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Çin Ulusal Kimliği Ve Bölgesel Stratejileri: Uluslararası Sistemdeki

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Çin Ulusal Kimliği Ve Bölgesel Stratejileri: Uluslararası Sistemdeki T. C. ULUDAĞ ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER BİLİM DALI ÇİN ULUSAL KİMLİĞİ VE BÖLGESEL STRATEJİLERİ: ULUSLARARASI SİSTEMDEKİ NORMATİF DEĞİŞİME ETKİLERİ (DOKTORA TEZİ) Mustafa Tüter BURSA- 2016 U.Ü. SOSYAL U.Ü. BİLİMLER İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM ULUSLARARASI ULUSLARARASI ENSTİTÜSÜ DALI T. C. ULUDAĞ ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER BİLİM DALI ÇİN ULUSAL KİMLİĞİ ÇİN STRATEJİLERİ: VE BÖLGESEL ULUSLARARASI SİSTEMDEKİ NORMATİF DEĞİŞİME SİSTEMDEKİ NORMATİF ULUSLARARASI ÇİN ULUSAL KİMLİĞİ VE BÖLGESEL STRATEJİLERİ: ULUSLARARASI SİSTEMDEKİ NORMATİF DEĞİŞİME (DOKTORA TEZİ) ETKİLERİ ETKİLERİ (DOKTORA TEZİ) Mustafa TÜTER Mustafa Tüter Mustafa BURSA 2016 BURSA - 2016 T. C. ULUDAĞ ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER BİLİM DALI ÇİN ULUSAL KİMLİĞİ VE BÖLGESEL STRATEJİLERİ: ULUSLARARASI SİSTEMDEKİ NORMATİF DEĞİŞİME ETKİLERİ (DOKTORA TEZİ) Mustafa TÜTER Danışman Prof. Dr. Göksel İŞYAR BURSA - 2016 T. C. ULUDAĞ ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜNE Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı’nda 711016006 numaralı Mustafa TÜTER’in hazırladığı “Çin Ulusal Kimliği ve Bölgesel Stratejileri: Uluslararası Sistemdeki Normatif Değişime Etkileri” konulu Doktora Tezi ile ilgili tez savunma sınavı, -------------------- günü -------------- saatleri arasında yapılmış, sorulan sorulara alınan cevaplar sonunda adayın tezinin ………………………........... (başarılı/başarısız) olduğuna …………………………(oybirliği/oy çokluğu) ile karar verilmiştir. Yemin Metni Doktora tezi olarak sunduğum “Çin Ulusal Kimliği ve Bölgesel Stratejileri: Uluslararası Sistemdeki Normatif Değişime Etkileri” Başlıklı çalışmanın bilimsel araştırma, yazma ve etik kurallarına uygun olarak tarafımdan yazıldığına ve tezde yapılan bütün alıntıların kaynaklarının usulüne uygun olarak gösterildiğine, tezimde intihal ürünü cümle veya paragraflar bulunmadığına şerefim üzerine yemin ederim. Tarih ve İmza Adı Soyadı: Mustafa Tüter Öğrenci No: 711016006 Anabilim Dalı: Uluslararası İlişkiler Programı: Uluslararası İlişkiler Statüsü: Doktora ULUDAĞ ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ DOKTORA TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ÖZGÜNLÜK RAPORU ULUDAĞ ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI’NA Tarih: 15/10/2016 Tez Başlığı / Konusu: Çin Ulusal Kimliği ve Bölgesel Stratejileri: Uluslararası Sistemdeki Normatif Değişime Etkileri Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 329 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 04/10/2016 tarihinde şahsım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda belirtilen filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan özgünlük raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı %7‘dir. Uygulanan filtrelemeler: 1- Kaynakça hariç 2- Alıntılar hariç 3- 5 kelimeden daha az örtüşme içeren metin kısımları hariç Uludağ Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Çalışması Özgünlük Raporu Alınması ve Kullanılması Uygulama Esasları’nı inceledim ve bu Uygulama Esasları’nda belirtilen azami benzerlik oranlarına göre tez çalışmamın herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim. Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim. Adı Soyadı: Mustafa TÜTER Tarih ve İmza Öğrenci No: 711016006 Anabilim Dalı: Uluslararası İlişkiler Programı: Uluslararası İlişkiler Statüsü: Y.Lisans Doktora x X Danışman: Prof. Dr. Göksel İŞYAR / 15/10/2016 ÖZET Yazar Adı ve Soyadı : Mustafa Tüter Üniversite : Uludağ Üniversitesi Enstitü : Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Anabilim Dalı : Uluslararası İlişkiler Bilim Dalı : Uluslararası İlişkiler Tezin Niteliği : Doktora Tezi Sayfa Sayısı : XXI+366 Mezuniyet Tarihi : …/…/ 2016 Tez Danışmanı : Prof. Dr. Göksel İŞYAR ÇİN ULUSAL KİMLİĞİ VE BÖLGESEL STRATEJİLERİ: ULUSLARARASI SİSTEMDEKİ NORMATİF DEĞİŞİME ETKİLERİ Bu tezin temel amacı uluslararası sistemde meydana gelen yapısal değişime eşlik eden normatif değişimi mümkün kılan koşulları ortaya çıkarmak ve bu süreçte hangi faktörlerin belirleyici olduğunu incelemektir. Çin’in uluslararası sistemde devam eden değişimi yönetebilme yeteneği, akıllı güç kombinasyonuna dayanan stratejik tercihleriyle yeni bir düzen inşa edebilmesine bağlıdır. Bu çalışmada analitik eklektisizm yöntemine başvurularak, güç geçişi ve güç yayılımı modelleri teorik bir inşa olarak birleştirilmiştir. Bu perspektiften bakıldığında uluslararası sistemdeki değişim, yükselen güçlerin ABD hegemonik düzenine karşı direniş stratejileri geliştirmelerine imkan sağlamaktadır. Gücün normatif yayılımı maliyet dayatan stratejiler izleme iradesini pekiştirirken, gücün