POLITICAL BARGAINING AND THE PUNJAB CRISIS:
THE PUNJAB ACCORD OF 1985
By
ALVARO JOSEPH RODRIGUEZ
B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1987
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(Department of Political Science)
We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard
THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
September 1988
® Alvaro Joseph Rodriguez 1988 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced
degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it
freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive
copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my
department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or
publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written
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Department
The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada
DE-6 (2/88) those who dared ABSTRACT
Since the early 1980's, the Punjab state of India has been in turmoil as a result of a separatist movement that developed among elements of the Sikh community. Political tensions not only characterized the relationship between the Punjab and New Delhi/ but also between Sikhs and Hindus and among different segments within the Sikh community itself. The most important attempt to end the conflict in the state has been the Rajiv Gandhi-Sant
Longowal Accord signed on July 24, 1985. However, the Accord failed and by mid-1987 the Punjab was once again racked by political violence. This thesis focuses on the events that led to the signing of the Accord and the forces that caused its demise. Bargaining theory provides the general theoretical framework against which the data are analyzed.
This thesis highlights the fact that political bargains in
Third World weakly-institutionalized states are often the result of particular configurations of political power which are short• lived. The corollary of this is that once the configuration of political forces changes, the chances of success for the previously reached political bargain are weakened. In the particular case of the Punjab Accord, there was a change, beginning in late 1985, in the relative political power of the participants in. the bargain. Also, the terms of the bargained
Accord unleashed forces on both sides which undermined its implementation. Third World leaders should draw two major lessons from this. First, they should be careful not to have exaggerated perceptions of their power since this may be counterproductive in the future if they cannot deliver what they have promised. Second, these leaders should attempt to consult all interests with a stake in the bargained settlement as a way to prevent opposition to it.
iii TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract ii
Table of Contents • iv
List of Maps v
Acknowledgements vi
Chapter I: Anatomy of an Accord 1 The Accord 2 The Sikhs 6 Genesis of Sikh Separatism 11 Bargaining Theory 15 Information Interpretation 20 Decision-Making 22 Strategy Search 26 Chapter I Notes 31
Chapter II: The Accord to End Discord 33 Separatism and Communal Violence in Punjab 33 An Accord at Last 37 Final Remarks 55 Chapter II Notes ... 57
Chapter III: The Resurgence of Discord 58 From Accord to Discord 59 Final Remarks 78 Chapter III Notes 81
Chapter IV: Conclusion 82
Bibliography 89
iv LIST OP MAPS
Page
Map 1 India. Political Divisions 8
Map 2 Linguistic Divisions of Punjab in 1966 9
Map 3 Punjab and Haryana Today 10
v ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This thesis is the culmination of five years of study at the University of British Columbia that would not have been possible without the help of numerous individuals. I am grateful to my parents who supported me in my decision to leave Chile close to six years ago, knowing that I would, or could, never go back. In addition, I owe many thanks to all my friends. My achievements owe much to their acceptance and tolerance.
My gratitude also goes to Professor John R. Wood for his encouragement in the last few years. For his patience and dedication I am much indebted. As well, I would like to thank Professor Diane K. Mauzy for her help and support when I seemed to lack direction. To Professor Harjot S. Oberoi I am grateful for an uncanny ability to open new fields of interest for me in the realm of Sikhism. All three I must also thank for their help in the quick completion of this thesis.
vi CHAPTER I: ANATOMY OP AN ACCORD
August and September 1985. Punjab, India. The air is full of hope; the cities peaceful; the fields coloured by different crops symbolizing a new beginning. It was in this optimistic setting that a Memorandum of Settlement was signed by Harchand S.
Longowal, leader of the Akali Dal party, and Rajiv Gandhi, prime minister of India, on July 24, 1985. Their Accord was an attempt to end the terrorism and political conflict which had beset the
Punjab for several years.
The Punjab had been in turmoil as a result of a separatist movement that had developed in the early 1980*s among elements of the Sikh community, the biggest ethnic group of the state. Their desire for separatism was strengthened as a result of New Delhi's apparent intransigence regarding a number of political, economic, and religious grievances of the Sikhs. The movement had also been made increasingly violent as a result of the preachings of
Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a Sikh religious leader who imbued the movement with fundamentalist overtones. Moreover, it was exacerbated by the factional disputes and electoral machinations of Punjab's major political parties. However, during August and September, all this seemed forgotten and the two major ethnic groups of the state, the Hindus and the Sikhs, appeared to be developing a common Punjabi outlook. The feeling of harmony was reflected in the electioneering for the State
Assembly and national Parliament. The restoration of the democratic process was significant as Punjab had been under New
Delhi's administration since late 1983.
1 April and May 1987. The hope is gone, the cities are havens for terrorism, and the parched soil due to the failure of the monsoon symbolizes the sterility of the recent political initiatives. The Accord has not been fully implemented and the future looks bleak. The document promising "peace in our time" is but one more failed attempt to solve the Punjab crisis, a crisis that has reached new heights in the last few months.
Hostility and suspicion are the norm now. Even the democratic process in the Punjab has been halted due to its "inefficiency" in handling the "law and order" situation in the state.
Why? Why the hope in 1985? Why the despair in 1987? Why was the Punjab Accord viewed so promisingly? Was it doomed to fail right from the start? If so, what were the forces that shaped its drafting and its implementation? These are some of the questions this thesis will attempt to answer. In doing so, the analysis will take us to the roots of a conflict which has led to communal violence unparalleled since India's partition in
1947.
THE ACCORD
This thesis focuses on the Memorandum of Settlement signed between Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, and Sant Harchand
Singh Longowal, president of the Shiromani Akali Dal (L), a preponderantly Sikh party, on July 24, 1985. It examines the events and forces that led to it; the shape the Accord took; and the developments that led to its demise. Of critical importance is to determine why the bargain that took place between these two politicians was possible then and not at any other time. The
2 perceptions and attitudes of both leaders are explored and the nature of the decision-making units that supported the bargaining process is examined. Furthermore, the overall strategy of the 1 two men in trying to reach their bargaining goals is examined.
The thesis focuses on bargaining theory for two reasons.
First, the bargaining concept provides a broad but practical tool with which to give coherence to the different political phenomena that play a role in bargained settlements. Bargaining theory is closely associated with other political theories, such as those focusing on factionalism, coalition-building, and elite accommodation. Second, bargaining theory is critical in explaining the relationship between the Punjab Accord itself and the opposition forces it unleashed. In other words, this theory is indispensable in the explanation of the events that led to the demise of the Accord.
The Accord, consisting of eleven paragraphs, promised to put an end to all major grievances of the Sikhs. These included the transfer of the city of Chandigarh to Punjab, the referral of the
Akali Dai's major separatist manifesto to a commission looking into center-state relations, and the promotion of the Punjabi language. The Sikhs' major religious demand was also granted as
New Delhi assured the Akali Dal that all Sikh temples in India would be brought under the administration of the Shiromani
Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC). High levels of Sikh recruitment into the army and a better allocation of river waters for the Punjab were also guaranteed by New Delhi, thus settling the Sikh's economic demands. Also included in the Accord were five paragraphs dealing with grievances that developed out of the 3 separatist movement and the subsequent government reactions to it. These clauses related to the protection of minorities, compensation for victims of political violence, rehabilitation of
Sikh army deserters, withdrawal of special courts from the
Punjab, and greater scope for the judicial enquiry looking into anti-Sikh riots in New Delhi. In effect, New Delhi was trying to accommodate Sikh grievances in order to make the community regain confidence in India's political system.
The Punjab Accord is of particular interest for comparative politics. In the first place, if politics can be interpreted as the authoritative allocation of values, the Accord of July 1985 is an example of a particular kind of allocation; one which takes place through a bargaining process. It provides clues as to how bargaining is done - or fails - in Third World multinational states. Secondly, the Accord is interesting because it provides insights into the political forces that shape a bargaining process, both during the negotiation stage and the implementation stage. A better understanding of the nature of bargaining in the
Third World will be reached if we can determine whether the forces are the same during each stage or whether the bargain itself activates new political forces. Therefore, both the reaching of the Accord and its demise are illuminating for students of comparative politics.
One last major reason for the importance of the Accord to comparative politics has to do with the implementation of the bargain struck on July 24, 1985. If the political situation changed to such an extent in 1986 and 1987 that it made the implementation of the Accord difficult, then there may be a
4 correlation between the time span of a bargain's implementation and its success in Third World politics. Third World governments, being weakly institutionalized, are more easily susceptible to political pressures from different sectors of the population. In consequence, the success of a bargain may only be guaranteed by quick implementation. This ensures that opposition forces will be presented with a fait accompli which, by definition, is harder to disrupt than a bargain involving a time schedule written on a piece of paper.
The importance of understanding this Accord for political scientists studying India in general and Punjab in particular cannot be underestimated. First, it represents an interesting case study of a bargain arranged between the central government, ruled by the Indian National Congress, and a regional political party, the Akali Dal, in order to solve a crisis in the Indian federation. It thus represents a tacit acceptance of the right of regional parties to speak for their states when dealing with the center. This seems to confirm what Paul Brass has described as tendencies toward regionalism, pluralism, and decentralization in India (Brass, 1982). Thus, analyzing the Accord provides important insights into the political dynamics that shape the
Indian political system both at the state level and at the national level. Understanding these political dynamics may lead to better predictions as to when such bargains can be carried out. As well, more accurate predictions will be able to be made with respect to the content of political bargains that New Delhi is willing to strike with regional parties.
5 Most of the grievances dealt with in the Accord were the subject of previous negotiations between New Delhi and the Akali
Dal party. Therefore, it is very likely that in the future the
Punjab Accord will be used as a base for further negotiations and bargains. It is important to note here that despite its non- implementation, progress was made in clarifying areas where trade-offs might be made. The success of future bargains may depend on this. Lastly, the Accord is significant because it represents the most concrete and detailed attempt to solve the
Punjab crisis by political means.
THE SIKHS
Punjab is a small state by Indian standards. Its 16.7 million people live in approximately 50,400 square kilometers 2
(Jeffrey, 1986:27). This has not always been the case. Before independence the Punjab region extended across vast tracts of today's Pakistan and also south-east to the boundaries of New
Delhi. However, partition in 1947 divided this area and two- thirds of the Punjab were absorbed into Pakistan. In 1966, another bifurcation of Punjab took place; the state of Haryana was carved out in order to make Punjab a unilingual Punjabi- speaking state. This completed the linguistic reorganization of
India. Despite its size, Punjab is strategically important due to its boundary with Pakistan. Also it is important as a result of its superior agricultural production. Punjab produces huge surpluses of wheat and rice that have helped make the state very prosperous: Punjab has India's highest per capita income
(Wallace, 1987:12). 6 The people of Punjab are ethnically very diverse. This is the result of the numerous invading groups that settled in this fertile plain. Religion is the primary basis of identification.
The Sikhs in 1971 comprised 60.2% of Punjab's population while the Hindus constituted another 37.6% (Wallace, 1986:364).
However, equally significant is the fact that, although the Sikhs constitute 1.89% of India's total population, over 80% of India's
Sikhs are concentrated in Punjab (Kapur, 1985:1). The effect this has had is that Sikhs have identified Punjab as their homeland and made this state a key focus of their loyalties.
The Sikhs are the followers of one of the world's newest major religions. Developed in the late-fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries as an off-shoot of the Bhakti movement,
Sikhism gradually developed martial characteristics. These were the result of persecutions by the Mogul rulers of India and of the preference given to the Sikhs in the British-Indian army during the colonial era. Another important aspect of the Sikh religion has been its tendency to revert back into Hinduism. For this reason, "fundamentalist" movements within Sikhism have been common since the nineteenth century.
