_________________________________________________________________________Swansea University E-Theses The collapsing pillar: Jimmy Carter and US foreign policy towards Iran, 1977-1981. Rees, Samuel Huw How to cite: _________________________________________________________________________ Rees, Samuel Huw (2013) The collapsing pillar: Jimmy Carter and US foreign policy towards Iran, 1977-1981.. thesis, Swansea University. http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa43014 Use policy: _________________________________________________________________________ This item is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms of the repository licence: copies of full text items may be used or reproduced in any format or medium, without prior permission for personal research or study, educational or non-commercial purposes only. The copyright for any work remains with the original author unless otherwise specified. The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holder. Permission for multiple reproductions should be obtained from the original author. Authors are personally responsible for adhering to copyright and publisher restrictions when uploading content to the repository. Please link to the metadata record in the Swansea University repository, Cronfa (link given in the citation reference above.) http://www.swansea.ac.uk/library/researchsupport/ris-support/ The Collapsing Pillar Jimmy Carter and US foreign policy towards Iran, 1977-1981 Samuel Huw Rees Submitted to Swansea University in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Swansea University 2013 ProQuest Number: 10821404 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 10821404 Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 SUMMARY (ABSTRACT) The continuing diplomatic impasse between the United States and Iran dates back to the turbulent events of the late 1970s. Blame for the ‘loss’ of Iran, which had been one of the ‘twin pillars’ of US strategy in the Persian Gulf, has inevitably fallen on the White House incumbent at the time, President Jimmy Carter. This thesis offers a reassessment of Carter’s decision making and his responses to the fall of the Shah, the Islamic Revolution and the US embassy hostage taking. It demonstrates that the breakdown of US-Iranian relations was not simply a one-president phenomenon and, more significantly, Carter’s handling of Iran was not as dire as it is often portrayed. The research is based on a thorough examination of the available archive material, including newly released documents, as well as recent interviews with the major protagonists. When Carter took office in 1977 he inherited a badly creaking Iranian pillar that was soon to collapse altogether. The flawed policies of his predecessors placed strict limitations on his administration and unwittingly created a ticking time bomb in the form of the Shah. Despite these restrictions, Carter battled to reconcile the strategic necessities of Cold War containment with his moral principles in areas such as human rights and arms sales. In an administration seemingly dominated by the disagreements amongst his top two advisors, Carter remained the key decision maker at all times. He recognised the practical limits of American power and assumed sensible positions in response to an ever changing and uncontrollable crisis. Aside from its contemporary significance, Iran is therefore critical to Carter’s disputed legacy and how he rates as a foreign policy president. DECLARATIONS AND STATEMENTS DECLARATION: This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree. Signed (candidate) < Date 13 STATEMENT I: This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Where correction services have been used, the extent and nature of the correction is clearly marked in a footnote(s). Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended. Signer (candidate) Date STATEMENT 2: I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations. Signed (candidate) Date CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS p. ii INTRODUCTION p. 1 LITERATURE REVIEW: Portrayals of Carter’s Foreign Policy p. 8 1. The Historical Roots of American Involvement in Iran p. 17 2. The Cold War and American Support for the Shah p. 46 3. Carter’s Iranian Inheritance p. 74 4. Strategic Realities versus Moral Values: p. 100 Arms Sales and Human Rights 5. Limited Intelligence: p. 134 The Onset of the Iranian Revolution 6. Reacting to Iran: US responses 1978 p. 166 7. Reacting to Iran: US responses 1979 p. 192 8. The Decision to Admit the Shah into the United States p. 217 9. Held Hostage by Khomeini: p. 248 Launching Operation Eagle Claw CONCLUSION p. 295 BIBLIOGRAPHY p. 304 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First and foremost from an academic standpoint I am deeply indebted to my supervisor, Professor Jon Roper, who has been with me every step of the way since October 2006 when I started as a part-time student. Jon has been a great source of encouragement and wisdom throughout, often going above and beyond the call of duty, particularly when I moved away from the area and again following his recent retirement. He always challenged me to improve every facet of my work and there is no doubt that without such a knowledgeable and dedicated influence I would not have completed the final thesis to the standard I have. Thanks a lot Jon, hopefully I repaid the favour somewhat by successfully teaching your eldest daughter Caitlin! I would also like to thank Dave Bewley-Taylor, for taking over as lead supervisor in the final months and for guiding me through the submission process, and all those in what was the Department of American Studies at Swansea. There are many people in the research and academic community that have aided me over the last six years or more. I would like to offer heartfelt thanks to those who willingly agreed to be interviewed or offer their thoughts to the project; principally Bill Daugherty, Phil Wise, and Henry Precht. The staff at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta, Georgia were extremely helpful during the three weeks I spent there in March and April 2008, none more so than archivist Albert Nason. Thanks also to the kind people at Armstrong Atlantic State University in Savannah and Mercer University in Macon who hosted me as a guest lecturer during my stint in Georgia. I also have to thank my employers over the last six years - Bridgend County Borough Council; Gorseinon College (latterly Gower College Swansea); and South Downs College. All have been supportive in their different ways and have given me time off to take up various opportunities or to attend conferences. Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank all my family, friends, teammates and colleagues who have supported me throughout what for them must have seemed like a torturously long time. Two people in particular who have been ever-present sufferers and supporters; my mother Peta and my wife Jane. Mum has been there during some of the toughest times, encouraging me to keep going and offering her assistance whenever I have needed it. Jane has been forced to live and breathe the project first hand for six years, showing great patience when books and papers have been spread far and wide. Working full-time and completing the thesis in my ‘spare time’ as we have changed jobs, moved houses, got married, and welcomed our son loan Gareth into the world, has not been easy and we have had to forgo a lot of things in order for me to complete it. My family and friends have been my rock and needless to say that I owe you all a great deal of thanks; I could not have achieved what I have done without you. SHR, February 2013. ii Dedicated to the memory of my father Professor Gareth Rees (1951-2008) He inspired me to undertake my own research, then encouraged and guided me for the first two years until he passed away in2008 after a long struggle against cancer. His strength and belief in my ability has driven me on towards the finishing line and enabled me to negotiate the many difficult times during the last few years. INTRODUCTION The roots of the fragile US-Iranian relationship can be found in the seminal events of the late 1970s, events that continue to echo in their historical importance today. For many commentators, contemporary US foreign policy towards Iran and Iran’s position in the international community is still defined by what happened over thirty years ago. Understanding the relationship between the US and Iran today is simply not possible without consideration of their past interactions and encounters, particularly those that occurred during the one-term presidency of Jimmy Carter from 1977-81. On 7 April 1980, five months after the US embassy in Tehran was overrun by Iranian militants and American diplomats were taken hostage, the US government formally broke off diplomatic relations with Iran. For over thirty years the state of play has remained unchanged and currently shows little prospect of improvement in the near future.