Investigating the Memory of Operation Spring The Inquiry into the Black Watch and the Battle of St. André-sur-Orne, 1944-46
Alexander Fitzgerald-Black
“In memory of the men of the Black Watch of Canada and their comrades who fought for the liberation of Europe and the hope of a better world.” – Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada Association plaque, Point 67
peration Spring, the ill-fated 25 upon: the battalion “was ordered to July 1944 attack by II Canadian Abstract: The scholarly literature for begin Phase 2 of Operation ‘Spring,’ O the Black Watch role in Operation Corps against German defences on Spring is largely based on survivor the advance to Fontenay-le-Marmion. Verrières Ridge, has become “one testimony compiled by C.P. Stacey’s Believing that Phase 1, the capture of the most controversial military Army Historical Section during of May-sur-Orne was partially operations in all of Canadian history.”1 and after the war. Stacey and his successful, higher command pressed At the centre of this controversy is team faced a significant challenge the Black Watch to ‘go ahead.’” This understanding what happened to the the fate of the Black Watch (Royal Black Watch on 25 July 1944 using explains why the unit was ordered Highland Regiment) of Canada and recollections almost exclusively. Did to continue with the operation even Major Frederick Philip Griffin, the this significant use of memory in the though hindsight tells us that by that young officer who took command investigation of Operation Spring point there was little hope for success that day after the death of the compromise the scholarly record? in the second phase. The second This study argues that Stacey and the battalion’s commanding officer. The Army Historical Section, conscious paragraph reads “Major Philip principal source of the controversy of the limitations of memory, were Griffin, who assumed command is how survivors remembered these diligent in gathering and handling this of the battalion when Lieutenant- catastrophic events.2 evidence with the goal of determining Colonel S.S.T. Cantlie was killed in Memory is a powerful but the fate of Major P.F. Griffin and the action earlier that morning, received Black Watch. Consequently, a clear flawed part of the human psyche. understanding of how the historical orders to advance directly from St. Memories are intensely personal, record was created is available to Martin-de-Fontenay over the crest impressionistic, always susceptible assist future historians in examining of the ridge to the objective.” This to the present, and in constant danger the role of memory in writing Canada’s statement represents the collective of being lost. Fear of this loss is one military history. memory of the Black Watch that of the reasons why we establish sites Major Griffin was pressured by of memory, what Pierre Nora refers familiar with the controversy some higher authorities into making what to as lieux de memoire.3 A visit to the insight into how lieux de memoire are turned out to be a tragic tactical error. Canadian Battlefields Foundation constructed by taking into account, Historical accounts confirm that viewing area at Point 67, overlooking in this case, the work of historians senior commanders were naturally Verrières Ridge, will find a plaque as well as the oral traditions created anxious to achieve as many objectives dedicated by the Black Watch (RHR) in the years and decades after the of the plan as possible, but have of Canada Association explaining the event by those who lived it. The first uncovered evidence, again based on battalion’s role in Operation Spring. paragraph of the plaque reports the personal recollection and therefore This plaque provides one who is basic evidence historians have relied not conclusive, that Griffin made the
© Canadian Military History, Volume 21, Number 2, Spring 2012, pp.21-32. 21 Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies Air Photo Collection 0312-4015&4017 Collection 0312-4015&4017 Military and Disarmament Studies Air Photo Laurier Centre for Strategic
ultimate decision to attack directly fall of 1945 the minister of national of a battalion-size engagement, and from St. Martin.4 defence tasked Colonel C.P. Stacey, the comprehensive documentation Whichever version is closest to the director of the Army Historical created by the investigators allows us truth, the result was the destruction Section in Ottawa (just promoted to trace how the historical record was of the attacking companies: a total from his wartime position as historical assembled. The fact that the historical of 307 casualties including 123 dead, officer for the overseas army at staff had to depend heavily on the 101 wounded and 83 prisoners of Canadian Military Headquarters in testimony of survivors of the battle war.5 The purpose of this article is London), to investigate the Black provides an unusual opportunity to examine how memory has been Watch’s action of 25 July 1944, which to assess the possibilities and limits used by historians, the regiment, had already become the subject of of memory as a source. It makes and others to piece together what controversy. This is an unusual case for a significant case study because occurred on that fateful day. In the of nearly forensic historical analysis the survivor testimony which the
22 Army Historical Section assembled the minister’s office in Canadian the historical section. Reginald Roy, continues to serve as the basis for Military Headquarters (CMHQ) while a member of the section in the scholarly research. This is also a Report No.150 of February 1946. early 1950s, had used the interviews field of contested memory, for the The account of the Black Watch’s from the 1945‑6 investigation to traditions of the regiment, which attack in The Victory Campaign cites draft the extended “narrative” on draw upon the memory of at least 31 interviews done with survivors Operation Spring11 upon which one officer whose early recollections for the 1946 report, mainly other Stacey based the shorter account in were gathered by Stacey’s team, ranks , about what happened once the The Victory Campaign. When Roy have diverged from the conclusions assaulting companies were cut off: published his own important book, reached by the official historians. 