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GRUPO CLARÍN S.A. 2009 ANNUAL REPORT To the Shareholders of Grupo Clarín S.A. We hereby submit to your consideration the Annual Report and Exhibit, the Balance Sheet, the Statement of Income, the Statement of Changes in Shareholders’ Equity and the Statement of Cash Flows, and the Notes and Exhibits of Grupo Clarín S.A. (hereinafter, “the Company” or “Grupo Clarín”) for fiscal year No. 11 ended December 31, 2009 and the Consolidated Financial Statements as of December 31, 2009. The main subsidiaries in which Grupo Clarín S.A. has a direct or indirect controlling interest are: Arte Gráfico Editorial Argentino S.A. (AGEA), Artes Gráficas Rioplatense S.A. (AGR), Compañía Inversora en Medios de Comunicación S.A. (CIMECO), Cablevisión S.A., Primera Red Interactiva de Medios Argentinos (PRIMA) S.A., Contenidos de Medios Digitales S.A. (CMD), Arte Radiotelevisivo Argentino S.A. (ARTEAR), GC Gestión Compartida S.A., Inversora de Eventos S.A. (IESA) and Radio Mitre S.A., among others. MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT During 2009 and as in the case of most developed and emerging countries, Argentina underwent what was considered the most severe international financial crisis since the Great Depression. The effects of the crisis, which were underestimated locally, consisted mainly of a collapse of the productive activity and a strong destruction of employment, asset value and foreign trade. Unlike other external negative shocks, the crisis found the Argentine economy with reserves at the Central Bank and current and fiscal account surpluses. These buffers allowed our country to deal simultaneously with the international crisis and the serious domestic problems that were building up before the crisis, such as the high and sustained outflow of foreign currency from the private sector and the lack of access to voluntary financing for the public sector. The extraordinary drought that affected the agricultural sector and the mid-term elections (with the natural controversy that resulted from their unexpected early rescheduling) worsened this already complex scenario. To face the adverse effects of the international crisis, Argentina adopted expansive economic policies, in line with the most countries. However, the lack of a counter-cyclical reserve fund and the inability to obtain financing from the sovereign debt voluntary market limited the extent of the most significant (i.e. fiscal) stimulus. A brief review of the results of the fundamental economic variables reveals that the country was able to cushion only in part the cumulative collateral damage of the international crisis and local uncertainty. In fact, in 2009 Argentina experienced an abrupt slowdown in its economic growth rate (which decreased between three and four percentage points). This slowdown was more pronounced than that of other comparable countries in the region, such as Brazil (whose GDP growth rate did not decrease) or Chile (whose GDP growth rate is estimated to have fallen by approximately 1.5%). In addition to a greater decrease in its GDP, Argentina again recorded a higher inflation rate, on average, than other countries in the region. The decrease in productive activity curbed the inflation rate somewhat, but not enough to bring inflation down to reasonable levels, with the consequent direct impact on social indicators. According to private estimates, the inflation rate in 2009 was of approximately 15%, that is, eight percentage points lower than in 2008, but almost double the 7.7% official rate published by the INDEC. At the end of 2009, unemployment and poverty rates stood at 11% and 35% respectively, exceeding the previous year’s records. 1 Along with the productive activity slowdown and the inflationary deceleration, the current and fiscal account surpluses were also adjusted negatively. The value of exports in 2009 fell by 20%, mainly as a result of their high sensitivity to the agricultural commodities cycle. This decrease occurred in spite of the controlled depreciation in the nominal value of the Argentine peso, which was another distinctive feature of the local accommodation to the global readjustment process. In real terms, at the end of 2009 the Argentine currency showed a remarkable depreciation (of more than 20%) relative to the currency basket of its main trading partners. The collapse of exports did not have a negative impact on the genuine generation of foreign currency in the economy. In fact, the external trade surplus (estimated at almost USD17 billion) broadened as a result of the higher decrease in the level of imports. The sustained growth of government expenditure over revenues (+30% against +19% in 2009) resulted in the collapse of the primary fiscal surplus, which in consolidated terms, decreased from a high of 5.2% of GDP in 2004 to only 1.1% in 2009. This collapse is mainly attributable to the federal government, whose fiscal surplus fell from 3.9% of GDP in 2004 to an estimate of only 1.6% of GDP in 2009. If one were to offset this figure by leaving out the funds received