Negotiating the 'governance gap':

The UN and Capacity-building in Afghanistan

For the UN Capacity-building Task Force ACKU Nicholas Leader Islamabad, 24 November, 2000 [email protected]

Managed by UNCHS Habitat. Funded by UNDP, UNHCR and UNICEF l3lt~ ~ACKU~l~t llii 00011175t[li tmil~tt ~~~mr 6

Negotiating the 'governance gap':

The UN and Capacity-building in Afghanistan

For the UN Capacity-building Task Force ACKU

Nicholas Leader Islamabad, 24 November, 2000 [email protected]

Managed by UNCHS Habitat. Funded by UNDP, UNHCR and UNICEF Table of Contents

Acronyms ...... 3 Executive Summary ...... 4 1. Background and scope ...... 7 2. Process ...... 7 3. The problem ...... 8 4. The concept of 'capacity-building' and its relevance to the problem ...... 12 5. UN and Donor policy on 'capacity-building' ...... 14 5.1 UN policy ...... ~ ...... 14 5.2 Donor policy ...... 17 6. Taliban 'policy' ...... 19 7. UN-Tali ban relations; the 'governance network' ...... 21 8. UN policy implementation ...... 23 8.1 Working with or though the authorities ...... 23 8.2 Institution-building ...... 26 8.3 Community Development ...... ~ ...... 28 8.4 The future role and nature of the state ...... 28 9. Conclusions and Recommendations ...... 29 9.1 General Recommendations ...... 30 9.2 Working with or through the authorities ...... ·...... 3 I 9.3 Institution-building ...... 33 9.4 Governance and Community Development ...... 33 9.5 Human Resource Development ...... 33 9.6 The future role and nature of the state ...... 34 9.7 Further research ...... 34 Bibliography ...... , ...... 35 Annex 1: Terms of Reference ...... 37 Annex 2: Itinerary ...... 39 Annex 3: List of Interviewees ...... 40 Annex 4: The Case for Targets,ACKU not Goals ...... :...... 43

Acknowledgements

The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of the staff of Habitat and the RCO's offices for arranging transport and interviews in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and ofUNDP in New York.

2 Acronyms

ARRP Afghanistan Rural Rehabilitation Programme APB Afghanistan Programme Body ASG Afghanistan Support Group CBO Community Based Organisation CAP Consolidated Annual Appeal CDAP Comprehensive Disabled Afghans Project DFID Department for International Development (of the UK government) DOLSA Department of Labour and Social Affairs ECHA Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs EPI Expanded Programme of Immunisation FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross lEA Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan IHL International Humanitarian Law JCC Joint Consultative Committee MMR Ministry for Martyrs and Returnees MOPH Ministry of Public Health MRRD Ministry for Rural Reconstruction and Development MoU Memorandum of Understanding PCP Principled Common Programming RCO Regional Coordination Officer SMU Strategic Monitoring Unit ToR Terms of Reference UNCHS (Habitat) United Nations Centre for Human Settlements UNDCP United Nations Drug Control Programme UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNFPA United Nations Family Planning Agency UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund UMSMA United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan WFP World Food Programme WHO World HealthACKU Organisation

3 Executive Summary ·

The issue of capacity-building has long been a controversial and problematic area of policy for the UN in Afghanistan. This Consultancy, not the first to look at the issLte, was commissioned by the UN Afghanistan Capacity-building Task Force to: 'provide advice to UN Afghanistan in terms of developing a principled, coherent and coordinated policy for maintaining and building the capacities of structures essential for the recovery and longer­ term sustainability at national, regional and local levels'.

This report concentrates on UN capacity-building activities in relation to what remains of the administrative structures. This was partly to give focus to a very broad subject in the short time available, but mainly because, by common consent, this is one of the most controversial and confused area of UN capacity-building policy. Owing to time and transport problems, only Taliban held areas were visited and so the report corf1ments only on capacity .. building i'ssues in Taliban controlled Afghanistan.

Twenty years of war have left Afghanistan's physical and social infra-structure in ruins. Despite assistance work by the international community, this process of degradation continues, notably the progressive depletion of human resources. It is widely agreed that a reactive, localised, relief-orientated intervention is insufficient to address these problems. However, the presumptive authority in most of Afghanistan, the Taliban, rule themselves out as a partner in a more systemic approach by their abuse of human rights. The predominant pol icy response has been to focus on communities, but this too is problematic as certain functions, such as public health, require wider structtires for successful implementation. The Strategic Framework can be seen as one of a number of attempts by the international community to deal with this 'governance gap'. Within that overall policy framework, the idea of capacity-building- of communities, organisations and of the remaining welfare and development arms of the state - is often.proposed as one way of addressing this problem.

However, the concept is problematic. Firstly, it is used in the Afghan context to cover such a wide variety of issues as to be virtually meaningless~ It is used to mean; working with or though the administration on specific projects such as the EPI programme, institution­ building with parts of the administration such as the MOPH, community development activities with shuras and community fora, training and human resource development, the development of Afghan NGOs, promoting human rights, and the overarching question of what should be the future role and nature of the state in Afghanistan. Each of these policy issues should be addressed on its own terms. Secondly, the term assumes that there is a functioning and legitimate government,ACKU either as recipient of capacity-building or as regulator of civil society; bu't in the Afghan context the absence of 'good governance' is precisely the problem.

The history of UN and donor policy on capacity-building iJ Afghanistan demonstrates these problems. The primary statements of UN policy- the ECHA guidelines (June 1997), the King Report (November 1997) and the Strategic Framework (September 1998) -all rule out 'institution-building' of the Afghan authorities while discriminatory practices continue. None of them however defines the difference between institution-building, which is forbidden, and working with or through the authorities, something that almost all UN agencies do, indeed it could be argued need to do to fulfill their humanitarian mandate. Donor policy on capacity-building has also been negative but uncoordinated. For donors, the

4 relief/development distinction, on which the idea of capacity-building rests, is still functional. The distinction has been rejected by assistance actors as it does not provide a workable model of vulnerability in Afghanistan. But for donors it is essentially a political distinction; the distinction allows them to provide humanitarian aid, but without recognising the Taliban. So th e distinction rules out 'capacity-building' with the authorities as this woul d imply recognition. But because 'capacity-building' is such an ill-defined concept what it rules out and what it does not is unclear. This leaves agencies (and indeed donors themselves) in considerable confusion as to what is acceptable in terms of working with the authorities and what is not. Ironically, the two assistance activities that probably most benefit the Tal iban are refugee return and food distribution, but these are considered acceptable to donors as they are defined as relief. But a more systematic approach to government structures, which it is arguable can moderate Taliban excesses, is not acceptable as it is seen to ' legitimise' their rule. Thus, caught in the political confusion and inherent vagueness of the concept of capacity-building, donors recognise that the assistance actors have to deal with the Taliban and the state structures, but are unwilling to formally accept this by defining how and where they consider this to be acceptable.

Tali ban attitudes to the role of the state are unclear to many outsiders, but appear to have undergone some development the longer they have remained in control. Is Afghanistan under the Taliban developing from a failed state to rogue state? They have shown little interest in the welfare and development functions of the state, seeing their legitimacy coming from the provision of security and the imposition of their own interpretation of shari a. Their primary interest in the state is in its coercive and repressive capacity, most famously in the Ministry of Vi ce and Virtue. Continued military subsidy from external powers enables th em to be to an extent autonomous from the people they control; they have little need, or an ideology that would encourage them, to negotiate with the population. However there are some indicators that there is the beginnings of a more serious interest in welfare and development, at least am ong the more pragmatic oftheTaliban. This needs to be monitored carefully. But despite thi s, the Taliban's primary interests in the aid system are: forcing it, and so by proxy the international comnnmity, to recognise their empirical sovereignty, ensuring that aid actors abide by the Tali ban's interpretation of shari a, denyi ng aid to their opponents, and using it for corruption and patronage. This produces a context that is experienced as a high degree of control, but in terms of programme content and location, the UN in fact has quite wide opportunities.

The confusion in capacity-building policy has lead to considerable confusion in practice. This is not helped by the resistance of the agencies to anything other than coordination by consensus. At the field level, almost all UN agencies work with or through the ministries, and a number make payments ofACKU incentives, in cash or food, to government staff and donations of equipment. Certainly all have to get permission from them to work. But in the absence of policy clarity, notably a workable distinction between 'working with' and 'capacity-building', each UN agency has in effect negotiated its own relations with ministries and departments. This is done according to the dictates of its own programmes, mandate and HQ position and with little reference to any kind of central UN policy. The payment of incentives, for example, is variable, as is the nature of project agreements or protocols signed by agencies with ministries. The picture thus ranges from the close relationship of WHO with the MOPH to the virtually non-existent relationship between UN FPA and the authorities. There is also no thinking about the long-term issues of the role and nature of the state and the impact that decisions taken now may have on future options, the question of centralisation versus regionalisation, for example, or cost-recovery in health care.

5 Rather than 'capacity-building', the report argues that the concepts of 'scaling-up' and 'principled negotiation' are more useful in terms of guiding UN policy for bridging the 'governance gap'. In other words it is possible, on occasion, to negotiate for principled goals with unprincipled people. This requires identifying areas where it is possible to work in a principled way with the authorities and then painstakingly negotiating terms such that it is possible to use the state structures to implement principled work. This though is only possible to the extent that the authorities believe it to be in their interest to perm it such work. This is in effect what has happened with much public health work where, for instance, equal access for men and women has been negotiated, as has education of female health workers. Patient and principled negotiation, a willingness to suspend work when it is impossible to work in a principled way, and visible delivery on implementation when it is, would appear to have made more progress than condemnation or conditionality. However, crucially, this has worked because the authorities consider principled work to be acceptable in some areas, notably health. In other sectors, education for example, such an approach is unlikely to work as in current circumstances the Taliban do not consider to be in their interest. Other areas that might benefit from this approach that have not been fully exploited are work on the drought response, agriculture and with the municipalities. This approach requires a high degree of political analysis and negotiating skill. More broadly it requires an acceptance from donors that it is possible to work with the state structures in Taliban controlled areas in a principled way. This is something that many donors in the current foreign policy context find it hard to admit. An approach which promotes isolation of the Taliban means that there is little money for activities other than relief.

Thus it is recommended that: Firstly that the UN agencies adopt a limited number of UN wide targets, such 'the reduction of maternal mortality in Afghanistan from ... to .... by such and such a date'. This will provide a clear focus for overall negotiations with the authorities and for any work with the state structures. It will also make the planning process more unified and coherent and will enable the UN to communicate its objectives to the Afghan people much more clearly and transparently. Secondly, the UN needs to renegotiate its overall relationship with the Tali ban. The Memorandum of Understanding needs to be overhauled and replaced by a new agreement within which such work can be conducted, the new statute could be an opportunity for this. And thirdly the UN needs to challenge the overall policy context prevalent in the Security Council with a clear vision of \Vhat a coherent humanitarian and assistance programme can achieve.

More specifically, the report recommends that it is recognised, by staff and donors, that it is legitimate for the UN to work with or through the authorities, as long as certain criteria are met and that all payments andACKU protocols. are consistent between agencies. This will reduce the current tendency for the Taliban to play off agencies against each other and for some UN staff to disguise work with the authorities.

The report also recommends that the UN, and other agencies, work together to develop a longer-term human resource strategy, identifying likely skill shortages for the system as a whole and pooling resources to train people to fill these roles. Finally, the report recommends the UN develop a process of discussion and research that will inform both Afghans and the UN about the various options for the future role and nature of the state, and their political and economic implications.

6 1. Background and scope

The issue of 'capacity-building' has long been an issue for the UN in Afghanistan. Most recently, it was discussed at the UN Heads of Agency retreat in Burban in ~-larch 2000, (Reynolds, 2000). As a result ofthese discussions, a Capacity-building Task-Force was established, chaired by UN Habitat. This 'rask-Force decided to engage a consultant to study the issue and make recommendations. The consultancy was funded primarily by UNDP, but with contributions from UNICEF and UNHCR. The complete Terms of Reference (ToR) for the consultancy are in Annex I. The objective was: 'To provide advice to UN Afghanistan in terms of developing a principled, coherent and coordinated policy for maintaining and building the capacities of structures essential for the recovery and longer-term sustainability at national, regional and local levels.'

