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Home , Akali movement, Amrik Singh, Beant Singh (politician), Dharam Yudh Morcha, Gurcharan Singh Tohra, Nirankari

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 39 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II)

M.A. (Political Science) PART-II PAPER-VII (OPTION-II) Semester-IV ( POLITICS) LESSON NO.1.5 AUTHOR: Dr. G. S. BRAR

SIKH MILITANT MOVEMENT IN PUNJAB

Punjab witnessed a very serious crisis of Sikh militancy during nineteen eighties till a couple of years after the formation of the government in the state in 1992 under the Chief Ministership of late . More than thirty thousand people had lost their lives. The infamous ‘’ of 1984 in the , the assassination of by her Sikh bodyguards and the subsequent anti-Sikh riots left a sad legacy in the history of the country. The , who had contributed to the freedom of the country with their lives, were dubbed as anti-national, and the age-old Hindu-Sikh unity was put on test in this troubled period. The democratic movement in the state comprising mass organizations of peasants, workers, government employees, teachers and students remained completely paralysed during this period. Some found the reason of Sikh militancy in ‘the wrong policies pursued by the central government since independence’ [Rai 1986]. Some others ascribed it to ‘an allegedly slow process of alienation among a section of the Punjab population in the past’ [Kapur 1986]. Still others trace it to ‘the rise of certain personalities committed to fundamentalist stream of thought’ [Joshi 1984:11-32]. The efforts were also made to trace its origin in ‘the socio-economic developments which had ushered in the state since the advent of the Green Revolution’ [Azad 1987:13-40]. The problem was seen as multi-dimensional. It was held that it was a political one and needed a political solution. The Central government, however, opted for a military solution and, may be said, succeeded in that way. The Background The Sikh Aspirations in the Pre-Independence Era Way back in history, in 1909, the Morley-Minto reforms gave weighted representation to the Muslims in provinces in which they were in minority. This created a lasting separatism between the Muslims and the . In 1916, the Congress attempted to appease the Muslims by proposing a number of separate communal laws and claims for them in a pact, called the Lucknow Pact. In Punjab, 50 per cent of seats in the provincial Assembly were reserved for the Muslims under this League-Congress pact and the Sikhs were completely ignored. In the same year, Gajjan Singh of , a Sikh representative, moved an amendment recommending the addition of words, "subject to the just claims of the Sikhs". This was opposed by both the Hindus and the Muslims. At that time, there

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 40 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II) were only two Sikhs in Assembly. The franchise committee was established by the British to go into matter of composition of new legislatures based on religion. The Sikhs were given 15 per cent seats but were only 12 per cent of Punjab, while the Muslims in Bihar and Orissa were less than 10 per cent and got 25 per cent of total legislature seats. The Sikhs were the smallest minority in Punjab and they were generally averse to the communal representation. The Muslims, in spite of being a majority, had been given statutory protection and weightage in the form of separate electorates and reservation of seats. This created among the Sikhs a sense of grievance, and they demanded to be treated on par with the Muslims in the matter of political rights. In 1940, Mohammad Ali Jinnah called for a separate state, Pakistan, for the Muslims, which was to be created out of those areas in which the Muslims were living as a majority. It was a shock for the Sikhs, as they, although were spread out throughout Punjab, but were a minority in all the districts of the province. The British appointed a Commission under Sir Stafford Cripps in 1942 to look after the creation of a new province or a separate state for the Muslims. The Sikh representatives told this Commission: "Why should a province that fails to secure three-fifths majority of its legislature, in which a religious community enjoys statutory majority, be allowed to hold a plebiscite and given the benefit of a bare majority. In fairness, this right should have been conceded to communities who are in permanent minority in the legislature. From the boundary of to the banks of the Ravi river, the population is divided as follows: The Muslims, 4,505,000; The Sikhs and other the non-Muslims, 7,060,000. To this may be added the population of the Sikh states of , Nabha, Jind, Kapurthala and Faridkot, which is about 2,600,000, of this the Muslims constitute barely 20 per cent and this reduces the ratio of the Muslim population still further. We shall resist by all possible means, the separation of Punjab from the all- Union. We shall never permit our motherland to be at the mercy of those who disown it’. When it was a certainty that Pakistan will be formed, Giani Kartar Singh in 1943 declared a call for a separate State, called the Azad Punjab, to be comprised of Ambala, , Lahore, Multan, and Lyallpur divisions. Master , the president of Shiromani , and other Sikh leaders, such as Giani , Sadhu Singh Hamdard, Amar Singh Dosanj, and Ambalvi, supported this call for Azad Punjab. Then, in a speech in in August 1944, Master Tara Singh declared that ‘the Sikhs were a nation’. And as such’ a demand was formerly put forward by in a resolution passed on March 22, 1946 for a separate Sikh state. After this, the situation in Punjab got tense. On one hand, Jinnah and the Muslim League were calling for blood or Pakistan and declaring that the Muslims are no believer of ahimsa and will resort to any means possible to achieve their goal. The Muslim League declared August 16, 1946 to be

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 41 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II) observed as Direct Action Day, where all the Muslims were asked to show the support for Pakistan by rioting. Explaining the implications of Direct Action Day threat, Liyaqat Ali Khan, the general secretary of the Muslim League said: "Direct action means resort to non-Constitutional methods that can take any form which may suit the conditions under which we live. We cannot eliminate any methods. Direct Action means any action against the law." Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar spoke in more forthright terms: "Pakistan can be achieved through shedding blood of others. The Muslims are no believers in ahimsa.” By this time, points out J.S. Grewal, the Akali leaders were not feeling happy with the Congress because of its indifference to the resolution of the Muslim League, passed at Lahore in March, 1940. Sikandar Hayyat Khan forcefully pleaded for the united Punjab in the Assembly, making an appeal to the Punjabi sentiments of its members. Nevertheless, the resolution of the Muslim League, popularly referred as the ‘Pakistan Resolution’, was denounced at the All India Akali Conference. Dr. V.S. Bhatti of Ludhiana published a pamphlet demanding ‘Khalistan’ as a buffer state between India and Pakistan. It may, however, be stated that the idea of Khalistan was meant merely to oppose the idea of Pakistan. This is evident from the frequent use of the phrase ‘if Pakistan is to be conceded’. On December 1, 1940, a general conference of the Sikhs was convened at Lahore to pass a resolution against the formation of Pakistan. Throughout 1940, however, the Congress did not formally react to the ‘Pakistan Resolution’, treating the idea as fantastic. Ultimately, the Muslims got their Pakistan, but the Sikhs gained only the assurances of the protection of the Sikh culture, identity and freedom by a leader no less in stature than of in 1946. However, these assurances were not fulfilled at the time of the independence and afterwards. The Punjabi Suba Agitation In 1947, the country had a number of British provinces and a large number of independent territories, known as the Indian states. They were merged into the Indian Union by grouping them into A, B, and C categories. After a couple of years, the process of reorganization of these states was started on the linguistic basis. The reorganization was completed without any major difficulty in the case of other states. However, it was delayed in the case of Punjab. Initially, the Shiromani Akali Dal demanded the state to be carved out on the basis of Sikh population, ignoring the principle of language. The government on the other hand, struck to the linguistic pattern of reorganization [Kaur 2000:48]. The problem was complicated by the Hindu leadership in Punjab which insisted on getting Punjab declared as a bilingual state. Master Tara Singh considered all these steps discrimination against the Sikhs. He also alleged that the Government of India had not referred the case of Punjab to Dar Commission due to its step motherly attitude. He said “We want to

