EASTEconomics, Politics and PubliASIAc Policy in East Asia andFORUM the Pacific Vol.7 No.3 July–September 2015 $9.50 Quarterly

Japan–China relations

Michael Yahuda How war memory divides China and Japan Zhang Yunling From modernisation to great-power relations Ryo Sahashi and Zha Daojiong Fixing the relationship Madoka Fukuda The Koizumi years, a time of lost opportunities Rumi Aoyama What’s pushing Japanese firms out of China? . . . and more ASIAN REVIEW: Amitav Acharya Will ASEAN survive great-power rivalry? EASTASIAFORUM CONTENTS 3 michael yahuda Quarterly How war memory continues to divide China ISSN 1837-5081 (print) ISSN 1837-509X (online) and Japan 6 jean-pierre lehmann From the Editors’ Desk Economic ties won’t ensure peace between neighbours The China-Japan relationship has made headlines in recent 8 robert A. manning and james j. przystup years. Political and security rivalry has badly damaged the bilateral Asian stability hangs in the balance relationship, yet major trade and investment ties continue to fuel the economies of both China and Japan, and the wider Asian region. 10 madoka fukuda Can this economic relationship alleviate China-Japan rivalry? Or will The Koizumi years, a time of lost opportunities the political and security tensions between these two states lead to conflict in Asia? What will it take for China and Japan to negotiate a 12 ryo sahashi mutually acceptable regional order? Fixing the relationship: a view from Japan These are the questions with which this issue of East Asia Forum 14 zha daojiong Quarterly deals. On the 70th anniversary of the end of World Fixing the relationship: a view from China War II, the China-Japan relationship is mired in tensions over the 17 amitav acharya remembered history of Japanese war and imperialism, maritime ASIAN REVIEW: Will ASEAN survive disputes in the East China Sea, and contested views about Asia’s great-power rivalry in Asia? future strategic order. Yet Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese 21 natasha kuhrt Prime Minister Shinzo Abe have also used backchannel diplomacy ASIAN REVIEW: Is Sinocentrism putting and two face-to-face meetings to lift the relationship from its Russia’s interests at risk? nadir in 2012–13. Even more important are the trade, investment 24 takashi inoguchi and growing people-to-people ties that serve as ballast in the ASIAN REVIEW: Uncertain times cast a relationship. cloud over happiness in Asia Yet the relationship is now at a crossroads. Japan can no longer 27 nobuhiro aizawa invest in China as a low-cost manufacturing base, as China ASIAN REVIEW: Indonesia’s foreign policy shifts towards higher-value-added manufacturing and services. takes an economic turn Strategically, Japan should choose whether to remain dependent 29 shiro armstrong on the United States and resist China’s efforts to dominate regional Economic embrace is warm enough to thaw order or negotiate relationships with China and the United States the politics that make Japan feel secure. Equally, China must decide where Japan 31 he ping fits in its own vision of regional order, and must find a productive Could Sino–Japanese competition benefit way to relate to Japan, recognising that insecurity in relations will Asia? thwart China’s efforts for regional leadership. 33 rumi aoyama This special issue brings together top experts from China What’s pushing Japanese firms out of China? and Japan, as well as voices from beyond the region, to offer 35 zhang yunling their perspectives on what is needed to fix the relationship. They From modernisation to great-power relations emphasise the importance of diplomacy and economics, the role of 38 amy king leadership in shaping domestic expectations and the need for both No shared vision yet on a strategic order in sides to acknowledge squarely the positive and negative aspects of Asia the interdependent history between China and Japan. COVER: Cool greetings: Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Amy King and Shiro Armstrong. and China’s President Xi Jinping in Beijing in November eastasiaforum.org 2014, the first leaders-level meeting in two years. PICTURE: Kim Kyung-Hoon / REUTERS / AAP.

2 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 the politics of history picture: AP / aap

This huge calligraphy work, displayed at Changchun railway station in September 2015, shows confessions made by Japanese war criminals after World War II. How war memory continues to divide China and Japan

Michael Yahuda cooperation and the perils of military the current leader and his legitimacy. conflict, outweigh historical memories, It did not suit Mao Zedong to dwell NE might think that the 70th however contrived this history may be. on the war with Japan. Apart from O anniversary of the end of Japan and China remain divided one occasion, he withheld Communist World War II would lead to further over how to remember successive wars forces from fighting. After the People’s deterioration in relations between dating from the Sino–Japanese war in Republic of China was established, China and Japan. But, to the contrary, 1894 to World War II (known in China Mao chose to approve films on the the Chinese and Japanese leaders, as the War of Resistance against Japan war that depicted Kuomintang (KMT) President Xi Jinping and Prime [1937–1945]). Official histories in both officers and landlords as class enemies Minister Shinzo Abe, are exploring countries have been written to serve who tried to betray heroic workers the prospects for yet another meeting political needs, not respect historical and peasants to the Japanese soldiers. (they have already met four times in accuracy. Mao’s claim to historic legitimacy the last three years). It seems that Writing history under the aegis of stemmed from his victory in the civil the pragmatic calculations of regime the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) war. survival, which include economic has always been designed to bolster Despite his campaigns against class

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 3 enemies and traitors of many kinds, security of the region as a whole. Mao did not launch any campaign The CCP depicts itself as the EASTASIAFORUM against alleged collaborators with the authentic representative of China’s Quarterly Japanese. Many of those dislodged past glory at home and in the world from urban offices by the returning more broadly. The ‘rejuvenation of EDITORIAL STAFF KMT after the Japanese surrender China’ promised by CCP leaders and were welcomed in rural Yan’an as Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’ all grow out Issue Editors people with much-needed skills. Mao of this history. Amy King is a lecturer in the Strategic did not attack Japan diplomatically There is a tendency in Japan, too, and Defence Studies Centre, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs,ANU . during most of the time he held power, to present itself as a victim of the except when some Japanese leaders war. Much is made of the bombing of Shiro Armstrong, Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU. displayed a preference for old friends Japanese cities—including the fire- Series Editors in Taiwan. bombing of Tokyo—culminating in the Attitudes (and therefore history) nuclear devastation of Hiroshima and Peter Drysdale, Head, East Asia Forum and East Asian Bureau of Economic began to change after Deng Xiaoping Nagasaki. But few Japanese residents Research at the Crawford School of became leader. Class struggle was knew much about the actual fighting Public Policy, ANU. dropped in favour of a new emphasis and the cruelties inflicted on civilians Shiro Armstrong, Co-director, on the unity of the Chinese people, and prisoners of war in China, on the Australia-Japan Research Centre and which from 1979 onwards also Korean peninsula and throughout Executive Director, EAF and EABER, included their ‘compatriots’ in Taiwan. Southeast Asia. Crawford School, ANU. The CCP’s historical legitimacy After the first year of theA merican-