A major political development in Sikh history was the Akali movement of 1920-25. During this period, the Akali Dal (army of the faithful) was organized to take over Sikh temples
(Gurdwaras). These temples, up to then, had been controlled by
Hinduized Sikhs who, quite often, desecrated the shrines. In
1925, all Gurdwaras of Punjab came under the control of the 3
Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC) , thus heralding a new era for the Sikhs. Not only had they gained control of their 7 s JAMMU & KASHMIR /
^,3 . HIMACHAL Simla ^ ARUNACHAl ^HARYANA PRADESH^-. .~ , /+DELHI \, V7 ••^ SIKKIM BHUTAN .v Jaipur ^UTTAR PRADESH RAJASTHAN * < ^ ^-5>>*-'V^" _ ^spur ,/.NAGALANO ^..sytohima • Patna / . Imphal BIHAR K^MEGHALAYA7/" . \ GUJARAT _ __^WEST• Agartala> w» .;, '^MANIPUR C BENGAL*-. TRIPUR/W l^awl M/ZORAM O/U DAMAN DADRA & NAGAR HAVELI Kavaratti * LAKSHADWEEP Trivandrum Map 1. India. Political Divisions. Adapted from. Robin Jeffrey, What's Happening to India? Punjab.Ethnic Conflict. Mrs. Gandhi's Death & the Test for Federalism (England: The Macmillan Press, 1985); XVIII. 8 Chandigarh # Delhi New Delhi Hindi-speaking region Punjabi-speaking region Bilingual Map 2. Linguistic Divisions of Punjab in 1966. Adapted from, Baldev R. Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab (New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1966): XIV. 9 Map 3. Punjab and Haryana Today. Adapted from. Mark Tully and Satish Jacob. Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle (London: Pan Books Ltd.. 1985): XVI. 10 temples but the Akali Dal eventually became the premier Sikh political party. The partition of India in 1947 was also significant as the exodus of Sikhs from the newly-formed Pakistan meant that the community had become largely concentrated in the Indian Punjab. Although still a minority relative to Hindus, the Sikhs were now poised to demand a majority-Sikh state. GENESIS OF SIKH SEPARATISM It is to the first twenty years of India's independence that the origins of Sikh separatism can be traced. In the 1950's, India's state boundaries were reorganized according to linguistic criteria, but Punjab was left untouched. In effect, Punjab remained a bilingual state with both Hindi and Punjabi having official status. Between 1947 and 1966 Sikhs constituted 33.3% of the population of Punjab compared with 63.7% of Hindus (Wallace, 1986:364). The States Reorganization Commission argued that Hindi and Punjabi were mutually understandable and that the existing Punjab state was a single economic unit that should not be divided (Report of the States Reorganization Commission, 1955:141-53). The Akali Dal opposed the verdict and launched an agitation in order to force the government to concede Punjabi Suba, a Punjabi-speaking state. After years of agitation, Punjabi Suba was formally conceded in 1966. The importance of the movement for Sikh politics was threefold. First, it meant that the new Punjab had a majority of Sikhs: Sikhs were 60% of the population by 1971, while Hindus accounted for most of the remaining 40% (Wallace, 1986:364). In fact, this was the first time in Sikh history that Sikhs formed a majority in a major politico-administrative unit. Second, the achievement of Punjabi Suba was largely the success of Sant Fateh Singh, a Sikh from the rural areas. As a result, after 1966, the Akali Dal became a rural-based mass party whose political objectives were tied to agricultural interests. Third, the Sikhs learned that through communal agitation, New Delhi could be forced to grant concessions. Despite this major victory for the Sikh community, many problems sprang out of the bifurcation of the erstwhile Punjab into the new states of Haryana, the predominantly Hindu and Hindi-speaking territory carved out of it, and Punjab. The water resources of Punjab's three main rivers were left to the central 4 government to distribute. This meant that Punjab could not utilize this water as it pleased. Also, Chandigarh was made a Union Territory and was declared the capital city of both Haryana and Punjab despite Punjab's claims that it should be part of that state and the capital of it only. Lastly, the boundaries were not drawn to the satisfaction of either of the two states. These issues later became the key demands in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973. The late 1960's were also significant due to economic changes in the state. New agricultural technology was introduced i and developed into what is now called the Green Revolution.' Although crop yields increased greatly, they led to a widening gap between rich and poor farmers. Many poor farmers migrated to the cities and found that Hindus dominated them (Wallace, 1987:16-17). Politically, the Green Revolution led to pressures for governmental decentralization. Since agricultural requirements are highly variable and regional or local in nature, and since rural power structures are also by definition local or regional, the pressure for a shift in economic policy orientation towards agriculture also implied pressure for decentralization in both the economy and politics (Brass, 1982:257). In addition, economic prosperity led to heightened expectations and feelings of relative deprivation as mechanization in the rural areas 6 contributed to Sikh youth unemployment. In the realm of politics, major changes were taking place throughout India in the late 1960's. Up to then, the Congress party had ruled both at the national and state levels, but in 1967/ several regional parties gained power in the states. Also, after 1966, the new Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, moved to acquire a foot-hold in state politics. This was further accentuated after the Congress split in 1969 (Dua, 1979:19); control of the states became crucial as Indira realized that in order to survive at the center, she needed to control them (Wood, 1985:9). In the Punjab, Indira promoted factionalism in and defections from the Akali Dal (Brass, 1986:17). This was done by granting concessions to one group at the expense of another and by promising important political offices to defectors. Not only that, she also sought to embarrass the moderate Akali leadership in order to decrease its power and weaken its position as a strong competitor to Congress in Punjabi politics (Brass, 1986:62). The Akalis reacted to these growing encroachments of the central government by writing up a list of demands which came to be known as the Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973. Originally it 13 asked for New Delhi's jurisdiction to be reduced to Defence, Foreign Affairs, Post and Telegraphs, Currency and Railways. In 19 78, however, it was amended and the above clause was deleted. The clauses of the 1978 copy of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution dealt mainly with political, economic, and religious grievances and they became the main objectives for which the Akali Dal party worked. They asked for the granting of Chandigarh to Punjab, for a more pro-Punjab distribution of water resources, and for more recruitment of Sikhs into the armed forces (White Paper on the Punjab Agitation, 1984:67-90). The armed forces had always been the focus of Sikh interests, but the mechanization of agriculture had increased even further their importance for Sikh employment. Also significant was the call for an All-India Gurdwara Act. The existing Gurdwara Act only incorporated Sikh temples in Punjab and the body in charge of running these temples, the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC), wanted to assume control of Sikh temples throughout India.^ The Resolution only gained relevance in the 1980's however, when it became the focus of an outbidding process between Akali factions. Growing interference in states' affairs and the consequent conflict with states' leaders reached their peak in 1975. By that time, Indira Gandhi, unable to control developments in India had declared an "Emergency" which was to last until 1977. The Emergency was notorious for the jailing of dissenters and press censorship. Of significance for Sikh politics was the fact that during that time, Akali demonstrators regularly defied the bans; more than 40,000 are said to have been imprisoned. This would make the Akali protest, which operated from the gurdwaras, the most sustained opposition to the "Emergency" offered anywhere in India (Jeffrey, 1986:116). Following the elections of 1977, the Janata Party formed a government, but it was too embroiled in its own factionalism in New Delhi and the states remained relatively free of the central government's interference (Wood, 1984:11). Sikh demands were moderated at this time because the Akali Dal formed part of the Janata coalition in New Delhi. Also, the Akali Dal ruled the Punjab from 1977 to 1980, with the Janata party as a coalition member in the state Assembly for much of the period. In effect, it was not until Indira's return to power in 1980 that center-state tensions began to be exacerbated once again, leading to a violent separatist movement in the Punjab and a desperate search for peace by moderates that eventually led to the signing of the Punjab Accord. Therefore, the political bargains of 1985 can only be understood if they are seen in relation to events in Punjab after Mrs. Gandhi's return to power. BARGAINING THEORY Bargaining is not only used in politics; it is an essential part of everyday life for most people. Such issues as the decision of who will wash the dishes after dinner or how to divide the profits of an investment equitably between all the contributors to an enterprise are other instances of bargaining. More politically salient examples would include trade negotiations between Africa and the European Community, the Law of the Sea Conventions, or center-state relations in federal systems. In general, it can be stated that bargaining is one of the most basic decision-making processes in the world. what makes bargaining relevant to our study is that decision-making through bargaining is an integral part of India's cultural baggage. Bargaining can be seen at work most clearly in the bazaars where peddlers try to sell their goods. The prices quoted initially by potential buyers or sellers are not what are expected, but simply a bench-mark price from which the bargaining process begins. Sometimes the offers are unreasonable and no deal is struck. Other times the "buyer" is not serious and has no intention of purchasing anything. Of more interest, however, are the cases in which both buyer and seller attempt to obtain mutual gains by a process of compromise, that is, by adjusting their conflicting stances in order to reach an agreement. In politics, such attitudes and behaviour are similar, as we will see below. The implications of bargaining in politics are clear, especially if we define politics as the authoritative allocation of scarce resources. Public officials, bearing the ultimate responsibility for allocating society's goods and services among the members of the society, must choose and make concessions among the competing demands reaching them. Also, they must attempt to reach compromises in areas where mutual gains can be obtained by all competing groups if a bargain is struck. This is particularly important in cases in which all stand to lose from the failure to reach a settlement. An important consideration in the allocation of resources is that, if most citizens get enough of what they need and want to keep them minimally satisfied, even if these are symbolic resources or values of little cost, then they will presumably support the society and uphold the values and beliefs that keep it operating (Reilly and Sigall, 1976:XIII- XIV) . But, what is bargaining? Oran Young defines bargaining as a means by which two or more purposive actors (henceforth referred, to as participants) arrive at specific outcomes in situations in which (1) the choices of the participants will determine the allocation of some value(s), (2) the outcome for each participant is a function of the behaviour of the other(s), and (3) the outcome is achieved through negotiations between or among the players (1975:5). This definition highlights one critical issue: interdependence. For one thing, every bargaining process is characterized by interdependence of process and of outcome. And no really satisfactory agreement can be reached by one of the participants without taking into account the interests of the other(s). However, as Daniel Druckman argues, each participant not only has to take into account the interests of the others during the bargaining process, but also the demands of different interests within his/her own political unit (1978:88). Groups with a stake in the issue may have to be taken into account because their political influence may become critical during the implementation of the bargain. If they were not considered during the bargaining process, they may turn against the agreement once it has been reached. Otomar Bartos presents another ingredient of bargaining processes. He argues that bargaining situations often involve dual and mostly conflicting motivations: the individualist (competitive) desire to maximize one's gain and the collectivist (cooperative) desire to reach a fair solution (1978:13). If the 17 dominant view in both political units during the bargaining process is that a deal is worthwhile, an agreement may be reached. However, if during the implementation stage different interests become disenchanted with the deal, or other interests excluded from the bargaining process put all their efforts into scuttling it, then the deal will probably fall apart as it will be hard for the affected participant to deliver what he/she had promised. This process is intensified if both participants are subject to "anti-agreement" forces. In our case, "participants" refer to the key decision• makers involved in the bargain: Rajiv Gandhi and Sant Longowal. "Political units" refer to the constituencies they represent; in the case of Sant Longowal it is the mainstream-moderate Akali Dal while for Rajiv Gandhi it is both the Congress party and India in general due to his position as prime minister. And interests refer to different factions, opposition parties and even states which have a stake in the settlement of a conflict. In our case study there are factions within the Akali Dal, key Sikh advisors in the central government, and the state of Haryana. In the particular case of the center-state bargaining process that developed over the Punjab crisis, numerous theoretical problems need to be dealt with in order to find an adequate framework for analysis. The framework developed by Charles Lockhart in 1979 to deal with bargaining during international conflict provides a useful approach to analysis. In what follows, his framework has been altered in order to make it useful for. a center-state interaction. In addition, individual components of the framework have been supplemented by 18 contributions from theorists such as Allison, George, Snyder, Diesing and Nordlinger. Despite the fact that many of these theorists deal with international cases of bargaining or decision-making, it is argued here that the interaction between the Punjab and New Delhi can be seen as a product of similar forces and pressures. Charles Lockhart states that three processes lie at the center of bargaining situations: information interpretation, decision-making, and strategy search. Information interpretation refers to the process by which the participants in the bargain attempt to discover the nature of the situation confronting them. At this time, the participants in the bargain and the different interest groups involved determine their stance. During the decision-making process the participants to the bargain deal with the impact the situation is apt to have on their political units. Relevant here are the nature of objectives and the nature of the decision units involved. Finally, there is the strategy search in which the interaction between the participants to the dispute takes place and different stances are taken by them in order to resolve the conflict (Lockhart, 1979:34). Despite the apparently clear-cut separation between the" three processes, this is deceiving. The boundaries separating them are quite imprecise. Furthermore, these processes are very interdependent. At first, information interpretation takes place and is followed by the decision-making and strategy search processes. However, new information is being received all the time and changes in decision-making and in strategy are subsequently made. As a result, this model is not meant to 19 suggest a chronological analysis. It simply seeks to dissect three major components that provide clues as to how bargains are struck. Despite these complexities and imprecisions, the model is still adequate for our inquiry. As Lockhart says, these topics form the most fruitful focus of attention. This choice inevitably places limits on what will be studied and on the nature of the theoretical results ... [However,] they help to explain why the parties hold such disparate views of the conflicting interests, why some settlements are inherently unstable, why strategies are often less than optimal from the standpoint of ... strategic interactions, why strategies are relatively inflexible, why clear-cut choices among strategic options rarely arise, why certain compromises are possible and others are not (1979:87). Information Interpretation Information interpretation is crucial to bargaining episodes. Lockhart states that, Since each party to a conflict reacts not to the situation as perceived by the other but rather to the situation as seen from its own perspective, the parties are not reacting directly to each other. Under these conditions it is necessary to understand the perspectives guiding each party (1979:38). At the most basic level, the process of information interpretation is critical when a potential participant to a bargain tries to determine whether he has a counterpart with whom to deal. Sometimes two potential participants already exist, as in superpower summits, but this is not always the case. Often, in situations where violence has occurred, one of the sides