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 42 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II) have a province where we can safeguard our culture and tradition” [Kaur 2000:49]. The Akali Dal decided to intensify its struggle for the achievement of its political goals. In order to curb the rising demand of the ‘Punjabi Suba,’ the Sachar Ministry in Punjab imposed a ban on the slogan of Punjabi Suba on April 6, 1955. The Akali Dal launched an agitation against the ban on the slogan itself. Consequently, the ban was withdrawn on July 12, 1955. Thus, by a crucial coincidence of history, the question of communal and political aspirations of the Sikhs got closely mixed up with the language issue. To resolve this issue, and the similar demand in some other areas of the country, the Government of India at long last, decided to set up a States’ Reorganization Commission [SRC] to reorganize the states on linguistic pattern as per the data available in 1951 census report. The were not in favour of creating a state on language basis as it would turn Punjab into a Sikh dominated state. As language was to be the basic principle of states’ reorganization, apprehending that the Akalis would get the maximum mileage out of these principles, ‘the Hindu leadership exhorted the members of its community to report Hindi as their mother tongue in the census’ [Nayer 1966:44]. The Akali leadership, whose territorial claims for the proposed Punjabi Suba squarely depended upon the linguistic census, grudged the en masse denial of Punjabi as their mother-tongue by the Hindus. They considered it as a ‘stab’ in their back and cited it as an additional ground for demanding a Sikh majority state where they could protect their interests from the ‘onslaughts’ of the hostile Hindu majority. On September 30, 1955, the SRC submitted its report which declared that the Commission did not accept the Akali Dal’s demand, as there did not exist among the people of Punjab a ‘minimum measure of agreement necessary for making a change in the preset set up [Kapur 1985:184]. The Akalis got infuriated at it. They alleged about ‘the religio-cultural discrimination and repression’ against the Sikh minority in India. Master Tara Singh described the report “as a decree of Sikh annihilation.” Soon after, the Akali Dal got split up on the issue of the principle underlying the demand for Punjabi Suba. Sant , the newly emerged moderate Akali leader, demanded a Punjabi Suba on language basis rather than on communal composition of the state. This change was welcomed in the political circles as reasonably principled. He had to resort to agitation for the acceptance of the demand, which was ultimately conceded by the centre. Thus, a Punjabi speaking state of Punjab was carved out in 1966 on the recommendations of a newly appointed States’ Reorganization Commission. The Akali Dal was not fully satisfied as some of Punjabi- speaking areas were left in Haryana and , the state capital, was promised to be given to Punjab in the future. The Sant Akali Dal came into power in the first state Assembly elections after reorganization in 1967. However, even after coming to power, the Akalis did

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 43 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II) not feel politically satisfied for long. Their government was toppled by a splinter group, led by Lachhman Singh Gill, in 1967 with the mechanization of the Congress party, which ruled at the centre [Anand 1974:271]. In its place, a minority government, supported by the Congress from outside, was installed. This sent a wave of anguish and unrest against the interference of the centre. After the fall of the Gill government within one year, the Akalis were again voted to power, this time too as a coalition partner with the Hindu dominated Jan Sangh. But their government could not survive for long due to conflicting perceptions of the two parties on various issues. It may be concluded that the Akali Dal, almost the sole representative of the Sikhs after independence, was not satisfied with political set up that the Congress opted for India. Long ago, the Sikhs were promised by the Congress leaders ‘an area in which the Sikhs will enjoy their glory’, and what they got was a smaller state like others, and that too after a prolonged struggle. Nehru was particularly against the creation of a state in which the Sikhs, albeit the Akalis, will happen to be a majority. Consequently, in 1980, the Akalis launched an agitation for the implementation of this resolution. The ASR became the basis of their (The Holly War). The Sikh-Nirankari Clashes, 1978 The discriminated and suppressed fixation, allegedly created and affirmed by the Akali Dal in the Sikh psyche, was attributed as providing a ready ground for the rise of Sikh militancy. After the end of national emergency in 1977, the Akali- Janata government came into power in Punjab under the leadership of . In the meanwhile, the radical elements among the Sikhs became active. J.S. Grewal has also observed that ‘if the Akalis in power tended to become more secular, their opponents among the Sikhs, tended to become more radical in the spheres of religion and politics’ [Grewal 2005: 215]. Ignoring his own son, Bhai , Sant Kartar Singh Bhindranwala, the head of the , before his death in 1977, had nominated Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale as his successor, on account of latter’s qualities of leadership and commitment to the cause of fundamentalist ideals. Running almost parallel with this mission was the 'heterodox' mission of the Sant Nirankarisi. Their head quarter is at Delhi. They were much different from the successors of Baba Dayal, the founder of the Nirankari sect. The Sant Nirankaris based their teachings on the but their leader Baba Avtar Singh also composed his Avtar Bani and Yug Pursh. Their decreasing reverence for the , coupled with their belief in the living Guru, made the Sant Nirankaris extremely unorthodox in the eyes of the Sikhs. On the occasion of Baisakhi in1978, the Nirankari Guru, Baba Gurbachan Singh, was to hold a congregation at Amritsar. Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwala, who subscribed to the

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 44 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II) twin doctrine of Guru-Granth and Guru-Panth, regarded Baba Gurbachan Singh's congregation in the holiest city of the Sikhs, on the day when had instituted the , as an affront to the entire Khalsa Panth. Encouraged by his open resentment over the Sant Nirankari congregation, a number of Sikhs went there with the idea of stopping its proceedings. The Sant Nirankaris were also ready. Their bullets proved to be more deadly than the traditional swords of the Khalsa who, consequently, lost thirteen lives, more than their opponents. The Akali government took legal action. In June 1978, however, a hukmnama [A religious dictate] was issued from Takht to all the Sikhs that they should not have any connection with the Sant Nirankaris and they should discountenance their heterodoxy. The hukmnama referred to the false claims of Baba Gurbachan Singh to be an Avtar and to his turning away from the Shabad-Guru to preach the worship of a human being. The Akalis and the Sikhs in general, were content to invoke legal and social sanctions but there were others who wanted to avenge themselves on the Sant Nirankaris by other means. In August 1978, a five-member Council was formed in Chandigarh to fight the 'Nirankari onslaught on the Sikhs'. This small organization was called the Dal Khalsa [Grewal 2005:216]. It was believed to have been financed and encouraged by some Congress leaders opposed to the Akali Dal-led coalition government in Punjab. Yet, another small organization, which decided to take revenge upon those Nirankaris and officials who were connected with the incident of the Baisakhi day of 1978 at Amritsar, was a purely religious organization, called the Akhand Kirtani . It is noteworthy that new political ideas and organizations were sprouting in 1970s rather imperceptibly. The idea of Khalistan was thrown out by Dr Jagjit Singh Chauhan through a half-page advertisement in the New York Times in October, 1971 soon after his brief spell as a Finance Minister under Lachhman Singh Gill. Whatever the superficial historians or self-interested politicians and public men say about its antecedents, argues J. S. Grewal, the idea of Khalistan was altogether a new idea. In the 1970s, it was treated as a hoax. Chauhan was treated well by some eminent Congress leaders during his visits to India. In the late 1970s, the defunct Sikh Students Federation, originally founded in the 1940s, was revived as All India Sikh Students' Federation (AISSF) by Bhai Amrik Singh, son of the deceased Sant Kartar Singh Bhindranwala, who was closely linked with Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwala. Some of the new Sikh organizations were opposed to the traditional Akali leadership. In the SGPC elections of 1979, for instance, the Dal Khalsa candidates fought against the Akali candidates though without any success. Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwala also fielded about forty candidates who were backed by the Congress, but only four of them were elected. In the elections of 1980