1944: The Canadians in Normandy Because human memory of It appears that on or just beyond the (1984), the chapter “Storm of Steel specific events, especially in the crest they ran into a well-camouflaged on Verrières Ridge” made still fuller trauma of battle, is so selective enemy position strengthened with use of the material gathered in 1945‑6. and malleable,6 Stacey generally dug-in tanks. What remained of the There are passages quoted from did not rely on the recollections battalion was now “pinned down” the transcripts of interviews with of individuals. The important by intense close-range fire. Further five survivors of the attack to offer exceptions were the disasters at advance being out of the question, a “glimpse of their situation once Hong Kong (1941), Dieppe (1942), Griffin ordered his men to make they were up the slope and about to and Operation Spring where the their way back individually as best move over the slight crest down to chaotic circumstances prevented they could.9 Fontenay-le-Marmion.”12 Roy also the keeping of written message logs used the account of Captain R.E. and other dependable records. Tim The figures in Stacey’s conclusion Bennett, which is unique in that the Cook, in Clio’s Warriors, refers to in The Victory Campaign that 60 men testimony was recorded on 1 August “the hidden history of war – that made it over the crest of the ridge, 1944, within a week of the battle. which was not documented in the of whom 15 returned, was based on In fact, Bennett had discussed his official records.”7 During the interwar a memorandum drafted for Stacey’s experiences with Ralph Allen, war period, when Colonel A.F. Duguid investigators in December 1945 by correspondent for the Toronto Globe was working on the first volume of Lieutenant-Colonel Eric Motzfeldt, and Mail, on 27 July and supplied the official history of the Canadians who set down his own memory of the many of the same details he later in the First World War, he attempted action together with the recollections recorded on 1 August, confirmation to include this hidden history in his of four other officers who had served that the information was fresh from work by drawing on the memories that day and survived the war. the battlefield. Bennett did not of the fighting soldier – or at least The Victory Campaign recorded the participate in the attack on Fontenay the views of the higher ranks. He “impression” on the part of the – his platoon was at that time engaged quickly realized that interviewing officers and the other ranks “that the with German troops that infiltrated and corresponding with these officers tank and artillery support planned back into the Black Watch’s assembly “often left him susceptible to overt for their attack did not materialize,” area – but he had been present when pressure to conform his judgements but then reported, on the basis of early on the morning of 25 July to an individual’s point of view. As further interviews in 1945‑6 among Griffin regrouped the battalion, and a result, Duguid was always forced the gunners and armoured personnel arranged for the artillery and tank to judge critically everything that who had participated in the action, support originally planned for the was presented for the possibility of that every effort had in fact been dawn attack to be laid on later in enhancing reputations.”8 He also made to deliver the support. The the morning. Bennett, who did not acknowledged a need to be conscious artillery had fired as planned, but the survive the war, was inspired by of contradictions within those rounds had landed too far in advance Griffin’s calm and confidence, and the accounts and between memories of the bogged down infantry to help effective control he exerted. Bennett’s and the written record. Stacey and – or even be noticed – by them. The accounts, both as reported in the his team encountered both of these tanks’ push on the right flank had press and in his own memorandum, challenges in their work on Operation been stopped, with heavy casualties, strongly suggest that Griffin made Spring. by sustained fire from German his own decisions to carry on with In the completed official history armour and anti-tank guns.10 the attack, and to strike directly for The Victory Campaign, published in Subsequent published studies of Fontenay on the reverse slope, rather 1959, Stacey relied upon the evidence the Black Watch attack have relied on than first dealing with May-sur-Orne gathered in 1945‑6, and distilled for the survivors’ memories gathered by on the flank of the forward slope.13
23 Nevertheless, the quite different of the Normandy campaign that It is exceedingly doubtful that we view that grew in the regiment began to appear in the 1980s. It must will ever know the precise content in postwar decades – that Griffin be noted that Megill’s recollection, and tone of that fateful conversation. had been compelled by higher decades after the event, is the only Megill may have simply accepted levels of command to undertake the record of the conversation. Stacey’s Griffin’s view; he may have urged attack – became the focus of a major report on the investigation of 1945‑6 or insisted that Griffin go because controversy in the early 1990s. The mentions that the meeting took place, his superior commanders were regimental traditions featured in the but does not describe what was pressing him to hurry; or the two docudrama entitled “In Desperate discussed.15 Historians have assumed inexperienced battle commanders Battle: Normandy 1944,” part of The that Megill’s later recollections about may have agreed they had a chance. Valour and the Horror series televised the details of the meeting are correct. Rather than pronounce a fatuous by the Canadian Broadcasting For instance John A. English wrote categorical judgment on that human Corporation in early 1992. At that Megill “reluctantly acquiesced in dilemma, we would be better advised issue in the ensuing controversy this decision [to bypass May] largely to consider its nuances and hope that was a meeting between Brigadier because of Griffin’s enthusiasm and none of us has to experience what W.J. Megill, commanding the 5th the promise it held for success.”16 these men faced that early morning.20 Canadian Infantry Brigade of which English believed that Griffin, having the battalion was a part, and Griffin recently taken command of the Such caution, the present shortly before the Black Watch attack. battalion, should have been directed paper argues, has in fact always Megill recalled that he suggested by Megill to change his plan to take characterized the historiography that the Black Watch should secure account of enemy resistance that was of Operation Spring, in large part May before moving on to Fontenay. stronger than expected.17 Roy, in his because of the care with which The production discounted Megill’s 1984 book, took a slightly different the official history team in 1945‑6 version. In a subsequent article in view. He noted that both routes to