the military intervention against the legionnaires71. In front of these new circumstances, Horia Sima was constrained to order, in the morning of 23 January 1941, the members of his organisation to cease fire and evacuate the public institutions taken under siege. Published in the pages of the newspaper `Curentul`, the order presents the verdict to stop fights as a consequence of treaty talks started among the state and the Iron Guard72. 813 dead and wounded among the army, rebels and civilians was the total of victims fallen in the country during the legionnaire rebellion that took place on 21 – 23 January73. The organised rebellion of the legionnaire concluded with their removal from governance and the banning of their organisation. A vast majority of persons that held, during their administration, key functions choose to get shelter at different German functionaries which permitted them later to `pass` in Germany where they could ask for political asylum74. As a consequence of this rebellion, on 27 January 1941 a new military govern was formed by general Antonescu. His decision to co-opt military individuals was argued by the lack of civic courage among men that preferred to limit themselves at protests and critics towards the

70 Gh. Buzatu, Marshal Antonescu facing history, vol. I, Iași, 1990, pp. 191 -192. 71 A. Simion, The political regime in Romania during September 1940 – January 1941, Cluj-Napoca, Dacia, 1976, p. 267. 72 Curentul, year XIV, no. 99, 23 January 1941, p. 1. 73 Ion Calafeteanu, “The Legionnaire rebellion seen by Antonescu’s cabinet”, Historia, http://www.historia.ro/exclusiv_web/actualitate/articol/rebeliunea-legionar-v-zut- cabinetul-lui-antonescu, (accessed on 13 July 2016). 74 A. Simion, The political regime in Romania during September 1940 – January 1941, Cluj-Napoca, Dacia, 1976, pp. 271 – 272.

116

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 authorities than taking part in the decisive institutions of the nation75. The series of measures taken during this period by Antonescu to re-establish the law and order in the state conclude, on 14 February, with the promulgation of decree no. 314 through which `the national – legionnaire state` was abolished, withal any political actions, indifferent of its nature, until new regulations appeared were forbidden76. Despite the modifications made immediately after the rebellion, Ion Antonescu decided to hold, in March, a plebiscite to get the opinion of the nation regarding the way in which his regime managed the state affaires after 6 September 1940. This referendum was not only an enquiry, but it also tried to see if the promoted policy and the general’s action were confused by the Romanian people with the legionary movement77. Therefore, when the question `Do you give General Antonescu your complete confidence to rule the State further to lift the Nation and defend your rights? `, addressed on 2 March78, 2.960.298 people gave their vote to the general’s regime out of 2.963.294 voters79. We can affirm that the vote casted by the Romanian people came both as a public confirmation of Antonescu’s policy and a debut of a new regime, this time only a personal dictatorship.

75 Nicolae Ciachir, The Great Powers and Romania (1856 – 1947), București, Albatros, 1996, p. 168. 76 Monitorul Oficial, No. 39, 15 February 1941, p. 758. 77 M. Ciucă, A. Teodorescu, B. Popovici (ed.), Transcripts of the Council of Ministries’ meetings. Ion Antonescu’s governing, vol. I (September– December 1940), București, 1997 – 1998, p. 438. 78 Curentul, year XIV, No. 4689, 5 March 1941, p. 1. 79 Monitorul Oficial, No. 60, 12 March 1941, p. 1238.

117

Elena Cazacu RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

The return of law and order in the country after the legionary rebellion permitted the new government to focus its attention in taking the measurements necessary to regain the lost provinces during the summer rapt in 1940. An important aspect to mention is that regardless of the evolution of events on the internal political arena, the authorities were constantly in the loop with the situation from Bessarabia and northern Bucovina, fact confirmed by the notes and informative bulletins forwarded by different institutions (Direcția Generală de Politie, Inspectoratul General al Jandarmeriei)80 to the Prime Minister’s Office. If internally, the months that passed after obtaining the vote of confidence from the Romanians can be characterised by order and peace, according to the countless appeals launched by Antonescu, on the international arena, especially the Balkan peninsula, things weren’t as good. We remind Bulgaria’s adherence on 1 March 1941 to the Berlin Pact which led to the German troops passing through the Bulgarian territories to reach the Greek frontiers81. Germany’s plans concerning the campaign from south – eastern Europe suffered modifications on 27 March when the Yugoslavian government was overturned as a consequence of deciding to sign the Accession for the Tripartite Pact (25 March 1941)82. The naming of a new regime meant not only a new leader, but also changes in the foreign politics lend until now, in this case the sympathies general Simovici had for the Soviets triumphed on 5 April 1941 with the signing of a nonaggression

80 For more information’s we recommend seen A.N.I.C., funds: Direcției Generale a Poliției, Inspectoratul General al Jandarmeriei, Inspectoratul Regional al Jandarmeriei. 81 Platon Chirnoagă, Political and military history of Romania’s war against Soviet Russia. 22June 1941 – 23 August 1944, 3rd edition, Iași, FIDES, 1997, p. 77. 82 Platon Chirnoagă, op. cit., p. 77.

118

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 and friendship pact with the U.S.S.R.83, culminating the following day, 6 April, with a launched attack from Germany, Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria against Yugoslavia. This offence concludes on 17 April with the defeat of the Yugoslavian army and the division of its lands between the winners84. Ten days later, the same soldiers manage to occupy Athena (27 April), and on 29 Peloponnese85. Although Germany decided to intervene in the Balkan peninsula, Romania did not participate in these military operations against Greece and Yugoslavia, even in this context the simple fact of permitting the passing of German troops on its soil was seen by the western countries as a proof of joining the German politics86, confirmed by the English government on 15 February 1941 when diplomatic relationships between the two countries are broken, and the United States Legation become an intermediary state in representing the English interests in our country87. A few months later, on 6 May 1941 the American Legation from Bucharest become intermediary, this time, between Romania and Yugoslavia, because of Antonescu’s decision to recognise the independence of Croatia88. The striking rapid victories obtained by Hitler in Europe, except England, represented the foundation of his decision to apply the plan regarding a possible invasion of Russia. The hypothesis of a war between

83 Ibidem. 84 Dan Vătăman, op. cit., p. 187. 85 Platon Chirnoagă, op. cit., p. 77. 86 Dan Vătăman, op. cit., p. 187. 87 Ibidem. 88 For details regarding the relationship between Romania and Yugoslavia see Sorin Oane, “How the friendship between Romania and Yugoslavia broke”, Historia, http://www.historia.ro/exclusiv_web/general/articol/cum-s-stricat-prietenia-rom-nia- iugoslavia, (accessed on 19 July 2016).

119

Elena Cazacu RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

the two countries took shape starting with July 1940 when the articles stipulated in the Ribbentrop – Molotov Pact were exhausted, grounds on which Hitler order the elaboration of a war plan against the soviets89. The failure of the German – Russian negotiations in November concerning a possible adherence to the Berlin Pact determined the Fuhrer to sign on 18 December 1940, Direction No. 21, mainly know today as the Barbarossa Plan90. This direction became permanent on 31 January 1941 when the day for beginning the operation (Z day) was established on 27 March 1941, however the events from south – eastern Europe led to postponing it to 22 June 194191. The increased attention given by Hitler to the Barbarossa Plan after the Balkan campaign was felt by Romania in the month of May when the 11th German Army headquarters were transferred on Romanian soil92. Aware of the significates brought by such a move, Antonescu, through his German contacts, asked that the official date (Z day) for beginning operations to be communicated with at least 2 weeks in advance to correctly mobilise his army93. As a result, to his request official details regarding the Barbarossa Plan were brought to the general’s attention on 12 June 1941 during his official visit in München94. Taking advantage of this meeting, Antonescu transmitted, after long debates and negotiations, the decision to

89 Adrian Pandea, “Loyalty towards Hitler or anti-Communist crusade? The Reich’s allies on the Eastern”, Dosarele Istoriei, year IV, No. 7/1999, p. 6. 90 Ibidem, p. 7. 91 Jaques de Launay, The great decisions of the Second World War, Vol. I, București, Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1988, pp. 270 – 271. 92 Adrian Pandea, op.cit., p. 8. 93 Ibidem. 94 Timpul, year V, No. 1471, 14 June 1941, p. 1.