As discussed further in Section 4, the term 'capacity-building' has a wide range of uses - and the UN in Afghanistan has a wide range of agencies and activities. As will become clear through the report, the consultant concentrated on UN capacity-building activities in relation to what remains ofthe administrative structures. This was partly to give focus to a very broad subject in the short time available, but mainly because, by common consent, this is the most controversial and confused area of UN capacity-building policy. There is thus much that could be said to be capacity-building that the report does not address. In particular, the report does not fully address the important areas of capacity-building of national NGOs, in terms of protecting human rights, or of communities.

2. Process

The Consultancy period was 9 weeks. For a detailed itinerary see Annex 2. From 11 July to 9 September, the consultant visited New York, Geneva, Islamabad, Kabul, Herat and Kandahar. It was planned to visit Mazar and Faisabad but owing to logistical problems this was not possible in the time available. As only Taliban-contro/led areas were visited, this report concentrates on capacity-building issues in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

A wide range of people were interviewed, including policy-makers in UN headquarters, UN staff in Islamabad and in Afghanistan, Tali ban representatives and staff in a number of ministries, community leaders, NGO staff, and donors. See Annex 3 for a list of interviewees. A number of documents were also reviewed, for some of which see the bibliography. Apart from short visits to two Community Fora (in Kabul and Herat) lack of time meant that project visits or missions into rural areasACKU were not possible. Three meetings of the Capacity-building Task-Force were held during the field-work, the first for initial discussions, the second at which some interim findings were presented by the consultant, and a third when initial findings and conclusions were discussed. The consultant also made a brief presentation of findings and recommendations to a Heads of Agency meeting in Islamabaq on 8 September, 2000. A brief presentation was made to the Afghanistan Programme Body (APB) on 7 November 2000. A draft report was circulated and further comments received at a meeting of the Task-Force on 13 November 2000.

7 3. The problem

The problems and dilemmas of working in Afghanistan have been described in detail in many other documents and will not be done so again here, 1 rather the key issues f~J r the subject of this consultancy will be discussed.

Afghanistan presents the UN with one of the most complex operating environments in the world. Twenty years of war have led to a situation in which conventional dichotomies of relief and development, peace and war, humanitarian and political, make little sense. Despite large swathes of the country enjoying relative stability for some years, th e economy and political situation is dominated by the ongoing war. In terms of capacity-building, the key problem is that, on the one hand, the needs of the population cannot be met with only a short­ term relief focus. The widespread destruction of infrastructure, communities and governance is such that needs can only be properly met by working on a systemic .and long-term basis, an approach which includes governance and human rights issues as much as physical needs. Further, the length of the conflict has ensured a progressive degradation of human and physical infrastructure. The longer this goes on, not·only will reconstruction be 1nore difficult and costly, but short-term goals too will become harder and harder to meet. The shortage of qualified staff, for instance, especially female staff, gets \vorse as more and more qualified people leave the country while none are educated to replace them.

However, on the other hand, the Tali ban, who as the de facto authorities in most of Afghanistan are necessarily a key partner in a longer-term approach, are not recognised by the international community. Not only are they not recognised, they are considered to be illegitimate by many Afghans and are responsible for widespread abuse of international humanitarian and human rights law, including the UN charter.2 To use the language of the ToR, the 'structures essential for the recovery and long-term sustainability .. ' must include the administration and the authorities, it is impossible to achieve such long-term goals without some kind of effective state structures. Yet the authorities in Afghanistan rule themselves out as partners in this enterprise by their blatant disregard for UN principles.

In other words, the key problem is one of 'scaling up' in a situation of contested sovereignty (Macrae, 1999). A sovereign state is defined as a bordered territory occupied by a settled population under effective government (Jackson, 1990: 38). Sovereignty can be seen as comprising two elements: juridical and empirical (Jackson, 1990, quoted in Macrae, 1999). \Vhile juridical sovereignty is absolute, and the borders of Afghanistan are not in question, empirical sovereignty is more complex, implying an ability of the state to protect borders and promote development and well-beingACKU of its people. In Afghanistan, there is thus what might be called a 'governance gap' (Duffield, 1998). While the Tali ban exercise a degree of empirical sovereignty, or at least control, over much the country, they appear to have little interest in what the international community expects of a state, and have little international or indeed national legitimacy. Aid actors have crude and inappropriate instruments to deal with this situation~ 'On the one hand relief aid is unconditional but delivered outside the state. On the other hand, development aid is

1 See for example Keating (1998) 2 See for example reports by the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women (Coomaraswamy, 2000). and the Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan (Hossain, 2000).

8 conditional upon the presence of an internationally accepted recognised state and assumes that the government is the legitimate and primary counterpart for aid relations' (Macrae, 1999: 17). The needs in Afghanistan require scaling up, from project to programme, from community to nation, from short to long-term, from hand-pump to city water supply. But the governance context necessary for this task is not there. The problem of capacity-building is in essence how to bridge this gap, how to 'scale up'. ·

The Strategic Framework for Afghanistan is one of a number of ad hoc attempts devised by the international community to address this situation.3 It provides for the UN a degree of international legitimacy for engagement, through General Assembly resolutions and the leadership of the UN Secretary General, as well as an attempt to coordinate the humanitarian and political activities ofthe international community. Importantly though, and unlike UN operations in, for example, Kosovo, it has no coercive power. The extent of its legitimacy with Afghans is more open to question, as will be discussed below.

However, given that effective control is in the hands of the Tali ban, the agencies involved in the Strategic Framework can only achieve its goals through a continpos and often difficult process of negotiation. The quality and effectiveness of this negotiation is thus a key element in the process of scaling up. The ability of the agencies to 'scale up' or not depends in a great degree on the extent to which they can find common ground and negotiate what is in effect a deal with the authorities. Given the frequent incompatibility of the principles and interests of both sides of this negotiation it is a highly precarious deal, but it is a deal nonetheless. This is not to say that such a deal is somehow automatically unprincipled; in a sense the history of humanitarianism is a demonstration that it is possible to negotiate for principled ends with unprincipled people. Rather it is to point out the reality that for any work at all to be carried out by the assistance community, the authorities must feel that they are getting something out of it, that it is in their interests, or at the very least are not threatened by it. This however does not mean that to undertake such work is unprincipled, rather that it can be in the interest of otherwise abusive authorities to permit principled assistance work in some circumstances. Of course it is more often in their interest for assistance work to be 'unprincipled', which is why conscious attention to principles by the assistance community in their negotiations at all levels is so important.

However, despite appearances and rhetoric to the contrary, there is in fact a degree of common ground between the two sides where principled assistance work is possible. This common ground is most apparent in the area of public health where both sides have an interest in promoting the health of Afghans, though for different reasons. And indeed it is here where the most effective co-operation has been negotiated, though with considerable difficulties on the way notably over women's access to health facilities. However, in effect a deal acceptable to the principlesACKU and interests of both sides has been reached. But over education for example, divergent interests and principles have prevented any kind of mutual accommodation.

Scaling up is thus to a large extent dependent on identifying, and then effectively negotiating over, such common ground. This is an intensely political process, requiring a high degree of negotiating skill and political acumen; the extent and nature of this common ground changes and develops according to political and military factors way beyond the influence of the UN. Should the Taliban lose external military support, for example, this might force them to

3 Others would include UN operations in East Timor and Kosovo.

9 negotiate more with the people they claim to represent.

The Strategic Framework however must be situated in the context of donor countries' foreign policy, and indeed that of most of the international community. The primary international concern with the Taliban is the spread of Islamist violence and instability. B·Jt to date powerful countries see little importance in engaging with Afghanistan, rather the emphasis is on condemnation, isolation and occasional outright attack on the Taliban as a means of attempting to get them to moderate their policies.4 In the absence of serious and sustained diplomatic and political engagement by powerful countries, the political task of resolving the conflict and engaging with the Taliban on their human rights record has been delegated to the UN agencies, humanitarian and political. While the Security council debates sanctions, the UN agencies have thus been cast as peace-maker, as provider of assistance to Afghans, and as the de facto 'gate-keeper' for the international community with regards to the Tal iban. 5 The tension between these roles is the source of much of the UN' s di fftculties.

Formal policy, however, does not always reflect what happens in practice. Because the Tali ban are the de facto authorities, some level of engagement with them is necessary to conduct any assistance work in the country at all. Thus for instance the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the UN with the Taliban in 1998, and the ongoing negotiations in the Joint Consultative Committee (JCC). T\1ore than this though, many agencies have found that a more sustained engagement with what remains of the administrative structures is necessary to implement programmes, notably in terms of public health,6 despite the fact that the leadership of the ministries .and departments are all Talibs. The EPI programme for instance is managed with and through the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), and much sanitation work is done by UNDP/Habitat with and through the municipalities. In other sectors, notably education, the discriminatory policies of the Taliban have demanded that assistance actors set up what is in effect a parallel system. Thus either with or without the authorities, the UN finds itself in the position of fulfilling many functions normally associated with the state, notably in the area of planning and policy coordination, but also in terms of picking up running costs for ongoing activities such as waste collection and health workers' salaries. It has become in effect part of a 'governance network' alongside the Taliban, sometimes as partner, sometimes as competitor. In either case, the role is uncomfortable and raises difficult questions of legitimacy and sustainability, as well as more prosaic problems of securing long-term funding from emergency budgets.

A further complication is the structure of the UN system itself and in particular its ability to implement UN-wide, as opposed to agency-specific, policy. Through the Strategic Framework and the Principled Common Programme (PCP) process, UN Afghanistan has probably gone further in terms ofACKU developing UN-wide policy and strategy than in any other country. However, the underlying structure remains one of a number of independent agencies each with their own mandate and fund-raising mechanisms. The ability of this system to determine and implement UN wide-policy is still patchy and the power of the coordinator

4 St!e for example Rashid (2000) ch 13 for an assessment of US policy on Afghanistan. 5 The author watched this process of delegation happening in miniature. During an interview with the UN Coordinator. a diplomat arrived and proceeded to hand over funds to the UN for assistance work. When asked by the Coordinator if his country could also engage the Tali ban on gender issues, he replied 'we would rather the UN did that '. 6 The very concept of ' public health' could be said to presume a legitimate authority with a responsibility for ·public', as opposed to ' private', health.

10 relies more on consensus than on control (Donini et al, 1996). Ultimately each agency answers to its Headquarters, not the Coordinator (Wiles et al, 1999).

This combination of a formal policy which does not accommodate the political realities of the situation, and a multitude of UN agencies with their own mandates, has led to a situation where policy towards what the ToR for this consultancy calls 'building the capacities of structures essential for the recovery and longer-term sustainability at national, regional and local levels' is confused and indecisive. This confusion is most apparent in terms of engagement with the administrative structures; it is here that scaling up is most difficult, but most important. In effect, each agency has pursued its own line in determining if and how it will work with the authorities, relying as much on mandate and programme issues as interpreting and implementing UN wide-policy. For example, each agency has tended to establish its own ways of working with ministries - establishing its own protocols or agreements and setting its own rates for incentives.7 The policy situation is less problematic in terms of capacity-building that emphasises the empowerment of communities, rural and urban; this is widely agreed to be important and much work has gone on here. It is the relationship with the administrative structures that is the area of debate and controversy, both within the UN and in terms of its relations with donors. However, as argued below in Section 4, the idea of assistance provision somehow by-passing the authorities and concentrating on communities is unrealistic; the concept of civil-society assumes a functioning state.

Differences of approach between agencies are not problematic per se. However, problems and questions resulting from this variety of approaches have recurred over and over again at Heads of Agency meetings, in the JCC, and in numerous evaluations. This indicates that there is in fact a problem here. The particular issue of incentives, for example, has been raised several times in the last few years, but to date without any system-wide policy being developed.8

Much of the debate has been framed using the concept of 'capacity-building'. 'Do we or don't we do capacity-building', runs the question. This, for example, was the label under which these issues were discussed at Burban, and indeed it provides the title for this consultancy. The next section will briefly examine the concept of 'capacity-building' and its relevance to the problem.

7 This is not the first time this point has been made in the context of capacity-building. 'As a result, a vast array of capacity­ building activities now take placeACKU under the aegis of assumedly single purpose agencies; and similar activities- but with different programmatic thrusts and parries- arc sponsored by different agencies. The result is a mixed bag of relief, rehabilitation and recovery activities, all with different justifications, different program purposes, and different engagements with the presumptive authorities' (Newberg, 1998; 20).