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 45 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II)

Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwala supported some of the Congress candidates [Tully and Jacob 1985]. Causes of Rise of Sikh Militancy in 1980s The rise of Sikh militancy during 1980s has different interpretations. To begin with, the root of its rise lies in ‘the Sikh community’s imperative to preserve its separate identity in the face of what is seen as the threat of re-absorption into the Hindu vast majority’ [Kaur, Harpreet 1990: 34] and the much hyped discrimination against the Sikhs by the Centre’. The Shiromani Akali Dal has been constantly ‘highlighting the grievances of the Sikhs against the Indian State which for them was Hindu sarkar or Hindu raj’ [Singh, Birinder Pal 2002: 18]. The discrimination theory obtained high credibility in the decade of 1980s due to innumerable irrational measures adopted by the Indian state to ‘settle’ the Punjab problem. Earlier calls, given for Khalistan by Dr. Chauhan, and later by the Dal Khalsa, were never taken seriously. They were rather ridiculed. But in the second half of 1980s, these calls had become a reality and a goal for the community. The Sikhs had started believing that there was no alternative left to them after Operation Blue Star. This feeling of an absence of choice other than the Khalistan had become more profound after the massacre of Sikhs in November 1984. Another interpretation of Sikh militancy was that it was nothing but an attempt to disintegrate the country. The major national parties including the Congress, the BJP and the Communist parties, were the chief protagonists of this line of thought. The Punjab problem was looked upon primarily as a problem of religious fundamentalism. It was maintained that ‘a few misguided Sikh youth had picked up guns against another [Hindu] community of the state with a purpose to terrorize them so that they might either leave space open for them, or accept a subordinate status. These youth wanted to establish Khalistan, a home of the Sikhs alone’ [Singh, Birinder Pal 2002: 15-16]. These youth, called as terrorists, were rather looked upon playing in the hands of a hostile neighbour who remained ever ready to dismember India. The threat to the ‘unity and integrity’ of India was the central theme of this interpretation which did not find any fault with the Indian state. It insisted on maintaining India’s integrity, even if the government had to take the hardest measures. Yet another interpretation of the Sikh militancy emphasized on the economic dimension of the problem. Efforts were made to examine it in the background of the prosperity brought about by the Green Revolution in the agriculture sector of Punjab in 1960s. Gill has observed that ‘the model of socio-economic development, which engendered the famous green revolution, sharpened several contradictions in society resulting in the creation of an objective basis for the present crisis’ [Gill, Sucha Singh 1995: 610]. It was held that ‘though the Green Revolution brought enormous prosperity to the State, the lower strata hardly derived any benefit from

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 46 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II) it. The rich became rich and the poor poorer. It was observed that ‘the affluent Sikh farmers cornered political power, social status, wealth and all modern comforts, whereas a comfortable segment of small and marginal farmers remained below poverty line’ [for details, see Bhalla and Chadha 1982]. ‘Whereas landless farmers were only 20% during sixties, their number increased to 30% in the next decade’ [Paroha, Uma 1998: 154]. The penury of the marginal and middle range farmers was attributed to have driven them to ‘terrorism as they are more responsive to religious and fundamentalists’ cry than to reason and logic’ [Chaturvedi, S K 1998: 142]. The State badly lacked big industry to employ the unemployed youth who had been deprived of their land. Under these circumstances, the call of Bhindranwale to Sikh youth to join in the struggle for the protection of Sikh religion and customs had tremendous impact. The complex licensing policy of the Union government created hurdles in investment in Punjab. The intensified Sikh militant activities further worsened the situation as the Hindu entrepreneurs were terrified. As a consequence, many of them had migrated from the State. It was also observed that, leaving aside a few projects, the Union government did not make much investment in Punjab that could have helped in the industrialization of the state. Punjab lacked in public sector industries. Besides, there was severe unemployment in the educated youth of Punjab. On the whole, the socio-economic backwardness was attributed to have led the lower middle class peasantry and labour to religious fundamentalism. The Rise of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwala succeeded to the headship of the Damdami Taksal in 1977. The Taksal is an organization which had upheld Sikh 'orthodoxy' for several decades in free India. Its head quarter is at Chowk Mehta, near Amritsar. Bhindranwale was the most vocal critic of Brahminism in the recent times who succeeded in precipitating the conflict to the extent of adopting violent means for its resolution. Sant Bhindranwale had belonged to the priestly class in the Sikh community, which commanded considerable respect among the Sikh devotees, but was completely alienated from the Sikh institutional framework. For example, it had the power of the SGPC, which was dominated by the Akalis, and therefore, the Taksal had no say in the State’s political system. The only way of getting entry into the supreme body lay through the ordeal of polls. To be successful in the Gurdwara elections, it needed the support of the Sikh masses. For this, it depended upon ‘the Congress (I) which enjoyed the allegiance of a considerable chunk of the Sikh population and was a rival of the Akali Dal in Punjab’ [Kaur 2000:66]. Sant Bhindranwale knew well the relevance of SGPC in Punjab politics.

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 47 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II)

