DOCSLIB.ORG

“They Came in Droves. . .”

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
“They Came in Droves. . .” CHAPTER 4 “They came in droves. .” It is not clear at which point in time the Japanese became cog - nizant of the activities of the radar picket ships. Perhaps they were too preoccupied with the overall campaign to stop the American landing on Okinawa in the early days of April, or perhaps because of their failure to stop the invasion despite the magnitude of their first massed raid, the Japanese air forces had neglected to identify the specific locations of the radar picket ships. By the end of Kikusui # 2 , however, the radar picket ships had not escaped their attention. They noted that at “the same time [ Kikusui # 2 ], mea - sures were adopted by the enemy to counterattack our attack units by employing radar patrol ships. ”1 This led to the decision to utilize kamikazes during the evening hours when they would have fewer CAP planes with which to contend. Additional attacks on the bases at Yontan and Kadena would ensure air supremacy over the area. 2 To combat the night-time attacks, the TAF began to utilize the marine night fighter squadrons based on Okinawa. Beginning in the evening of 14 April F6F-5N Hellcat night-fighters from VMF(N) 543 began operating in the night skies around Okinawa. The first flights that evening began at 2045 and lasted until 0550 the next day. During the daylight hours, a new two plane radar picket patrol would begin flying continuous cover over three of the radar picket stations. A few days later, on 16 April, the coverage was increased to five radar picket stations. Saturday, 14 April 1945 On RP Station # 1, the light minelayer J. W. Ditter , LCS(L)s 51 , and 116 patrolled without incident. At 1612 the destroyer Laffey 155 156 Kamikazes, Corsairs, and Picket Ships relieved J. W. Ditter and within twenty minutes picked up eight planes approaching from the north. She notified Bryant on RP Station # 2 which controlled the CAP and the fighters were vec - tored to intercept the Japanese planes. The CAP splashed all eight. At 1650 Laffey picked up three or four more bogeys. Bryant turned over control of the CAP to Laffey which vectored them toward the planes. They shot down three Zekes. Patrolling RP Station # 3 were Hudson and LCS(L)s 38 , 111 , and 118 . Overhead a division of F6F-5 Hellcats from VC-30, based on Belleau Wood , was on patrol. The Hellcats were led by Ens. J.J. Noel. At 1410 the Hudson picked up incoming bogeys and vectored them twenty miles to the northwest for interception. There the Hellcat pilots found two Bettys at 8,000 feet and another at 4,000 feet. The Bettys were part of a flight of seven that had taken off from Kanoya. Flying cover for the twin engine bombers was a Zeke at 19,000 feet. Ensign H.A. Lee took off after the Zeke. He made a high side run on the enemy plane, fired a burst into the engine and it began to smoke. The pilot soon bailed out and the Zeke went down. Noel caught one of the Bettys from the side and got several bursts into the starboard wing and engine. It soon exploded, breaking the wing off and sending it spiraling toward the ocean. The other Betty tried to avoid destruction by diving from 8,000 feet. It was unsuccessful as Ens. K.W. Curry caught up with it, hitting its wing root and fuselage. The Betty went down. The third Betty, under attack by Ens. R.L. Rhodes and flying at 4,000 feet, plummeted into the sea after being hit in both engines. One of the Bettys had been carry - ing an Oka which it jettisoned in order to escape. The Oka was seen to hit the water without making any attempt to fly. The VF-30 Hellcats returned to Belleau Wood at 1443 . Later in the day, at 1854, two enemy planes approached the station. Hudson vectored the CAP to intercept them; one was shot down and one escaped to the south. Radar Picket Station # 4 was patrolled by the high speed minesweeper Ellyson , the destroyer Wickes , and LCS(L)s 12 , 39 , 40 , and 119. In the early morning hours, between 0310 and 0417, enemy planes were in the area but none attacked the ships; one fell victim to a night fighter at 0310. Randolph launched two divisions of VF-12 Hellcats at 1330. As they arrived in the vicinity of the station one division, led by Lt. “They came in droves. .” 157 H.E. Vita, spotted a Zeke below them which had just evaded some other Hellcats. Vita dove toward the Zeke and fired on it from an 11 o ’clock position, hitting the Japanese plane with several bursts. The Zeke continued on its course, attempting to escape from the Hellcats, and Vita was able to get behind him and fire again. The cockpit area of the plane burst into flames and it crashed into the sea. Sunday, 15 April 1945 Kikusui # 3 was scheduled for 15 to 16 April and would include a total of 165 kamikaze aircraft. Of these, 120 would be navy and 45 army. They were from the First, Third, Fifth, and Tenth Air Fleets, and the Sixth Air Army and would fly from the fields north of Okinawa on Kyushu and Tokuno Shima, as well as from Taiwan to the south. At least three hundred other aircraft would fly regular attack and escort missions as well. Ugaki issued the following order for the attack: “TEN Operation Order 145. ” dated 16 April X Day for Kikusui # 3 Operation is the 16th. All units will operate as follows: (1) At dawn the forward fighter unit and the Army fighter unit will carry out strafing