may lack a stable and coherent leadership as its senior politicians may be exiled or imprisoned. Other times, the political situation on one of the sides is so fluid that none of its "leaders" can depend on the clear support of a majority of the 20 constituents of the political units. Whatever the case, until each side develops a leadership that is perceived by the other side as stable and effective, the continuation of the political bargaining will be futile. Once each side has a coherent leadership, two factors shape the process of information interpretation. These are the political role and the power each one of the participants perceives himself as having and is perceived as having. Role is significant since, to a large degree, it influences the stance of a participant in the bargaining situation. In the case of a prime minister, for example, the "national interest" dictates that he view a center-state crisis with a broader perspective than a regional leader who has more particular and narrowly- defined interests. Perceptions of power are also important in the process of information interpretation. If a participant in the bargaining perceives that he has a large amount of power, he will attempt to deal with a crisis more single-handedly than if he perceives his support base as weak. As well, he will feel that he has enough influence to determine the course of events in order to achieve a desired outcome. However, this may be counterproductive if he cannot maintain the same amount of power until the crisis is fully settled. Eric Nordlinger argues that sometimes political leaders are subject to hostile criticisms and attacks by subordinates who have an interest in exacerbating a conflict as a way of enhancing their own positions (Nordlinger, 1972:42). In fact, for a bargain to proceed successfully, it is essential to have leaders who are clearly predominant and who 21 enjoy extensive independent authority to take actions and make commitments (Nordlinger, 1972:73). Having considered how the participants' perceptions of the opposite side and of their own position affect the bargaining situation, one issue remains to be mentioned; this is how the belief system of the participants affects political bargaining. Alexander George presents a concise analysis of the belief system of politicians and how this affects their behaviour during conflicts. He argues that politicians behave according to an operational code. This code consists of both "philosophical" beliefs and "instrumental" beliefs. George states that the philosophical beliefs refer to assumptions and premises politicians make regarding the fundamental nature of politics, the nature of political conflict, the role of the individual in history, and so forth. By instrumental beliefs he refers to the criteria by means of which politicians choose alternative courses of action (George, 1969:198-99). As well, they display certain psychological traits that may predispose them to either confrontation or towards a more amicable resolution of conflict. The above, however, is only relevant in a situation where the politicians have enough power to determine the course of events; if this is not so, the operational code becomes meaningless. Decision-Making The second component of Lockhart's bargaining model is the decision-making process. Decision-making has two primary 22 elements. First, there is the nature of the objectives. The participants in a bargain must reconcile various, possibly conflicting, objectives present in their camps (Lockhart, 1979:12). Second, there is the nature of the different groups involved. Different members of each of the participants' entourage will represent different interests, or may even represent institutions that will implement the bargain if an agreement is reached with the other participant, and it is their power that determines their influence in the decision making (Lockhart, 1979:62). Lockhart states that various aspects of actual decisions form a set of constraints that define the boundaries of a satisfactory solution (1979:61). For example, a policy designed to appease one political unit should not be pursued to the extent of alienating another as this would be counter-productive. In fact, settling grievances may involve political costs, but these costs should be calculated and kept low by the participants in the bargain. If the cost is miscalculated or simply ignored, then the bargained settlement is likely to encounter strong opposition from the aggrieved party. It is also important to calculate the costs of no settlement. In the particular case of center-state relations, for instance, it is important to ensure that settling grievances with one state does not involve jeopardizing the interests of other neighbouring states. Whatever the case may be, constraints may prove difficult because, on the one hand, a bargain may not be struck if all constraints are taken into account. On the other hand, however,, if none are, this will remove legitimacy from the bargaining process or from the subsequent implementation phase. Statesmanship consists in walking the fine line between these two positions. Graham Allison proves helpful when the issue of group decision-making is examined. One of his models of decision• making stresses the point that decisions are the result of conflict and compromise among different key advisors with diverse interests and unequal influence. In effect, the results of intra-group decisions are also the outcome of a bargaining process (Allison, 1971:162). The outcome is determined by the "power" of each one of the participants involved in the group. Power is an elusive concept to define but in this thesis it will be equated with influence. Lockhart is in agreement with Allison here when he argues that "... whether or not the solution that a particular [advisor] perceives to be satisfactory is accepted as the satisfactory solution is largely a matter of the political power of its supporting faction" (1979:69). Thus, when a solution is put forward in a crisis, it may or may not be the best solution, but maybe the feasible one due to the particular g configuration of power distribution at the time. In political systems characterized by strong factional alignments this is 9 particularly relevant. It is important that the main factions with a stake in the issues be included in any settlement. If they are not, the settlement will be weak and hard to implement. Intra-group bargaining raises the question of coalition- formation as a way of strengthening a desired policy alternative. However, political groupings are not always clearly defined, especially after major political upheavals, and it may not be 24 easy to identify factional alignments. Moreover, the participants in the bargain may not perceive the potential danger that individuals and factions may represent in the future due to their changing influence. Furthermore, a lack of trust among different factional leaders (where these can be identified) within each of the parties to the conflict may prevent a coalition from forming. The participants in the bargain may not feel that giving others in their respective camps a say will keep them from attacking the settlement in the future. Because of such problems, coalition-formation may not be possible in unstable political environments and this limits the usefulness of 10 the concept. The above remarks suggest that the success or failure of bargains may be explained by looking at both the forces that partook in the settlement and those that did not. If the "ins" gradually lose power during the implementation stage as a result of the "outs'" activities, the bargain may eventually fail. Not only that, but a process of outbidding may develop because those excluded from the bargain may promise to reach an even better settlement.^ Therefore, when a bargain is being carried out it is important not to ignore potential opposing forces. Especially in weakly-institutionalized states, power shifts may always occur. The effect all this has on the top decision-makers, that is, on the participants in the bargaining process, is succinctly put by Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Their experience ... is one of being continually pulled in different directions by their various subordinates, 25 the partisans. Each partisan ... is continually pressing his case, by presenting selected information, urging selected values, offering slanted interpretations and arguments. The partisans* purpose • is to ... [get the central decision-maker] committed to the favoured strategy. (1977:352). Strategy Search Strategy search is the third process of Lockhart's bargaining model. Simply stated, it is the gradual process of closing in on a satisfactory solution through repeated efforts (Lockhart, 1979:71). The participants in the bargain give on some issues and take on others until an adequate settlement is reached. In this way, no impression is created of having "sold out" and the bargain gains legitimacy. Strategy search is often a time-consuming process because once a concession is given or taken, a process of information re- interpretation ensues and strategies are reassessed and sometimes even altered. When concrete proposals are introduced into the bargaining process they may be rejected as they stand or variations of them may be demanded as each participant tries to maximize his gains. It is important to note here that the participants establish a direct link, not only across the bargaining table, but also with their respective advisors in their political units who have the responsibility of silencing the opponents of particular concessions. As Lockhart states, a reconciliation of differences is sought by decomposing each participant's goals in order to see what can be traded off and what cannot (19 79:81). At this stage of the bargaining process much depends on the desire for an agreement. If an agreement is sought at all costs 26 by one of the participants then he/she will be more willing to grant concessions and to go against the wishes of those within his/her political unit who oppose a settlement. Several reasons account for this kind of behaviour. They may include the desire to upgrade one's reputation as a leader and as a problem solver, a strong determination to remove a long, drawn-out dispute from the political center stage, or simply the opportunity that certain dramatic events present, such as being elected with a massive majority to a position of power. The most serious problem during the strategy search is the tendency to grant concessions that in reality are not within any of the participants' power to give. This may cause problems during the implementation stage as sometimes only one of the participants will be able to deliver on his/her side of the bargain. Sometimes, the ability of one participant to deliver his/her part of the quid pro quo will depend on the other conceding something first. This is the case when one participant's authority is being eroded and a concession by the other would help the former reassert his/her leadership, thus enabling him/her to fulfill his/her side of the bargain. A failure to understand a situation like this may put the whole implementation of a bargained settlement in jeopardy. In effect, it is imperative that during the negotiation and implementation stages of a bargain both the weaknesses and strengths of a participant's position be understood by the other participants. In this way, the possibilities of the settlement falling apart will be minimized. 27 Charles Lockhart's model is useful for understanding the reasons for both the reaching of bargained settlements and their demise. Information interpretation, decision making, and strategy search are three processes that provide valuable insights into political bargaining. In looking at the particular factors that lead to the reaching of bargained settlements three hypotheses can be postulated that will help guide the study. First, Lockhart's bargaining model suggests that bargained settlements are the result of particular power configurations. The participants* perceptions of their power, their interpretation of events, as well as the relative influence of interests involved, all help account for why a bargain is struck or not. Therefore, it is important to determine why a power configuration that favours an agreement develops at a particular point in time. Thus, historical circumstances such as dramatic events or changes in leadership play a significant role in the initiation of political bargaining. Second, individual leadership is a crucial aspect of bargaining situations. In fact, a successful bargain is, to a large degree, made possible by decisive and authoritative leadership of all participants in the dispute. A leader's confident, but not exaggerated, perception of his role and power is essential in a bargaining situation. Third, during the strategy search process it is important that all participants must perceive that their counterparts are sincere in their desire for an agreement. Concessions, gestures 28 of goodwill, and showing determination are some of the tactics that may be used to convince counterparts of genuine intentions. Once a bargained settlement has been reached, its implementation follows. Here again, Lockhart's bargaining model proves useful in guiding analysis and giving coherence to seemingly unrelated information. At the general level it can be argued that in weakly-institutionalized states changes in the configuration of power are produced by the way the bargained settlement was reached and this may eventually lead to the demise of the agreement. In fact, it is during the three processes that characterize bargaining situations that the roots of future discord can be sown. The three following hypotheses can be put forward to test the above remarks. First, if an agreement depends too much on the participants' perceived capacity to silence dissent it will prove weak and difficult to implement. It is important that during the information interpretation process decisions should not be made based on participants' exaggerated perceptions of their power and their capacity to maintain it. Second, if during the decision-making process constraints are miscalculated or ignored and/or interests with a major stake in the settlement are excluded totally, this may contribute to the demise of the settlement during the implementation stage. The unleashing of new forces opposed to the settlement should be avoided by careful calculation of the costs of a decision. The exclusion of groups with vested interests in the issues should be considered very carefully. 29 Third, if during the strategy search the quid pro quos are set too high or without understanding the need for cooperation during the implementation stage, the settlement may be scuttled. Cooperation should not end with the signing of an accord, but should be present throughout the whole implementation phase. It remains to be shown how Lockhart's bargaining model can prove to be useful for the study of the Punjab Accord. In Chapter II, I intend to demonstrate how the Accord followed a series of dramatic events and leadership changes which vividly illustrate the theory presented above. However, before we look at how the Accord was actually reached it is important to understand why an accord was needed in this most troubled of India's states in the 1980's. 30 NOTES 1. Focusing on the political bargain that led to the Punjab Accord is only one of the many ways that Punjab politics can be approached. Other approaches that have been attempted include: Ethnicity, Robin Jeffrey, What's Happening to India? Punjab, Ethnic Conflict, Mrs. Gandhi's Death and the Test for Federalism (Basingstoke:The Macmillan Press, 1986); factionalism, Kuldip Nayar and Khushwant Singh, Tragedy of Punjab (New Delhi: Vision Books Pvt. Ltd., 1984), Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle (London: Pan Books Ltd., 1985); economic changes, Amarjit Narang, Democracy, Development and Distortion (New Delhi: Gitanjali Publishing House, 1986); political anthropology, Joyce Pettigrew, Robber Noblemen (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985); economic anthropology, Murray Leaf, "The Punjab Crisis," Asian Survey 25:5 (May 1985), 475-98; federalism, Abida Samiuddin, ed., The Punjab Crisis: Challenge and Response (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1985) . 2. For an analysis of the changing perceptions of Punjab's boundaries see Harjot Oberoi, "From Punjab to 'Khalistan': Territoriality and Metacommentary," Pacific Affairs 60:1 (Spring 1987), 26-41. 3. The SGPC is the elected body of the Sikhs that has the responsibility of running the Sikh temples of Punjab. This organ is important for three reasons. First, its president holds a large degree of influence in Sikh politics and his support is indispensable for any leader seeking to establish his control over the Akali Dal. Second, because temples are the links between the "elites" and the "masses", the SGPC both affects and reflects Sikh public opinion. Third, the SGPC controls the revenue of the hundreds of temples under its jurisdiction. 4. Under the 1956 Inter-State River Disputes Act, the river waters of Punjab were to be allocated by an impartial tribunal appointed by New Delhi. The purpose was to uphold the agreements reached in the Indus Water Treaty reached by India and Pakistan in that same year. 5. The effects of the Green Revolution are examined by Robin Jeffrey, What's Happening to India: Punjab, Ethnic Conflict, Mrs. Gandhi's Death and the Test for Federalism (Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1986); Murray Leaf, Song of Hope: The Green Reveloution in a Punjab Village (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1971); and Gopal Singh, "Socio-Economic Bases of the Punjab Crisis," Economic and Political Weekly, January 7, 1984. 31 6. For the seminal work on relative deprivation see Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. 