120

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 fight alongside Germany and start a war against the Soviet Union95, therefore representing the most important action taken by Antonescu’s regime to regain the lost territories from the summer of 1940.

Conclusions

King Carol II’s abdication in favour of his son, Mihai and the appointment of general Ion Antonescu as president of the Council of Ministers with full power on 6 September had as main consequence the fact that the legionnaires come to power. Understanding the impact produced by the territorial raptures from the summer of 1940 on the Romanian people, Antonescu establishes as main objective both the internal and foreign policy recovering the Romanian provinces. In this regard, the accession of Romania to the Berlin Pact, the administrative reform, the extensive program for reorganising and the modernization of the Romanian army, the decision to fight alongside Germany against the Russians represented only a few measures taken by Antonescu’s regime during September 1940 – June 1941 for returning Romania’s borders known after World War I. Taking these aspects into consideration, together with the evolution of events in the international arena, we can affirm that the Antonescu’s regime during the first months was centred on regaining the lost Romanian territories for which entire generations of Romanians fought.

95 Ioan Scurtu, Gh. Buzatu, Romanian history in the XX Century (1918 – 1945), București, Paidea, 1999, p. 402.

121

Elena Cazacu RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Bibliography: Archives: Romanian Central National Archives historical funds: Direcția Generală a Poliției, Inspectoratul General al Jandarmeriei, fund Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri.

Newspapers: Curentul, 1940, 1941. Monitorul Oficial, 1940, 1941. Timpul, 1939, 1941. Universul, 1940, 1941.

Books and articles: Antonescu, Ion, The infernos epistolary, notes by Mihai Pelin, București, Viitorul Românesc, 1993. Antonescu, Ion, The foundation of the national – legionnaire state. 6 September 1940 – 6 October 1940, București, Monitorul Oficial și Imprimeriile Statului Imprimeria Centrală, 1940. Antonescu, Ion, To the Romanians… Calls-speeches-documents. At the crossroad of history, București, SOCEC & Co, S.A.R., 1941. Bădescu, Gh., Al. Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, Constantin Bușe (ed.), International relationships in acts and documents (1939 – 1945), vol. II, București, Didactică și Pedagogică, 1976. Buzatu, Gh., Marshal Antonescu facing history, Vol. I, Iasi, 1990. Buzatu, Gh., Scurtu, Ioan, Romanian history in the XX Century (1918 – 1945), București, Paidea, 1999. Calafeteanu, Ion (ed.), Iuliu Maniu, Ion Antonescu. Opinions and political confrontations.1940 – 1941, Cluj-Napoca, Dacia, 1994. Calafeteanu, Ion, “The Legionnaire rebellion seen by Antonescu’s cabinet”, Historia, http://www.historia.ro/exclusiv_web/actualitate/articol/rebeliunea- legionar-v-zut-cabinetul-lui-antonescu (accessed on 13 July 2016). Căruntu, Mihai – Aurelian, Bukovina in the Second World War, Iasi, Junimea, 2004. Chirnoagă, Platon, Political and military history of Romania’s war against Soviet Russia. 22June 1941 – 23 August 1944, 3rd edition, Iași, FIDES, 1997.

122

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Ciachir, Nicolae, The Great Powers and Romania (1856 – 1947), București, Albatros, 1996. Ciucă, M., Popovici, B., Teodorescu, A. (ed.), Transcripts of the Council of Ministries’ meetings. Ion Antonescu’s governing, Vol. I (September– December 1940), București, 1997 – 1998. Constantiniu, Florin, Crossing the Dniester (1941). A controversial decision, București, Albatros, 1995. ***, Diplomația cotropitorilor. Repercusiunile ei asupra Basarabiei și Bucovinei de Nord, Chisinau, Universitas, 1992. Duțu, Al., Retegan, M., (ed.), The liberation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina (22 June – 26 July 1941), București, Fundației Cultura Române, 1999. Gheorghe, Ion, A unhappy dictator. Marshal Antonescu (Romania’s road towards a satellite State), edition and introductive study by Stelian Neagoe, București, Machiavelli, 1996. Kirițescu, Constantin, Romania during the Second World War, Vol. I, București, Universe Enciclopedic, 1996. Fătu, Mihai, Contributions to studying the political regime in Romania (September 1940 – August 1944), București, Politică, 1984. Hillgruber, Andreas, Hitler, King Carol and Marshal Antonescu: the German – Romanian relationships (1938 – 1944), București, Humanitas, 2007. Hlihor, Constantin, Scurtu, Ioan, Plot against Romania. 1939 – 1947. Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and Hertza in the whirlpool of the Second World, București, Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, 1994. Jaques de Launay, The great decisions of the Second World War, Vol. I, București, Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1988. Pandea, Adrian, “Loyalty towards Hitler or anti-Communist crusade? The Reich’s allies on the Eastern”, Dosarele Istoriei, year IV, No. 7/1999. ***, On the brink of disaster. 21 – 23 January 1941, Vol. I, București, Scripta, 1992. Scurtu, Ioan, (ed.), A collections of documents and materials regarding Romania’s history (February 1938 – September 1940), București, Universității, 1974. Simion, Aurică, The political regime in Romania during September 1940 – January 1941, Cluj-Napoca, Dacia, 1976.

123

Elena Cazacu RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Oane, Sorin, “How the friendship between Romania and Yugoslavia broke”, Historia, http://www.historia.ro/exclusiv_web/general/articol/cum-s-stricat- prietenia-rom-nia-iugoslavia (accessed on 19 July 2016). Tătărăscu, Gheorghe, Confessions for history, București, Enciclopedică, 1996. Vătăman, Dan, Romania and international studies (1939 – 1947), Vol. I, București, Pro Universitar, 2009.

124

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

The Heroism of Romanian Soldiers from Comarnic, Prahova, during the First World War

Maria Cristina Ilincuța* Angela Năsulea*

Abstract: The purpose of this article is to initiate a discussion on Romania’s situation during the First World War. Beyond the military operations, which often ended in failure, as they were wrongly conceived and designed by the Great Military Headquarters, one can see the heroism of the Romanians. We intend to integrate the local history along the Prahova valley with the reality of the Great war at national and international level. The local heroism is illustrated by the examples offered by the sacrifice of the soldiers of Comarnic (a town situated along the Prahova valley), who fought in the most important battles of the war. At the same time, we intend to show the impact of the German military occupation upon the civilian population by giving examples of the destruction recorded in the towns along the Prahova valley. The evocation of the local history leads to cultivating national feeling, almost one century since the fulfilment of the unitary Romanian state.

Key words: Romania, Romanian Army, Prahova Valley, Comarnic.

The beginning of the First World War found Romania in a delicate situation. Since 1883, King Carol I had already secretly signed an alliance with Germany and Austro-Hungary. This alliance was the cause of many disputes between politicians because of Austro-Hungary holding the Romanian territories of Transylvania and Bucovina. After two years of

* MA – International Relations and Euro-Atlantic Integration, BA - Contemporary History at the University of Bucharest, Member of The Society of Historical Sciences in Romania. E-mail: [email protected]. * MA - Educational Management and European Integration, BA - English and French Language and Literature at “Al. I. Cuza” University, Iasi. E-mail: [email protected].

