That's the Political Question

To mix or not to mix? That’s the political question

A comparative study to the role of land ownership in facilitating mixed-income housing developments in the different planning systems of London and Amsterdam

Author: Patrick van Son Student number: 10365230

Programme: Urban Studies (Research Master) Programme group: Urban Planning Thesis Supervisor: Prof. dr. Tuna Tasan-Kok

Second Reader: Dr. Jochem de Vries Institute: Universiteit van Amsterdam

Amsterdam, 22 June 2018 Preface

The cover picture is a cut out of the famous painting Victory Boogie Woogie by Dutch painter Piet Mondriaan. A housing programme consists out of a number of basic elements, the housing segments, which resemble the limited amount of colours used by Mondriaan. Some segments typically occur more often in the mix than others, through the influence of national housing policy on shaping these housing segments. Also some colours occur more often than others in the painting. Although the painting seems to be a very simple mix of colours and squares, the painting process was highly complex and Mondriaan constantly altered the composition of the colours. This complexity resembles the development process of mixed-income housing as investigated through this research. Attaining a mix of housing segments in urban developments is certainly desired by policy makers, but the mix can vary to a large extent as the political context influences the way planning instruments and land policy are used to facilitate a mix of housing segments.

This thesis is a result of a one and a half year study to a question I personally wanted to investigate. Why is the housing developed in cities what it is? During my years of living in Amsterdam and keeping track of new housing and area developments in this city, I wondered why some new developments consist of merely market homes, why other developments consist of intermediate rent, and why other developments provide a mix of housing segments. I wanted to find out what regulations and other factors influenced the decisions about what housing is developed in the city. At the moment of writing, I can tell that throughout the past one and a half year, I found the answer to that. Particularly in Amsterdam, all planning instruments are available to influence the mix of housing developments, especially when the land is publicly owned. A political commitment towards affordable housing development is however needed to use these instruments in planning practice. This commitment was absent for most of the past decade, but since 2017 the Municipal policy has changed in favour of affordable housing segments, and thus in favour of mixed-income housing. In London, this trend is similar, but as the research will explain, the nature of the British planning system and lack of public land will make it difficult for the Greater London Authority to initiate change and facilitate more affordable housing as part of the housing mix.

I am pleased with the large amount of freedom given by my study programme and supervisor to shape this thesis research towards my personal interests. I would also like to thank my supervisor and other academic staff of the University of Amsterdam and Bartlett School of Planning for providing useful feedback on my research. Finally, a special word of thanks to people involved with the studied cases and external experts who have been interviewed for this thesis. Without their help and input this thesis would not have been possible.

Index Preface ...... 1 1. Introduction: mixed-income housing, a remedy towards urban affordability problems, but a challenge to develop ...... 4 2. A theoretical framework on why socio-economically mixed neighbourhoods should be developed and how it can be achieved ...... 9 2.1. The importance of socio-economic mixing in urban areas ...... 9 2.1.1. Mixing income groups in urban developments ...... 9 2.1.2. Mixing in a neoliberal context ...... 10 2.1.3. Conceptualising mixed-income housing ...... 11 2.2. Strategies to promote housing mix ...... 13 2.2.1. Affordable housing provision embedded in planning and housing systems...... 13 2.2.2. Facilitating affordable housing within the housing mix of new developments ...... 18 3. An institutional framework of housing development in London and Amsterdam ...... 20 3.1. Two different planning systems ...... 20 3.1.1. London embedded in the British development-led system ...... 20 3.1.2. Amsterdam as powerful municipality in the Dutch plan-led system ...... 22 3.2. Housing institutions: who decides what about the housing system? ...... 24 3.2.1. United Kingdom ...... 24 3.2.2. The Netherlands ...... 25 3.3. Housing segments: what type of housing can be developed in each city? ...... 27 3.3.1. The United Kingdom and London ...... 27 3.3.2. The Netherlands & Amsterdam ...... 29 4. Research design and methodology ...... 31 4.1. Research questions...... 31 4.2. Comparative research design ...... 32 4.3. Introducing the cases ...... 33 4.3.1. Royal Albert Wharf – London ...... 33 4.3.2. Cruquius – Amsterdam ...... 35 4.4. Research methods ...... 37 5. Empirical findings ...... 40 5.1. Mixed-income housing embedded in London and Amsterdam ...... 40 5.1.1. London ...... 40 5.1.2. Amsterdam ...... 44 5.2. Investigating the development processes of mixed-income housing ...... 47 5.2.1. Royal Albert Wharf – London ...... 47

5.2.2. Cruquius – Amsterdam ...... 52 5.3. The value of public land policy for mixed-income housing ...... 56 5.3.1. Royal Albert Wharf & London ...... 56 5.3.2. Cruquius & Amsterdam ...... 58 6. Conclusion ...... 61 6.1. Main conclusion ...... 65 6.2. Recommendations...... 67 6.3. Reflection...... 69 References ...... 71 Appendixes ...... 79 Appendix 1: Anonymised Interview List ...... 79 Appendix 2: Information letter (English) ...... 80

Great Eastern Quays (London) (top) and Cruquius (Amsterdam) (bottom), own production, 2018.

1. Introduction: mixed-income housing, a remedy towards urban affordability problems, but a challenge to develop

Many main cities in Western Europe cope with challenges on their housing markets in terms of accessibility and affordability (Boterman et al., 2013; Dewilde, 2017). Finding a place to live in these cities becomes increasingly difficult for large groups of residents, since there is often not enough supply of suitable housing or the available housing is too expensive. New residential developments can make a contribution to providing access to housing for potential new residents for a city, but also for people already living in the city looking for a home that better suits their housing need. In terms of equity and inclusivity, the provision of new housing should ideally be focused towards a broad range of citizens (Rowlands et al., 2016). Despite many city governments deliberately promote inclusive, socially mixed communities in new urban area developments, it appears to be something difficult to succeed in practice as new urban developments often tend to consist of merely market homes (Raco et al., 2007; Majoor, 2011; Boland et al., 2016). To explore and understand why, this paper aims to investigate the development process of mixed-income residential developments in two cities with a large pressure on the housing market, London and Amsterdam. This study will hereby offer a comparative perspective on these two cities and the differences in the planning systems in both countries, with a specific focus on the role of land ownership.

Land is a crucial factor for the development of new housing, particularly in cities where land is scarce and land values are high. Particularly public land policy is a crucial factor that can influence the outcome of spatial developments in terms of income mix (Montgomery, 1987; Evans, 2004). Land is needed to build new developments, and without land a developer cannot build any developments. The party that owns the land decides how the land will be used and developed, but within the limits of the law and planning system (Buitelaar et al., 2008). Particularly in urban areas, land prices are generally high, which makes it financially challenging to include cheaper housing segments within a development (Evans, 2004). As through land policy, the price of land can be regulated, particularly public land ownership is seen as a crucial factor for influencing the development outcome (Buitelaar et al., 2008; Cheshire, 2009). In Amsterdam, for instance, public land development through public ownership has traditionally been central in planning to achieve social goals, particularly the development of social housing (van der Krabben & Jacobs, 2013; Fainstein, 2010). In London, the land market is however much less controlled and the costs of acquiring land generally make up the highest costs of a development (Adonis, 2015). As the mentioned literature mentions, and as particularly Amsterdam illustrates, public land policy and planning instruments can influentially steer on the outcome of developments. However, the precise relation between the role of land on the one hand, and planning instruments on the other hand remains unclear. To what extent does it matter whether land is publicly or privately owned and does public land ownership really enable the use of stronger planning instruments to steer on the inclusion of affordable segments in a housing mix?

The question this study aims to answer is:

“How does the interaction between land ownership and planning instruments influence mixed- income urban residential developments within different planning systems?”

To understand the interaction of the planning instruments available to facilitate mixed-income housing and the public land policies to facilitate mixed-income housing, two ongoing area developments will be investigated in London and Amsterdam. In London, the Royal Albert Wharf will be investigated, a residential area development in the Royal Docks on public land. In Amsterdam, Cruquius will be investigated, a similar development in the Eastern Docklands on predominantly public land, but the Municipality adopted a strategy to apply minimal guidelines to this land. Both cases are typical for the current trends in planning in London and Amsterdam. Where in London, there is an increased focus on using public land to facilitate affordable housing within developments, in Amsterdam and the Netherlands the focus in planning shifts towards a less active and more facilitating public sector (GLA, 2017:b; Dixon, 2009; Janssen-Jansen & Woltjer, 2010). The cases are however atypical in relation to the traditional development models of both cities. This makes the cases useful to study the planning instruments in both different planning systems separately from the role of land (Gerring, 2009; Schofield, 2002). As in London there is normally no control over land prices and the development-led planning system makes it difficult to secure more affordable housing segments in a development scheme, public land might facilitate this better (Martin, 2017; Wainwright, 2014; Janssen-Jansen & Woltjer, 2010). In Amsterdam, the Municipality, through its land ownership, traditionally adopts a very active role in plan making and facilitates social housing within developments. Investigating Cruquius can nicely explain to what extent the Amsterdam planning instruments are effective in facilitating mixed-income housing without the use of public land policy.

The underlying issue crucial to this research is: what is the value of public land ownership towards facilitating mixed-income housing? To what extent is this factor crucial and is it different for two cities with a totally different planning culture? As city governments make housing policies and make social mixing policies, it would be expected that -if they own land- they would use their land to support these policy goals. It is therefore crucial to question the argumentations behind public land policy: is a public landowner bringing in cheap land to facilitate a higher share of more affordable housing or does it play a financially driven role within the general land market (Haila, 2016; Montgomery, 1987)? This would imply an important role for local politics as they decide where the priority is. Wainwright (2014) and Besussi (2016) illustrated that in London boroughs, under austerity-driven neoliberal influences, public land is regularly used to generate money to fund social services and to stimulate gentrification. Also Heurkens & Hobma (2014) and Raco (2018) conclude that these neoliberal influences of deregulation and privatisation, have led to more market-oriented development practices in both the UK as the Netherlands. Planning and land policy would therefore be increasingly focussed on achieving economic goals, and less to the public benefit, such as affordable housing (Boland et al., 2016). Since neoliberal policy is more integrated in London and the UK, it is likely that the public land policy will be less facilitative towards affordable housing segments, than in the more socio-democratic Amsterdam. On the other hand, public land ownership maybe does not have to be a crucial factor in facilitating this housing mix. Planning instruments might provide enough regulations and stimuli for the private sector to include affordable segments within a housing mix (Rowlands et al., 2016). Private developers might follow these planning guidelines since they know they have to comply with housing targets and the fact whether land is publicly or privately owned might be only a small factor.

The conceptual structure of the research As this study is a comparative case study, it is essential to look at the differences between different levels of organisation of housing and land development in different institutional contexts (Squires & Heurkens, 2016). The study will hereby largely adapt the theory on mixed-income housing provision by De Kam, Needham & Buitelaar (2014). On a more abstract level, this theory can be conceptualised by the three-level framework by Healey & Barrett (1990) on how planning decisions -that shape the planning outcome of developments- are influenced by three levels of mechanisms.

At the highest level, there are the cultural norms and values that people have about what should be developed and how this should be achieved. This level determines the way for instance state and market relations are defined (the planning culture), the welfare system and housing system. The Netherlands has a Napoleonic law and a relatively social-democratic welfare system, while the UK has a common law and is a third way country with characteristics of liberal welfare states. These kind of factors will not be directly investigated for both cases, but it is discussed as an important context that is influential in shaping the second level, politico-juridical rules. The planning processes are guided by rules that determine what actions different actors are allowed to take, and which not, to achieve a desired planning outcome, such as mixed-income housing development. The planning system (and its instruments) is therefore placed on this middle level. The politico-juridical rules determine how resources, the lowest scale, may be used in the planning process. The resources are described by Healey & Barrett (1990) as the paths through capital flows that are derived from the economy by different actors. These resources can be used in the planning and development process and hence have a large role in shaping the outcome. Land ownership is placed as the most important resource that will be investigated for the two cases.

The use of planning instruments derived from the planning system and the land policy through land ownership will shape the planning process for both cases and how mixed-income housing is generated. As the theoretical framework will illustrate, for each development this will likely been done by a combination of shaping, regulating an stimulating measures. Mixed-income urban residential developments will be investigated by covering the three different aspects mentioned in the theoretical framework: 1)the mix in the housing programme, 2)the finance of the affordable share of the mix, and 3)the duration of the housing mix.

Conceptual model

Norms & values (macro) -Desire for affordable housing -Political context –Housing system -Welfare system

Politico- Mixed-income residential -Planning system Shaping juridical rules developments (meso) 1: Programme Regulating 2: Finance

Resources 3: Duration -Land ownership Stimulation (micro)

Relevance of the study The relationship between urban transformation and land ownership is not often investigated, particularly in the Netherlands (Buitelaar et al., 2008). Particularly the separate influences of planning instruments and land policy on development outcome are unclear and dependent on context (Evans, 2004). This study therefore aims to generate some valuable knowledge on the interplay of planning instruments through the different planning systems and land policies through land ownership. This study thus particularly adds the role of the variable land ownership to the academic debate on planning systems and how they evolve (Munoz-Gielen & Tasan-Kok, 2010; Janssen-Jansen & Woltjer, 2010). The research hereby aims to generate insight in considerations made by public landowners in London and Amsterdam. As Haila (2016) suggests, these considerations are key to generating conditions for the inclusion of affordable housing segments in a development. With the UK as a state where more neoliberal influences are present than in the more social-democratic Netherlands, the expectation is that public land would more easily serve economic goals, while in Amsterdam it would more easily support social goals, such as mixed-income housing. Since there are also indicators that under neoliberal influences, the Dutch planning system is evolving towards a more development-led system, the comparison with the UK might be particularly useful to transfer knowledge from the British practice to the Netherlands (Heurkens & Hobma, 2014). Then especially the Royal Albert Wharf developed under a development-led planning system, but on public land, might be useful for the Dutch context as public land ownership is common in Dutch municipalities. Is in such a more market-led development public steering through land still required or can the market create a housing mix on its own? Additionally, the study is relevant as it connects planning theory to the contemporary challenges on urban housing markets in terms of inclusivity and accessibility. Such kind of topics as inclusivity and residential mix are often studied in the context of urban regeneration and gentrification, particularly in Amsterdam (Hochstenbach, 2017; van Gent, 2013; Uitermark, 2009; Musterd, 2014). These studies then often focus on the sale of social housing as neoliberal policy to mix less affluent neighbourhoods with more affluent residents and study the effects on the existing community and amenities (Arthurson, 2002; Lees, 2008). This study adds a “development perspective” within this field of housing and socio-economic mixing and specifically focusses on the development processes of new urban neighbourhoods and how a mix of housing segments can be developed. As Boland et al. (2016) and Raco et al. (2007) illustrated, mixed-income housing is not always realised. How do cities plan for new socio-economically mixed neighbourhoods and what factors influence this? Finally, the comparative research aims to provide some practical knowledge on the opportunities and constraints of providing a diversity of housing segments in cities. The development of affordable housing segments is hot topic in both London and Amsterdam since the demand for it is high (Hulsman, 2018; Damen, 2016; Martin, 2016; Boterman et al., 2013). Despite the fact that city governments often have deliberate goals to add a mix of housing segments to the urban housing stock, these goals are not always realised (Colenutt et al., 2015). This study explores the housing policies with regard to mixing in both cities and links them to the development processes of the studied cases. This might indicate why certain housing segments are more frequently included in the housing mix than others. Through the case selection, the study aims to explain to what extent public land ownership can play a role to influence the housing mix in these developments. Is public land policy the key to facilitate more affordable housing or are planning instruments (or other factors) more important to facilitate mixed- income housing? By studying the two cities in both countries that have the largest problems on the housing markets in terms of accessibility and affordability, the comparative knowledge might be useful as well for cities with a lesser amount of challenges on these issues.

Structure of the thesis The thesis starts with the twofold theoretical framework. This chapter will first make clear what mixed- income housing is and what the benefits are of mixing different housing segments in developments. The second part of the theoretical framework explains how mix-income housing can be facilitated in new developments through the housing system, planning system and land policy. Next, as the research compares two different cities in different countries, the thesis spells out the most important contextual differences between planning and housing developments in the UK and the Netherlands. Chapter 4 discusses the research questions the thesis aims to answer and by what methodological strategy. This chapter will also address the comparative strategy of this research and the case selection. Chapter 5 will discuss the research findings on the three sub-questions. Chapter 6 offers a comparative conclusion on the three sub-questions, while this comparison leads towards the answering of the main question of this research.

2. A theoretical framework on why socio-economically mixed neighbourhoods should be developed and how it can be achieved

2.1. The importance of socio-economic mixing in urban areas

2.1.1. Mixing income groups in urban developments In urban context, the idea of mixing reflects the ideal that a neighbourhood or new development should be accessible to live and visit by all sorts of residents. The composition of different housing segments is a powerful tool to enhance the social mix of a city, neighbourhood or area as a housing segment determines the income class who can live in it (Rowlands et al., 2006; van Gent, 2013; Hochstenbach, 2017). As social mixing comes with many, expected benefits, it is often a deliberate political goal and implemented by policy makers and urban planners as a way to promote diverse and sustainable communities (Arhurson, 2010; Musterd & Anderson, 2005; Lees, 2008). Mixing in spatial policy is mostly pursued to produce ethnically or socio-economically diverse areas (Arthurson, 2010). As this research is focussed on the housing aspect of urban developments, there is a focus on income- based mixing (socio-economical dimension) as a mix of different incomes is relatively directly attainable by providing or developing different housing segments (van Gent, 2013).

Mixed-income housing1 is associated with a number of benefits. First of all, there is a place-oriented goal that emphasises a better quality of a neighbourhood by mixing different segments of housing (Levy et al., 2013). A diverse population of residents would lead to more diverse facilities and improved safety than there would be in particularly housing estates. This place-oriented goal is thus largely associated with preventing the existence of economically poor and segregated areas. The benefit is often used in urban regeneration context and mixing is then often used to make poorer neighbourhoods more diverse by the addition of more expensive housing segments (Lees, 2008; van Gent, 2013). Critics however argue, that it are most often poorer areas being mixed with more expensive, middle-class homes, but not vice-versa (Lipman, 2008; Hochstenbach, 2017). As this study investigates the development processes of brownfields, there is no existing neighbourhood on the developed site itself and thus place quality by mixed-income housing can be produced from the scratch (Dixon, 2009).

Creating a mixed supply of housing segments then also results in a second benefit, the improved accessibility for many types of residents to the local housing market. Developing a mix of housing segments can simply offer a suitable home for different income groups as someone dependent on social benefits could inhabit a social home, an architect might inhabit an intermediate rental home and a surgeon might buy a home. These different socio-economic classes then get the opportunity to live within the same neighbourhood. In new housing developments, the inclusion of a mix of segments is in no means a certainty, but it can be deliberately facilitated in the planning process (Boland et al., 2016; Tasan-Kok & Sungu-Eryilmaz, 2010).

A third benefit of mixed-income housing is linked to social cohesion and social mobility for low income residents. Many urban policies strive that the encounters between different income groups might

1 Other key terms used in literature for a housing scheme that consists of all housing segments are mixed tenure and inclusionary housing. The terms are relatively interchangeable, but this research sticks to mixed-income housing. Mixed tenure is very UK specific and mostly only focusses on the segment and not on factors as size, while inclusionary housing is mostly US specific. Mixed-income housing is chosen as most neutral, straightforward term. 9 result in towards stronger ties between residents from different social-economic classes and that low income groups can lean on the social capital of more affluent income groups (Levy et al., 2013; Musterd & Anderson, 2015; McIntyre & McKee, 2012). Among researchers there is a debate on the positive external effects of mixing and at what scale housing segments should be mixed to gain the biggest positive effects (Arthurson, 2010). Research has however indicated that these effects are difficult to be measured, purely as a result of mixed-income housing (Levy et al., 2013). In some cases home- owners perceived their social renting neighbours as bad neighbours, and in general renters move quicker from an area than home-owners (Levy et al., 2013; Tersteeg & Pinkster, 2016). Such kind of factors make it difficult to create social engagement between different groups of residents. Gans (1962) also stated that within mixed areas, a certain degree of tenure homogeneity is required as people tend to identify themselves more easily with residents with a similar socio-economic status. However, with additional functions and actions, interaction between different groups of residents can be facilitated (Levy et al., 2013; Rowlands et al., 2016).

For this last benefit, mixed-income housing is mostly a means to achieve higher societal goals (Fainstein, 2000). For the first two benefits, mixed-income housing is a goal on itself to directly achieve a better spatial quality and, importantly, housing access to an area for a diverse group of citizens. As this study is focussed on the development process of these inclusive urban residential areas, it focusses on mixed-income housing as a goal on itself. The additional benefits for social cohesion and upward mobility are outside the scope of this research as they can only be measured after developments have been entirely completed for some time.

2.1.2. Mixing in a neoliberal context Since the 1990s, cities over the world started to revive after a period of urban decline in the 1970s and 1980s (Scott, 2011). As cities became more popular to both live and work, the pressures on many of their local housing markets increased significantly, including Amsterdam and London (Boterman et al., 2013; Hochstenbach, 2017). Hence, housing in many major European cities became slowly more expensive and living in many parts of these cities remains a right for the most affluent groups (Hochestenbach, 2017). Regularly, these trends are also facilitated by (national) governmental policy, focussed on attracting more skilled workers and the sale of social housing, often in favour of urban regeneration (van Gent, 2013; Uitermark, 2009; Lees et al., 2008; van Kempen & Priemus, 1999). Particularly the inclusion of cheaper housing segments in the housing mix tends to be at pressure in new (large) urban developments, as governments take a more entrepreneurial approach to urban developments, desiring internationally appealing and competitive developments to promote the city for high-skilled workers (Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Boland et al., 2016; Raco & Henderson, 2009; Hochstenbach, 2017). According to Swyngedouw et al. (2002), many of these urban developments are guided by neoliberal policy based on values as deregulation and increased (international) competitiveness. These neoliberal forces have their influence on planning as they comprise a shift towards market-led planning and less regulation by public planning authorities (Tasan-Kok, 2011; Boland et al., 2016). According to some, planning is hence being downgraded to simply adjusting plans to meet demands of (market) actors.