7. The SGPC sought to control Sikh temples elsewhere in India for three reasons. First, the 20% of India's Sikhs that live outside of Punjab could be brought under its influence in this way. Second, the economic resources of the SGPC would grow substantially if more temples were brought under its control. Third, this would extend the Akali Dai's political base throughout India and give it political leverage in pursuing Sikh interests outside Punjab. 8. By power distribution is meant the relative influence different key actors have in a political system. Over time this influence may wax or wane and.this helps account for the political fluidity of weakly-institutionalized states. Power is the ability of A to make B do something that B would not do otherwise. 9. On factionalism theory see, Frank Belloni and Dennis Beller, Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective (Santa Barbara: Clio Books, Ltd., 1978 ) . 10. On coalition theory see, William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962; A. de Swann, Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973); Gabriel Almond et al., Crisis, Choice and Change (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.,1973). 11. On outbidding see, Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1972). 32 CHAPTER II; THE ACCORD TO END DISCORD Before turning to the events that led to the signing of the Punjab Accord in 1985, it is necessary to look at Punjab's politics in the early 1980's. Why did they become so tense following Indira Gandhi's return to power in 1980? Why were Sikh grievances never settled? Why did conflict within the Sikh community, between Sikhs and Hindus, and between Punjab and New Delhi, grow to such violent proportions after Mrs. Gandhi's return? These are questions that have to be answered before the events of 1985 can be adequately explained. SEPARATISM AND COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN THE PUNJAB The most important consequence for Punjab of Mrs. Gandhi's return to power in 1980 was the intensification of party factionalism.. In great part, this was the result of her attempts to divide and weaken power-holders both within the Congress party and the Akali Dal. In the Congress party, the main factional struggle was between the newly appointed central Home Minister, Giani Zail Singh, and the recently elected Chief* Minister of 1 Punjab, Darbara Singh. In 1980, Indira Gandhi brought Zail Singh, former Chief Minister of Punjab (1972-77), to New Delhi in order to prevent him from establishing too strong a power base in that state. This was clearly a promotion for Zail Singh. However, due to the fluidity of India's political system he sought to maintain a strong power base in the Punjab in case he fell from Indira's favour. As a result, he resorted to "dirty politics" to undercut Darbara Singh's power (Jeffrey, 1986:139). Zail Singh made use of a fundamentalist Sikh preacher named Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. Bhindranwale had been a little known leader who came to Zail Singh's attention after a group of Sant Nirankaris killed twelve Sikhs in 1978. The Sant Nirankaris are a sect of.Sikhism that believe in a living guru or master and this was a heresy to orthodox Sikhs. Bhindranwale claimed to represent orthodoxy and in his zeal to "reform" the Sikh faith he came into armed confrontation with the Sant Nirankaris. The deaths of 1978 were the climax of this conflict. Bhindranwale*s militancy was never popular but politically he could easily be manipulated to divide the Sikh community. For this reason, Zail Singh and Sanjay Gandhi, Indira's son, recruited him in 1978 to divide the Akali Dal party which was then ruling the state of Punjab. The opportunity to divide the Sikhs presented itself in 1979. That year, the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, the body in charge of running the Sikh temples, was having its first elections since 1965. Control of the SGPC was important due to the influence this body has over Sikh public opinion. The elections are to be carried out every five years and it is the government of India that calls them. However, Congress-ruled New Delhi had postponed the elections twice and now, as before, pro- Akali Sikhs were likely to be the winners. For this reason, Zail Singh and Sanjay Gandhi attempted to use Bhindranwale to divide pro-Akali Sikhs. This did not work as Congress was routed by the Akali Dal (Tully and Jacob, 1985:61). Despite this failure, Bhindranwale was still useful to Zail Singh. He could use Bhindranwale to undercut Darbara Singh's power in the Punjab (Tully and Jacob, 1985:66). However, Bhindranwale only remained in Zail's camp until 1981. The Akali Dal was also subject to factionalism in the early 1980's. Three major factions can be identified. One was led by Harchand. Singh Longowal, the President of the Akali Dal, representing the moderate mainstream of the Sikh community. Another faction was led by Prakash Singh Badal, former Chief Minister of Punjab (1977-80). The members of this faction were generally more radical than Longowal's men as they were attempting to strengthen their support base by appealing to the more fundamentalist elements of the Akali Dal. Lastly, there was the faction led by Gurcharan Singh Tohra, who had been the president of the SGPC since 1973. This faction was the most outspoken as it represented the most religiously inclined elements in the Akali Dal, those who since the 1970's had turned increasingly fundamentalist. A process of outbidding developed between these factions as all promised to achieve the implementation of the major clauses of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. Needless to say, Indira, refused to grant any of them any concessions since the Akalis were the greatest threat to Congress in Punjab and any victories of the Akalis would strengthen them at the expense of the Congress (Nayar and Singh, 1984:50). As a result, calls for greater autonomy for Punjab began at this time. It was in this atmosphere of political fluidity in the Akali Dal and factional intrigue in the Congress that the Bhindranwale phenomenon acquired a life of its own. Bhindranwale united diverse fringe elements of the Sikh ' community into a fundamentalist movement which through the use of violence acquired influence far beyond its numbers. The main elements that constituted Bhindranwale1s movement were disaffected Sikh youths. These youths advocated separatism, and some even secession, as a way to settle Sikh grievances. Violence was an accepted tactic for these radical elements. Eventually, Sikh separatism became notorious for the violence that accompanied it. Matters were made worse by Mrs. Gandhi's refusal to settle the grievances, as this only strengthened feelings of alienation in the Sikh community. Moderate leaders such as Longowal ceaselessly looked for some concessions from New Delhi to take the initiative away from the extremists (Akbar, 1985:196), but these never came. Between November: 1981. and May 1984, while the extremism of Bhindranwale intensified, Longowal and other moderate Akali. leaders had twenty-six meetings with Congress representatives, but none of their demands was accepted by Indira Gandhi. As a result, the popularity of Bhindranwale spread and the calls for violent means to achieve the resolution of the grievances dating back to 1966 became more strident. Pressure for the creation of "Khalistan" intensified as more and more Sikhs grew disappointed with Congress rule. Eventually, as the law and order situation deteriorated in Punjab, President's Rule was declared in late 1983 . The escalation of violence climaxed with Operation Bluestar, the government's attack on the Golden Temple at Amritsar to "flush out" Bhindranwale and a few dozen terrorists lodged within its precincts on June 5-6, 1984. Many Sikhs saw the need to- "flush out" the terrorists but the scale of the attack, although successful in eliminating Bhindranwale, was a political blunder. The Golden Temple is the holiest Sikh shrine. The attack on the Temple and the killing of approximately 1,000 innocent worshippers accentuated feelings of alienation, as did the imprisonment of top Akali leaders and over 400 other Sikhs. The assassination of Mrs. Gandhi by two Sikhs on October 31 was a direct result of Operation Bluestar. Once again, however, the Sikhs as a community were humiliated. Following Indira's death, riots spread in New Delhi and other major cities and over 2500 2 Sikhs were killed. Suspicions of Congress involvement in the riots made the situation even worse. When Rajiv Gandhi became prime minister after his mother's death, it apparently became clear to him that a political, rather than a military, solution to the Punjab crisis was needed. At this point, a process of political bargaining between the Akalis and Congress leaders"in New Delhi took place. AN ACCORD AT LAST The December 1984 election was a massive victory for the Congress party and provided Rajiv Gandhi with a new mandate to deal with center-state conflict. Having won four-fifths of the Lok Sabha seats, Rajiv had obtained the largest majority ever in India! Some have argued that the election not only represented a sympathy vote due to the death of his mother but also that, although people wanted a change of government, the old-line opposition parties were unattractive. Rajiv looked goal-oriented and many who would not have voted for his mother voted for him (Narang, 1986:155). This perception was reflected in an India Today cartoon where Rajiv was portrayed as an octopus with each tentacle holding plans, new technology, and tools with which to move India into the twenty-first century. (January 31, 1986:8-9). His massive majority and personal popularity gave Rajiv the confidence to tackle the: Punjab crisis with a determination his mother had always lacked. The Punjab, however, had not participated in the electoral process of December 1984. The gloom there contrasted sharply with the euphoria in the rest of India. Punjab, since June 1984, was de facto being ruled by New Delhi using the. Armed Forces Special Powers Act. This meant that the army and police in Punjab had special powers that were reserved for emergency situations only. Moreover, All-India Radio and the national television networks portrayed the Punjab in a derogatory manner and this made the Sikhs of Punjab feel even more alienated from India. Clearly the return of Punjab into the all-India democratic process was going to be one of the main priorities for the new prime minister. Although it took only seven months to reach an agreement on issues that dated back to the mid-sixties, the bargaining situation that developed was both complex and difficult. In fact, it went through three major phases. The first phase ran from early-January to early-March 1985; the second phase from early-March to late-May; and the third phase from late-May to the date of the signing of the Accord, July 24, 1985. The reasons for this periodization will become clear in the following analysis. 38 The first phase of the bargaining process, running from January to early March, 1985, was characterized by an optimistic new prime minister thinking he could solve the Punjab crisis quickly, and also by the lack of any coherent leadership in the Akali camp. As a result, no agreement was possible at the time. More specifically, Rajiv did not perceive the depth of the problem in Punjab and the pressure to which moderate Akali leaders were subjected by the radicals. As well, the Akali leaders at the time, most of whom were only second-rung men, did not present a unified front which could represent Akali interests adequately and. deal with Rajiv from a position of strength across the bargaining table. In effect, during this phase there was a failure of information interpretation on the part of Rajiv Gandhi as he did not realize that the Akali camp was too divided to be able to bargain effectively. However, what was also noticeable was that Rajiv was taking his prime minister's role of federal conciliator much further than his late mother ever had. His massive victory must have made him confident about his power and about the goals he could obtain with that power. Rajiv's optimism was shown clearly by his statement of January 4, which said that an agreement should be reached quickly between New Delhi and the Akali Dal in order to hold an election in the Punjab in March (Times of India [henceforth, Times]. January 5, 1985). This followed the appointment of a Cabinet sub-committee to look into the Punjab tangle. This committee consisted of the Home Minister, S.B. Chavan, the Defence Minister, Narasimha Rao and the Education Minister, K.C. Pant. The lack of any Congress Sikhs or Haryana leaders in this top 39 decision-making body was a departure from Indira's policy of seeking the advice of both Congress Sikhs and Haryana politicians when dealing with the Akalis. Mrs. Gandhi, although not willing to grant concessions to the Akali Dal, had always been in contact with them in order to manage political tensions. Also, she always consulted Haryana in issues that affected the Punjab. Rajiv's approach would prove harmful in the future as he was ignoring important interests with stakes in the Punjab conflict.' Rajiv Gandhi hoped that with his massive December victory he would be able to control resentment and disaffection in the Punjab. He had won all ten seats from Haryana, the state that stood to lose most in a settlement with Punjab (Abraham, 1985:1298). Haryana was the state with which Punjab had its territorial and water disputes and these issues were perceived as hard to settle without there being, a winner and a loser. These results could not be but an endorsement of Rajiv's approach. The style of the new prime minister was that of a technocrat. With respect to the Punjab he adopted modern crisis management techniques to reach a settlement. He set up a tightly-knit command group, kept his mind clear by working from brief position papers and maintained secrecy by insisting that documents were only to be read by those who needed to know (Tully & Jacob, 1985:223). Moreover, he did not allow any bureaucrat or politician to interfere with his officials in Punjab (Ibid., 1985:220). In this way, Rajiv sought to quell speculation and keep communal harmony. His object was to reach a settlement that would be considered satisfactory by both Sikhs and Hindus inside Punjab and outside. Alexander George's Operational Code model proves useful in helping explain the political relevance of Rajiv's tactics in the bargaining process. As suggested in the theory, a politician's assumptions about the political system and his individual political role are important in determining his leadership style. Rajiv was a technocrat and he attempted to settle Akali grievances without understanding that political maneuvering was also necessary. In fact, the technocratic approach was not suited for a situation in which trade-offs would have to be made. Two factors account for the lack of unified and coherent leadership in, the. Akali. camp from January to March. First, top Akali leaders such as Longowal, Badal, and Tohra were in prison during this time. As a result, the Akali Dal party and the major religious governing, institution of the Sikhs, the SGPC, were in the hands of less authoritative politicians. These did not have the popular support or influence that the imprisoned Akali leaders had, and therefore, they could not make far-reaching decisions. Moreover, they disagreed among themselves as to what course of action to take. Nothing provides better evidence of this than their attitudes towards a possible election. While the acting head of the Akali Dal, Surjan Singh Thakedar, stated, that any election should only focus on the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, Balwant Singh, a former Punjab finance minister, said that the Akali Dal party would decide how to deal with the election only at a later date. Both these men were shunned, in turn, by the acting head of the SGPC, Prem Singh Lalpura, who stated that the party had no right to decide on any major issues relating to the election (Tribune, January 24, 1985). Lalpura's comments referred to the conflict that religiously-inclined Alakis had had with more secular Akali politicians. Nordlinger's comments about the need for a predominant leader as a prerequisite to conflict regulation prove illuminating here. In the Punjab there clearly was no predominant leader. The second factor that accounted for the lack of any coherent leadership in the Akali Dal was the renewed importance of Sikh militants and terrorists. Terrorist violence began once again in January after having been practically eliminated after June 1984. The new strength of the militants was the result of the: influx of, refugees from the rest of India following the early November riots. Over 40,000 Sikhs fled to the Punjab after the riots (India Today, January 15, 1985:111). Also, the militants were strengthened by the return of Sikh youths from Pakistan. Many of these youths had been supporters of Bhindranwale and had fled to Pakistan following Operation Bluestar (Times, February 26, 1985). The militants were sufficiently influential to deter moderate leaders from standing up to them. Those who did were shot. This was the case with Kirpal Singh, acting head of the Akal. Takht, who on January 16, 1985, was shot following his criticism of Sikh* terrorism. Inevitably, the militants influenced Akali leaders to take a tough stand in their dealings with Delhi. With the terrorists gaining strength, it is not surprising that Rajiv's attempt to solve the Punjab crisis, in time to hold an election in March 1985 proved futile. S.B. Chavan of the cabinet sub-committee stated that during February several meetings were carried out between government leaders and Akali 42 representatives, but only the modalities of future official contacts were worked out (India Today, February 15, 1985:37). However, they did allow for exchanges of information that made Rajiv realize that he had to approach the Punjab issue differently. This new approach was not only the result of new information but also of a threat by the Akalis to start an agitation on April 12 if their demands were not met. Three demands were put forward. First, the Anandpur Sahib Resolution should be the basis of any talks with New Delhi. Second, an inquiry commission should be appointed