approached the challenge of capturing Maclean’s magazine, the docudrama’s Fontenay – direct or through May and assessing the memories of producer Brian McKenna cited the – would have met stiff resistance,18 participants. This conclusion is based memory of Captain Campbell Stuart, and thus underscored the focus of on an examination of records that the battalion’s adjutant on 25 July both commanders on the seizure show how the official team carried 1944, who “hotly disputed” Megill’s of Fontenay. Terry Copp, who out its task, a subject not directly recollection. Responsible for wireless interviewed Megill, has echoed this treated in the published literature. communications between Griffin view. By bypassing points of enemy Rather ironically, in view of the and brigade, Stuart remembered resistance and heading straight controversy over contested memories constant pressure to attack. Griffin’s for the final objective Griffin was following broadcast of the Valour replies “stress[ed] the foolhardiness proposing the aggressive action and the Horror in the early 1990s, the to attack” but the meeting with senior commanders demanded. investigation of 1945‑6 began as an Megill – which Stuart was not present Copp acknowledged that it was exercise in political damage control for – convinced the major that “the most unfortunate that Megill did because of disquiet in Montreal over honour of the regiment was at stake not intervene if his recollection is the disaster that had befallen the and [he] ordered the attack to go correct. Copp did, however, question city’s most prominent regiment. forward.”14 Stuart was one of the the tendency to inject hindsight into In order to understand why officers who had assisted Motzfeldt in the analysis of the action of the Black an investigation into Operation the preparation of the memorandum Watch as everyone can agree, with Spring took place it is necessary to for the official historians in December hindsight, that the battalion should review contemporary newspapers, 1945. That memorandum noted his have focused first on securing its which provide insight into what recollection of the wireless messages start line in St. Martin against the the general public knew about the from higher authorities urging that enemy troops who had infiltrated battle. A flurry of articles by Ross attack take place, but did not draw into the area, and then taken May Munro, lead war correspondent for the larger conclusions of Stuart’s before attempting the final phase the Canadian Press, and Ralph Allen, later reflections, which, theMaclean’s against Fontenay.19 Bill McAndrew war correspondent for the Toronto article suggests, strongly influenced emphasized the imperative for Globe and Mail, were published on 26 the television production. caution in an article that responded and 27 July 1944. On 26 July Munro The meeting between Griffin and to the controversy over the CBC described an “All-Day Uphill Battle Megill had already figured in studies docudrama: Fought by Canadians” in which he
24 Library and Archives Canada PA 115819 Canada PA Library and Archives
Lieutenant-Colonel C.P. Stacey and the staff of the Canadian Army Historical Section in London, 19 April 1944. From l. to r.: William Ogilvie, O.N. Fisher, Captain Heathcote, L. Wrinch, C.P. Stacey, J. Engler, A.T. Sesia, G.C. Pepper, G.R. Martin.
reported that “British staff officers the immediate aftermath of the battle above May-Sur-Orne on July 25, said the Canadians face the strongest the successes were highlighted. in the heart of a powerful German opposition to appear on any one Wartime censorship delayed the tank, gun and infantry position, sector of the Normandy front and brutal truth only for seventeen days. all that was left of their gallant that the fighting has been extremely On 27 July Allen of the Globe and spearhead was swallowed up, heavy.”21 Allen’s 27 July article in the Mail had filed a 1,000-word account platoon by platoon, section by Globe compared the fighting to that that made the front pages of several section, finally man by man. of the First World War22 while on the newspapers in Canada on 12 August, Their ammunition ran out same day Ross Munro noted that an with the original filing date and as a ring of Germany heavy guns officer had described the operation the notation publication had been and lighter automatic weapons as “disappointing.”23 That same day “delayed” at the head of the piece. went about its deadly work with in the Toronto Star the front-page “Black Watch Units Died Alone in the calculated precision of a firing headline was “Canadian Drive Ties Trap,” the headline in the Globe, left squad. Finally, even the thin Up Half Nazi Normandy Armour,”24 no doubt there had been a disaster. trickle of wounded, half-walking, reflecting how the operation was half-crawling to the rear, came to already being rationalized as a Here is the epitaph of a an end. As a desperate little party holding attack. On 2 August Allen regiment. Three words only: of headquarters and support emphasized the territorial gain of “Don’t Send Reinforcements.” personnel prepared to fight its the operation, specifically, how two From the four rifle companies way forward in the forlorn hope Ontario battalions (both veterans of that comprised almost the full of making a partial rescue, the last the Dieppe raid) fought off fierce fighting strength of the Black man out…bore this message from German counterattacks to hold Watch (Royal Highlander of the battalion’s 24-year-old acting Verrières village.25 While there were Canada), the rest was silence. commanding officer: “don’t send some reports of disappointments, in Trapped on a barren ridge just reinforcements….”
25 Black Watch Archives Black Watch
Officers of The First Battalion, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada, 24 September 1943 Front Row: Captain R.E. Bennett, Captain E. Motzfeldt, Captain J.P.W. Taylor, Captain V.E. Traversy, Lieutenant-Colonel S.S.T. Cantlie, Field Marshal Lord Wavell, Major B.R. Ritchie, Major A.G. Stevenson, Captain F.P. Griffin, Captain J.L. Duchastel de Montrouge, Captain J.P.G. Kemp. Middle Row: Lieutenant R.A. Horwood, Captain G.A. Demers (RCAPC), Lieutenant R.D. Yuile, Lieutenant E.S. Duffield, Captain A.P. Bates, Lieutenant J.P. Cowans, Lieutenant A.R.W. Robinson, Lieutenant M.H. Cassils, Lieutenant G. Birks, Lieutenant I.H. Louson. Back row: Lieutenant J.G. Smith (RCCS), Lieutenant J.E. Fox, Lieutenant F.A Heubach, Lieutenant C.G. Bourne, Lieutenant S.E. Griffin, Lieutenant F.T. Rea, Lieutenant D.A McAlpine, Lieutenant G.S. MacInnes, Lieutenant J.K. Neil. (Names of officers mentioned in text are italicized.)