The more entrepreneurial approach towards urban policy and urban regeneration started in the 1980s in the United Kingdom under the Thatcher administration, and spread to other European countries later this decade. This urban entrepreneurialism represents a neoliberal philosophy characterised by deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation, as a step away from the Keynesian socio-economic

10 tradition of the post-war period in Western Europe that led to the development of large stocks of cheap social housing in European cities (Tallon, 2013; Harvey, 1989; Scanlon et al., 2015; Carmona et al., 2003). Since the 1980s, there was a larger emphasis on the private sector in shaping urban policy and area development. Particularly in this phase, there was a relative “roll-back” of the state in urban policy making. Neo-liberalisation however does not imply a full retreat from the state in policy, but it implies a different role of the state to impose and facilitate market mechanisms in social spheres: the so-called roll-out neo-liberalisation (Pinson & Morel Journel, 2016; Peck & Tickel, 2002).

Since the late 1990s, and continuing till present-day policy, there has been a renewed focus on preventing social exclusion and involving local communities in urban policy (Tallon, 2013). Pinson & Morel Journel (2016) argue that especially since the 1990s the more traditional social-democratic policies have been intertwined with neoliberal thinking. According to Tasan-Kok (2011), present-day planning is in-between two counter currents. On the one hand, planning needs to be responsive to growing critics on the trends that have come with neoliberal planning practice (more privatisation, market-led development and regeneration), while on the other hand, planners need to work within this new system to do what they can to prevent possible negative impacts on cities and communities (Tasan-Kok, 2011). It is clear that this shift to market-oriented development entails a new role for planners to cooperate with private developers in order to achieve planning goals such mixing housing segments to foster inclusivity (Heurkens & Hobma, 2014). As a result of the retreating role of public parties in leading developments, developers have an increasing role in safeguarding these values. Moreover the inclusion of cheaper housing segments has benefits for the general plan quality, what would be appealing to all parties (Majoor, 2011; Boland et al., 2016). Traditionally, it is often understood that only the public partners of a development protect public interests as inclusivity, while private partners are guided by financial, short term goals. The reality is however less twofold, and both developers and planners act as market actors in a complex negotiating process on what will be developed on a location (Reynaers, 2014; Rainey & Bozeman, 2000; Adams & Tiessdell, 2011).

2.1.3. Conceptualising mixed-income housing When mixed-income housing is developed, there should ideally be a balance between similar housing segments and differentiation of housing segments in a development scheme, but there is no standard or perfect rule (Gans, 1962; Alexander et al., 1977). Vale & Shamsuddin (2017) investigated 260 mixed- income housing developments in the United States and concluded that the term includes a broad group of different housing compositions. The concept is therefore differently operationalised by various authors. Alexander et al. (1977) mention that a housing mix in an area should be mixed in a sense that it can accommodate a similar population as the total population of a city. Holin et al. (2013) found that at least 20% of the residents in an area should earn below 30% of the area median income and 20% should earn more than 50% of the area median income. Baron (2009) uses a more straightforward mix of one-third public housing, one-third intermediate housing, and one-third market homes. Khadduri & Martin (1997) use a normative perspective, viewing mixed-income housing as a means to a particular social end, and thus focus particularly on including low income families with children in an area. Finally, Brophy & Smith (1997, 5) use a more general definition that describes mixed-income housing as a “deliberate effort to construct multifamily development that has the mixing of income groups as a fundamental part of its financial and operational plans”.

Based on Vale & Shamsuddin (2017) who studied 260 mixed-income housing developments, four different dimensions of mixed-income housing can be studied: 1)the housing programme, 2)the

11 finance of the mix, 3)the duration of the mix and 4)how interaction between the different income groups is promoted. The first three dimensions will be studied for this research. The fourth dimension is left out in this study as the research focusses on the development process of mixed-income housing. Moreover, only the first residents of the studied cases have moved in and it is therefore difficult to study the interactions between different income groups of residents.

First, and the most conventional way of investigating mixed income housing, is the distribution of the different types of residential units by tenure: the programme. Investigating the programme of the developed homes, provides a global image of the resident mix in the area. Decisions made about the different segments and their size has a result on the types of residents that have access to the area. For instance, a large development of studio homes will likely attract single person households, while social rental housing will house a relative large share of ethnic minorities. When investigating the proposed programme, it is also important to reflect on the extent to which housing is provided for the most vulnerable groups on the local housing markets (Arthurson, 2002). These vulnerable groups are not necessarily the least affluent groups. In Amsterdam, it are predominantly starters on the housing market and mid-income groups that find it hard to find a home (Boterman et al., 2013; Hochstenbach, 2017). The housing programme should thus ideally be to some extent demand-driven.

Secondly, it is important to investigate the financial considerations made by both public and private partners as they eventually result in the financial viability of the development programme. Including more affordable homes will normally result in less profit for developers and local authorities as well (Colenutt et al., 2015). It is therefore interesting to investigate how the affordable homes are financed through the development process. In general affordable housing can be financed through a number of ways. Firstly, the government can provide direct supply subsidies to affordable housing. This was a very common way in Europe till the 1990s (Burgess et al., 2007). Secondly, a local government could give discount on the land for the development of affordable housing. This approach is typically linked to many European countries, but particularly the Netherlands (Buitelaar et al., 2011; Cheshire, 2009). Thirdly, the cheaper housing segments could be financed from the profits that the market homes generate (Morrison & Burgess, 2013). Finally, subsidies could be given to tenants of housing themselves, making certain types of market homes more affordable and accessible for them (Vale & Shamsuddin, 2017; Schwartz & Tajbakhsh, 1997). In practice, the funding will be typically a combination of the mentioned ways.

Third, the duration of the mix is an important aspect of maintaining areas sustainably inclusive on a long-term basis. Housing tenure can change and particularly owner-occupied housing is subject to quick price changes (Vale & Shamsuddin, 2017). For intermediate private rental housing, the rents might increase as well over the time and the rent increase could thus displace residents with a middle income (Damen & Kieft, 2016). A mix of housing only upon completion of the development is not serving the long-term housing need, and is therefore important to investigate what kind of agreements local authorities made with developers to maintain the housing mix in an area over a longer time period (Rowlands et al., 2006).

2.2. Strategies to promote housing mix

2.2.1. Affordable housing provision embedded in planning and housing systems In planning practice, achieving a housing mix can be quite challenging. It is particularly the provision of affordable and/or social housing that can be problematic, as affordable housing is simply less profitable than housing that can be sold or rented at market prices (de Kam, Needham & Buitelaar, 2014; Boland et al., 2016; Colenutt et al., 2015). In order to promote affordable housing within residential developments, in most countries and cities there is public policy that focusses on the regulation and promotion of affordable types of housing.

Particularly public parties traditionally take the leading role in facilitating affordable housing, and thus mixed-income housing developments, particularly as a housing mix is seen by policy makers as an effective means for achieving long-term broader societal goals which are linked to the public benefit for an area or the city (Arthurson, 2010; Musterd & Anderson, 2005; Musterd; 2002; Lees, 2008). For private partners -developers and to a lesser extent investors- these long-term goals are generally less important, as these parties have more economic and short-term goals (Kort & Klijn, 2011; Kenniscentrum voor PPS, 2006). The public policy that regulates affordable housing provision differs over different countries, and some countries have more effective legal possibilities to promote the inclusion of affordable housing within developments.

De Kam, Needham & Buitelaar (2014) created a framework to analyse the relation of affordable housing provision with public policy. The authors make a distinction between a country its housing system on the one hand, and the planning system on the other hand. The housing system hereby determines the wish for affordable housing in a country, while the planning system influences the possibilities for affordable housing provision. The differences of both the housing and planning systems between countries can be embedded in the society and welfare regimes of the different countries (figure 1). The role of land ownership is added through this study (see below).

Figure 1: Basic relations between housing and planning systems and mixed-income housing provision

Source: Own adaption of De Kam, Needham & Buitelaar, 2014.

Housing systems: a shift towards home-ownership De Kam, Needham & Buitelaar (2014) use Kemeny’s (2001) classification of housing regimes. Kemeny (2001) distinguishes dualist and unitary housing systems, which he bases on Esping-Anderson’s classification of welfare states. Dualist and unitary housing systems both have a different view on the role of social and affordable housing in society.

The dualist housing system can be mostly found in liberal welfare states such as the United Kingdom and the United States and Mediterranean countries. In the dualist housing system, the state takes a direct responsibility for the provision of social and affordable housing. The social housing sector is however seen separately from the regular housing market and the provision of social housing is seen as an activity for the most vulnerable people in society. The unitary housing system is found in more social-democratic and corporatist welfare states such as the Netherlands and Sweden. In these countries, the social housing sector is more integrated with the regular housing market and hybrid semi-public organisations (e.g. housing associations) exist to provide social and affordable housing. These organisations are often supported by the government and they do not only provide housing for the lowest incomes, but sometimes also for middle incomes (De Kam, Needham & Buitelaar, 2014; Lennartz, 2011). The type of housing system thus influences what type of social or affordable housing is typical for a country, as some types of housing are more institutionalised and/or supported by government policy. By this way, the housing system sets the definitions for the different types of housing and for which kind of citizens are eligible for living in them (De Kam, Needham & Buitelaar, 2014).

Housing systems are not static and evolve over time under political reforms. In many European countries, including the Netherlands and the UK, the national governments have started stimulating home-ownership of citizens since the 1980s (UK) and 1990s (Netherlands) (Ronald & Elsinga, 2012; Aedes, 2013; Scanlon et al., 2013). Because of the increase in welfare since the end of the Second World War, an increasing number of citizens were able to afford their own home (Musterd, 2014). The increase of home-ownership also fits within the neoliberal shift in many European countries in the 1980s. National governments saw home-ownership as way of providing individual welfare for its citizens as an un-mortgaged home can substitute a pension income (Castles, 1998). At the same time, the stimulation of home-ownership also meant a retrenchment of the welfare state and public expenditures. Kemeny (2005) and Castles (1998) call this the “really big trade-off” between home- ownership and the welfare state. This paradigm shift towards a “home-ownership society” depends on the increase of house values, as housing has been commodified as welfare asset (Ronald & Elsinga, 2012). It is outside the scope of this study to discuss the drivers of house price increases, but since the 1990s house prices in both the UK and the Netherlands started to increase more quickly than inflation. Changes in the UK and Dutch society and welfare regime have clearly influenced the way the housing system functions in each of these countries.

Planning system: plan-led versus development-led The planning system determines the possibilities for including affordable housing within development plans. The planning system determines what legal abilities public and private partners have to initiate, influence and steer on developments, including the housing mix (Munoz-Gielen & Tasan-Kok, 2010; Kang & Korthals Altes, 2015). The planning system is therefore an important means of safeguarding the inclusion of affordable housing within spatial developments (Carmona et al., 2013). Through the planning system, governments can intervene in property rights by means of e.g. compulsory purchase or the creation of land-use plans to ensure landowners provide an amount of affordable housing as

14 well (De Kam, Needham & Buitelaar, 2014; Webster, 2005). Especially when planning systems allow detailed prescriptions about the required tenure split for developments, the planning system can prevent the development of purely market housing.

Based on the work of Faludi (1987), academics generally differentiate two groups of planning systems. On the one hand, there is the plan-led (or conforming, or Continental) system, found in most European countries, and on the other hand there is the development-led (or performing, or British) system, found in the United Kingdom and the Anglosphere (Kang & Korthals Altes, 2015). Plan-led systems are characterised by legally binding land-use plans or zoning ordinances that determine the preconditions on which developers step in when they want to propose a new development. The central idea behind this is that this legal certainty prevents municipalities and planners against making arbitrary decisions in favour, or against, specific developers/parties. The legally binding guidelines, based on the rule of law are typically linked to the civil (Napoleonic) law in many continental European countries (Kang & Korthals Altes, 2015). In contrast, in development-led systems land-use plans are not legally binding, but they are more indicative. They indicate a general way of thinking about the future by the public authorities (Munoz-Gielen & Tasan-Kok, 2010). Based on these general plans, developers can initiate their plans for development. The way the initiatives fit within the land-use plans, is largely dependent on negotiations between local authorities and developers. After the negotiations, just before the development phase, the plans become legally binding. This negotiated aspect of the development-led system is called “development control” (Kang & Korthals Altes, 2015). Development control is often seen as problematic by academics as it means that there is generally less certainty about the outcome of developments and there are less possibilities to regulate a development by public parties (Kang & Korthals Altes, 2015). The development-led system is typically linked to the British common-law, which draws rules from preceding cases.

In general it can be said that, particularly due its legally binding and detailed land-use plans that preserve the existing land-use of sites, plan-led systems are considered to offer better legal instruments for public bodies to steer on development outcomes (Munoz-Gielen & Tasan-Kok, 2010). For mixed-income housing, these planning systems with legally binding land-use plans are seen to be better in facilitating the inclusion of cheaper housing segments, as development proposals consisting of only market homes could be more easily and legally refused. Contrastingly, the development-led system is more focused on a public body facilitating new developments. Together with more discretion and room for negotiations, it would be more easy to make exceptions on affordable housing targets and allow more market housing (De Kam, Needham & Buitelaar, 2014).

Planning systems are however country specific and a strict generalisation is difficult to make. In the UK for instance, there is a very widely established value recapturing mechanism to let private parties contribute to finance facilities for the public benefit such as affordable housing, but on the other hand there is (as expected) less regulation through land-use plans as they are not legally binding (De Kam, Needham & Buitelaar, 2014; Janssen-Jansen & Woltjer, 2010; Webster, 2005). In addition many plan- led countries, including the Netherlands, have characteristics of the development-led system as well. Land-use plans are legally binding instruments in the Netherlands, but they are regularly made through a process of negotiations (Munoz-Gielen & Tasan-Kok, 2010; Buitelaar et al., 2011).

As De Kam, Needham & Buitelaar (2014) argue, the extent to which governments find intervening in property rights desirable -and how the available planning instruments are used- differs quite a lot between countries. Like the housing system, the use of the planning system is dependent on the type

15 of welfare system and political context of a country and/or city. In general, countries with liberal welfare states find intervening with property rights less desirable, while countries with a social democratic or corporatist welfare regime see it as a good means to capture land value and redistribute wealth (Calavita & Mallach, 2010).

The inclusion of land ownership One aspect that is not directly included in the original model by De Kam, Needham & Buitelaar (2014) is the role of land ownership. Land ownership is an important factor which is related to the planning system since the planning system determines the legal possibilities for landowners versus the government. The specific situation of who owns the land is also important for steering on the outcome (and thus affordable housing provision). Land ownership is a crucial factor for affordable housing development, as the landowner (or the person holding the rights to the land) has the right to bring forward land for development (Needham, 2006). If a landowner is not willing to keep the land for development, he or she can also decide to sell it to other parties. If a developer sees a high potential for the location and the price for the land that is paid is high, it becomes more challenging to develop affordable housing as this type of housing generates less profits than market housing, a profit that is needed to cover the land acquisition costs. This is particularly the case in cities, as the land available for housing developments is generally scarce (Cheshire, 2009; Evans, 2004).

Land is crucial for any human activity, such as living, working and leisure to happen. It is however a complex commodity that has multiple functions. In particular, a tension exists between the producers and consumers of land (Montgomery, 1987). The developer of the land aims to achieve a high as possible return by producing new housing or other facilities on land, while the consumers -often residents- benefit most from how the land is finally used (and using the land and facilities for a decent price). To structure this complex interaction between producers and consumers of land, many countries use a form of land-use planning to regulate these economic benefits versus social, public, needs (Montgomery, 1987). On the one hand, the government can use its planning system to regulate spatial developments, but on the other hand, public land ownership can be a powerful tool to facilitate housing mix, such as the inclusion of affordable housing within developments (Terhorst et al., 2003). This is especially beneficial when land is scarce and high in value (Montgomery, 1987). When the (local) government owns the land, it generally has additional powers to steer on developments either by active land-use planning or giving discount on the land price for affordable/social housing developments (Buitelaar et al., 2011; Montgomery, 1987; Martin, 2017). The public landowner also has the choice to procure the land and let developers compete on certain values, such as housing programme, sustainability, but also land price (van Gelder, 2016).

A crucial aspect of public land ownership is the goal that ratifies the ownership of land by the (local) government (Haila, 2016). Land ownership itself is rarely a goal by itself but it is often a means to serve a greater good. Montgomery (1987) distinguishes four functions of public land ownership, which can function both separately or together (figure 2). First, the land could serve as a means of production. The government can make the land available for development, something which is common in the Netherlands. Second, apart from just delivering land, the government can make the land and the to be developed buildings available for consumption. In this case the government makes land available under the conditions that certain facilities or a share of affordable housing will be provided. Third, the goal can be circulation, serving a wider community than just the direct residents or workers on the site. In this case the government would make the land available for e.g. public infrastructure or

16 conservation of valuable buildings. Finally, the land can serve as investment for the state, and like regular property developers, the public body owning the land could use the land to make financial profits by using land in anticipation of future increases in land value.

When the government is a landowner, it automatically puts the government in a difficult position as it has an economic interest in the land (as market player) while it also has the responsibility to safeguard the public interest by e.g. providing affordable housing (as market regulator) (Montgomery, 1987; Buitelaar, 2010). Buitelaar (2010) refers to this governmental dilemma as the “double hat problem”. As public land can thus also serve as a simple means to fill budgetary gaps, it is important to understand the intentions and reasons that lie behind the land policy of a governmental institution (Besussi, 2016; Martin, 2017).

Figure 2: The functions of public land ownership

Source: Montgomery (1987).

Society and welfare regimes: the importance of political context As mentioned, the wish and possibilities for a mixed-income housing programme, but also the use of public land, are strongly influenced by the society and in particular the political context. Although there could be housing policy and planning instruments to facilitate housing mix, the reality is that planning outcomes differ in terms of mix and how inclusive the housing mix is (Colenutt et al., 2015). Aaron Wildavsky (1973) analysed this discrepancy between planning expectations and reality and noted that in many cases expectations do not meet up with the outcome. According to Wildavsky, the planning process stands between its actors and society, as the society influences how actors perceive problems and what they want to do about it. In other words, if a certain housing segment is not desired in society, nobody will make effort to include it in the housing mix, even though planners might personally want it and planning instruments could facilitate it.

According to Wildavsky (1973, 132), planning decisions thus have a strong political component: “planning is politics”. According to Wildavsky, planning is an instrument used within the political arena to achieve political goals (Wildavsky, 1973). As local politicians want for instance more owner-occupied housing (e.g. guided by national housing policies), then the planner’s efforts to develop more social/affordable homes can be nullified. According to Wildavsky, in planning practice there are different wills competing between different political groups, planners and private parties, all having different intentions. What is developed is dependent on the dominant plans in mind. The question therefore is, who’s intentions are realised? Wildavsky’s answer to this is that in practice, the most

17 dominant intentions arise from the political arena: governmental bodies are after all responsible for a large part of the funding of developments. The planning process is in this view mostly there to control and mitigate the political choices into a executable plan. Wildavsky (1973) notes that the political and societal context is under constant change. A new government, might change policy focus (on e.g. other housing segments) or the housing and land markets fluctuate. These changing factors indicate how intentions might change and the policies to implement them. Planners and plans must simply adapt to these changing circumstances.

In response to Wildavsky, Alexander (1981) argued that the planning process is not only dictated by political factors, but that the planning process is much more influenced by other factors such as the presence of community groups and the location. Local community groups can intervene in the planning process and can for example promote more social housing in a plan. The location might be on a brownfield, where a local community lacks, or the land values on an inner-city area might make it less viable to develop affordable housing segments. The planning process is the result of a social interactive process between different stakeholders. According to Alexander, the political arena might control the goal of a development, but the planner’s role is to become actively involved in the planning process and negotiate with other stakeholders to come up with the optimal strategy within the constraints of the societal and political context. The planning process is a process after all, and is often reflective. A planning process involves many options and choices made will be evaluated (Alexander, 1981; Faludi, 2000). This process thus also influences how planning instruments will be used to facilitate mixed- income housing.

Resuming, Wildavsy (1973) gives a much greater role to the political, societal context in determining the housing mix of developments. As the contemporary societal context is guided by neoliberal influences, these influences should have an important influence on the mix and planning processes of both cases. On the other hand, Alexander (1981) would put a much greater emphasis on the planning process and the actors in determining the housing mix in both cases. More recently, Raco (2018) illustrates that political pressure is still shaping local planning processes and outcomes. He hereby especially gives importance to the national government in reshaping planning powers of local governments.

2.2.2. Facilitating affordable housing within the housing mix of new developments To plan mixed-income housing, there are three main ways through which local authorities can shape market conditions for developments, and promote a more inclusive housing mix in an area (Schwartz & Tajbakhsh, 1997; Adams & Tiesdell, 2010 & De Bruijn & Dicke, 2006). In practice these ways work more or less together to result in a mutual agreement by public and private parties.

First, the national and local governments can enforce the development of mixed-income housing by simply enforcing regulations (Adams & Tiesdell, 2010). Without conforming these regulations, developers can simply not get planning permission for their proposed development (Schwartz & Tajbakhsh, 1997) These regulations are commonly implemented in the form of zoning ordinances or they can be prescribed in land-use plans. In Amsterdam, the municipality regularly enforces a specific mix through procurements, which is possible in case of public land ownership (van Gelder, 2016). 30 percent social rent, 40 percent middle priced homes and 30 percent market homes was for instance a regularly used formula (Kieft, 2017). In the United Kingdom, Section-106 forms a legal ground for local governments to force developers to include certain aspects in plans, including affordable housing (Kang & Korthals Altes, 2015; Webster, 2005). De Bruijn & Dicke (2006) refer to regulations as

18 hierarchy. By implementing certain standards or regulations, local authorities and planners do not only enforce private developers to conform these standards, but they also conform themselves. Hierarchy, or regulation, is thus a relatively “strict” way of safeguarding a specific housing mix, and therefore local authorities might sometimes choose for other ways of promoting the public interest (De Bruijn & Dicke, 2006).