attacks on the Yontan and Katena airfields. (2) [Word missing] medium bomber unit will attack Naha and [word missing] around Okinawa. (3) Medium bombers and flying boats will carry out night patrols in accordance with previous orders. When they have located the enemy carrier group, medium bombers will carry out night attacks. (4) [Word missing], medium bombers and torpedo bombers will cooperate with Army [medium bombers] in bombing the Yontan and Katena airfields. (5) [Word missing] will also carry out strafing attacks on the Yontan and Katena airfields. (6) The reconnaissance unit will take off and find the enemy striking force and thereafter will endeavor to maintain contact and to cooperate with the units scheduled to attack during the day. (7) The fighter unit which is to cooperate with the Anchorage Attack Unit will operate as follows: 158 Kamikazes, Corsairs, and Picket Ships (a) The [word missing] unit will take off at [time missing] and provide cover along the route to be taken by the attack unit. (b) The [word missing] unit will take off at [time uncer - tain] and provide cover over [place names missing]. (8) The Anchorage Attack Unit (including ten torpedo bombers) will take off from its bases so as to complete its attacks between 0930 and 1000; the objective of the attacks will be Katena roadstead. (9) The attack unit which is to attack the enemy striking force and its covering fighter unit will take off [word missing] and carry out daytime attacks on the striking force. (10) #11 Force fighters will carry out [word missing] against the striking force. (11) Army forces which are to assist in this operation are as follows: Forward fighter unit — 12 planes Covering fighter unit — 30 planes Airfield bombing unit — 8 planes Suicide attack unit — about 30 planes 3 Poor weather and American carrier planes delayed the start of the main attack until about 1630 on 15 April. At 1400 on the 15th, eighty American planes from Task Force 58 pulled a surprise raid on the southern Kyushu airfields, delaying the Kikusui raiders. Destroyed in the attack were fifty-one aircraft on the ground, with another twenty-nine shot down. 4 The Japanese were not sure if the American planes had come from the carriers or from Kadena and Yontan, since they carried auxiliary gas tanks. In actuality, the first long range marine raids from the Okinawa fields did not occur until 10 June. 5 Although the assumption by the Japanese about the origins of these raids was incorrect, they made sure that Yontan and Kadena were on their hit list. In a message sent to all units under his command on 15 April, Admiral Ugaki claimed that sup - pression of the American planes at Yontan and Kadena would be the deciding factor in the success of Kikusui # 3. The army ’s 100th Air Brigade sent eleven fighters to raid the marine airfields. At 1840 they strafed the fields, damaging planes and equipment at both Yontan and Kadena. Eight of the Japanese planes did not make it back and one made an emergency landing at Kikaiga Shima. A few minutes after that attack, ten Zekes roared in from the Kyushu airfields and continued the bombing and straf - “They came in droves. .” 159 ing. At 2100 the 60th Air Brigade followed up the earlier attack by sending four heavy bombers to attack Yontan. All four of the Japanese bombers made it back to their base but they had been badly shot up. An hour later eight Betty bombers made still anoth - er attack. MAG-31 reported ten planes damaged. In a final attack, four Zekes and twelve Judys bombed and strafed the marine air - fields the next morning at 0300. They dropped 500 pound bombs on the runways and started several fires Bryant and LCS(L)s 32 and 35 patrolled on RP Station # 2 on 15 April.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Third Battle
    NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT PAPERS 16 The Third Battle Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines N ES AV T A A L T W S A D R E C T I O N L L U E E G H E T R I VI IBU OR A S CT MARI VI Owen R. Cote, Jr. Associate Director, MIT Security Studies Program The Third Battle Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines Owen R. Cote, Jr. Associate Director, MIT Security Studies Program NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, Rhode Island Naval War College The Newport Papers are extended research projects that the Newport, Rhode Island Editor, the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, and the Center for Naval Warfare Studies President of the Naval War College consider of particular Newport Paper Number Sixteen interest to policy makers, scholars, and analysts. Candidates 2003 for publication are considered by an editorial board under the auspices of the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies. President, Naval War College Rear Admiral Rodney P. Rempt, U.S. Navy Published papers are those approved by the Editor of the Press, the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, and the President Provost, Naval War College Professor James F. Giblin of the Naval War College. Dean of Naval Warfare Studies The views expressed in The Newport Papers are those of the Professor Alberto R. Coll authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy. Naval War College Press Editor: Professor Catherine McArdle Kelleher Correspondence concerning The Newport Papers may be Managing Editor: Pelham G.