125

Maria Cristina Ilincuța RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 Angela Năsulea neutrality, Romania joined the war alongside the Entente Cordiale under the slogan: “Now or never!”. The military situation of Romania in 1916 was unfavourable. The Romanian army that had been mobilized had over 800 000 soldiers and officers, who had to defend a front about 1,500 km long. This front was positioned in the North and North-West against Austro-Hungary and in the South against Bulgaria. Romania also depended on the offensive of the allies on the Salonic front, which was not going to take place, but also on a difficult cooperation with the Russian troops. The laurels of victory and the heroism of Romanians masked the poor outfitting of the Romanian army and the logistic mistakes of the Grand General Quarters who dealt with the battle plan. Romania joined the war on August 15th 1916 with an attack against Austro-Hungary, who was in charge of a part of the Romanian territory. A dramatic episode from the history of the Romanians took place at that moment when those in the Old Kingdom fought against their brethren in Ardeal. With particular tenacity, the Romanians obtained several victories, managing to penetrate the NW front. The joy was short-lived as the Romanians had to fight simultaneously on two fronts (N/NW and S). The offensive of the Romanian troops in Transylvania was interrupted by moving some units on the Danube front, fact which created a very dangerous breech in that area. At the beginning of September 1916, the Romanian army was defeated at Turtucaia in the South of the country by the Bulgarian army. For

126

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 the historian Constantin Kirițescu, Turtucaia “made a mockery of us in front of the enemies and discredited us in front of friends (…) and it deeply influenced the evolution of the war. It is the initial cause of the disasters that followed”.1 Although the defeat at Turtucaia was a painful one in the tactical plan, it did not have strategic importance. Unfortunately, the impact at the level of the public opinion was so great and the morale of the population and that of the army dropped so low, that at the level of the superior command of the army a great crisis took place with consequences far greater than the Turtucaia defeat. Another important military operation was the “battle of the passes” over the Carpathian Mountains. The Romanian army had fought heroically along the Jiu valley, the Olt valley, the Prahova valley, the Teleajen valley, the Bratocea pass, with the purpose to reject the German counter-offensive. One of the most important strategic areas was the Prahova valley. The road along the Prahova valley connected Transylvania and the capital of the country. Also, here was the “petrol belt” of the country which spread from Târgoviște to Ploiești, very sought after by the Germans. The Prahova area was a region very much affected by the war, but which also gave many hero soldiers. From the beginning of October 1916, important battles were fought in this area. Such a battle took place in Brasov, in the area of the Bartolomeu church and of the railway station. The counter-offensive of the 9th German army continued towards the town of Predeal. An important

1C. Kirițescu., Istoria războiului pentru întregirea României, 1916 – 1918, Bucharest, Editura Științifică si Enciclopedică, 1989, Vol. 1, p 168.

127

Maria Cristina Ilincuța RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 Angela Năsulea

Romanian resistance force was defeated at the Predeal railway station. Many soldiers of the 61st Regiment from the area Ilfov – Dâmbovița fought in this area with numerous losses of human lives. Being an important strategic point, a Romanian resistance operation was organized here. This is what a German eye-witness declared: “It was extraordinary to see those ranks, tightly united, rushing forward carelessly, despising death in spite of our artillery and infantry’s terrible counter-effects… The direct hits of our mortars would tear the ranks, but they formed back. And, still, our artillery was so heavy and its effect was so terrible in this attack”2 In order to open the way along the Prahova valley, the Germans attacked the village of Azuga, which immediately surrendered. The Romanian troops retreated towards Busteni, Sinaia, Comarnic, Câmpina. In these areas, the civil population had to face the regime of the German occupation. “The regime of the German occupiers was based on the requisitions of: food products, cloth, tissues, clothes, leather, alcohol; a card-based system was introduced for the population for bread, meat, flour, soap. Nothing could be sold without the approval of the Germans while the famine generated an exaggerated rise in prices.3 The regime of the military occupation along the towns on the Prahova valley demanded that the administrator of the Peleș district in the person of Mr. Ion Sarateanu, who supervised the territory from Azuga to Breaza, had to be replaced. Official documents began to be issued in

2 Glenn E. Torrey, România în primul război mondial, Bucharest, Meteor Publishing House, 2016, p. 117. 3A.N.D.J.PH. Fond prefectura Prahova, dosar nr. 9, f.119.

128

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

German and Romanian. Administrative changes also took place in the town of Comarnic. Thus, the Mayor Nae Stoicescu, who was ill, was replaced by the Germans with the headmaster of School no. 1, Mr. Vasile Dumitrescu. The town hall archives were handed in to the German authorities. The notary of the town of Comarnic was replaced by a seller, Radu Nicolescu, who had no specialized training. The authorities drew up lists with all the merchants in town for the aim of requisitioning.4 While the local administration was taken over by the Germans, the army retreated towards Ploiesti. This is how this retreat was described by a British officer: “I went with general Văitoianu to Câmpina when his troops retreated from the pass of Predeal and I saw these troops after a march of 45 km with no food or rest; although the March discipline was non-existent, the troops continued the march all night long towards Ploiești. The March discipline is very feeble amongst the Romanians.”5 It appears that by the end of November and the beginning of December 1916, the Prahova valley and the capital of the country, Bucharest, were occupied by the German troops. Ploiești was the centre of the Romanian oil industry. The British government sent over a team of engineers with the purpose of setting fire to the petrol tanks and destroying the oil wells, in spite of the protests of the Romanian government. The chief of this mission was lieutenant-colonel John Norton – Griffiths who used the tactics of

4 A.N.D.J.PH. Fond Primăria Comarnic, dosar nr 15, f.49. 5 Ana Sterian, „Necazurile primarului Mârzescu”, in Historia Special - România în refugiu 1916-1918, Year VI, No.18, March 2017, p. 28.

129

Maria Cristina Ilincuța RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 Angela Năsulea

“burnt ground”. This action provoked a strong reaction even from the French mission, who intervened through General Henri M. Berthelot to stop the destructions. After the fire, the city of Ploiesti was enveloped by a cloud of thick smoke. A German soldier wrote: “All the rivers, especially Prahova, were covered with thick multi-coloured layers of petrol and at sunrise the entire sky was black because of the smoke and the darkness”.6 In another report about the city, it was described “like a scene from the Old Testament, when at day it was dark because of the clouds of smoke and at night there was light because of the giant flames of the grease which kept burning for a whole week.”7 Even the representatives of the French mission in Romania were strongly impressed by this image of the city “which in three days turned from the capital of the black gold into the capital of black smoke”.8 After Bucharest surrendered, on December 7th 1916, the exodus of the civilian population began, as well as that of the army and politicians, towards Moldova. Ploiești became overcrowded because it was the railway exchange towards Moldova. The railway station was more than overcrowded by trains coming from Bucharest but also by civilians who retreated together with the army coming from Sinaia - Comarnic - Câmpina.

6 St. Popescu-Filuță, “Insemnări de război”, in Magazin Istoric, Year L, New Series, No.4 (601), April 2017, p. 82. 7 Ibidem, p. 82 8 Alexandru Averescu, Notițe zilnice de război, Bucharest, Editura Militară, 1992, Vol 2, p. 130.

130

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

The Prahova Valley also stood out via the heroism of the soldiers recruited along the fighting front. The soldiers from Comarnic had an important contribution in those battles. An analysis initiated by the Association “The Cult of the Heroes” led to the identification of local heroes participating in the war. Thus, most of the soldiers from Comarnic joined and participated in the battles within the 7th Infantry Regiment and the 47th Prahova Infantry Regiment. In 1916, the 7th Prahova Infantry Regiment was part of the 9th Brigade, respectively 5th Division, part of the 2nd Romanian Army, led by General Aristide Razu. The 5th Division fought in the battles in Covasna, Buzău, Râmnicu Sărat and Focșani. Between the 16th – 23rd of November 1916, the Comarnic soldiers fought in the battle for Ploiești. After the German occupation, the soldiers of the 5th Division retreated through Ploiești – Buzău to Moldova, setting up a rehabilitation centre at Dornești. The Comarnic soldiers within the 47th regiment were part of the 25th Brigade, respectively the 13th Division. All these were subordinated to the 1st Romanian Army. This division fought in the battles on the Olt Valley. Following the German offensive, the 13th Division retreated through Pitești – Târgoviște – Ploiești – Buzău, so that the army could recover at Hârlău. Romania’s defeat in 1916 meant hundreds of thousands of casualties, as well as the loss of two thirds of the national territory. At that moment, “Romania” only meant Moldova. It was a delicate period in the existence of the Romanian state, when the country was in danger of being completely conquered.