8 The issue was raised tirst at the HQ level in the Joint Consultative Group on Policy in an April 1996 report on 'Payments to Government staff. In Afghanistan it was raised by the then Coordinator in June 1997 and again in June 1998 when the intention was 'to define a common Afghanistan UN System policy on this' (Witchi-Cestari 1998). In October 1999 the RCO in Kabul began, but was unable to complete, a survey on UN ' implementing arrangements' with line ministries and technical departments which was intended to lead to 'a series of internal guidelines for project implementation' (Leslie, 1999). And, also in October 1999 the UN Coordinator initiated a 'Survey of payment of incentives' (de Mul, 1999). The issue of capacity-building was also studied in a report commissioned at the December 1997 ASG for the following ASG in May 1998 (Principles, Capacity Building and Gender in Afghanistan. Newberg, 1998), though in the end it was not discussed. This consultancy is thus part of a long line of attempts to get to grips with the problem.

11 4. The concept of 'capacity-building' and its relevance to the problem

In the last few years, the term 'capacity-building' has taken its place alongside concepts such as participation and empowerment as a central element of development thinking. As with these terms, it too has suffered from the conceptual confusion of becoming everything to everybody.9 The OECD/DAC definition for example is 'the process by which individuals, groups, organisations, institutions and societies increase their abilities to (I) perform core functions, solve problems, define and achieve objectives and (2) understand and deal with their development needs in a broad context and a sustainable manner' (quoted in UNDP 1998:x), which makes it hard to distinguish from the concept of development itself.

The idea of capacity-building has its origins in the radical 'development for liberation' ideas of such thinkers as Paulo Freire in Latin America in the sixties. In more recent times, the advent of the neo-liberal consensus, the anti-state philosophy it espoused, and the growth of NGOs as contractors with their reputedly greater ability to 'build capacity' , has given the concept a much more mainstream 'civil society' twist; often 'capacity-building' appears synonymous with creating NGOs (Eade, 1997). The concept also includes what used to be called 'institution-building'. This implied a focus on a particular organisation or institution, capacity-building though is considered to be a broader more systemic approach. But as Eade points out 'Capacity-building does not begin and end with NGOs, or with donors. Nor is 'civil society' independent of, much less an alternative to, the state. Rather, capacity-building involves the whole network of relationships in society.' (Eade, I 997: 21 ). Again, it is hard to see \Vhat capacity-building does not include.

A number of academics are thus very sceptical of the usefulness of the concept. Moore for instance, commenting on such definitions as the OECD/DAC one above has written 'the term becomes practically and analytically useless as it tries to include everything' , and has advised that 'Aid agencies would be wise to have no truck with the new jargon of capacity-building and to insist on using language and terms that have identifiable and precise meanings' (Moore, 1995).

The findings of this consultancy would tend to support Moore' s arguments about the usefulness of the term. In Afghanistan, in relation to the subject of this consultancy, i.e. the 'structures essential for the recovery and longer-term sustainability at national, regional and local levels', the term 'capacity-building' is in fact variously used to cover a number of separate, but related, policy areas. Each of these requires a separate UN-wide policy, and one concept10 cannot do justice to themACKU all. Some of the most important areas are: • The implementation ofprojects and programmes with or through the administrative structures. Almost all UN agencies do this in some way or another. Issues here range from whether or not such work is strengthening discriminatory practices, providing legitimacy to the Taliban, to the coordination of the payment of incentives and the variety of different protocols and working arrangements.

9 ' Like most development jargon, capacity-building is now used so indiscriminately that any meaning it once had may soon evaporate' Eade, ( 1997: 9) 10 Or one consultancy.

12 • What is more accurately called institution-building with specific organs of the administration. Few UN agencies do this, but an example would be some of the work of WHO with the MOPH. Whether or not this perpetuates abuse is again an issue, as is whether or not this kind of work is realistic in the current context of insecurity and the lack of recognition.

• What is more accurately called community development, such as is carried out by UNDP with its implementing agencies, OPS/ARRP with the shuras, OPS/CDAP in its disability programme, and UNCHS with the Community Fora.

• What is more accurately called human resource development. To many interviewees, notably national staff, capacity-building is synonymous with training. It is commonly pointed out that there is a very bad skills shortage in Afghanistan, in particular of women, and that it is getting worse as more and more qualified people leave and education continues to receive so little attention. This lack of skills has short-term consequences in that it effects both agencies and the administration's abilities to recruit suitable staff. The long-term consequences for running any kind of state, or for the ability of 'civil-society to engage in governance, are of course very damaging.

• The development ofAfghan NGOs: Sometimes rather grandly referred to as 'building civil society', the UN has encouraged the development of a wide variety of Afghan NGOs. The most successful in terms of project implementation seems to be the mine action sector (Wiles et al, 1999). This policy originated before the Taliban, but was given a boost by their arrival as Afghan NGOs are seen as a way of by-passing the authorities, as well as being core components of Afghan civil society. There are serious issues here to do with the extent to which the assistance community has merely replicated itself through contracting or has genuinely contributed to the development of Afghan civil society, and whether indeed this is actually possible for a largely humanitarian operation to achieve. 11

• And lastly the overarching question of the UN's role in the future nature and role of the state in Afghanistan. This is a question of relevance to both the assistance and the political sides of the UN. Assistance decisions being taken now, such as the concentration on Kabul, or whether or not to encourage user fees for health and education, will have an impact on the range of political possibilities in the future and are of great relevance to the political side. The future interaction between the NGOs and CBOs now being supported and the state has also received little attention. The nature and role of the state in Afghanistan is an important element in the conflict, the Tali ban's vision of the role of the state is very different to many Afghans, let alone the international community. And the financing of the state willACKU be a key political question in the future.

Clarity of ideas and language matter and it is in part a lack of clarity in the use of the term 'capacity-building', caused by the term's lack of specificity, that has caused some of the policy confusions mentioned above. Policy formation in these areas is difficult enough, the use of this term has, it is argued here, further hampered the UN's ability to develop distinct and coherent policy for each.

11 See for example 'Imposing Empowerment' (African Rights, 1997), using experience from South Sudan, for an argument that international agencies cannot build effective indigenous organisations through a contractual relationship. Similar arguments are made in Eade ( 1997) ch 3.

13 A further problem with the concept is that the term 'capacity-building', despite its 'motherhood and apple pie' appearance, is in fact highly political. This will be examined in greater detail below (Section 5) but in short, as with 'development' the idea of capacity­ building assumes a legitimate authority, either as recipient of capacity-building assistance or as regulator of civil society capacity-building. But what determines a legitimate authority is of course a political decision by the international community, not the UN agencies. It is precisely because such an authority does not exist in Afghanistan that the UN has so many problems. Use of the term capacity-building by the UN means it unintentionally plays into political debates between the international community and the Taliban regarding their legitimacy and acceptability. This helps to reinforce the UN's gatekeeper role, which complicates its negotiations with the Taliban, and so reduces the UN's ability to meet the needs of Afghans.

In short, it is the argument of this report that the concept of 'capacity-building' offers little of value to the problems facing the UN in Afghanistan. The idea of 'scaling up' is a more descriptive, and less ideologically-laden, term for the problem and the process, but risks replacing one piece of jargon with another. Each area of policy needs to be dealt with on it~ own terms. Suggestions and recommendations for each area are made in Section 9.

5. UN and Donor policy on 'capacity-building'

5.1 UN policy

As argued above, there are in fact a number of related but separate areas of policy confused in the term 'capacity-building'. Existing formal UN-wide policy will be examined with regards to the most important of these areas, in particular working with the authorities.

In many ways it was the Tali ban's capture of Kabul in 1996, and the media attention on their explicitly discriminatory polices towards women, that led the UN, and NGO's, to 'discover' principles in Afghanistan. This led to the first formal statement on principles and a principled approach in the form of the ECHA guidelines of June 1997. The question of working with or through the authorities was not explicitly addressed. It was stated that 'UN agencies will continue to be engaged in life-sustaining humanitarian assistance activities to all Afghans in need, including male and female refugees, displaced persons and vulnerable populations' (para. 1 a), but if this meant working with the authorities, how, or indeed whether this was permitted, was not alluded to.ACKU The UN was allowed to 'engage in rehabilitation of socio­ economic infrastructure ...... so long as it benefits women and men equally in participation and results' (para. 1 b) but again if this was to be done with the authorities was not dealt with. Engagement with the authorities in JCC was mandated, but only explicitly for advocacy and planning. Community-based rehabilitation was also permitted, with the same caveat as for rehabilitation of infra-structure. In para. I e however, it was stated that 'UN agencies will not engage in institution-building efforts of the Afghan authorities as long as their discriminatory practices continue', in effect a ban on capacity-building. The issue of the long-term role and nature of the state is not mentioned. In terms of policy implementation, it is recommended that a 'monitoring committee be established under the chairmanship of the UN Coordinator to review compliance of the agencies to the above mentioned policies and guidelines' (para. 3 a) .

14 A number of features can be identified here which have continued to plague UN policy in this area, so will be commented on here in some detail:

• First the lack of guidance on whether working with or through the authorities for specific goals is acceptable or not, combined with an explicit ban on 'institution-building' 'as long as their discriminatory practices continue'. This lack of clarity has continued to plague discussions and confusion; when does 'working with' authorities, which all agencies do and which could be argued is necessary to implement 'life-sustaining' assistance, constitute 'institution-building', which is forbidden. ,

• Second, the distinction between 'life-sustaining', which is permitted, and 'institution­ building' which is not, 'as long as discriminatory practices continue'. This introduces the 'life-saving/life-sustaining' distinction, with the purpose of allowing conditionality on the later, but not the former. This, as discussed in section 5.2 below, is the politically­ motivated relief/development distinction in another form.

• Thirdly, the strange absence of the authorities as authorities. The Taliban appear as the object of advocacy and of conditionality, but not as authorities who are in fact already engaged in the running of the country. It is as if UN assistance activities can continue in a vacuum without engaging with the authorities except to advocate to them. The fact that they are not recognised means almost that they are not seen, a situation bound to lead to unrealistic goals.

• Fourthly, the major question about the future role and nature of the state, and the impact UN assistance decisions might have on that, is simply ignored.

• And lastly, the absence of any serious thought as to how UN-wide policy will be monitored and implemented across a variety of independent UN agencies each with their own mandate. The 'monitoring committee' for example has not functioned.

The guidelines were taken and developed into what is known as the Angela King report in November 1997 (Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, 1997). In this report many of the ECHA recommendations are repeated, but this time with guidance for their implementation. The comments above on the ECHA guidelines remain valid. 'Institution-building' is now defined as 'strengthening the capacity of provincial and local institutions of governance and/or services', but remains forbidden 'as long as discriminatory practices apply'. But again the difference between working with the authorities and 'strengthening the capacity' is not made clear. Thus it is left totally unclear if, for example, an EPI programmeACKU with the MOPH, which presumably is strengthening capacity but also life-sustaining, is permitted or not. Indeed, it is specifically recommended that 'In the absence of any current system of rational long-term planning in any sector by local authorities, UN agencies should assist the authorities to develop short and long-term sectoral plans' (pp 16). How this is different to 'strengthening capacity', a forbidden activity, is not made clear.

The King report also advocates the use of conditionality. Conditionality is explicitly recommend as a tool of influencing the authorities and has also been adopted by WFP. This assumes a role for the UN in changing Taliban behaviour in which a form of coercion, conditionality, can be legitimately employed. This contrasts with the approach of ICRC towards International Humanitarian Law (IHL); their role is only advocacy, they inform the

15 authorities of international standards and react in a principled way when those standards are breached. It is the authorities responsibility to respect the law, not ICRC's to try and force them through conditionality. This responsibility to change the Taliban's approach, and the element of coercion, gives the UN a political role, again in effect a gate-keeper role. It is a role the Tali ban are well aware of and a role which continues to create tension with the humanitarian role of meeting need in a principled way where possible.

Attention to UN-wide policy implementation in the King report is, if anything, even more cursory than in the ECHA guidelines.

The next relevant formal statement of UN-wide policy is the Strategic Framework of September 1998. The overall concern with a principled approach is similar to the King report; the UN is concerned to 'facilitate the transition from a state of internal conflict to a just and sustainable peace through mutually reinforcing political and assistance initiatives.' As the Strategic Framework goes on to say 'A paramount _condition for sustainability is to ensure the national ownership of this process, a condition which is made particularly difficult in Afghanistan by the near total breakdown of institutions of governance at the national and sub­ national levels.' However, principle five states that: 'Institution and capacity-building activities must advance human rights and will not seek to provide support to any presumptive state authority which does not fully subscribe to the principles contained in the founding instruments of the UN, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the CRC, the CEDA W, and IHL'. Again however, the difference between 'working with' and institution-building is not made clear, nor when one becomes the other. In fact, if this statement were interpreted strictly, much of what is done in public health by agencies such as UNICEF, WHO and UNDP/UNCHS would have to be terminated.