to look into the events surrounding the Delhi riots. Third, "civilians" imprisoned in Jodhpur after Operation Bluestar should be released (Times, February 26, 1985). These conditions came three days after Rajiv had announced his preconditions for talks with the Akalis. He had stated that the Akali Dal party should disown the terrorists and that they should agree to place all their demands within the framework of the Indian Constitution (Tribune, February 23, 1985). Thus, by the end of February, 1985, a stalemate had taken hold. By this time, Rajiv had decided not to have an election in Punjab in March as, it was argued, this would only exacerbate communalism due to the fluid political situation in the state. In fact, one of the pillars of Rajiv's approach to the Punjab crisis was his resolve to keep electoral concerns out of the political bargaining process he was attempting to begin with the Akali Dal. It is interesting to note here that the Congress did not fare well in the March 1985 elections in eleven states. In almost every state Congress support declined. These defeats did not relate to the Punjab crisis since state elections center on regional issues. However, Rajiv should have taken this as a warning. His power was not as overwhelming as the December 19 84 victory has suggested. As can be seen, during the first phase of the bargaining, Rajiv Gandhi misinterpreted the situation and attempted to settle the crisis with second-rung Akali leaders. Of course, this did not work. More significant were defects in the decision-making process that developed in Rajiv's camp. No Sikh leaders were included, which was symbolically and strategically a weakness. Not only that, but the failure to include Haryana representatives seemed to imply that their interests in the Punjab situation were being ignored. A. settlement reached this way, as Lockhart's model suggests, would be very tough to implement. The second phase of the bargaining, process lasted from early-March to late-May. This phase was distinguished by the effects of two new developments. One was the appointment of Arjun Singh as governor of the Punjab and his role as mediator in the bargaining process. The other was the release of top Akali leaders from prison and the gradual rise to prominence of the moderates: within the Akali Dal. These two events were critical to the signing of the Accord in July 1985. Arjun Singh's role as conciliator allowed Rajiv to communicate with the Akalis through a "man on the spot". The Cabinet Sub-committee spent most of its time in New Delhi. Arjun Singh had daily contact with both the Akalis and Rajiv and this allowed for a dialogue that had not been possible in January and February. The rise to prominence of moderate Akali leaders was also significant. Although at first weak, the moderates eventually stood up to the radicals and this allowed for the creation of a strong focus of power in the Akali camp with which Rajiv could bargain. As the general secretary of the Congress put it, "all we want is that Akali politics should be settled. As long as they remain fluid the Punjab problem cannot be settled" (India Today, June 15, 1985:20). Arjun Singh was appointed governor of Punjab on March 12, the day after, he had been sworn in as Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh! It is not hard to conclude that Rajiv was simply waiting for him to be re-elected in the early-March poll in order to shuttle him to Chandigarh. Arjun had joined Congress during Nehru's time and had been minister at the state level since 1963. He had also been Madhya Pradesh's Chief Minister since 1980. Immediately he: began building bridges of confidence and in little over a week he managed to bring Rajiv to the Punjab for a visit (Narang, 1.986:160-61). This showed that he had Rajiv's total support and that he spoke with the prime minister's tacit approval. At. the same time of Arjun's appointment, Rajiv ordered the release of top Akali leaders. Among the released were Sant. Harchand. Singh Longowal, the: Akali. president, and Surjit Singh Barnala, the Sant's right-hand man and former Union Minister for Agriculture. These two politicians had always been characterized by their moderation. Not surprisingly, more outspoken leaders such as Prakash Singh Badal and Gurcharan Singh Tohra were not released until April 14. This was done to allow the moderates to establish their leadership unhampered by factional intrigue. 45 This desire to show the moderates that Rajiv was determined to solve the crisis explains the numerous political initiatives that followed in the latter half of March. On March 14, the Special Powers (Press) Act of Punjab was withdrawn; on March 23, Rajiv announced an economic package for the state — including a railway coach factory to be established in Ludhiana that would employ 10,000 people, and a new dam (Kalia, 1985:89). On March 29, Rajiv discussed the Punjab crisis with national opposition leaders in order to develop a consensus, and on March 30, he announced a wheat bonus of Rs. 5 per quintal. Moreover, on April 2, the Cabinet sub-committee on Punjab visited the state, and after April 5, a mass contact programme was carried out by Congress MP's and MLA's in order to show New Delhi's commitment to Punjab, at the grass-roots level (India Today, April 30, 1985:12). These numerous initiatives, however, apparently did not help strengthen the moderates relative to the militants. The proof that the militants had a large degree of influence could be seen in the fact that Sant Longowal on March 30 had felt pressured enough to raise from three to seven the number of items demanded as a precondition to talks (Times, March 31, 1985). This triggered off a series of meetings between government leaders and Akalis. These meetings not: only involved Arjun Singh but also members of the Cabinet Sub-committee on Punjab and the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs. The discussions convinced the government that if a new agitation were launched on April 12, as had been warned on February 26, the costs would simply be too high (India Today, April 30, 1985:10). Therefore, New Delhi had to make new concessions. These concessions were made the day before the Akali agitation was to begin and consisted of establishing an official inquiry into the Delhi riots, the lifting of the ban on the All-India Sikh Student Federation (AISSF), and broad hints that more Akali and AISSF leaders would be released (Times, April 12, 1985). Two days later, Badal and Tohra were released. Having been thus successful, the Akali leadership called off its agitation plans and a new attitude began to permeate the Akali Dai-New Delhi relationship. The major development in this changing relationship was Sant Longowal's statement of April 27 that the Akali Dal was opposed to terrorism and. that all its demands were within the framework of the Indian Constitution (Times, April 28, 1985). In effect, this meant that whereas previously the government had met most of the Akali preconditions, now the Akalis agreed to Delhi's preconditions.. A rapprochement had finally taken place! This rapprochement was given credibility by the meeting of the top four Akali leaders on April 30. That day Sant Longowal, Barnala, Tohra, and Badal agreed on taking a positive approach to New Delhi (Times, May 1, 1985). Also,, the Sant established a consultative committee which, included the above politicians and Balwant Singh, one of his top aides (Nayar, 19 8 5:394-95). A credible and unified leadership had now been established that could deal with Rajiv. Unfortunately, things did not prove so simple. The day after the top Akali leaders met, Sikh radicals made their move. On May 1, under the puppet leadership of Joginder Singh, the octogenarian father of Bhindranwale, they called for the union of all Akali factions, both moderate and radical, and announced the formation of the United Akali Dal. This would mean that the moderate Akalis could not carry out a dialogue with New Delhi without outbidding by the United Akali Dai's leadership, which was mainly radical. In many ways it looked like,a return to the early 1980's, when, the radicals took the initiative away from the moderates. This, however, did not occur in May 1985. On May 12 Longowal, Tohra, and Badal "resigned" from any posts in the United Akali Dal as an obvious challenge to Joginder Singh. The moderates' determination to stand up to the radicals was accentuated by the "transistor bombings" in New Delhi in which 81 people were killed by Sikh separatists. Sant Longowal used this event to condemn Sikh terrorism and those who instigated it. The moderates' opposition, to Joginder Singh was vindicated in late- May when, a meeting of Akali representatives from all over Punjab asked them not to resign and to "assume their responsibilities" as leaders of the Akali Dal (Tribune, May 23, 1985). As can be seen, Longowal's belligerency in late March allowed him to reassert his authority. After Joginder's attempt to outbid him, the Sant stood up to the challenge and became the undisputed head of the Akali Dal (India Today, August 15, 1985:9-11), and. the one Sikh leader who could lead the mainstream of the Sikh community (Malik, 1985:1471) ., Thus:, the second1 phase of the bargaining process to solve the Punjab crisis saw the establishment of a strong and, for the most part, unified leadership. Furthermore, it brought an improvement in the information channels between New Delhi and Punjab as a result of Arjun Singh's appointment to the 48 governorship of that state. The stage was now set for closing in on a solution acceptable to both New Delhi and the Akalis. However, although the improvement of information between the two camps and the establishment of a unified leadership over all parties illustrates the conditions for a bargain as suggested in Lockhart's model., some problems can be detected, most importantly in the decision-making process in Rajiv's camp. No Sikhs Or Haryana politicians were included during this second phase of the bargaining. As well, Rajiv seemed to be giving everything the Akalis demanded and more. This made interests with a big stake in the Punjab crisis wary about any settlement the prime minister was planning to reach with the Akali Dal. The third phase of the bargaining process ran from late-May to the signing: of the Punjab Accord on July 24. This stage, in many ways, exemplifies many aspects of the Strategy Search component of Lockhart*s bargaining model. The participants to the bargain reconciled their differences and traded-off issues. Rajiv had to reassure the Akalis that their interests were being taken seriously, by New Delhi. This was a major concern for Longowal, who had been disappointed on numerous occasions by Indira Gandhi. At: the same time, the prime: minister had to make sure not to grant too much to the Akalis. as this would be viewed, as a sell-out. to the Sikhs by the predominantly Hindi-speaking Hindu voters of north India. Sant Longowal's problems were of a different kind. He had to show New Delhi that he was in control of the situation in Punjab and that he could maintain communal harmony in the state. However, to do this the Sant had to obtain, enough concessions in his bargaining with New Delhi, to show the. Sikhs that the moderate approach was the best for safeguarding Sikh interests. If he did not get enough from New Delhi, it was possible that the radicals would gain the initiative. After being reinstated, Sant Longowal launched a "peace offensive". He travelled extensively, reiterating Hindu-Sikh amity, condemning acts of violence by Sikh extremists, and repeatedly declaring that the Akali Dal was not in favour of the pursuit of a separate state of Khalistan (Kapur, 1986:242). He was very successful in this and clearly became the most popular leader among the Sikh masses. This made other Akalis follow his lead, and stick to him (Times, June 14, 1985). During this time, Longowal clearly represented the majority Sikh view. New Delhi did not rest idle throughout all this. Arjun Singh was busy meeting Akali leaders and trying to come up with package deals that would have the approval of both the prime minister and top Akali leaders. In fact, Arjun held fourteen meetings of this kind with Sikh representatives during this phase of the bargaining process (India Today, August 19, 1985:9) His efforts were aided by the removal of S.S. Randhawa as president of the Punjab Congress due to alleged links with terrorists. Randhawa was close to the former Chief Minister, Darbara Singh, and his replacement by R.S. Sparrow was an attempt to clear the Punjab Congress of its old factional alignments (Times, June 19, 1985; India Today, July 31, 1985:13). It is important to note here that Arjun Singh's meetings with Akali leaders usually included only Longowal, Barnala, and Balwant Singh. Tohra and Badal were excluded due to the fear that they would delay the search for a settlement of the Punjab 50 crisis (India Today, August 31, 1985:8-9). At this time, and as a result of their imprisonment, these men's factions were in disarray and some of their followers had "defected", noticeably from the Badal faction, to other factions. However, although their exclusion from the talks may have speeded up the process of reaching a settlement to solve the Punjab crisis, it proved very harmful to its implementation. Rajiv had another deadline to meet and this also helps explain his desire for an agreement that would restore normality to the Punjabi On October 6, 1985, President's Rule would expire in the state and a Constitutional Amendment would have to be promulgated to extend it. The general consensus was that the extension of President's Rule would be counterproductive (Tribune, June 22, 1985). In effect, between June 18 and June 27, Rajiv met Arjun Singh three times to discuss the course of events in light of the approaching end of President's Rule (Times, June 28, 1985). The conclusion of these talks seems to have been that the moderates needed another push to get them to respond more favorably to New Delhi's overtures. Keeping in line with the above assessment, starting on June 29,. Sikhs who had been, detained during Operation Bluestar began to be released. That day, 152 people were freed. Following this, 200 were released on July 1, 100 on July 3, and 600 on July 7. These releases were accompanied by Arjun Singh's calls for talks. On June 30, he urged the Akali leadership to join the government in order "to restore the honour and dignity of the Sikhs" in the country. He also stated that the Akalis should be more forthcoming in responding to the gestures of Rajiv (Tribune, July 1, 1985). At the same time that this was going on, Rajiv was arranging for a personal meeting with Sant Longowal. As can be seen, he was determined to reach a settlement and was only waiting for the Akalis to make up their minds. The event that seemed to finally establish Longowal's supremacy in the party and that gave him the courage to meet Rajiv was the Akali Dal meeting at Anandpur during the second week of July. During this gathering, the Sant was given authority to chastise the United Akali Dal and to streamline the party (Tribune, July 9, 1985). In effect, Longowal had been given carte blanche to represent the Akali Dal. As can be seen, Sant Longowal's meeting with Rajiv Gandhi on July 23 and 24 was only possible once the Sant felt secure enough in his standing both with respect, to the prime minister and. with respect to his basis of support. The Memorandum of Settlement signed on the 24th was made possible, however, by one other significant factor which, in many ways, later played a role in its demise. When Rajiv met Longowal on the 23rd, Zail Singh, the president of India, was away from the capital. Moreover, Buta Singh, the Minister of Agriculture, and Darbara Singh, the former Chief Minister, were also deliberately kept away from the bargaining table due to their involvement with Punjabi politics. All of these men were from Punjab, and being part of the Congress party represented a powerful segment of the Sikh elite (India Today, August 15, 1985:9). Some have even argued that the Accord had been reached six weeks earlier but a "suitable" time was sought to make it public (Far Eastern Economic Review, August 8, 1985, p. 9). Rajiv must have feared that their presence would come in the way of signing the Accord. In the Akali camp, some leaders were also left out. Only Balwant Singh and S.S. Barnala went to Delhi; Badal and Tohra were not even informed that the^Sant was going to meet Rajiv Gandhi. In retrospect, it can be seen that the Accord that was reached in July was only possible because of the exclusion of such politicians who had too many vested interests in its failure. Whatever the case, once the Accord was signed, all hailed it as a major breakthrough. Few focused on its flaws until the initial euphoria had passed. The reason for this was that almost all Akali grievances had been dealt with. Only time would show that the Accord was a. hornet's nest. Before moving onto Chapter Three where the demise of the Accord is analyzed, it is important to present the Memorandum of Settlement in its entirety. It consisted of eleven paragraphs and they can be summarized as follows: 1. Compensation is to be paid for those killed in agitations or any action after August 1, 1982. 2. Merit is established as the basis of recruitment for the army (thus guaranteeing Sikh preference!). 3. The Delhi riots inquiry is extended to the cities of Kanpur. and Bokaro. 4. Sikhs who deserted the armed services following Operation Bluestar are to be rehabilitated. 5. An All-India Gurdwara Act is to be considered by the Government of India. 6. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act is withdrawn and the scope of Special Courts is narrowed down substantially. 7. Chandigarh is to be transferred to Punjab on January 26, 1986; Haryana will be compensated territorially for this; one boundary commission will be established to deal with the 53 above clause and another one will deal with boundary readjustments between Punjab and Haryana. 8. Those parts of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution that deal with Center-State relations will be referred to the Sarkaria Commission. 