materyal dağılımı bunun yapılabilirliğini belirlemektedir. Bununla beraber Çin’in akıllı gücü, diğer yükselen güçler arasında ayrıcalıklı bir konum edinmesine yol açmaktadır. Uluslararası kurumlarda artan etkinliğiyle sağladığı Dışsal Bağdaşım; düşünsel, ekonomik ve askeri güç unsurlarını birleştiren Kapsamlı Ulusal Güç projeksiyonu ve kendine duyduğu özgüvenle geliştirdiği Stratejik Kimlik, Çin akıllı güç kombinasyonunu doğrudan yansıtmaktadır. Öte yandan, Çin, yeni düzen arayışında öncelikle bölgesel düzeyde ulusal çıkarlarına uygun düşecek jeopolitik norm ve pratikler üretmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Barışçıl kalkınma stratejisi, bir yandan Çin’in yükselişi karşısında diğer devletlerin duydukları endişeleri gidermeye yararken, diğer yandan ileride uluslararası sistemi kendi lehine şekillendirecek koşulları hazırlamasına imkan vermektedir. Neticede, Çin’in uluslararası tutumunu belirleyen temel faktör barış içinde bir arada yaşama ilkelerine dayanan diplomatik etkinliği ve üstlendiği düzen inşa edici rol olmuştur. Çin’in diplomatik etkinliğinde çok rollü bir stratejik tutum ortaya çıkmasına rağmen, sergilediği ilkesel duruş başta gelişmekte olan ülkeler olmak üzere diğer aktörler nazarında da meşruiyet kazanmasına yol açmıştır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Çin Ulusal Kimliği, Uluslararası Sistemde Değişim, Çin Akıllı Gücü, Barışçıl Kalkınma, Çin Jeopolitik Muhayyilesi, Analitik Eklektisizm IV ABSTRACT Name and Surname : Mustafa TÜTER University : Uludağ University Institution : Social Science Institution Field : International Relations Branch : International Relations Degree Awarded : PhD Page Number : XXI+366 Degree Date : …. / …. / 2016 Supervisor : Prof. Dr. Göksel İŞYAR CHINESE NATIONAL IDENTITY AND REGIONAL STRATEGIES: IMPLICATIONS TO THE NORMATIVE CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM The main aim of this study is to analyze how the ongoing structural change of material distrubution of power is mutually reinforced by the normative change and which factors mainly determine those processes. China’s capability to manage the proceeding change in the international system basically depends on its ability to construct a new order by its own strategic preferences which are derived from the combination of Chinese smart power. By applying to the analytical eclecticism as a methodological perspective, both power transition and power diffusion models are combined as a theoretical construction. Whereas the normative diffusion of power ensures the will to follow the cost-imposing strategies, the material distribution of power confirms the practicability of them. Besides, the Chinese smart power leads to have an exceptional status among the other new rising powers. The combination of Chinese smart power, directly reflects three elements: its Foreign Coherence provided by the increasing influence in the international institutions, Comprehensive National Power projection combined as the ideational, economic, and military power dynamics, and Strategic Identity improved largely with its increasing self-confidence. Furthermore, China’s search for a new order aims to create its own jeopolitical norms and practices expedient to its national interests by primarily at regional level. Peaceful development strategy, on the one hand serves to counteract the doubts and concerns of other states about the rise of China, but it provides also on the other to make installations that shape the future conditions of international system. Thus China’s contemporary international posture is identified by both its diplomatic influence based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence and by the order making role expediently undertaken. Although the multiple lines of strategic action take place within its diplomatic influence, the fixed principle stance recently displayed by China provides to gain legitimacy in the eyes of developing countries as well as other actors. Keywords: Chinese National Identity, Change in the International System, Chinese Smart Power, Peaceful Development, Analytical Eclecticism V İÇİNDEKİLER TEZ ONAY SAYFASI ........................................................................................................ IV ÖZET.................................................................................................................................... VI ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ VII İÇİNDEKİLER ................................................................................................................. VIII KISALTMALAR ................................................................................................................ XII GİRİŞ ....................................................................................................................................
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