The German Army's Use of Horses and Cavalry During World War II

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The German Army's Use of Horses and Cavalry During World War II University of South Carolina Scholar Commons Senior Theses Honors College Spring 2021 Warhorses Amongst War Machines: The German Army's Use of Horses and Cavalry During World War II Katherine V. McFarland University of South Carolina - Columbia, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/senior_theses Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation McFarland, Katherine V., "Warhorses Amongst War Machines: The German Army's Use of Horses and Cavalry During World War II" (2021). Senior Theses. 405. https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/senior_theses/405 This Thesis is brought to you by the Honors College at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Senior Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. McFarland 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS THESIS SUMMARY 3 INTRODUCTION 4 THE GERMAN CAVALRY AND THE INTERWAR YEARS 6 The German Cavalry 6 Treaty of Versailles, 1919 12 Hitler’s Rearmament and Nazi Germany 14 ON HORSES AND MEN 19 Strategy and Operation Planning 19 Truppenführung 24 The Bond Between Man and Beast 25 THE HORSE IN WAR 28 Suitability of Breeds 30 Horse Care 32 The Battle Horse and the Supply Chain 35 THE MOUNTED CAVALRY OF WORLD WAR II 43 Organization 43 The Waffen-SS 44 Equipment and Uniform 46 Cavalry Training and the Remount Program 50 SELECT CAMPAIGNS OF WORLD WAR II 57 Polish Campaign, 1939-1941 57 The Western Front, 1940 62 The Battle of Britain and Operation Sea Lion 64 Operation Barbarossa and the Eastern Front, 1941-1945 65 Pperation Spring Awakening and the End of the War 73 THE HORSE BEYOND COMBAT 75 Psychotherapy 75 Eugenics 76 CONCLUSION 78 BIBLIOGRAPHY 80 APPENDIX 84 McFarland 3 THESIS SUMMARY This thesis explores the role of the horse as used by the German Army throughout the Second World War. Contrary to the propagandic image of a mechanized Germany and of the blitzkrieg, the reality of warfare at the time remained primarily dependent on the horse, as man and beast continued to engage in conflict side by side. Horses served a variety of uses within the German forces, from mounted cavalry to hauling artillery, with disasters and successes throughout the war. Employing vast numbers of horses, the Germans allocated extensive resources, and often found themselves relying on the animal when vehicles losses were high. The scope of this work includes a discussion on war strategy, select campaigns in which the horse played a pivotal role, the history of cavalry within Germany, and training of cavalrymen and their horses. It is important to understand the role of the horse within the scope and context of the German Army during World War II, in order to fully analyze and comprehend the German Army’s operations. McFarland 4 INTRODUCTION A quick nudge of the heel and the horse leapt into a gallop – for a brief moment the horse pulled against the bit in his mouth towards freedom and the soldier felt the power beneath him; the same power Napoleon and Alexander felt as they charged into battle. Suddenly, the ground seemed to erupt as a shell buried itself into the dark earth and sent horse and rider into a frenzied state, racing towards an inevitable barrier, not of horseflesh but rather of steel and iron. Flashes of metal – bullets, not swords – whizzed past the pinned ears of the horse and the helmeted head of the German cavalryman as they dashed into the fray of war and strife. Yet this was not the first time war horses met war machines on the battlefield; indeed, the frantic meeting of cold steel to equine muscle had occurred across the map, on local to global stages, with disastrous consequences. Still ensuing after the lessons of the First World War, the warhorse was destined to continue its ride with the German Army during World War II. Historically met by other horses and swords, the twentieth century cavalry horse would now be met by machine guns, tanks, airplanes, and motor vehicles. A great misunderstanding of World War II is that of the mechanized and advanced German Army. While the German Army possessed motorized vehicles and an impressive tank strategy, the majority of her forces relied on horse-drawn transport and supply. So much so has this image influenced how the past is told, that the hoofprints of millions of horses have almost faded from the pages of history. The image of the German blitzkrieg, aimed to strike fear and terror in the minds and hearts of Germany’s enemies, was in reality only a portion of the military force and masked a largely under-motorized army. McFarland 5 The role of the horse as it was used by the German Army during the Second World War, while being inspected to an extent compliant with available resources, has not been adequately dispersed nor their significance