Secondly, national and local governments can stimulate the development of mixed-income housing within an area (Schwartz & Tajbakhsh, 1997; Adams & Tiesdell, 2010). Stimulating is a more encouraging approach than regulation, and has a more positive connotation. Stimulating can be done by providing subsidies to private developers when they develop a specific amount of affordable housing or by specific grant programmes. For instance, in New York the local authority provided tax- exempt for projects that reserve at least 20 percent of their homes for low- and moderate income households (Schwartz & Tajbakhsh, 1997). A local authority could also give a price discount on land it owns for the development of certain types of housing, such as social housing. In sum, stimulating measures are meant to lubricate private parties to provide less profitable goods for the public benefit such as social housing (Adams & Tiesdell, 2010).

Finally, private developers can provide a mixed housing development by themselves (Schwartz & Tajbakhsh, 1997). Not all developers aim to maximise their profits by developing purely high-end homes and developing a mix of housing segments might above all spread out sales risks (Rowlands et al., 2016). Therefore they are likely to respond to the demands on the local housing markets by providing a certain mix of housing. Moreover, especially for brownfield developments, a developer would aim to create a well-designed and integrated urban area to achieve place quality. To facilitate the market to develop mixed-income housing, planning authorities should make sure that the market conditions are fitting the desired developments for the areas (Adams & Tiesdell, 2010). Adams & Tiesdell (2010) call this method shaping. Shaping the market conditions can be done by making indicative urban design visions or housing visions. Shaping might seem somewhat similar to regulating, but it is a more soft way of influencing mixed-income housing. By shaping a specific vision for an area, private developers would ideally conform these visions with their proposals before hard regulation is needed. Since developers are then aware of the expectations of the planning authority, they will adjust their proposals to fit these visions (Rowlands et al., 2016). Good shaping can thus generate better conditions for negotiations between local authorities and developers (De Bruijn & Dicke, 2006).

3. An institutional framework of housing development in London and Amsterdam

As there are differences between the way housing is developed in London (United Kingdom) and Amsterdam (Netherlands), this chapter spells out the institutional differences between both cities and countries with regard to housing development. The first section compares how the different planning systems shape planning practice in both cities (see figure 3). The second section discusses the roles of the different institutions governing housing policy. The third and final section spells out the differences between the housing segments existing in each country. This contextual chapter supports the understanding of the empirical findings and analysis for each city.

3.1. Two different planning systems

Figure 3: Overview of the most central differences between the British and Dutch planning systems UK (England) Netherlands Development-led Plan-led with development-led characteristics Planning to regulate new developments Planning to preserve existing land-use Reactive, facilitating planning Proactive Municipal-led planning initiating spatial change Indicative Local Plans provide general guidance for Potentially highly detailed land-use plans form the planning legal guidance for planning High degree of discretion allowing flexible ad-hoc Lower degree of discretion through the land-use solutions plans Affordable housing typically financed through Affordable housing typically financed through land planning gain Source: own production, 2018. 3.1.1. London embedded in the British development-led system The British (this paper focusses on the English and Welsh practice) planning system is embedded in the British common-law, and planning is mainly used to regulate developments, rather than to control or initiate them (as the Dutch system). Public intervention through planning is predominantly done through the assessment of new development proposals. This process is called development control (Janssen-Jansen & Woltjer, 2010). As part of the development control, a developer submits a planning application to the local authority with the aim to get planning permission for development. Local authorities (known as boroughs in London) are responsible for the most important planning document, the Local Development Framework (also known as the Local Plan) (Janssen-Jansen & Woltjer, 2010). This, since 2004 existing, document contains most indicative rules and desired developments for housing, spatial planning and recreation. According to Janssen-Jansen & Woltjer (2010), this document is in principle guiding to test development plans before planning permission is given. The document is however not legally binding and planning permission can also be given when a development is not conforming the Local Development Framework. Achieving planning permission is in practice often a result of extensive negotiations between local authorities and private developers. In the end, planning permission is mostly granted based on argumentation, and not entirely based on a land-use plan (Janssen-Jansen & Woltjer, 2010; Kang & Korthals Altes, 2015).

The British planning system is furthermore characterised by a high level of discretion (Janssen-Jansen & Woltjer, 2010; Heurkens & Hobma, 2014). This discretion is possible because of the non-legally

20 binding status of the Local Development Frameworks. Local authorities are therefore free to make separate, and thus different, agreements with different developers and for different projects. This also makes the British planning system much more flexible than the Dutch system and it gives room to political judgement, which is lesser the case in the Netherlands where plans are essentially judged by the law (Janssen-Jansen & Woltjer, 2010).

Affordable housing as part of the housing mix in the UK and London is typically facilitated through planning gain, which is embedded in Section-106 of the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act (Kang & Korthals Altes, 2015; Janssen-Jansen, 2010; Dixon, 2009; van der Veen & Korthals Altes, 2010). By use of Section-106 agreements, local authorities can enforce the developer to reallocate profits (the planning gain) from the development towards social goals such as infrastructure, affordable housing and schools within developments, even when the local authority is not the landowner. When agreed, the Section-106 agreement is a legally binding deed (van der Veen & Korthals Altes, 2010). Planning gain and the Section-106 agreements have been widely criticized for being inconsistent, not transparent, unfair and the negotiations take normally much time (Janssen-Jansen & Woltjer, 2010; Oxley, 2006). Moreover, local authorities might demand either much higher or lower contributions than reasonable for social infrastructure (Oxley, 2006). Moreover, the agreements do not necessarily contain sanctions for when developers do not meet the negotiated requirements (van der Veen & Korthals Altes, 2010).

The relatively small role of public land ownership in London Land in the United Kingdom is traditionally owned by the aristocracy, as a result of the feudal system. In the 20th century, there was an significant increase of public owned land, and the share of public land (1/6th) reached its top during the Second World War (Home, 2009). The Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s, however advocated the sale of many private lands and since then the share of public land has dropped. In London, about 10 percent of the land is publicly owned, while another 10 percent is owned by public-related bodies, such as Transport for London (Dixon, 2009). The remaining 80 percent of the land is owned by private landowners, including the traditional aristocracy, individuals or large international investment firms (Dixon, 2009; Haslett, 2017). Like in Amsterdam and the Netherlands, land is scarce in the UK and London (Home, 2009; Monk et al., 2013). This has led towards increasing and high land costs for developments, particularly in London (Home, 2009; Haslett, 2017; Adonis, 2015). Public land ownership in urban developments in London, is thus much less common than in Amsterdam. Moreover, many public land is already in use, although Dixon (2009) notes that especially many brownfield locations are owned by public bodies.

As most land in London is in private ownership, local planning authorities have a smaller tradition than the Municipality of Amsterdam to actively control developments towards certain planning objectives, such as mixed-income housing developments (Bowie, 2015). The most common way for local authorities to intervene in developments for achieving those social objectives is through Section-106, but this instrument is not linked to public land ownership (Kang & Korthals Altes, 2015; Janssen-Jansen, 2010; Dixon, 2009). Local authorities in the UK can however make use of compulsory purchase to enforce the sale of private land to the local authority. However, in practice this is not often used, as high costs come with this (especially in London) (Dixon, 2009). Moreover, there are less instruments in the UK that can help local authorities to financially gain from active development, making it not very interesting for public parties to buy up lands (Heurkens & Hobma, 2014). Local governments in the UK thus depend on the private land market and planning gain to mix housing programmes of new developments (Bowie, 2015).

3.1.2. Amsterdam as powerful municipality in the Dutch plan-led system The Dutch planning system present in Amsterdam is historically a very plan-led system with an active development role for municipalities in terms of plan-making and land development (grondexploitatie) (Buitelaar, 2010; Heurkens & Hobma, 2014). As of today, municipalities hold the largest and most important executive power for the coordination of projects and developments (Janssen-Jansen & Woltjer, 2010). This active role of municipalities in spatial planning stems from the early 19th century. Particularly in the case of infrastructural works, such as the development of polders, canals and railroads, the government started buying up lands in favour of a fast and effective development (van der Cammen & de Klerk, 2010). As a result, and also by the motivation of good planning (no area in the country should find itself excluded), the national government bought up and assembled land to guarantee that all regions were connected by the railroad system.

Later, in the second half of the 19th century, the national government shifted many power to municipalities. Municipalities were granted instruments for expropriation to speed up developments, while the 1901 Housing Law also made municipalities responsible for housing production, shifting power to a lower institutional level. The practice of public land acquisition developed further after the Second World War. Because of the vast housing need, the national government, municipalities and housing associations worked together to effectively develop large amounts of social housing: the housing associations developed the homes, the national government subsidised them and municipalities provided cheap land (Buitelaar, 2010). Together with large planning departments that have the capability to create plans and the legally binding status of land-use plans (since 1965), municipalities had a very strong say in what would be developed in the city (Buitelaar et al., 2011).

Since the end of the 1980s, municipalities started to increasingly work together with private parties to develop areas. Often private landowners and developers sold land to municipalities in trade for building rights and the possibility to buy the lands later in the process (Kang & Korthals Altes, 2015). Many locations were developed by a collaboration of public and private parties or in joint-ventures (GEMs). These models turned out to be a reliable source of income for municipalities and both parties could rely on each other’s expertise within area developments (Buitelaar, 2010). However, by three main reasons this practice started to decline. First, these joint-ventures turned out to be time- consuming and ineffective (Heurkens & Hobma, 2014). Secondly, after the 2008 financial crisis, many municipalities made large financial losses on their land developments that they made in favour of joint- venture developments (Buitelaar, 2010). Thirdly, since 2004, the European Commission started opting for a more Anglo-Saxon-based separated role division between public and private parties and for tendering based on competition, equality and transparency (Heurkens & Hobma, 2014; ICER, 2008). Henceforward, Dutch municipalities increasingly took a more facilitating, instead of active role in area and housing developments. For the Dutch planning system, it meant the emergence of more market- oriented development practices (Heurkens & Hobma, 2014; Buitelaar, 2010).

Kang & Korthals Altes (2015) discussed the Dutch planning system in relation to the British planning system. They concluded that the Dutch planning system is often considered to be a typical example of a plan-led, or conforming planning system. In these systems, public values (e.g. the inclusion of social housing) are thought to be consolidated within these plans, based on the rule of law. Local authorities ideally have no right to deviate from these legally binding plans, and otherwise they should be renewed (which is often a lengthy procedure). In practice, the reality is however less clear. Dutch land-use plans are often development-led, as municipalities often make or renew them in favour of developers. Moreover, municipalities are regularly directly involved in development plan-making (Buitelaar et al.,

2011). Buitelaar et al. (2011) therefore describe the Dutch planning system as a “pragmatic system”: legally binding land-use plans form the norm, but there are possibilities to deviate from them (Munoz- Gielen & Tasan-Kok, 2010). Despite the plan-led approach, the nature of the Dutch planning system thus also encompasses a certain space to negotiate between public and private parties about the planning conditions and deviations from plans (Janssen-Jansen & Woltjer, 2010). Negotiations can for instance take place between municipalities and landowners about the exchange of land for building rights, but also third parties, such as environmental organisations, can enforce negotiations about conditions within plans that might harm the environment (Kang & Korthals Altes, 2015). Also urban development plans, typically prescribing the housing mix, (stedenbouwkundig plan) are often the result of negotiations between municipalities and private landowners, although in Amsterdam they are generally produced by the Municipality (Savini, 2016).

The important role of public land ownership in Amsterdam As already mentioned, public land ownership has always been a crucial aspect in the Dutch planning system. Public parties have a traditionally strong involvement in the land market and it is a typical characteristic of the Dutch planning system and planning culture. The protection of land-use rights and the intervention in land-use markets is historically seen as a public task (Janssen-Jansen & Woltjer, 2010). Like, the plan-led planning system, the public involvement in the land-use market is a result of the French rule by Napoleon over the Netherlands and it is meant to guarantee legal protection for individuals from undesired developments (Janssen-Jansen & Woltjer, 2010; van Veen, 2005). This strong commitment to involve in the land-use market and is absent in the United Kingdom.

In Amsterdam, the Municipality holds over 70 percent of the land, and land is leased to developers and end-users for a certain period (often 50 years) (van Veen, 2005). This system of ground lease (erfpacht) was founded in 1896 and it is still at work2. The system was founded on two grounds. First, it simply allowed the local government to have more control over planning and housing developments, and second, it allowed to capture the value of land for the community (van Veen, 2005). The traditional strong focus on the inclusion of housing for different income groups is thus historically embedded in Amsterdam. The municipal owned lands are traditionally leased to developers under predetermined conditions and for a price, which is often determined by the desired development programme (van der Veen & Korthals Altes, 2011). The terms of the ground lease thus determine the use of the land and it is seen as a core instrument through which the Municipality of Amsterdam steers on housing mix (van Veen, 2005). According to Van Veen (2005), the Amsterdam ground lease system has not resulted in increased or more efficient housing production, mainly because the land remains scarce in Dutch cities, and the housing production is largely driven by changes in demand (Monk et al., 2013; van der Krabben & Jacobs, 2013). However, the ground lease system effected the housing distribution and affordability, particularly by the stimulation of the social rental sector for a long historical period (van Veen, 2005; Uitermark, 2009). This is mainly done because of the conserving nature of the ground lease contract that is made. Once a home is meant to be social, it has to remain social as prescribed in the ground lease contract. However, the benefit for affordability only works as long as the Municipality desires. Since the 1990s, many of the social housing in the city was allowed to be sold towards the owner- occupied or private rental sector (van Veen, 2005). This touches Wildavsky’s (1973) core definition of spatial planning, which he characterises by the “deliberate intervention to control future action”.

2 The ground lease system is however subject to renewal in which the ground lease will be made perpetually lasting 23

3.2. Housing institutions: who decides what about the housing system? Housing policy is traditionally made at different governmental levels. In many countries, including the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, there is a top-down deregulation of housing policy from the national government to the local level. This section spells out and compares the different governmental levels between Amsterdam (the Netherlands) and the London (United Kingdom) with regards to housing policy and housing development.

In both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the national governments set the basic rules for the different housing sectors, rent and building regulations, subsidies and taxation for the housing sectors existing. National governments have an important role in structuring housing markets as they create the different housing segments through the rules they make (Ronald & Elsinga, 2012; Vlak et al., 2017). This structure is important as it creates a demand for certain housing types and developers will develop housing segments based on what is subsidised, or based on what they think they can sell easily to tenants or investors (in the case of rental housing). At a lower level, in the UK, the Greater London Authority is the overarching urban institution for London. London’s 32 boroughs are however the most important planning and housing institution. In the Netherlands, municipalities are the most important local planning institution. In big cities as Amsterdam, there are also city districts (stadsdelen) having a limited influence on planning and housing. These lower governmental levels are responsible for implementing the national housing policy to fit their local housing market and urban policies.

3.2.1. United Kingdom National government As mentioned, the British national government has strongly promoted the development of owner- occupied housing since the 1980s. It is important to note that incentives to stimulate home-ownership have had big consequences for the social rental sector (which was very big and growing from 1945 till the 1980s) (Whitehead & Scanlon, 2007). In the United Kingdom, the Thatcher Conservative government introduced the Right to Buy for tenants of social housing in 1980. This incentive has been the most important incentive to stimulate home-ownership and is still active in England. The Right to Buy allows tenants of social housing to buy their home with a large discount on the price (Whitehead, 2012). The scheme was very successful and since 1980 over 1,8 million homes have been transferred from the social rental sector to home-owners. Home-ownership stimulation has thus coincided with reducing the social rental sector.

In addition to Right to Buy, the British government stimulates home-ownership for lower-income groups by offering partial ownership options to these groups. Options include shared-ownership, in which a person buys at least 25% of a home from a housing association and then rents the other 75%, or Rent to Save in which a person can rent for a discounted rate giving him/her the possibility to save to apply for a mortgage on the house within a number years (Boterman et al., 2013). The UK government also supports the Help to Buy scheme in which it provides equity loans for first time buyers.

The UK government is also directly responsible for the distribution of subsidies for non-market housing types (Allen, 2015). Government policy has however focussed on diminishing social housing grants, and basically all grants have been abolished since 2010 (Edwards, 2016; Bowie, 2015). In order to retain funds for the more expensive “affordable rental housing”, developers had to change social homes to affordable homes (Allen, 2015). At the same moment, the UK government increased the subsidies for Help to Buy. It again shows how the UK government is facilitating home-ownership as a housing

24 segment. Recently, in October 2017, Theresa May’s administration has reserved 2 billion pounds to stimulate social housing production (Booth, 2017). This is an interesting shift in government policy since the 1980s.

Greater London Authority The Greater London Authority (GLA) is quite recently established in 2000. It consists of an elected Mayor and an elected Greater London Assembly. The establishment of the GLA is the result of a long search to the best way to govern and internationally promote a 8 million inhabitants world city that is split up into 32 boroughs and the City of London (Bowie, 2010). The Mayor and its cabinet are responsible for making strategies on issues as strategic planning, economic development, transport and air quality. The Mayor can do anything to promote sustainable development, equal opportunities and health for Londoners within certain constraints. The Assembly has the role to scrutinise the Mayor’s policy, and additionally the Mayor’s strategies and policies have to fit within the National Planning Framework, determined by the national government. Only since 2007, the Mayor has taken over the London Housing Strategy from the national government. Since then, the GLA is also allowed to make housing strategies and take over planning applications from boroughs under the conditions that developments consist of more than 150 homes or have a height over 30 meters (Bowie, 2010).

The GLA produces two main strategic documents for planning and housing. The boroughs are expected to confirm to these documents in their Local Planning Frameworks. First, the Mayor produces the London Plan, which guides strategic planning in London. Often every newly elected Mayor produces his/her updated London Plan. As the London Plan is such a big document, it takes several years to implement it (the 2016 elected Mayor Khan’s London plan has released for consultation by the end of 2017). The Mayor can however more quickly introduce Supplementary Planning Guidance to update the London Plan with new rules concerning housing. Second, the Mayor produces a Housing Strategy indicating the housing output targets, affordability targets and funds. The GLA can only shape the conditions for the housing output and is dependent on the local authorities (boroughs) for the implementation of it through planning applications (Mayor of London, 2017:a).

Borough Newham London’s 32 boroughs, in this case study Newham, are the main planning institution. These local authorities control development rights and are responsible for granting planning permission to any party who wants to develop housing (Janssen-Jansen & Woltjer, 2011). The process to get planning permission, the planning application, is often an intensive process involved with negotiations between developers and local planners. The boroughs also produce the Local Development Framework (Local Plan), which has to be in “general conformity” with the London Plan and Housing Strategy. Planning applications need to be in line with the Local Development Framework, but as mentioned earlier, there is a high level of discretion and flexibility in the UK planning system (Janssen-Jansen & Woltjer, 2011). The local council needs to grant planning permission in the final phase. Finally, the local authorities also control the allocation of residents to new social and affordable homes.

3.2.2. The Netherlands National government In the Netherlands, home-ownership stimulation has mainly been done through tax policy. Particularly in the 1990s, several tax incentives were introduced to allow low incomes to apply for a mortgage (Ronald & Dol, 2011). The most important tax incentive which is still active, is the mortgage tax relief (hypotheekrenteaftrek). This tax policy makes the mortgage rents paid entirely deductible from tax. It

25 also allowed homebuyers to get a mortgage higher that the value of the house, having a price increasing effect (Ronald & Dol, 2011). Together with the government-backed National Mortgage Guarantee (Nationale Hypotheekgarantie), it is relatively risk-free for Dutch citizens with a fixed income to buy a home. Since the 2008 financial crisis, the rules for acquiring a mortgage have been tightened, making buying a home difficult for starters on the housing market (Boterman et al., 2013). Particularly in expensive areas, mostly in the Randstad, this has increasing the demand for rental homes in cities as Amsterdam.

On the other hand, the housing associations, responsible for the production of social rental housing have been financially independent from the national government since the 1995 grossing and balancing operation (bruteringsoperatie). Since then, the housing associations are non-profit organisations responsible for their own finance and do not receive any direct subsidies anymore (Ronald & Dol, 2011). While being financially independent, the housing associations were also allowed to sell social housing (“Right to Sell”), but also under pressure of left wing city governments, this was not done in large numbers. The 2008 financial crisis brought change to this, as housing associations made financial losses and selling off homes was a good way of filling financial gaps. In these times of budget cuts, the Rutte government also introduced the landlord tax specifically for housing associations (verhuurdersheffing), making housing associations more reserved to build new homes (Boterman et al., 2013). Finally, under pressure from the European Union, the national government lowered the income limit for social renters to the modal income (about 36.000 euro). Critics of this policy argue that the limit set is lower than necessary and excludes many citizens with an income just higher than modal (often starters on the housing market) from access to the housing markets in cities as Amsterdam (Hochstenbach, 2018).

Municipality of Amsterdam In the Netherlands, municipalities are the most important planning actors. Their importance even increased over the years since many governmental tasks including spatial planning and housing have been increasingly deregulated since the financial crisis (Waterhout et al., 2013). The Municipality of Amsterdam is led by a Mayor and his/her aldermen (College van B&W). B&W is responsible for installing Planning Strategies (structuurvisie) every 10 to 20 years. These documents guide the general long-term spatial strategy for the development of the cities and urban areas. The current Planning Strategy is “Amsterdam 2040” from 2011. In addition, B&W produces housing strategies, informing about the general, but also area-specific guidelines for housing development and tenure change for the next 5 to 10 years. Since 2009 the Housing Vision 2020 is adopted, but since 2017 the Housing Agenda 2025 has renewed the former housing vision.

As mentioned earlier, Dutch municipalities and particularly Amsterdam own many land. The position as landowner allows the Municipality of Amsterdam to steer on many developments as landowner. As landowner, the Municipality technically determines the land price through the ground lease system (erfpachtcanon), and can thus also provide discounts for certain land uses. A ground lease price discount is traditionally given to housing associations for the production of social rental housing, making the Municipality a large facilitator of this housing segment (Buitelaar et al., 2011; Vlak et al., 2017). Unlike London’s boroughs, the Municipality of Amsterdam does not control the allocation of social housing. This is done by the housing associations themselves, and in the case of Amsterdam on a metropolitan scale, together with several surrounding municipalities.

Other than the London local planning authorities, the Municipality of Amsterdam is also responsible for adopting new land-use plans (bestemmingsplan). Land-use plans legally control the current land- use of areas and plots of land, and when areas (e.g. brownfields) are transformed to housing areas, a new land-use plan must be made allowing the new land-use. The municipal council (gemeenteraad) and then the responsible alderman are responsible for accepting these land-use plans. Land-use plans can, but not necessarily, include rules for housing programmes (often based on local housing visions and the Planning Strategy).

