Nagorno-Karabakh

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CSS Analysis in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich No. 131 • April 2013

NAGORNO-KARABAKH: OBSTACLES TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) between Armenia and Azerbaijan remains immune to a political solution despite the two decades of intensive international mediation. The parties to the conflict are using negotiations to buy time and maintain a fragile status quo, even if they find it unfavourable in the long run. The external actors either lack tangible interest in breaking the current political impasse or are unable to do so. The complexity of issues and geopolitical realities around the NK conflict render it intractable and make its resolution ever more challenging.

menia. Increasingly, the NK authorities are becoming impatient with this exclusion from the direct negotiations.

The geopolitical context is not favourable for progress in the OSCE-led peace process either. Russia, Turkey, and the US, the main powerbrokers in the region, seem to be content with the current status quo in light of their own strategic interests. Moreover, they are shaping the power im- balance and arms race through their involvement in the arms trade and security alliances. Despite its intentions to act as a mediator, Iran has only limited options for becoming engaged in peacebuilding in the NK context. The EU has been unoffi- Russia’s ambiguous mediation role: Dmitry Medvedev and the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Ilham cially present through France, but remains Aliev (left) and Serzh Sargsyan (right). Astrakhan, 27 October 2010. Reuters / RIA Novosti largely passive as an institution. Georgia neither has the interest, nor is it well po- Despite the prevalent misperception, the A close look at the reasons why both the sitioned, to contribute to the Nagorno- conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is far from conflict parties and the external actors Karabakh peace process. At this point, being frozen. In the absence of an interna- have an interest in maintaining the sta- power politics seems to have restricted, tional peacekeeping force, the “negative tus quo provides an insight as to why the if not blocked the necessary space for the peace” – that is, the absence of war – in peace process is currently in a stalemate. engagement of another third party. High- Nagorno-Karabakh rests on conventional The governments of Armenia and Azer- level mediation, as ineffective as it has military deterrence and self-regulation by baijan have no real interest in reaching a been, seems to be the prerogative of Rus- the parties. Since 1994, a self-controlled negotiated outcome as proposed by the sia, which views the South Caucasus as its ceasefire has been in place, but exchanges OSCE Minsk Group, the main mediating strategic stronghold. of fire are a regular occurrence along the body comprising Russia, France, and the Line of Contact (LoC) between NK and US. The political elites in Yerevan and Baku Events unfolding Azerbaijan, causing both military and civil- continue to use the conflict for their politi- The origins of the NK conflict date back ian casualties. The precarious security situ- cal gains. The government of the de facto to the early 19th century, when Armenians ation along the frontline is exacerbated Nagorno-Karabakh Republic has been for- and Azeris fought continuously over the by militant rhetoric, an asymmetric arms mally excluded from the peace process region. The predominantly (94 %) Armeni- race, and continuous ceasefire violations since 1998. Isolated and unrecognized by an-populated territory was transferred to that increase the risk of an accidental re- the international community, NK is repre- Soviet Azerbaijan as part of Joseph Stalin’s sumption of hostilities. sented in the peace process through Ar- nationalities policy in 1923. Despite the au-