The priestly class, represented by Damdami Taksal, therefore, made sustained efforts to make its debut in the SGPC. It launched a vigorous campaign of Amrit Parchar in the rural areas in order to create a following for itself. In its race for power, the Damdami Taksal tried to wean away the Sikhs from the moderate influence of the Sikh scriptures and endeavoured to give a radical orientation to their outlook through selected verses of the . Thus, after making due preparations for an electoral contest, the fundamentalist-priestly forces, led by Sant Bhindranwale, entered the arena of Gurdwara polls under the banner of Dal Khalsa. The Dal Khalsa had the blessings of some of the prominent Congress leaders and it made an electoral alliance with other pro-Congress groups, forging a common front, known as Panth Khalsa, against the Akali Dal. Mark Tully and Satish Jacob have claimed that , the former Congress Chief Minister of Punjab, not only funded the organization but also used his influence in the media to highlight its activities. Whereas the Akali Dal wooed the voters on the issues of state autonomy and achievements of Akali-Janata Government, the Panth Khalsa tried to capitalize the failures of the Akali Dal and sought votes on the slogan of a ‘sovereign Khalsa state’. It promised a true Khalsa rule in an independent state, which would have the membership of the United Nations [Suri 1979:21]. But the Sikh masses refused to be swayed by the fundamentalist postures adopted by the priestly class as the electoral victory was bagged by the Akali Dal [of SGPC or Assembly]. The chief of the Nirankari sect, Gurbachan Singh, was killed on April 24, 1980. Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale was implicated in this case and he took refuge in the Golden Temple Complex. The charges against him, however, could not be established and the Government absolved him of the allegation of the crime. Shortly after, he announced that the killers of the Nirankari chief deserved to be honoured by the head priest of the . He also stated that he would weigh the killers in gold if they come to him [Tully and Jacob 1985:66]. The next victim of the fundamentalist forces was, Lala Jagat Narain, the editor of a group of vernacular papers published from Jalandhar, who used to support the Nirankaris against the fundamentalists in his editorials [Kaur 2000:78]. Since, Sant Bhindranwale was known as a bitter critic of the slain editor, a case of suspected complicity in the murder was registered against him. The Punjab Government issued warrants of his arrest. At the time when the orders for the arrest of Bhindranwale were issued, he was on his preaching tour to Haryana and was camping at village Chandu Kalan. Getting news of the warrants, he retraced his steps swiftly and found sanctuary in his own Gurdwara at Mehta Chowk leaving his vehicles laden with religious literature behind. On getting information that the Sant had reached his Gurdwara at Mehta Chowk, the police surrounded it to arrest him. A large number of Sikhs

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 48 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II) also assembled at the Gurdwara to support him. Before surrendering himself, he addressed the gathered Sikhs and put them into frenzy by his fiery speech. Soon after, he was arrested by the police. As he stepped into the police van, his followers resorted to violence and about a dozen persons to death [The Indian Express September 21, 1981]. This violent happening set in motion a chain of incidents of arson, killings and robberies in Punjab which did not see an easy end. The Government decided to release Sant Bhindranwale in the hope that peace would return to the state. After his release, the Sant reacting against government inaction against himself had said: “The government has done for me more in a week than I would have achieved in a year” (Tully and Jacob 1985:71). In view of the anti-Akali stance of the Bhindranwale, the Congress leaders, in their wishful thinking that they will gain and Akalis will lose, continued to extend him patronage. Bhindranwale was again arrested in September 1981. The Akalis, who opposed him earlier, realized that he was a force to be reckoned with. A popular response to his campaign of Amrit Parchar, a massive demonstration by his followers and the volunteers of the AISSF against the sail of tobacco in Amritsar, a heavy gathering of Sikh supporters, which assembled to protect him at Mehta Chowk at the time of his arrest, and the organized violence that followed his arrest, were some of the obvious indicators of his rising influence among the Sikh masses. Under the changed political circumstances, the Akalis drew closer to Sant Bhindranwale inspite of their veritable differences with him on various issues. The leaders of the Akali Dal (Longowal), who were eager to earn his goodwill, went to see him in Ferozepur jail, where he was lodged after arrest. They consoled him and expressed their solidarity with him. While he was still in jail, the Dal modified its charter of demands to give it a fundamentalist touch. In place of the 45 demands identified as significant in September 1981, it submitted a reduced list of 15 demands with demand for the unconditional release of Sant Bhindranwale and for a judicial inquiry into the incident of Mehta Chowk and Chandu Kalan at the top [Government of India Report 1984]. After his release from jail, the triumphant Sant Bhindranwale became hero of the orthodox Sikh masses. The emboldened Sant reinvigorated violence against the Nirankaris, whom he considered to be his rivals in the domain of religious power. A Nirankari IAS officer was wounded and his brother was killed after a day of his release [The Statesman: October 17, 1981]. The Nirankari pramukh [Chief] of Kapurthala was killed after a month and three more prominent members of this sect got dead during December 1981 and March 1982. The edge of violence was then turned towards the Hindus and the Government functionaries. By the beginning of April 1982, the situation became so alarming that Kalpnath Rai, a general secretary of the Congress, who looked after Punjab, reported to the party high command that the State had been virtually burning. He

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 49 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II) suggested that appropriate measures be taken to restore law and order [The Tribune: April 15, 1982]. By the end of the month, the Parliament expressed its deep anguish and concern over the situation in Punjab. By a resolution, it reiterated that the law shall take its course to bring the culprits to book speedily [: April 30, 1982]. A Congress MP in Punjab even lamented that the Government was not acting swiftly whereas Bhindranwala had planted his own people in the government offices, in police and in the intelligence agencies [Shourie 1984:17]. Eventually when Sant Bhindranwale outgrew the expectations and control of the Congress leadership, and his intention of creating a communal void between the Hindus and the Sikhs in Punjab evoked a nation-wide condemnation and concern, the Congress regime did act against him this time, and acted a bit more seriously. Although the Government did not move against Bhindranwale himself, it arrested Bhai Amrik Singh on July 19, 1982 on a criminal charge of attempting to kill Joginder Singh Shant, the propaganda secretary of Nirankari Mandal. The Bhai was the right hand man of the militant Sant and his ardent supporter [Kaur 2000:85]. His arrest was a big jolt to the Sant and it made him maddened. He decided to launch a Morcha for the unconditional release of his lieutenant, and as a matter of precaution he shifted his headquarters from Mehta Chowk to Amritsar on the very day of Amrik Singh’s arrest. He encamped in Niwas in the Golden Temple Complex in order to secure protection against the police. In fact, he was in search of such an advantage of the holy precincts since long. That was perhaps one reason why he had been trying to acquire a foothold in the Gurdwara administration through the SGPC elections. The Morcha, launched by the Sant, did not evoke an encouraging response from the public, despite reports of his popularity. If this Morcha was allowed to flop it would have proved to be a fatal blow to his prestige. He, therefore, decided to join hands with the Akali Dal (Longowal), which was to launch its Dharam Yudh Morcha from August 4, 1982 and after the Kapuri debacle was in search of allies to make it a success. Consequently, therefore, when Sant Harchand Singh Longowal launched his Dharam Yudh Morcha from Golden Temple, Sant Bhindranwala announced the merger of his Morcha with it. The Akali Dal's Dharm Yudh Morcha (The Righteous War) In retrospect, in early 1980, the Congress party replaced the at the Centre. Following the Janata precedent, the President’s rule was imposed in nine non-Congress ruled states, including Punjab. With its majority in 1980 Assembly election, the Congress party came in power in the state. Soon after out of power, the Akali Dal, resorted to organize the masses, particularly the Sikhs, against the Congress government for certain demands, religious as well as political. The agitation was named as the Dharm Yudh Morcha by the Akali Dal. It was