Editorial Staff henceforth was based on the War of led occupation, administrators did Coordination: Mark Fabian. Resistance Against Japan. There can not dwell on the pursuit of war Editing: Alison Darby, Owen Hutchison, Patrick Deegan, Linda Ma, Amanda be little doubt that this was welcomed criminals or exposing the horrors Maclean, Nawaaz Khalfan, Stephen by many of the millions of people of Japanese conduct during the war. Norman, Catherine Yen, ANU. who had genuinely suffered from From 1947 onwards the main goal of Editorial Advisers: Japanese wartime atrocities. But the the occupation was to rebuild Japan Peter Fuller, Max Suich. official historical narrative was less as a pillar against communism in East Production: Peter Fuller, Words & Pics. interested in historical accuracy than Asia. Imperial bureaucrats and former Original design: Peter Schofield. in extolling the alleged role of the CCP Zaibatsus (business conglomerates Email [email protected], in defeating the Japanese aggressors, that held much power in the Japanese [email protected]. even though the bulk of the fighting economy from the Meiji era to the was done by Chiang Kai-shek’s forces end of World War II) such as Mitsui and not the Red Army. and Mitsubishi, which had served the The views expressed are those of the In 1993, after the Tiananmen imperial war machine were called back individual authors and do not represent disaster, Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, the views of the Crawford School, ANU, deepened the call for patriotism by . . . it is Japanese EABER, EAF, or the institutions to which setting up a huge patriotic education the authors are attached. campaign that persists to this day. historians who have Japan in particular was excoriated as the last and most cruel of the done most to expose the foreigners who had humiliated China over 100 years, beginning with the fallacies of the Japanese First Opium War in 1839–42. It was also emphasised that Japan had not right wing’s interpretation Published by ANU Press properly apologised and atoned for The Australian National University its aggression. Until it did so, it was Canberra ACT 0200, Australia of history Email: [email protected] argued, there was a danger of a revival Web: http://press.anu.edu.au of militarism, which could threaten the

4 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 picture: aap

A soldier tends a fallen comrade on a Chinese battlefield. Japan and China remain divided over how to remember successive wars from 1894. to promote Japan’s economic recovery. and Chinese. These views are not the United States. Former imperial officials, who representative of Japanese historians. The more conservative mainstream might otherwise have been prosecuted Indeed, it is Japanese historians differs from this vision mainly in for war crimes, assumed important who have done most to expose the recognising the importance of positions after the end of the Allied fallacies of the Japanese right wing’s maintaining the US–Japan alliance Occupation in 1952. They could hardly interpretation of history. The United and of finding a way to get on be expected to have exposed wartime States has done little to persuade the with neighbours, especially China. horrors. The most prominent of these Yushukan Museum, adjacent to the Mainstream Japanese opinion was Nobusuke Kishi—the grandfather Yasukuni Shrine, to correct its version continues to be wedded to the of Prime Minister Abe—who went on of history that holds the Roosevelt pacifism pursued since the end of to become prime minister. He and his administration responsible for the war. the occupation, but it is divided on associates in the conservative Liberal The contested Japanese versions of whether to continue to rely on the Democratic Party took the view that history are not really about historical strategic dependence offered by the Japanese warfare was justified, alleged accuracy. They reflect divergent views United States or to find a way to get on wartime atrocities were fabricated or about Japanese identity and its future with China. EAFQ exaggerated and that the Tokyo War orientation. The rightists envision a Crimes Tribunal was no more than Japan that is proud of its past and that Michael Yahuda is professor emeritus victor’s justice. can deploy its armed forces without of International Relations at the Such right-wing views still animate restrictions. Above all it should be London School of Economics and important political figures in Japan, a Japan that is ultimately freed of its Political Science and a visiting scholar to the chagrin of many Koreans cultural and strategic dependence on at George Washington University.

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 5 uncertain future Economic ties won’t ensure peace between neighbours

Jean-Pierre Lehmann the outbreak of the Japanese war in As noises began to spread in the China in 1937. In the process Japan 1980s that China’s new economic ILL increasing economic established a substantial economic program heralded potential major W interdependence between Japan presence in China, especially in the transformations and opportunities, and China increase or reduce the risk northeast. Japanese investors seemed unwilling to of conflict? Then for three decades—from the take a chance on China. The Japanese The conventional liberal wisdom Communist Revolution in 1949 to did not see the rise of China coming is that economic interdependence the launch of the reform program and are still reeling from the shock. between states enhances peaceful in 1979—China closed itself off To go forward, we first need to relations—as in the saying attributed from the rest of the world economy retrace our steps. to the early 19th century French and there was only a small amount As Rana Mitter recently economist Frederic Bastiat: ‘If goods of trade between China and Japan; documented in China's War with don’t cross borders, armies will’. But nor was there any armed conflict. Japan, 1937–1945: The Struggle for critics have pointed out that on the Then, following Nixon’s surprise visit Survival, historians have grossly eve of World War II Germany and the to Beijing in 1972, Japanese prime misrepresented, if not obliterated, United Kingdom were each other’s minister Kakuei Tanaka hurried to China’s role in aiding the defeat of major trading partners. Beijing, diplomatic relations were Japan in World War II. This is reflected The specific patterns of Sino– renewed, trade picked up and Japanese in, among other things, the prevalent Japanese relations also pose a aid flowed to China. view among Japanese that defeat was possible challenge to this theory. For at the hands of the Americans, not the a very long period, from the 17th Can economic Chinese! century to the mid-19th century, American occupation policy trade between China and Japan was interdependence underwent a dramatic 180-degree limited to occasional visits by Chinese change after the Communist Party merchants to the port of Nagasaki. erase or even took control in China and the Cold And there were no wars. Then, not War settled on the world. Japan long after both China and Japan were attenuate fundamental metamorphosed from defeated enemy ‘opened’—China with the First Opium to pampered protégé. In a large part War in 1839 and Japan with gunboat antagonisms? Are thanks to all the American support— diplomacy in the 1850s—the Sino– massive transfers of technology, Japanese War of 1894–95 broke out. long-term sustainable setting the value of the yen at a low, From the late-19th to the mid-20th highly competitive exchange rate century Japanese aggression towards economic relationships (360 yen to the US dollar), opening of China was virtually uninterrupted: the US market to Japanese goods— the Sino–Japanese War, military possible with people you the Japanese economy rose rapidly, invasion over the Boxer Uprising engendering the ‘economic miracle’ of (1900), fighting on Chinese soil during mistrust? the 1960s. Within a dozen years after the Russo–Japanese War (1904–05), the war it became the world’s second annexing the erstwhile Chinese biggest economy. During this time the tributary state of Korea (1910), the Chinese continued to be dirt-poor. Twenty-One Demands (1915), the Throughout the 1980s the Japanese occupation of Manchuria (1931), and economy grew rapidly and appeared