    [Show full text]
  • Ship Hull Classification Codes
    Ship Hull Classification Codes Warships USS Constitution, Maine, and Texas MSO Minesweeper, Ocean AKA Attack Cargo Ship MSS Minesweeper, Special (Device) APA Attack Transport PC Patrol Coastal APD High Speed Transport PCE Patrol Escort BB Battleship PCG Patrol Chaser Missile CA Gun Cruiser PCH Patrol Craft (Hydrofoil) CC Command Ship PF Patrol Frigate CG Guided Missile Cruiser PG Patrol Combatant CGN Guided Missile Cruiser (Nuclear Propulsion) PGG Patrol Gunboat (Missile) CL Light Cruiser PGH Patrol Gunboat (Hydrofoil) CLG Guided Missile Light Cruiser PHM Patrol Combatant Missile (Hydrofoil) CV Multipurpose Aircraft Carrier PTF Fast Patrol Craft CVA Attack Aircraft Carrier SS Submarine CVE Escort Aircraft Carrier SSAG Auxiliary Submarine CVHE Escort Helicopter Aircraft Carrier SSBN Ballistic Missile Submarine (Nuclear Powered) CVL Light Carrier SSG Guided Missile Submarine CVN Multipurpose Aircraft Carrier (Nuclear Propulsion) SSN Submarine (Nuclear Powered) CVS ASW Support Aircraft Carrier DD Destroyer DDG Guided Missile Destroyer DE Escort Ship DER Radar Picket Escort Ship DL Frigate EDDG Self Defense Test Ship FF Frigate FFG Guided Missile Frigate FFR Radar Picket Frigate FFT Frigate (Reserve Training) IX Unclassified Miscellaneous LCC Amphibious Command Ship LFR Inshore Fire Support Ship LHA Amphibious Assault Ship (General Purpose) LHD Amphibious Assault Ship (Multi-purpose) LKA Amphibious Cargo Ship LPA Amphibious Transport LPD Amphibious Transport Dock LPH Amphibious Assault Ship (Helicopter) LPR Amphibious Transport, Small LPSS Amphibious Transport Submarine LSD Dock Landing Ship LSM Medium Landing Ship LST Tank Landing Ship MCM Mine Countermeasure Ship MCS Mine Countermeasure Support Ship MHC Mine Hunter, Coastal MMD Mine Layer, Fast MSC Minesweeper, Coastal (Nonmagnetic) MSCO Minesweeper, Coastal (Old) MSF Minesweeper, Fleet Steel Hulled 10/17/03 Copyright (C) 2003.
    [Show full text]
  • Kamikazes: the Soviet Legacy
    Naval War College Review Volume 67 Article 7 Number 1 Winter 2014 Kamikazes: The oS viet Legacy Maksim Y. Tokarev Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Tokarev, Maksim Y. (2014) "Kamikazes: The oS viet Legacy," Naval War College Review: Vol. 67 : No. 1 , Article 7. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss1/7 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Tokarev: Kamikazes: The Soviet Legacy KAZ mikA es The Soviet Legacy Maksim Y. Tokarev hroughout history, despite the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s concepts, continental European and Asian navies have had a simple choice to make: Teither to create a balanced fleet to engage another balanced fleet at sea and defeat it in one or more “decisive battles” or to take an “asymmetrical approach,” creat- ing an “unbalanced” navy, able to prevent the enemy from achieving sea control and to keep one’s own vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs), if one has any, untouched by the enemy’s naval forces. In the case of Russia, the era of a blue-water, balanced navy ended with defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Russia did not lose the capability to build capital ships, nor did the context for their employment evaporate.