City district Oost In the Netherlands, municipalities generally form the lowest institutional level concerned with planning and housing developments. Amsterdam, and several other big cities, have (had) additional city districts (stadsdelen). The city districts in Amsterdam are however subject to administrative reforms. In general, it can be said that their role has been made less important over the past years. For the planning process of Cruquius, the city district Oost (responsible for the case area), has had three different forms.

Before 2014, the city districts had their own aldermen and council having their own powers for making housing visions and adopting land-use plans. Between 2014 and 2018 the city districts still had their own council, but no real aldermen. The city districts became under the influence of the Municipality of Amsterdam. The city district councils were however still responsible for the adoption process of land- use plans, but their final decision had to be accepted by the municipal alderman (which was basically always done). The city districts however didn’t make any housing visions anymore, as the districts adopted the municipal visions. Since the municipal elections of 2018, the Municipality of Amsterdam is fully responsible for housing and planning. The city district councils only have an advising role.

3.3. Housing segments: what type of housing can be developed in each city? As mentioned, different housing choices in the Netherlands and United Kingdom have led to different housing segments in each country (figure 4). Although there are differences in regulation of the different segments, in general the housing segments available in London and Amsterdam can be classified in three categories. First, market housing, an unsubsidised category, is offered at prices in line with the market. Secondly, the cheapest form of housing is social rental housing. There are many different definitions of social housing, and they vary over different countries. The main overarching characteristic of social housing is that it is a segment of housing meant for citizens who cannot serve their own housing need on the regular housing market (Whitehead & Scanlon, 2007). In both the Netherlands as the United Kingdom, the social rental housing segment is therefore intensely regulated in terms of access and rent price. In-between these two segments, there is an intermediate segment offering housing options with a somewhat lower price compared to the market price, generally focussed towards middle incomes.

3.3.1. The United Kingdom and London Market housing Due the size of London and large locational price differences, there is no standard categorisation of the market segment. In general it can be said that any property with a rent starting at 81% of the market rent in an area is classified as a market rental home (the start of affordable rent is up to 80% of the market rate). The monthly rent in the studied borough Newham is £1200 for a one-bedroom flat and £1400 for a two-bedroom flat. This is about the London average (Mayor of London, 2018). Rental homes considered as market rent thus start at £960 pound per week for an one-bedroom flat.

Also the prices of the owner-occupied sector in London vary widely, but in general, all London’s boroughs have a price much higher than the UK average. In Newham the average house price in December 2017 is £364.902. This is relatively low compared to the London average of £484.172 (Gov.UK, 2018). In practice this means that in order to buy a private starter home in London a deposit of £90.000 is required (Mayor of London, 2017:a). This is logically a challenge for many residents.

Social rent In the London and the United Kingdom, social rent is the cheapest category of “affordable housing”. The rest of the affordable housing types can be classified as intermediate types of housing (see below). Until 1988, social housing was developed by local authorities themselves and funded by direct subsidies from the local authority (Whitehead & Scanlon, 2007). Since 1988, the provision of social housing is funded by a mix of capital grants (distributed by the national government) and (private) developer contributions. Also, since 1988, social rent is developed by registered social landlords (RSLs) and regular housebuilders (Whitehead & Scanlon, 2007; Carmona et al., 2003). Registered social landlords are factually housing associations without a primary goal towards financial profit and with the aim to reinvest the profits made into housebuilding. Unlike in the Netherlands, these registered social landlords operate fully in the private market and are also allowed to build market homes (Carmona et al., 2003). Because of their status, registered social landlords can apply more easily for capital grants for social and affordable housing. In practice, capital grants have been under pressure, particularly during the financial crisis, and therefore also the registered social landlords become more dependent on the sale of market homes to build new social homes (Scanlon et al., 2015). Funding through planning gain (Section-106 agreements) is then the dominant way of funding social (and affordable) segments. Bowie (2015) also argues that since the crisis the UK government has shifted its focus from social rent towards the intermediate “affordable housing” segment.

Maximum social rents are determined by the national government in the Rent Standard. The rents are calculated through a formula on the base of 30% property value (date 1999) relative to the national average, 70% the average local income relative to the national average and a bedroom factor (Homes & Communities Agency, 2015). In practice, social rent levels are set around 50% of the market rents in an area (Whitehead & Scanlon, 2007; Allen, 2015). Also, the maximum rent increases are determined by the Rent Standard. The maximum rent increase is limited to the consumer price index +1% (Homes & Communities Agency, 2015). Access to social housing is regulated by local authorities (boroughs) who manage the waiting lists. Despite there is no formal income limit, access is mainly open to vulnerable groups and they are allocated based on “housing need”. In practice, half of the social tenants has a yearly income lower than £10.000 (Whitehead & Scanlon, 2007). Despite the production of social rent has almost entirely halted, the census of 2011 indicated that in Newham 29,6% of all households lives in a social rental house (Newham, 2017). Finally, there are also housing allowances available for social renters (Scanlon et al., 2015).

Intermediate segment In the United Kingdom and London, the intermediate segment consists of many types of housing, most notably affordable rental housing. Affordable rent in the UK is regulated similarly as the social rental sector, but the rent discount is lower than social rent. All rental homes with a discount starting at 20% of the rental price are considered to be affordable rent (Homes & Communities Agency, 2015). As a rental price of 80% of the market rate is not really affordable in London for many incomes, Mayor Sadiq Khan introduced the “London Affordable Rent” in 2017. This segment is funded by additional grants and it sets the rents around the social rental price (Mayor of London, 2017:a). Factually London

Affordable Rent can thus be best classified as social rent. Both homes developed as regular affordable rent or London Affordable Rent are perpetually assigned as regulated homes.

In addition to London Affordable Rent, the Mayor of London introduced London Living Rent as housing segment in-between intermediate rent and owner-occupied housing. London Living Rent means that tenants can rent a home at 50% to 80% of the market price, enabling them to save money to pay a deposit after a set time (often 10 years) to buy the home (Mayor of London, 2017:a). Finally, there is shared-ownership where someone buys a minimum of 25% of the home, while renting the rest of the home with the possibility to buy additional shares of the home. The finance of the intermediate housing types works similarly as social rent: a mix of capital grants and the sale of market homes within a project. Particularly for the new London Affordable Rent and London Living Rent, there is additional funding by the Mayor’s Affordable Homes Programme (Mayor of London, 2017:a). All intermediate housing types are accessible for households with an income between £18.100–£66.000 (£80.000 for large families) (Mayor of London, no date).

3.3.2. The Netherlands & Amsterdam Market housing In Amsterdam, the owner-occupied sector is the largest category of market housing and covers 32,5% of the total housing stock in 2017 (Municipality of Amsterdam & AFWC, 2018). The Municipality of Amsterdam classifies three owner-occupied housing categories, based on price class. First, the homes with a value under €156.000 are classified as cheap owner-occupied homes, while a middle segment of homes is classified with a value between €156.000 and €250.000. Both of these lower two categories of owner-occupied homes are small in size and decreasing in Amsterdam, and consist of respectively 2,4% and 15,6% of the total housing stock. The large share of the owner-occupied sector thus consists of homes with a value over €250.000 (Municipality of Amsterdam & AFWC, 2018). The private rental sector at market prices (>€ 971 p/month) covers 8,4% of the housing stock. Both market rent and the owner-occupied sector are growing (owner-occupied was 29% and private rent 3% in 2011).

Social rent Amsterdam has a strong tradition of social housing and between 1945 and 1985, the requirement for new housing developments was 90% social rental housing (Terhorst et al., 2003; Fainstein, 2010). Because of this, the total share of social rental homes owned by housing associations is still 39,4% of the total housing stock, but this percentage has been declining since 1995 when housing association’s stocks peaked at 55% (Municipality of Amsterdam & AFWC, 2018; Musterd, 2014). This decreasing trend fits within the national policy which increasingly focusses on home-ownership and less on social rent. Social rental housing in Amsterdam and the Netherlands is typically only developed by the non- profit housing associations and they own the big share of all social housing. There is however an additional share of privately owned flats which are classified as social rent (13,2%), making the total social segment in Amsterdam 53,7%.

Social rent levels are nationally determined by the national government. Through a standardised model, points are awarded to quality aspects of social homes, such as size, bedrooms and facilities (woningwaarderingsstelsel). The maximum monthly rent in 2018 has been set at €710,68 (the liberalisation limit) and can increase maximally with the inflation. In case a social home has more points than this maximum monthly rent, the home can be rented on the private market (most likely in the intermediate rental segment), but then the rent regulations are not applicable anymore. Moreover, tenants of social homes can apply for a rent allowance (huurtoeslag), but this is not possible for tenants

29 paying over €710,68 per month. This all creates a strong divide between the well-regulated social rental sector and the scarcely regulated non-social rental sector (Jonkman & Janssen-Jansen, 2015).

Intermediate segment In the Netherlands, and particularly in cities as Amsterdam, there is a recent focus on the development of intermediate rental homes (middenhuur). This housing segment is classified as having a monthly rent just above the liberalisation limit of €710,61 until about €1000 per month. In Amsterdam, this maximum rent has been set at €971 (Municipality of Amsterdam & AFWC, 2018). As a result of the lowered income limit for social housing and the increased requirements for getting a mortgage, this segment evolved as an alternative segment for median income households (Vlak et al., 2017). The intermediate rental segment covers only 6% of the total housing stock in Amsterdam, but it is growing relatively quick (Municipality of Amsterdam & AFWC, 2018).

Since the new Housing Law introduced in 2015, housing associations are only allowed to develop non- social rental homes if a municipality can prove there are no private developers willing to build them (Platform 31, 2014). This means that the development of the intermediate segment is dependent on private developers. Moreover, unlike the social rental sector, intermediate rent is not very institutionalised in the housing system yet (although increasing). There is relatively little regulation on this segment and many characteristics (e.g. the duration and rent increase) of intermediate rental homes are to be negotiated between municipalities and developers (Vlak et al., 2017). Also, tenants within the intermediate segment are also not eligible for housing allowances. Intermediate owner- occupied housing is not existing in the Netherlands. The low segment of owner-occupied housing could be considered as intermediate, but as there is no special subsidy or regulation for it, it is considered as market housing.

Figure 4: Overview of housing segments in London and Amsterdam

London Amsterdam Market: owner-occupied Average price London: £484.172 High segment: >€250.000 Average price Newham: £364.902 Mid segment: >€156.000 <€250.000 Low segment: < €156.000

Market: private rent Avg. monthly rent £1200-£1400* Monthly rent > €971

Social: rent Around 50% of market rate** Monthly rent < €710,68 London Affordable Rent** Intermediate: rent 50-80% of market rate Monthly rent > €710,68 < €971 (affordable rent)** Intermediate: owner-occupied London Living Rent** n/a

Shared-ownership** *1 Pound is about 1,15 euro (June 2018) **All statistically considered as “affordable housing”

Source: own production, 2018.

4. Research design and methodology

This chapter explains the choices made concerning the research design and methodology. The chapter starts explaining the three sub-questions that will guide the research and why these questions have been posed. Secondly, the section will explain the comparative research design and why cases in London and Amsterdam have been chosen. Special attention is given to explaining why two atypical cases have been chosen. The third section explains the twofold research methods based on policy document analysis and expert interviews.

4.1. Research questions This thesis will study the main question:

How does the interaction between land ownership and planning instruments influence mixed- income urban residential developments within different planning systems?

To answer this main question, a number of sub-questions have been formulated:

1. How is mixed-income housing embedded in London’s and Amsterdam’s urban policies?

2. How did the different planning processes influence the housing mix in both cases, and to what extent did the landowner influence the mix?

3. What role could public land policy play in facilitating mixed-income housing?

The first sub-question aims to provide insight on what mixed-income housing is in the different contexts of London and Amsterdam. As both cities are embedded in different housing and welfare systems, London and Amsterdam are expected to have a different view on residential mixing. This chapter will explain how the respective housing visions of Amsterdam and London envision housing mix in the city and for new developments. Answering this question will give a contextual background to the individual cases within each city.

The second sub-question will explain how the different planning processes of each case have resulted in the housing mix for the projects within each case. It will focus on the instruments, contracts and arguments that have led to the housing programme for each development. It is likely that forms of regulating, stimulation and shaping have been used and, as the literature suggests, that the political context has influenced the use of these instruments. Logically, the chapter will also discuss the role of the public landowner in influencing the mix. The question will thus also answer why certain housing segments have been more willingly included in the mix and to what extent the planning processes succeeded in generating an inclusive, mixed-income housing development. What factors were crucial?

The third and final sub-question will particularly reflect on the role of public land ownership in London and Amsterdam and the role that public land policy can have on influencing mixed-income housing. The discussion will hereby reflect on the role of land policy for the housing mix for both cases and how these findings fit in the general possibilities for public land policy in each country to influence a housing mix. Finally, the question discusses to what extent public land ownership differs from private land ownership in terms of possibilities to steer on mixed-income housing.

4.2. Comparative research design A comparative case study based on differences This study investigates the development process of two cases in two different cities: London and Amsterdam. Both cities (and countries) have a different planning system and planning culture. Where developments in London are traditionally led by the private market, Amsterdam has a very public-led planning tradition. This apparent sharp contrast makes both cities and their countries often interesting for a comparative case study (Heurkens & Hobma, 2014; Janssen-Jansen & Woltjer, 2010; Kang & Korthals Altes, 2015). The British planning system can provide much knowledge on private sector-led urban developments and how local authorities can facilitate the private initiatives, while the Dutch planning system can provide much transferable knowledge on instrumental steering by local authorities. Especially as the Dutch and Amsterdam planning practices shift towards a more private- led approach, the transferable knowledge derived from London might be particularly beneficial for Amsterdam and Dutch emerging private-led development practices.

The case selection and comparison is thus based on the investigation of differences (Pickvance, 2001; Yin, 2009). According to Pickvance (2001), a comparison based on differences is particularly useful to explain possible different characteristics for each case and how their particularities result in the different outcomes. As Bryman (2012, 25) spells out, the investigation of these particularities of the multiple cases act as “a springboard for theoretical reflections about contrasting findings”. On the other hand, a comparison based on differences might also explain how two different processes lead to a similar outcome (Pickvance, 2001). It might then excerpt a specific necessary causal factor to facilitate mixed-income housing (Goertz & Mahoney, 2015). The focus on differences intents to explain how crucial the role of public land ownership is for generating mixed-income housing in cities with high land values, but this contrast-based research approach might hereby also explain why public land might have a more significant role in e.g. Amsterdam than London.

Two atypical cases As many research has been done yet on the differences of typical Dutch and UK planning practice, this study chooses to do a comparison of two atypical cases in terms of the development model and the use of public land (Gerring, 2006). The London case is a public-led development on public land, while the Amsterdam case is a private-led development on predominantly public land, but with some private owned plots of land. The selection of these atypical cases is particularly interesting because they fit within the planning trends in both cities and countries. In the UK, the planning system is slowly moving towards a more plan-led system and additionally in London there is a renewed focus on the use of public land for affordable housing developments. In the Netherlands, planning is gradually shifting towards a more market-led approach where the government acts as facilitator rather than the initiator of new developments (Heurkens & Hobma, 2014; Buitelaar, 2010). Despite being atypical in relation to the traditional development model, the cases nicely fit in the respective trends and context for London and Amsterdam.

Atypical cases do not only give better insight in the complexity and context of mechanisms, such as typical cases, but atypical cases also have the benefit of adapting the existing theories with new mechanisms (Yin, 2009). A typical (comparative) case study has a risk to overexaggerate the reality as it aims to conform a certain hypothesis (Gerring, 2006). Through investigating an atypical case, the reality and the existing theories are investigated by adding, omitting or changing a specific variable or mechanism of interest (Gerring, 2006). For this study this variable is the role of public land ownership

32 in facilitating mixed-income housing. The investigation of two atypical cases in terms of land ownership and development model, can hence nicely build forward on the existing theory on the British and Dutch planning systems, as it allows to investigate the particularities of the British planning system with the addition of the use of public land ownership and the Dutch planning system without the use of an active public land strategy to facilitate a housing mix in urban areas in thriving, but expensive housing markets.

As case studies are characterised by an intensive investigation of a specific event or mechanism, they also have the risk of being difficult to generalise (Thomas & Bertolini, 2014). Instead of striving for a statistical generalisation, this study and most case studies aim to achieve an analytical generalisation (Skocpol & Somers, 1980; Yin, 2009). Particularly the atypical cases have a large power to do analytical generalisation of a theory as they activate additional mechanisms and actors and can thus put limits and extensions to existing theories (Schofield, 2002). This will be done by reflecting the results of the atypical cases to the typical, common development practices. Particularly the third sub-question discusses the cases in the light of the traditional planning models and land policies in Amsterdam and London. The common practices of both cities thus serve as “informal cases” to which the studied case results will be compared (McMichael, 2011). This reflection will indicate the importance of public land ownership in two different planning systems to promote inclusivity in urban housing developments.

Apart from the selection based on the atypical development model and use of public land, the cases are selected based on a few other criteria. Both cases have a mixed-use programme with a focus on residential development. They are also both being developed at the moment of doing the research with the most important planning decisions recently made. Moreover, the cases have a similar size and they have a similar, “average”, location within the respective cities (both are located at the edge of the inner city). Finally, both cases are brownfield developments, meaning they consist of a transformation of former industrial areas into residential areas. This means as well that there is no existing community of residents yet in the areas, and both planners and developers can create a new urban residential area almost from the scratch making it possible to focus the study purely on public- private relations.

The two cases investigated are:

1. Royal Albert Wharf, London, United Kingdom: public land ownership, one plot “used” as private land 2. Cruquius, Amsterdam, the Netherlands: mostly public land ownership with some private plots

4.3. Introducing the cases 4.3.1. Royal Albert Wharf – London The Royal Albert Wharf is part of the Royal Albert Docks in borough Newham (east London). As the name tells, the area used to be a former dockyard for commercial shipping. In the 1980s, the dockyard closed down, and since then it has been part of the larger London Docklands redevelopment. The area consists of public land, formerly owned by the London Development Agency (LDA) which was GLA’s land and economic development organisation, but since 2012 it has been transferred to the Greater London Authority (GLA) as the LDA was closed as institutional body. The GLA intended to transform the area into a mixed-use residential area.

In 2008, housing association Notting Hill Housing acquired the first plot of land from the LDA, the Great Eastern Quays. As this plot of land was acquired through a general land disposal, the planning process for this site works similar as for developments on private land. In 2012, a second plot of land was procured by the GLA and it selected Notting Hill Housing as developer for the neighbouring Gallions Quarter site. For this plot, Notting Hill decided to subcontract parts of the development to Linden Homes and Telfort Homes, two other developers. A third plot, Gallions 3B, was procured in 2017 and again Notting Hill won the bid. A forth plot Gallions 4 is left for future development, while two businesses, BDM Kesslers and Buhler Sortex still occupy two plots. As a whole, the area is branded as the Royal Albert Wharf (Notting Hill Housing, 2017). In total, over 1500 homes will be developed. The area is projected to be “a vibrant, thriving and sustainable community in a historic riverside setting”. The first phase of the Great Eastern Quays has been completed in the summer of 2017, while the second phase has started during that time. The development of Gallions Quarter started in May 2017 (London’s Royal Docks, 2017).

Figure 5: Map of Royal Albert Wharf

Beckton 1 3

Gallions Quarter 4 Gallions

2 Great Eastern

Quays 1: Gallions 4 2: Existing housing London City 3: BDM Airport Kesslers 4: Buhler Sortex

Source: own production, 2018.

Figure 6: Overview of stakeholders Royal Albert Wharf Stakeholder Role Task Government National government National Making rules for housing segments government Allocating subsidies social/affordable housing Greater London Authority Metropolitan Greater London Plan, shaping borough policies government Housing policy (Mayor’s Housing Strategy) London Development Landowner Selling land (Great Eastern Quays) Agency GLA Land and Property Landowner Making Development Agreement (Gallions Quarter & Gallions 3B) and procuring land

Borough Newham Local government Planning authority (planning permission) Making Local Plan Housing policy Market Notting Hill Housing Developer/investor/ Developing Great Eastern Quays, 1/3th housing association Gallions Quarter & Gallions 3B

Linden Homes Developer Developing 1/3th Gallions Quarter Telford Homes Developer Developing 1/3th Gallions Quarter DP9 Consultant Negotiating planning permission and S106 (Great Eastern Quays) Savills Consultant Negotiating planning permission and S106 (Gallions Quarter)

4.3.2. Cruquius – Amsterdam Cruquiuseiland is the most southern peninsula of the Amsterdam Eastern Docklands (Oostenlijke Eilanden). Since the 1990s many of the other former port peninsulas such as Java-eiland and Borneo- eiland have been redeveloped into residential areas. Cruquius, is the final peninsula of the Eastern Docklands to be transformed, and is still predominantly industrial land (Stadsdeel Zeeburg, 2009). At this moment, Cruquius is redeveloped as well into a more mixed-use area, but with preservation of its industrial atmosphere. As of 2018, the first homes have been delivered.

From 2006 onwards, investor and developer Amvest started buying plots on the Cruquiuseiland and currently owns the majority of the Cruquius land or has the development rights in leaseholds from the Municipality. Two other developers, AM and Vorm each possess one plot, while the Municipality of Amsterdam still holds some vacant plots in the southwest of Cruquius (Gebiedsontwikkeling.nu, 2013). The relatively large landholdings of Amvest allowed a different development approach than usual. Where the Municipality normally takes the lead in creating the development plan, the Municipality now adapted a type of “invitation planning” in which it facilitated Amvest and other developers with more flexible and loose regulations. For instance, there is no investment decision (investeringsbesluit) and no general urban development plan (stedenbouwkundig plan) required for the area. The combination of the so called “Rules of the Game documents”, a strategic note from 2009 and the Amsterdam 2040 spatial planning strategy are the most important spatial regulations for the Cruquius area (City district Oost, 2013). These first two documents have been created by the Municipality together with Amvest and existing businesses, collaborated within the Stichting Cruquius 2015. This approach makes Cruquius an atypical development in Amsterdam, as for most developments the Municipality of Amsterdam is the only landowner and creates urban development plans and/or procures plots of land based on strict regulations. As the Rules of the Game do not include any rules for the housing programme, it is above all interesting to investigate how the housing mix was established.

