Investigating the Memory of Operation Spring the Inquiry Into the Black Watch and the Battle of St

Investigating the Memory of Operation Spring The Inquiry into the Black Watch and the Battle of St. André-sur-Orne, 1944-46 Alexander Fitzgerald-Black “In memory of the men of the Black Watch of Canada and their comrades who fought for the liberation of Europe and the hope of a better world.” – Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada Association plaque, Point 67 peration Spring, the ill-fated 25 upon: the battalion “was ordered to July 1944 attack by II Canadian Abstract: The scholarly literature for begin Phase 2 of Operation ‘Spring,’ O the Black Watch role in Operation Corps against German defences on Spring is largely based on survivor the advance to Fontenay-le-Marmion. Verrières Ridge, has become “one testimony compiled by C.P. Stacey’s Believing that Phase 1, the capture of the most controversial military Army Historical Section during of May-sur-Orne was partially operations in all of Canadian history.”1 and after the war. Stacey and his successful, higher command pressed At the centre of this controversy is team faced a significant challenge the Black Watch to ‘go ahead.’” This understanding what happened to the the fate of the Black Watch (Royal Black Watch on 25 July 1944 using explains why the unit was ordered Highland Regiment) of Canada and recollections almost exclusively. Did to continue with the operation even Major Frederick Philip Griffin, the this significant use of memory in the though hindsight tells us that by that young officer who took command investigation of Operation Spring point there was little hope for success that day after the death of the compromise the scholarly record? in the second phase. The second This study argues that Stacey and the battalion’s commanding officer. The Army Historical Section, conscious paragraph reads “Major Philip principal source of the controversy of the limitations of memory, were Griffin, who assumed command is how survivors remembered these diligent in gathering and handling this of the battalion when Lieutenant- catastrophic events.2 evidence with the goal of determining Colonel S.S.T. Cantlie was killed in Memory is a powerful but the fate of Major P.F. Griffin and the action earlier that morning, received Black Watch. Consequently, a clear flawed part of the human psyche. understanding of how the historical orders to advance directly from St. Memories are intensely personal, record was created is available to Martin-de-Fontenay over the crest impressionistic, always susceptible assist future historians in examining of the ridge to the objective.” This to the present, and in constant danger the role of memory in writing Canada’s statement represents the collective of being lost. Fear of this loss is one military history. memory of the Black Watch that of the reasons why we establish sites Major Griffin was pressured by of memory, what Pierre Nora refers familiar with the controversy some higher authorities into making what to as lieux de memoire.3 A visit to the insight into how lieux de memoire are turned out to be a tragic tactical error. Canadian Battlefields Foundation constructed by taking into account, Historical accounts confirm that viewing area at Point 67, overlooking in this case, the work of historians senior commanders were naturally Verrières Ridge, will find a plaque as well as the oral traditions created anxious to achieve as many objectives dedicated by the Black Watch (RHR) in the years and decades after the of the plan as possible, but have of Canada Association explaining the event by those who lived it. The first uncovered evidence, again based on battalion’s role in Operation Spring. paragraph of the plaque reports the personal recollection and therefore This plaque provides one who is basic evidence historians have relied not conclusive, that Griffin made the © Canadian Military History, Volume 21, Number 2, Spring 2012, pp.21-32. 21 Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies Air Photo Collection 0312-4015&4017 Collection 0312-4015&4017 Military and Disarmament Studies Air Photo Laurier Centre for Strategic ultimate decision to attack directly fall of 1945 the minister of national of a battalion-size engagement, and from St. Martin.4 defence tasked Colonel C.P. Stacey, the comprehensive documentation Whichever version is closest to the director of the Army Historical created by the investigators allows us truth, the result was the destruction Section in Ottawa (just promoted to trace how the historical record was of the attacking companies: a total from his wartime position as historical assembled. The fact that the historical of 307 casualties including 123 dead, officer for the overseas army at staff had to depend heavily on the 101 wounded and 83 prisoners of Canadian Military Headquarters in testimony of survivors of the battle war.5 The