131

Maria Cristina Ilincuța RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 Angela Năsulea

The refuge to Moldova in the winter of 1916 - 1917 meant the restoration of the Romanian army. Nothing was easy. The city of Iași became overstuffed, the 70 000 inhabitants mixed with the large mass of new-comers, amounting to over 400 000 people. The image of Iași was a bleak one because of the crowd, misery, cold and hunger. Another winter difficulty was that of exanthemata typhus. The precarious hygiene, the lack of wood and food intensely contributed to the spreading of this epidemic. The landscape in Iași was sinister: “The carts weren’t enough to take the dead to the cemeteries… Typhus was our real enemy”.9 The morale of the Romanian army was low and General Alexandru Averescu described it as it follows: “Many officers wandered across the city, looking for the units to which they belonged. It was hard to imagine a greater disorder. Many soldiers, still wearing the summer uniforms, walked as far as 300 km, in the cold winter, facing the blizzard. It was particularly difficult for the recruits who were not organized, very weak, poorly dressed and shoed.”10 The winter and the spring of 1917 brought the re-organizing of the Romanian army, which received weapons and began instruction with the help of the French mission led by General Henri Mathias Berthelot. The Russian Bolshevik revolution had confused Romanian plans because of the numerous desertions of Russian soldiers. Nothing was going to stop the

9 Dorin Stănescu, “Iașiul anilor 1916-1918, deznădejde și speranță”, in Historia Special - România în refugiu 1916-1918, Year VI, No.18, March 2017, p. 17. 10 Al. Averescu, op. cit., p. 138.

132

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Romanians from their desire of freeing the territory and forming the unitary state. On the 23rd of July 1917, the Romanians began a new episode of their heroism. It was the moment the Mărăști battle began, which lasted until the end of the month. This victory proved that the Romanian soldiers, if properly instructed and equipped could fight as well as their enemies. On August 6th, the attack in the Mărășești battle began. Fighting heroically under the slogan “You can’t go this way either”, launched by the commandant of the First Army, General Eremia Grigorescu, the soldiers of the 13th division rejected the German attack, paying the price with important human losses. The commandant of this division from Prahova county, general Ioan Popescu, was victorious in the Muncel area, at Peak 100, at Doaga, in the “La Răzoare” forest. The wounded commandant of the 47th regiment, lieutenant-colonel Radu Rosetti, was replaced by Captain Drăgănescu. He managed to re- establish defences in the Panciu area. The last day of the battle at Mărășești, (22 August / 4 September 1917) in the Muncel area marked the death, in the line of duty, of the first lady-officer, infantry ensign Ecaterina Teodoroiu. Regiment 7 Prahova of the 5th division stood out in the Mărășești battles in the legendary “battle in shirts” when Comarnic soldiers, led by major Malamuceanu, also secured an important victory. The flags of the Prahova military units were decorated with the “Mihai Viteazul” order.11

11 Eugen Stănescu, Cavaleri ai Ordinului « Mihai Viteazul », Ploiești, Editura Universal Cartfil, 1996, p. 17.

133

Maria Cristina Ilincuța RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 Angela Năsulea

If the battle at Mărăști was “the first real victory of the Romanian army”,12 the battle at Mărășești was the most important, being named by the soldiers “our little Verdun”.13 Together with the battle at Oituz, all these confrontations have written in Romanian blood the heroic deeds of the Romanian soldiers. The bravery of the soldiers from Prahova is enlightening. Some 110 soldiers, out of all the Prahova troops, were identified as being from Comarnic, having actually taken part in this war. Most of them fought in the 7th Infantry Regiment and in the 47th Prahova Infantry Regiment. According to our research, we noticed that there were a large number of those who died in hospitals from exanthemata typhus or other epidemics or were hurt on the battlefield. To this, we must also add a not-so-precise list of those taken prisoner or those who disappeared in action. The Romanian soldiers captured by the German army in the battles at Turtucaia on the Argeș River and on other battlefields have been detained in at least 172 camps in Germany. This was the conclusion of the investigation of the Romanian Red Cross in 1919 when the letters sent to the country by Romanian prisoners were studied. Thus, out of the 43,000 Romanian military taken prisoners by forces of the Triple Alliance, about 20 – 25,000 soldiers were transported as war prisoners in the area Pomerania – Gdansk. Here, from the very beginning of the war, the Germans set up 4 concentration camps in Gdansk – Troyl (Przerobce),

12 Al. Averescu, op. cit., p. 139. 13 Glenn E. Torrey, op.cit. p. 179.

134

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Brodnica, Tuchel (Tuchola) and Czerk to provide labour force for the industrial enterprises in this area of Germany.14 The Comarnic soldiers taken prisoner were inmates in the camps at Sandorf (Slovakia), Hausberg (Austro-Hungary) and in Germany. For most of them, there is no information about the cause or the date of their death. A special situation is that of the soldier Oancea Nicolae of Comarnic who had fought in the 47th Prahova Infantry Regiment at the battle of Mărăști. He was taken prisoner in this battle and declared missing on the 6th of August 1917. On the 18th of February 1918, he was set free from the camp. Being alive, he requested from the Romanian civil and military authorities the cancelation of his death certificate from 1919.15 A particular case is that of Mr. Ion Peticila of Comarnic in whose “Memoirs” he tells of having been mobilized in 1916 in the 47th Prahova Infantry Regiment. As he was in charge of the regiment’s logistics, he did not take part in the instruction organized by the French mission in the spring of 1917. For this reason, he was not accepted in the military operations from Mărășești. With great emotion he tells about the death of his comrades and his chance to survive.16 Even if the war had ended in 1918, the Romanian army continued to fight on the fronts in Bessarabia, Ukraine and, respectively, Transylvania. The two regiments were de-mobilized in 1920. In memory of the human sacrifice, a number of memorials were built, in the period between the two

14 Alice D. Boboc, “Prizonierii români din lagărele germane în primul război mondial”, in Pentru Patrie, No.4/2014, p. 18. 15 A.N.D.J.PH., fund Primăria Comarnic, dosar nr 18, f. 59. 16 Ion Peticilă, Memorii nepublicate, 2 volumes in manuscript, personal fund Ioana Vișan, granddaughter of Ion Peticilă, Comarnic, 2017, unpublished.

135

Maria Cristina Ilincuța RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 Angela Năsulea

World Wars. Such a memorial is the one from Mărășești, which looks like a citadel. The central hall has the sarcophagus of General Eremia Grigorescu and around him there are crypts with the earthly remains of over 6,000 soldiers dead in battle. In the town of Comarnic, there are monuments dedicated to the heroes. In 1923, a Committee was organized in order to build a commemorative cross.17 Also in the period between the two Wars, the War Orphans Organization was created. Queen Mary, who had become an active member of the “Red Cross” Association, was preoccupied with gathering the funds, helping the wounded on the front and in the mobile hospital in Moldova. For Comarnic, the gathering of funds for the orphans was coordinated by Princess Martha Bibescu. In the period between the two World Wars, the tradition of commemorating the heroism of the soldiers who died during the First World War was established in Romania. It was decided that the heroes’ day would be held on the day of Christ’s Ascension from the Christian orthodox calendar. In the year of this article’s publication, on May 25th, the church bells toll to commemorate the bravery of the Romanian soldiers, marking a century since their heroism. Without their bravery and sacrifice, the unitary national state of Romania would not have been possible.

17 A.N.D.J.PH., fund Primăria Comarnic, dossier no. 18, f. 59.

136

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Bibliography

A.N.D.J.PH., fund Prefectura Prahova. A.N.D.J.PH., fund Primăria Comarnic. Averescu, Al., Notițe zilnice de război, Bucharest, Editura Militară, 1992, Vol. 2. Boboc, Alice D., “Prizonierii români din lagărele germane în primul război mondial”, in Pentru Patrie, No.4/2014. Kirițescu, C., Istoria războiului pentru întregirea României, 1916 – 1918, Bucharest, Editura Științifică si Enciclopedică, 1989, Vol. 1. MacMillan, Margaret., Războiul care a pus capăt păcii, Bucharest, Editura Trei, 2016. Popescu-Filuță, St, “Insemnări de război”, in Magazin Istoric, April 2017. Stănescu, Dorin, “Iașiul anilor 1916-1918, deznădejde și speranță”, in Historia Special- România în refugiu 1916-1918, Year VI, No.18, March 2017. Stănescu, Eugen, Cavaleri ai Ordinului « Mihai Viteazul », Ploiești, Editura Universal Cartfil, 1996. Sterian, Ana, “Necazurile primarului Mârzescu”, in Historia Special - România în refugiu 1916-1918, Year VI, No.18, March 2017. Torrey, G., România în primul război mondial, Bucharest, Meteor Publishing House, 2016. White, Matthew, Marea carte a inumanității, Bucharest, Editura Humanitas, 2015. Peticilă, I., Memorii nepublicate, 2 volumes in manuscript, personal fund of Ioana Vișan, granddaughter of Ion Peticilă, Comarnic, 2017, unpublished.