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 50 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II) formally initiated in the All World Sikh Convention held at Amritsar on July 26, 1981. Some important demands included: the enactment of All India Gurudwara Act, inclusion of Chandigarh and other Punjabi-speaking areas in Punjab, control over dams and Hydro-electric works and setting up heavy industry in the state. Two rounds of talks were held between the Central Government and the Akali Dal to discuss the Akali demands. The first and second rounds were held respectively on October 16, 1981 and November 26, 1981. The water issue dominated these rounds. The third round also broke down when the Prime Minister refused to review the accord between the Punjab, Haryana and governments on the question of sharing Ravi-Beas waters. From that onwards the distance between the government and the Akalis began to increase [Nayar and Singh 1984:38]. Failure of talks led to the intensification of the . The Akali Dal started its 'Nehar Roko Morcha (Canal Prevention Agitation)' on April 24, 1982 at Kapoori village in with nearly one thousand volunteers of the Akali Dal (Longowal) and CPI (M) courting arrest in protest against the construction of the - Link (SYL) canal in Punjab territory. It was followed by yet another Jatha (Group) of nearly one thousand agitators led by and Balwant Singh, a CPI (M) MLA. Thereafter, small batches of Akalis proceeded daily to the site to court arrest there. Meanwhile, the venue of Morcha was shifted from Kapoori to Amritsar on August 4, 1982. Shortly, Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwala and Jagdev Singh Talwandi merged their Morchas with the Dharm Yudh Morcha led by Sant Harchand Singh Longowal. The Morcha proved to be a great success. Hundreds of Sikhs gathered daily inside the Golden Temple and listened to the sermons about their religious duty to fight. Sant Longowal spoke almost everyday and Sant Bhindranwala appeared occasionally. The wearing saffron bands in their turbans marched out of the Temple and down to the police station, shouting traditional religious slogans, like 'Raj Karega Khalsa (The Pure Shall Rule)'. Within two months, the jails were overflowing and special prisons had to be established in schools and other governmental buildings [Tully and Jacob 1985:74-75]. By the end of September 1982, about 20,000 Sikh agitators were arrested. The Akali Morcha took another turn when the Akali Dal decided to demonstrate in Delhi at the occasion of Asian Games. On the opening day of the Asiad, nearly 131 Akali volunteers courted arrest in the capital despite massive preventive measures taken to stop their entry into New Delhi [Rai 1986:330]. The Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, unilaterally announced on February 27, 1983 that her government had decided to accept the religious demands of the Sikhs including: the Jallandhar Radio Station will broadcast the programme relayed from the Golden Temple Amritsar; the Sikhs will be permitted to wear a nine-inch long sword during air flights and; the concerned state governments would enact the

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 51 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II)

Gurudwara Act. This acceptance of religious demands and rejection of political demands by the Prime Minister was obviously done to weaken the Badal-Tohra- Longowal combine so as to eliminate any future political challenge from them [Singh, Ajit 1992:63]. The Akali Dal, however, continued the agitation for the acceptance of all of its demands. The April 4, 1983 'Rasta Roko Andolan (Traffic Obstruction Agitation)' was marked by the killing of 40 Sikhs in the police firing. In reaction, the Akali leaders decided to raise an army of marjivaras to do or die for a decisive war against the government [The Spokesman, April 25, 1983]. By the time the situation in Punjab started to take a new turn. One senior police officer, A. S. Atwal, was shot dead by the followers of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwala when he was coming out of Darbar Sahib on April 25, 1983. A number of Hindu passengers were shot dead by the Sikh militants in certain incidents. One such incident took place on October 5, 1983 when six Hindu bus passengers were shot dead. Consequently, had to resign from Chief Ministership. Punjab was brought under President's rule and was declared as disturbed area. The Akali Dal leadership added some more demands in its charter in order to contain the growing influence of Sant Bhindranwala, who followed a militant line. The Akali Dal demanded amendment to Article 25 (2) (b) of the Constitution which considers Sikhs as a part of the Hindus, thereby denying their separate identity. It was decided that in order to compel government to accept separate identity of the Sikhs, the Akali leaders would burn the copies of the Constitution outside the Parliament. Despite government's massive preventive efforts, Parkash Singh Badal managed to reach Delhi and he burned the copies. Gurcharan Singh Tohra stated in a press conference that "The Sikhs are a national minority. They seek justice as ordinary citizens. But when they demand justice they are sent to jail, lathi-charged, or shot dead. In the present Dharm Yudh over 1, 26,000 Sikhs have been jailed. One hundred Sikhs have been shot dead. Out of these more than two dozens were mercilessly killed in fake encounters" [Report 1983:6]. Nevertheless, the Akali leadership could not stop the growing influence of Sant Bhindranwala among the Sikh masses. In fact, it felt pressurized from his fundamental following [Singh, Ajit1992:260]. The agitation turned violent. The people belonging to Hindu community started feeling insecure on account of the growing Sikh militancy. The Akali leadership was becoming the silent spectator with every day gone. The Central Government, however, continued to adopt a rigid attitude towards the Akali agitation and its demands. This ultimately led to communal violence in the state precluding the possibility of a negotiated settlement of the problem. The Akali Dal announced that a new campaign of mass non- cooperation will begin on June 3, 1984. Sikhs were urged to stop the movement of

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 52 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II) food grains outside Punjab and the payment of land revenue and water rates to the government from that day. The Operation Blue Star and its Aftermath The army was ordered to move in the Golden Temple. The whole Punjab was completely sealed off from the rest of the country by the . The troops, equipped with tanks and heavy armour, surrounded the Golden Temple. Curfew was imposed throughout Punjab. The battle started on June 3, 1984 and the Golden Temple complex was stormed on June 6, 1984. The room to room fighting took place in the Akal Takht but it was only on the 7th June that the troops managed to penetrate the basement of the Akal Takht [Nayar and Singh 1984:38]. The Akal Takht was totally destroyed in the army action. Nearly 200 army personnel and 400 militants including Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwala, and Amrik Singh lost their lives. The military operation injured badly the religious sentiments and self- respect of the Sikhs and led to far reaching consequences. The Sikh community felt alienated in their own country. , a veteran journalist and a nominated member of the , returned his Padma Bhushan and compared the Operation with the Jallianwala Bagh massacre by the British army [Madhok 1986:124]. voiced his protest by resigning his seat in the Lok Sabha and leaving the Congress Party. The wrath of the two Sikh bodyguards resulted in the assassination of the Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, on October 31, 1984 [Adiraju 1991:124]. The massacre of Sikhs in Delhi and some other parts of India in the wake of Indira Gandhi's assassination led to further alienation of the Sikhs from the national mainstream. The military action at Golden Temple could not eliminate militancy in Punjab. Rather, it added fuel to the fire. Militants started making the demand for Khalistan more forcefully than ever before [Sidhu 1994:50]. The hurt Sikh psyche provided a fertile soil to grow this demand. The Punjab Accord The Central Government, under the Prime Ministership of Rajiv Gandhi, tried to reach an agreement with the Akalis. The Akali leaders were released. After prolonged efforts, especially by the then Punjab Governor, Arjun Singh, an agreement was reached between the Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, and the Akali Dal president, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal on July 25, 1985. It was felt that the Rajiv-Longowal Accord would solve the Punjab problem and usher a new era in the troubled state. It, however, later proved to be a misfire. At the very beginning of its signing, it was not accepted by two senior Akali leaders, Parkash Singh Badal and Gurcharan Singh Tohra. Badal termed the agreement as a "sell out". The also opposed it. It was, however, hailed by almost all the national parties as a step in the right direction. J. S. Grewal opines that there was nothing spectacular about the Accord [Grewal 2005: 229]. It provided for an ex gratia grant