purpose of this article is London), to investigate the Black provides an unusual opportunity to examine how memory has been Watch’s action of 25 July 1944, which to assess the possibilities and limits used by historians, the regiment, had already become the subject of of memory as a source. It makes and others to piece together what controversy. This is an unusual case for a significant case study because occurred on that fateful day. In the of nearly forensic historical analysis the survivor testimony which the 22 Army Historical Section assembled the minister’s office in Canadian the historical section. Reginald Roy, continues to serve as the basis for Military Headquarters (CMHQ) while a member of the section in the scholarly research. This is also a Report No.150 of February 1946. early 1950s, had used the interviews field of contested memory, for the The account of the Black Watch’s from the 1945-6 investigation to traditions of the regiment, which attack in The Victory Campaign cites draft the extended “narrative” on draw upon the memory of at least 31 interviews done with survivors Operation Spring11 upon which one officer whose early recollections for the 1946 report, mainly other Stacey based the shorter account in were gathered by Stacey’s team, ranks , about what happened once the The Victory Campaign. When Roy have diverged from the conclusions assaulting companies were cut off: published his own important book, reached by the official historians. 1944: The Canadians in Normandy Because human memory of It appears that on or just beyond the (1984), the chapter “Storm of Steel specific events, especially in the crest they ran into a well-camouflaged on Verrières Ridge” made still fuller trauma of battle, is so selective enemy position strengthened with use of the material gathered in 1945-6. and malleable,6 Stacey generally dug-in tanks. What remained of the There are passages quoted from did not rely on the recollections battalion was now “pinned down” the transcripts of interviews with of individuals. The important by intense close-range fire. Further five survivors of the attack to offer exceptions were the disasters at advance being out of the question, a “glimpse of their situation once Hong Kong (1941), Dieppe (1942), Griffin ordered his men to make they were up the slope and about to and Operation Spring where the their way back individually as best move over the slight crest down to chaotic circumstances prevented they could.9 Fontenay-le-Marmion.”12 Roy also the keeping of written message logs used the account of Captain R.E. and other dependable records. Tim The figures in Stacey’s conclusion Bennett, which is unique in that the Cook, in Clio’s Warriors, refers to in The Victory Campaign that 60 men testimony was recorded on 1 August “the hidden history of war – that made it over the crest of the ridge, 1944, within a week of the battle. which was not documented in the of whom 15 returned, was based on In fact, Bennett had discussed his official records.”7 During the interwar a memorandum drafted for Stacey’s experiences with Ralph Allen, war period, when Colonel A.F. Duguid investigators in December 1945 by correspondent for the Toronto Globe was working on the first volume of Lieutenant-Colonel Eric Motzfeldt, and Mail, on 27 July and supplied the official history of the Canadians who set down his own memory of the many of the same details he later in the First World War, he attempted action together with the recollections recorded on 1 August, confirmation to include this hidden history in his of four other officers who had served that the information was fresh from work by drawing on the memories that day and survived the war. the battlefield. Bennett did not of the fighting soldier – or at least The Victory Campaign recorded the participate in the attack on Fontenay the views of the higher ranks. He “impression” on the part of the – his platoon was at that time engaged quickly realized that interviewing officers and the other ranks “that the with German troops that infiltrated and corresponding with these officers tank and artillery support planned back into the Black Watch’s assembly “often left him susceptible to overt for their attack did not materialize,” area – but he had been present when pressure to conform his judgements but then reported, on the basis of early on the morning of 25 July to an individual’s point of view. As further interviews in 1945-6 among Griffin regrouped the battalion, and a result, Duguid was always forced the gunners and armoured personnel arranged for the artillery and tank to judge critically everything that who had participated in the action, support originally planned for the was presented for the possibility of that every effort had in fact been dawn attack to be laid on later in enhancing reputations.”8 He also made to deliver the support.

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