The inspirational part of the or National Defence Headquarters The regiment was well connected story reported in detail Captain in Ottawa. On 14 August, Stacey, in Montreal. Demands from its R.E. Bennett’s account of Griffin’s at CMHQ, received a request from “friends” for a fuller account of the leadership when he took command in Ottawa “for infm re experience of disaster became effective with the the early morning amidst the heavy RHC [Royal Highlanders of Canada] end of the war in Europe and when in fighting with the German forces on 25 Jul; newspaper reports indicate August 194528 Douglas Abbott, who that had infiltrated behind the Black that this unit was almost wiped represented St. Antoine-Westmount, Watch’s start line: out in the MAY-SUR-ORNE area.“ a Montreal riding, became minister Stacey had to ask his officer in of national defence. Pressure from Major Griffin set the whole battalion charge of the war diaries section, Abbott’s constituents led the minister an example I can’t describe. He got Major C.J. Lynn-Grant, if he had to order the preparation of an account men under cover in St. André while any information about what had that he could, if necessary, release he arranged for a new artillery happened at the front. The daily war as a ministerial statement.29 Early in program, and if he ever thought diaries for all formations and units October 1945 Stacey arrived in Ottawa twice about the possibility that the were dispatched to CMHQ at the end from London to make arrangements attack would have to be cancelled, of each month, but, in the midst of the to take over as director of history he never showed it. His orders were intense large-scale operations, no one at National Defence Headquarters. to go ahead, and as he moved among in the combat formations had drawn He had an interview with the chief the companies under constant fire the attention of the historical officers of the general staff, General Charles from machine guns and mortars, attached to II Canadian Corps and Foulkes who had commanded the giving his last orders, we were all each of the divisions to this particular 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, of infected by his coolness and his air battalion level action. Lynn-Grant which the Black Watch was a part, of absolute confidence.26 reported “that 5 Cdn Inf Bde War in Operation Spring, and Foulkes Diary largely supported” the press made it clear that investigation of the Interestingly, the Canadian public account, and Stacey had him quickly battalion’s action was a priority. He had the news before either Canadian prepare a short report of the basic concurred in Stacey’s suggestion that Military Headquarters in London facts in the war diaries for NDHQ.27 the historical section should find and
26 interview former prisoners of war work in interviewing survivors of Kemp had already contributed as who had been captured during the Operation Spring. much information as he could to operation. The chief of the general Stacey’s initial hope was that Motzfeldt’s report.36 The delay in staff also agreed that the historical officers who had survived Operation Motzfeldt’s submission of his original section should take the time needed Spring could supply the information report had already led the historians for thorough research; Stacey’s hope needed to flesh out the documentary to suspect that the officers had no was that the Spring investigation record. Initial inquiries in London desire to revisit that terrible day. would move in tandem with work and Ottawa turned up the names of Stanley had confirmation when already in progress at CMHQ on the Lieutenant-Colonel Eric Motzfeldt, Motzfeldt visited the historical narrative account of operations in and Major J.P.G. Kemp, who had section office in Ottawa on 9 January Normandy during July 1944, one of been company commanders at the 1946: “He admitted that he was a series of detailed studies intended time of the attack. Both had returned very reluctant to commit himself on to serve as the basic reference for the to civilian life in Montreal; Stacey paper on anything relating to the published official history. Clearly sent them the key documents the unfortunate experience of the Black Stacey was concerned that a rush job researchers at CMHQ had located Watch. His general attitude was on Spring might result in the release to help them produce a report.31 the sooner this episode is forgotten of information that his section’s Motzfeldt completed the report only the better. In brief, he was not very own wider research might prove to on 12 December; it was based on cooperative although he appears be incomplete in facts or analysis. his own recollections, and those of willing, within limits, to give off the Foulkes’ cooperative attitude, Stacey Kemp, Captain Campbell Stuart, who record statements.”37 wrote to Lieutenant-Colonel Sam had been the adjutant, and Major E.C. Stacey had realized on reading Hughes, acting head of the London Duffield, who had been the battalion Motzfeldt’s report of 12 December section, was a good reason to expedite intelligence officer. 32 that the officers could not give much work on the general narrative as well The information provided in the help on events that transpired over as the Spring investigation.30 report matched Bennett’s account on the crest of the ridge – the virtual Thus began an intensive four most points for the period leading ambush of the remnants of the months of work on both sides of up to the attack. The main possible companies by the unexpectedly large, the Atlantic. The section in London difference concerned Griffin’s well emplaced and camouflaged launched a search in the operational willingness to attack. Motzfeldt’s German forces that lay in wait. His files that had been gathered from report, almost certainly on the basis disappointment in the failure of his First Canadian Army, II Corps and of Stuart’s memory, stated that Griffin original hope to wrap up the main the divisions under its command, had “repeatedly received orders by elements of the investigation through and consulted the overseas personnel wireless from Bde that in spite of the consultation with the officers in authorities to find survivors of start line NOT being secure, 1 RHC Montreal, and the need for a much the operation who might be able MUST proceed with phase III.”33 The greater effort than planned to locate to provide evidence. Most of the officers’ joint report, as already noted, and interview other survivors of the