fully explained within the context of World War II as a whole. While the end of the cavalry was a subsequent consequence of a modernizing world, the horse’s role as a dependable and relentless ‘soldier’ persisted during modern conflict, and therefore deserves to be understood within the context of the Second World War in which they were so numerously deployed and recognized for their contribution and impact. Even as war modernized, horses retained a, albeit decreasing, role in support and transportation. Further, to remember the warhorse and to understand their plight, is akin to remembering the soldier who gave his life on the battlefield and the extended impact of war on the land and animals; it is not only essential to understanding our past, but in the understanding of how far we have come as humankind, from bareback charges across open fields to armored calvary retaining the name as an ode to their origins. Horses are flight animals who learned to trust man even after man hunted them and became the mode for many battles and empires to be established.1 In battle, they were urged forward only by trust in the rider upon their backs, giving man the gifts of speed, height, strength, intimidation, and companionship. As a testament to the warhorse, but also in an effort to understand the full comprehensive nature of the German Army operating during World War II, it is necessary to explore the large role the horse played during the war. This thesis seeks to understand and analyze the use of horses and cavalry by the German Army during the Second World War in the context of mechanizing warfare. 1 For further information see Wendy Williams’ book The Horse: The Epic History of Our Noble Companion. New York, NY: Scientific America, 2015. McFarland 6 THE GERMAN CAVALRY AND THE INTERWAR YEARS “A thousand years or more of cavalry achievements and tradition were being consigned to the dustbin of history” according to Peter Hart who wrote of the impact of mechanized warfare in his book The Somme: The Darkest Hour on the Western Front. 2 Hart was describing the Battle of Flers-Courcelette in the First World War and the inevitable realization that horses were no match for the beasts of steel that opposed them on the battlefield. Indeed, many western nations took their cavalry and either armored them or relayed them to be ceremonial following the Great War. If these nations retained cavalry into the Second World War, they eventually were phased out. These nations included Poland, Belgium, and Russia, among others. The broader matter of cavalry becoming obsolete in the face of metal and technology was an inevitable truth of modern warfare. However, the prevalence and continuation of the use of the horse within the German Army in the Second World War and furthermore into the twentieth century, was in part due to engrained tradition and regulatory circumstance following the First World War. This positioning, and the undeniable mobility advantages of the horse placed the animal to retain a prominent role in the German Army. The German Cavalry The cavalry3 was an essential military component in armies once man understood how to harness the power of the horse and utilize that power on the battlefield. A man on a horse is not only bigger, but faster and more terrifying than a man on foot. Although the horse presented a 2 Hart, Peter. The Somme: The Darkest Hour on the Western Front (New York, NY: Pegasus Books, 2010), 407 3 Appendix: Image 15 McFarland 7 larger target, and stopping the horse would stop the man, larger horses carried more weight and thus more equipment. An impressive figure, a man on horse could not only ram into his enemies but could leap over obstacles and utilize his horse’s hooves to inflict damage along with his weapons. Cavalry has its roots in the ancient civilizations such as the Sumerians in Mesopotamia and the Egyptians, whose warriors used horses to pull war chariots. The Persians rode against the Greek infantry in 4th century BC, without armor or stirrups. Elite, aristocratic horsemen were enlisted into the Macedonian cavalry, a heavily armored and impressive force.4 European cavalry is thought to be dated to the fifth century BC, and it continued to be a prominent component of European militaries up until the late 1800s.5 The Franco-Prussian War can be considered the last continuous cavalry dependent conflict, where the operations were cavalry-on-cavalry.6 By the end of the nineteenth century and into World War I, western nations still fielded cavalry units and divisions, but they adapted to newer technologies and transitioned to fighting on foot, the United States cavalry during the civil war being a prime example.7 By the turn of the twentieth century, the romanticism of the cavalry was dying out, as military leaders began to consult the effectiveness of the cavalry as it related to working against and with infantry.
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