UN-wide policy implementation was taken rather more seriously by the drafters of the Strategic Framework than the drafters of previous policy statements. However, some of their more radical proposals, notably the common fund to be controlled by the UN Coordinator, did not make it into the final draft, victims of the influence of the large agencies' desire for independence.

The policy was relaxed slightly in the Next Steps II paper by when it was in effect recognised that there was a difference between 'working with' and institution-building: 'UN agencies will continue to work with the technical branches of public administration structures when there is evidence that these entities provide essential services to the civilian population in a non-discriminatory manner (e.g. health, solid waste disposal)' (Next Steps Paper, 24 Feb 1999). This policy adjustment was part of a growing recognition that the humanitarian/development distinctionACKU was not useful in the Afghan context in that it did not provide a useful conceptual distinction for analysing the needs of Afghans. But the difference between institution-building and 'working with' remains undefined, allowing in effect each agency to make its own definition.

In October 1999, as a result ofthe JCC meeting ofthat month, it was agreed that there was 'a need for a clear distinction to be made between the various arrangements, particularly with regard to the involvement of line ministries, and for a set of operational ground rules to be developed for UN agencies in the field' (UN Afghanistan, 1999). Though the ground rules were not developed, the distinctions remain a useful starting point. 12

12 f. . 'd . d Three types o 1mplementmg arrangements were 1 entl fie :

16 The root of the problem for the UN has been its inability to sort out the implementation of its multiple roles- humanitarian, rehabilitation, human rights, gate-keeper, and peace-building­ a situation made worse by the structural problem of so many different agencies with their own mandates. If the UN were only in the business of saving lives, working with the authorities to that goal, as long as principles were respected, would not be so controversial; ICRC for instance has a significant programme of work with the MOPH but is not accused of 'condoning' or 'supporting' the Tali ban. That accusation is only relevant in the context of the UN' s other role, that of being the international communities' 'gate-keeper' and thus being responsible for promoting, and checking, the observance of the full complement of human rights law by the Taliban. In terms of this role, any talk of capacity-building is considered illegitimate as it implies recognition, something the UN can not be seen to be conferring.

The problem thus arrives from the conflation of these different roles. As argued below, donors have deliberately conflated these roles for essentially political reasons. The UN's failure to define the difference between 'working with' and capacity building has allowed this to happen. The UN though does not have to accept this. One way of the UN could do this, as will be argued in Section 8, is being much clearer and more specific in its various objectives and the terms that it uses to describe them.

The existence of separate mandates and organisational structures has also been unhelpful in reaching policy clarity and coherence. Different agencies have taken markedly different approaches in their relationship to the authorities and what they consider to be legitimate under existing policy. WHO and WFP for example have been seen to be on different ends of the spectrum, yet both are working closely with the MOPH. The UN agencies have different corporate views on capacity-building according to their mandate. Thus .while WHO, and to an extent UNDP, have a strong institutional bias towards 'capacity-building' , WFP and UNHCR do not. WFP indeed in this instance has taken an explicitly conditional stand to 'capacity­ building'. While different approaches are not per sea problem, indeed given the many jobs that need doing probably positive, when it comes to engaging with a movement such as the Tali ban, a degree of coherence is necessary to ensure a principled approach.

5.2 Donor policy

The policy of donor governments tow<;1rds capacity-building has on the whole been even more negative than the UN, though for different reasons. Though donor policy is not uniform, this overall antipathy to capacity-building is perhaps best evidenced by the consistent reluctance by many donors to fundACKU rehabilitation work, preferring to concentrate on

Direct UN implementation; where UN employed staff work directly with the project beneficiaries with no involvement or benefit to official institutions or local authorities.

Programme implementation with line ministr-ies: where UN staff, sometimes alongside civil servants, work together on joint activities. Here principle inputs from the UN art! technical support, equipment and materials as well as out-put related incentives.

Programme implementation through line ministries: where UN agencies use line ministries in effect as subcontracted implementing partners and take full responsibility for the project. The UN supplies equipment, material, operational and personnel costs. (UN Afghanistan, 1999)

17 emergency projects. Only one donor has produced explicit guidelines for the implementation of this policy, and that only for NGOs. 13

Donor government policy however has a different starting point. It has to be seen within the overall foreign policy context of most donor countries (and the Security Council) which has emphasised isolation and condemnation ofthe Taliban as a reaction to the security threat they are seen to pose to western and regional interests. Donor aid policy is one part of an overall policy that has attempted to change the Taliban's approach to international relations through isolation rather than engagement. It can be contrasted with, for example, donor government foreign and aid policy towards North Korea, where a degree of dialogue has been backed up with a considerably less critical approach to food distribution and monitoring (Bennett, 1999).

In this broader foreign policy context, for donors, unlike the UN, the distinction between humanitarian and development assistance is functional. Rooted as it is in natural disaster and classical conflict models of human need, the distinction does not adequately describe the complexities of vulnerability in long-term war economies' such as Afghanistan. However, for donors, the humanitarian/political distinction is not a conceptual tool for analysing needs, rather it is an essentially political distinction; development aid implies recognition and legitimacy whereas humanitarian does not. Thus, because the concept of 'humanitarian' still plays well to western publics, the distinction allows donors to assert they are doing something in Afghanistan to themselves and their publics (meeting humanitarian need) while simultaneously sending a political signal of disapproval to the Tali ban ('we will not authorise development aid until you change your ways, or, better, disappear'). This is why much of the continuum rhetoric about reliefto development and sustainability has been dropped by donors in Afghanistan. It would be an implicit recognition that there is light at the end ofthe recognition tunnel, something they are not willing to admit.

The concept of 'capacity-building', which is seen to fall squarely within development, has become a victim of this essentially political logic. The very vagueness of the concept is functional in that it provides maximum bureaucratic and political room for interpretation. Thus in the case of Afghanistan the relief/development divide has been scre\ved down to a very minimalist interpretation, whereas in other situations where strategic interests are different, such as South Sudan, it is interpreted considerably more loosely. 14 One area of 'capacity-building' which is acceptable to donors however is in the area of community development. Programmes such as the UNDP/UNCHS Community Fora and the UNDP/OPS shuras are seen as being potential 'community-based' alternatives to the Taliban, while simultaneously playing into nco-liberal paradigms about civil society and the rolling back of the state popular with many donors.ACKU However, that the concept of civil society assumes a functioning state, and the lack of any substantial thought about the future role and nature of the state in Afghanistan, demonstrates the essentially short-term and political nature ofthe calculations underlying this logic.

13 See DFID 'Guidance for NGOs' ( 1998) where it is stated 'in view of the current circumstances DFID concludes that the full range of capacity building cannot be undertaken under the principled Common programming approach'. Payment to 'individuals for services undertaken by individuals experts', is permitted, but 'strengthening departmen ts in "Ministries" or related institutions, for example through the provision of training or equipment' is not. 14 For example, see Bradbury eta! (2000) for a discussion of how the US has approached 'capacity-building' with de facto authorities very differently in SPLA controlled South Sudan.

18 The rejection of capacity·building has been justified by asserting that such aid would somehow support or legitimate or condone Taliban rule and perpetuate abuses. Thus 'We are committed to continuing humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, but considering the many unacceptable policies of the Taliban, we believe their involvement in humanitarian aid should be minimised to the greatest extent possible' (US, 1999). The logic of how such assistance might in fact support the Taliban, based, for instance, on an analysis of their political and economic base and thus how assistance might feed into this, is absent. It is merely asserted. Also absent is any acceptance that humanitarian aid, which donors are willing to support, probably does benefit the Taliban, at a minimum through food diversion. This is necessary because the logic is the political game of simultaneously asserting that ' humanitarian needs are being met' while also isolating and condemning. In the assistance game, of meeting need where possible in a principled way, this distinction is not relevant; if it is possible to conduct a humanitarian programme in a principled way in Afghanistan, it is surely possible to conduct at least some rehabilitation. In other words it is not what you do that matters (humanitarian or development) but how you do it (principled or not). ·

'Capacity-building' is thus seen as somehow condoning or legitimating the authorities because it is essentially a political, rather than an assistance, concept. The political rather than assistance-based logic is demonstrated by the fact that the assistance activities that probably most support the Tali ban, both materially and in terms of their legitimacy, are refugee return and food distribution. These activities are heavily supported by the US and WFP, two actors who have been particularly vocal in their opposition to the Tali ban and in their advocacy of a restrictive and conditional approach to 'capacity-building'.

As with the UN though, donor policy on the various areas mentioned above is far from uniform, and on the question of the long-term nature and role of the state even more embryonic than the UN's. It is noticeable that those donors most consistent in the foreign policy approach that emphasises isolation and condemnation have been those with the most minimalist interpretation ofthe humanitarian/development distinction. This lack of consistency continues through to more prosaic aspects; there is little donor coordination on issues such as payment of incentives to government staff.

6. Taliban 'policy'

The attitude of the Tali ban to 'capacity·building' in all its varieties, or indeed 'scaling up', is complex and not well understood by the international community. In almost all interviews with Taliban officials in ministries,ACKU they expressed the desire for the UN to work more through them and less through NGOs. Indeed the common experience of UN field offices sometimes seems to be a more or less constant battle for control of programmes and projects with the Taliban. However, the reasons for Taliban attempts at control are varied, and require careful elucidation, an ongoing task this report can only contribute to.

Overall the Tali ban view of the nature and role of the Afghan state, the relationship between state and citizen, and indeed their own relationship to the state, does not yet appear to be fully formed, at least it is not apparent to many outside observers. In their initial phases, for example, they were explicit that their role was merely the physical control of Afghan

19 territory, ~overnment would be done by 'someone else', and they had no responsibility for welfare. 1

According to many interviewees, the last few years appear to have seen a growing realisation amongst at least some Taliban of the need to govern and not just rule. Some observers though would disagree and there still seems to be serious divisions in Taliban ranks on the nature of the government they should be instituting. The oft-quoted distinction between ' hard-liners' and 'moderates' appears to be in part a disagreement on this issue. 16 What can be said is that their view of the role of the state is radically different from that shared by almost the entire international community in that they see its prime role as controlling and bringing order to the territory of Afghanistan and imposing a particular version of sharia. They do not appear to see much of a role for the state, or that they have much responsibility, for areas such as public welfare, education or economic development. This attitude to the state, as much as their abuse of human rights, makes them an inappropriate partner for the kind of governance work needed in Afghanistan.

The attitude of the Tali ban to the rights of the citizenry and the role of citizens in governance is also complex and somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, one of their main claims to legitimacy is that they have brought security to ordinary people's lives. They also claim to listen to the will of the people and to be 'the servants of the people'. And indeed there do appear to be a number of avenues through which the Tali ban are exposed to the wishes of the people, either through the constant individual petitions for assistance from communities and villages through to more formal meetings in municipalities between governor and local government representatives. Unlike the commanders who preceded them, Taliban ideology does demand at least lip-service to this aspect of governance. But, on the other hand, they have instituted a high degree of political and ethnic repression, and spent considerable eftorts on the building up the coercive elements of the state structures, and very little on th ose for welfare or development. 17 A number of interviewees also felt that the Tali ban's reputation for purity and incorruptibility was rapidly waning as time went on, Taliban ranks \\'t:re filled with the usual opportunists, and ideological fervour has waned. This is a process that the Taliban leadership too appears concerned about, given the recent decr~es about corruption.

A very important, and as yet unanswered question, is the extent to which Taliban views on the role of the state has changed, or might change in the future. It may be for instance, that as the initial gratitude of the population for the security they have brought wears off, that they receive increasing pressure from the populations they control for economic development and public welfare. How they react to this will be very important for UN strategy in this area. The Taliban may get increasingly repressive, or try and meet some demands through growing control of the assistance community,ACKU or attempt some oftheir own solutions. However, one of the political impacts of continued military support from abroad is that the Tali ban are to an extent isolated from having to negotiate with the population they control for resources. Like all of Afghanistan's rulers in this century, they are heavily subsidised from outside, and are thus to an extent politically 'autonomous' from most Afghans. 18 Thus they may not feel the

15 'TI1e Taliban continuously insisted that they were not responsible for the population and that Allah would provide'. ~Rashid, 2000: 127) 6 Though, given that few in the Taliban could be called 'moderate', a distinction between ' ideologues' and ' pragmatists' might be more accurate. 17 The newly painted buildings in Kandahar for example include the prison and the state court. 18 Sec Rubin, ( 1995) for a discussion of foreign support to the Afghan state and its political consequences in terms of 'automony'.