137

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Shaping Public Diplomacy through Social Media Networks in the 21st Century

Valentin Costa*

Abstract: The practice of public diplomacy is being disrupted as a result of 90% of UN nations having a presence on social media networks, along with the advent of new technologies making communication global and in real time. This article aims to look at the relationship between public diplomacy and the media and identify the challenges and opportunities social media networks pose for public diplomacy in the 21st century from the perspective of both scholars and policymakers.

Key words: public diplomacy, social media networks, digital diplomacy, engagement.

Introduction

There are 173 countries with a Twitter account for governments and foreign ministries, which represents 90% of all UN nations, according to a study done by Twiplomacy in 2016.1 88% of those countries have a presence on Facebook, while 71% on Instagram. The mere existence of these accounts indicates that public diplomacy is adapting to the new channels of communication.

* Valentin Leon Costa holds a MA in Corporate Communication from the University of Bucharest. He is a former foreign press correspondent, currently working in a technology company. He is interested in the impact of social media networks at individual, company and institutional levels. E-mail: [email protected]. 1Twiplomacy, Twiplomacy Study 2016, 31 May 2016, http://twiplomacy.com/blog/twiplomacy-study-2016, (accessed 19 January 2017).

139

Valentin Costa RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

The arrival of the internet and the rapid rise of new technologies has disrupted many fields and public diplomacy makes no exception. If, traditionally, public diplomacy was characterized by neutrality and monologue, the public diplomacy of the 21st century has the opportunity to communicate in real time through the new social media networks, along with the expectation that it should do so. Therefore, for the first time in history, public diplomacy has the potential to foster not only one-on-one dialogue, but also discussion between many more participants or between one entity and the public. Nowadays, the civil society can be reached directly through the social media accounts of the ministry of foreign affairs, embassies or other non-governmental organizations or individuals. Information is spread in real time, it is collaborative and transparent. The internet has also erased the borders between different types of audiences: abroad vs. at home. The way public diplomacy is being re-shaped has been captured by Judith McHale, President Barack Obama’s Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in the following statement:

In a world where power and influence truly belongs to the many, we must engage with more people in more places... people all around the world are clamoring to be heard... they are having important conversations rights now... and they aren’t waiting for us, as mentioned by Hayden.2

This focus on engagement, which came from the dialogical nature of the social media networks, has a profound impact on the essence of public

2 Craig Hayden, The rhetoric of soft power: Public diplomacy in global contexts, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2012, p. 242

140 RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 diplomacy. Pamment3 argues that, in the 20th century, public diplomacy was communicated using a broadcasting model. The aim was persuasion of the foreign audiences. In the 21st century, the new center of interest of public diplomacy became dialogue. As the President Barack Obama’s Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs highlighted, public diplomacy needs to be part of the global dialogue. In order to understand the way social media networks shaped public diplomacy in the 21st century, this paper will depart from the definition of public diplomacy, will look at the relationship between public diplomacy and the media and, finally, will analyze the challenges and opportunities social media networks pose to public diplomacy.

Theories of public diplomacy

According to Gilboa4, the academic literature has researched public diplomacy from several perspectives: in the field of international relations, in the field of strategic and diplomatic studies or in the field of communications. However, Gilboa5 believes that, in order to better understand it, the subject has to be approached from a multidisciplinary perspective. In international relations, the study of public diplomacy aims to determine the role and the status of a diplomat. In the school of

3 James Pamment, New public diplomacy in the 21st century: A comparative study of policy and practice, New York, Routledge, 2012, p. 3. 4 Eytan Gilboa, “Searching for a theory of public diplomacy”, in: The annals of the American academy of political and social science, Vol. 616, No. 1, 2008, p. 64. 5 Ibidem, p. 65.

141

Valentin Costa RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 communications and journalism, the focus falls on how the media and new technologies have an impact on the practice of public diplomacy, while in the school of public relations, the researchers are interested in how public diplomacy crafts the image of the state and how it is communicated. Jowett and O’Donnell captured the broad understanding of public diplomacy in the following definition:

It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation of governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communications between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications.6

Media and public diplomacy

There are countless studies on the relationship between the media and public diplomacy. The more recent ones capture the complex interactions between public diplomacy and the media in the context of global communication in real time. Archetti7 and Gilboa8 analyze, for instance, the influence that a live broadcasting of an event has on international relations, phenomenon known as the CNN effect. This was the

6 Garath Jowett & Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and persuasion (5th ed.), Thousand Oaks, California, Sage, 2012, p. 287. 7 Claudia Archetti, “The impact of new media on diplomatic practice: an evolutionary model of change”, in: The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2012, p.187. 8 Eytan Gilboa, “Diplomacy in the media age: Three models of uses and effects”, in: Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2001, p. 15.

142 RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 first time when public diplomacy ran out of time or had to respond in real time to events. Nevertheless, the media outlets were still the gatekeepers and governments could, to a certain extent, still frame their arguments. In the 21st century, news became even more transparent with the rise of citizen journalism which was integrated into the live streams of major news outlets or it was broadcasted independently on social media platforms. To better understand the relationship between media and public diplomacy, Gilboa9 identifies three models in which the media communication channels are used as instruments of public diplomacy. The first model, called generically "public diplomacy", refers to the way in which government representatives, NGOs or private citizens use the media to influence public opinion abroad. The second model refers to "media diplomacy" and involves using media channels to transmit a message on common interests or resolve conflicts between two or more states. A very good example in this case is the press release after a negotiation. The third model, which the researcher calls "media-broker diplomacy", refers to the way in which journalists take that information and are thus intermediaries or brokers in relation to the public. Journalists become temporary mediators in international negotiations. Entman takes this concept further and proclaims the term "mediated diplomacy", which he defines as a cascade of frames: "organized attempts by a president and his foreign policy apparatus to exert as much control as possible over the framing of U.S. policy in foreign media".10 The

9 Ibidem, p. 12. 10 Robert Entman, “Theorizing mediated public diplomacy”, in: The International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol.13, No.84, 2008, p. 98.

143

Valentin Costa RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 researcher also argued that the government was dependent on news agencies and influencers in order to send its message across to its public or to receive feedback from them. In the beginning of the 21st century, however, the definition of public diplomacy shifted from a one-way communication model, as the communication channels diversified and enabled dialogue through social media networks. Pamment captures this shift in what follows:

The new public diplomacy is dialogical, collaborative and inclusive. It represents a break from ‘broadcasting’ models and takes advantage of social media to establish two-way engagement with the public. 11

The following chapter aims to understand the new definition, the challenges and the opportunities that scholars and policymakers alike encountered in light of this new change.

Digital diplomacy

Melissen12 was the one who came up with the term "New Public Diplomacy" or "digital diplomacy", following the appearance of a variety of blogs and web platforms in early 2000. But he was not the only one. Brown & Studemeister13 speak of a "virtual diplomacy", Potter14 about the "cyber- diplomacy", Glassman15 about "PD 2.0" and Nye16 about the "soft power".

11 James Pamment, New public diplomacy in the 21st century: A comparative study of policy and practice, Routledge, New York, 2012, p. 3. 12 Jan Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, New York, Springer, 2005, p. 8. 13 Sheryl Brown & Margarita Studemeister, “Virtual diplomacy: rethinking foreign policy practice in the information age”, in: Information & Security, Vol. 7, 2001, p. 42.

144 RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Moreover, Glassman17 indicates that public diplomacy should aim at the most densely populated social fabric because it is there where its communication has the most significant impact. Online, social media networks represent the meeting place for individuals to get informed and discuss current issues. According to the Twidiplomacy research, on average, Facebook is the place where governments and foreign ministries have the highest number of followers. The audience of public diplomacy isn’t anonymous any more, but active agents in a diplomatic exchange of views with the diplomatic institutions. Social media networks become thus a catalyst for public diplomacy and an interface for interacting with the national and foreign audiences. The rise of social media networks led to almost a consensus among scholars and practitioners of public diplomacy, if not for the name, but at least for the phenomenon. The phenomenon consists in the emergence of a "new" public diplomacy that must face a media environment transformed all over the world, characterized by networks of selective audiences and fragmentation of media discourse18.