9. The Punjab river waters will be adjusted by a tribunal that will report within six months; the Sutlej-Yamuna Link canal that will carry some of these waters to Haryana is to be completed by August 15, 1986. 10. Chief Ministers throughout India are asked to ensure the protection of minorities. 11. The Punjabi language is to be promoted. The third phase of the bargaining situation lasting from late-May to July 24, 1985 involved a process of trade-offs and reconciliation of goals. In several of the clauses of the Accord it can be seen that wherever conflicts were found, compromises were reached. For example, tribunals were to be constituted to solve the problems that the participants in the bargain could not settle. In effect, the responsibility for final settlement of several grievances was passed on to others, with the hope that they could deal with them more effectively. Another problem was that the dates set as targets for the implementation were not realistic. They only allowed for a very short time span for achieving, an enormous amount of work. Finally, New Delhi granted almost all the Akali Dal had demanded while the Akali's quid pro quo was to maintain communal harmony in the Punjab. This was going to be very hard to implement as, in many ways, one depended on the other and, in turn, both depended on a degree of cooperation and harmony between New Delhi and Punjab that had never really existed and was unlikely to develop. 54 FINAL REMARKS The events leading up to the signing of the Memorandum of Settlement between Rajiv Gandhi and H.S. Longowal on July 24, 1985 provide numerous theoretical insights. At the most basic level, it can be seen that bargained settlements are the result of particular configurations of power. Following dramatic events or changes in leadership, new configurations of power develop that may favour a course of action conducive to political bargaining. In late 1984, the death of Indira Gandhi allowed for her son to assume the prime ministership. Rajiv began with fresh ideas and with a new approach to governing India that contrasted sharply with his mother's. As well, he brought with him a new set of advisors with innovative leadership styles. The old guard seemed, discredited and the new prime minister promoted young technocrats to higher positions within the government. In fact, a new leadership with new ideas and a new mandate had taken the reins of government. Secondly, this chapter has demonstrated the importance of individual leadership in the reaching of bargained settlements. Without the determination of men such as Rajiv Gandhi and Sant Longowal, the Accord would not have been possible. Their approach foreshadowed problems for the Accord, such as their exclusion of interest groups from the decision-making process, but despite this, they reached the settlement that has come closest to settling the Punjab tangle. This chapter has also shown how a process of mutual trust has to develop for a bargaining situation to be successful. Both Rajiv Gandhi and Sant Longowal were in a dilemma as to how much to give in order to show a genuine commitment to settling the crisis. In fact, Rajiv had to grant a large number of concessions throughout the bargaining situation in order to establish his credibility in the eyes of the Akalis. Longowal did not give much in the manner of concessions but he stood up to the radicals' challenge by "resigning" from the United Akali Dal, denounced terrorism, and opposed calls for the creation of Khalistan. This seems to have been enough for Rajiv to be convinced that Longowal was the man to deal with. In this way, the bargain was gradually consolidated. Despite the above positive elements some problems can already be detected in the Accord. The leaders' perceptions of their power seemed to have been exaggerated and important interests were ignored in the decision-making process. Especially, Haryana was not actively consulted throughout the bargaining. Lastly, the quid pro quo required a degree of rapport between New Delhi and Punjab that had never existed before and would probably be difficult to develop. Not surprisingly, once the initial euphoria over the settlement had evaporated, many began to ask themselves whether the Accord would in fact end the discord which had bedeviled the Punjab for nearly a decade. 56 NOTES The factional struggle between Darbara Singh and Giani Zail Singh dated back to the 1960's when both sought to gain the predominant position in the Punjab branch of the Congress party. Caste differences may have also played a role. While Darbara Singh is a Jat, a predominantly agricultural caste, Zail Singh is a Ramgharia, a lower caste relative to the Jats that is largely concentrated in the urban areas. For a detailed description of the Delhi riots and Congress involvement, see Who are the Guilty? a report by the Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights and the Peoples' Union for Civil Liberties, 1984. In 1985 there was a strong feeling throughout India that Congress Sikhs had played a large role in the escalation of the Punjab crisis, and Rajiv Gandhi was determined not to let them interfere with his initiatives. 57 CHAPTER III; THE RESURGENCE OF DISCORD The hopefulness of India in July 1985 contrasts sharply with the despair of mid-1987. After two years of trying to implement the Punjab Accord, New Delhi and the Akalis were accusing each other of being irresponsible, opportunistic, traitors, and even mad! P.S. Badal and G.S. Tohra were in prison and Chief Minister Barnala had returned to live in his farmhouse, now built and defended like a fortress. The terrorists were wreaking havoc on the population. In New Delhi, conditions were less violent but similarly chaotic. Rajiv Gandhi seemed to have lost control of the country and to have resorted desperately to his late mother's tactics and machinations to retain at least nominal authority over the Indian political system. The old Congress guard was back and a new guard opposed to the weak leadership of Rajiv was gaining strength. The Accord had fallen by the wayside. Why? As was argued in. Chapter I, changing configurations of political power in weakly-institutionalized states influence the way bargained settlements are implemented. In the case of the Punjab Accord, the settlement was reached at a point when groups favouring an agreement had the upper hand. However, several factors in the way the settlement was reached foreshadowed the problems for the future. As described in Chapter II, representatives of the state of Haryana were not consulted and other relevant interests were not included in the decision-making process. As well, Rajiv Gandhi and Longowal based their actions on an exaggerated perception of their power. It is true that these men had the upper hand in mid-1985 relative to other 58 politicians. However, the implementation schedule of the Accord was going to demand particularly strong leadership for the next year or two. The biggest problem for the Accord, ironically, was how it was reached. As suggested above, its basis of support in 1985 was strong but narrow and if the participants in the bargain could not withstand the pressure of the opposition forces they unleashed, the Punjab Accord would fail. Chapter I outlined possible sources of conflict that ought to be avoided when attempting to reach a bargain. These were exaggerated perceptions of one's own power, the exclusion of groups with vested interests from the bargain, the failure to consult all parties to the dispute, and unrealistic offers or expectations of quid pro quos. As we will see in the following analysis, all_. these problems were present during the bargaining situation from January to July 1985. Eventually they played the decisive role in scuttling the Accord during the two years that followed. FROM ACCORD TO DISCORD Following the signing of the Accord on July 24, 1985 and until January 1986, politics in the Punjab seemed to stabilize. Even serious incidents such as the assassination of Sant Longowal on August 20 did not interrupt the process of normalization. Most people adopted a wait-and-see attitude. Several factions in the Akali Dal were brought into the moderate fold at least temporarily. Hours before his death, the Sant had reconciled his differences with P.S. Badal and G.S. Tohra, who resented having been excluded from the Rajiv-Longowal negotiations. Electoral 59 concerns kept these two leaders within the Akali moderate mainstream during this period. The elections in late-September and the victory of the Akalis further strengthened the process of normalization as the radicals, who had boycotted the election, were shown to be a tiny minority of the Sikh community. Also important, but somewhat controversial, was the work of the tribunal looking into the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab, which was to take place on January 26, 1986. Many felt that this would settle the most important grievance the Sikhs had. Rajiv also played a role in\ keeping tempers cool. He "convinced" those opposed to the Accord that it was a good settlement for all. In effect, until January 1986, the political forces that had led to the signing of the Accord clearly remained in command. However, the failure to transfer Chandigarh to Punjab began to undermine their credibility. Akali factionalism had an immediate effect on the reception of the Accord. While the moderates hailed it, more outspoken factional leaders such as Badal and Tohra rejected it in private (Kapur, 1985:298). Publicly, however, they gave it lukewarm support. The United Akali Dal, of course, labelled it a total "sell-out". An important consideration moderating the main Akali leaders' views, however, was Rajiv's announcement of August 18 that an election would be carried out in the Punjab in September. In fact, because party tickets were given to different factions according to their strength, all wanted a piece of the pie. Not surprisingly, two days after this announcement, Badal and Tohra met with Sant Longowal and were reconciled with his leadership (India Today, September 15, 1985:12). Badal, a former Chief Minister, knew the benefits of being in office and Tohra, with the elections for the SGPC presidency approaching in November, could not antagonize top Akali leaders (Times, August 4, 1985). As can be seen, important groups in the Akali camp that had been ignored during the bargaining situation, namely the Badal and Tohra factions, kept a, low profile while they waited to see what they would get from the Accord. It was only a matter of time before they could reject a settlement from which they had been so ignominiously excluded. The radicals were desperate to stem the moderates' victories. The same day that Longowal met Badal and Tohra to iron out their differences, he was shot dead by Sikh terrorists. This was to have an important effect on future developments as Longowal had become the most respected and. popular Sikh leader. His. successor, S.S. Barnala, a former Union minister for agriculture, was a clever politician but lacked the grass-roots support the Sant had. Barnala was a long-time Akali and had been the general secretary of the working committee that drafted the Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973. On the central government side, Rajiv Gandhi tried to keep dissenting voices at bay. In the particular case of Bhajan Lai, the vocal chief minister of Haryana, Rajiv ordered an inquiry to look into allegations of corruption against him. The timing of this inquiry was not coincidental, but meant to seal his lips for the time being (India Today, September 30, 1985:40). The chief minister of Rajasthan, Harideo Joshi, who was concerned about the water issue, was "persuaded" that the Accord would not be harmful 61 to his state (India Today, August 15, 1985:15). In effect, Rajiv was using his power to gain acceptance for the Accord. The elections of September 25, 1985 were the clearest endorsement the Accord could have had in Punjab. This election, which was boycotted by the United Akali Dal, featured one of the highest voter turnouts ever recorded in the Punjab: 66.54% (India Today, October 15, 1985:12). The results, however, did show that the state had become increasingly polarized since the 1980 elections. For the first time, the Akalis had won a clear majority. With 38.5% of the vote they bagged 73 seats, in contrast to only 32 seats and 37.7% of the vote for the Congress party, a drop of over 10% since 1980 (Narang, 1986:131). Undoubtedly, the attack on the Golden Temple in June 1984 had alienated many Sikhs. Also,^Sikhs voted for the Akali Dal as it had been this party that was perceived as having settled their grievances. Significantly, the Akalis only gave tickets to candidates that pledged to support the Punjab Accord (Narang, 1986:167). Following the elections, factional struggles in the Akali Dal resurfaced. The issue of the representation of each faction in the government led to a. disagreement with Badal, and he and his supporters refused to sit in the ministry (Kapur, 1986:248). Appointment to ministries and other political positions in Akali governments had always been done according to the relative power of., each faction, but disputes over how to measure this power often led to conflicts. Moreover, the accommodation of several radical leaders was sought in order to curb their belligerency. As a result, Sukhjinder Singh, a militant Akali, was made 62 Education Minister. This made the prospects of divisions in the government particularly dangerous. Tohra, in turn, was looking for a way to acquire center-stage attention before the November elections for the SGPC presidency. To do this, he announced that the Akal Takht, the main administrative building in the Golden Temple, destroyed by the army in June 1984 and then reconstructed by New Delhi, would have to be demolished and rebuilt by Sikh volunteers (kar sewa) (Puri, 1985:1682). At first this was perceived as a minor irritant, but the failure to transfer Chandigarh to Punjab, which was supposed to occur at that time, made the issue explosive. Tohra's move was so popular that it was a major factor in his victory in the SGPC election in late November. Now, with his power base consolidated, Tohra could assume a powerful role in Punjab politics. He was no longer the weak leader of a few months earlier and he could attempt to outbid Barnala as a way to gain even more support. Another significant event in late 1985 was the work of the Mathew Commission. Justice Mathew was the man put in charge of determining Haryana's territorial compensation in conjunction with the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab on January 26, 1986. A problem occurred when, the Commission's terms of reference were 1 published, as these had been altered since July 24, 1985. Rajiv apologized for the mistake but the damage had been done as irritants developed between Punjab and Haryana (India Today, October 31, 1985:10). Another irritant was the conflict over the amount of Haryana's compensation. While Punjab offered 13 villages, Haryana demanded 410 villages in the Abohar and Fazilka area (Tribune, November 23, 1985). Haryana's position was largely dictated by its Chief Minister's need to be tough due to the strong opposition to the Accord in that state. Three other sets of events took place in late 1985 that foreshadowed problems for the Accord in the future. One was the November 15 exit of Arjun Singh as governor of Punjab. Rajiv had promised Arjun Singh that his assignment was only temporary and that eventually he could be given a cabinet post in New Delhi. He was replaced by Shankar Dayal Sharma, an experienced politician who had just completed a posting as governor of Andhra Pradesh. Although an able man, he could not inspire in the Punjab the confidence that Arjun Singh had enjoyed. Another set of events was the working, or non-working of several commissions called for in the Accord. The Mishra Commission looking into the Delhi riots was having problems with its investigation as victims were being harassed and few dared, to testify. As well, the police were being uncooperative (India Today, November 15, 1985:17). Moreover, two tribunals were not set up at all. These were the ones that were supposed to deal with Punjab's boundary problems and with the redistribution of river waters. The waters issue was becoming increasingly significant as the construction of the Sutlej-Yamuna Link canal (SYL) was halted in October due to farmers' agitations in the area (India Today, November 30, 1985:15). This was of critical importance as water was Haryana's major concern with the Punjab Accord and it was the SYL Canal that was to take water from Punjab's rivers to Haryana. The last set of events to foreshadow problems for Rajiv Gandhi, occurred in December. Both in several unsuccessful by-elections that month, and. in his performance at the 100th anniversary celebration of: 64 the Congress party, many perceived that the prime minister did not have a clear political program and that he was losing his charisma (India Today, January 15, 1986:19 and 55). As stated above, Punjab experienced an attitude of anxious expectation during late 1985. The promised transfer of Chandigarh was to be the first and most important item in the Accord to be implemented. However, the transfer did not take place. Numerous problems surrounded the deliberations of Justice Mathew and impeded the successful completion of his task. Already noted was the problem of determining the size of Haryana's compensation. There also was the problem of mapping out a territory that was both contiguous and Hindi-speaking. To determine Hindi-speaking areas, Haryana wanted to use the 1961 census,, while Punjab advocated the use of census data taken in 1971 or 1981. Moreover, Haryana claimed the Hindi-speaking areas of Abohar and Fazilka but these were not contiguous. Mathew, therefore, was in a situation in which not even the terms of reference of his work were accepted by the two states involved. In consequence, in his report released January 25, he stated that since Haryana could not be compensated, for the time being Chandigarh could not be transferred (India Today, February 15, 1986:16). Political considerations on the part of Rajiv may also have intervened, since Bhajan Lai. had warned the prime minister on January 13 that a Congress revolt in Haryana was possible if Chandigarh were transferred with nothing in return (Times, January 14, 1986). Whatever the case, this was the first of many disappointments Punjab was to experience in the next few months. 