    [Show full text]
  • Newport Paper 38
    NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT PAPERS 38 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE WAR NAVAL High Seas Buffer The Taiwan Patrol Force, 1950–1979 NEWPORT PAPERS NEWPORT N ES AV T A A L T W S A D R E C T I O L N L U E E G H E T I VIRIBU OR A S CT MARI VI 38 Bruce A. Elleman Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile Composite Default screen U.S. GOVERNMENT Cover OFFICIAL EDITION NOTICE This perspective aerial view of Newport, Rhode Island, drawn and published by Galt & Hoy of New York, circa 1878, is found in the American Memory Online Map Collections: 1500–2003, of the Library of Congress Geography and Map Division, Washington, D.C. The map may be viewed at http://hdl.loc.gov/ loc.gmd/g3774n.pm008790. Use of ISBN Prefix This is the Official U.S. Government edition of this publication and is herein identified to certify its authenticity. ISBN 978-1-884733-95-6 is for this U.S. Government Printing Office Official Edition only. The Superintendent of Documents of the U.S. Government Printing Office requests that any reprinted edition clearly be labeled as a copy of the authentic work with a new ISBN. Legal Status and Use of Seals and Logos The logo of the U.S. Naval War College (NWC), Newport, Rhode Island, authenticates High Seas Buffer: The Taiwan Patrol Force, 1950–1979, by Bruce A. Elleman, as an official publication of the College. It is prohibited to use NWC’s logo on any republication of this book without the express, written permission of the Editor, Naval War College Press, or the editor’s designee.
    [Show full text]
  • Radar—New Eyes for the Fleet
    CHAPTER 1 Radar—New Eyes for the Fleet Beginnings of Radar May Day—24 October 1944 apanese scout planes found the ships of Admiral Frederick C. Sherman's Task Group 38.3 early in the morning of 24 October 1944,90 miles east of Manila, protecting the JU.S. Army invasion of Leyte Island. Soon after the sighting, the 51 Zero fighters of Number 3 Protective Squadron began turning up their engines. They were to fly top cover for the dive bombers and torpedo planes of the Imperial Japanese Naval Air Force's First Attack Group that had been assembled to annihilate the task group. The first of the 187 plane raid, the precursors of 'Operation Victory,' a massed air and sea offensive by which Imperial General Headquarters intended to reverse the fortunes of the Pacific war, broke ground from Mabalacat and Bamu Bamu Airfields near Manila at 0635 [108, pp. 174-175]. At 0807 air search radar screens on the carrier Essex began to light up with a large num- ber of targets 75 miles to the west, and ranging in altitude from 1,000 to 25,000 feet [108, p.xi]. The radar operators in each ship of the task force began sharing the radar tracking load, with each tracking only targets in an assigned wedge-shaped bearing sector. As the operators detected a new target, plotting officers assigned the target an identity (friendly, foe, or unknown) and a track number designating the reporting ship and the sequence in which it had been detected. Each ship announced the radar ranges, bearings, estimated altitudes, and identities of the targets in its sector by voice calls over a shared radio channel.
    [Show full text]
  • Naval Accidents 1945-1988, Neptune Papers No. 3
    -- Neptune Papers -- Neptune Paper No. 3: Naval Accidents 1945 - 1988 by William M. Arkin and Joshua Handler Greenpeace/Institute for Policy Studies Washington, D.C. June 1989 Neptune Paper No. 3: Naval Accidents 1945-1988 Table of Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1 Overview ........................................................................................................................................ 2 Nuclear Weapons Accidents......................................................................................................... 3 Nuclear Reactor Accidents ........................................................................................................... 7 Submarine Accidents .................................................................................................................... 9 Dangers of Routine Naval Operations....................................................................................... 12 Chronology of Naval Accidents: 1945 - 1988........................................................................... 16 Appendix A: Sources and Acknowledgements........................................................................ 73 Appendix B: U.S. Ship Type Abbreviations ............................................................................ 76 Table 1: Number of Ships by Type Involved in Accidents, 1945 - 1988................................ 78 Table 2: Naval Accidents by Type
    [Show full text]
  • USN Ship Designations
    USN Ship Designations By Guy Derdall and Tony DiGiulian Updated 17 September 2010 Nomenclature History Warships in the United States Navy were first designated and numbered in system originating in 1895. Under this system, ships were designated as "Battleship X", "Cruiser X", "Destroyer X", "Torpedo Boat X" and so forth where X was the series hull number as authorized by the US Congress. These designations were usually abbreviated as "B-1", "C-1", "D-1", "TB-1," etc. This system became cumbersome by 1920, as many new ship types had been developed during World War I that needed new categories assigned, especially in the Auxiliary ship area. On 17 July 1920, Acting Secretary of the Navy Robert E. Coontz approved a standardized system of alpha-numeric symbols to identify ship types such that all ships were now designated with a two letter code and a hull number, with the first letter being the ship type and the second letter being the sub-type. For example, the destroyer tender USS Melville, first commissioned as "Destroyer Tender No. 2" in 1915, was now re-designated as "AD-2" with the "A" standing for Auxiliary, the "D" for Destroyer (Tender) and the "2" meaning the second ship in that series. Ship types that did not have a subclassification simply repeated the first letter. So, Battleships became "BB-X" and Destroyers became "DD-X" with X being the same number as previously assigned. Ships that changed classifications were given new hull numbers within their new designation series. The designation "USS" standing for "United States Ship" was adopted in 1907.