14 Evan Potter, Cyber-diplomacy: managing foreign policy in the twenty-first century, Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press, 2002, p. 45. 15 James K, Glassman, ‘Public Diplomacy 2.0: A new approach to global engagement’, Washington DC, New America Foundation, December 2008, available at https://2001- 2009.state.gov/r/us/2008/112605.htm (accessed 11 February 2017). 16 Joseph Nye, “Public diplomacy and soft power”, in: ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616, 2008, p. 94. 17 James K Glassman, op.cit. 18 James Pamment, “Articulating influence: Toward a research agenda for interpreting the evaluation of soft power, public diplomacy and nation brands”, in: Public Relations Review, Vol. 40, No.1, 2014, p. 53.

145

Valentin Costa RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Bjola and Holmes19 consider that digital diplomacy refers broadly to the way state actors use information and technology in order to manage international change. They identified three fundamental components in the definition of digital diplomacy: engagement, accessibility or resources, and information monitoring, which will be further discussed from the perspective of both scholars and practitioners in what follows.

Engagement

When it comes to the new form of public diplomacy, Fitzpatrick stresses the importance of engagement in order to project a certain message, as the new channels of communication enable dialogue.

Recognizing transformational changes in global society, public diplomacy scholars and practitioners and other informed observers have called for a new public diplomacy to meet the demands of a new time... As a result, nations must “engage with” rather than “communicate to” foreign publics in the pursuit of more collaborative relations .20

Practitioners agree with this approach. The Ambassador of Poland in Romania in 2013, Marek Szczygie, highlighted that digital diplomacy is a very important aspect of the Polish diplomacy because it provides new communication platforms for interacting with the foreign audiences.21

19 Corneliu Bjola & Marcus Holmes, Digital Diplomacy: theory and practice, New York, Routledge, 2015, p. 207. 20 Kathy, Fitzpatrick, US public diplomacy in a post-9/11 world: From messaging to mutuality, Los Angeles, Figueroa Press, 2011, p. 10. 21 DigitalDiplomacy, “Diplomația publică, vedetă pentru o zi în România”, 23 September 2013, available at http://digitaldiplomacy.ro/diplomatia-publica-vedeta-pentru-o-zi- romania/ (accessed 21 March 2017).

146 RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Within the European Forum for public diplomacy, in 2013, the diplomat stated that he believes that digital diplomacy is the future of public diplomacy.22 At the European Forum of Public Diplomacy of 2013, organized in Bucharest, the president of Romania at that time, Traian Băsescu, pointed out the necessity of a coherent approach in terms of communication, both internally and externally.23 Six years later, President Klaus Johannis, returned to this idea and argued for a need of better coordination of institutions, a related strategy and a rapid response during his speech at the Annual Meeting of the Romanian Diplomacy.24 At the same event, Bogdan Aurescu, Chief Foreign Policy Adviser of the President of Romania announced the implementation of the "Ministry of Foreign Affairs strategy for digital diplomacy in Romania", which aimed at better coordination of communication of the diplomatic missions and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.25

22 Ibidem. 23 Ibidem. 24 President Administration, “Speech of Mr. Klaus Iohannis, President of Romania to all Romanian diplomats at the Yearly Reunion of Romanian Diplomacy”, 31 August 2016, available at https://www.mae.ro/sites/default/files/file/anul_2016/2016_pdf/2016.08.31_discursul_pres edintelui_romaniei_la_radr.pdf (accessed 23 March 2017). 25 Calea Europeană, “Speech of Mr. Bogdan Aurescu on Romanian foreign policy in crisis situations and regional instability at the Yearly Reunion of Romanian Diplomacy”, 2 September 2015, available at http://www.caleaeuropeana.ro/reuniunea-anuala-a- diplomatiei-romane-bogdan-aurescu-un-discurs-despre-politica-externa-a-romaniei-in- jurul-unor-crize-si-instabilitati-regionale/ (accessed 23 March 2017).

147

Valentin Costa RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

From Q&A on Twitter to live Facebook events, digital diplomacy enables ministries of foreign affairs or diplomats to engage with audiences in countries where they don’t even have a physical presence because the political context does not allow it. They can open virtual embassies in order get their message across and start a dialogue. Furthermore, as the internet makes information accessible for everyone, everywhere, the next question to arise is „who is the target audience that is engaged by the new form of public diplomacy?”. Historically, public diplomacy aimed at persuading foreign publics, using their local media channels and their local language. On social media networks, however, it is harder to differentiate. For instance, most of the Romanian Embassies in Europe are communicating in Romanian. Are they trying to engage solely with the diaspora? Or maybe they don’t have a clear set of best practices, or they have a hidden agenda. Manor26 identifies the same phenomenon in the case of the US State Department and questions whether it is ethical to use the national resources destined for communicating with foreign public in order to campaign for the actions of a certain administration. This leads us to a following challenge for the digital diplomacy, namely the institutionalization of the use of social media networks in the public diplomacy practice.

26 Ilan Manor, “Are we there yet: have MFAs realized the potential of digital diplomacy?”, in: Brill Research Perspectives in Diplomacy and Foreign Policy Vol.1, No.2, 2016, p. 1.

148 RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Resources

Governments and foreign ministries from over 90% of all UN nations have a presence on some type of social media network. Although the numbers are high, there are no clear sets of best practices on how to use these platforms. Some countries offer recommendations or general guidance for their diplomats, however, at the moment, the practice relies mostly on individuals who use them according to their best knowledge. The Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), for instance, recognizes the need for a permanent body of digital professionals.27 The new digital environment comes with a series of new challenges that the practitioners need to face. Manor28 identified five fundamental threats: (1) the work routine and ethic of the internet (being able to adapt offline to online communication), (2) information resources (being able to create content relevant for social media networks), (3) plurality of channels (being able to adapt to a multitude of social media networks: Facebook, Twitter, Instagram Youtube or any country specific social network), (4) best practices and training (the need for trained human resources), (5) ministries of foreign affair risk adverse culture, (6) diplomacy’s need for time. In the 21st century, information flows in real time and the audience is used to consuming it as such. However, this is not the process through which public diplomacy works. Public diplomacy needs time to gather all

27 Tom Fletcher, ‘Former UK Ambassador to Lebanon in the Future FCO Report’, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/521916/Fut ure_FCO_Report.pdf (accessed on 27 March 2017). 28 Ilan Manor, op.cit., p. 78.

149

Valentin Costa RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 the information, needs time to understand the situation and to be able to make recommendations. The social media networks put a lot of pressure on its practitioners to respond in real time.

Monitoring

Traditionally, public diplomacy was built around information gathering and dissemination. On the one hand, the diplomat needs to gather information on how foreign audiences perceives the actions of a certain government. They need to make an assessment of the nature of the relationship between the two states and to identify opportunities or threats for collaboration. In this context, the social media networks provide an excellent tool for monitoring opinion and beliefs of the foreign public. On the other hand, the diplomat has to address key issues in a bilateral agenda, reinforce its stance and engage foreign audience in a sustained dialogue regarding the objectives of its government. Social media networks offer thus the perfect platform for engagement. Nevertheless, if public diplomacy was traditionally good at gathering and disseminating information for its key audience, with the appearance of new technological tools and platforms, the question that arises is how efficient these new channels are and how efficient are the professionals in using them.

Ambassadors and diplomats need to think of technology not merely as tweeting feel-good photos, but as an essential tool for accomplishing their core mission in a technology-driven era,

150 RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 stated Ambassador Kurt Volker, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO and Executive Director of the McCain Institute for International Leadership at Arizona State University.29 There are academic studies which tried to measure the efficiency of digital diplomacy on social networks and provide models of assessment of different strategies of engagement in social networks. Bjola et al30 propose a model which assesses engagement over the following components: agenda setting, presence expansion and conversation generating. Nevertheless, the study is done on the Chinese micro-blogging website Sina Weibo. As every social network has its own particularity, its own algorithm for engagement, and its own specific audience, the study might not be relevant in other parts of the world or on other networks. Generally speaking, the majority of research is focused on the United States of America, but the phenomenon itself is global. Thus, measuring efficacy remains a problem to be further researched.