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 53 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II) and compensation to the sufferers of violence, rehabilitation of Sikh soldiers discharged from the army and extension of the inquiry into the violence against the Sikhs in the aftermath of Indira Gandhi's assassination. It also provided that the Resolution, like other memoranda on Centre-State relations, could be submitted to the Sarkaria Commission already appointed. It seems that Grewal has ignored some of the important provisions of the agreement, like transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab and inclusion of Punjabi speaking areas in Punjab, etc. As a result of the agreement, the elections to the Punjab Vidhan Sabha were held in September 1985. The Akali Dal won a massive victory and formed its government under the Chief Ministership of . Parkash Singh Badal decided not to oppose it but he and his men did not join the Barnala ministry. The subsequent course of action showed that the Central Government was not sincere to implement the provisions of the Accord. Barnala regretted that the successive Commissions set up to implement various clauses of the Accord violated the terms of reference given to them under it. First, he remarked: they asked us not to insist on the linguistic affinity on territorial matters and later the internationally accepted norms and laws were ignored by the Eradi Commission. He further asked as to why the Commissions were allowed to undo what Sant Harchand Singh Longowal and Rajiv Gandhi had done [The Tribune, August 20, 1987]. The Growing Sikh Militancy and the Pitfall Policy of the Centre Nevertheless, the Punjab Accord and the subsequent installation of Akali ministry under Barnala could not in any way stop the increasing Sikh militancy in Punjab. Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, the chief representative of the moderate approach of the Sikhs, was killed on August 24, 1985 by the Sikh militants. The killings increased with every passing day. The situation was going out of hands of the State government. Much to the disgrace of Akalis, the Badal-Tohra factions rebelled against Barnala. Taking together, the non-implementation of the Punjab Accord, the consequent rise in the activities of Sikh militants and the internal dissensions within the Akali Dal led to the weakening of the position of the Barnala ministry and the eventual imposition of the President's rule in Punjab on May 12, 1987. However, the immediate motive behind this move, according to Nazir Ahmed, was to win the support of Hindu voters in the coming Assembly elections in Haryana [Dehlvi 1986-87:46]. Chief Minister persuaded the Prime Minister if any further concessions were made to Punjab, the Congress Party would forfeit in Haryana, which, however, it could not stop. The situation in Punjab went on worsening. The militants were asserting themselves in politics. It was in the year of 1986 that the demand for Khalistan was made in clear terms by the Sikh militant outfits. The achievement of a sovereign Sikh state under the name of Khalistan was declared as the objective of the armed

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 54 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II) struggle. Following this, a number of organizations with the name of Khalistan, such as: [KCF], Khalistan Liberation force [KLF], Bhindranwale Tigers Force of Khalistan [BTFK], and Khalistan Armed Force [KAF] came into being. Besides, the All India Sikh Students Fedration [AISSF], led by Daljit Singh Bittu, also stood for independent state for the Sikhs. In September 1987, the Panthic Committee, led by Dr. Sohan Singh was created as an umbrella organization of the Sikh militant outfits, which declared Khalistan as the goal of Sikh politics. The Panthic Committee, with similar objective, was led by Bhai Wassan Singh Zaffarwal. Both of these worked as the patron bodies of the Khalistani forces. Some, like Birinder Pal Singh, do not believe that Bhindranwale had sought an independent Sikh State in the name of Khalistan. They hold that the notion of Khalistan gained momentum only in the aftermath of Operation Blue Star. Singh has referred Zaffarwal saying in an interview that ‘so, April 29, 1986 … we announced to the world our attention to become free and that we wished to state that we were not talking, as was Sant Jarnail Singh, of self-determination within India but rather of an independent sovereign state, called Khalistan’ [Singh, Birinder Pal 2002: 61]. However, the former Sikh student leader and presently the president of Shiromani Akali Dal [Panch Pardhani], Daljit Singh Bittu, was stated to have said that ‘Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale had been articulating the urge for independence of the Sikh nation … from the beginning’ [see Puri]. Whatever the truth may be but the fact is that that it was primarily Operation Blue Star and the 1984 Sikh genocide that provided fuel to the Sikh demand for Khalistan. By this time the Central Government under Rajiv Gandhi had abandoned political approach in favour of a law-and order solution. Siddhartha Shankar Ray as the Punjab Governor and Julio F. Ribeiro as the Director General of Police adopted an aggressive policy of repression [Grewal 2005: 235]. Fully armed squads were let loose on the people in the form of vigilante, consisting of dismissed policemen and militant approvers. This opened the door to misuse of police power. It was openly justified by Ribeiro and approved by Ray on the plea that the police all over the world used 'undercover people'. The militants were gaining ground nonetheless. Arms were smuggled into the Golden Temple, giving the opportunity to K.P.S. Gill, the Director General of Police, to organize ''. In the beginning of 1988, two senior Sikh police officers were murdered in Patiala by Sikh militants. Murders of both Hindus and Sikhs gathered pace. What made the situation worse, notes Khushwant Singh, that no one in the Central Government nor any of the Akali leaders were sure about how to bring peace back to the state [Singh, Khushwant 2006:413]. In desperation the Prime Minister's 'think tank' turned to as a possible redeemer. According to unconfirmed reports, he was even offered Chief Ministership of Punjab if he could restore

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 55 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II) normalcy to the state. Mann remained non-committal but was able to win over a large section of the Akalis to his side. The Operation Black Thunder Meanwhile, the situation in and around the Golden Temple became more volatile with militants entrenched in the premises exchanging fire with the police stationed on the periphery. S. S. Virk, DIG Police, was shot and seriously wounded outside the Temple. The Central Government did not take any political initiative to solve the worsening situation. Instead, it resorted to the earlier tactics. A plan was drawn to surround the Temple, place marksmen at vantage points and cut off men inside from access to potable water. Operation Black Thunder, as it came to be known, took place between May 13 to18, 1988. Men and women hiding in the Akal Takht were compelled to come out. Two who tried to get away were shot; one committed suicide by swallowing a cyanide capsule; the rest surrendered with their heads held high. However, the notion that Operation Black Thunder wiped out terrorists, writes Khushwant Singh, proved to be premature [Singh, Khushwant 2006:414]. Those killed in encounters were promptly declared martyrs. Small shrines created in their memory on sites of their cremation became places of worship. The armed stalemate still continued. With 1989 Lok Sabha elections, V. P. Singh, as leader of the , came into power as Prime Minister, leading the coalition government of the . He visited the Golden Temple in a gesture of goodwill towards the Sikhs and repealed the 59th Amendment to the Constitution which had provided for President's rule in the Punjab beyond three years and for declaring 'emergency' if necessary. He announced speedy trial of the accused in the Delhi massacres, promised to rehabilitate the army deserters of 1984, and agreed to review the case of every Sikh detainee. Above all, he organised all-party meetings to evolve a reasonable political settlement. The Parliamentary elections of November 1989 were particularly significant for the politics of the Sikhs in Punjab. They brought Simranjit Singh Mann to the fore of Sikh politics. Though still under detention, he was put up as a candidate by the United Akali Dal which won eight seats out of thirteen. The UAD victory was a reflection of the strength of the militants who looked upon Simranjit Singh Mann as a suitable leader. When he came out of jail, Sikhs thronged his meetings, journalists sought his views and politicians courted him. ‘Knowing little about the aspirations of the militants’, writes J.S. Grewal, ‘he asked for autonomy within the Indian Union in terms of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution’ [Grewal 2005:236-237]. The minority government of V.P. Singh was, however, not in a position to concede any major concession. The militants stepped up their activities. It was estimated that by the end of 1992, ‘over 25,000 people were killed in the terrorist and counter-terrorist violence in Punjab. The reported annual toll rose numerically