participants in the battle, it turned was particularly useful in its estimate action, was reflected in an apologetic out, had already returned home, that 60 troops reached the crest of note to Stanley: “I am afraid we have and thus the task of making contact the ridge, and that 15 returned from stuck you with rather a dirty job in and gathering testimony fell largely the attack. There seems to have been the matter of the Black Watch, but to the Army Historical Section in some confusion on this second point the Motzfeldt memorandum did not Ottawa. Stacey returned to London as Stacey enquired whether those 15 help with the final phase of the action in December 1945 to supervise the survivors had been taken prisoner.34 and the Minister will presumably ongoing work in organizing records Motzfeldt, in a second letter dated expect some information on that. and drafting the basic narratives, and 11 January 1946, confirmed that the The names we sent you as prospects to ensure a minimum of interference 15 had indeed returned to Canadian for interrogation were really shots in these essential tasks by the release lines, and also confirmed Stacey’s in the dark….”38 Consequently, the of wartime personnel and first stages information that Griffin was the historical section began an urgent in the transfer of people and files back only officer who had not become a search for survivors that had been to Ottawa. Lieutenant-Colonel G.F.G. casualty before the attack crossed with the battalion throughout the Stanley, who had been Stacey’s the crest of the ridge.35 Kemp, who attack; many of these men had wartime deputy at CMHQ, moved to had been taken as a prisoner of been prisoners of war and had only Ottawa and administered the Army war, was the possible exception; recently become accessible upon their Historical Section, including the main however, it seemed to Stacey that return from Europe.39
27 This was the origin of the during the Black Watch’s attack. In interviews with 31 survivors. the words of Motzfeldt’s report: “0910 Stacey sent the guidelines about hrs Bn moved off and reached start the information required to Stanley line at 0925 to find Artillery support in Ottawa in a message dated 27 had NOT materialized and tanks had December 1945: “(a) about what NOT arrived.”42 The investigators hour were survivors overwhelmed Archives Black Watch took this charge very seriously; on and roughly how many survivors 11 January 1946 Stacey dispatched a remained at that hour (b) did bn dig message with detailed instructions in (c) was any actual attempt made for follow up to Stanley in Ottawa. to withdraw (d) nature of German Stacey himself interviewed one counter-attacks and any additional armoured officer, Lieutenant-Colonel infm on German posns etc.”40 Major J.W. Powell, who was still in England. C.E. Brissette of the Ottawa office At the time of the battle Powell had carried out most of the interviews, been the second-in-command of “B” and, in addition to responses to the Squadron of the 1st Hussars and specific questions, he recorded any following Major Griffin’s orders personal information or comments group prior to the attack had taken by the survivors. Not surprisingly over command of the unit from Major there are contradictions among W. Harris who had been wounded. the various accounts, and Brissette Powell recalled that the plan was diligently noted his assessment of for the tanks to provide fire support the reliability of each witness. As from May-sur-Orne, on the Black one would expect the answers to Watch’s right flank. The tanks were “a” varied both in the times given late in arriving at their meeting point for the round up of prisoners by with the infantry but continued the Germans, and estimates of the into May and attempted to provide number of prisoners taken. For “c,” support, but suffered heavy losses some recalled an order to withdraw from German anti-tank guns.43 The coming from Major Griffin, but 145558 Canada PA Library and Archives investigators also contacted Harris many others did not remember who had been at Griffin’s orders such an order and remarked that group, 44 but Harris, now a member an attempt to withdraw would of parliament, was unable to provide have been useless as the battalion them with anything of value because was cut off. In answering “d” some his tank had been put out of action survivors indicated that the Germans early in the day.45 counterattacked, but many others Powell identified the two troop indicated that the Germans had no commanders who were in May, need to; they simply kept up their fire Captain Williamson and Lieutenant from their well prepared positions Rawson, who were back in Canada. and then ordered the isolated pockets Stanley contacted them, and their of survivors to surrender.41 Some recollections supported Powell’s of these differences reflect how the account of the heavy enemy battalion had been scattered and opposition in May. In Rawson’s different groups of men had different words: “[m]y troop was belting away experiences. Overall, however, the 132650 Canada PA Library and Archives with machine guns at anything that accounts were mutually supporting, looked like a Gerry position but I’m and allowed the investigators to come afraid it was mostly blind shooting up with a reasonable estimate of what as Gerry had turned out his usual happened to the battalion once it efficient job at camouflaging.”46 crossed the crest of the ridge. From top to bottom: Williamson’s recollection of events One thing on which all the in May was equally harrowing: Major F.P. Griffin, Brigadier W.J. Megill, survivors agreed was that there had Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds. “Rawson’s troop was wiped out on been no artillery or armoured support the left…My troop went through the