Conclusions

Both scholars and practitioners agree that the internet, information and communication technologies have shaped the definition and practice of public diplomacy. The social media networks which are continually

29 Lauren DeLisa Coleman, “Diplomacy Must Embrace Digiculture”, 13 June 2014, available at http://www.diplomaticourier.com/diplomacy-must-embrace-digiculture/ (accessed on 27 March 2017). 30 Corneliu Bjola, Lu Jiang, Marcus Holmes, “Social Media and Public Diplomacy: A Comparative Analysis of the Digital Diplomatic Strategies of the EU, US and Japan in China”, in: Digital Diplomacy Theory and Practice, New York, Routledge, 2015, p. 74.

151

Valentin Costa RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 changing are impacting public diplomacy in ways in which the literature tries to analyze, understand and describe, but doesn't always manage to keep up the pace. The challenges and opportunities the social media networks bring along are fundamentally disrupting the practice of public diplomacy. Media has always played a mediating role for public diplomacy, framing the message and offering feedback and information. In the 21st century, the role of social media networks is even more salient, as diplomats have direct access to their audiences, can enter in a sustained dialogue with them and engage in real time. The governments are not relying on foreign media anymore to convey their interpretations of events but they can now discuss them on their own social media accounts. But the question is: do they have the right resources and training to do that? Furthermore, are their actions efficient and coherent? Do they use the social media networks in order to accomplish their objectives or does their message gets lost in the increasing buzz of the internet? Public diplomacy is undergoing a process of transformation, while social media networks are themselves evolving. Thus, scholars and policymakers will have to further investigate the relationship between public diplomacy and social media networks.

152 RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Bibliography

Archetti, Claudia, “The impact of new media on diplomatic practice: an evolutionary model of change”, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2012. Bjola, Corneliu, Holmes, Marcus, Digital Diplomacy: theory and practice, New York, Routledge, 2015. Bjola, Corneliu, Jiang, Lu, Holmes, Marcus, “Social Media and Public Diplomacy: A Comparative Analysis of the Digital Diplomatic Strategies of the EU, US and Japan in China”, Digital Diplomacy Theory and Practice, New York, Routledge, 2015. Brown, Sheryl, Studemeister, Margarita, “Virtual diplomacy: rethinking foreign policy practice in the information age”, Information & Security, Vol. 7, 2001. Calea Europeană, “Speech of Mr. Bogdan Aurescu on Romanian foreign policy in crisis situations and regional instability at the Yearly Reunion of Romanian Diplomacy”, [web article], 2 September 2015, http://www.caleaeuropeana.ro/reuniunea-anuala-a- diplomatiei-romane-bogdan-aurescu-un-discurs-despre-politica- externa-a-romaniei-in-jurul-unor-crize-si-instabilitati-regionale/. Coleman, Lauren DeLisa, “Diplomacy Must Embrace Digiculture”, 13 June 2014, http://www.diplomaticourier.com/diplomacy-must-embrace- digiculture/. DigitalDiplomacy, “Diplomația publică, vedetă pentru o zi în România”, 23 September 2013, http://digitaldiplomacy.ro/diplomatia-publica- vedeta-pentru-o-zi-romania/. Entman, Robert, “Theorizing mediated public diplomacy”, The International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 13, No. 84, 2008. Fitzpatrick, Kathy, US public diplomacy in a post-9/11 world: From messaging to mutuality, Los Angeles, Figueroa Press, 2011. Fletcher, Tom, “Former UK Ambassador to Lebanon in the Future FCO Report“, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment _data/file/521916/Future_FCO_Report.pdf . Gilboa, Eytan, “Diplomacy in the media age: Three models of uses and effects”, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2001.

153

Valentin Costa RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Gilboa, Eytan, “Searching for a theory of public diplomacy”, The annals of the American academy of political and social science, Vol. 616, No. 1, 2008. Glassman, James K, ‘Public Diplomacy 2.0: A new approach to global engagement’, Washington DC, New America Foundation, December 2008, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/us/2008/112605.htm. Hayden, Craig, The rhetoric of soft power: Public diplomacy in global contexts, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2012. Jowett, Garath, O’Donnell, Victoria, Propaganda and persuasion (5th ed.), Thousand Oaks, California, Sage, 2012. Manor, Ilan, “Are we there yet: have MFAs realized the potential of digital diplomacy?”, Brill Research Perspectives in Diplomacy and Foreign Policy Vol.1, No. 2, 2016. Melissen, Jan, The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, New York, Springer, 2005. Nye, Joseph, “Public diplomacy and soft power”, ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616, 2008. Pamment, James, “Articulating influence: Toward a research agenda for interpreting the evaluation of soft power, public diplomacy and nation brands”, Public Relations Review, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2014. Pamment, James, New public diplomacy in the 21st century: A comparative study of policy and practice, New York, Routledge, 2012. Potter, Evan, Cyber-diplomacy: managing foreign policy in the twenty-first century, Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press, 2002. President Administration, “Speech of Mr. Klaus Iohannis, President of Romania to all Romanian diplomats at the Yearly Reunion of Romanian Diplomacy”, 31 August 2016, https://www.mae.ro/sites/default/files/file/anul_2016/2016_pdf/201 6.08.31_discursul_presedintelui_romaniei_la_radr.pdf. Twiplomacy, ‘Twiplomacy Study 2016’, 31 May 2016, http://twiplomacy.com/blog/twiplomacy-study-2016.

154 RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Book Reviews

Frédéric Pichon, Syria - Why the West Got it Wrong, Bucharest, Corint Publishing Group, 2016.

Ionuț Filipescu*

Founding member of the “Conflicts” magazine specialized in the geopolitics of the Middle East and having a PhD in contemporary history with a thesis on the Christians from the city of Maaloula, Syria; Frédéric Pichon is currently a research associate within the EMAM team from the University François Rabelais in Tours. The outbreak of the Syrian crisis in March 2011 which was threatening the Middle East’s stability has opened a new area of study for the researchers of contemporary history, who are now trying to answer the questions concerning the real reasons behind the conflict situation from Syria, passing over Western diplomacy’s statements and actions. In this regard, Frédéric Pichon’s book represents a welcoming approach for historiography as it is attempting to exhibit the way in which the actions took place and how the West seems to have missed a chance to solve or appease the state of affairs from Syria. The present paper comes after the French edition published at Groupe Artège Éditions du Rocher, in 2014. Its main subject deals with the

* Ionuț Filipescu is a PhD candidate in his second year, at The Faculty of History, University of Bucharest. Email address: [email protected].

155

Book Reviews RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 war from nowadays Syria and the position took by the Western embassies. This volume is structured in 5 chapters, as it follows. The first chapter, „The conflict’s anatomy: a country like a mosaic”, outlines Syria’s profile which, if we take into account the number of communities living there, is one of the least homogeneous Arab country, where the Sunni Arabs represent 65% of the population, the rest being composed of diverse communities, such as Alawites, Christians, Armenians and Kurds. At the same time, the particularity of these communities is given by the logic of the tribal order, or clan order, which is generating a social fracture within these communities. For a better understanding of the Syrian political, religious and social status as well as the nature of power, the author defines the concepts of “asabiyyah” and emphasizes the unique character of the Alawite community, which is so different from the rest of the Islamists that, theologically speaking, they must be considered non-Muslims. The fact that the first revolutionary intentions aroused in rural areas constitutes a distinctive element of this conflict. By no longer getting involved in the economic sphere – alongside with Bashar al-Assad’s failure to respect his promises (borders surveillance, fight against corruption) - the state allowed social classes living in urban areas to take advantage of this phenomenon, which caused an explosion of the commercial exchanges and increased the number of tourists. This phenomenon coincided with the emergence of poverty and instability in the rural areas. According to the author, globalization, and especially that of information, acted as a catalyst for the outbreak of the Syrian conflict. The

156

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 externalization of the social issues for almost a decade, with the aim of attracting foreign direct investment, alongside with the border’s permeability (notably in the northern region, at the Turkish border), permitted a wide dissemination of the jihadist ideology through the internet network, far more intense compared to the events from Afghanistan and Iraq. The Jihad, originally a virtual one, became an integrated part of the battle waged between loyalists and rebels. The second chapter, “Arab spring euphoria”, brings into question the role of the press in the evolution of the events from Syria. Considered by the author as direct responsible for presenting the Syrian conflict in a truncated and subjective manner, the western mass media has often shown to the world the fact that Syria is confronting with an extremely difficult situation, however the terms used through the communication channels were risking to become dangerous. Thus, the governmental armies turn into “pro-governmental forces”, “pro-Assad”, whilst on the opposite side there are “revolutionaries”, “opposition”, armed “combatants”, but who are miraculously changing into civilians when they are facing a brutal repression. Moreover, the author thinks that the western journalists have even resorted to staged events intended to prove a pre-established thesis. With the lack of field reporters, even the editors have unthinking reactions, as their method is to misinterpret the facts in order to match them with the journalists’ general opinion. In front of this problematic situation, Frédéric Pichon urges the journalists who are dealing with the Syrian conflict to respect the code of ethics and therefore diversify their sources, or even question them.

157

Book Reviews RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

The third chapter, “The impossible international intervention”, focuses on the relations between Syria and Russia, the latter being seen by the author as one of Syria’s main advantages at international level. Dating from the time of Tsarist Russia, the relationship between these two states remained on good terms until today, when Russia provides Syria with some air defense systems. At the same time, the Kremlin got involved in Syria’s economy, helping it to avoid an asphyxiation of this field which was subject to the embargo imposed by the European Union. On the other side, Syria allowed Russia to consolidate two essential fields: the supply of refined oil products and foreign exchange reserves of the Syrian regime. Frédéric Pichon claims that jihadism is a taboo subject, Jacques Bérès being the first who has brought into the West’s attention the fact that jihadists are present in the Syrian conflict. The TV channel France 2 has broadcasted his testimony in 2012 and from that moment onwards, one can observe an evolution of the manner in which the Syrian war was perceived. In addition, the author indicates that the journalists living in Aleppo proved a certain incompetence as they did not revealed the jihadist’s presence until they had occupied the base Sheikh Suleiman, which is west of Aleppo and was the last refuge for the Syrian army. In this situation, Pichon thinks that this is the moment when the West failed in taking a firm position regarding this conflict. This fail was due to the inaccurate assumption that there is a Free Syrian Army. Also, the number of jihadists has been minimized, estimated to be 45.000, therefore twice the number of Taliban in Afghanistan. According to the author, Syria will remain for many years a source of jihadists, at only a few hours away

158

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 from the central Europe: „We have allowed the positioning of a grey area at our door, from where the violence from tomorrow will come: a blind violence which will crush our fragile societies”1. The fourth chapter, “France’s unbearable lightness”, analyzes France’s reactions concerning the evolution of the Syrian conflict, which are considered by the author as being frequently improper. France’s opposition in accepting Iran to a conference discussing the situation from Syria and the declarations made by the Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius, in regards with Bashar al-Assad (that he must be killed as “he is not worth living”), brought France in a situation in which the diplomatic demarches were risking to no longer obtain any success. For this reason, France alongside with the United States have lost precious time in their attempt to put this violent conflict to an end. On the other hand, Frédéric Pichon does not fall into the trap of considering France totally overwhelmed by the situation, bringing forward its relations with Qatar, a tiny state which managed, in the context of the Arab Spring, to impose itself in just a few years as an extremely respected actor. While the French diplomacy was acting carefully or more boldly, in 2013 there were large contracts of military equipment and public works signed between French companies and firms from Qatar and Saudi Arabia. In addition, many French companies have contracted infrastructure works for preparing the Football World Cup from 2022, hosted in Qatar. On the

1 Frédéric Pichon, Syria - Why the West Got it Wrong, Corint Publishing Group, Bucharest, 2016, p. 82.

159

Book Reviews RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 other side, the Government of Qatar has contracted an enormous amount of military equipment from France, taking the liberty to deliver them in accordance with its own interests. It is therefore clear that the Islamist militants were those who received these deliveries. The author is then raising the issue of the Syrian Christians, an important community from a cultural point of view. Considered, to a certain extent, to be loyal to the Assad regime, the Christians found themselves in the situation of trying to resist with their own means - although extremely difficult, as it is proved by the numerous bombardments of Christian places of worship – or take the path of emigration. Finally, the last chapter, “Syria, a laboratory for a worldwide imbalance”, debates the implications determined by the lack of reaction, or of the reactions lacking firmness, of some of the European chancelleries in regard to the Syrian conflict. Analyzing Russia’s position, Frédéric Pichon explains that with this conflict Russia saw an opportunity to get back on the international diplomatic scene, pursuing benefits like maintaining its naval base from Tartus (Russia’s only access point to the Mediterranean sea) and resolving the oil transportation issue. Syria is, from this point of view, the crossroad through which the new routes from the Persian Gulf could arrive in Europe. Moreover, the escalation of the Syrian conflict has an explosive potential on the long term, including for the West. France’s position does not seem to coincide with the attitude expected by the world and the Middle East from the French diplomacy, more precisely, to be capable of discussing with all involved parties and to have a balanced and wise position. In return, the attitude displayed from

160

RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

Paris reveals a “narrow atlanticism”, as the good faith, the morality and the determination are prevailing. The end of the book brings a warning regarding Syria’s neighbours and their involvement in this conflict. According to the author, if the situation will impose it, the idyll between Ankara and Damascus will resume from where it stopped in 2011 and the role of an ambiguous interlocutor will be played by Qatar, a country which excels and proves to be extremely efficient in this position. As per Iran, it seems that this state is recovering from the losses caused by the economic sanctions, while the US are counting on the economic development in order to put to silence its military ambitions. On the opposite side, the losing parties in this conflict are Israel and Saudi Arabia, the main pivots for US’s anchoring in the region. Given the fact that the US are progressively retreating from the Middle East, Saudi Arabia might be thrown aside, while Israel feels betrayed by its American ally and seems worried about the situation from the Syrian front which caused a tension that could be compared with the one from 1973. Under these circumstances it takes place the rapid expansion of the Islamic State, an entity which nourishes an old ambition and explains the massive response of the Sunni populations from Iraq and Syria. This state would abolish the heresy of the nation-states and would allow Sunni to regain their dignity. With regard to the young European jihadists, the author sees in frustration, nationalism and millenarianism an explosive cocktail. Despite its subtitle, the present paper tackles to a lesser extent the involvement of other Western embassies, preferring to always get back to

161

Book Reviews RJHIS 4 (1) 2017

France’s position – and rarely to that of the United States – towards the Syrian conflict. The author denounces the poor diplomatic management of this conflict, towards which France has had an extremely offensive attitude. It would be interesting to identify what were the approaches chosen by other European states in order to solve the Syrian crisis. The tragedy of the country that became a battlefield for Islamists from around the world has often been distorted in western mass media, certain parts of this conflict being covered or even falsified. Moreover, the author points out the mistakes and the contradiction in actions made by the Western powers in a war which, in just 3 years, has made over 150.000 deaths and which continues to represent a situation with an explosive potential in the Middle East. Ultimately, it does not seem that the problems from Syria will be solved shortly and this conflict will certainly remain an important subject for mass media from all around the world.

162

Submission of Manuscripts

RJHIS invites students, early-career researchers, and professionals to submit papers for its forthcoming issues. RJHIS welcomes articles and book reviews from a broad range of disciplines, including international history, international law, diplomacy, theory of international relations, European studies, among others.

RJHIS is published biannually in May and November. The next issue of RJHIS will be published in November 2017.

There are no formal deadlines. Submissions are accepted on an ongoing basis.

The submitted papers will undergo a peer-review process by the Academic Board of RJHIS within 4-6 weeks from the initial submission.

Only papers to follow the technical requirements will be published.

• manuscripts are accepted in English • articles should have no more than 7000 words, including bibliography • book reviews should not exceed 2000 words • articles should use the Oxford reference system • articles must include an abstract of approx. 150 words and 3-5 keywords • manuscripts submitted will be expected to contain original work • submissions & queries should be made electronically at [email protected]

For further technical requirements please follow the Instructions for authors section on our website! (www.rjhis.ro)

Romanian Journal of History and International Studies is biannually published by the Department of International Relations and World History in collaboration with the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies at the Faculty of History, University of Bucharest.

164