6 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 picture: Asahi shimbun / getty images

At home to visitors: then Japanese prime minister Kakuei Tanaka, right, with Chinese premier Zhou Enlai, left, and president Mao Zedong at Mao’s Beijing residence in September 1972. The visit normalised relations between the Asian neighbours. to be poised to surpass the United are disputes galore, including over possible with people you mistrust? As States. Then, as the Japanese economy territory (the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands), China’s economy seems to be headed tanked into its lost decades—in stark over history and over Japanese Prime for choppy waters, might Beijing be contrast to China’s inexorable rise— Minister Shinzo Abe’s defence policy. tempted to encourage popular venom economic interdependence intensified. In a Pew Survey on Global Views against Japan to deflect attention from China and Japan became major trading of China, the Japanese stand out domestic ills? partners. What meagre growth Japan as having the most ‘unfavourable’ More fundamentally, can economic was able to generate was driven by views of China at 89 per cent. The pragmatism trump nationalist fervour? exports to China. Japanese direct second is Vietnam with 74 per cent The lessons from history in respect investments surged and Japanese ‘unfavourable’, while the figure is much to this question are not encouraging. technology played a critical role in lower among China’s other Asian Economic interdependence is not the development and competitiveness neighbours: 37 per cent for South enough: measures for confidence- of China’s global supply chains. Most Korea, 32 per cent for India, 22 per building and dialogue are urgently recently, with the advantage of the cent for Indonesia and 17 per cent for required. EAFQ declining value of the yen, Japan Malaysia. For the United States it is 54 has become a major destination for per cent. Jean-Pierre Lehmann is an emeritus Chinese tourists. All this raises several key questions. professor of international political While the mutual benefits derived Can economic interdependence erase economy at IMD, Switzerland, founder from economic interdependence or even attenuate such fundamental of The Evian Group, and visiting would seem to indicate that all is antagonisms? Are long-term professor at Hong Kong University and well, this is far from the case. There sustainable economic relationships NIIT University in India.

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 7 cooperation and competition Asian stability hangs in the balance

Robert A. Manning and 2010 China’s GDP of US$5.47 trillion This incident froze implementation James j. Przystup surpassed Japan’s US$4.88 trillion of a 2008 agreement to jointly develop economy. resources near the disputed Senkaku/ ISTORY strongly suggests that As China’s economy took off and its Diaoyu islands, marked a rise in H the character of relations among military began to modernise, Japanese tensions and underscored the political major powers is a key determinant defence planners became increasingly limits of Chinese accommodation. It of stability. Europe was convulsed in concerned about the implications of also reflected a rise in anti-Japanese continuous warfare until France and China’s growing military prowess. nationalism in China, increasingly Germany came to terms after World Japan’s 2004 Defense Planning a pillar of the Communist Party’s War II. Only then did Europe enjoy the Guidelines first called out China in a legitimisation. prospects of integration leading to the public document, pointing to China’s The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute European Union. ongoing military modernisation and intensified two years later, in 2012, Similarly, in the Asia Pacific the its expanding maritime operations, when Japan purchased three of the future of regional order will be noting that Japan would have to five islands from a private owner. significantly defined by the character ‘remain attentive to its future actions’. High-level political and diplomatic of Sino–Japanese relations. There have As China’s confidence and self- contacts went into the deep freeze been progressive and regressive cycles image as an emerging great power and large-scale anti-Japanese riots since Tokyo and Beijing normalised rose, Sino–Japanese ties became more spread throughout China. Japanese relations in 1971, but since 2000, contentious. In September 2010, a Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to largely reflecting China’s rise and the Chinese fishing trawler operating the Yasukuni shrine in December 2013 evolution of the US–Japan alliance, within Japan’s exclusive economic zone deepened the impasse. Sino–Japanese ties have been on a in the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands collided Meanwhile, China’s increasing downhill slide. with two Japanese coast guard ships. presence in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Importantly, Chinese views of the In the ensuing controversy over the island chain and Japan’s declared Air US–Japan alliance have evolved since custody of the ship’s captain and crew, Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) the end of the Cold War. During the China cautioned Japan against taking heightened Japan’s security concerns 1990s, Chinese analysts viewed the ‘so-called law enforcement activities’ with regard to ‘grey zone’ situations. US–Japan alliance as a net good. into Chinese waters. As such, in 2013 Japan’s National As a leading Chinese analyst, Wu Security Strategy described Japan’s Xinbo, has noted, views among Abe has focused on security environment to be ‘ever Chinese analysts have shifted from more severe’, with China’s incursions an appreciation that the alliance peaceful resolution and into Japan’s ADIZ almost tripling the was a ‘useful constraint on Japan’s number of scrambles by Japan’s Air remilitarisation’ during the 1990s, avoiding threats and use Self-Defense Force jets from 156 in to the view in the mid-2000s that 2011–12 to 415 in 2013–14. ‘enhanced security cooperation of force, emphasising the To address Japan’s increasing between Washington and Tokyo security concerns, US President compromises China’s security interest’. importance of the Barack Obama in April 2014 made it It was no coincidence that as the clear that Article 5 of the US–Japan 21st century began and after decades Japan–US alliance Alliance extended to the Senkaku/ of double-digit growth, China’s Diaoyu islands. This was a significant economy began to rival Japan’s. By setback to Chinese efforts to drive

8 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 picture: greg baker / afp photo / aap