    [Show full text]
  • Distant Early Warning Line Radars: the Quest for Automatic Signal Detection
    • NAKA AND WARD Distant-Early-Warning Line Radars: The Quest for Automatic Signal Detection Distant Early Warning Line Radars: The Quest for Automatic Signal Detection F. Robert Naka and William W. Ward I In the early 1950s, the threat of manned bombers carrying nuclear weapons across the arctic region was of paramount concern in continental defense. The 1952 Summer Study at MIT recommended the development of an early- warning radar line across the northern reaches of Alaska and Canada, from Cape Lisburne on the northwest corner of Alaska to Cape Dyer on Baffin Island on the east coast of Canada. It was an ambitious undertaking, particularly since the radar system had not yet been developed or designed and a new detection process had yet to be invented. Among other innovations the radar net was proposed to use automatic-detection techniques to reduce drastically the heavy manpower requirements and unacceptable time delays characteristic of manual radar operations of the period. After the U.S. Air Force accepted the Summer Study recommendation in December 1952, Lincoln Laboratory was contracted to deliver ten radar sets by 30 April 1953, a period of less than five months. F. Robert Naka was assigned the task of developing the automated radar signal processing and alarm system. The article reviews the primary author’s experiences with this challenging radar project. While the technical problems sound primitive in view of today’s radar capabilities, they were met and solved at a pace that was easily ten times faster than today’s Department of Defense developments. .. sponsored Project critical component of defense against manned bomb- Charles, a study chaired by F.
    [Show full text]
  • Navy Filing Manual, 1950
    fC NAVY FILING MANUAL FIFTH EDITION 19050 ( NAVEXOS P-20(Rev.) i Administrative Office NAVY DEPARTMENT - - Washington 25, D. C. ( THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Washington 10 February 1950. From: Secretary of the Navy. To: All Ships and Stations. Subj: Navy Filing Manual, Fifth Edition, NAVEXOS P-20 (REV). 1. The Secretary of the Navy on 5 July 1923 directed that the Navy Filing Manual be adopted for use and placed in effect in the Naval Establishment. The original edition was fol­ lowed by the Second (1931), Third (1939), and Fourth (1941) Editions, each of which super­ _3 _ A.I__ * o-Aj2 seded the previous edition. 2. The Fifth Edition of the Navy Filing Manual supersedes the Fourth Edition and may be Establishment Edition shall be installed in the Naval placed in effect upon receipt. The Fifth from the Administrative by 1 January 1951. Assistance in making installations is available Officer, Navy Department, from Records Officers in the several Bureaus and Offices and in in the from District Records Management Officers Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, and present files In installing the Fifth Edition of the Manual, Headquarters of each Naval District. should remain unchanged under the system now in use, whether that prescribed by the Fourth Edition or otherwise; instead, installation should take the form of establishing a new series of files as of a convenient date (e.g., 1 July 1950 or 1 January 1951). 3. The filing system presented in this Manual is intended as a basic framework, as explained in the instructions thereto. The Manual may be expanded or supplemented by local instrue­ set forth in this Edition are not counter to the rocedures oitns rovided such instructions Bureaus and Offices and the U.