28 main street of May-sur-Orne drawing attempted to bring high explosive his own report dated 31 January 1946 some fire from upstairs windows. and smoke down in support but his which was “not for publication but As my tank passed the last house signaller had been wounded and the for historical record.”54 In the report it was hit by a panther [tank] twice No.38 wireless set lost. Powis was he emphasized that Spring had been from fifty yards killing my co-driver then faced with the choice to either intended as a holding operation. His and fatally wounded my loading return to the carrier which had been own assessment of the operation operator.”47 given orders to follow the advance to indicated that “eleventh hour Rawson was captured while keep in wireless contact, or make use reinforcement of German positions Williamson managed to make his of two less powerful No.18 wireless east of the ORNE”55 made the original way back across Canadian lines. sets used by the infantry. Powis objectives more difficult to achieve.56 Stacey also instructed Stanley to decided on the second option but Simonds emphasised the success at follow up with two artillery officers, failed to make contact on either set. Verrières village and his decision Captain G.D. Powis and Lieutenant He and the men he was with were to send in the British 7th Armoured G.H. Van Vliet , who were believed cut off and taken prisoner later in Division to secure these gains from to have been forward observation the day.50 further German counterattacks. officers (FOOs) for the Black Watch In a response to a draft of CMHQ Simonds believed that “the capture on 25 July 1944, and Lieutenant- Report No.150, Megill insisted that of the ridge in Operation ‘SPRING’ Colonel E.D. Nighswander, the “the fire plan was fired on time exactly established the firm base which former commanding officer of the as arranged. It is quite apparent later made possible the mounting 5th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian however that, due to enemy fire, the of Operation ‘TOTALIZE’ under Artillery, which had been slated to adv[ance] of the battalion was too much more favourable conditions.”57 fire in support of the Black Watch. slow to take full advantage of it.”51 He argued that in spite of German Nighswander responded he could The original fire plan brought down reinforcement his forces should have only remember that the regiment fired shells far beyond where the Black been able to complete phase I – the heavily that day, and not the specific Watch began their advance and it is capture of May-sur-Orne, Verrières, missions for the Black Watch. He did, therefore possible that the infantry and Tilly-la-Campagne – without however, note that he could “see no were not aware of the fire. No on-call heavy casualties: “that we failed to reason why the concentrations would fire support had been available to the capture and hold MAY-SUR-ORNE not be fired if required.”48 Van Vliet troops due to the FOOs’ equipment and TILLY-LA-CAMPAGNE and replied that he could be of little help failures. Megill recalled that later in that we suffered what were, in my as his radio broke down but Powis the day “tasks that were felt to be safe opinion, excessive casualties was provided a detailed statement.49 “It (i.e. not likely to hit our own troops) due to a series of mistakes and errors was decided to refire the original were fired over and above the original of judgement in minor tactics.”58 fire plan less targets on or behind plan.”52 Interestingly, some survivors Simonds listed four tactical failures May-sur-Orne” as it was believed who had or would be taken as by his junior commanders. These that the Calgary Highlanders were prisoners of war recalled friendly fire included ensuring the security of still advancing on May and Black landing near their positions around start lines, advancing closely behind Watch scouts had reported little the time they were captured. With supporting artillery fire, and the enemy activity in the area. Powis’ the information from the armour and importance of ensuring the enemy job that day had been to arrange artillery officers, the investigators was cleared out of areas that were the fire plan to coincide with the were able to conclude that the armour deemed secure. He did not mention advance and then join the advance and artillery had done their utmost how the careful timing of his plan with the left forward company. He to provide the planned support to gave the officers tasked with carrying noted that the two other FOOs with the Black Watch, but those efforts out the operation very little flexibility the battalion did not advance. One had largely failed because of the very to deal with unexpected events. lost his carrier to enemy fire and heavy enemy resistance. Interestingly, these points mainly received permission from Griffin to Stacey had meanwhile completed referred to failures on the right flank return to his unit, while Van Vliet a draft of the report summarizing near May while the left flank was remained in St. André to repair his the results of the investigation and hardly mentioned. Here Simonds wireless communications. At 0900 sent it to Lieutenant-General G.G. tailored his explanations to fit the hours Powis received word from 5th Simonds, who had commanded parameters of the investigation. The Field Regiment that the fire plan was II Canadian Corps during the close focus on the action of the in progress and he advanced with operation. Simonds said he had no Black Watch led him to conclude the infantry. During the advance he changes for the draft, 53 but he wrote “that the losses were unnecessarily
29 heavy and the results achieved army retained editorial control over in his handling of the generals’ disappointing. Such heavy losses everything he wrote. Stacey had recollections of the battle and ensured were not inherent in the plan nor in originally refused the position as that Simonds’ distinct perspective its intended execution. The action of official historian on these terms.63 survived for subsequent generations the Black Watch was most gallant but Just as he refused to surrender his of historians. was tactically unsound in its detailed academic freedom, Stacey did not One area in which the execution.”59 For McKenna, the bend to Simonds’ pressure to blame investigators were not dependent producer of The Valour and the Horror, the regimental officers, Major Griffin on memory was the crucial question this statement was evidence that the included, who had been tasked of casualties. On 4 January 1946 military high command conspired with carrying out the operation.64 Lieutenant-Colonel H.M. Jackson, to blame Griffin for the casualties Stacey did, however, accept Simonds’ in charge of the Records Office at the Black Watch suffered. It was, position that the battle had been a Canadian Military Headquarters however, only Simonds’ personal holding attack and, as David O’Keefe in London, responded to Stacey’s view. Stacey noted in his memoirs points out, also accepted Simonds’ queries with the nominal rolls of that Foulkes, who as commander appraisal of the effects of the last casualties suffered by the Black of 2nd Canadian Infantry Division minute