20 pressure to accede to demands for welfare or education in return for extracting resources of · funds or manpower from the population.

Whether or nor Taliban views have changed recently is an open question on which observers are divided. There have for instance been some examples ofTaliban using their own (or the state's? the difference is unclear) resources for public works, in particular roads, but also for example electricity supply in Kandahar. However, this could also be seen not so much as evidence of a changed attitude to the role of the state as rewarding their supporters. According to one interviewee, the equipment used for establishing the Kandahar electricity supply was cannibalised from power stations around the country. On the other hand, there is growing evidence that, for example, the ban on poppy cultivation is being taken seriously, something a number of observers were sceptical about as it was assumed the Taliban themselves and their supporters were generating revenue from the trade.

In terms of the mechanism of power, despite their revolutionary rhetoric, the Tali ban have made remarkably few changes to the administrative machinery. The provincial and district structure remains intact, as does the system of ministries and departments. Taliban 'aparatchiks' have been appointed to a large number of posts in the administrative structure. Though often unqualified, in some areas at least, 'the Taliban appointee often does not interfere in the limited work that is carried out in the offices, enabling bureaucrats to function as before' (Newberg, 1997). According to one interviewee a recently appointed Talib declared to his agency counterpart 'I don't know anything about health, I have to learn from you', an interesting example of the new administration learning about the responsibilities of the state from the representatives ofthe international community. There has also been a recent massive 'down-sizing' of public sector employees by about 40o/o. This appears to have been motivated by cost-cutting, but probably also the more political motive of removing sympathisers of previous regimes (and of course women) from the government payroll (UNOCHA 2000).

More significant changes have of course been made to taxation and in particular to the administration of justice in order to bring them more in line with the Taliban's view of Islamic principles. Raising sufficient tax revenue to pay for the state has been a chronic problem in Afghan history. According to one recent estimate, the published budget is equivalent to 0.9% of GOP, eloquent testimony to the weakness of the state (UNOCHA, 2000). Interviews with Taliban officials for this consultancy also indicated a fairly high degree of centralisation of control of expenditure in Kabul. However, the financing of the state, and in particular the war effort, by the Taliban are surrounded in secrecy; the assistance community remains largelyACKU ignorant. It is an area that requires much more systematic study. 7. UN-Taliban relations; the 'governance network'

In this 'governance gap' has evolved a complex 'governance network' in which legitimacy and control are contested, and to an extent shared, by the UN, the authorities, NGOs and fledgling CBOs. 19 In the case ofUNDCP, there is even cooperation between the UN and the

19 An interesting example of this 'governance network' at work is the recent decree (25 dated 26.05.1421) issued by Mullah Omar ' In relation to reporting of all ministries/departments from and to ofthe lEA, and national/international agencies to the Central Statistical department'. Statistical collection and analysis is of course a core function of government, and this decree intends to regulate and control what is being done in this area. The decree though is addressed to both departments of government and international agencies and addresses them effectively as equals throughout the text.

21 coercive capacity of the state in the destruction of poppy. But it is a network characterised by a high degree of mutual suspicion and many difficult negotiations at all lev els. The attitude of the main players to each other in this governance network is complex and often contradictory. Both players are of course made up of many different constituencies and power bases; the UN, covering institutions from the Security Council to \VHO being even more diverse in this respect than the Taliban. The UN wants to be able to criticise the Taliban for righ ts issues, yet needs good relations on the ground to run assistance programmes. El ements \Vith in the Taliban see the UN as 'polluting' and an agent of US power and would rather all fo reign agencies left the country?0 Others though seem to appreciate the need for the UN to be in the country, both for the assistance it provides and to prove to the intern ati onal community their emp1nca. . l soveretgnty. . 21

As argued in Section 3, this 'governance network' works most effectively in the interests of Afghans when all sides recognise, and negotiate over, what is in effect common ground. However, much of the time interests and principles rarely converge, misunderstanding and suspicion is rife, the parties to the negotiation are talking about different things, and trying to cajole and manipulate rather than negotiate. However, working out and disentangl ing what is behind the various attempts by the Taliban to manipulate the UN is important. UN negotiation strategies should be based on a thorough analysis of the various interests that are driving the Tali ban. For example, being a victim of petty corruption is a lesser concern than food being diverted to the front line. Broadly, Taliban attitudes to the UN include: a desire to demonstrate empirical sovereignty, a desire to bring aid resources into the country 'for the good of Afghans', a desire for international legitimacy through allowing and protecting the aid programme, a desire to divert resources to the war effort, and the desire to use the aid system for patronage and corruption.

Whatever the future ofthe attitude to the role of the state, the Taliban's prime foreign policy concern is recognition of their control of most of the country, of their empirical sovereignty. But most of the international community is determined to deny them such recognition. It is this struggle over sovereignty that underlies much of the Taliban's attitude to the UN and permeates its negotiations with the UN at all levels. While the international community deny the Taliban judicial sovereignty, the Taliban will continue to emphasise their empirical sovereignty and it is this which underlies the Taliban's desire to control much UN work and, for instance, the recent issuing of a statute on UN regulation. Many interviewees noted that the Tali ban feel that 'whatever they do is not enough' in terms of meeting the demands ofthe international community, and this too may be part of what lies behind the recent deteriorati.o n in relations. But in many project negotiations, once 'sovereignty' is recognised by an agency, usually through getting permission, there appears to be considerable scope for the UN in terms of actual project content.ACKU With the outstanding exceptions of the denial of access to war affected areas and the gender issue, the UN would appear to be able to exercise a considerable degree of freedom over what it does where, in public health and rural reconstruction for example. Interference in aid work by the Taliban thus accords with their priorities; recognition of sovereignty, and imposition of their own brand of shari a.

In some ways, precisely because the Taliban is not very interested in the we lfare functions of the state, UN agencies have actually been able to conduct quite a wide variety of activities without too much interference. Given this lack of interest in the welfare fun ctions of state,

20 See Rashid (2000) pp 64-5. 21 Many Taliban interviewees proclaimed that the advent of the Taliban had ' made the country safe' for the UN and NGOs.

22 evidenced by the pitiful resources directed to this, the p r ~ m ary aims of the welfare arms of state now seem to be to ensure that the assistance community abide by sharia, rather than to develop and implement a welfare programme.

8. UN policy implementation

This section will examine the implementation of UN policy on 'capacity-building' in terms of the various areas outlined in Section 3, concentrating on relations with the authorities. Before doing that though it will be useful to sketch out the many and various ways in which the UN assistance agencies do in fact interact with the authorities.

These include:

• Negotiating consent/establishing 'Ground rules': This happens at several levels and includes for example the MoU, ongoing negotiations through the JCC, individual agencies negotiating protocols, getting permission for projects, informing ministries of projects, getting approval for individual members of staff etc.

• Security: The Taliban provide, and are paid for providing, guards on UN compounds and 'security focal points' for the.UN.

• Joint planning: In for example the drought response, the return of refugees from Iran and Pakistan, planning of for example EPI through the JCC, planning sanitation and other projects with the municipalities

• Advocacy: on a number of issues e.g. access to war affected populations, gender issues, education, the mahram edict etc. This takes place at all levels, from the JCC down to field staff negotiating with local officials.

• Contracts/joint projects: a number of agencies have contracts or project agreements with ministries, which involve certain tasks in return for which the UN provides resources, e.g. though incentives to EPI staff, equipment, food for hospitals etc. The UN also purchases fuel from the Taliban for the UN flight operations.

• Provision of resources/support outside of projects: Through a number of means, direct or indirect, UN agenciesACKU provide resources to the authorities outside the scope of specific projects, e.g. sending staff abroad for training, the donation of equipment and vehicles to ministries outside project agreements, and the occasional transport ofTaliban on the UN plane. Some resources are also provided for 'good will' often as a kind of payment for project approval, office refurbishment of administration offices being common.

8.1 Working with or though the authorities

As argued above, part of the problem has been the lack of an agreed definition for when

23 'working with or through' the authorities becomes 'capacity-building'. This is, of course, a grey area, complicated by the large variety of ways in which the UN works 'with or through' the authorities. Just about any relationship, certainly one which involves the transfer of resources, could be seen as 'capacity-building'. Institutional feeding, for example, though classed as a humanitarian project, could quite reasonably be said to be building the capacity of the MOPH to meet the nutritional needs of patients. This looseness is indeed pa11 of the problem with the term capacity-building.

A workable distinction and definition will need to be agreed on. For working purposes, here, 'working with or through' will mean assistance activities conducted with the authorities which are directed to project-specific goals and which involve the transfer of resources from the UN to the administration, either directly or though an intermediary. 'Institution building' which is dealt with in the next section will be defined as activities primarily focused on an institution itself, as opposed to a project focused on Afghans.

Establishing what UN agencies are actually doing in practice for this consultancy has not been easy. This consultancy has not been alone on this. The response to the Coordinator's letter of 28 October 1999 requesting details of incentives and protocols was patchy. RCOs too have reported difficulty in persuading agencies to be open in this area. Charitably, this is much to do with the fact that there has little attempt at a definition of 'capacity-building', or how it differs from 'working with or through' the authorities, or what exactly an incentive is, which makes it hard for agencies to respond consistently. But it is also because this area is so controversial and capacity-building is such a politically loaded concept. During the field­ work for the consultancy it became apparent that there is considerable confusion amongst field staff about what is or is not acceptable in terms of working with the authorities, a general feeling that it was somehow not legitimate or acceptable. Many staff, at all levels, know that their HQ has a position for or against it, and so there has been a reluctance in some areas to talk about it or to be transparent about what is going on. But the practical reality is that it is happening and indeed for many projects, notably public health, is necessary.

This lack of policy clarity has led to a considerable degree of, at best, confusion amongst field-staff, at worst deliberate obscuring of actual ways of working. Thus, at best, an activity that one agency calls capacity-building another will not, depending, as outlined in Section 5.1, on HQ policy on capacity-building. Some projects have even been re-named and put under different budget lines to make them seem more acceptable. What are in fact incentives are disguised, or called something else and then denied as such. Indeed the use of the word 'incentive' itself, for what is in effect a salary, could be said to be misleading at best. At worst, there were several allegations made to the consultant of the use of 'front' NGOs, set up by the Tali ban at the instigationACKU of UN officials, so that UN can have sub-contracts with NGOs rather than the authorities. This lack of transparency is an invitation for corruption and bad practice, and encourages an attitude to UN policy that it is to be subverted rather than followed, and so brings it into disrepute.

In fact, following the definition of 'working with' outlined above, almost all UN agencies are, in one way or another, working with the authorities:

• WFP programmed about $1 .4m worth of food aid through the MOPH and MRRD from December 1998.

24 • UNICEF's EPI programme pays incentives to over a thousand MOPH staff and it has contracts with MRRD

• WHO provides substantial drugs and other equipment to MOPH facilities and trains many MOPH staff

• UNDP/UNCHS has a large number of rehabilitation projects with municipalities,

• UNDP/FAO has contracts for seed reproduction with the Ministry of Agriculture

• UNHCR has provided equipment to the MMR and has some joint projects,

• UNDP/OPS has had contracts with MRRD,

• UNDCP funds a liaison unit, staffed by Taliban appointees, through which it liaises with the authorities.

• All UN agencies, through the field security system, pay for the salaries of Tali ban guards and provide fuel and communication equipment.

As far as the research could establish, the only UN agencies which do not work with or through the authorities in some way are CDAP, though they too have conducted policy work with ministerial structures and like all other agencies work only with permission of the authorities. UNFPA too has minimal links with the authorities, though they work through the Afghan Red Crescent, which is headed by a Talib. Most agencies would also appear to pay incentives, if not directly then indirectly through food or other subsidies.

Overall, the current UN approach to working out these various project agreements with the authorities tends to be ad hoc and based on individual agency needs and requirements. There is little consistency in terms of whether or how to engage with the authorities over issues such as employment, incentives, projects agreements, protocols, donations of equipment, refurbishment of offices etc. Individual agreements are negotiated with little reference to any kind of central UN standard or principles. RCOs seem to play little planning or coordination role in what is an ad hoc and local series of bilateral agreements, rather they play a kind of trouble-shooting role when these go wrong. Though this is perhaps not for lack of will, rather the result of agencies being jealous of their right to do what they feel appropriate.

