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Weekly Iraq .Xplored Report 14 Mar 2020

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Weekly Iraq .Xplored report 14 Mar 2020 Prepared by Risk Analysis Team, Iraq garda.com Confidential and proprietary © GardaWorld Weekly Iraq .Xplored Report 14 Mar 2020 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................................................................... 2 ACTIVITY MAP .................................................................................................................................................... 3 OUTLOOK ............................................................................................................................................................. 4 Short term outlook ............................................................................................................................................. 4 Medium to long term outlook ............................................................................................................................ 5 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS ...................................................................................................................................... 6 US-Iran tensions culminate in multiple airstrikes ........................................................................................... 6 THREAT MATRIX ................................................................................................................................................ 6 OVERVIEW............................................................................................................................................................ 7 Security ............................................................................................................................................................... 7 Political ................................................................................................................................................................ 7 Economy ............................................................................................................................................................. 8 WEEKLY OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT .................................................................................................... 9 Countrywide Military/Security Situation .......................................................................................................... 9 ACRONYM LIST ................................................................................................................................................ 16 GARDAWORLD INFORMATION SERVICES .............................................................................................. 17 GARDAWORLD.................................................................................................................................................. 17 This report is an abridged version of GardaWorld Weekly Iraq .Xplored Report. To subscribe to the full versions of the daily/weekly Iraq .Xplored reports, or for enquires relating to other GardaWorld services, please contact [email protected] Disclaimer: The information and opinions expressed in this Report are the views of GardaWorld and constitute a judgment as at the date of the Report and are subject to change without notice. The information and opinions expressed in this Report have been formed in good faith on the basis of the best information and intelligence available at the time of writing, but no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made as to its accuracy, completeness or correctness. GardaWorld accepts no liability arising out of or in connection with the comments made or the information set out in this Report and the reader is advised that any decision taken to act or not to act in reliance on this Report is taken solely at the reader’s own risk. In particular, the comments in this Report should not be construed as advice, legal or otherwise. Confidential and proprietary © GardaWorld [2] garda.com Weekly Iraq .Xplored Report 14 Mar 2020 ACTIVITY MAP Confidential and proprietary © GardaWorld [3] garda.com Weekly Iraq .Xplored Report 14 Mar 2020 OUTLOOK Short term outlook ▪ Health related concerns as a result of COVID-19 have been at the forefront of media reporting throughout Iraq. Official figures though regularly updated are likely to lag behind the situation on the ground and as such, cases are expected to increase in the short term. The fatality rate remains low with the elderly and immunosuppressed individuals in higher risk categories. As Turkish and Qatari authorities have banned entry for individuals travelling from Iraq within 14 days of arrival (although transit passengers are still permitted through Qatar) it is a realistic possibility that air travel will be further restricted should cases exponentially increase. However, the quarantine period as directed by WHO is 14 days and these restrictions are likely to be lifted as soon as practicable to maintain commercial capability. ▪ Activity between US and Iranian interests recently spiked following a relative lull and resulted in an IDF attack on Taji military base, 17km north of Baghdad on Mar 11 killing two US and one British soldier in addition to wounding 12 others. Shortly after the strike on Taji, retaliatory IDF on a PMF base at the Syrian-Iraq border in Al-Hassyan, Albukamal resulted in the death of 18 PMF soldiers- however the US denied involvement. That said, on Mar 13, five strikes were conducted on Kataib Hezbollah affiliated weapon facilities prompting a second attack on Al Taji camp on Mar 14. Prior to this the majority of incidents involved harassing IDF attacks targeting the IZ- the most recent recorded on Mar 05. A period of friction between US and Iran culminated in a US led strike on Qassem Soleimani, the Commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and Deputy Commander of the Popular Mobilisation Force (PMF), Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who was also the leader of Kata’ib Hezbollah IVO Baghdad International Airport on Jan 03. Initially inhibited by the US swift retribution effective kinetic activity decreased. However, it is probable that Iran will continue to use its proxy- militias in Iraq to launch periodic IDF and asymmetric attacks against US and western interests in Iraq and the wider Middle East to afford Tehran a degree of non-culpability. The US strike on multiple KH affiliated weapon facilities will likely trigger retaliatory attack and as such the threat to US and western assets in Iraq from Iranian sponsored Shia militia groups remains heightened in the short to medium term. ▪ Fatal demonstrations that occurred throughout the country since protests started on 01 October 2019 have to date left over 550 people dead and as many of 24,000 civilians injured. On Feb 03, President Barham Salih named Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi as the country's new Prime Minister. While initially well received among political parties, he then lost a considerable amount of political support- struggling to establish backing for parliament to pass his government choices. Following three postponements of the parliamentary vote to pass his cabinet choices- Allawi resigned in a letter to Salih on March 02, alleging corruption and sectarianism were his main hurdles in passing a cabinet. As a result, political progress in pursuit of a new government and early elections has stalled as Salih is now forced to choose a new PM designate. MPs reportedly discussed alternative individuals prior to Allawi’s resignation. Should a party affiliated politician step into the role of PM it is highly likely that they will similarly be rejected among protesters. As anti-establishment protests persist demonstrators have continued to become involved in violent clashes anger appears focused not only on the government but also the various militias. It’s highly likely that there will be intermittent flare ups of violence from militia groups as they attempt to assert dominance over the protest movement and crack down on potential escalatory behaviour resorting to use of force. That said, overall attendance at demonstrations has gradually decreased since October 2019 indicating a loss of traction for the protest movement. ▪ Although defeated militarily, IS continues to pose a serious and long-term security threat in Iraq, especially in the northern provinces and Anbar, where high levels of asymmetric activity continue. Following a pause in activity by the US led coalition there was a resultant increase in IS reporting in northern Iraq throughout January however operations recommenced late February. During a largescale operation conducted in the Makhmour Mountains, on Mar 09 two US special forces soldiers in a supporting and advisory role were killed; Confidential and proprietary © GardaWorld [4] garda.com Weekly Iraq .Xplored Report 14 Mar 2020 demonstrating the palpable threat posed by insurgent operatives despite high tempo clearances. It is probable that the reduction in coalition ISR assets targeting IS cells had emboldened IS tactical commanders to consolidate territory and attempt to expand resupply routes and recruitment. The Iraqi government’s inability to function continues to have a detrimental impact on ISF operations enabling further PMU autonomy, exacerbating the marginalization of the Sunni population. The result of this will likely see IS increase the sophistication of their attacks. There remains an enduring, though managed, threat by IS in Baghdad, highlighted by three insurgent attributed attacks in the
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