German reinforcement.65 Watch between 24 and 27 July 1944. had served under Simonds during This was not really meant to appease Jackson believed that “it is extremely Spring, “resented Simonds’ tendency Simonds but rather was based upon likely that all of the casualties shown to blame the inefficiency of our troops the only information available to him actually took place on the date in for our misfortunes.”60 Foulkes also at the time: “having had little access question.”69 In support of this he disputed Simonds’ contention that to strategic records, Stacey was… cited and attached extracts of the the operation had been planned as desperate to understand the context unit’s war diary which proved that a holding attack. He had not been of Canadian operations.”66 This is the Black Watch were not likely to informed of this “and he doubted why the director of the historical have suffered casualties after 25 whether Simonds had been told section had to turn to the recollections July as the unit was withdrawn for either.”61 Foulkes had by the time of of the generals. In doing so, Stacey the remainder of July to “re-group, the investigation surpassed his former was conscious of Simonds’ desire re-equip and be brought back up to corps commander to become chief of to uphold or secure his reputation strength.”70 Jackson concluded that the general staff. McKenna postulated and did not allow the way the because the Black Watch was only that Simonds, no longer able to blame general recalled the operation to significantly engaged on 25 July in his one-time subordinate as a result of manipulate the handling of what he the course of the week beginning Foulkes’ new appointment, therefore already understood about what had 22 July, the 23 officers and 350 other blamed Major Griffin who was not happened. ranks struck off strength could be able to defend his actions.62 We Admittedly, at the request of assumed to be the battalion’s total cannot know Simonds’ motivations Simonds, Stacey had omitted his losses sustained during Operation for certain, but the historiography emphasis on the losses sustained in Spring.71 shows that Simonds, brilliant and Operation Spring and comparisons On 9 January Stacey replied driven, conceived his plans with to the casualties sustained at Hong to Jackson with a draft of the little input from subordinates, whose Kong and Dieppe in his preliminary casualties paragraph for the mission he saw as being to execute study, Canada’s Battle in Normandy. minister’s statement. Stacey had the plan with as little deviation as However, these phrases reappeared scaled Jackson’s figure back to “an possible. In this light it is possible in The Victory Campaign67 as, by aggregate of 16 officers and 308 that Simonds was defending his plan, the time it was published, Stacey other ranks”72 by identifying and rather than consciously attacking a had secured academic freedom for removing casualties from the days junior subordinate. the writing of the official histories. before 25 July, as these undoubtedly The battle between the When Foulkes and Simonds decided resulted from operations prior to reputations of Foulkes and Simonds, to destroy the conflicting reports Spring. The memo also included as historian Tim Cook has argued, they had prepared for the Historical a request for Jackson to determine was a difficult one for Stacey, who Section, Stacey ensured that a copy how many of the wounded were was in the process of trying to secure of Simonds’ report survived in the also taken prisoner in order to avoid academic freedom for the official archives.68 Therefore, throughout double counting. “Arriving at the historians. While he had received the investigation of Operation precise truth of this matter is a most full access to military records, the Spring, Stacey remained diligent complicated task,” Stacey confided to
30 his diary, his sentiment about many those arms had in fact made vigorous Notes aspects of the investigation.73 On 14 efforts that had had little effect in January Jackson sent a new nominal the face of the unexpectedly strong 1. Terry Copp, “Operation ‘Spring,’”in A roll. He proposed three specific enemy resistance. Rather ironically, Nation at War: Essays from Legion Magazine (Waterloo: Laurier Centre for Military amendments to the text, the first two in view of the controversy over Strategic and Disarmament Studies, amendments essentially transferred responsibility for the disaster that 2004), p.107. a single other rank casualty from burst forth with the broadcast of The 2. The Black Watch regimental history refers to 25 July 1944 as the Battle of the wounded total to the prisoner of Valour and the Horror in 1992, Stacey St. André, reflecting how veterans of war total. The third was to indicate skilfully put to one side the question the battalion remember the battle. See that 11 of the prisoners of war are of blame despite the strong views Paul P. Hutchinson, Canada’s Black 74 Watch: The First Hundred Years, 1862- also known to have been wounded. of Lieutenant-General Simonds. 1962 (Bloomfield, Ontario: Museum Stacey made these amendments in The investigation remained true to Restoration Service, 1987), pp.222-4. his second draft, while adding that its focus, which was understanding 3. See Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” “it appears certain that some of those what had happened, while assuring Representations no.26 (Spring 1989), pp.7- listed merely as ‘wounded’ were also the full range of evidence, including 24. prisoners for a time, and that some Simonds’ reflections, would be 4. For instance, see Terry Copp “Operation ‘Spring’: An Historian’s View,” Canadian listed merely as ‘prisoners’ were also available to future scholars. In the Military History 12, nos.1-2 (Winter 2003), wounded.”75 The totals of 16 officers end the minister’s office did not issue pp.63-70. and 308 other ranks were the figures the statement, the intention always 5. C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, vol.3, included in the final draft of the having been to hold it in reserve in The Victory Campaign: The Operations in statement. (With further research by case of continued or renewed pressure North-West Europe, 1944-1945 (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Reginald Roy in the early 1950s the on the department. Yet it certainly Stationary), p.194. figures were revised yet again to a fulfilled Stacey’s determination that 6. Tim Cook, Clio’s Warriors: Canadian total of 307 casualties, the number the investigation should support the Historians and the Writing of the World Wars (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), p.51. published in The Victory Campaign in research for the published official 7. Ibid, p.84. 