The question of course is, is this situation problematic? There are a number of ways in which this could be so. Such workACKU could support the Taliban politically, either by allowing them to claim credit for such action and thus bolstering their political suppot1 amongst the population, or by implicitly recognising their authority and so conferring some kind of legitimacy. And it could support the Taliban materially, either directly through straight-forward diversion or indirectly through allowing the authorities to divert funds they would otherwise have spent on welfare to the war effort.

Politically, it is hard to see how such work does in fact support the Taliban. As argued in Section 6, the Taliban's claim to legitimacy is based on control, a monopoly of violence and thus the security they have brought, and their claim to be able to bring about their version of a properly Islamic society. In a sense, precisely because they do not appear to be that

25 interested in the welfare and development responsibilities of the state, it is hard for them to claim credit for such things. Indeed, an attitude to welfare that 'God will provide' can be seen as the antithesis of the often secular, humanist, orientation of much relief work. It is safe to say that for most Afghans anyway it is clear that such work is sustained by the efforts of the international community rather than the Taliban. While the Taliban continue to impose strict dress and gender policies in the cities, and taxes and forcible recruitment and other forms of oppression in the countryside, the extent to which they can successfully claim credit for the assistance effort will be politically marginal.

The impact of material assistance is more complex, particularly as so little is known about Taliban finances or the war economy in Afghanistan. This is an area that requires considerably greater study. When discussing material benefit it is important to distinguish between material benefit that furthers the aims of the Tali ban movement and individual corruption or the use of the assistance machinery by individual Talibs to reward their own followers.

From the little that is known of the Tali ban finances, their priority is obviously financing the war. Arguing that UN money spent on rehabilitation allows the Taliban to spend more on the war assumes they would otherwise have spent the money on 'domestic' expenditure. There is, as argued in Section 7, very little evidence that this is one of their priorities. Indeed in areas where the UN has not spent money owing to lack of access, or at times when it was absent, it is not evident that the Tali ban have compensated. Despite the slowness of the UN drought response for example, the Taliban have done little to intervene. Where they have spent their own money on 'public goods' it has been roads and other infrastructure that benefits their supporters (Rubin, 2000).

As mentioned above, overall, there is a tendency towards ~n ad hoc rather than a systematic approach to working with the authorities. This lack of UN coherence tends to enhance the Tali ban's ability to use the UN for localised corruption and patronage, if not so much for political gain. The Tali ban is able to play one agency off against another along the lines of 'so and so does this, so should you'. This will over time tend to raise the price of working as precedents are set which other agencies will have great difficulty avoiding, espt:L:ially the smaller agencies with less bargaining power. It will also ensure the recognition and legitimacy aspect of such agreements is not managed in a principled and effective way; the issue of shari a and regulation by the IAE for example is an issue that has come up in a proposed protocol between UNDP/UNCHSACKU and the DOLSA. 8.2 Institution-building

In terms of the administrative structures, there is very little of what could really be called institution-building being carried out by the UN at the moment. Perhaps only some of the WHO work with MOPH could count as this. A brief review of some of the current literature on institution-building demonstrates that few if any of the pre-requisites for success in this work now exist and in any serious sense the conditions are simply not right for this type of work yet. UNDP for instance has stated that a necessary pre-requisite for institution building is 'Visible leadership: meaningful commitment and ownership (and "political will") at the political and senior bureaucratic levels'(UNDP, 1998: 15), something that is highly questionable in current circumstances given the Taliban's lack of interest in the welfare and

26 development functions of the state.22 DFID and US AID state that a minimum time horizon for institution-building is 10 years, again hardly possible in current circumstances (Eade, 1997: 3). Eade argues that 'experience suggests both that some organisational purpose and capacity need to exist before investing in training, or the establishment of particular structural forms' (Eade, 1997: 30). War and its unpredictability, funding constraints, lack of will on the part of the authorities, and indeed the sheer lack of capacity in the structures would all argue that serious institution-building for state structures is simply not a feasible objective at the moment.

However, it may be that one of the side effects of working with the authorities discussed above is an impact in terms of what might be called 'institution sustaining'; there is some evidence to suggest that working with the existing structures has some impact in terms of keeping professionals in place and equipment working. The donation of equipment, often second-hand, by the UN would fit under this description. This probably has a value above and beyond the value of the individual projects. It is noticeable that the MOPH, for all its faults and failings, is still just about functioning, this could in some way be a result of the sustained effort made by many aid agencies to work with MOPH structures. The Ministry of Agriculture however, though no less important for the future of the country, has received almost no attention and is in effect non-existent. A similar point could be made about the UNDP/UNCHS work with municipalities where joint projects have at least kept some minimal, yet essential, functions of the municipalities ticking over.

Indeed, the preference for contracting Afghan NGOs over the technical departments and ministries could be argued to be progressively shifting capacity away from the state onto even more precarious and dependent institutions. This progressive undermining of the state's already very weak capacity in the short-term could have serious long-term consequences, the state after all will necessarily play a key role in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan in the future.

As well as the MOPH, another vestige of state capacity that has managed to retain some semblance of operation are the municipalities. This probably has much to do with the fact that they have a resource base and some limited control of locally raised resources. Municipalities tax residents for water, sanitation, and raise revenue from markets and other sources, though at very low rates. Municipalities also own considerable assets such as· land, hotels etc. How much income is siphoned off for the war and how much retained for local use is not clear, but salaries of municipal workers appear to be paid from locally raised resources, as do some very basic services such as rubbish collection. Several of the cities also have very long­ standing political and cultural identities, most obviously Kabul, which as a result has attracted particularly brutal repression. Cities are also where the government has to deal most directly with its population. WhileACKU in Kabul this has meant repression, it may be that this combination of some vestigial capacity built on local resources and the proximity of rulers and ruled provides some space for a more systematic arid longer-term partnership between UN and municipality than has hitherto beeh attempted, at least outside Kabul.

22 Indeed the UNDP text lists a series of 'factors critical to success'. none of which couJd be said to apply in the current context. (UNDP, 1998:15)

27 8.3 Community Development

Work with the shuras and the Community Fora is sometimes referred to as 'capacity­ building', both for the communities themselves and in terms of governance. Indeed it is hard not to get the impression that some involved, especially donors, see these structures almost as potential alternative power structures to the Taliban. While there are some anecdotal examples of where such structures have challenged local abuse ofTaliban authority, to see them as being any serious alternative is hopelessly unrealistic. These activities would perhaps be better classed as community development, i.e. strengthening the ability of communities to work together and to voice their demands to the authorities and the UN.

The consultancy was unable to do any kind of serious evaluation of the effectiveness of this work and this has anyway been done in a previous UNDP evaluation and in a current study. Comments here will be restricted to saying that it appears to be a sound strategy in itself, except in so far as it is sold as any kind of alternative power structure or as a route for by­ passing the authorities. Both the Community Fora and the ARRP shuras for example are set up and run with the full knowledge and acceptance of the Tali ban. Should they prove any kind of threat, it can be assumed they would be rapidly stamped on.

One 'governance' avenue that may be worth exploring further however is using the shura and the Community Fora as accountability mechanisms for the performance of the UN, rather than the Taliban. Taking the UN as part of the 'governance network', by its own rhetoric it too has an obligation to hold itself accountable to Afghans. A number of interviewees felt that the failure to do this to date, or develop a sufficiently strong Afghan voice ·in the PCP was a significant failure of the UN. The Strategic Framework may have some kind of international legitimacy through the UN General Assembly, it has little national legitimacy through support from Afghans. If the UN is to 'practice what it preaches' in terms of legitimacy and good governance, it could be argued, it should do more to ensure that its aims, objectives and results are indeed in line with what Afghans want. Not only is this demanded by consistency, it could be seen as a form of indirect advocacy, if the UN can hold itself accountable to Afghans, shouldn't the authorities too? One way of doing this may be to use the shuras and Community Foras to discuss the broad national aims of the Strategic Framework and the PCP with Afghans, rather than, as is commonly done, for discussion of local and project specific discussions on hand pumps etc.ACKU 8.4 The future role and nature of the state

The overarching question is the UN' s view of what it thinks should be the future nature and role of the state in Afghanistan in terms of future peace and development. It could be said that it is not the UN's place to have such views. However, the UN is in effect already part of the 'governance network' of Afghanistan and as such, there are assistance decisions being taken now that will influence the possible political options in the future. In particular over issues such as regionalisation versus centralisation, the balance between private and public, and cost recovery. For example, the current focus by the UN on the ministerial structure in Kabul, and the lack of systematic work at the municipality level, could be argued to be playing into the

28 centralising tendency already noted in the Taliban. This may make future options, such as a more regionally-based government, which may be important for the peace process, more difficult in the future. These are very political issues, and the implications of decisions taken now need to be assessed and thought through with UNSMA.

9. Conclusions and Recommendations

To reiterate, the objective ofthis consultancy was: 'To provide advice to UN Afghanistan in terms of developing a principled, coherent and coordinated policy for maintaining and building the capacities of structures essential for the recovery and longer-term sustainability at national, regional and local levels.' This report has argued that there are a number of different areas, or structures, that require UN policy in this regard, that the concept of capacity-building is not helpful in formulating such policy where there is a 'governance gap', and that the problem is better characterised as one of 'scaling up'. It has also argued that only on common ground, on areas where the principles and interests of both the assistance actors and the authorities meet, can such scaling up happen in a principled way. Finding, and then exploiting, this common ground demands a high level of political judgement and negotiating skill. There will be times when it barely exists, there will be times when there are a number of opportunities that can be exploited?3 These opportunities are unlikely to arise from the impact of aid itself,24 conditional or otherwise, but rather from the larger economic and political forces shaping the conflict. But a greater level of political acumen and skill in negotiations will enable the UN to make more of those opportunities that do appear.

Overall, in terms of coherent UN policy formulation in these areas, the main problem is the tension between the UN's multiple roles- peace-maker, relief and development provider, human rights promoter, and 'gate-keeper' for the international community. The engagement strategies, and the ethical and political compromises they involve, are different for the different roles. An actor concerned only to alleviate suffering for example, can chose a different engagement strategy and make different ethical choices in terms of reaching that goal then one concerned with the international legitimacy of a regime's authority. Lack of clarity in terms of each of these objectives makes this tension even worse. This problem of multiple roles is also made worse by the UN agencies' conflicting mandates and institutional jealousies. The definition of whether or not a project is 'capacity-building' or not has little to do with its actual impact and a lot to do with institutional positions on Afghanistan and on general policy. This multiplicity of roles and mandates means that every discussion of 'what are we to do' in response to Taliban challenges to the UN tends to be an inconclusive discussion of first principlesACKU rather than a focused discussion intended to work out how the UN should react.

Given the breadth of the issues raised by the innocuous term 'capacity-building', the following recommendations inevitably range over a number of large policy issues as well as more specific issues such as working with the authorities.

23 In South Sudan, for example, the collapse of the Derg in lead to the expulsion of the SPLA from its bases in Ethiopia. This was one of the factors that lead to a process of reform within the SPLA that the UN was able to capitalise on, notably through the singing of the 'Ground Rules', to promote respect for humanitarian principles by the SPLA. In Liberia, the presidential election campaign of 1996 briefly enabled the UN to exert some leverage on the warlords through the ~ublication of human rights violations. (Leader, 2000) 4 'Aid alone has limited capacities to determine the dynamics of violent contlict' ( Uvin, 1999: 4)

29 9.1 General Recommendations

There is a limit to what the UN agencies can do in terms of sorting out the inherent confusions in the UN's mandated role, however, there are some things they can do to minimise the confusion these multiple roles generate and to better exploit opportun ~ties for scaling up that arise.

Firstly, the UN agencies need to be much clearer and more precise about their overall objectives in Afghanistan. More clarity about its own objectives will protect the UN from the conflation and abuse of its objectives by donors and the Tali ban alike. The Strategic Framework has gone some way to this goal but needs to be taken a stage further. There are two aspects to this. The first is greater clarity and vision about how exactly the assistance, human rights, and the political can reinforce each other. The second is making the assistance goals far more specific, more like targets than the rather vague and unspecific goals of the current CAP. Its recommended that the UN in the next planning cycle move to overall targets, such as 'reducing child mortality from ... to ... by such and such date' or reducing maternal mortality from ... to .. by ...... ' or on 'reducing literacy for girls from ... to ... by .... '. This would have a number of advantages: for example, it would make specific goals that would make sense of the planning process, provide indicators that could be measured by SMU, provide an easily communicable message about the purpose of the UN in Afghanistan to ordinary Afghans, and provide targets against which the UN could be held accountable. It would also provide a clear basis from which to negotiate for common ground with the Tali ban, and on which to formulate joint projects with the authorities. The many arguments for a target-based planning approach are laid out in greater detail in Annex 4.

Achieving this shift in the current approach to planning would be a complex process. Assuming agreement from the agencies and donors, it would probably be best done by a dedicated staff member, working with a task-force of re,presentatives from the agencies and the SMU under the PCP process. The 2001 plan and CAP would be the target for such a revised plan.

Secondly, on the basis ofsuch redefined goals, the UN needs to re-structure its relationship with the Taliban. The MoU does not appear to be providing a central reference point for all UN!faliban relations, nor does the JCC appear to be fulfilling the function it was set up for. The new statue governing the UN may be an opportunity to revise and re-negotiate the overall Taliban/UN relationship, which in turn would provide a standard against which a series of bilateral agency/ministryACKU relationships could be worked out. Universal issues from issues such as the sovereignty questions (recognising the law of the lEA, the recognition of sharia), the payment of incentives, and other administrative issues could be dealt with in principle here. This would mean that individual agency negotiations would not have to reinvent the wheel each time, or set unhelpful precedents for other agencies. A common approach to the negotiation of agreements with state structures would seem to be an obvious implication of principled common programming.

This re-negotiation would be lead by the UN Coordinator, supported by an increased l.evel of analytical capacity than is currently available. This could be achieved by the proposed standing Task-Force on engagement.

30 And thirdly and perhaps most ambitiously, the UN needs to challenge the overall foreign policy analysis, in the Security Council and powerful capitals, that dominates the picture of Afghanistan. A general foreign policy context which, on the one hand, refuses to accept the Taliban, but, on the other, is unwilling to determine an alternative, is an impossible situation within which to formulate policy. UN political and assistance actors together need to develop a more coordinated and plausible vision of how a more concerted diplomatic effort, backed up by imaginative uses of economic assistance, can promote peace and development in the country. If the nature of the war economy is one of the factors fueling the conflict, UN­ brokered peace deals are unlikely to reduce the structural conditions encouraging conflict (Rubin, 2000). A long-term peace strategy requires creating licit economic incentives for powerful economic actors, a job the humanitarian and development actors, currently focused on the most vulnerable, are not equipped to do. With such an analysis the UN can challenge the prevailing negative view of future possibilities in Afghanistan. This would require the UN agencies taking the debate to London, Washington and Moscow, rather than waiting for these capitals to determine the policy context as now.

A good starting point for developing this strategy would be a small conference, convened jointly by UNSMA and Coordinator's office. This would bring in some academics and the World Bank and would be enhanced by a background paper based on desk research on the various existing work.

9.2 Working with or through the authorities

As argued in Section 8.1, the primary problem here is not that work is done with or though the authorities, but that such work is often done in an uncoordinated and far from transparent way. This tends to encourage bad practice and even corruption and abuse. On the basis of the distinction between 'working with' and 'capacity-building' outlined above, there should be an agreement that 'working with' is acceptable and legitimate for individual agencies, as long as certain UN-wide conditions and principles are fulfilled. It is recommended that a document be drawn up to specify these conditions and is presented to the donors at the next ASG as a quid pro quo for greater acceptance that the practice is acceptable, and therefore release greater funding. The following is a suggestion as to the issues such a document might cover. The document would cover such things as:

• ensuring that individual projects are in line with the.MoU (or what ever replaces it) and the recent Operating Requirements,ACKU • - that project outputs are specific and measurable and in line with the principles in the Strategic Framework and the objectives in the CAP

• that incentives and other transfers of resources to administrative structures are coordinated across agencies

• that resources transferred directly contribute to specific, measurable and monitored outputs,

• that the project will focus on the most vulnerable and will be impartial as regards men and women, ethnic minorities etc

31 • every effort is made to encourage the authorities to contribute in some way to the project goals

• that there is some degree of'community verification of the project goals

• that there are explicit agreements about the ownership and use of assets

• that the RCO is involved in the process of negotiating agreements,

• that the structure concerned has demonstrated the capacity and will to engage in the project

• that opportunities for' institution-sustaining' have been identified and capitalised on where possible

It may be possible to develop 'compliance indicators' for all projects with the authorities in end of project reports such that the extent to which different departments and ministries meet the terms of projects agreements can be measured. Thus over time, it may be possible to determine which structures are worth investing in and which not and so create an incentive for better performance.

The payment of incentives should be considered legitimate and acceptable once the conditions above have been met. However it should be in line with UN-wide policy documents such as the Joint Consultative Group on Policy report on ' Payments to Government staff of April 1996. Incentive rates should also be coordinated across UN agencies so that similar work receives similar pay. One way of doing this may be to use the existing civil service grade structure as a starting point. All payment, including payment in kind such as food, should be covered by this approach. Once coordinated and agreed, it will be easier for the Coordinator's office to monitor such payments at the UN-w ide level.

Making the judgments necessary for such an approach requires a higher degree of analysis than currently exists, notably on the financing of the state and the war effort by the authorities, the extent to which revenue raised by municipalities is spent and controlled locally for example. It is recommended that further studies are conducted into this subject.

Assuming such a document is agreed, there is probably scope for expanding the work done with or through the authorities, notably in the area of public health and possibly agriculture and with the municipalities. ACKU The document itself would have to go through an inter-UN process of development and ratification to ensure acceptability to all agencies. This process could be done by a dedicated person to ensure continuity, and managed by the existing chair of the Capacity-building Task force.

32 9.3 Institution-building

As argued in Section 8.2, in terms of government structures in the current context there is very little that can be achieved in any real way in this area. However, there is an important secondary objective of 'working with or through' that is what might be called 'institution­ sustaining'. This is not an objective in itself, but given its importance could be addressed more systematically than it is at present. It is recommended that a more comprehensive and systematic survey and ongoing analysis of current capacities of the administration is conducted by UNDP. There ate techniques for 'capacity-assessment (e.g. UNDP, 1998) that could be modified for this to be done in effect without the consent of the 'target'. This should ~tart with a comprehensive audit of all projects done with the ministries and technical departments and a review of lessons learnt, concentrating on the strengths and weaknesses of individual departments and· ministries at national and regional level.

This analysis needs to be placed alongside a more long-term projection as to the role and nature of the state as a whole (see section 9 .6) so that a longer-term view can be taken as to which arms of the administration will require some kind of .'sustaining' for the future.

9.4 Governance and Community Development

As argued in Section 8.3, if the UN is to push governance issues with any credibility it should do all it can to ensure the Strategic Framework and the PCP have as much consultation and legitimacy as possible. One way of doing this would be to use of the Fora and shuras as a kind of accountability mechanism for the UN. It may be that these mechanisms could provide one way for Afghans to engage with the UN in a more systematic and pro-active way on issues such as planing than happens at present. These institutions are far from being fully representative, and the coverage ofthe shuras in particular is low, but they are a least community based and could provide a useful opportunity for at least a limited consultation.

It is recommended that UNDP and the Coordinator's office, through the RCOs, lead a process in which the shuras and foras are consulted on broad policy issues.

9.5 Human Resource Development A coordinated policy on incentivesACKU is one element of what should be an overall policy on human resource development. International managers commonly lament the difficulty of recruiting qualified national staff and that many leave to take up residence as refugees in the West. The implementation of principled programming also suffers from the difficulty of recruiting for instance female health staff. It is also commonly pointed out that agencies in effect compete for staff through differing pay scales and incentive rates and that the administration can not compete at all, thus losing many qualified people to the agencies. In an unregulated labour market, characterised by severe shortage, such competition is not necessarily the most efficient way of ensuring a rational use of scarce human resources. This situation is not helped by donors paying little attention to this issue.

33 It is recommended that an inter-agency human resource planning group is established. This group would look at the mid to long-term human resource needs of the assistance system as a whole, including the needs ofthose parts of the administration most often working with the agencies. The group would estimate the number and location of staff of different levels and skills that are likely to be needed in the future. It could than identify likely shortages, both in terms of regions and specific skills, and propose solutions. Such a group could also review training needs and pool resources to improve the skill levels of existing staff. More controversially, such a group could look at remuneration and try and ensure if not uniformity, then at least a degree of consistency amongst pay scales. It might also look at ways of ensuring that skilled staff remain in key ministries and departments.

9.6 The future role and nature of the state

This is the most complex area of policy for the UN, but perhaps the most important of all. It should be UN thinking in this area that is informing the other areas of policy. The most important recommendation here is that the UN, both the assistance and the political parts, need to jointly start a process of exploration on this issue. There are a number of ways of doing this. The UN could start a process of facilitating debate on these issues with Afghan and international intellectuals and politicians, a series of seminars on various different types of state for example. The UN and the World Bank could investigate previous tax and other revenues and construct various options based on different projections. The UN needs to review the impact its current decisions are likely to have in the future, such as the focus on Kabul and on some ministries and not others for example. This work also needs further macro-level analysis of the war economy and the current 'winners' and what sorts of incentives might provide alternative but licit economic opportunities.

9. 7 Further research

As has been stressed several times in this report, there arc many areas of research that could usefully contribute to policy development. Several are important for the subject of this Consultancy. Broadly, a better understanding is needed of the political economy of the conflict, in particular who are the economic 'winners', how and why, and how they relate to the Taliban. This is known to an extent in outline, but needs to be known in more detail. This is important for developing a complementary assistance and political strategy; for developing a strategy for economic assistance activities, probably not directed at the poorest, but which would nevertheless help provideACKU legal and 'pro-peace' economic opportunities for economic actors. One element of this political economy in particular that also needs further study is the taxation system as it is being developed by the Taliban and the municipalities.

A final, more speculative, area of research is on the possible future options for the state, this needs to be done to stimulate debate on this topic. The UN could invest research time in sketching out various constitutional options and their political and financial implication as a basis for informed discussion by Afghans and other interested actors.

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UNDP (1998) Capacity Development and Assessment: In a Systems and Strategic Management context. Technical Advisory Paper No.3. Management Development and Governance Division. Bureau for Development Policy. New York: UNDP

US ( 1999) Paper prepared for the US delegation to the ASG, Ottowa. 12 February 1999

Uvin, P. (1999) The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict: A sythesis and a commentary on the lessons learned from case studies on the limits and scope for the use of development assistance incentives and disincentives for influencing conflict situations. For the Development Assistance Committee. Paris: OECD

Wiles, P., Chan, L., Horwood, C., Leader, N. ( 1999) Evaluation of Danish Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan 1992-8. Copenhagen: Danida

ACKU

36 Annex 1: Terms ofReference

Objective To provide advice to UN Afghanistan in terms ofdeveloping a principled, coherent and coordinated policy for maintaining and building the capacity ofstructures essential for the recovery and longer term sustainability at national, regional and local levels.

Duration: two months

Location: New York, Geneva, Islamabad, Peshawar and Afghanistan

Background Afghanistan is a classic example of a 'failed state'. Twenty years of war have seen the collapse of what limited state structures existed, indeed the nature and role of the state has been a source of conflict for generations. Currently 90% of the territory is controlled by the Taliban, a movement that is not viewed internationally as a legitimate government, due among other factors to its human right's record, notably its trt!atment of women, and its links with international terrorism.

The aid community of UN agencies, NGOs (national and international) and the ICRC has been working in Afghanistan throughout the conflict. Assistance has been in the form of humanitarian action aimed at alleviating immediate suffering from disasters such as earthquakes or vulnerability due to conflict and extreme pove11y, usually worst during the winter months. At the same time a number of longer-term projects aimed at rebuilding both the physical and social fabric of the country have been implemented.

Both these types of assistance interventions have recognised the need to retain and build on capacity in the country: at the community level, among the technical departments and with the authorities. Attempts to build capacity have taken different approaches: materially, financially, in human resources, in terms of management capacity and in terms of pol icy and legislation. In so doing the assistance community has in effect taken on many of the responsibilities that would normally fall to the state. In lieu of there being a formal state the UN and other assistance actors have 'de facto' become what has been described as a 'surrogate state' or a 'government in waiting with shadow ministries'.