US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping with other APEC-nation leaders at the Beijing summit in November 2014. Although China remains in existing international institutions, it has begun to promote its own parallel bodies. a wedge into the alliance over the (EAS) that excluded the United States, and Conference on International Senkaku/Diaoyu issue. At the same Australia and New Zealand, which Confidence Building in Asia all pose time, Japanese direct investment into Japan successfully contested. Twelve new challenges for the regional order China’s slowing economy plunged, years later, Xi called for a new ‘Asia for and the US–Japan alliance. down nearly 50 per cent in 2014 and a Asians’ security architecture, one that Early in his second administration, further 16 per cent in the first half of departed from the ‘outdated thinking’ Abe set out five principles for 2015. of the Cold War. He added that ‘no Japanese diplomacy, including Over the course of 2014, diplomats country should attempt to dominate ‘universal values’ and governance of in Tokyo and Beijing explored paths regional affairs or infringe on the the maritime commons by ‘laws and towards accommodation that both legitimate rights and interests of other rules, not by might’. In subsequent Prime Minster Abe and Chinese countries’. Thus Beijing effectively remarks on territorial disputes in the President Xi Jinping could accept. cautioned Japan and the United States South and East China Seas, Abe has In an act of inspired diplomacy, in not involve themselves in the South focused on peaceful resolution and November 2014 the two sides agreed and East China Sea disputes. avoiding threats and the use of force, to a four-paragraph document While China remains in the old emphasising the vital importance of whose texts differed creatively on the Bretton Woods institutions and the Japan–US alliance in maintaining sensitive issue of Senkakus/Diaoyu. similar associated institutions such as the safety and prosperity of the Two days later, Abe shook hands with EAS and the Asia Pacific Economic Asia Pacific region, of expanding a stone-faced Xi. Cooperation (APEC) process, ties between Japan and America’s Behind the ups and downs of this Beijing’s assertiveness now includes other allies and partners, and of relationship are competing visions the promotion of parallel institutions strengthening Japan’s ‘ties with of order and leadership in the Asia as a hedging strategy. The One maritime Asia’. Abe has also shifted Pacific region. Belt One Road concept, the Asian Japan’s defences, stationing troops on In the early 2000s, China supported Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Southwest islands. a version of the East Asia Summit Shanghai Cooperation Organization Abe and Xi met on 22 April in

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 9 goodwill eroded

Jakarta during the Asia–Africa Summit. Additionally, Abe’s 14 August The Koizumi years, speech to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II appears to have paved the way for a Beijing a time of lost summit later this year. But, as Beijing prepared for China’s 3 September victory parade, it was clear that issues opportunities relating to history, territory, security and regional vision will continue to trouble this relationship. If the past Madoka Fukuda negative sentiment placed additional decade is a prologue, the best that can constraints on Koizumi and then be hoped is that rationality prevails ELATIONS between Japan Chinese president Hu Jintao and in managing the critical issues that R and China shifted significantly prevented them from repairing the stalk the bilateral relationship and the during the Koizumi years and this relationship. region. has created ongoing issues for the China’s accession to the World The likely trajectory of Sino– relationship between the two countries Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 Japanese relations depends on China’s even today. Junichiro Koizumi served was a symbol of its growing stature in approach to regional order. Currently as Japanese prime minister from the international community, as well there is a bifurcated relationship April 2001 to September 2006—the as a sign that China sought to take marked by economic cooperation and third-longest-serving administration a greater role in global cooperation. security competition. This duality in post-war Japan. This was a time The Japanese government supported characterises East Asia writ large. Over when China increased its global and China’s WTO accession. This was the coming decade, whether China regional presence and importance, in line with Japan’s China policy joins Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) a change that was fully recognised at the time, which attempted to and how it responds to instability on by the Japanese government. But encourage China to actively adhere to the Korean peninsula will both be domestic politics in both countries international rules and fulfil its global inflection points in shaping Sino– came to hinder all opportunity for responsibilities. Economic integration Japanese ties. More broadly, whether bilateral summit meetings. The between Japan and China increased as or not US–China relations are more mutual goodwill between the public a result of China’s WTO accession— cooperative than competitive and also declined to the point where by 2007, China had become Japan’s whether they forge a framework for largest trade partner (overtaking trade strategic stability will be a bellwether While Koizumi with the United States), and trade for the future success of such ties. EAFQ expanded continually during the acknowledged the Koizumi years. Robert A. Manning is a senior fellow On top of this, Prime Minister of the Brent Scowcroft Center for economic development of Koizumi was invited to attend the International Security at the Atlantic very first meeting of the Boao Forum Council. He served as a senior China as an opportunity, for Asia, which China has organised counselor from 2001 to 2004 and a since 2002. It was there that Koizumi member of the US Department of State his visits to Yasukuni delivered a speech titled ‘Asia in a New Policy Planning Staff from 2004 to Century—Challenge and Opportunity’. 2008. created political problems It was a move to show that in order to claim leadership in regional James J. Przystup is senior fellow and for the Chinese leadership cooperation, China would require research professor in the Institute backing from Japan and that Japan of National Strategic Studies at the welcomed such a notion. National Defense University. As economic interdependence continued to grow, and both countries

10 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 picture: koji sasahara / ap photo / aap When Koizumi visited Yasukuni for the second time in 2002, after his speech at the Boao Forum, it drew fierce condemnation from the Chinese side. Ultimately, Koizumi visited Yasukuni annually in his official capacity as prime minister. This prompted China to demand a halt to these official visits as a precondition for resuming top-level bilateral summit meetings. Although protests against Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits continued, signs of a willingness to take a new approach emerged in China after Hu Jintao's inauguration as Chinese leader in autumn of 2002. This was manifest in Ma Licheng's ‘The “New Thinking” on Japan’, which centred on the possibility of forming a new Japan policy without being constrained by historical issues. The new leadership of China also utilised opportunities— such as international conferences—to maintain summit meetings between leaders of Japan and China. Yet large- scale anti-Japanese demonstrations still broke out across China every weekend throughout the spring of 2005 in opposition to Japan becoming a permanent member of United Nations Security Council. During Koizumi’s prime ministership, the Communist Party of China (CCP) was undergoing a transition of power from Jiang Zemin Former Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi: domestic politics in Japan, as in China, thwarted the to Hu Jintao and it was difficult for desire of both governments to develop a closer and more positive relationship. the Hu–Wen leadership group to formulate a foreign policy of its own. emerged as regional powers, Japan of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The anti-Japanese demonstrations and China realised that they could But in October that same year, he also were seen as a way to rattle Hu’s not ignore each other. Nevertheless, made a trip to the Museum of the leadership and its willingness to take strains in the political relationship War of Chinese People’s Resistance a softer approach towards Japan, and developed over time, with Koizumi’s Against Japanese Aggression at were possibly influenced by struggles visits to Yasukuni Shrine in particular Lugouqiao (Marco Polo Bridge) in within the Party. causing the relationship to deteriorate. Beijing. During this visit he expressed Ultimately, this decline in affinity Koizumi first visited Yasukuni ‘deep remorse and a heartfelt apology’ between the Japanese and Chinese Shrine in August 2001, as he pledged as a conciliatory gesture in Japan’s people became an obstacle to the when he was elected as the President relationship with China. restoration of the relationship by the