1959 and cited at the beginning of the history. As he noted with more than 8. Ibid. present paper.)76 a hint of satisfaction in his covering 9. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, pp.191-2. 10. Ibid. It was because the attack letter for the minister “it may almost 11. [Reginald Roy], “Canadian Participation had been such a disaster that the be doubted whether any single in the Operations in North-West Europe, investigation needed to go beyond battalion operation has ever been 1944; Part II: Canadian Operations in July,” 15 February 1953, Army existing wartime records that could more thoroughly investigated than Headquarters Historical Report No. 58 not provide essential facts since many this one.”77 The plaque at Point 67 [AHQ 58],
31 17. English, The Canadian Army and the because they include clearing the start reinforcements, doctrine meant Simonds’ Normandy Campaign, p.249. line (which was to be completed before only option was to cancel the operation. 18. Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, the operation but was not) as “phase I”. It is likely that this would not have been p.125. 34. Stacey to Stanley, message, 27 December permitted by high command. See pp.159- 19. Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians 1945, LAC, RG 24, vol.12745, file 24 160. in Normandy (Toronto: University of AEF/1/6. 57. Simonds, “Operation ‘Spring,’” p.67. Toronto Press, 2003), p.176. 35 Motzfeldt to Stanley, 11 January 1946, 58. Ibid. 20. Bill McAndrew, “The Canadians on LAC, RG 24, vol.12745, file 24 AEF/1/6. 59. Ibid, p.68. Verrières Ridge: A Historiographical 36. Stanley to Stacey, “Black Watch Report, 60. Stacey, A Date with History, p.177. Survey,” in David J. Bercuson and S.F. Submitted by Lt-Col. E. Motzfeldt,” 18 61. Ibid. Wise, eds., The Valour and the Horror December 1945, LAC, RG 24, vol.12745, 62. McKenna, “Heroism on Verrières Ridge,” Revisited (McGill-Queens University file 24 AEF/1/6. pp.73-4. Press, 1994), pp.140-1. 37. Stanley to Stacey, 10 January 1946, DHH 63. Cook, Clio’s Warriors, p.135. 21. Ross Munro, “All-Day Uphill Battle 917.009(D1) pt. 1. 64 Ibid., p.137. Fought by Canadians,” Globe and Mail, 38. Stacey to Stanley, 31 December 1945, ibid. 65. O’Keefe, “Bitter Harvest,” p.28. 26 July 1944, p.8. For a full account of 39. Stacey to Stanley,message, 27 December 66. Cook, Clio’s Warriors, p.136. press coverage of Operation Spring see 1945, LAC, RG 24, vol.12745, file 24 67. Stacey, A Date with History, p.176. Timothy Balzer, The Information Front: AEF/1/6. 68. Cook, Clio’s Warriors, p.137. The Canadian Army and News Management 40. Ibid. 69 Jackson to Stacey, “CASUALTIES TO during the Second World War (Vancouver: 41. Survivor Accounts, LAC, RG 24, BLACK WATCH, 25 Jul 1944,” 4 January UBC Press, 2011), pp.154-60. vol.12745, file 24 AEF/1/6. 1946, LAC, RG 24, vol.12745, file 24 22. Ralph Allen, “Fighting Below Caen Like 42. Motzfeldt to Stanley, “Report on Battle AEF/1/6. First Great War,” Globe and Mail, 27 July of ST. ANDRE and MAY-sur-ORNE 25 70. “EXTRACT FROM WAR DIARY – BLACK 1944, p.13. JUL 1944,” 12 December 1945, LAC, RG WATCH,” LAC, RG 24, vol.12745, file 24 23. Ross Munro, “Action At Caen Described 24, vol.12745, file 24 AEF/1/6. AEF/1/6. as Disappointing,” Globe and Mail, 27 July 43. Stacey, “Memorandum of Interview with 71. Jackson to Stacey, “CASUALTIES TO 1944, p.1. Lt-Col. J.W. Powell,” 10 January 1946, BLACK WATCH, 25 Jul 1944,” 4 January 24. “Canadian Drive Ties Up Half Nazi LAC, RG 24, vol.12745, file 24 AEF/1/6. 1946, LAC, RG 24, vol.12745, file 24 Normandy Armour,” Toronto Daily Star 44. Stacey to Stanley, message, 11 January AEF/1/6. 27 July 1944, second section headline. 1946, LAC, RG 24, vol.12745, file 24 72. Stacey to Jackson, “Casualties to Black 25. At this point most of the credit is given AEF/1/6. Watch, 25 Jul 1944,” 9 January 1946, LAC, to the Royal Regiment of Canada rather 45. Stacey, A Date with History, p.177. RG 24, vol.12745, file 24 AEF/1/6. than the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, 46. Rawson to Stanley, 24 January 1946, LAC, 73. Stacey diary, 9 January 1946, UTA, B90- now credited with holding Verrières. See RG 24, vol.12745, file 24 AEF/1/6. 0020, box 17, notebook no.38. Ralph Allen, “Royals Revenge Dieppe 47. Williamson to Stanley, 23 January 1946, 74. Jackson to Stacey, “Casualties to Black By Wiping Out Jerries Attacking In LAC, RG 24, vol.12745, file 24 AEF/1/6. Watch, 25 July 1944,” 14 January 1946, Normandy,” Globe and Mail, 2 August 48. Nighswander to Stanley, 29 January 1946, LAC, RG 24, vol.12745, file 24 AEF/1/6. 1944, p.1. LAC, RG 24, vol.12745, file 24 AEF/1/6. 75. Stacey to Jackson, “Casualties to Black 26. Globe and Mail, 12 August 1944. 49. Stanley to Stacey, “Operation ‘Spring,’” Watch 25 Jul 1944,” 5 February 1946, LAC, 27. Stacey diary, 14-15 August 1944, 12 February 1946, LAC, RG 24, vol.12745, RG 24, vol.12745, file 24 AEF/1/6. University of Toronto Archives [UTA], file 24 AEF/1/6. 76. AHQ 58, p.132. accession B90-0020, box 16, notebook 50. G.D. Powis Statement, “MAY-SUR- 77. CHMQ 150, p. 1, para. 2. no.32. ORNE. 25 JULY ’44,” February 1946, LAC, 28. David R. O’Keefe, “Bitter Harvest: A Case RG 24, vol.12745, file 24 AEF/1/6. Study of Allied Opertioanl Intelligence 51. W.J. Megill Commentary, 29 January for Operation Spring Normandy July 1946, LAC, RG 24, vol.12745, file 24 25, 1944” (master’s thesis, University of AEF/1/6. Ottawa, 1996), p.12. See also C.P. Stacey, 52. Ibid. A Date with History, Memoirs of a Canadian 53. Stacey diary, 4 February 1946, UTA, B90- Historian (Ottawa: Deneau Publishers, 0020, box 17, notebook no.38 [1983], p.175. 54. G.G. Simonds, to J.C. Murchie, Chief 29. Stacey, A Date with History, p.177. of Staff CMHQ, “Attack by R.H.C. – 30. Stacey to Hughes, 11 and 16 October Operation “SPRING,” 8 February 1946, 1945, Directorate of History And Heritage LAC, RG 24, vol.12745, file 24 AEF/1/6. [DHH] 917.009(D1) pt. 1. This report was reproduced in Canadian Alexander Fitzgerald-Black recently 31. Stacey to Stanley, 24 December 1945, ibid. Military History 1, nos.1-2 (Autumn 1992), completed his Bachelor of Arts Honours 32. Motzfeldt to Stanley, “Report on Battle of pp.65-8
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