The active development of Cruquius started in 2009 and takes place in multiple phases. A land-use plan for the whole Cruquius area was made in 2012 and approved in 2013, although it is only conserving, and thus only regulates what is already existing within the plan area (City district Oost, 2013). For new initiatives, developers have to propose an initiative document which has to fit within the Rules of the Games. When the city council accepts the proposal, smaller land-use plans will be created to renew the conserving land-use plan and to allow the proposed development. For the first

35 phase (Subarea 1), a new land-use plan was made in 2014 and it has been approved in 2015. This land- use plan is thus a ratification of the agreements made between Amvest and the Municipality, and permits the development of housing. After this phase, the new developments will globally take place following the curve of Cruquiuseiland, with the end of the peninsula as projected final development. The total development will consist of about 1700 homes.

Figure 7: Map of Cruquiuseiland

Oostenlijke Eilanden

VORM 2 1 3 Architectenbuurt 5 AM

1: Subarea 1 2: Subarea 2 3: Subarea 3 Indische Buurt (private land) 4: Subareas 4-7 5: Van Lohuizenlaan

Source: own production, 2018.

Figure 8: Overview of Stakeholders Cruquius Stakeholder Role Task Government National government National government Making rules for housing segments Municipality of Amsterdam Local government Rulemaking Landowner for some Housing vision sites Negotiating City district Oost Sub-local government Confirming land-use plans (before 2018) Negotiating (before 2018) Housing vision (before 2014) Market Amvest Developer/investor Developing most sites Landowner for some Full owner of Subarea 3 sites AM Developer Developing Cruquiuswerf VORM Developer Developing Cruquiusweg 142 De Alliantie Housing association Taking over a share of the social rent

4.4. Research methods Data collection The cases have be investigated by two core data collection methods. First, policy and planning documents have been studied. These documents include housing visions, local plans, land-use plans (in Amsterdam), the Section-106 contracts (in London) and council meeting minutes. These documents give insight in the plans made for each development project and how the housing mix aspects are foreseen in these plans. The housing visions and local plans are shaping the housing mix by setting targets and guidelines for developments, while the other documents give insight in the precise argumentation and effectuation of the targets in the case areas. All documents have been collected on the (local) government websites and on the project websites. It was quite easy to find these documents. The only documents that weren’t publicly accessible were development agreements and ground lease agreements between the public landowners and developers, as these are private agreements. This didn’t really constrain the research as through interviews with key persons involved with these documents, it became clear that all relevant information concerning housing mix could be found in the other documents and that an in-depth study of these contracts wouldn’t really add any useful information for this study.

Figure 9: Overview of studied documents Amsterdam London Document Role Document Role Housing Vision Housing policy Mayor’s Housing Shaping borough’s Amsterdam 2020 Strategy housing policy Amsterdam Housing Housing policy Greater London Plan Shaping borough’s Agenda 2025 + Action planning policy Plan Intermediate Rent Strategic note Cruquius: Planning strategy Newham Local Plan Planning strategy 2009 Amsterdam 2040: 2011 Planning strategy Section-106 Agreements Contract including housing programme, its finance and argumentation Rules of the game: Regulatory planning Newham Council Political debate 2011/12 strategy Minutes Land-use plan Cruquius: Conserving land-use plan 2012/13 Land-use plans Cruquius Land-use plans Subareas 1, 2, 3, 4 Initiative documents Urban development individual plots plans to be approved by Municipality City District Council Political debate Minutes and resolutions

Secondly, semi-structured interviews have been held with key persons for each development and external experts on both city’s housing markets. These interviews are a core method to investigate the argumentations concerning housing mix during the development processes of each case. The interviews have been structured through the use of an interview guide around different themes, which varied per interview as the interviewees were generally diverse in function, expertise and relation towards the development. Themes discussed for each interview include, the argumentation of the

37 programme, the finance of the mix, how the duration of the mix is maintained and a reflection on the housing and planning policies. The semi-structured nature of the interviews allows asking questions focused on relevant issues, but it also allows freedom for interviewees to mention things they find most important for the decision-making process concerning the developments (Bryman, 2012).

Given the nature of key person and expert interviews, all interviewees are purposefully sampled. Interviewees have been chosen in a strategic way to ensure the most relevant questions are asked to the most relevant persons (Bryman, 2012). Interviews have been done with planners, developers, consultants and local politicians involved with the cases. Their names were often mentioned on project websites or in documents. Particularly in London, the names were not always up-to-date as persons were not working anymore on the development or when emailed, persons replied they were not very knowledgeable on the research aspects mentioned. Often these persons, and the persons factually interviewed, helped with contacting other relevant persons involved with the cases. This form of snowball sampling is a form of purposive sampling and is helpful when general purposive sampling is not feasible (Bryman, 2012). The snowball sampling appeared to be an important technique to find relevant interviewees, as eventually a significant amount interviewees have been contacted because they were mentioned by interviewees or other persons contacted.

The interviews will complement the analysis of the planning and project documents and will give more insight in why certain decisions have been made and what (other) considerations have been made during the planning process. In addition to the interviews with key persons, also interviews have been done with experts on the general housing and development markets of both cities. Some of these experts have been involved with the cases themselves at a higher level in the past. The external experts have generally been interviewed after the interviews with key persons, as this allows the external experts to critically reflect on the findings derived from the interviews with key persons. This allows the triangulation of the derived data (Bryman, 2012). Exceptions were the very first interviews in each city. Especially the interview with an academic expert in London was purposefully planned as a first interview to triangulate knowledge from literature on the relatively unfamiliar British planning system and London planning practice. In Amsterdam a PhD researcher was interviewed who studied the area around Cruquius earlier. This selection technique appeared to be very useful as it helped to confidently ask questions on the most relevant aspects for subsequent interviews.

The investigation of a development process and the considerations made by different actors might involve sensitive information. To unsure all interviewees were informed about the purpose of the interview and to guarantee confidentially, an information letter was send together with the first email (Bryman, 2012). This letter spelled out the rights of each interviewee to abstain from answering questions if wished, informed that the interviews would be held anonymously and mentioned the right to ask to inspect a draft version of the findings (Appendix 2). In practice, none of the interviews really discussed sensitive information and none of the interviewees invoked any of these rights. An anonymised list of interviewees indicating their function and/or relation to the case is provided in Appendix 1 in order to place the used references in context. In addition to the information letter, permission was asked to record every interview. None of the interviewees objected to this. In total, 10 people have been interviewed in London and 10 people have been interviewed in Amsterdam, making a total of 20 interviews. The interviews typically lasted for an hour, with a few lasting for about 40 minutes while a few others lasted for almost two hours.

Data analysis As the research is focussed on investigating how various aspects influence the housing mix within urban developments, the collected data/information have been analysed as a thematic analysis. The thematic analysis searches for certain important themes within the data that are relevant for answering the research question (Bryman, 2012). The thematic analysis is a very common analytic technique for qualitative data, but as Bryman (2012) mentions, it is not directly connected to specific analytic procedures. Themes have partially been pre-selected (e.g. the role of planning instruments and land ownership), but new themes can ideally also be identified throughout the research process. Themes can be defined through repetition, but also importance interviewees give to certain aspects can identify a theme (Bryman, 2012).

For the data analysis, this means searching purposefully for relevant themes in the documents and interview results, ideally until a theoretical saturation is reached. For a structured and flawless analysis of the data, notes have been made during the interviews to keep an overview of the important and relevant aspects mentioned in the documents. Most importantly, the interviews have been transcribed in literal form for further analysis. The interviews have been transcribed as soon as possible after they have been held. This is useful for the quality of the transcript as it is more easy to remember things mentioned during an interview in case an interviewee is for instance talking about things on a map. Transcribing interviews as soon as possible is also better for the understanding of the data during the process, and it allows the researcher to use remarks from interviewees in subsequent interviewees. Transcribing the interviews also generates a high degree of transparency (Bryman, 2012).

As the total of the interviews is not extremely large, all interviews are unique in their nature and are focussed on facts concerning the planning processes of the cases rather than visions, it was quite manageable to keep an overview of the most interesting things mentioned and by whom. Therefore, coding through the use of a qualitative data analysis program would not add much value to quality of the data analysis (which could be useful when doing e.g. a discourse analysis based on interviewing a group of similar respondents). As for some thematic analyses -and this research- the themes are similar to the codes, the predefined themes are structured per section of the interview (Bryman, 2012). New themes have been coded with annotations in a word processor programme. This approach worked quite well, and it was easy to find relevant quotes in the transcripts.

5. Empirical findings

This chapter covers the empirical findings on each of the three sub-questions. Each section first analyses London followed by Amsterdam by using various quotes from interviewees. A one to one comparison of the cities and cases will be made in the next chapter -the conclusion- leading to the answering of the main question. 5.1. Mixed-income housing embedded in London and Amsterdam

“How is mixed-income housing embedded in London’s and Amsterdam’s urban policies?” 5.1.1. London London’s rationale of mixing: mixed and balanced communities On a London-wide scale, the GLA’s London Plan is the chief policy document that promotes a mix of different housing segments. Mixing in London is generally targeted towards the concept of “mixed and balanced communities” (GLA, 2016). This policy objective is embedded in the fact that London aims to create diversity and equal opportunities for different income groups across London, also by providing jobs across neighbourhoods. As adopted in the Newham Local Plan, a core goal for housing development is:

“Providing a mix of housing types (including family housing) together with good amenities and services so that people will want to stay longer in Newham - reducing the population churn and creating sociable, inclusive and balanced communities.” (Newham, 2012, 24)

A second aspect of the objective is to prevent social exclusion, “particularly in some neighbourhoods where social renting predominates and there are concentrations of deprivation” (GLA, 2016, 116). This is an interesting aspect of housing mix, as it literally mentions that more market housing should be added to new developments in areas where there is already a high share of social housing (and not vice-versa). This second aim has however been omitted from the new 2017 London Plan, while “mixed and balanced communities” has been rephrased to “mixed and inclusive communities”. Particularly this alteration is distinctive for the change of the mixing rationale of the Boris Johnson Conservative administration to the Sadiq Khan Labour administration, who put a greater emphasis on the development of social and affordable housing segments.

The London Plan, predominantly mentions housing mix as the inclusion of affordable types of housing within new developments. The Royal Albert Basin is developed under two London Plans, starting with the 2011 London Plan of Conservative Mayor Boris Johnson. This plan prescribes that all new housing developments should consist of 35% affordable housing (GLA, 2011). This 2011 plan broke with the former targets of the 2008 London Plan of London’s first Mayor Ken Livingstone (Labour), which prescribed 50% affordable housing, of which 70% social rental housing (Bowie, 2010). The in 2016 elected Labour Mayor Sadiq Khan reintroduced the 50% affordable housing target (of which 33% social rent) for developments on public land. Public landowners, should in his argumentation, set a good example in providing non-market housing on their lands (Mayor of London, 2017:a). As borough’s Local Plans need to be in “general conformity” with the London Plan, the Newham Local Plan (which is adopted for a longer period) mentions affordable housing targets between 35% and 50% (of which 60% should be social) (Interview 2; Newham, 2016). In addition, Newham desires to deliver at least 39% family homes (3 bedroom plus). The targets are applicable for all developments containing over 10 homes. As figure 10 shows, the affordable housing targets have fairly fluctuated over the years.

Figure 10: Housing mix targets London through the years Period Share affordable types Sub-division affordable 2008-2011 50% of which 70% social, 30% intermediate 2011-2017 35% of which 60% social, 40% intermediate 2017-present 35%, 50%+ public land of which 33% social, 33% affordable rent, 33% shared-ownership Newham 2012-present 35%-50% of which 60% social, 40% intermediate *also 39% family homes

Important to note is that all these targets are no hard targets, and there are possibilities to deviate from them in case circumstances provide a good reason to do so. This is embedded within the nature of the British development-led planning system in which the role of the government is to facilitate developments to make them happen (Janssen-Jansen & Woltjer, 2011; Interview 9). There are many reasons to deviate from the targets. Mentioned in the Local Plan of Newham are: 1. Scheme (financial) viability; 2. The availability of subsidy; 3. The existing mix of housing in the area; 4. The individual circumstances of the site in terms of site conditions, local context and site features; 5. The availability of required infrastructure and community facilities for residents (Newham, 2012). Although the initial aim is to fulfil the housing targets set in GLA’s and the Borough’s policies, in practice almost everything can serve as a reason to deviate from the targets. The British planning system also allows developers to pay fines to local authorities or to develop social and affordable housing off-site. Although this seems bad for the housing mix on-site, the justification of this is that on an expensive location, much more cheaper segment homes could be provided for the same amount of money on cheaper land. The result is that in cheaper, generally more deprived, boroughs as Barking & Dagenham the share of social and affordable housing increases as large plots of land there are developed by off-site housing (Interview 1). For the quantitative production of affordable housing this might be beneficial, but it is generally not supporting the income mix within neighbourhoods as on the large scale and long term it facilitates segregation through the addition of market homes in already expensive areas and the addition of cheaper homes in already cheaper areas.

The practice of London’s mixing policies and housing delivery The result of London’s flexible approach to affordable housing targets is that there has been a large underproduction of affordable housing over the years (Bowie, 2010; Mayor of London, 2017:a). As figure 11 shows, the total share of the affordable segment in London has never complied with the 35% (and 50%) affordable housing target of the London Plan. More interestingly, since 2011/12, the planning permission approvals of social rental homes has decreased significantly, making the social rental housing completions between 2015 and 2017 almost nil (Mayor of London, 2017:a; GLA 2018). During this period, the share of more expensive sub-market (e.g. shared-ownership) and intermediate types (e.g. affordable rent at 80% of the market rate) of affordable housing has thus increased at the cost of social rental housing. The underproduction of affordable housing as part of new housing developments is widely recognised in London among politicians, policy makers and planners, and it is one of the reasons of the strong focus on the delivery of “genuinely affordable housing” by Mayor Khan (GLA, 2017:a).

The underproduction of affordable, and particularly social housing has a number of reasons. In brief, it is a combination of the flexible nature of handling planning applications and the high land values in

London on the one hand, and the dependence of housing schemes on national government funding (Interviews 1, 2, 10).

The first point reflects the high land values in London. Land values in London are not only high because the market conditions, but also because developable land in London is scarce. London has a strict greenbelt policy and developing in open lands is generally not permitted (Interviews 1, 10). As there is little available land and a very lively land market in London, developers often buy land for high prices and landowners know they can sell land for high prices. As the British planning system allows many exceptions -most importantly the requirement that development schemes should be financially viable3- developers often pay much for the land, as they know the affordable housing share can be lowered if they can prove that delivering a target of 35% or 50% is unviable (Colenutt et al., 2015). As interviewee 4 mentioned:

“…as a private developer you probably know you get away with a much lower percentage and you can use these viability assessments and show “oh I can only do 5%”. Therefore they can bid lots and lots more [than a housing association]” (Interview 4, Housing association)

Local planning authorities do generally not insist on high percentages of the affordable segment as they think that asking too much might halt development, make developers build in other boroughs, and they often have regeneration goals to allow more market housing in areas with high social rent percentages (in line with the second mixing aim of the 2016 London Plan).

“And it’s a difficult one with private developers, as local authorities want housing and if they put in too strict regulations or anything, the developer will say: “I go to somewhere else”. So it’s a balancing act.” (Interview 4, Housing association)

Another aspect mentioned by several interviewees (1, 4, 10) is that particularly local governments, but also the GLA, didn’t have the capacity and expertise to properly scrutinise the financial viability assessments for developments, particularly since the financial crisis. According to interviewee 1, who was responsible for the introduction of the viability assessments in planning in 2003, the original idea was that these assessments could give insight in whether developments were viable anyway and then there was no need to provide public grants for affordable housing. Now, the viability assessments are said to work in favour of developers, as they can be used to bring down affordable housing shares of developments and therefore allow developers to pay more for the land.

“If you know the system it is really easy to manipulate the data sets. And the most critical issue is the land value, because technically you should only spend on land what you can afford to do and what policy allows. You shouldn’t be able to say “I bought this land this much and these needs I can’t afford to pay because I pays that much for the land”. And planning inspectors didn’t understand that land value should be determined by policy compliance.” (Interview 1, Academic)

Since the appointment of Mayor Khan, the GLA has reinstalled a viability team to provide more scrutiny on the assessments (Interview 1). In addition, Khan has introduced a threshold approach of 35% affordable housing in the Supplementary Planning Guidance ahead of the new London Plan (Mayor of London, 2017:b). If a proposed scheme contains 35% or higher affordable housing without public

3 Viable in this context means that a proposed development scheme should be able to cover all development costs, including a profit margin for the developer. 42 grants, it will be subject to a fast-track route with basically no viability assessment (Interview, 2). The GLA hopes to speed up new developments and to increase the share of affordable housing by offering developers more certainty for their planning application (Mayor of London, 2017:b).

Coming back to the second reason of the underproduction of affordable housing in London, the viability of housing schemes is directly influenced by the UK national housing policy. The national cabinet is namely responsible for the allocation and amount of social and affordable housing grants (Whitehead & Scanlon, 2007). As a combination of austerity measures and the national governmental focus on stimulating home-ownership for different income groups, all social housing grants have been abolished in 2010 (Edwards, 2016; Interview 1). So between, 2010 and 2017, all social housing in London is basically only funded by the development scheme itself through planning gain (Section-106) without any other stimulating measures (Interview 8). The problem of this way of funding is that affordable housing is made a development costs together with other obligations local authorities demand from developers (Morrison & Burgess, 2013; Interviews 6 & 8). This makes it a financial balancing act to reserve funds for lower segments of housing, other obligations such as infrastructure and schools, and earn enough money from market homes to fund it. As social housing is simply the least profitable type of affordable housing, the focus within the affordable segment is on shared- ownership and affordable rent, especially as grants for shared-ownership were still available.

For the GLA and local boroughs, it is difficult to obtain funds, as they have to negotiate funds with the national government (Khan, 2017). Despite this, the Khan administration managed to secure £3.15bn to fund the “Homes for Londoners: Affordable Homes Programme 2016-2021”. This programme should be enough to fund 90.000 affordable homes of which 58.500 shared-ownership and London Living Rent homes (Mayor of London, 2016). Together with Theresa May’s 2 billion pound reservation to stimulate social housing production, these are both interesting changes in the long term drought of affordable housing funds (Booth, 2017).

Figure 11: Affordable housing in London as share of total planning permission approvals (2004- 2016)

Source: Mayor of London, 2017:a.

5.1.2. Amsterdam Amsterdam’s rationale of mixing: the undivided city In Amsterdam, promoting housing mix is linked to the concept of the “undivided city” (ongedeelde stad). This term, mentioned in many municipal policy documents (including the 2040 Strategic Development Plan and housing visions), means that all parts of the city should be accessible to live for all groups of residents and incomes (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009). The 2009 housing vision explicitly promotes mixed-income neighbourhoods and mentions that the centre of Amsterdam should not only be accessible for the rich, and the periphery not only for less affluent income groups.

The undivided city policy focusses on a number of aspects. First, it aims to protect the cheaper segments of the housing market within the (more expensive) ring road A10. In addition, the Municipality desires that every neighbourhood remains accessible for citizens with low incomes. The Municipality continues with the so-called ‘performance agreements’ with housing associations to build social rental homes, meaning the Municipality allocates land with a standard low price for new social homes (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009; Interviews 16 & 17).

At the same time, the Municipality acknowledges that there should be space for more differentiation between areas in the city, and then particularly by adding intermediate housing segments. In response to the aim of housing differentiation between areas, the Municipality made area classifications with specific housing mix policies. Interestingly enough, Cruquius is classified within the central urban zone, which also includes the city centre, canal belt and Amsterdam’s most affluent city district Zuid. For the central urban zone, the Municipality concludes that there is enough cheap housing in this area, and that the focus for new developments should be on housing, mostly small apartments, for middle and higher income groups and expat workers (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009). As mentioned in the housing vision:

“Intermediate rental housing in the central urban area is virtually impossible to achieve due to the high market pressure in the central urban zone. … The starting point will therefore be: providing homes for urban-oriented families with a higher income, families with a middle income can go to the zone around the central urban zone: the 19th-century ring and belt ‘20 – ‘40.” (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009)

In addition to this, for all area classifications, the former 30% social housing requirement for new developments that Amsterdam had for a very long time, has been abolished in the 2009 housing vision. This 30 percent however remained a common practice (Interview 16). The 2009 housing vision also promoted the sale of 3.000 social rental homes in Amsterdam based on earlier performance agreements with the housing associations. The sale of social homes peaked in 2014, and since then the sales have been significantly lowered (AFWC, 2017). Although, the housing vision clearly mentions the cheaper segments should be protected, particularly within the ring road A10, the sale of social housing (the cheap segment) is clearly promoted in the 2009 housing vision, particularly to create more homes in the intermediate segment (figure 12). Also, significantly more social homes have been sold since 2009 in neighbourhoods within the ring road. It is interesting to note that two aspects of mixing are at odds with each other. On the one hand, Amsterdam aims to maintain all neighbourhoods accessible for lower incomes, but on the other hand Amsterdam promoted the sale of social rental cheap homes and abolished the 30% social housing requirement for new developments to enlarge the intermediate housing stock (privatised social homes are typically sold for low and middle high market prices).

The 2009 housing vision can be seen as a final piece of the municipal policy to differentiate the housing stock since the late 1980s. According to interviewee 16, the municipal policy since the late 1980s was focussed on revitalising the Amsterdam economy and to make the city more attractive for middle incomes, as they had left the city in the 1970s and most of the 1980s. The Municipality realised that in order to accommodate the middle incomes, more owner-occupied homes and intermediate rental homes were needed (van Kempen & Priemus, 1999). It is worth saying that this housing vision was made and implemented during the financial crisis, when it was difficult to attract investments and developments (Interviews 15 & 16). Due the financial crisis, there was also an increased financial pressure on housing associations to privatise social housing, as the landlord tax was implemented in 2012 (Interview 16). The combination of the municipal incentive to differentiate the large existing social sector and the effects of the 2008 financial crisis, shaped the conditions for a mixing rationale that was focussed on diversifying the housing stock with more expensive and intermediate types of housing.

Figure.12:. Municipal housing targets Amsterdam

Source: Municipality of Amsterdam,.2009.