    [Show full text]
  • Background the Electromagnetic Spectrum and Air Operations
    AOC ISSUE REPORT E-2 HAWKEYE ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT INTEGRATION BACKGROUND The E-2 Hawkeye is an American all-weather, carrier-capable tactical airborne early warning and control (AEW/C) aircraft. Developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s, its mission was to be an airborne radar picket system to detect aircraft, ships and vehicles at long ranges and perform command and control of the battlespace in an air engagement by directing fighter and attack aircraft strikes. The E-2 has also been used to carry out surveillance, including over ground targets and frequently perform command and control, battle management (C2BM) func- tions similar to air traffic control. The most recent variant of the E-2, currently still in production, is the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye. It incorporated arguably the most capable airborne sensor sys- tems ever designed and produced—and the core of the air defense mission of the carrier strike group. One can immediately understand the traditional role of the E-2. A strike package, or no-fly zone package launches from the carrier. The E-2, in cooperation with cruisers and destroyers at- tached to the carrier battle group, provide an air and surface picture, directing fighters to enemy aircraft, and also helping to provide the combat identification (positive identification), of enemy aircraft, which allows for proper weapon target pairing. It was the APS-145 radar (and the new APY-9 radar) on the spinning disk atop the E-2 that was the key detection system. But with the increased capability of the E-2, especially with its AN/ALQ-217 electronic support measures system, the E-2 is able to be a key player in the electronic warfare aspects of air operations.
    [Show full text]
  • Operation Deep Freeze the Weather Picket Ships As Part of The
    Operation Deep Freeze The Weather Picket Ships As part of the International Geophysical Year and subsequent to, scientific research in Antarctica became a permanent operation. The United States used mainly aircraft for transportation during Operation Deep Freeze between Christchurch and McMurdo Sound. This meant that aircraft had to fly over the 4000km route with practically no weather information available to them. The US Navy decided to station weather picket ships 700km south of Campbell Island at 60 South, 160 East (midway between New Zealand and Antarctica) to provide: • Weather and upper air conditions, for aircraft flying between Christchurch and McMurdo Station. • TACAN (Tactical Air Navigation) - navigation beacons for these aircraft. • Search and rescue operations in case of aircraft emergencies. • Deliver and collect mail and supplies at Campbell Island, a sub-Antarctic New Zealand weather station. The Edsall class destroyer escort, radar picket ships (DERs) were chosen to perform this task as they had been completely modified for this role in the 1950's. Upgraded communications, radars and navigation equipment were installed on approximately 34 ships out of the original class of 85 (DEs), including a high freeboard. The first two picket ships on station, USS Brough and USS Peterson were not completely modified. USS Brough 1951 USS Brough 1956 – thicker foremast and updated radars USS Peterson USS Mills The completely modified DERs as shown on USS Mills, had radar updates and a high freeboard. On the foremast at the top is the AN/SPS-28 Air Search Radar. Below that is the AN/SPS-10 Surface Search Radar. On the mainmast at the top is the TACAN and housed in the domes below that are the Passive ECM units.
    [Show full text]
  • Guarding the Cold War Ramparts the U.S
    Naval War College Review Summer 1999 Guarding the Cold War Ramparts The U.S. Navy’s Role in Continental Air Defense Captain Joseph F. Bouchard, U.S. Navy HOMELAND DEFENSE WAS PUSHED to the top of the national security agenda when in August 1998 North Korea’s flight test of its Taep’o- dong 1 ballistic missile sparked a renewed debate over national missile defense. The Navy has become embroiled in that debate because its theater ballistic missile defense programs could provide a foundation for developing a sea-based national missile defense. It is seldom remembered that the Navy in the recent past took on a significant homeland defense mission—continental air defense. The Navy excelled at the continental air defense mission but found it difficult to reconcile with its other missions of sea control, power projection, and forward presence. That experience is worth examining as we contemplate our role in national defense today. The Cold War took a serious turn for the worse in 1954. During the early postwar years, the United States had been able to rely on superior military technology, particularly its sole possession of nuclear weapons, to counter the huge Soviet armies threatening Western Europe. The United States possessed an arsenal of long-range bombers and carrier-based naval aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. The Soviets had exploded their first atomic device in 1949, but they lacked credible delivery systems to threaten the United States directly. In 1954, however, American superiority in delivery systems appeared to disappear almost overnight. On 15 February 1954, Aviation Week published a sensational article describing powerful new Soviet bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons at 1 intercontinental ranges.
    [Show full text]