independence for Karabakh, while Azerbai- The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh jan refuses to consider any option short of full jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh, suggesting a high level of autonomy in- stead. Azerbaijan prioritises the return of its territories and the resettlement of its IDPs over the status issue, and has proposed a referendum on the NK status throughout all of Azerbaijan. Armenia, on the other hand, insists that the solution of the NK status and provision of security guarantees precede the withdrawal of its forces from the occupied districts. The de facto authorities of the NK are uncom- promising when it comes to their self- governance and insist that a referendum take place only in Karabakh, before the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the occupied territories. In the wake of any eventual political settlement, international thoritarian Soviet regime, Karabakh Arme- control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the peacekeeping forces would guarantee the nians periodically contested the enclave’s Lachin corridor connecting it to mainland security of NK. The modalities of the ref- status in the course of the 70 years of So- Armenia. To guarantee strategic depth and erendum and the peacekeeping forces are viet rule and petitioned to be transferred create a security buffer zone, it also oc- largely unknown. to the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic cupied seven Azeri districts (15 % of Azeri in 1945, 1965, 1977, and 1987. All of these ef- territory) surrounding Karabakh. The war The lack of progress in the OSCE-led ne- forts were rejected by Moscow so as not to resulted in an estimated total of 25,000 to gotiations is a result of the reluctance of create similar precedents across the Soviet 30,000 casualties on both sides, 750,000 both direct conflict parties and important Union. internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Azer- indirect actors to seek a politically viable baijan both from Karabakh and the occu- negotiated outcome. As unattractive as The current conflict over Nagorno-Kara- pied districts, and around 360,000 Arme- the current status quo is in the long run, bakh dates back to 1988, when the pre- nian refugees from Azerbaijan. Today, the both Armenia and Azerbaijan view the dominantly Armenian population of internationally unrecognized Republic of conflict as a zero-sum game and are un- Karabakh launched its independence Nagorno-Karabakh is a de facto independ- willing to make concessions that would movement and demanded unification ent state with a democratically elected lead to any breakthrough in the negotia- with Soviet Armenia. The Armenian-led government and a population of 140,000. tion process. Karabakh movement has to be viewed in the context of Mikhail Gorbachev’s pere- Conflict issues and direct actors Azerbaijan continues to buy time through stroika and glasnost reform policies. These The ethno-territorial conflict over -Na the negotiations while strengthening its policies allowed more freedom for nagorno-Karabakh has a multidimensional economy through its oil assets and isolat- tional aspirations to gain momentum and nature that involves political, socio-eco- ing Armenia from major regional energy shape a nationwide independence move- nomic, and security-related issues ranging projects. The economic development in ment in Armenia and Karabakh as well as from territorial disputes to ethnic hostil- Azerbaijan is closely linked to a massive all over Soviet Union. In February 1988, the ity. Legally, it is a clash between the law of military buildup accompanied by bellicose local authorities in Soviet Karabakh passed territorial integrity for Azerbaijan and the rhetoric at the official level. With a view to a resolution favouring unification with right to self-determination for Nagorno- taking over Nagorno-Karabakh militarily, Soviet Armenia, later to be followed by an- Karabakh. Four main issues have been on Azerbaijan is continuously upgrading its other resolution calling for complete inde- the negotiating table for the past 18 years, military arsenal by buying new weapons, pendence. The central politburo in Moscow including the political status of NK and mainly from Turkey and Israel, but also rejected these claims to independence the Lachin corridor; the withdrawal of the from Russia. Azerbaijan has increased its fearing any precedents that could cause a Armenian forces from the occupied Azeri defence budget from US$ 175 million in wave of nationalist movements all over So- territories; security guarantees for Kara- 2004 to US$ 3.74 billion in 2012, which is viet Union. bakh and Armenia in case the occupied twice as large as the entire Armenian state territories are returned; and the return and budget. Despite the heavy political and What started as a peaceful political up- resettlement of the Azeri IDPs. The four is- socioeconomic costs of the conflict, Azer- heaval turned into ethnic violence and sues are at the core of the Madrid princi- baijan is not interested in resolving the eventually full-fledged war between Arme- ples, which is the main framework for the situation through the existing negotiation nia and Azerbaijan in 1992, following the peace process led by the Minsk Group. format. collapse of the Soviet Union. A Russian- brokered ceasefire was signed in 1994 in The most contested issue for the conflict- Armenia’s defence budget remains very Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Armenia came out ing parties is the status of Nagorno-Kara- modest in comparison to that of Azerbai- of the war with a military victory, taking bakh. Armenia fully supports complete jan, although it has recently upgraded its

military arsenal. Its defence budget in 2012 Basic Madrid Principles reached around US$ 400 million, up from around US$ 180 million in 2006. Armenia The “Basic Principles for the Peaceful Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict” as adopted by the OSCE Minsk Group and revised in 2007 included the following: has primarily focused on the quality of its command and control, training, morale, Return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan’s control and on boosting defensive capabilities. The An interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance security alliance with Russia within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty A corridor (Lachin) linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh Organisation (CSTO) entails obligations for Future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally bind- ing expression of will collective defence of its members and is a reassuring factor for Armenia vis-à-vis a The right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence potential threat from Azerbaijan. International security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation

Despite the high economic costs of the conflict, the Armenian government does weaken Russia’s foothold in the region bakh conflict resolution, but to no avail. not seem to be interested in achieving a and would create alternative possibilities Its tense relations with Azerbaijan and real breakthrough in the negotiations ei- for Armenia to cooperate with Azerbaijan the US, but also its cautiousness regarding ther. The status quo gives Nagorno-Kara- economically, thus damaging the Russian Russia’s sphere of influence restrict Iran’s bakh the space to exercise its right to self- monopoly over certain industries, particu- outlook of becoming a mediator in the NK determination, even if it is largely isolated larly gas supplies. conflict. and internationally unrecognized. The de facto NK authorities hope that over time, The US is involved in the conflict as a The EU remains largely marginal in its ef- the independence of NK will become a fait Minsk Group co-chair, but has very limited forts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh accompli and that their territory will even- interest and influence vis-à-vis Russia to conflict. Despite the European Neigh- tually be recognized internationally as an push for any negotiated settlement of the bourhood Policy Action Plans for Armenia established state. NK conflict. Despite its increasing econom- and Azerbaijan and a number of Track 2 ic cooperation with Azerbaijan and good initiatives launched through different External actors: peacemakers or relations with Armenia, the NK conflict NGOs, the EU has mostly been passive and peace wreckers? remains a matter of peripheral interest for uncommitted to the peace process in the The complexity of the Nagorno-Karabakh the US, thus limiting Washington’s involve- region. Increasingly, it has come under in- conflict is further exacerbated by -the na ment in, and influence on, the efforts to ternal criticism and been encouraged to ture of power politics among the main push for a peaceful resolution of the NK take on a more active role in the NK peace influential actors in the region. The exter- conflict. process not least because of its energy se- nal actors can be categorized into three curity interests. groups – actors who are well placed, but Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tur- unwilling to bring change (Russia, US); ac- key has been expanding its sphere of influ- Georgia as an immediate neighbour is tors who are willing to bring change, but ence in the Caucasus. It has established a both unwilling and unable to contribute are not well placed and are largely unable close economic and security partnership to the resolution of the NK conflict. The to do so (Turkey, Iran); and those who are with Azerbaijan and Georgia, while it has Georgian-Azeri economic partnership is neither committed nor able to contribute closed borders with Armenia since 1993 strengthened through a common con- to the NK peace process (EU, Georgia). in reaction to the NK conflict. Turkey’s cern both countries share about their ter- thorny relations with Armenia because ritorial integrity and the threat of Russian Russia has exercised its influence in the of the genocide recognition issue and the dominance in the South Caucasus. With NK context from the onset of the con- NK conflict are the remaining stumbling Armenia left out of regional cooperation, flict and has clearly monopolized the me- blocks on its way to become a dominant Georgia has been benefiting not only from diation process within the OSCE Minsk regional actor in the South Caucasus. For energy-related projects, but has also posi- Group. Russia’s position as co-chair is am- this reason, Turkey has been increasingly tioned itself as the regional hub for many biguous because of its direct involvement pushing for a mediation role within the international initiatives. in the conflict both as a security provider OSCE Minsk Group. Given its hegemonic for Armenia and as a lead mediator. The aspirations, troubled relations with Arme- The external actors – unwilling, unable, or closely-knit partnership with Armenia nia, and its strong economic and military both – continue to influence the geopoliti- gives Russia a strategic and economic partnership with Azerbaijan, combined cal context around the Nagorno-Karabakh foothold in the South Caucasus vis-à-vis with its clearly pro-Azeri policies in the Na- conflict. A constellation of factors, such as Turkey and Iran. In addition to its strong gorno-Karabakh context, Turkey is not well the complexity of issues inherent to the military presence, Russia has also heav- placed as a mediator. conflict, the immediate actors’ diverging ily invested in key infrastructures of Arme- positions on these issues, the absence of nia, particularly in the energy sector, the Despite its earlier short-lived attempts at a mutually hurting stalemate, the lack of metal industry, telecommunications, and mediation and increasingly strong eco- inclusivity of the peace process, and the banking. Any change in the status quo is nomic ties with Armenia, Iran has had a geostrategic interests of the regional pow- unfavourable for Russian security and stra- relatively passive position on the NK issue. erbrokers render the Nagorno-Karabakh tegic energy interests in the region. The Tehran has continuously expressed will- conflict intractable and resistant to- apo resolution of the Karabakh conflict would ingness to mediate in the Nagorno-Kara- litical solution.

Minsk Group: mediation or field of capacity-building for negotiations in alignment with Swiss peacebuilding ex- conflict management? and specific confidence-building measures pertise. The OSCE Minsk Group seems to have ex- (particularly on Track 2) would be very ben- hausted all possible approaches for the eficial to the overall peace process if imple- Author: Anna Hess Sargsyan resolution of the conflict, yet it remains mented under the necessary preconditions [email protected] the only major platform for formal media- and carried out in a sustainable manner. tion. Intensive negotiations together with No lasting peace will be possible without Responsible editor: Daniel Trachsler numerous high-level meetings between the inclusive participation of civil society [email protected] the presidents and foreign ministers of Ar- in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Kara- German and French versions / other menia and Azerbaijan have yielded no tan- bakh. With its longstanding tradition of CSS Analyses / mailinglist: gible results. civilian peace support, Switzerland is well www.css.ethz.ch/cssanalysen placed to launch new Track 2 initiatives if More often than not, the OSCE Minsk in demand by the conflicting parties and ISSN: 2296-0244 Group has been criticized for its opaque and exclusive nature and its inability to push the peace process forward. Azerbai- Previous issues jan has been accusing the Minsk Group in having a pro-Armenian bias and using No. 130: The ICC: High expectations, ambiguous record the negotiations format for consolidating No. 129: Whole of Government: Integration and Demarcation the status quo in favour of Armenia. 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