Recent change in Amsterdam’s housing policy As the effects of the financial crisis faded away and it went better with the Amsterdam economy and housing market, the 2014-2018 coalition, under a Socialist Party alderman for housing, introduced Housing Agenda 2025. The most important change of the housing policy is the introduction of the so- called “40-40-20 rule”, meaning for all new housing developments, 40 percent of the homes should be social rent, 40 percent should be within the intermediate sector, while 20 percent should be market homes (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017:b). This new rule is seen as a radical change to the housing agenda of 2009, which basically dropped all mixing requirements (Interview 20). According to Interviewee 16, the Municipality felt that because the house and rent prices increased so much over the last years and so many social homes had been sold, that the social rental sector needed a new boost under the better market conditions. In addition, there was a continuing need to stimulate the intermediate rental sector as the maximum income for social rent was lowered by the national government to the modal income in 2013 (Interview 16).

To supplement the 40-40-20 rule for new developments, the new housing agenda also mentioned the stop of the sale of social housing when the share of social rent gets under 35% in 22 administrative areas, which is seen as an ideal share of social housing (Interview 16). Besides that, the agenda continued the promotion of the development of intermediate rental homes as the total share of this segment is still only 6 percent (Municipality of Amsterdam & AFWC, 2018). A new Action Plan for intermediate rent (Actieplan meer Middeldure huur 2017-2025) made new conditions for this segment starting in 2019. As mentioned in chapter 3, intermediate rent was pretty much absent in the Dutch housing system, and therefore regulations lacked for intermediate rent. The Action Plan thus not also tries to stimulate intermediate rent, but it also set conditions for intermediate rental homes. New standard conditions include 1. allocation to movers from the social sector; 2. allocation to middle incomes (till 1,5 times modal income); 3. A maximum rent; 4. rent increase by inflation; 5. 25 year duration of the homes as medium-rent; 6. steering on also larger intermediate rent dwellings (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017:a).

The new 40-40-20 rule is quite ambitious, but unlike in London, the rule is more enforcing and strict. Developers will have to come up with a very good reason to demonstrate that they aren’t able to meet the target (Interviews 14, 15, 16, 17 & 19). There is relatively little doubt that the target can’t be realised due to financial unviability as in London. Interviewees mention the strong control the Municipality of Amsterdam has over land. Through ground lease contracts the Municipality can allocate appropriate land prices fitting the 40-40-20 target (Interviews 17, 18, 19 & 20). Moreover, there are many housing associations existing willing to provide the first 40 percent of social rent (Interview 16). A certain fear exists over the rule as it is very rigid, and exceptions are likely to be made in favour of expensive housing.

“The problem with such a rule is that the exceptions always go one way: so that the programme is more expensive. And if sometimes, but that does not happen that often, somewhere a block pops up, “let’s do crazy and put in 100% social”. In one way or another, such an exception is never imposed.”(Interview 15, District alderman)

As the 40-40-20 rule has just recently implemented, its effects remain to be seen. What is sure, is that it introduces a new focus on the mix of housing segments in new developments in Amsterdam4.

4 Recent 2018 municipal elections led to a left wing coalition of Green Left, Liberal Democrats (D66), Labour and the Socialist Party. This coalition with the same alderman for housing is expected to globally continue the housing policy introduced in 2017. 46

5.2. Investigating the development processes of mixed-income housing

“How did the different planning processes influence the housing mix in both cases, and to what extent did the landowner influence the mix?” 5.2.1. Royal Albert Wharf – London As mentioned, the Royal Albert Wharf consists as so far of three phases: the Great Eastern Quays, followed by Gallions Quarter, followed by Gallions 3B. As the time period, land situation and realised housing mix differ per phase, each phase will be discussed separately. Figure 13 provides an overview of the three projects.

Figure 13: Overview of developments Royal Albert Wharf Project Land situation Housing mix realised Great Eastern Quays Sold for market price, housing mix fully 31,5% affordable, of which: negotiated through S106 agreement 43% affordable rent, 57% shared-ownership Gallions Quarter Procured with 40% affordable housing 40% affordable, of which: requirement (OJEU) 50% affordable rent, 50% shared-ownership Gallions 3B Procured with 50% affordable housing 50% affordable, of which: requirement (for London Development 1/3th London Affordable Rent, Panel) 1/3th London Living Rent, 1/3th shared-ownership

Great Eastern Quays: Public land as a regular sale and planning process The development of the Great Eastern Quays starts in 2008 when developer/housing association Notting Hill Housing acquired the leasehold rights for the land in the Royal Albert Basin. While the land was (and is) owned by GLA Land and Property, there was no active land policy by the public landowner at the time to procure the land or set any (housing) regulations in a development agreement. The land was sold for a 999 year leasehold, which makes it basically similar to private land (Interview 5).

As there were no set regulations, the programme was fully negotiated, as it goes with private land, through a Section-106 agreement between the GLA (as first owner), Notting Hill Housing (as second owner and developer) and Newham (as local planning authority).

Negotiations for the housing programme resulted in an initial housing mix of 31% affordable housing, with a 45:55 split between affordable rented and shared-ownership homes (GLA, 2012). This mix is not in line with the planning regulations at the time of the planning application (35% affordable housing with a 60:40 split). The GLA refused this first planning application, particularly because it had questions about the affordable housing split. In 2013, the scheme was approved at a second planning application and a viability assessment proved that a higher share of affordable housing would be financially unviable. The developer however raised the share of family homes (3-bedroom plus) from 23% to 27%, as this was a request from specifically Newham (Interview 7). The result on the scheme was that the total number of homes was slightly lowered from 837 to 819 and that the affordable housing split was changed to 43:57 (GLA, 2013).

Despite this, 31,5% affordable housing is significantly higher than the London average of 20% in 2012/13 (figure 11). With the Great Eastern Quays as first development in the area there was a relatively high pressure on the Newham planning team to set a good precedent for subsequent

47 developments (Interview 5). What also helped for securing the affordable housing was the fact that there was a very experienced viability officer appointed to the project (Interviews 6 and 7).

“He was a tough cookie! He would sometimes disregard viability assessment, and he pushed it really hard. He was good for the borough in some ways, but sometimes he really stuck to his principles, which made him really challenging.”(Interview 6, Consultant)

Apart from the viability assessment there are a number of reasons why this mix is chosen and approved by the local council.

First of all, the lower share of affordable housing and also the lower share of affordable and social rent, are acceptable because of the goal to create mixed and balanced communities and “the high level of social rented housing within the surrounding area” (GLA, 2013, 5). This is particularly fitting within the second aspect of mixed and balanced communities as written down in the 2016 London Plan. The adjacent ward Beckton is used as comparison, where there is a relatively high share of social housing. According to some, these kinds of justifications are unfair, as social rent levels are generally declining through Right to Buy and there it does not take the impact of new developments in account (Interview 1). What is certain, is that it impacts the on-site housing mix by allowing lower shares of affordable and social rent.

Secondly, borough Newham has a relatively strong focus on the production of family housing, particularly as many homes in the borough have been split into smaller homes over the years (Newham, 2012). In London, the share of family homes is typically a discussion point for planning applications, particularly as family homes are less profitable than one or two-bedroom flats and thus have a large impact on the viability of a plan (Interviews 6 & 7). Interviewees from both the public and private sector indicated that Newham’s target of 39% (Interviews 5, 6 & 7) is high, and perhaps even unreasonable to ask. Given the constraints of the location (located at a brownfield near London City Airport), 27% was realised and allowed. Despite this, 27% is seen as a big achievement: Interviewee 6 mentioned he had never been involved with developments with a higher share of family homes.

An additional problem with family housing in London is, is that there is no mechanism to ensure that families will buy the family homes (Interview 3). As there are certain building standards, the price of 3- bedroom plus homes is simply very high. Because of this, there is a large chance that family homes will eventually be bought to be let to flat sharers, especially in apartments such as the Great Eastern Quays (Interview 8). This is not considered to be a problem by developers as family homes might then offer housing options for starters on the housing market, but it is not in accordance with how Newham’s Local Plan envisions family housing.

“I can tell you right now that the three bedroom units, no-one is gonna buy them. … 1 and 2 bedroom units are what everybody wants. But if you’re a person living in Newham, so there is the arc of opportunity and the rest is urban Newham, which is basically Victorian housing, well there is a lot of run-down stuff, but it is not that big different form Victorian housing in other parts. So if you look for a family house I would hazily guess that you would buy it there and it’s probably cheaper or the same price.” (Interview 6, Consultant)

What the development team proposed to make better use of the family units was to allocate most family homes in the affordable segment. As the Council controls the waiting list for both affordable

48 and social rent, it can allocate the family homes to families. Hereby the scheme is meeting local demands better, as there is generally a higher share of families eligible for social and affordable rent.

As a third justification for the scheme relates to the lack of grants for affordable, and particularly for social housing. In the scheme only 11 homes (1.3%) of the homes are classified as social rent, and including more was not really an issue during the planning process (Interview 6; Newham, 2013). The core reason for this was not only the high share of social housing in Beckton, but also the lack of grants for social housing. Both the Cameron (National) and Johnson (GLA) administrations abolished social housing grants during the financial crisis (Interviews 1, 2 & 5).

“The government abolished funding for social housing since 2010 … And all the government money now goes to shared ownership, or “so-called” affordable rent. And some of that is 50% of market rent, but that’s still higher than 30% of market price that social rent was.” (Interview 1, Academic)

Also Newham used to have the policy at this time to not give grants for affordable and social housing in case a Section-106 agreement was used (Interview 8). In this context of budget cuts and crisis, the focus was therefore on the higher segment of affordable housing: shared-ownership. Moreover, it is simply financially more viable and better to mix with market homes in buildings, making it a more appropriate option for developers.

As a final point, the borough secured a 2.89 million pound contribution from Notting Hill Housing for Social and Physical Infrastructure through the Section-106 agreement. For this site it includes money for a primary school and bus stop in the Royal Albert Basin and local training programmes (Newham et al., 2013). When redeveloping a brownfield, these aspects are logically also essential for creating a liveable neighbourhood. In addition, there also needs to be a certain quality of the design of the buildings, public areas and homes. It is theoretically possible to slightly increase the shares of social and affordable housing, but then it would result in a lower design and engineering quality of the project. The reality is that a certain balance has to be found between spatial quality, the inclusion of cheaper housing segments and a sound business case (Interview 6).

Gallions Quarter: Public land procured for housing under Johnson’s administration In contrast to the sale of land for the Great Eastern Quays, the Gallions Quarter was marketed by the London Development Agency in 2010 and was procured following an OJEU (Official Journal of the European Union) procedure. As the land was procured through an OJEU procedure, the GLA technically put up a competition, open for all EU developers to come up with a plan and develop and build the proposed scheme. The tender was won by Notting Hill Housing in 2012 (GLA Land & Property, 2012). As the GLA wanted to set requirements for the development of the site, it is mandatory to do a procurement, because a public landowner is demanding a certain work/service (Interview 5). Whether a public landowner wants to set these kind of requirements is however a political choice (Interview 9 & 10). For Gallions Quarter it was a combination of the increased demand for affordable housing - where the GLA wanted more control over- and the GLA wanted to ensure the integration of the design quality with the first development Great Eastern Quays (Interview 5).

The tender document contained three main requirements for the development: 1. Design and Approach; 2. Development, Viability and Programme and 3. Financial and Commercial Viability (GLA Land & Property, 2012). The three aspects were equally weighted. As part of the requirements, there was a set requirement of 40% affordable housing for the whole development (Interview 5). The final

49 agreed programme for Gallions Quarter contains 40% affordable housing with a 50:50 split between affordable rent and shared-ownership (GLA, 2015)

The share of the affordable segment was higher because the set target of 40%. As the GLA asked a certain price for the land, this price should be realistic for developers to achieve the 40% target. No price discount was however given to stimulate the development of the affordable segment, as this is simply not common in London and public landowners are obliged to sell their land around the market value to avoid corruption (Interviews 5 & 10). As the 40% target was known before developers bid on the land (a share of the tender was assessed by a bid), the 40% target results in the fact that developers bid accordingly because they know 40% is expected for the site (Interview 3). Through the procurement, a financial offer is also not the only criterium on which a plan is selected, making it possible to select proposals on their design quality as well. Notting Hill Housing won the tender procedure because scored good on the design quality, but also because they could make an acceptable financial bid as they could make benefit of certain economies of scale as they were already developing the Great Eastern Quays (Interview 5).

After Notting Hill Housing won the right to develop their proposal on the site, the plan including the 40% affordable housing requirement was put into a Development Agreement. The Development Agreement is a private law contract (in contrast to the public law Section-106 Contract made through a Planning Application) in which the GLA acts as landowner instead of a governmental planning authority. The fact that the 40% affordable housing is put into the Development Agreement makes it for developers more difficult to bring the affordable housing share down during the Planning Application, because they agreed 40% in the contractual relationship with the GLA.

“There is two kind of forms of control ... One is the Planning Permission, the other is the developer’s contractual position with us [GLA]. They can always apply to the council to change things, but they would also need to apply to us, because we made the contract, the Development Agreement. And the problem we would have then would be a procurement issue, so if we want 40% affordable and eventually change it to 20% affordable, someone else can say, “if we were allowed to do that we would have won!” ” (Interview 5, GLA)

Despite this, the original proposal in the 2013 planning application was 35% affordable housing with a 40:60 affordable rent/shared-ownership split and 22% family units. This was however increased to 40% (with a 50:50 split and 30% family units) after a viability assessment was done (GLA, 2015). Despite this, the share of family housing (30%) and the 50:50 affordable housing split is not confirm the Newham Local Plan, although the planning application process changed it. The 50:50 split was however also written in Development Agreement. Generally the GLA accepts 50:50 if that is better for the mix of a neighbourhood (Interview 3). It also shows the higher priority of family housing within Newham, as the GLA found 22% acceptable.

Alike, the Great Eastern Quays, there is only a small share of social rent (1,8%) as part of the affordable segment. The reasons are similar to the ones given for Great Eastern Quays: the high share of existing social rent in Beckton, lack of grants and the least viable type of affordable housing (Interview 3). Also, under Boris Johnson, the GLA found it more important that homes would be delivered at all, than that they would be affordable. Therefore the inclusion of more social rent was not really an issue (Interview 5).

As a final point, this project also shows how the Section-106 contract can form a mechanism to ensure the negotiated affordable homes are built. As Gallions Quarter is split-up into three phases, there is a theoretical risk that a developer first only builds the first phase and then resells the land for the later phases. As phase 1 contained significantly less social and affordable homes -due its location close to the Gallions Reach DLR Station making it more appropriate for smaller intermediate homes- a penalty was added in the Section-106 agreement in case this would happen, to ensure funding for the negotiated share of affordable homes (Interview 3; Newham et al., 2016).

Gallions 3B: Procurement under Sadiq Khan’s new affordability regime The most recent site Gallions 3B will deliver the most diverse housing mix of the three sites. The scheme will deliver 50% affordable housing as part of the development with a affordable housing split of 1/3th London Affordable Rent (more or less similar to social rent), 1/3th London Living Rent and 1/3th shared-ownership. The procurement started in March 2016 with a 35% affordable housing requirement, still under the regulations of Boris Johnson. The procurement was however paused during the Mayoral election in April. After the election of Sadiq Khan who had a much greater emphasis on affordability and social rent, the affordable housing requirement was raised to 50% (GLA, 2017:b). According to Interviewee 5 this was quite unique, but none of the interested developers objected to it.

What makes Gallions 3B interesting is that it was procured under the London Development Panel instead of the open market. The London Development Panel is a collective of the 25 biggest developers and housing associations operating in London. The Panel is thus already pre-procured and the allocation of sites to the London Development Panel is mostly meant to speed-up development for these sites, as the procurement process can be quicker (Interview 5). It is a matter of choice and priority to procure a site on the open market or under the London Development Panel (or to procure it at all), but the choice to procure Gallions 3B under the London Development Panel was based on the fact that the site was a difficult site due its location next to an unplanned river crossing, and the GLA wanted to make sure the development was integrated properly with that (Interview 5).

Moreover, the focus of the GLA, particularly since the election of Sadiq Khan, was less about getting a high land value, but more on factually achieving the new housing targets for public land (Interview 5). To increase the financial viability of the scheme, the GLA also asked developers to propose their own payment structure. This particularly helped to make sure the developer, Notting Hill Housing, started paying for the land once they sold the first housing units, and thus reduced some development risks for Notting Hill.

Although the housing mix is agreed between Notting Hill Housing and the GLA in a Development Agreement, the planning permission and Section-106 procedure are at the moment of writing still in negotiations. Interviewee 5, responsible for the negotiated Development Agreement, is confident that this negotiated mix will be contained throughout the planning application. The highest worry is however the strong focus on family housing by Newham. In case Newham insists on 39% family housing, it is likely there will be less affordable housing within the scheme, as family housing is less profitable than one or two bedroom apartments (Interview 5 & 6).

5.2.2. Cruquius – Amsterdam Cruquius is a less clearly phased development than the Royal Albert Wharf. As the development is guided by the “Rules of the game”, a similar development strategy has been applied for the whole area, although four general phases of the development can be distinguished. The following text will therefore discuss the planning and development process of Cruquius as a whole, but in doing so, it will refer to the following four phases of Cruquius.

Figure 14: Overview of phases Cruquius Phase Land situation Housing mix realised Subarea 1 Public land 100% market (of which +-50% market rent) Subarea 3 Private owned land by Amvest 8% social 29% intermediate rent (including co-living homes) 63% market Subareas 2,4-7 Public land 7,5% social 15% intermediate rent (including co-living homes) 77,5% market (including cheap owner-occupied) Van Lohuizenlaan Public land in use by Municipality 100% social (temporarily student-refugee housing)

Organic, rule-free development influenced by the crisis In general, the housing mix for Cruquius can be classified as a mix of 75% market homes, with addition of predominantly intermediate rent and a bit of social rent. The mix is a result of the market-led approach of the Municipality for the area.

The most important reason for this market-led approach is the fact that the plans for transformation started in the middle of the financial crisis. Since the crisis, the economic activity went further down for the already ailing businesses on Cruquius. The Municipality therefore proposed to transform the area in a mixed-use residential area, as logical extension of the already transformed other Eastern Docklands (Interview 12). As it was very difficult to make developments happen during economic downturns, the Municipality decided to organically transform Cruquius led by market initiatives (Interview 12, 14 & 15). With the crisis in mind, the Municipality could not bear the risks and financial means to transform the area through the “traditional approach” and buy out the existing businesses, create a full urban design plan, create a land-use plan and start procurement procedures, without the certainty that eventually a developer wants to build new homes (Interviews 12 & 19).

To make the area interesting for development and also to set certain guidelines for the initiatives, the Municipality together with Amvest (that already acquired some plots in 2008) and the existing businesses made the Rules of the Game Map indicating a general urban design and plot layout, a maximum plot density (FSI) and the buildings of historical value (Interviews 12 & 19). The Rules of the Game thus provided no regulations or guidelines for housing programme or mix (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2012). This contrasts strongly with the traditional approach the Municipality of Amsterdam takes, in which a housing programme is written down in an urban design plan or tender document (which is possible on the large share of land the municipality owns).

“That [a prescribed housing programme] is not the case here, because at the time the attitude was "if at least someone is going to build something". It was crisis, nothing was being built, but we also need homes. Then we can at least continue providing these homes.” (Interview 12, Municipality)

The fact that no rules for a housing mix where applied to Cruquius is also supported in the 2009 Housing Vision and the municipal wish to add more market and intermediate housing segments to Amsterdam, and particularly in the central urban zone where Cruquius is located (Interview 12, 13 & 14). As this housing vision also formally dropped the former 30% social rent requirement for new developments, a development with only market homes was possible. The first phase of Cruquius - Subarea 1- was planned between 2012 and the beginning of 2015, in the middle of the crisis. This phase of four projects consists of only market homes, although the developer tried to differentiate these homes in size to serve different types of residents and incomes (Interview 19). For this first phase the focus was less on affordability, and more on the fact that a first development could trigger further developments in the area (Interview 19). It is therefore a typical example of the time period of which it is built.

“We [the Municipality] had obviously no idea how long the crisis would last. And there was also a bonus, the faster they would build, the more favourable the land price was. So the rules are very much typical for that time: we want production, please build something.” (Interview 12, Municipality)

Bringing in some mix through negotiations As it went better with the economy and housing market during the development process, there was a growing desire to differentiate the housing mix with other segments. On 23 September 2014, the city district Oost council passed a resolution (motie) in which it expressed the wish to differentiate the housing programme for further projects with intermediate rent and social rent, but also with “modern”, types of housing such as studios. A resolution proposed by the Socialist Party to include 30 percent social housing within subarea 1 was rejected by the council. The enforcement of 30 percent social housing did simply not comply with the agreed development strategy (Rules of the Game) for the area and secondly, the ground lease contract with Amvest for subarea 1 was already made together with a new land-use plan (City district Oost, 2014; Interview 15). The Municipality would be an unreliable partner if it would change its former agreements, as developers acquired land positions based on the Rules of the Game. The housing differentiation for the later phases was therefore based on a more soft approach based on negotiations and arguments.

At the same time, both the Municipality and the developers did not want to create a neighbourhood that would merely consist of relatively expensive market homes. Particularly Amvest was sensitive to the idea of a mixed-income neighbourhood as it is also area developer and the investor who lets the rental homes on the long term (Interviews 12, 13 & 19). The negotiation process did thus not focus on whether the housing programme should be mixed, but there were different views -the Municipality wanted more cheaper segments than the developers- on the extent of the mixing and which housing segments should be added (Interview 15). As a strategy, the Municipality said at a certain point that they would like 20 percent social housing within subarea 3, the plots on private land. Eventually the Municipality didn’t expect this to happen, but it was a sign that they were serious about differentiating the housing mix for the further phases (Interview 12).