65 The non-transfer of Chandigarh led to widespread disillusionment and a huge drop in New Delhi's credibility among the Sikhs. The same day that Justice Mathew released his report, Tohra was to begin the SGPC kar sewa to rebuild the Akal^Takht. However, strengthened by the Mathew verdict, radicals and pro- Khalistani elements of the All-India Sikh Student Federation (AISSF) and of the United Akali Dal, wrested the initiative from the SGPC and took over the kar sewa. Not only that, but the radicals took over the Golden Temple complex and Tohra had no choice but to flee! (India Today, February 15, 1986:12-13). This act eventually led him to be "persuaded" by Barnala to resign the SGPC presidency. The radicals' seizure of the temple placed the Barnala government in a dilemma. If it left the AISSF alone this would be seen as a sign of weakness, but if it sent the police into the temple this would bring reminders of Operation Bluestar and, consequently, would weaken Barnala's basis of support. The fact that Chandigarh had not been transferred as promised had already left Barnala with very little to show for his first four months in office. The problem now was that Barnala could only regain support if: New Delhi granted him a; concession. But the center was wary of granting Punjab anything since the Barnala government seemed reluctant to criticize the radicals. Moreover, Tohra now had a real grievance against Barnala as he had been forced to resign the presidency of the SGPC after fleeing the Golden Temple in late January 1986. Rajiv attempted to regain momentum for the resolution of Akali grievances by appointing Justice Balakrishna Eradi on 66 January 25, 1986 to head the tribunal looking into the river waters issue. His job was to determine the amount of water that flowed through Punjab's three main rivers -- the Ravi, the Beas, and the Sutlej — and to allocate the water to the states of Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan. However, the Eradi Commission was subject to problems right from the start. For example, its terms of reference had been altered since the signing of the Accord and this led to confusion as to exactly what water was to be divided among the three states (India Today, March 15, 1986:12-13). This compounded a problem already detected by the editors of Tribune, the daily newspaper of Chandigarh, in August 1985. They concluded that "whether by accident or design, clause 9 (waters) has been so worded as to leave enough scope for interested parties to interpret it in different ways to suit their partisan ends" (August 1, 1985). Another problem, similar to that with which Justice Mathew had to deal, involved the compensation for Haryana. The. completion of the Sutlej-Yamuna Link (SYL) canal by August 15, 1986 was to be a form of compensation since the canal was to supply Haryana with water from Punjab's rivers. However, work on the canal had halted in October 1985. In effect, the appointment of Eradi, which was supposed to renew confidence in the Punjab Accord, only led to more confusion and fears that New Delhi was not serious about its attempt to settle the Akali grievances. The confusion was unfortunate since more water was one of the main issues for which the rural-based Akali Dal party had worked since the Green Revolution. 67 Another attempt to restore confidence in the Accord was Rajiv's declaration that Chandigarh would be transferred to the Punjab on June 21, 1986, and that a new commission would be appointed to determine Haryana's compensation. This commission, headed by Justice E. Venkataramiah, was appointed April 2, and given only a few weeks to do its work in order to meet the June 21 deadline. Meanwhile, the months of March and April witnessed the gradual return of terrorism to the Punjab. The temple takeover by the militants and the apparent unwillingness of the government to stop them boosted the morale of the militants. In many ways, the situation resembled 1984 when extremists had taken over the Golden Temple and terrorists roamed in the cities and rural areas. Undoubtedly, the failure to transfer Chandigarh was seen as evidence of; Delhi's intransigence and led many Sikhs to give tacit support to pro-Khalistanis and to the United Akali Dal. As a result of the rise in terrorism, Julio Ribeiro, India's "super- cop", as the press described him, was transferred to the Punjab to head the state police in mid-April. Ribeiro was assigned to the Punjab at Barnala's insistence to show determination on the part of: the authorities to quell terrorism (India Today, April 30, 1986:35). However, Ribeiro could not deter terrorism and eventually caused a major political crisis for the Barnala government. Punjab's baptism of fire at the hands of the new police chief was Operation Search. Operation Search was the police action at the Golden Temple on April 30, 1986. Designed to capture AISSF terrorists allegedly living within its premises, 68 the action was triggered by a declaration of the birth of Khalistan. The police action failed to capture any important extremists but it caused a split in the ruling Akali Dal party. Barnala had been careful not to tell anyone in the party of the "action", fearing that some of its more radical elements would leak the information out. However, senior Akali leaders such as Badal, conscious of their already diminishing influence in the government, interpreted Barnala's silence as an example of the growing personalization of power by the chief minister. In addition, MLA's who had grown disappointed with his government following the January events, saw this as an opportunity. Consequently, 27 of the 73 Akali MLA's formed a separate group in the Assembly and began opposing Barnala. Badal was delighted to lead them while Tohra, humiliated by Barnala when he was forced to resign the presidency of the SGPC, happily gave them his support (India Today, May 31, 1986:10). Barnala kept the support of a majority of the Assembly, but the effects of the opposition of Badal and Tohra as well as of the action on the temple were immeasurable. From this point onwards, Barnala not only had to confront New Delhi, but also an opposing group of Akalis led by two of the most resourceful politicians in the Punjab. In effect, his power base was gradually shrinking. Once again, Rajiv sought to restore confidence in the Accord by a combination of initiatives. First, he asked Bhajan Lai to step down from his post of chief minister of Haryana on June 5; he had been too much of a hindrance in the implementation of the Accord. His successor, Bansi Lai, appeared to be more conciliatory (India Today, June 30, 1986:16). However, it was 69 not only the government of Haryana, but also its people in general who opposed, the Accord. Second, Rajiv timed this change of office with the release of' the report by Justice Venkataramiah. The Justice had been asked to be specific about which areas should go to Haryana in exchange for Chandigarh. This issue was critical as central intelligence officers had warned of a massive exodus from Congress if the report did not satisfy Haryana (Tribune, May 3, 1986). Unfortunately, when Venkataramiah released his report on June 12, he had only partially fulfilled his job. He had determined that 70,000 acres should go to Haryana, but only 45,000 acres had been identified as possible for transfer due to the opposition of the Punjab government (India Today, June 30, 1986:18). In effect, the Commission had failed to settle the deadlock between Punjab and Haryana. Rajiv, in an effort to keep the momentum of the transfer going, appointed a committee headed by Justice D.A. Desai to report within 18 hours on the 70,000 acres to be transferred to Haryana. Barnala, by now under heavy pressure from the more vocal dissident Akali Dal and from the increasingly popular United Akalis, had no choice but to repudiate the Desai Committee for its arbitrary character. By mid-1986, a large number of Akalis had opted for total confrontation with New Delhi, and Barnala could not appear to be the center's stooge. He feared that, if he played New Delhi's game, he would lose support among the Sikhs in general as well as the allegiance of even more MLA's in the state assembly. Many Sikhs did not view the transfer of 70,000 acres to Haryana as a high price to pay for Chandigarh, but the 70 appointment of a third tribunal to settle the issue alienated Sikh opinion. Matters had been made worse when its terms of reference were published since no mention was made that the area had to be Hindi-speaking (Tribune, June 21, 198G). The rejection of the Desai Committee meant, however, that the transfer of Chandigarh was postponed indefinitely (Tribune, July 15, 1986). The Punjab government did not submit its claims to it, and therefore, Desai could never fulfill his task. As can be seen, Rajiv still appeared to have considerable authority by mid-1986, as his political initiatives demonstrate. However, Barnala had lost much of the support he had had only a few months earlier. Once again, the political situation in the Punjab was fluid and this made the implementation of the Akalis1 part of the quid pro quo, namely communal harmony and political stability, hard to attain. The failure to settle the grievances provides evidence of what our theory describes as exaggerated perceptions by the bargaining participants of their ability to achieve certain goals. The consequence of the above for Barnala was that he was stuck between New Delhi and the more radical Akalis and was developing conflicts with both. A rather extreme expression of anti-Barnala sentiment was Badal's comment in late July that, Barnala is a traitor. He is a tyrant worse than the Moghuls. Even Mrs. Gandhi's despotic regime pales before his misdeeds. At the behest of the Centex he is finishing the Sikh youth and attacking the Sikh holy shrines. Neither God nor Sikhs shall pardon him (India Today, July 31, 1986:15). 71. Barnala also had conflicts with New Delhi, especially with the Home Minister, Buta Singh. Appointed Home Minister in March 1986, Buta Singh was a lower caste Sikh who never got along with Barnala (Times, August 27, 1986). Two problems were at the crux of their rivalry. One was the issue of New Delhi's responsibility for the problems of implementing the Accord. Barnala felt the Center was intransigent, but. Buta argued that New Delhi had implemented seven of the eleven paragraphs of the Accord (Tribune, July 23, 1986). In the light of the evidence presented, Buta's comments show his concern for form and not substance. The most important point of conflict was over the prerogatives of the two men. Barnala was determined to keep direct control of the Punjab police while Buta felt that the "law and order" situation in the state required direct supervision from New Delhi (Times, September 9, 1986). In any case, the dialogue that had developed between Punjab and New Delhi in late- 1985 was clearly gone by late-1986. In fact, the Accord was losing momentum altogether by late 1986. Two examples help to illustrate this. Both relate to the work of Commissions established by Delhi to implement the Accord. The: Eradi Commission was given a three month extension to submit its report, thus delaying it until the new year (Tribune, September 18, 1986). Also, although the Mishra Report was submitted in time (mid-August), it was not released by the government until February 1987. The fact was that by late 1986 the Accord was stalled. New Delhi seemed to be waiting for a potential reassertion of Barnala in the Punjab following the SGPC elections of late-November. If his candidate won, this would be 72 an endorsement of his policies. However, the Center did not understand that Barnala could only win these elections if he had something to show for his efforts, and after fifteen months in office he had very little to show. The editorial board of the Times of India was correct when it stated that the Center was putting all of its eggs in Barnala's basket for the November 30 elections for the presidency of the SGPC (Times, November 20, 1986). However, the elections did not go well for Barnala and New Delhi. The splinter Akali Dai's candidate, who not surprisingly was G.S. Tohra, won the contest. Barnala's candidate only received fifty-eight votes against Tohra's seventy-four (Tribune, December 1, 1987). The SGPC, although strictly speaking not a political institution, is of critical importance in Sikh politics for it serves as the barometer of the community. No Akali leader can get very far without its support. By having lost these elections, Barnala was seen as lacking legitimacy as a Sikh leader. Moreover, his defeat represented the disapproval of his policies by a majority of the community. The chief minister had already lost the initiative, and the 27 dissident Akalis in the state Assembly appeared ready to launch a campaign against Barnala. However, the Center would not allow this as became obvious in a few days. The clearest indication of New Delhi's opposition to letting Badal's dissident Akali Dal and Tohra play a role in the Punjab developments was their imprisonment on December 2. The two men were arrested on the charge of giving "cover and respectability to the activities of extremists and terrorists" (Times, December 3, 1986). They remained in prison for the rest of Barnala's 73 tenure as chief minister. New Delhi was clearly trying to prop up Barnala, but the chief minister had little support left in the state. Consequently, as 1987 began, the center was depending on a man who represented a configuration of political forces that did not exist anymore. The failure to understand this, or simply the lack of any alternatives, led to the total demise of the Accord in the first half of 1987. Barnala's indecisiveness and isolation were clearly displayed in early January 1987. Having meekly threatened a morcha (agitation) if the letter and spirit of the Accord were not implemented, he later called it off after a vague promise by the center to implement the Accord (Times, January 14,. 1987). In consequence, he angered both New Delhi and the militant Akalis and did not please anyone! Another instance of Barnala's isolation was his reaction to the transformation of the United Akali Dal into the Unified Akali Dal, a move designed to unite all Akali factions opposed to New Delhi. Barnala refused to join it - following Longowal's example in May 1985 - but was excommunicated by the high priests of the Golden Temple for this action in mid-February. The Unified Akalis represented those Sikhs who opposed both Barnala and the Center. The refusal of the government to release the Eradi Report after it was submitted in mid-January, and the release of the Mishra Report on February 23, did not help Barnala either. The Mishra Report vaguely blamed the police for the Delhi riots but shirked its full responsibility by recommending two committees to finish the task it had begun (India Today, August 31, 1987:39). As well, it stated that the Congress party had not played a 74 substantial role in the riots, thus contradicting numerous other reports. This apparent "whitewash" was a humiliation to the Sikhs since it indicated the guilty would never be punished adequately. Much of the Center's indecisiveness in its dealings with Punjab, as already stated, had to do with the failure on the part of the Akali government to maintain law and order as their side of the bargain. However, another factor of equal importance that came to the fore during 1987 was Rajiv's weakness as a prime minister. His glitter was fading. His problems were of two kinds; some were related to electoral losses while others were problems within the government itself. Rajiv's electoral defeats since early 1985 had become a big threat to the Congress party. Congress had gone from ruling eighteen states to ruling only twelve. As well, from April 1987, for the first, time since independence, the Congress did not form a government in any of the four southern states. Large chunks of eastern India had also fallen to opposition parties. The fear was that the Congress was becoming a Hindi-heartland party only (India Today, April 15, 1987:32). Rajiv's decline at the state level was received gleefully by regional leaders; a Bihari politician was quoted as saying that "this is exactly what we wanted - a chastened Rajiv Gandhi who will be forced to listen to us" (Times, April 22, 1986) . Rajiv's problems within the government revolved around his declining authority. Rajiv was not only having a struggle with India's president over the divisions of powers between them (India Today, February 28, 1987:16-17), but also with different 75 members of his government. The most important example of this was Rajiv's conflict with V.P. Singh in March and April 1987. Singh had been Finance Minister until January and in his attempt to curb corruption had recruited the American Fairfax Investigation Agency. However, he did not inform other Congress leaders or the prime minister (India Today, April 30, 1987:11- 19). This outraged senior Congressmen and eventually led to Singh's resignation and expulsion from the party. However, his removal seemed like an attempt to cover up corruption. Another problem involved alleged payoffs in a defense contract between the Indian government and the Bofors arms factory of Sweden (India Today, May 15, 1987:12). The payoffs issue was leaked to the press and eventually shook to its foundations Rajiv's image of incorruptibility. Considering the extent of these problems, it is not surprising that Rajiv Gandhi could not give the Punjab his undivided attention during the first half of 1987. Another aspect of Rajiv's declining authority was the return of old Congress politicians who had been displaced by Rajiv's younger aides in early 1985. By May 1987, Rajiv's set of advisors was basically associated with old style manipulation and wheeling and dealing (India Today, May 15, 1987:25). In consequence, the technocrats who had helped in reaching the Punjab Accord had given way to the old tacticians who, in many ways, exacerbated tensions in Punjab in the early 1980's by using political manipulation in order to obtain electoral victories. Rajiv had learned the lesson that to control New Delhi you need to control the states. This had become increasingly important- after May 5 when an election was called for June 17, 1987 in the 76 state of Haryana. This election was significant because Haryana is part of the Hindi-speaking heartland, the area of north India that is the bastion of the Congress party. A defeat in that state would be catastrophic in view of the already extensive losses in the south and east of the country and because of the precedent it would set in the north. It is not surprising then, that the Punjab Accord was shelved in mid-May 1987 in order to devote full attention to the Haryana election. Simply stated, the Punjab Accord was quietly abandoned after the Barnala government had been replaced by President's Rule on May 12. For all intents and purposes, the Accord was already dead, but this was the coup de grace. By May, the central government's argument was that extremism was uncontrollable and that the terrorists were running a parallel government. For this reason, President's Rule must be established to restore people's confidence (India Today, May 31, 1987:14-15). However, it was clear that the Haryana election was Rajiv's main concern. The fact that the Sutlej-Yamuna Link canal's construction was speeded up showed that Haryana's interests were being promoted. Another motivation was the fear that the twenty-two by-elections to be carried out in May and June in Punjab would allow militant Akalis to be elected to the state assembly (Times, May 9, 1987). President's Rule would prevent any elections from being carried out. As can be seen,, the unpredictable and volatile Punjab was sacrificed because of the fear of a. Congress defeat in Haryana. The fear of a defeat in Haryana was most clearly seen in the way New Delhi dealt with, the Eradi Report. Justice Eradi had 7 7 submitted his report in January but the government only released it a few weeks before the Haryana election in order to help the Congress (Tribune, May 13, 1987). Theoretically, the Eradi Report's verdict allocated more waters to both Punjab and Haryana than any previous award due to the Report's assessment of available water (Tribune, May 21, 1987). But looking at it practically, it became clear that Punjab's water supply would be reduced while Haryana's would be doubled (India Today, June 15, 1987:22). This is the result of technical problems that make it impossible for Punjab to exploit all the water allocated to it. Ironically, the Congress party was routed in Haryana during the June 17 elections. While Congress won five seats, the opposition, united in the Haryana Sangharsh Samiti, captured seventy-three seats (Tribune, June 20, 1987). The election of Devi. Lai as chief minister put the last nail in the Accord's coffin as he had bluntly stated since July 1985 that he was opposed to it, and that no concessions could be made on the Punjab issue without Haryana's consent. Clearly, the failure to resolve the Punjab crisis had cost the Congress dearly, since Haryana was lost and the Accord was dead. FINAL REMARKS The events that led to the demise of the Punjab Accord indicate that a change in the configuration of political forces had taken place in Punjab and New Delhi during the period from July 1985 to mid-1987. In fact, the political bargaining that led to the Accord was problematic in several ways and thus played a key role in changing the balance of political forces after mid- 78 1985. Four major problems can be identified. First, both Rajiv Gandhi and Sant Longowal had an exaggerated perception of their power and of their ability to lead the settlement to a happy conclusion. By 1987, Rajiv had proven unable to deal, not only with the Punjab crisis, but also with problems in the rest of India and within the government itself. His electoral record was dismal and his popularity was sagging. Longowal was shot dead a month after the signing of the Accord, but it is unlikely that he would have been able to deal with the issues any differently than Barnala. Dissension within the Akali camp was just too great. Second, relevant political forces that were ignored during the decision-making gained greater prominence after July 1985 and helped weaken the Accord. Buta Singh became Home Minister in 1986 and this gave him a good platform from which to attack his rival, Barnala. Moreover, he probably undermined Rajiv's confidence in the Akalis. In the case of the Akalis, Badal and Tohra were ignored. These two leaders appeared weak in mid-1985, but by mid-1986 they had regained their strength and were proving to be a real thorn in Barnala's side. Third, Haryana's disaffection, which was a result of being excluded from the negotiations that led to the Punjab Accord, also caused problems for the implementation of the Memorandum of Settlement. Although Haryana had voted massively for Rajiv Gandhi in the December 1984 elections, this was not a mandate for him to represent the state in its dealings with Punjab. Chandigarh is Haryana's capital as much as it is Punjab's, and thus Haryanvis were highly disgruntled by Rajiv's tactics. Also, the state depends heavily on Punjab's river waters and Haryana. 79 had a major interest in any settlement regarding their allocation. Although it is true that tribunals were set up to deal impartially with these two issues, the general feeling was that Haryana was being sacrificed for Punjab. Fourth, the Accord was unrealistic in what it set out to accomplish. The implementation schedule was short and the issues dealt with required a rapport between New Delhi and the Punjab which was difficult to maintain for very long. The events of 1986 proved this. Furthermore, throughout the implementation phase, the center did not realize that the Accord represented only the beginning of the gradual consolidation of the basis of support of the moderate Akalis and that several concessions would have to be made before the moderates could establish a strong grip over Sikh politics. The failure to understand this meant that Barnala was caught between New Delhi and the more radical Akalis with nothing to show for all his efforts either to the center or to the more militant Sikhs. As has been shown, the failure of the Accord was in large part a result of changes in power configuration in both New Delhi and Punjab. Also responsible for its failure were flaws in the wording of the settlement and unrealistic guid pro quos. Such explanations and their theoretical significance will be considered in the concluding chapter. 80 NOTES 1. The Accord signed on July 24, 1985 stipulated three criteria by which to determine Haryana's territorial compensation. The area was to be Hindi-speaking, territorially contiguous and was to be assessed using the village as a unit. When the terms of reference of the Mathew Commission were published a reference to "other" criteria was made, thus leaving the way open for Haryana to demand territory that did not conform to the original three conditions. 81 CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION Oran Young defines bargaining as a means by which actors come together and negotiate to achieve mutual gains because the outcome for one is a function of the other's behaviour and vice versa. This definition illustrates the importance of bargaining theory, for the case study of the Rajiv Gandhi-Sant Longowal Accord of July 24, 1985. Neither of these two politicians could achieve what he wanted without the cooperation of the other. Rajiv was a new prime minister determined to settle center-state conflicts in India which had become increasingly violent in the last few years. He particularly wanted peace in Punjab. Punjab is an agriculturally rich and strategically important state in north-west India. Its proximity to New Delhi and the facility with which its communal conflict could spill over into the capital was alarming. Stability in the Punjab was not only important for these reasons, but also because India prided itself on its secular Constitution. Religious violence threatened one of the basic principles upon which India had based its statehood. Sant Longowal, meanwhile, wanted to settle several political, economic, and religious grievances which the Sikh community had harboured since the bifurcation of the state of Punjab into the new Punjab and Haryana following the Punjabi Suba movement. These grievances could only be achieved with New Delhi's participation since they all fell within the center's jurisdiction. In addition, Longowal sought to restore communal peace in the state because of the suffering and destruction it 82 had caused since the early 1980's. As can be seen, both politicians had something to gain from a settlement, but things are never simple in Indian politics. The massive election victory of Rajiv Gandhi in December 1984 gave him the largest electoral mandate any Indian ruler has ever had. He was seen as the man who could take India into the twenty-first century. Rajiv was popular and young, well-educated and goal-oriented. No one knew whether he was a strong leader, but he was perceived as being one. Immediately, he began to work on the settlement of the Punjab crisis. This involved bargaining with senior Akali Dal leaders and eventually Sant Harchand Singh Longowal joined him in negotiations. An Accord on Punjab was finally reached in July 1985. However, by mid-1987 it had failed to settle the crisis and the bargain had been shelved. Why? Bargaining theory helps explain this. Charles Lockhart's bargaining model proves useful in identifying three processes that characterize bargaining situations. These are information interpretation, decision• making, and strategy search. Making use of these processes, I have analyzed the Punjab Accord's negotiation phase arguing that the settlement was the result of a particular configuration of power that occurred in Punjab and New Delhi in mid-1985. A close look at the evidence substantiates this central hypothesis. Information interpretation is the first process that takes place in any bargaining situation. It is during this stage that potential participants in a bargain look at their options and determine a stance. Perceptions of one's own power and the power of other potential participants are crucial at this point. The 83 perception of the participants' power by followers is equally important. The political role of the bargainers also helps determine the stance they take. Thus, information interpretation is nothing more than the subjective analysis of the political situation at one point in time. Unfortunately, it is bound to be inaccurate, as the behaviour of Rajiv Gandhi and of Sant Longowal confirms. Both men thought they could reach a settlement, and they set out to get it without considering that they might have exaggerated perceptions of their own power. Maybe, if they had not done this, the Accord would not have been reached or would have been different. In effect, in our analysis, these misperceptions play a key role in explaining the way the Accord was flawed from the beginning. The decision-making process also confirms our view that political bargains are the result of a particular configuration of power. The theory suggests that only those groups with a large degree of influence participate in the decision-making. Not only that, but constraints on policy-making may often be ignored if a participant or decision-making unit wrongly perceives that it can deal with the political costs involved. The decision-making style of Rajiv Gandhi exemplifies this. The interests of the state of Haryana were neglected and other important groups were ignored. Haryana was seen as being totally subordinate to New Delhi and, therefore, could be sacrificed at least in the short term. The failure to include important interests conformed to the normal pattern of Indian politics in which the "ins" determine policy and the "outs" wait for a new opportunity to arise for them. Sant Longowal's decision-making 84 was just as interesting. Prior to 1984, he had played the militants' game, but after his release from prison in March 1985 he clearly would not do so anymore. He did not even include Tohra and Badal in his inner circle of advisors. These two men appeared weak at the time, but Longowal should not have ignored them so completely. As was seen, factions in Punjab play a central role in determining the course of events. No bargained settlement can be successful without including at least the major factional alignments in the decision-making. Finally, the strategy search process has been examined. Clearly, the participants in the bargain gave concessions according to their perceptions of their own power. Both Rajiv Gandhi and Sant Longowal appeared sure of their capacity to fulfill their quid pro quo commitments. However, time showed how unrealistic the Accord had actually been. In weakly- institutionalized states, policies seldom succeed if their advocates lose power during the implementation stage. The demise of the Accord was implicit in its negotiation phase as long as one factor was not changed; namely, the relative political influence of the participants to the bargain. Weakly institutionalized states are often characterized by the rapidity with which certain decisions are made. In the case of the Punjab, 1985 was seen as the beginning of the end of the crisis. In fact, until January 1986, this remained so. However, Rajiv's weaknesses began to show in 1986, as did Chief Minister Barnala's. Once this occurred, a snowball effect took place. By mid-1987, very little remained of the 1985 initiatives: Barnala was relegated to the political backstage of Punjab and Rajiv was 85 fighting for his political survival in New Delhi. Thus, the failure of the Punjab Accord occurred in great part due to the weak leadership in New Delhi and Punjab. India lacks the institutionalization needed to keep initiatives and commitments alive once their advocates are gone or weakened. The above remarks highlight the importance of bargaining that involves all relevant interests. Shrewder coalition-making might have been helpful in building support for the Accord. Badal and Tohra should not have been excluded from the decision• making process. They should have been included and given a part, however minor, to play. This would have forced them to acknowledge their participation in the Accord and, therefore, would have created a vested interest in them for its success. In the case of Rajiv, he should not have excluded Haryana representatives from the negotiations that led to the Accord. It is the impression of this author that due to the personal popularity of Rajiv and influence of Longowal in 1985, an Accord would probably have been signed even with the excluded interests present in the decision-making process. Also important in the demise of the Accord is one aspect of bargaining that our model did not deal with. This was the failure to differentiate between primary and secondary grievances between Haryana and Punjab. Lockhart's bargaining model focuses on the two participants in the bargain and the decision-making and strategy search they follow. It does not pay any attention to the kinds of issues that are being settled. In fact, it can be argued that this is one area of weakness in our model. Romans, in 1961, concluded that it was important to separate 86 issues according to the value different actors place on them. In this way, trade-offs are made easier as all parties get what they want, or at least, they have a better chance of getting what they want. Lockhart's model does not deal with this, probably because his main concern is how the bargaining process takes place, not the content of the final settlement. However, the importance of wording and of substantive issues dealt with in the clauses of a bargained settlement is demonstrated by the problems that the Mathew, Eradi, and Desai commissions went through in late 1985 and 1986. An example of the above can be seen in the water and territorial issues of the Punjab Accord. Since 1956, Punjab governments knew that their river water would be distributed among other states. This was confirmed during the 1966 bifurcation of the state as Haryana was allocated water from Punjab's rivers. In addition, since 1970, Haryana knew that Chandigarh would go to the Punjab eventually. For these reasons, a trade-off should have been carried out on these two issues. Chandigarh should have been conceded by Haryana, not in exchange for territorial compensation from Punjab, but for a steady supply of water, that is, for the completion of the Sutlej-Yamuna Link canal. Territorial disputes should have been dealt with separately from all this. This way at least, two major grievances could have been settled and the Accord would have retained the confidence of both New Delhi and the peoples of Punjab and Haryana. 87 In conclusion, it is important to note that the Punjab Accord of 1985 has come the closest of any of the attempts to solve the conflict in India's most troubled state. In the future, political bargaining may be used again to attempt a resolution of the Punjab crisis. The euphoria with which the Accord was received in July 1985 shows the underlying desire for a settlement of longstanding grievances. 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Asian Survey 26:3 (March 1986), 363-77. 92 Bibliography (continued) Wood, John R., ed. State Politics in Contemporary India: Crisis or Continuity? Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1984 . Young, Oran. Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975. Newspapers The Times of India (New Delhi, Bombay, Ahmedabad) December 1984- July 1987. The Tribune (Chandigarh) December 1984 - July 1987. Periodicals India Today, January 1985 - July 1987. Economic and Political Weekly. December 1984 - July 1987. 93