This however has raised many problems and dilemmas. At the broadest level, it has raised questions about the mandate andACKU capacity of the international assistance system to fulfill this role in the absence of an accountable mechanism through which Afghan society can express a vision of the future role of the state. In political terms, many questions have been raised, notably by donors, about the ability of the UN system to engage in capacity building in Afghanistan in a way that upholds UN principles and human rights standards, or at a minimum avoids complicity in their abuse. More practically, there has been little consistency between UN agencies in the approaches they have adopted. Thus, in some instances agencies will take over whole departments both from staffing to assets and in other instances only partially or not at all, or only in certain regions. While offering assistance to the immediate beneficiaries, this has undermined other aid efforts and longer term sustainability.

37 Recognising these problems, and in the context of the Strategic Framework and common programming, the UN wants to lay down the principles involved in this area with a view to developing clear policy, strategy and guidelines that will allow all UN agencies to fulfill their mandates within a coherent policy framework. It is also recognised that the rationale for capacity building needs articulating clearly so that the donors can be convin ~ ed of their responsibilities as part of the international community in relation to funding the recommendations made.

A consultant with relevant experience is required to facilitate this process.

Specific Tasks

Specifically the consultant will:

• Collect together the relevant facts on the current level, rational and nature of capacity building being undertaken by each agency and categorise this for easy comparisons and cross referencing.

• Identify relevant principles, based on existing UN principles and policy, including the Strategic Framework

• In the context of these principles, and in consultation with UN agencies, deve'lop appropriate policy and framework strategies for capacity building of formal and informal structures. These will apply to all UN agencies, but account for differing programme approaches. They should also provide guidance on the question of incentives, contracts and resourcing in kind.

• Assess current and projected policies of bilateral and multilateral donor and lending agencies towards Afghanistan and the Taliban.

• In view of the above, advise on a justification ofthis approach that can be used for advocacy with donors in terms of both releasing funds and more broadly shifting their approach to more constructive, long-term engagement.

Method and Approach Given the political sensitivity of capacity building in Afghanistan, the work will require a visit New York and Geneva, where the consultant will interview relevant UN agencies and representatives of member states.ACKU The rest of the period will be spent based in Islamabad, consulting with UN staff there and in Peshawar and Afghanistan.

The work will be monitored and facilitated by a UN working group on capacity building which will provide ongoing advice and guidance and facilitate access to staff and data. The consultant will facilitate meetings of the working group at which regular updates will be provided. A final report will be provided to the UNCO at the end of the period.

38 Annex 2: Itinerary

July

11-13 Geneva 16-19 New York 21-31 Islamabad

August

1-3 Peshawar 4-5 Islamabad 6-9 Kandahar 10-16 Islamabad 17-24 Kabul 25-26 Islamabad 27-30 Herat

September

1-9 Islamabad

Break

October

23 Islamabad

November

13 Meeting of Task-force to discus draft

24 Presentation on final report to Habitat ACKU

39 Annex 3: List of Inteniiewees

London

Peter Coleridge, UNOPS/CDAP Peter Marsden, BAAG

Geneva

Orwill Adams, WHO Daniel Bellamy, UNHCR Geoff Crisp, UNHCR Arafat Jamal, UNHCR Merete Johansson, OCHA Edouard Kossenko, WHO Dona Tarpey, US Mission Robbie Thomson, IFRCS

New York

Per Augustsson, Permanenet Mission of Sweden to New York Omar Bakhet, UNDP Stephanie Bunker, OCHA Olivier Chave, Observer Mission of Switzerland Andrew Cox, OCHA Bradley Forester, OCHA Kiyotaka Kawabata, DPA Nils Kastberg, UNICEF Michael Keating, UNDP lain Levine, UNICEF Frank O'Donnell, UNDP Maxine Olson, UNDP Knut Ostby, UNDP Barnet Rubin, CIC Laurie Shestack, US Mission Jorgen Sandstrom, Swedish Foreign Ministry Melaia Vatucawaqa, UNDP Alfredo Witchi-Cestari, UNDPACKU Islamabad

Louis George Arsenault, UNICEF Hans Brink, F AO Jan Bolling, UNSMA Umar Daudzai, UNDP Antonio Donini, OCHA Ahmed Farah, UNHCR Shahida Fazil, UNFP A Dr Anne Freckleton, DFID Dr Rana Graber, WHO

40 Ruedi Hager, SOC Tom Hushek, US Embassy Mikael Lindvall, Swedish Embassy Maysoon Melek, UN Coordinator's Office Eric de Mul, UNCO Norah Niland, UNCO Knut Ostby, UNDP Dr Solofo Ramaroson, UNICEF Samantha Reynolds, UNCHS Alain Robyns, ECHO Michael Sacket, WFP Michael Semple, UN Coordinator's Office Dr Alexandra Simon, WHO Zalmei Sherzad, UNDCP Andew Wilder, SCF US Fekare Gebrakail UNOPS/ARRP

Peshawar

Haneef Atmar, NCA Muhammad Shah Bariz, ANCB Eng Baryalai (Omarzai), Ariana Chris Cork, ACBAR Nancy Dupree, ACBAR Dr Amir Hassanyar, CCA Eng Azizurrahmna Refiee, ACBAR Penny Harrison, MSF Holland Carol Le Due, SCA Dr Z A Mumtaz, ANCB Sadozai Panah, ANCB Sayed Rahim Sattar, ANCB

Kandahar

Nazir Ahmed UNOPS/CDAP Mohamed Bari, WFP Alejo Bejemino, UNICEF Denis Charles, Handicap Interntaional Eng Mohammed Daud, SWABAC Fazal Mohamed Fazli, UNDCP Abdulwaril Hanifi, UNOPS/CDAPACKU Mullah Hashimi, Dept of Labour and Social Affairs Haji Mawlawi Mohamed Isa, Rural Reconstruction and Development Mullah Joma Khan, Dept. of Agriculture Eng Mohamed Morad, F AO Anwar Morshed, UNHCR Leslie Oqvist, UNCO Dr Popal, WHO Abdul Baqi Popal, UNCHS Mawlawi Sher Agha Rashidi, Ministry of Planning Mullah Abdul Samad, Ministry of Public Health Mullah Sadrazam, Deputy Mayor, Kandahar Municipality

41 Dr Arif Salemi, F AO Eng Abdul Sattar Raufi, UNOPS/ARRP Eng Shinwari, F AO Sandor Spakovszky, ICRC Dr Rabani Wardak, WHO

Kabul

Maktoum Abdusalam, Ministry of Agriculture A G Ahmadi, FAO Marcus Dolder, ICRC Ghazan Fari, UNCHS Peter Goossens, WFP N Hamzakheyl, F AO Dr Mohammad Daim Kakar, WHO M Yahya Maroofi, 10M Eng Raz Mohammad, UN Coordinator's Office Daoud Niazi, Head of UN Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dr Bashir Noormal, WHO Akram Salam, UNCHS Dr Tarzi Anoja Wijeyesekera, UNICEF Yoshiyuki Yamamoto, UNHCR Mohammed Salem Karim Zale, CFDO Mullah Qazi Zeda, Head of International Relations Dept, Ministry of Planning

He rat

Dr Mohammad Homayoun Amiri, UNICEF Hanne Bang, UNSMA Luc Chounet-Cambas, MDM Ghulam Dasgeer, Mayor's Office Hugh Fenton, DACAAR Pierre Gentile, ICRC Shah Jahan, UNHCR Amir Ibrahim, WFP Mullah Amir Mohammed, Ministry of Rural Development and Reconstruction Dr S A Rasooli, WHO Mullah Ras Mohammed, MinistryACKU of Martyrs and Returnees Ziaudin Paiman, FAO Mullah Kori Rahmatullah, Dept of Social and Labour Affairs Dr Mohibullah Wahdati, WHO

42 Annex 4: The Case for Targets, not Goals

'Until countries set targets to measure progress, it is difficult to believe that they are mounting a concerted campaign to address poverty' UNDP Poverty report, 2000

1. Introduction

The PCP process has made considerable progress in making the assistance programme in Afghanistan more coherent and better planned. The argument of this paper is that further improvements can be made by shifting away from the current emphasis on rather general goals towards more specific targets.

The PCP assistance strategy for 2001 is centered on five broad goals in the five thematic areas. Some of the groups have also developed more specific objectives. Almost none of the objectives, and certainly none ofthe goals, are quantified or measurable. Instead the goals are such as 'To strengthen', 'To expand', ' To develop', 'To improve', 'To mitigate', 'To enhance', 'To reinforce', 'To extend', 'To assist', or even to 'to further develop', or to 'build capacity'.

The achievement of such goals is subject to many variables beyond the control of the agencies, not least security and funding. However, a shift away from these rather vague goals to specific targets offers a number of advantages. It is proposed that the assistance community adopt a limited number, say 8-10, clear, specific and mea:\·urable targets to define their overall purpose in Afghanistan; targets such as: 'To reduce maternal mortality in Afghanistan from ..... to ..... by such and such a date'. To increase literacy of girl children from .... to ..... by ..... '.The achievement of these goals would then be the aim of the PCP, indeed of the entire assistance communities' efforts in the country. The advantages of such a shift are as follows:

2. Negotiations and Engagement with the authorities

• The targets taken as a whole would provide a clear focus for broad negotiations, at the level of the JCC for example. They would help to stake out common ground between the agencies and the authorities, on which both agencies and the authorities could agree, and thus leadACKU to more productive negotiations.

• Targets would provide an easily communicable and clear message to the authorities at all levels about the objectives of the assisstance community in Afghanistan. This greater level oftransparency (including budgetary) should help reduce suspicion of the agencies' motives.

• Specific targets would provide a clear basis for negotiations for joint projects with ministries and technical departments. Any transfer of resources would have to cleatly contribute to achieving a target. This would help focus negotiations and reduce the tendency for agencies to pay for' intangibles' not related to the targets.

43 • They would provide a clear set of objectives against which the impact of any move by the authorities could be measured. Faced with an announcement, the first question becomes 'what will be the impact on the targets of the latest edict, pronouncement, etc etc'. This calculation would give empirical solidity to difficult ethic;tl choices (if the impact is this, can we live with it or is it too far?). And it would provide a tool for negotiation with the authorities (by doing this you realise you will reduce the chances of meeting such and such a target, which you have agreed on, by so and so')

3. Planning and implementation

• Targets would help shift the planning process away from the current emphasis on fundraising towards being an actual plan, both at regional and national levels.

• Targets would provide transparent, overall priotisation in a situation of scarce resources.

• They would provide a clear focus for the planning process. The question for project design becomes 'how can we design a project that will contribute to the overall target' rather than 'how can we make this project fit into one of the thematic areas'. This would help shift from the current rather ad hoc 'project up' approach to a more coherent, national programme approach.

• They would provide a better method for selection of which projects go into the appeal (how, and to what extent, does this project contribute to the targets?).

• It would enable the planning process to start from existing base-lines. On female literacy for example it would be a way of recognising that it is currently very low rather than the current tendency of seeming to want to move to equality in one leap.

• A limited number of clear targets would simplify monitoring and evaluation through a smaller number of common indicators. This should improve learning and hopefully performance. The SMU would be involved in setting and monitoring indicators for the targets.

• The progress against last year's targets would provide a base-line from which the next year's planning cycle could begin, instead of the current approach of each year being in effect 'year zero'.ACKU • Targets would provide a clear focus for coordination activities both in thematic groups and at the RCB level.

4. Fundraising and budgeting

• Budgeting becomes a process of costing how to meet clear objectives and thus becomes more transparent.

44 • It is clear to donors what they are paying for.

• It can be made clear to donors what a shortfall in the overall appeal will mean in terms of reaching the targets.

5. Accountability and Afghan ownership

• The targets would provide a clear, simple and easily communicable message to ordinary Afghans about what the assistance community is doing in Afghanistan (as opposed to the rather complex and abstract principles in the Strategic Framework).

• They would provide a simple set of prioritised objectives to discuss with such community structures as there are, thus hopefully improving the legitimacy, verification and ownership of the overall PCP by Afghans.

• They provide measurable objectives against which the agencies can hold themselves accountable, as can donors and Afghans.

The assistance community in Afghanistan is often said to be in effect substituting for the state in many areas. It also claims that the opportunity is there to move away from a short-term, relief-focused way of working. Going back to the quote from UNDP at the opening of this paper, a shift from goals to targets follows from the logic of both these claims.

NL, November 1, 2000 ACKU

45