The negotiators from the Municipality were very positive about the attitude from the developers to differentiate the housing mix for the later phases and developer Amvest was positive about the facilitative attitude from the Municipality (Interview 19). In the end, about 30 percent of the homes on subareas 2-7 was differentiated into intermediate or social rental housing, of which intermediate rent makes up the largest share (Interview 17). The developers also agreed to put some experimental forms of housing in the mix. Both Amvest and AM develop co-living homes. This form of housing where tenants share the kitchen was not existing within the municipal policy of Amsterdam. The ground lease price the developer has to pay is therefore similar to market homes (the total rent price is between 1000 and 1400 euro per month), but the rent for individual tenants is within the social segment (between 500 and 700 euro per month). These homes are particularly suitable for starters on the housing market, and its development is a result of the facilitative, market-led planning process of Cruquius (Interviews 12 & 16).

AM also developed some studios and Amvest even developed social rental homes (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2018). The latter is particularly interesting as private developers do not receive a discounted standard ground lease price as housing associations do (Interviews 12 & 19). The choice to develop the units by Amvest was made because during the crisis most housing associations couldn’t bear the risks of developing themselves in this complex area where land was also contaminated (Interview 19). Amvest keeps 19 social rental homes on subarea 3, while 69 social rental homes on subarea 5 and 7 are transferred to housing association De Alliantie after completion. The positioning of the 19 social units on the private plots is remarkable. This is however mostly a result of the fact that the Rules of the Game indicated that the development on the southern private plot should consist of separate buildings. This makes it practical to develop a building of social units (Interview 19).

The intermediate rental homes are all relatively small, are guaranteed as intermediate rent for 15 years, and there is no income limit for tenants (Interview 12). Small homes with a maximum monthly rent of 971 euro are simply more financially viable than large homes with a rent of 971 euro. Also the fact that the intermediate rent is only safeguarded for a relatively short period of 15 years makes a significant financial difference with the 25 year term from the 2017 Action Plan Intermediate Rent (Interview 17). Because the ground lease price for all subareas was already determined before the new housing policy was implemented, the Municipality did not provide a lower land price for intermediate rent to the developers. Because the intermediate rent was added in the later phases (subareas 2-7), the land price was actually calculated at even a higher price because of the economic progression. As a trade-off the Municipality allowed the intermediate rental homes to be 1 or 2 bedroom apartments and only guaranteed regulated for 15 years (Interview 12 & 17). The intermediate rental homes were thus entirely financed by the developers. As small intermediate rental homes with the duration of 15 years are a relatively profitable non-market type of housing, they are typically preferred over social rent or larger intermediate rental homes (Interview 17).

As figure 14 shows, there is not a significant difference in housing mix between the plots on private land (subarea 3) and the plots on public land (subarea 2, 4-7). Because Amvest owns all plots on private land and leases most plots om public land, it can quite easily spatially move housing segments between the different plots and all public and private plots work basically as one business case. Amvest could earn relatively much with subarea 1, as it also had to pay for the land development, in terms of cleaning contamination and developing the public space (which is unusual in Amsterdam) (Interviews 18 & 19). Additionally, the Municipality of Amsterdam applied one strategy for the whole area, namely the Rules

54 of the Game. Although the original plan was to update the rules throughout the time, the Municipality realised quickly that this was not possible in terms of good governance.

“The idea was that it was easy to evaluate and update the Rules of the Games. And that appeared to be quite difficult. When a developer acquires a position and makes plans based on that, then you can’t actually say as government “could you now include a certain share of social housing as well?”. That is actually impossible. So that was a lesson for us, think about your governmental tasks.” (Interview 12, Municipality)

Cruquius and Amsterdam’s new Housing Agenda As the development of Cruquius is largely negotiated under rules made during the financial crisis, it raises the question to what extent the new Housing Agenda 2025 and Action Plan Intermediate Rent influenced the housing mix. The simple answer to this is that their influence is almost nil, because the ground lease contracts (and anterior land development agreements for cost recovery for private plots) had already been signed before the implementation of this new policy, or were almost ready to be signed (Interviews 12 & 17). The 40-40-20 rule was thus not applicable for Cruquius (with the exception of Van Lohuizenlaan, see below). On the other hand, the new financial incentives to stimulate the development of larger intermediate rental homes, and to support the duration of 25 years intermediate rent, were also not applicable for the intermediate rental homes in Cruquius. (Interview 17). The intermediate rental homes of Cruquius were thus slightly ahead of their time (Interview 19).

Since the Housing Agenda 2025, the Municipality also monitors the effect of new development on the area in which they are located. The current total housing programme makes the total share of social rent for Oostenlijke Eilanden/Indische Buurt, in which Cruquius is located, around 35%, the ideal municipal percentage. This way of argumentation is perceived as slightly dubious by some interviewees (12 & 14), as these administrative areas are quite large and diverse. The Indische Buurt has a relatively high share of social rent, while Cruquius is spatially much more integrated in the Oostenlijke Eilanden where the share of social rent is much lower. Despite this, the Architectenbuurt located directly west of Cruquius has a large share of social rent. Compared to this neighbourhood, the relatively high share of market homes in Cruquius is also seen by the Municipality and council to be a valuable addition to the social rent in this smaller neighbourhood (Interview 12 & 13).

Two remaining plots on the Van Lohuizenlaan are in temporary (10 year) use as student and refugee accommodation and as existing recycling centre. As the Municipality still controls these locations, the Municipality considers these locations to be suitable for permanent social or intermediate rent to balance out the total housing mix for Cruquius (Interview 12, 14 & 17). The rough planning is to procure these sites confirm to the applicable housing policies on the long term (which would be 40-40-20 till at least 2025). It is an illustration of the power the Municipality of Amsterdam holds over its land, but which it didn’t use for Cruquius.

5.3. The value of public land policy for mixed-income housing

“What role could public land policy play in facilitating mixed-income housing?” 5.3.1. Royal Albert Wharf & London The value of public procurements As the development of Gallions 3B shows, public landowners (the GLA in this case) can have a strong influence on the housing mix for new developments in London. Gallions 3B shows particularly how procurements/tenders can be used to regulate the housing mix on new development locations. The 50% affordable housing target (including 1/3 social rent) from the Mayor of London was literally pursued and achieved. As the GLA decided it had specific demands for Gallions 3B (and also Gallions Quarter), it had the obligation to procure the housing development as “public works” and write a tender for the land (Interview 5).

“we [the GLA] got a lot more control, as we’re in a kind of partnership with them [Notting Hill Housing]. We procured them to do the works, so they’re paying us. But in fact we can tell them to do some works for us. So it’s a funny arrangement, as when I procure some work, I would have to pay them, but because they get the benefit of all the sale value from all the units, they pay us, but in effect they carry out the works on our behalf and get the work done. So if you look at the differences between a public works contract and a disposal, it really changes what you can do and specify the land.” (Interview 5, GLA)

The procurement is thus a very strong instrument to steer on the mix of housing programmes. Because of its construction, it is basically possible to steer on everything, ranging from land value, design, sustainability and affordable housing (Interviews 1, 5 & 9). For Gallions 3B (and to a lesser extent Gallions Quarter), the focus was not particularly on how high developers could bid for the land value, but the focus was on design of the buildings. This approach was chosen due the complexity of the site and the wish to change the perception of the neighbourhood (Interviews 5 & 9). As described earlier, the low focus on land value was also driven by the policy focus of the new Mayor Sadiq Khan on “genuinely affordable housing”.

The challenge for mixed-income housing of procurements is that the selection criteria are not based on a set formula, but the selection criteria can change from site to site and from time to time (Interviews 1, 5 & 9). On the one hand, this is logical as it allows customised steering on each different site in different parts in a city. On the other hand, particularly the bidding on land value conflicts with the inclusion of affordable types of housing. The decision to focus on high land value or high shares of affordable housing is thus based on the amount of political commitment and support there is to gain significantly less profit on public land (Interviews 10 & 20). The phases of the Royal Albert Wharf clearly show that this political commitment has grown over the years in London. Where the land for the Great Eastern Quays was simply disposed at market value, the latter two phases were procured with increasingly lower focus on land value and higher focus on affordable housing.

“You don’t have to sell to the highest bidder under the British procurement system. You can determine what your housing requirement is, if it’s gonna be 100%, developers bid accordingly. But that is a political choice anyway.” (Interview 9, Academic)

“If I [as public landowner] own a hectare of land of let’s say 100 million pounds per hectare, I then say I want half the houses as affordable houses. Probably the land value drops down to

60 million per hectare, because all the affordable houses. So instead of getting my 100 million which I would have got with no affordable houses, I now only get 60 million. So essentially I pay 40 million pounds to get affordable housing built.” (Interview 10, Academic)

Land policy in relation to London’s development-led planning system What puts mixed-income housing developments under pressure in London is the nature of the planning system that uses no land-use plans, but general local plans combined with a planning permission. The planning permission is given by boroughs and the permission is strongly dependent on priorities by the local councils (Interviews 1, 5, 9 & 10). Different boroughs have different priorities and for example the Conservative-led boroughs in Outer London have a very strong protective stance on new housing developments and high rise (Interview 1 & 10). As the development of the Royal Albert Wharf shows, the local authority Newham has a large focus on family housing, something which puts the inclusion of cheaper segments under pressure. As the planning permission is the core legal instrument which approves the housing mix of developments, it might change the agreed mix between GLA and Notting Hill Housing for Gallions 3B.

Additionally, most land in London is privately owned, means that there is little control over the land values that are paid for private land. Affordable housing in London is thus entirely financed as part of a the sale of market homes within a market-based housing programme. Combined with the reactive role of both planning authorities in facilitating market-led initiatives, it is possible to negotiate the affordable housing targets down, because local authorities fear otherwise no development will take place at all, and developers might move to other boroughs (Interview 1, 10). The result is that the prices paid for land are typically higher than reasonable to finance cheaper segments as part of the total mix.

“The problem with the British Planning system is that planning determines land value. But the present government considers that land value is planning and decided that you can say ‘this scheme is unviable under your policy, we can do a viability test’. The answer should be, ‘it is unviable, so you can’t build it because you probably spent too much on your land’. And so I suggest you go bankrupt and the next person who picks it up under distressed land sale, brings it up at a level which comes forward in planning. But if you keep on swinging your policy on affordable housing between 50%, 30%, 20%, 35%, but we know you only need 15%, then you build up a hope value. And all what happens is that when you reintroduce 50% everybody sits on their land as they know they paid too much and hope on the next Mayor who probably reduces it down to 25%. So planning has to be consistent over a long period of time in order to control land values. And politicians interfere in the planning system so much, any builder/developer will sit on their lands in expectation the most favourable things will happen in the future.” (Interview 9, Academic)

The procurement of the land for two of the three sites is quite unique in the UK context, particularly given the typically reactive role public bodies in planning (Interview 5). In contrast to e.g. the Netherlands, there is no tradition of proactive role of public landowners to specifically allocate cheap land towards affordable housing development (Interview 1, 9 & 10). Despite a lower focus on land value for Gallions 3B, the affordable segments are -alike almost all British developments- still part of a market-led development programme and are financed by the sale of market homes (and new grants for Gallions 3B)(Interview 8). In rural British context, there is however the so-called “exceptions approach”, where a philanthropic landowner disposes land where housing developments normally

57 wouldn’t be allowed at current (agricultural) value to facilitate the development of affordable housing (Gallent, 2017, personal communication, see Carmona et al., 2003, 270 and Gallent, 2009 for a detailed explanation of this approach). In the early 2000s, London Borough Hammersmith and Fulham adopted this approach to only allow the development of residential schemes on some former industrial sites under the condition that 100 percent of the homes would be affordable. The approach was effective as it tempered the land value, making 100 percent affordable possible, but on the other hand it made landowners hold their lands back from the housing market (Gallent, 2017, personal communication). According to Carmona et al. (2003) the approach was also only possible under the strong political focus on affordable housing from the borough at the time. Although these schemes did not include market housing (meaning no mix), the approach could be an option to finance the affordable segments within a larger area development, while a regular approach could be used for the market homes.

5.3.2. Cruquius & Amsterdam Cruquius in relation to the traditional Amsterdam land policy The British “exceptions approach” is quite similar to the way the Municipality of Amsterdam normally facilitates the development of social rental housing. The Municipality assigns specific plots of land towards social housing and then allocates it to housing associations (Interview 17). In Amsterdam, the Municipality then disposes the land for a standardised low price, independent from the location. As a trade-off, the housing associations develop social rental housing on the base of the agreements between the Municipality and the Amsterdam Federation of Housing Associations (Interview 11 & 17). These agreements include the development of homes for people with disabilities, and other vulnerable groups, such as refugees. The foreseen approach for the Van Lohuizenlaan in which land is procured for social rent fits this traditional approach for facilitating social rent within the housing mix.

The procurement of land is seen by most interviewees as the most effective instrument to steer on mixed-income housing. Through a procurement, the Municipality can set out the whole programme of a location it owns. This programme could be 100 percent social, but it could also be a mix of segments (Interviews 17 & 18). The Municipality plans to use a procurement in Cruquius to balance out the mix with social/intermediate rental homes on the Van Lohuizenlaan (Interview 11). As the Municipality does give the standard low price for social rental homes (and plans to give an adjusted ground lease for larger intermediate rent) and is a major landowner, the combination of these factors with procurements of land can be very effective in steering on mixed-income housing (Interviews 11, 15 & 18). Additionally, the Municipality can set direct regulations for intermediate rental homes in terms of size and duration through the procurement. To facilitate this, the Municipality should determine an adjusted ground lease price for intermediate rental housing to make the development of the larger intermediate homes financially viable (Interview 11).

"And that's what we're looking at now: how can you prescribe that intermediate segment in tenders plus a minimum size. And then you have to do something with the land value. Otherwise, these larger intermediate rental homes will be financially unviable homes. If you keep it in line with the market, the monthly rent will be above 971. So what do you do with it? Then you can give you a subsidy towards that middle segment: that is possible, but then we also want to set requirements for a maximum income. That is not possible in Cruquius." (Interview 12, Municipality)

For Cruquius, the Municipality didn’t want to put a strong, enforcing pressure on housing mix from its role as landowner (Interview 13). The reasoning behind this was -as mentioned- mainly influenced by

58 the bad market conditions and additionally the political context preferring to develop more market and intermediate rental homes. It clearly shows that the procurement of land for mixed-income housing is something that a public landowner can do, but does not have to do. A certain political commitment is needed to use this enforcing and stimulating instrument and above all it is often politically dependent on what criteria the procurement focusses (Interview 18). According to Interviewee 18, the approach for Cruquius was quite exceptional and especially the Municipality of Amsterdam has adopted procurements as a more or less standard planning instrument.

“Procurements are very policy-dependent. Politicians also score on this. There is always 30% scored on sustainability and that is politically agreed.” (Interview 18, Academic).

“In Amsterdam, the Cruquius market-led approach is really exceptional. Generally, the Municipality is very clear and says “this and that should be the programme” and then they will steer on that. And generally they are quite strict. That is how it works and there are policies and visions behind it. The Housing Agenda 2025 for example, about the number of homes, how quick, which locations and the procedures, they are very steering on that and certainly not awaiting on what will happen.” (Interview 18, Academic).

Despite the fact that for Cruquius the Municipality didn’t use its role as landowner to facilitate the mix, two instruments can be used to facilitate a mix within the housing programme: the ground lease contract and the land-use plan. Through a ground lease contract the public landowner can adjust the ground lease price for certain segments (e.g. the larger intermediate rental homes), while also aspects such as the duration and income limit for these homes can be secured (Interview 12, 17). On the other hand, through the land-use plan, the Municipality can prescribe a certain share of social and -since 2017- intermediate rental housing to a location (Interview 20). Moreover, land-use plans have to be modified for most urban developments, including Cruquius. Land-use plan changes have to be approved by the council and technically the council can refuse to approve it and make demands (Interviews 12, 13, 14, 18). In practice this is something which does not often occur as it is a rigorous and time-consuming instrument. Despite this, it is still a power a municipality has, and where developers are aware of when proposing a development (Interview 18). If a proposed development is not in line with municipal housing targets, it is certain that it will be scrutinised by the council.

“In the case of Cruquius … morally it is not really a strong case when a municipality adopts a policy, the Rules of the Game, and when you then use your planning powers to enforce the things you’ve forgotten or didn’t include in the Rules. That is not a strong case in terms of reliability, but it is possible. The city council can decide not to approve the land-use plan change … That is obviously going to become a 2-3 year conflict, and does it benefit the city given the fact that we need homes? Yes it is possible, but it is the challenge to consider: is it worth it to be very difficult, or can we try to facilitate an investment that can benefit the city?” (Interview 15, District alderman).

Steering on private land in Amsterdam The power the Municipality has through the land-use plan is also applicable for private land and developers know they will often need approval for land-use change. As the Dutch, and particularly Amsterdam, planning system is less based on negotiations and less flexible than the UK planning system, it is not likely that developers would pay much more for a private plot of land under the assumption affordable housing targets can be negotiated down (Interview 18). In Amsterdam, housing

59 targets (like the new 40-40-20 policy) are much more enforcing than the flexible London housing targets. If a developer cannot finance the development of a scheme that is in accordance to the housing policy, the development will often not happen (Interview 18). Additionally, developers and the Municipality are aware of their roles and often collaboratively work together to apply the, generally realistic policy, to the development. The development process of Cruquius illustrated this good collaboration between public and private partners.

“In Amsterdam, policy is formulated in such a way that it is feasible and realistic and that is of course also the advantage. So then you get of a sort of funnel formation from: we can work it out.”(Interview 18, Academic).

Even when the Municipality does not own the land it can try to support the financial viability through the land development, particularly through the anterior land development agreement (posterior agreements also exist, but are practically never used). The anterior land development agreement typically covers the cost recovery for public space and land cleaning, but it can also cover agreements concerning the duration of intermediate rental units (Interviews 17 & 18). The anterior land development agreement thus works quite similar to the ground lease contracts, but a municipality has a weaker position in negotiations when it doesn’t own the land. Moreover, although the Municipality could support the inclusion of cheaper segments though the anterior development agreement, it is expected that there will be quite a lot of issues concerning state aid (Interview 19). One final aspect that is different with the UK is that these anterior land development agreements never include the costs for the development of schools or nurseries. In the Netherlands, these facilities are separately supported through cheap land by municipalities, while in the UK developers of housing schemes have to finance these facilities as well through the planning gain (Interview 18). The fact that Dutch developers do not have to pay for these facilities also helps to increase the financial viability of intermediate and social housing.

6. Conclusion

The development of mixed-income housing developments in cities as London and Amsterdam is under pressure from the high land values in both cities, which make the inclusion of affordable housing segments financially challenging. As both cases illustrate, both planning systems offer instruments to influence the housing mix within new developments, and public land ownership can play an significant additional role in supporting the development of affordable housing segments in cities with prosperous housing markets. As this conclusion will argue, despite these possibilities to influence mixed-income housing through planning instruments and public land, a certain political commitment is required to trigger the available instruments. In the beginning of both cases, this political commitment was largely absent, but as the time went by, a stronger political commitment to facilitate affordable segments evolved, leading to a different land strategy for the Royal Albert Wharf and plausibly different strategy for the final plots of Cruquius. Before the research will be concluded in a more detailed way, the empirical findings from the first three sub-questions will first be analysed in a comparative way. Question 1: How is mixed-income housing embedded in London’s and Amsterdam’s urban policies?

Both the Greater London Authority and the Municipality of Amsterdam strongly recognise the values of mixing neighbourhoods and new developments through mixed-income housing. Both mixing rationales over the past decade have however a strong focus on mixing neighbourhoods through the addition of more intermediate housing for the socio-economic middle class, rather than social housing for the lower class. Both cities argued in their policies that there is already a relatively large social housing stock in the city and in neighbourhoods. Because of this, particularly the poorer, more deprived neighbourhoods are to be mixed with more intermediate and market homes. The development of new residential areas is hereby seen as effective way through which poorer neighbourhoods can be regenerated. On the other hand, mixing more affluent neighbourhoods with more affordable housing is less explicitly mentioned in housing visions.

As indicated by Scanlon et al. (2013), the pressure on social rental housing in London is higher than in Amsterdam. Led by national housing policy focussed on stimulating home-ownership in favour of social rent, the national government cut the capital grants for new social housing to zero in 2010. In addition, London mixing targets have never been met due the flexible nature of the British planning system and the little control over the price that developers pay for land. This combination makes it very difficult to include social housing in the mix. In Amsterdam, the 30% social housing target for new developments was dropped in the 2009 housing agenda, but it remained a common practice. Despite the Municipality kept on stimulating social housing within new developments, there has been a large focus on particularly intermediate rent in housing policy as well. Interestingly, the intermediate segment is also stimulated by the sale of existing social housing, making the Amsterdam housing policy quite paradoxical.

Remarkable is that, in both cities since 2016-17, there has been a renewed focus on the inclusion of social housing in the mix, in addition to a continued focus on intermediate segments. In both cities the implementation of these new targets is largely a reaction on the large pressure on the local housing markets in terms of affordability. In London new social housing funds have been introduced, and

61 particularly on public land, the Mayor made a strong commitment to meet a stronger affordable housing target of 50% (of which 1/3th social rent). In Amsterdam, the Municipality recently introduced a 40-40-20 housing target for new developments promoting a very affordability-focussed housing mix. Question 2: How did the different planning processes influence the housing mix in both cases, and to what extent did the landowner influence the mix?

Both cases illustrate the influence of housing visions over the housing mix for individual developments. Despite not being legally binding instruments, the visions have a strong influence in shaping the developments, as many argumentations concerning housing mix are justified on the base of these visions. Because of this, low shares of social rent are permitted in both cases, while the mix is mostly made through adding more financially viable intermediate types of housing in the mix. For the Royal Albert Wharf, these are shared-ownership and to a lesser extent affordable rent, while for Cruquius mainly smaller intermediate rental homes are added.

In terms of finance, for both cases (with the exception of Gallions 3B), the addition of intermediate and social housing segments is entirely financed through the development programme itself, planning gain. For Cruquius the mix is the result of the organic, market-led approach the Municipality adopted for the area during the crisis. As there were initially no rules promoting mixed-income housing, the developers were left free to acquire ground lease rights to land and the Municipality did not give any discount for cheaper segments in terms of ground lease. This approach is similar to the conventional development approach in London, which was also applied for the Great Eastern Quays. The main difference is that for Cruquius no set mixing targets were set and the housing was voluntary mixed, while for London-based developments set targets can be negotiated down though the planning system (as slightly done for Great Eastern Quays). For the private developers at Cruquius, developing social housing is in none of their direct financial interest. Still the developers are developing a slightly higher share of social rental homes then the London-based housing association Notting Hill Housing. Developers in Amsterdam seem more conscious about the concept of the undivided city. Contrastingly, is interesting to see that in London even a housing association does prefer to build the intermediate segment above social rent. This exemplifies the residualised status of social rent in the United Kingdom as mentioned by Ronald & Elsinga (2012). It also raises the question of how money should be used: should it be used to fund 5 social homes or achieve maybe 20 homes in the intermediate segment?