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 11 future ties two leaders. In addition, Chinese Baodiao activities (or the Defend the Fixing the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands movement) and the development of gas fields in the East China Sea were beginning relationship: to be regarded as national security threats to Japan. The friction and tension that existed between Japan and a view from Japan China then came to exert influence on wider public sentiment through the media and the internet. In China, Ryo Sahashi sound redundant, but by repeating this tension was reflected in the form this sentiment Abe asked his fellow of protests against Japanese students’ UESTIONS of history were the Japanese to remember ‘the histories performance in Xi'an in 2003, anti- Q focus of a long hot summer in of suffering of the people in Asia’ due Japan riots over the Asian Cup in 2004 Northeast Asia. Many speculated to colonisation, invasion and human and anti-Japanese demonstrations in that on the 70th anniversary of rights abuses of women and prisoners 2005. Similarly, public opinion polls in the end of World War II, Japanese of war. Japan revealed a significant decline in Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, with No two people in a democracy sentiment towards China. his cabinet’s approval, would issue a have the exact same perception of The various factors that led new statement that leant towards a history, but Abe’s speech reflects the to the current complications in more ‘nationalistic’ understanding of basic consensus among Japanese. Japan–China relations became Japanese history from the late 19th Throughout the post-war period, apparent during the Koizumi years. century to the Pacific War. mainstream Japanese historians, While Koizumi acknowledged the As it turned out, the statement novelists and filmmakers have economic development of China published on 14 August was in line reflected on and expressed remorse as an opportunity, his visits to with previous statements made by for the path taken by pre-war Japan. Yasukuni created political problems post-war Japanese governments and This mind-frame constitutes the for the Chinese leadership, denying included key phrases from prime foundation of Japan’s unique pacifism. opportunities for bilateral dialogue. minister Murayama’s earlier statement. Conservatives have tried to challenge Yet Koizumi’s historical awareness Still, Abe’s statement has drawn the consensus, especially since the itself, shown both in his talk at criticism. While he repeated the key 1990s, but Abe’s statement inherits Lugouqiao and in the statement he phrase ‘deep remorse and heartfelt the most critical understanding of made on the 60th anniversary of the apology’, some have criticised Abe for Japan’s war history from previous end of World War II, should not have avoiding expressing this sentiment in administrations. Importantly, Japanese been unacceptable to the Chinese his own words. Others regard parts of voters have expressed their support for leaders. Although the Hu Jintao his statement as an attempt to satisfy such a balanced statement, something leadership sought to improve relations his conservative supporters, especially shown by the subsequent 10 per cent with the Koizumi administration, it the assertion that ‘[w]e must not let rise in the cabinet’s approval ratings. It failed to make any breakthroughs. our children, grandchildren, and even is clear that most Japanese want to see On top of domestic political issues, a further generations to come, who stable and prosperous relations with steady decline in goodwill between the have nothing to do with that war, be their neighbours. Chinese and Japanese public emerged predestined to apologise’. It is time for Japan and China to as a new challenge for the leadership But Abe’s statement continued: take steps towards forging a renewed of both countries. EAFQ ‘Even so, we Japanese, across bilateral relationship. It is unlikely generations, must squarely face the that the current and incoming prime Madoka Fukuda is an associate history of the past. We have the ministers of Japan will challenge the professor at the Department of responsibility to inherit the past, history question again, at least in this Global Politics, Faculty of Law, Hosei in all humbleness, and pass it on to decade. University, Japan. the future’. These two sentences may Japan–China bilateral political

12 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 picture: yomiuri shimbun / ap images / AAp

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reading his statement on 14 August, which expressed ‘deep remorse and heartfelt apology’ for Japan’s actions in World War II. relations have not bounced back from US–China rapprochement in the and economically. Also, as recent a post-crisis low in 2012–13, even after 1970s is that China accepted the maritime territorial disputes in Asia two summit meetings on November political and military role of the have indicated, understanding of 2014 and April 2015. Certainly, more United States and its alliances in the international laws and rules on all Chinese people are visiting Japan regional and global order. In exchange, sides are weak enough to cast doubt on for tourism, study and business. The the United States and its partners the resilience of liberal maritime order. political atmosphere has changed from welcomed China into the international Greater diplomatic efforts are what it was after September 2012, order by providing assistance. necessary, given that Japan and China’s when Chinese protestors destroyed Today, some in China—and different ideas about the international Japanese factories in response to the elsewhere in Asia—are calling for a order trouble the relationship. Japanese government purchasing review of the regional and global order Considering Japan’s still strong three of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu to reflect the new balance of power, influence on other Asian countries, islands from their private Japanese given China’s rise. China cannot ignore the advantages of owner. But both countries are yet engagement with Japan. China should to construct a cooperative political ECENT Chinese initiatives seek to avoid any potential criticism relationship. R such as the Asian Infrastructure that it is seeking regional dominance China and Japan’s leaders must Investment Bank and the One or trying to construct a new recognise that building a new, Belt One Road policy are two international order that undermines mutually acceptable strategic order for examples of Chinese efforts to play the existing post-war liberal East Asia is the key for Sino–Japanese a bigger role in the mega-regional international order. By cooperating cooperation and that stable Sino– developmental order. In this context, with Japan, China could soften US Japanese relations are just as valuable US rebalancing to Asia by enhancing anxiety about these affairs. On the as their bilateral relations with the its alliance and partnership network, other hand, Japan should understand United States. has been criticised as an attempt the importance of incorporating The historical meaning of the to ‘contain’ China both politically an increasing Chinese role in the