by the federal government from the nationalization of the social security system, the extraordinary contributions in Special Drawing Rights (SDR) that Argentina received as member of the IMF and the distributions received from the BCRA; the aforementioned primary surplus would become a deficit of approximately 1% of GDP. Notably, this result was achieved in spite of the significant additional inflow of revenues received by the federal government from the nationalization of the private pension funds (AFJP) and the application of a record-high aggregate tax pressure. Therefore, for the first time since 2003, the primary fiscal surplus was not sufficient to service debt interest, resulting in a significant financial deficit in 2009. As a consequence of the lack of access to voluntary financing from debt markets, this deficit was funded through domestic sources (the Central Bank and other public agencies). The fiscal deterioration is estimated to be even worse in the provinces. Due mainly to the fiscal imbalance of the province of Buenos Aires, in 2009 the primary deficit is believed to have fallen to almost Ps. 6 billion or Ps. 9 billion after interest. This last figure almost triples that recorded in 2008. Without access to voluntary financing from debt markets, many provinces had to resort to the federal government’s financial assistance. Perspectives for the Upcoming Year During the last months of 2009, worldwide economic growth resumed its positive cycle, supported by the strong public policies that removed the concerns over a systemic global financial meltdown. Driven by this incipient improvement, the local economy also started to show a certain recovery. This trend is expected to continue throughout 2010. The agricultural sector and the automobile industry are expected to be the most important pillars of the local recovery. In fact, after the strong contraction of more than 35% registered in the 2008/2009 economic cycle, the volume of the crop harvest in general and the soybean harvest in particular are expected to show a clear growth. These factors, along with a recovery in the prices of agricultural commodities will contribute to a new growth in the value of exports in 2010. This should lead to an increased current account surplus and to higher fiscal revenues from export duties. The automobile industry is also expected to grow, driven by the strong demand from Brazil: unlike crop harvest volumes, the volume of automobile production is expected to recover pre-crisis levels. Naturally, the new projected environment stresses inflationary pressures in an economy which already shows inertial price acceleration and now lacks a surplus from the public sector to minimize the likelihood of spiralization. Thus, the projected inflation for the year (market consensus expects a floor of 17%) revives the struggle over the distribution of income and is a limiting factor to the sustainability of the GDP recovery path. 2 The same applies to fiscal policy, which generates uncertainty over sovereign debt service capacity. In other words, the decision to continue to increase public expenditure (currently higher than 35% of GDP, already a record high) above the level of revenues – with the immediate consequence of further impairing government savings without genuine financing sources in sight - has a limit and, at some point, will start to be countered by a significant increase in capital flight, the ultimate measure of the level of confidence in the health of the economy. In summary, even though local economic activity is ready to take off, the prevailing uncertainties condition the rebound because they represent a burden that inhibits the perspectives for the recovery of reproductive investments and employment. The high level of social conflict and the growing institutional (and now also fiscal) weakness are factors that contribute to the extremely complex scenario that prevails in the Argentina of the Bicentennial. THE YEAR 2009 AND THE MEDIA SECTOR IN ARGENTINA Following the fall of one of its main sources of financing (i.e., advertising, which is highly sensitive to the economic cycle) and the leverage of some of its segments, the worldwide media industry was affected by the deep crisis most countries underwent in 2009. The decrease in profitability and in the value of this industry's assets over the year, paired with the withdrawal of investments, clearly reflected that trend. As expected, the impact was far from homogeneous among countries, companies and segments, based on the sharp economic recession and the specific weight of advertising over GDP and each segment’s revenue structure. However, the overall economic uncertainty that prevailed during the year under analysis was an additional focus of concern for this industry, which was already facing several challenges arising from the ongoing emergence of new technologies and the changes in the media consumption patterns of the new generations. For the economy and the local media industry, 2009 brought signs of deterioration and concern.

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