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 56 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II) from 598 during 1986 to 3, 788 in 1990, 4,768 in 1991 and it came down marginally during 1992’. During the peak years of Sikh militancy, the militants’ code of conduct was introduced at gun point and was observed in the areas where their writ ran. The code ordained replacement of national anthem by shabads in schools, suspension of teaching of Hindi, replacement of sari by kameez, ban on dowry, and on the number of members of a marriage party not exceeding eleven and so on. Many schools in such areas had changed children’s uniforms to avoid militants’ wrath. By 13 April 1990, Mann was supporting plebiscite for self-determination as the only solution. Despite V.P. Singh's declarations and intentions, President's rule was extended for six months more and the elections due in May were postponed to October 1990. V.P. Singh's helplessness was demonstrated further by the postponement of elections due in October and the extension of President's rule in Punjab by another six months. All the 'national' parties – the Congress, the BJP and the Communists – were opposed to the elections. They were afraid that the militants would win and resolve in favour of Khalistan in the Punjab Assembly. V. P. Singh was replaced by Chandra Shekhar, who was the leader of a splinter group of the Janata Dal and, therefore, even more dependent on the Congress. He offered to discuss political settlement with all the Sikh leaders. Simranjit Singh Mann presented a memorandum, asking for the right of self-determination. The Prime Minister started secret negotiations with some of the militant groups to explore the possibilities of a solution within the framework of the Indian Constitution. The Akali leadership was in favour of elections but the Congress threatened to revoke the elections if it came into power. The June 1991 Punjab Vidhan Sabha Election Postponed The President's rule was extended over a number of times. However, the elections to Punjab Vidhan Sabha were scheduled to be held in June, 1991. The Congress Party decided to boycott the elections. But until the day before the P.V. Narasimha Rao government was to be installed at the centre, the Chief Election Commissioner kept on crying that election would be held in any case in Punjab on the scheduled date of June 22, 1991. But hours before the oath-taking ceremony by P.V. Narasimha Rao, T.N. Seshan, the then Chief Election Commissioner, postponed the elections in the early hours of the polling day till September, 1991 [Frontline, February 14, 1992]. The Union Home Minister said later that neither he nor Chandra Shekhar knew anything about it. The results of the Parliamentary elections were going in favour of the Congress and the Chief Election Commissioner 'bent backwards to please his new masters'. The Governor of the Punjab, O. P. Malhotra, sincere in his commitment to hold elections, resigned on the same day. There was no wisdom in cancellation of the Punjab poll, which was unjustifiably

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 57 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II) called off at the last moment, simply because the non-Congress victory was otherwise certain [Mukerji 1992]. The February 1992 Punjab Vidhan Sabha Elections The President's rule continued up to February 1992 in Punjab. After a prolonged spell of almost five years, the elections to Punjab Vidhan Sabha were held on February 19, 1992. Elections to the 13 Lok Sabha seats from Punjab were also held simultaneously. They were held under the shadow of gun. Army was deployed to help civil administration to conduct elections peacefully. The Communist leader Pal Dang remarked that there was heavy rigging in favour of the Congress. And yet, only about 22 per cent of the total votes were polled [Grewal 2005:237].ii In 70 (out of 117) polling was extremely low. These were the constituencies where the Akalis had their roots and support. They had boycotted the polls and non-polling was virtually a referendum against the ruling party. While justifying the Akali decision of the boycott, Parkash Singh Badal stated that: "We are for total boycott and exposure of the Centre's mechanizations against Punjab". The boycott call was supported by almost all the Sikh militant outfits. Only one faction, the Akali Dal (Kabul), led by Captain Amarinder Singh, participated. And all the nationalist parties in Punjab, including the Congress, participated in the election. Virtually the February 1992 election was not an election but its rejection. The voting turnout was largely limited to the urban areas and it was mainly the Hindus who voted. The Congress ministry came into being in Punjab under the Chief Ministership of Beant Singh. Beant Singh pursued three interrelated objectives in his tenure of over three years: to suppress militancy, to prove his legitimacy, and to undermine the Akalis. In the beginning, his Chief Ministership could not make any impact on the ongoing militancy in Punjab. However, after the summer of 1992, the security forces succeeded in killing some important militant leaders. By the end of 1993, the Punjab was relatively calm. Before the end of the year, K.P.S. Gill could talk of the Punjab as 'the most peaceful state'. The return of normalcy brought the shocking surprise of 31 August, 1995 into sharp relief: Beant Singh was killed by a human bomb which took more than a score of other lives. The maintained that he had earned this punishment for betraying the Sikh community. The Congress Party honoured him as the 'martyr'. The Congress ‘triumph’ in the Akali boycotted-February 1992 Assembly elections in Punjab was used to intensify the counter-insurgency operations against the Sikh militants. With the result, by the early 1993, most of the leading militant organizations had been smashed. Within the Sikh politics, this marginalized the radicalsiii and helped in strengthening the moderates [for detail, see Singh, Gurharpal 1996: 418-21]. And, On the other hand, acutely conscious of a dubious mandate to the Congress, the Chief Minister, Beant Singh, had ordered elections to

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 58 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II) the municipalities in September, 1992 with the first appearance of some relief from militants. The victory of the Congress candidates in the cities and towns of the Punjab was a foregone conclusion as these were the traditional strongholds of the Congress. The elections to Panchayats in the villages were held in 1993 ‘when the militants were retreating' [Grewal 2005:238]. A massive rigging in favour of the Congress was reported. Nevertheless, the pro-Akali candidates were elected in a big way. Meanwhile, the Akali politics in the state was taking some new turns. The intensified factional fight within the Akalis led to the formation of a unified party, named as the Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar). But the dominant faction of Parkash Singh Badal continued to maintain its separate entity [Sidhu 1994:169]. In fact, the process of polarization within the Shiromani Akali Dal began with the Khalsa March organised in April 1994 under the leadership of the acting Jathedar of Akal Takht, Bhai Manjit Singh. Though ostensibly organised to celebrate the 400th birthday of the Sikh Singh, it virtually turned out to be a political event. In a most dramatic manner, the offer of the unity was made to the Akal Takht Jathedar by senior Akali leaders including Gurcharan Singh Tohra, Simranjit Singh Mann, Surjit Singh Barnala, Amarinder Singh, Manjit Singh, Jathedar Jagdev Singh Talwandi and leaders of all factions of the Youth Wing of the Akali Dal and of the Sikh Students Federation. Parkash Singh Badal also made the similar offer to the Jathedar. However, at the same time he lamented that 'the big show of Khalsa March was organised with a clear motive to dethrone him from the Presidentship of the Akali Dal' [The Tribune, April 14, 1994]. However, despite the tremendous maneuverability, Gurcharan Singh Tohra and other Akali leaders could not succeed in involving Parkash Singh Badal in their unity move. The Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar) was floated as unified Akali Dal without Badal's Dal. In due course of time, all of the prominent Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar) leaders parted their way with one another. Soon it was reduced to be a faction of the Akali Dal of Simranjit Singh Mann only. Some by-elections were held in Punjab in the year of 1994. The Congress won the by-election of Parliamentary seat of Jallandhar. In the by-election to the Punjab Assembly from Nakodar, despite rigging in favour of the ruling party, the Congress candidate won only by a narrow margin. The by-election from Ajnala was actually won by the Akali candidate. Beant Singh's credentials were at stake when he fought the last battle of his life in Gidderbaha, the home constituency of Parkash Singh Badal. All the Congress legislators and the bureaucrats worked in the field for weeks. Money flowed like water. The Akali candidate won with a narrow margin. But this was enough, says J. S. Grewal, to indicate that Beant Singh did not rule on popular mandate [Grewal 2005:239]. Moreover, the Gidderbaha election demonstrated that Beant Singh had failed to undermine the Akalis. He had