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 13 future ties international order. To hold dialogues on the developmental and maritime order would be their first step. Fixing the If China and Japan were to hold successful dialogues, Japan’s hands- on experience would benefit China. relationship: For example, China could learn from Japan’s experience with its demographic challenges, which a view from China China will likely face in coming years. Japan has many resources and much knowledge to support healthy growth Zha Daojiong islands. For many in China, it was an and stability in China on its trajectory unfathomable shock that a Japanese towards slower and more sustainable VIDENCE of a strain in the leader was so ready to disregard a growth. E diplomatic relationship between Chinese leader’s domestic political Bilateral relations between Beijing China and Japan over the past few circumstances or, seen another and Tokyo are still crucial and any years has been most apparent in the way, to mount such an outright remarks from leaders that could fuel absence of summits between top challenge to his authority at home. tensions should be avoided. Politicians government leaders, which has in Since then, high-level meetings have are responsible for educating their turn affected routine meetings at the ground to a halt, the brief and visibly populations on the merits of peaceful, ministerial level. It seems that Beijing uncomfortable meeting between prosperous relations. Some Japanese still has not overcome its diplomatic President Xi Jinping and Prime politicians have already made progress ‘Noda shock’. What hope, then, is Minister Abe on the side of APEC on this front. It was former prime there for an improvement in this 2014 in Beijing notwithstanding. minister Junichiro Koizumi who relationship? To resume such meetings, stressed that Japan welcomed the rise In September 2012, the very day bilaterally, trilaterally (China– of China. And Prime Minister Abe, in after his meeting with then Chinese Japan–South Korea) or on the side his 14 August statement, reaffirmed president Hu Jintao on the sidelines of of multilateral forums, is of course that ‘[w]e must never again repeat the APEC in Vladivostok, then Japanese in China’s interest in pursuit of a less devastation of war’. Chinese as well as prime minister Yoshihiko Noda tense external environment. But the Japanese politicians should publicly announced the nationalisation of true test is how to effectively signal stress the importance of bilateral some of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu their utility to respective domestic relations. This would encourage public constituencies. For Beijing, Tokyo servants as well as civil society groups Official development and indeed Seoul, several years of in both countries to avoid provocation domestic acrimony on such sensitive and seek mutual exchange. assistance from Japan issues as territorial sovereignty and Japan and China are neighbours and wartime history has been such that it destined to coexist. A sense of rivalry played a powerfully has put all countries’ leaders between (or ignorance) inhibits both China and a rock and a hard place. A prudent act Japan from constructing a win–win supportive role in of leadership now would be to gear situation. Their diplomatic priority is domestic attitudes on such delicate to work at rectifying this situation. China’s re-linking with issues towards strategic patience. This EAFQ is not an easy task, yet it is essential the rest of the world for even a photo-op meeting to be Ryo Sahashi is an associate professor worthwhile at all. of International Politics, Kanagawa economy The history issue is often said, by University. He was previously visiting those in both China and Japan tasked associate professor at Stanford to find ways out of the continuing University. impasse, to be the key roadblock

14 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 picture: kyodo / ap / AAP to progress. Over time, hope for government-sponsored joint versions of the history of World War II has faded to the point where there ought to be consideration of even dropping the entire project. China, ideally, should come up with the intellectual fortitude to publicise domestically Japan’s post- war contributions towards China’s pursuit of modernisation. In the 1950s, while locked in Cold War hostility towards the Chinese government, the Japanese government allowed limited trade activities to proceed when the former was under broad Western isolation in the wake of the Korean War. Official development assistance from Japan played a powerfully supportive role in China’s re-linking with the rest of the world economy, and not only in a material sense. Particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, the fact that China and Japan were able to work cooperatively in trade and investment relations was seen as a vote of confidence in China by other industrialised nations. China could not have succeeded in improving its relative economic position were it not for the foundation laid in these early years. Sure, China did pay back its yen loans, but this history of economic aid still merits recognition. To do this is, fundamentally speaking, in the interest of the Chinese polity itself. Indeed, for the past two years the phenomenon of increasing numbers of Chinese tourists travelling to Japan even against the backdrop of difficult government-to-government diplomacy can and should serve as a reminder: government-sanctioned versions of Japan are being tested. As is true in other societies, for the A protester holds up a defaced picture of then Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda during a average citizen, while remembering demonstration in front of the Japanese embassy in Beijing on 18 September 2012, the anniversary of an intolerable past is important, it the Mukden Incident in 1931 that later led to Japan’s invasion of China. Noda’s decision to purchase the can hardly be the only dimension of Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in 2012 exacerbated tensions with China.

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 15 picture: Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Chris Cavagnaro / US navy / afp photo / AAP a relationship with another society. I believe the Chinese nation-building project could benefit immensely from narrowing the unspoken gaps between accounts of pre-1945 Japanese atrocities in China and present-day sentiments about Japan that its citizens gather through personal observation and interactions. Likewise, Japan needs to demonstrate political courage and argue that the time has come for its government to finally stay clear of efforts to whitewash what the country did in China and the Korean peninsula during the war. Yes, the Japanese political system is far more pluralistic. But how the Japanese polity projects the country’s past to its own citizenry has been, is and will be taken into account by other countries, especially those that once suffered. Japan should ‘Shooters’ on USS George Washington prepare to launch an E-2C Hawkeye during exercise Talisman Sabre be aware of the future costs that the in the Timor Sea in September 2015. Japan joined the US–Australian exercise for the first time. ongoing diplomatic tensions carry. A truly wise approach would be to the willing in the East Asian region Australian approach amounts to a re-orient domestic conversations and even beyond, over issues ranging separation of military affairs from about the past and their present-day from investment to maritime order. economic ones. China and Japan relevance for the nation itself. Factors feeding into this race include should explore similar joint projects With China’s formal celebration changes in United States policy as well involving Southeast Asian countries. of the 70th anniversary of the end of as campaigns by some Southeast Asian Above all, positive synergy is what World War II behind us, Beijing and governments, those of the Philippines really matters in rescuing government- Tokyo should proceed by making and Vietnam in particular. For China, to-government interaction between progress on economic cooperation Japan and indeed the United States, it China and Japan from its present initiatives that have stalled in recent is becoming more and more obvious downward spiral. Achieving this years. Reinvigorated negotiations that no party can prevail in attempting requires boldness, wisdom and the toward a China–Japan–Korea free to re-engineer the regional security utmost care when making every move. trade agreement give rise to hope that and economic order as textbook After a four-decade long history of this useful addition will eventuate. geostrategic and geoeconomic uninterrupted economic and societal In many ways it would be a natural mapping would suggest. interactions between China, Japan and follow-on to the trilateral investment One suggestion is for China and other countries across the Asia Pacific treaty signed in 2012. It would Japan to take a page out of Australia’s region, there has to be ample political signal that the Chinese and Japanese book in its handling of its security will to take the relationship between leaderships are indeed committed to relationships. By conducting joint Beijing and Tokyo on to a more being future-oriented in their handling exercises, however low-level, with the positive path. EAFQ of the relationship. US and Chinese militaries, Australia The past few years have also has demonstrated that the principle of Zha Daojiong is a professor of witnessed both Beijing and Tokyo inclusivity can play a role in handling international political economy at testing their separate capacities in the mixture of strategic competition Peking University. building up respective coalitions of and cooperation in the region. The

16 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 ASIAN REVIEW: doomed by dialogue?

picture: AFP PHOTO / CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative / DigitalGlobe / AAP Will ASEAN survive great-power rivalry in Asia?

Amitav Acharya extending to East Asian waters, and A satellite image, issued by the Center for its assertive diplomacy under Prime Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think UNDITS and policymakers Minister Narendra Modi. tank, showing an airstrip under construction at P increasingly see changing Critics argue that ASEAN is both Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands. great-power politics in Asia as a toothless and clueless in responding challenge to ASEAN. Of particular to these changes. Its main reaction concern is China’s growing military has been to persist with regional its usefulness. Critics not only write off assertiveness in ASEAN’s backyard, institutions such as the ASEAN the idea of ‘ASEAN centrality’ in Asia’s the South China Sea, and the United Regional Forum (ARF) and the East regional architecture, but also the States’ ‘rebalancing’ or ‘pivot’ strategy. Asian Summit (EAS), disparagingly very survival of ASEAN as a regional Added to this picture are Japan’s seen as ‘talk shops’. This approach community. moves to reinterpret its constitution might have been sufficient when great- These criticisms miss a major to allow more room for forward power relations were less volatile in point. While ASEAN faces significant military operations, India’s growing the immediate aftermath of the end of challenges, these have less to do with military presence in the Indian Ocean, the Cold War, but it has now outlived its external environment, such as

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 17 asian review: doomed by dialogue?

picture: AZHAR RAHIM / EPA / aap

A wall-sized graffito welcomed US President Barack Obama to Yangon in November 2014. On that visit to Myanmar he attended the East Asia Summit and the US–ASEAN summit. ASEAN’s efforts mean that ‘Asia is the only region in history where the strong live in the world of the weak, and the weak lead the strong’. great-power policies and interactions, others who argue that international Both these perspectives have been than with strains in ASEAN’s stability is a function of the number of reinforced by Chinese moves in the internal cohesion and capacity, due great powers and the distribution of South China Sea and the East China especially to its expanded membership capabilities among them. A multipolar Sea, as well as Russian moves in and agenda. ASEAN’s external system, where the main actors are the Ukraine and Eastern Europe. Many environment is actually more helpful great powers, will be more prone to analysts see these developments to its security role than is commonly instability and conflict than a bipolar as signs of Chinese and Russian portrayed. If ASEAN’s unity holds system, as during the Cold War, expansionism, a ‘return of geopolitics’ and it makes necessary changes to its or a unipolar system with a single and the arrival of 19th-century ambitions and agenda, it should not hegemon. European geopolitics in Asia. only survive great-power competition These scenarios point to a bleak There are of course alternative but continue to play a meaningful role future for ASEAN. Chinese regional and more positive views about great- in managing that competition, at least hegemony, whether coercive or power politics. Hedley Bull stressed in Southeast Asia. relatively benign, is bad news the special responsibility of the Criticisms of ASEAN stem from for ASEAN. If it materialises, it great powers in the management of traditional perspectives on the will certainly cover at least parts international order. Karl Deutsch nature of great-power politics. These of Southeast Asia, including the and David Singer rejected the idea perspectives vary from views like those states involved in the South China that multipolarity invariably leads to of John Mearsheimer, who argues that Sea conflict. A multipolar system great-power competition and conflict. rising powers must expand to survive, dominated by the great powers gives It may make war less likely by making often leading them to seek regional little space to smaller and weaker a potential aggressor less sure about its hegemony and provoking conflict states, which would be victims of alignments and enlarging the size and with existing great powers. There are great-power politics. power of a potentially countervailing

18 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 asian review: doomed by dialogue? coalition. Multipolarity increases one takes the latter into account, the and war, and which are unlikely to opportunities for interaction among dominant feature of the world and reappear. the major players, creating cross- Asia today is not multipolarity but While power hierarchies remain, cutting pressures on their strategic multiplexity. the overall architecture of a multiplex designs. Multiplexity, or the idea of a world is non-hegemonic. The world is But even these relatively optimistic multiplex world, differs from a unlikely to see global hegemons like perspectives still assume great-power multipolar system in significant ways. Britain and the United States. China is primacy in maintaining stability, Whereas the traditional conception of not going to be one. A multiplex world and none of the above perspectives multipolarity assumed the primacy of is one that encourages pluralistic and recognises the possibility of smaller the great powers, actors in a multiplex shared leadership at both global and and weaker players influencing world are not just great powers or regional levels. ASEAN’s prospects great-power politics. If the traditional nation states, but also international should be judged not in terms of perspectives were correct, ASEAN institutions, non-governmental old-fashioned, outdated notions of would have been doomed from its organisations, multinational multipolarity, but of these unfolding birth in 1967. corporations and transnational changes towards a multiplex world. ASEAN is an anomaly in the networks (both good and bad). ASEAN’s big advantage is that universe of great-power politics. A multiplex order is marked by there is currently no alternative to its Not only has it survived, but it has complex global and regional linkages convening power in the region. The contributed significantly to reducing including not just trade but also great powers of the Asia Pacific— and managing conflict in Southeast finance and transnational production China, Japan, India and the United Asia and has served as the main networks, which were sparse in States—are not capable of leading anchor of regional cooperation. This pre-World War European economic Asian regional institutions because now involves all the major powers interdependence ordered around of mutual mistrust and a lack of of Asia and, indeed, the world. As ties to the old imperial powers. legitimacy. Renewed great-power a result, Asia is the only region in Interdependence today is not only competition does not undermine but history where the strong live in the economic in nature but covers many supports ‘ASEAN centrality’. world of the weak, and the weak lead other areas, such as the environment, Recent Chinese economic and the strong. ASEAN’s record has been disease, human rights and social security initiatives such as the Asian mixed, but ASEAN turns traditional media. A multiplex order has multiple Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) realism on its head. layers of governance, including global, and the Silk Road Fund are not likely Great-power politics may be a inter-regional, regional, domestic to alter this situation. The AIIB is one constant in world history, but it does and sub-state. Regionalism is a key of the first serious initiatives from not reappear in the same way and part of this, but regionalism today is China to promote Asian cooperation for the same reasons. The phrase open and overlapping. This is a far and commit to multilateral institution ‘great-power rivalry’ is misleading cry from 19th-century imperial blocs building. China had little to do with because of the significant and far- that fuelled great-power competition the establishment of APEC in 1989, the reaching cooperation that exists ARF in 1994, ASEAN+3 in 1997 and among the same great powers both the EAS in 2005. TheAIIB challenges at regional and global levels. And this On transnational and the principle of ASEAN centrality; cooperation is underpinned by a type yet Chinese initiatives are qualified by of interdependence that simply did not global challenges, ASEAN China’s problems in regional political exist a century ago. and security issues. What this means is that the term should share more China has proposed the idea of multipolarity, a Eurocentric notion, a conference on interaction and is now out of date. It referred mainly responsibilities with confidence-building measures in Asia to the number of actors and the (CICA), calling for ‘Asian solutions distribution of power among them but middle powers to Asian problems’. But this initiative said much less about the substance has found little traction and even and quality of their interactions. If evoked suspicion. Its prospects are

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 19 asian review: doomed by dialogue?

picture: RUNGROJ YONGRIT / epa / aap diminished by China’s territorial disputes with its neighbours, mistrust and apprehensions about Chinese geopolitical intentions and power in the region. ASEAN cannot take full advantage of this situation if it becomes a house divided. ASEAN’s potential impact will be limited if the domestic politics in key member states detract from their engagement in ASEAN or if it suffers from lack of leadership. To revitalise itself, ASEAN should do what a large corporation facing declining competitiveness and profitability does: downsize. Not in terms of its membership or its staff, which is small anyway, but in terms of issue areas. This does not mean removing itself from the South China Sea issue, as Dancers perform at the opening ceremony of the ASEAN summit in Naypyitaw in November 2014. In Cambodia has suggested. Southeast Asian affairs, as in dance, ‘cooperation is underpinned by a type of interdependence’. Instead ASEAN should focus more on issues within Southeast Asia and Asia, rather than taking them on occasion ASEAN emerged stronger, its immediate environment, and directly. This would include climate not only because these prophecies forget about the Korean peninsula, change, health issues, terrorism and were exaggerated but also because the Taiwan Strait and India–Pakistan disaster management. ASEAN stepped up its act to cope conflicts. These are now discussed ASEAN should further seek to with new strategic developments. through the ARF and EAS. As the rationalise the purposes and functions The Bali Summit in 1976, the decade convener and agenda-setter, ASEAN of the regional bodies in which it of persistent diplomacy to end the should give more focused attention participates. There is overlap in the Cambodia conflict through the 1980s to the South China Sea, no matter ARF, APEC, ASEAN+3, EAS and and the launching of multilateral what China says. On transnational ASEAN’s Post-Ministerial Meetings dialogues in the early 1990s are and global challenges, ASEAN (ASEAN–PMC). Creating a division examples of responses to changing should share more responsibilities of labour and building better synergy great-power politics. If ASEAN fails to with middle powers, such as South among them would reduce the burden adjust course now, it might not be so Korea, Australia and Canada, which on ASEAN. It should cut by a third lucky this time. EAFQ are ASEAN’s dialogue partners and the more than 1000 meetings its members of APEC, the ARF and EAS secretariat staff attend each year, and Amitav Acharya is the UNESCO (except Canada). better train and deploy an expanded Chair in Transnational Challenges ASEAN needs to audit its core staff. It should use a professional and Governance and professor of commitments, drop the less urgent international agency to recruit its international relations at the School ones and focus selectively on the core secretariat staff, eliminating of International Service, American more important and urgent items. It political manipulation and enhancing University, Washington DC, and the should make greater use of global and professionalisation. Chair of its ASEAN Studies Initiative. interregional institutions (such as the ASEAN’s marginalisation—even He is the author of the most cited book Asia–Europe Meeting, the various UN death—from changing great-power on ASEAN: Constructing a Security bodies and, through Indonesia, the behaviour has been predicted a few Community in Southeast Asia: G-20) to build cooperation in areas times before and each time it has ASEAN and the Problem of Regional that cover but go beyond Southeast proven to be exaggerated. On each Order, 3rd edition (Routledge 2014).

20 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 asian review: moscow’s recalibration Is Sinocentrism putting Russia’s interests at risk?

Natasha Kuhrt The huge gas deal was signed the economic impact of sanctions at the height of the Ukraine crisis. was forcing Russia to yield economic UCH has been made of Russia’s China’s response to Ukraine reflected positions to China here too. M ‘pivot’ to the Asia Pacific, but its long-standing positions on The dependence of the Russian is it all much ado about nothing? In non-interference and territorial economy on oil and gas revenues Russia and in the West the pivot is integrity. China is concerned about is particularly evident in Sino– presented as a ‘sudden’ change, but any potential implications of events Russian relations. Russia’s increasing we must see it in the context of the in Crimea for Tibet, Xinjiang and dependence on China (rather than US rebalance to Asia and heightened Taiwan. The commentary in Chinese interdependence) remains a cause rhetoric over Ukraine. This policy official publications sided with Russian for concern. Russia’s energy strategy is not so much a pivot to the Asia claims of Western interference in advocates increasing the share of Asia Pacific as the intensification of a the domestic politics of Ukraine and Pacific energy markets from 3 per gradual recalibration towards greater hypocrisy in hailing the independence cent to 30 per cent. Yet paradoxically, Sinocentrism in Russia’s Asia policy. of Kosovo but not of Crimea. Russian the 2009 National Security Strategy Yet the current downturn in the President Vladimir Putin publicly characterised as potential threats both Chinese economy places a question thanked ‘the people of China, whose a failure to reduce Russia’s dependence mark over the extent to which Russia leadership sees the situation in Crimea on raw materials and the loss of can continue to rely so exclusively on in all its historical and political control over Russia’s resources. The its eastern neighbour. The Russian Far integrity’. idea of Russia as China’s ‘resource East, long neglected by the Kremlin, Given that Russia and China had appendage’ is frequently invoked. had appeared to be moving higher up been in negotiation for nearly two the list of priorities. In the run-up to decades over price issues, there was USSIA has attempted to APEC in 2012, when Vladivostok was speculation that the Ukraine crisis had R portray itself as a potential hurriedly ‘dolled up’ for the occasion, spurred Russia to clinch the gas deal. ