Political Bargaining and the Punjab the Punjab Accord
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
POLITICAL BARGAINING AND THE PUNJAB CRISIS: THE PUNJAB ACCORD OF 1985 By ALVARO JOSEPH RODRIGUEZ B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1987 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Political Science) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1988 ® Alvaro Joseph Rodriguez 1988 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada DE-6 (2/88) those who dared ABSTRACT Since the early 1980's, the Punjab state of India has been in turmoil as a result of a separatist movement that developed among elements of the Sikh community. Political tensions not only characterized the relationship between the Punjab and New Delhi/ but also between Sikhs and Hindus and among different segments within the Sikh community itself. The most important attempt to end the conflict in the state has been the Rajiv Gandhi-Sant Longowal Accord signed on July 24, 1985. However, the Accord failed and by mid-1987 the Punjab was once again racked by political violence. This thesis focuses on the events that led to the signing of the Accord and the forces that caused its demise. Bargaining theory provides the general theoretical framework against which the data are analyzed. This thesis highlights the fact that political bargains in Third World weakly-institutionalized states are often the result of particular configurations of political power which are short• lived. The corollary of this is that once the configuration of political forces changes, the chances of success for the previously reached political bargain are weakened. In the particular case of the Punjab Accord, there was a change, beginning in late 1985, in the relative political power of the participants in. the bargain. Also, the terms of the bargained Accord unleashed forces on both sides which undermined its implementation. Third World leaders should draw two major lessons from this. First, they should be careful not to have exaggerated perceptions of their power since this may be counterproductive in the future if they cannot deliver what they have promised. Second, these leaders should attempt to consult all interests with a stake in the bargained settlement as a way to prevent opposition to it. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract ii Table of Contents • iv List of Maps v Acknowledgements vi Chapter I: Anatomy of an Accord 1 The Accord 2 The Sikhs 6 Genesis of Sikh Separatism 11 Bargaining Theory 15 Information Interpretation 20 Decision-Making 22 Strategy Search 26 Chapter I Notes 31 Chapter II: The Accord to End Discord 33 Separatism and Communal Violence in Punjab 33 An Accord at Last 37 Final Remarks 55 Chapter II Notes ... 57 Chapter III: The Resurgence of Discord 58 From Accord to Discord 59 Final Remarks 78 Chapter III Notes 81 Chapter IV: Conclusion 82 Bibliography 89 iv LIST OP MAPS Page Map 1 India. Political Divisions 8 Map 2 Linguistic Divisions of Punjab in 1966 9 Map 3 Punjab and Haryana Today 10 v ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This thesis is the culmination of five years of study at the University of British Columbia that would not have been possible without the help of numerous individuals. I am grateful to my parents who supported me in my decision to leave Chile close to six years ago, knowing that I would, or could, never go back. In addition, I owe many thanks to all my friends. My achievements owe much to their acceptance and tolerance. My gratitude also goes to Professor John R. Wood for his encouragement in the last few years. For his patience and dedication I am much indebted. As well, I would like to thank Professor Diane K. Mauzy for her help and support when I seemed to lack direction. To Professor Harjot S. Oberoi I am grateful for an uncanny ability to open new fields of interest for me in the realm of Sikhism. All three I must also thank for their help in the quick completion of this thesis. vi CHAPTER I: ANATOMY OP AN ACCORD August and September 1985. Punjab, India. The air is full of hope; the cities peaceful; the fields coloured by different crops symbolizing a new beginning. It was in this optimistic setting that a Memorandum of Settlement was signed by Harchand S. Longowal, leader of the Akali Dal party, and Rajiv Gandhi, prime minister of India, on July 24, 1985. Their Accord was an attempt to end the terrorism and political conflict which had beset the Punjab for several years. The Punjab had been in turmoil as a result of a separatist movement that had developed in the early 1980*s among elements of the Sikh community, the biggest ethnic group of the state. Their desire for separatism was strengthened as a result of New Delhi's apparent intransigence regarding a number of political, economic, and religious grievances of the Sikhs. The movement had also been made increasingly violent as a result of the preachings of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a Sikh religious leader who imbued the movement with fundamentalist overtones. Moreover, it was exacerbated by the factional disputes and electoral machinations of Punjab's major political parties. However, during August and September, all this seemed forgotten and the two major ethnic groups of the state, the Hindus and the Sikhs, appeared to be developing a common Punjabi outlook. The feeling of harmony was reflected in the electioneering for the State Assembly and national Parliament. The restoration of the democratic process was significant as Punjab had been under New Delhi's administration since late 1983. 1 April and May 1987. The hope is gone, the cities are havens for terrorism, and the parched soil due to the failure of the monsoon symbolizes the sterility of the recent political initiatives. The Accord has not been fully implemented and the future looks bleak. The document promising "peace in our time" is but one more failed attempt to solve the Punjab crisis, a crisis that has reached new heights in the last few months. Hostility and suspicion are the norm now. Even the democratic process in the Punjab has been halted due to its "inefficiency" in handling the "law and order" situation in the state. Why? Why the hope in 1985? Why the despair in 1987? Why was the Punjab Accord viewed so promisingly? Was it doomed to fail right from the start? If so, what were the forces that shaped its drafting and its implementation? These are some of the questions this thesis will attempt to answer. In doing so, the analysis will take us to the roots of a conflict which has led to communal violence unparalleled since India's partition in 1947. THE ACCORD This thesis focuses on the Memorandum of Settlement signed between Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, and Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, president of the Shiromani Akali Dal (L), a preponderantly Sikh party, on July 24, 1985. It examines the events and forces that led to it; the shape the Accord took; and the developments that led to its demise. Of critical importance is to determine why the bargain that took place between these two politicians was possible then and not at any other time. The 2 perceptions and attitudes of both leaders are explored and the nature of the decision-making units that supported the bargaining process is examined. Furthermore, the overall strategy of the 1 two men in trying to reach their bargaining goals is examined. The thesis focuses on bargaining theory for two reasons. First, the bargaining concept provides a broad but practical tool with which to give coherence to the different political phenomena that play a role in bargained settlements. Bargaining theory is closely associated with other political theories, such as those focusing on factionalism, coalition-building, and elite accommodation. Second, bargaining theory is critical in explaining the relationship between the Punjab Accord itself and the opposition forces it unleashed. In other words, this theory is indispensable in the explanation of the events that led to the demise of the Accord. The Accord, consisting of eleven paragraphs, promised to put an end to all major grievances of the Sikhs. These included the transfer of the city of Chandigarh to Punjab, the referral of the Akali Dai's major separatist manifesto to a commission looking into center-state relations, and the promotion of the Punjabi language. The Sikhs' major religious demand was also granted as New Delhi assured the Akali Dal that all Sikh temples in India would be brought under the administration of the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC). High levels of Sikh recruitment into the army and a better allocation of river waters for the Punjab were also guaranteed by New Delhi, thus settling the Sikh's economic demands. Also included in the Accord were five paragraphs dealing with grievances that developed out of the 3 separatist movement and the subsequent government reactions to it. These clauses related to the protection of minorities, compensation for victims of political violence, rehabilitation of Sikh army deserters, withdrawal of special courts from the Punjab, and greater scope for the judicial enquiry looking into anti-Sikh riots in New Delhi.