M.A. (Political Science) Part II 59 PAPER-VII (OPTION-II) pursued this objective from the day one. His relentless campaign against the Akalis was buttressed by a 'ruthless use of government forces'. Till his death he lost no opportunity to assert that the Akalis were responsible for the decade-long turmoil and militancy in Punjab. In his anxiety to contain militancy, Beant Singh did not care about the means and methods employed by the security forces. Along with the militants, innocent persons were killed. It was reported in 1992 that police excesses and high- handedness continued unabated. With the implicit approval of the Centre the security forces were given a 'free hand' to curb the militancy in the state. The lure of awards induced the security personnel to take the chance of killing the innocent persons in the name of 'terrorists'. In a number of cases the relatives of militants were tortured to death. Under the command of 'super cop' K. P. S. Gill the police resorted to unprecedented illegalities and atrocities. The fake police encounters were frequently reported. The bodies of thousands were cremated by the police declaring those as unclaimed. There was ruthless violation of human rights in the state in the name of curbing the Sikh militancy. In stead of adopting any political approach to solve the Punjab situation the Central Government resorted to crush any opposition in the state with ruthless use and abuse of the state power. In September, 1994 Jaswant Singh Khalra, a human rights activist, was picked up by the police to vanish into thin air like thousands of others. On the basis of Khalra's reports the National Human Rights Commission took serious note of cremating thousands of dead bodies as unclaimed by the . In November, 2006 the NHRC published a list of such cases in the news papers so that the relatives of illegally cremated persons could make their claims against the state. Gradually, but surely, writes J.S. Grewal, the Akalis were picking up the old political threads. Before the end of the 1993 Jathedar Jagdev Singh Talwandi declared that the aim of the Akalis was to get the demands of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution conceded and implemented, and not to establish Khalistan: the opponents of the Akalis were falsely bracketing them with the militants [Grewal 2005:241]. In the summer of 1995, even Beant Singh felt impelled to declare that the Punjab could not spare a single drop of water for any other state. Parkash Singh Badal laid increasing emphasis on the Anandpur Sahib Resolution as the charter of Akali politics, and Jathedar Tohra laid increasing emphasis on Akali unity. The choice was between the political objectives formulated by the Akali leaders before1984 and the post-Blue Star aspirations expressed by Simranjit Singh Mann. Eventually, the majority of the Akalis opted for their moorings under the leadership of Parkash Singh Badal and Gurcharan Singh Tohra. They launched a sustained campaign of mobilization for elections early in 1996. In the Parliamentary elections of 1996, the Akali Dal entered into alliance with the . However, during the February, 1997 Punjab Vidhan

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Sabha elections, the Akali Dal forged alliance with its old and trusted ally, i.e., the Bhartiya Janata Party. The Congress was routed in this election. Out of a total of 117 seats, the Akali Dal won 75 seats and the BJP won 18 seats. Their unprecedented success was taken as a measure of alienation from the Congress the people of the Punjab villages. Though the Akali Dal got the absolute majority in the election, it preferred to form a coalition government with the BJP. Though Akali Dal's ally the BJP was in power in the Centre, the former could not succeed in getting any of its charter demands accepted by the Union Government. The Akali Dal-BJP alliance, despite some constraints, worked successfully and it was for the first time in the history of the Punjab that the Akali Dal-led government could complete its full term. The alliance, however, lost to the Congress Party in February, 2002 Assembly elections. Notes: i The Sant Nirankari sect, with its headquarters at Delhi, is an offshoot of the nineteenth century puritan movement started by Baba Dyal. The Nirankaris are condemned by the Sikhs for accepting a live Guru that is strictly forbidden by the tenth Sikh Guru. ii According to Mainstream, however, the percentage was 24 per cent. iii Since early 1980s, the Sikh political leadership was divided broadly into four main categories: The moderates, the radicals, the democratic militants and the armed militants.

References:

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Gill, Sucha Singh [1995]: ‘Punjab Crisis and the Political Process’, in Verinder Grover (ed.), Indian Government and Politics at Crossroads, Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi. Government of India Report (1984): Punjab Andolan Ute White Paper, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi. Grewal, J.S. (2005): The Sikhs of the Punjab, Cambridge University Press, New Delhi. Joshi, Chand (1984): Bhindranwala Myth and Reality, Vikas Publications, New Delhi. Kapur, Anup Chand (1985): The Punjab Crisis, S. Chand Company, New Delhi. Kapur, Rajiv A. (1986): Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith, Allen and Unwin Publications, London. Kaur, Daljinder (2000): An Analytical Study of Politics of Terror in Punjab, An Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Punjabi University Patiala. Kaur, Harpreet [1990]: Punjab Problem and Press: The Content Analysis of The Punjabi Tribune and The Dainik Tribune [1989], an Unpublished M. Phil. Thesis, Punjabi University Patiala Madhok, Balraj (1986): Punjab Problem: The Muslim Connection, The Vision Books, New Delhi. Mukerji, Nirmal (1992): 'Punjab Problem or Opportunity', Mainstream, October. Nayar, Kuldip and Khushwant Singh (1984): Tragedy of Punjab: Operation Blue star and Aftermath, Vision Books, New Delhi. Nayer, Baldev Raj (1966): Minority Politics in Punjab, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Paroha, Uma (1998): ‘Terrorism in Punjab: Origins and Dimensions’, in N. S. Gehlot (ed.), Current Trends in Indian Politics, Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi. Puri, Harish, et al. Terrorism in Punjab Rai, Satya M. (1986): Punjab Since Partition, Durga Publications, Delhi. Report on the press conference addressed by Gurcharan Singh Tohra, President SGPC, The Secretary, , Dadar, Bombay, 1983. Shourie, Arun et.al. (1984): The Punjab Story, Roli Books International, Delhi. Sidhu, Lakhwinder Singh (1994): Party Politics in Punjab, Harnam Publications, New Delhi.

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