Gallions Quarter and especially Gallions 3B show the value of procurements for steering on mixed- income housing. Through a procurement a public landowner can set regulations for a to be developed project and based on that select the best development proposal. As developers know the set criteria for the to be developed programme, they will bid accordingly for the land, preventing extreme high land values. In London, also with a procurement on public land, there is no discounted land price for affordable segments. Contrastingly, as the Municipality of Amsterdam plans to do with the Van Lohuizenlaan, it will offer the standard low ground lease for social rental housing. Ground lease is an additional strength of the Amsterdam land policy, which is absent in London. For Gallions Quarter and Gallions 3B the affordable segments are namely still financed through planning gain. Gallions 3B also clearly illustrates why the planning system is development-led. Even when a Development Agreement is made after a procurement, affordable housing percentages can still be negotiated down through the planning application in case the scheme would be unviable: all to make development happen. In

Amsterdam, set targets are more cut in stone: if a developer can’t deliver the negotiated percentage, the development might not happen and the land is offered to another developer.

Despite being a powerful instrument, the decision to procure land or not, and under what conditions, is very dependent on the political context and market conditions. Particularly the Royal Albert Wharf shows that the land policy of the GLA has shifted from less facilitating mixed-income housing to more facilitating mixed-income housing. This happened particularly under the new housing policy of Sadiq Khan, when also more affordable and social housing grants became available to stimulate the development of these segments. For Cruquius, it were particularly the market conditions that influenced the less facilitative land policy for mixed-income housing. In the crisis, the Municipality simply didn’t want to set hard targets or requirements for different housing segments, although it would have had the possibility to. This decision was thus also politically made.

Finally, the duration of the agreed mix is guaranteed better in London than in Amsterdam. Through Section-106 contracts the duration of all types of affordable housing (including social rent) is perpetually guaranteed. In Amsterdam, social rent is typically guaranteed for 25 years, whereas in the case of Cruquius intermediate rent is guaranteed for 15 years. This is agreed in ground lease contracts or anterior land development agreements. After these terms end, the term for social rent is regularly renewed, although there is no guarantee that this will happen.

Figure 15: Comparative overview of the Royal Albert Wharf and Cruquius London – Royal Albert Wharf Amsterdam - Cruquius Housing programme Mostly market housing, mixed with Mostly market housing, mixed classified as intermediate types of housing, little with predominantly intermediate social rent (exception Gallions 3B) rent, some social rent Cheaper segments Intermediate: entirely financed by Intermediate rent: entirely financed by sale of market homes financed by developer due Social rent: idem., exception Gallions making the units relatively small 3B: with additional grant and for a duration of 15 year Social rent: idem. Duration of mix All affordable types of housing Intermediate rent: 15 year perpetually guaranteed Shared-ownership and London Living Social rent: guaranteed for 25 Rent can be bought by tenant year, but regularly renewed Role of political National government stopped social Focus on the addition of context housing grants intermediate and market GLA shifted focus towards segments affordability Recent renewed focus on social Newham: strong focus on family rent through 40-40-20 homes Role of planning Development-led planning system Influence through land-use plans system clearly influenced the housing mix, (although Municipality is willing as the implementation of affordable to change land-use) housing targets is flexible Role of land policy Shifting: from “private sale” to Traditionally large, but smaller for procurement meeting relatively high Cruquius due the facilitating affordable housing targets Municipal strategy Land-lease contracts used to regulate intermediate rent

Question 3: What role could public land policy play in facilitating mixed-income housing?

In London, contrastingly to Amsterdam, the finance of affordable types of housing is regularly not done through land. Despite the Royal Albert Wharf was developed on public land, no special arrangements were made to support the development of social or affordable/intermediate housing. For the Great Eastern Quays, the land was disposed at a market price and all more affordable segments were financed through planning gain (Section-106). The latter two developments were procured and an increasingly lower focus on land value helped to increase the financial viability of the housing programmes, so a higher share of social and affordable housing could be included in the programmes. Because of the development-led planning system, procurements are not very regularly used in London and the conditions on which the public landowner selects development proposals can differ quite radically. The use of procurements is thus politically dependent, and despite a housing programme might be agreed in a Development Agreement, each development project still has to apply for planning permission at the local council. Local councils can have different priorities (as Newham demonstrated) than the various public landowners (in this case GLA). This might alter the proposed housing mix. Also, every development, even when procured, is dependent on planning gain (Section-106) and (optional) national grants for the finance of the affordable and social segments. Moreover, planning gain also finances schools and nurseries, costs for which Dutch developers are not responsible.

This contrasts strongly with Amsterdam, where public land is typically used as means to finance social rental housing (and schools), but it can also be used to support larger intermediate rental units when the Municipality considers this necessary. The non-market segments are thus regularly financed through a lower ground lease price. Cruquius forms quite an exception to this approach as no cheaper land price was calculated for the social rent (since Amvest is a private developer) and the intermediate rental units (no special provisions were existing for this segment at the time contracts were made). Despite this, the ground lease contract was used to regulate duration of these non-market homes. The Cruquius land policy contrasts the traditional approach in which the Municipality also regularly uses procurements to enforce a housing mix on locations it considers appropriate for development. Like in London, the selection criteria are often policy-dependent, but in Amsterdam the Municipality hence supports the development of social and intermediate rent through a lower ground lease price. Technically London boroughs and public landowners have the possibility to do the same, but this is politically not done on large scale (Interview 18). It is illustrative for London’s facilitative planning traditions that the Gallions Quarter and Gallions 3B sites were sold rather than kept in public ownership after the procurement. In case of private land, the Municipality of Amsterdam typically makes an anterior land development agreement, which works more or less similar to the ground lease contract. The Municipality can try to support the financial viability of the programme by paying a larger share for, for example, public space and it can regulate intermediate rent.

A final key difference between London and Amsterdam is the existence of legally binding land-use plans in Amsterdam and the Netherlands. The preserving nature of land-use plans can form a strong legal barrier towards plans a municipality finds not appropriate. For many urban developments, a land- use plan needs to be changed and this is a formal procedure in which the city council has to approve the proposed change. Although it is unlikely city councils will use this power, it is something developers are aware of when proposing a development. Legally binding land-use plans are not existing in London and the planning permission is comparable to the approval of a land-use plan change. Planning

64 permission is however more based on negotiations, ad-hoc solutions and is based on facilitating change rather than preserving an existing land-use. Additionally, Dutch municipalities can prescribe social or intermediate housing in land-use plans, a power absent in the United Kingdom.

Figure 16 provides an overview of the more “powerful” enforcing steering instruments available in each planning system versus the more “flexible” negotiated steering instruments. The figure makes clear that particularly in case of public land ownership, and more in Amsterdam than in London, the local authority can enforce mixed-income housing. The ground lease contract offers hereby an additional stimulating instrument.

Figure 16: Comparison of steering instruments for mixed-income housing in relation to the land ownership situation in London and Amsterdam

London – United Kingdom

Procurement (and DA) (optional) Enforced Public steering

Land ownership Private Planning permission Negotiated Negotiations (Section-106) steering

Amsterdam - Netherlands

Procurement (and DA) (regularly) Enforced steering Public Land ownership Ground lease contract Stimulating Private Land-use plan Negotiated Negotiations (Anterior Agreement) steering

Source: own production, 2018. 6.1. Main conclusion So, what does this comparison explain in order to answer the research question?:

How does the interaction between land ownership and planning instruments influence mixed- income urban residential developments within different planning systems?

As the first research question made clear, both London and Amsterdam’s housing visions promoted mixing of housing segments, but the idea of socio-economic mixing through housing was mostly focussed on attracting skilled workers through the development of particularly the intermediate segment. By doing so, the city governments thus recognise the difficulties for particularly these middle income groups to find housing in both cities expensive housing markets. As the study of the development processes of the Great Eastern Quays and Cruquius explain, a more facilitative, market- led development process in which no public land policy is implemented, will particularly focus on the addition of these intermediate segments, since they offer an “affordable housing” option, but are more profitable than social rent.

As Gallions Quarter, the Van Lohuizenlaan and particularly Gallions 3B illustrate, public land policy can play an important additional role to also include social housing within the development programme. Especially when a public landowner decides to procure land to select a development proposal, the procurement is hereby a powerful enforcing instrument that can set selection criteria based on housing mix. This controls the high land values in cities as developers know they have to develop a certain share of less profitable social and intermediate housing. Moreover, a development proposal is simply not chosen by the public landowner if it does not fulfil the required housing mix (if this is part of the selection criteria).

There are however a number of crucial differences between the London and Amsterdam planning systems that make public land more valuable for mixed-income housing in Amsterdam. Firstly, the practice of procuring land is common practice in Amsterdam where public land policy is more interlinked with the planning system than in London. The Municipality of Amsterdam typically decides which areas are suitable for residential transformation, and then procures land based on the guiding mixing policy, facilitating mix. As the Buitelaar (2010) already argued, the Dutch planning system is linked to the pro-active role of Dutch municipalities in planning (plus land-uses preserve existing land- use). British local authorities feel more reserved to take an active role in procuring land and the Gallions Quarter and Gallions 3B can be seen as untypical developments. Additionally, Section-106 agreements allow local authorities in intervene in housing developments, also when they are not the landowner, making active land policy less prioritised. Secondly, the Municipality of Amsterdam has a ground lease system through which it can facilitate social and intermediate housing through a lower ground lease price. The GLA was more reluctant to stimulate affordable housing segments through a lower land price. This has to do with the third difference, the finance of social and intermediate housing which is entirely different in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In the United Kingdom social and intermediate housing segments are financed through planning gain and additional grants from the national government, while in the Netherlands municipalities finance, particularly social rent, through a low land price. The finance of social rent is hereby normally separated from the market housing making the development of social housing less dependent on the rest of the housing programme. Additionally, the Dutch municipalities do not have to rely on national government grants, because housing associations are self-sufficient organisations responsible for the development of social rent.

As the Great Eastern Quays and Cruquius illustrate, public land ownership is however no guarantee that all planning instruments available to influence a housing mix are used. Particularly the Great Eastern Quays demonstrates that a public landowner can also dispose its land at market value. Within the flexible British development-led planning system, this allowed only a minimum amount of social rent. It is therefore important to question how public land is used. Does public land function as investment for the state or is it used as means of consumption to facilitate diverse housing segments (Montgomery, 1987)? As a public landowner is both a market player as a market regulator, a certain political commitment is required to use public land for the development of affordable housing. Additionally, Cruquius illustrates that market conditions can also significantly influence this process of political decision-making as in economic downturns there is less money available to “spend” on a lower land value for cheaper housing segments. On the other hand, in better economic times, there is more money available to facilitate a highly differentiated and affordability-focussed housing policy such as 40-40-20.

This raises the question to what extent the political context influences mixed-income housing. On a large scale the influence of national politics is big. National housing policies in both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands strongly focus on the promotion of home-ownership and intermediate segments. This effect is particularly stronger in the UK as here the national government is also responsible for the allocation of affordable housing grants. Illustrative is that social housing grants had been entirely cut between 2010 and 2017, making the development of this segment very financially unattractive. In addition, also both London’s and Amsterdam’s housing policies have promoted the development of intermediate and market housing to attract skilled workers, also putting the inclusion of social housing in the mix under pressure. This analysis fits the elaborations of Wildavsky (1973) and particularly Raco (2018) on the large role of (national) politics on planning outcome. On the other hand, Alexander’s (1981) vision on the role of actors in shaping the planning outcome within the constraints of the political context can be confirmed through this study. Despite there were no enforcing rules for housing mix in Cruquius and the Great Eastern Quays and the public land policy was not focussed on facilitating a housing mix, the planners and developers managed to deliver a certain housing mix. These cases illustrate that public land policy is no prerequisite for differentiating a housing mix, although a market-led development would particularly lead to more intermediate housing, rather than social housing because financial considerations come more into place then.

Concluding, the planning systems of both London and Amsterdam offer good instruments to influence the housing mix in urban residential developments, although in London there are no pure enforcing instruments available. The use of public land can definitely support the development of more affordable segments in the mix, particularly through a public procurement. Despite these strong enforcing and stimulating powers, public land ownership is however no guarantee for mixed-income housing. As Haila (2016, 118) mentions:

“There is no ‘natural value’ for public land. Rather, the value depends on the role the city and the state assume as landowners, their point of view and whether they count alternative costs. If they decide to make money through their real estate and maximise revenue, they replace schools, libraries and day- care centres with offices, restaurants and hotels that can bid more for the land. If they value social consequences and the public good in their land allocation decisions, they calculate the use value of their land.” 6.2. Recommendations Based on the conclusion, a number of recommendations can be given to both policy makers and researchers.

Firstly, how public land is used, is something crucial when it comes to facilitating affordable types of housing in expensive housing markets. When a public body in these cities is in the comfortable position of owning land, it stands for the difficult decision to either bring cheap land in to support much needed affordable housing or to financially profit from the high land values and use this money to finance other public services. Given the large affordable housing need in London and Amsterdam, it would be unwise not to use it to support the development of these homes, which are generally more challenging to develop. Unregulated developments in such markets easily become expensive and inaccessible for large groups of citizens. The development of new housing is a phase in which a local authority still has the possibility to influence the housing mix developed, but it is much more difficult to control the prices of market housing once completed. The use of public land in the land and property market therefore requires prudence. If a public landowner decides to use its land to support more affordable segments,

67 good regulation of these segments is hereby preferred to guarantee the affordability over time. Particularly in Amsterdam, ground lease contracts can hereby play an important role to support intermediate rent over a longer time than 15 year.

Secondly, it is important to consider that decisions made during a planning process have typically strong implications for the long term, which makes it difficult to adapt plans to new situations or new (housing) policies. This was particularly visible for Cruquius when the Municipality adopted the Rules of the Game strategy. The Rules formed a great exception to the general Amsterdam development housing strategy and included no rules concerning housing programme or mix in the hope to let development happen during the crisis. When it went better with the economy, earlier and better than expected, the Municipality could not change the agreed Rules of the Game and add regulations concerning housing. This is something the Municipality has learned throughout the planning process. Such kind of policy learning is also recommended for planning practice.

Thirdly, the planning outcome of the studied housing developments is significantly dependent on national political decisions. Particularly in London, the large focus on the development of shared- ownership as affordable type of housing is a result of the strong focus of housing policy towards home- ownership. Such kind of decisions are made by the national governments of both countries and cities have little influence over this. The effect of national housing policy on the existing housing stock in cities is maybe even larger. In the United Kingdom, Right to Buy still supports tenants to buy their social home, while since recent years in the Netherlands the property value is calculated in the rent of social homes. The latter has particularly effect in the centre of Amsterdam where high property prices quickly result in a rent above the liberalisation limit, enforcing sale. It would be recommendable to allow more freedom for city governments to make their own housing policies, especially when the housing markets of London and Amsterdam are characterised by very city-specific challenges.

Fourthly, further research is recommended towards the politico-economic origins of housing and urban policies. As this study shows, urban policy is focussed towards mixing different socio-economic groups and make cities accessible to live for all incomes. Despite the fact that planning instruments and public land ownership can support these goals for new housing developments, the reality is that there is a large focus on delivering housing in the intermediate segment for skilled workers. Where does this desire come from? As the literature and studied policy documents show, at least one of the reasons policy makers prefer socio-economically mixed neighbourhoods is linked to the additional benefits for social cohesion and upward mobility. As the literature illustrates these effects are unclear, more research towards these effects is recommended. Also it would be useful to study how interaction between different income groups within developments can be efficiently promoted.

Finally, further research towards the effects of planning on housing supply on a larger scale is suggested. Something not entirely incorporated in the research, but what certainly effects house and land prices in both cities, are the relatively strict planning regulations. In London, the 1947 Green Belt is still prohibiting housing development on vacant plots of land within this belt, while Dutch cities, including Amsterdam, are spatially confined by the so-called “red contour”. These kind of measures meant to protect the countryside prohibit the growth of cities. Particularly in London some of these plots are not green pastures, but wastelands where no housing is allowed. Further research on the effects of these policies on the affordability of housing is beneficial for both research and planning practice.

6.3. Reflection This study introduced mixed-income housing as a remedy towards the affordability and accessibility problems of the London and Amsterdam housing markets. Although a mix of segments was developed in each case, not all income groups are served through the developments. In London, the one-bedroom affordable rental homes developed will have a rental price between 600 and 1.040 pound per month. Since a rent-to-income ratio of 1/3th is generally seen as affordable, the monthly income for renting such a home would be between 1.800 and 3.120 pound (whereas the average income in Newham is 2.250 pound per month) (National Statistics, 2018). The affordable rental segment in London is thus not very affordable for many citizens. The intermediate rent in Cruquius starts at about 750 euro per month. As a monthly income of 3,25 times the monthly rent is required, this segment is only accessible for people with an income starting at 2.437,50 euro per month (29.250 euro per year), while the maximum income for social rent is about 36.000 euro per year (Cruquius, 2018). Here the intermediate rent forms a good option for these middle incomes. As regularly private renting organisations ask a higher monthly income than 3,25 times (e.g. 4,5 times the monthly rent) the intermediate rental sector is not always an option for people earning just a bit more than the social rental income limit (Vesteda, 2018; Interview 20). Considering this, the delivery of mixed-income housing thus does not automatically serve the goals of offering housing affordability and accessibility for all income groups. Particularly new housing concepts, such as co-living in Cruquius, might offer an interesting alternative for both investors as tenants.

As the study aims to understand how steering on public land differs from private land, the cases were initially selected on the assumption that the land for the case in London was entirely in public ownership and the land in Cruquius was entirely private land. During the research process, the land ownership situations of both cases appeared to be a bit more complicated. In London, the initial focus was on the Great Eastern Quays (as it was the most advanced phase), but since the land disposal strategy appeared to be similar to private land, the more recently developed adjacent site Gallions Quarter was added to research as well. Since interviewee 15 also discussed the very recently procured smaller site Gallions 3B, the whole Royal Albert Wharf was studied. In the end I am happy with this as all three phases explain a different role of the public landowner in attaining a different housing mix within the sites. In Cruquius only two plots appeared to be in full private ownership by Amvest. The land and development strategy was however quite similar to private land ownership as the Municipality did not really made use of its role as landowner. Because of this and the integral development strategy, it was difficult to study the effects of public and private land ownership on the housing programme. If I had more time, I would likely have studied both a publicly and privately owned case in each city. Also interesting could be a comparison of a large number of developments in both cities concerning public or private land ownership to find out whether there is a statistical effect of land ownership on the housing mix.

Finally, the theoretical framework discusses the position of planning systems in a neoliberal context. Neoliberal influences have increased private-sector involvement in planning and have led to a more facilitative public sector (Heurkens & Hobma, 2014). Particularly Cruquius and the Great Eastern Quays can be seen as examples of such a market-led housing development. The study of these cases illustrate that also without strong enforcing public steering, mixed-income housing can be developed, but that particularly the development of social housing is likely to be under pressure. Particularly for the development of social housing, a stimulating public sector is still required and public land can play an important role in this. Neoliberal influences have had a stronger impact on the 2012 London Plan and

2009 Amsterdam housing vision, since these visions promoted privatisation of social rent to create more market and intermediate housing for the middle class to stimulate the urban economy (van Gent, 2013; Besussi, 2016). Interestingly enough, since recent years (2016-17) both cities are however in a strong wave of more social-democratic, left wing urban policy. Over the years, the affordability problems have been widely recognised in cities and the political change through recent elections is illustrative for that. For the development of mixed-income housing this would be considered a positive thing. As Wildavsky (1973) argued, the political context of a city might be crucial for planning decisions; however local citizens have the unique power to bring change to that political context.

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Appendixes

Appendix 1: Anonymised Interview List Name Function Location Date Interview 1 Senior Lecturer Housing and Development; London 12th October 2017 Highbury Group for Housing Development; Land Department Mayor of London (formerly) Interview 2 Senior Planner GLA Housing and Land London 6th November 2017 Interview 3 Planning Consultant Gallions Quarter Savills London 9th November 2017 Interview 4 Researcher G15 Housing Associations London 13th November 2017 Interview 5 Planner GLA Land & Development, responsible London 22nd November 2017 for land contracts Royal Albert Wharf Interview 6 Planning Consultant Great Eastern Quays DP9 London 23rd November 2017 Interview 7 Planning officer Newham, responsible for London 27th November 2017 planning applications Great Eastern Quays and Gallions Quarter Interview 8 Developer Vastint, responsible for a similar London 5th December 2017 area redevelopment in Newham Interview 9 Professor Urban Design; Head of Design for London 13th December 2017 London (formerly); Chief executive London Development Agency (formerly), responsible for regeneration strategy Royal Docks Interview 10 Professor Urban & Property Economics London 3rd January 2018 Interview 11 PhD Researcher University of Amsterdam, had Amsterdam 1st March 2018 done research on Cruquiuseiland and Zeeburgerpad Interview 12 Planner Project Management Bureau Amsterdam 22nd March 2018 Municipality of Amsterdam responsible for Cruquius Interview 13 Councillor City district Oost responsible for Amsterdam 23rd March 2018 housing and regeneration Interview 14 Developer Amvest responsible for one of the Amsterdam 27th March 2018 plots of Cruquius Interview 15 District alderman responsible for housing in Amsterdam 29th March 2018 City District Oost Interview 16 Advisor Research & Development at the Amsterdam 9th April 2018 Department of Housing, Municipality of Amsterdam Interview 17 Planning Consultant responsible for ground Amsterdam 17th April 2018 lease contracts for Cruquius, hired by the Department of Land and Development, Municipality of Amsterdam Interview 18 Professor Land Policy Delft 18nd May 2018 Interview 19 Area developer Amvest responsible for Amsterdam 29th May 2018 Cruquius Interview 20 Professor Housing Systems Delft 4th June 2018

Appendix 2: Information letter (English)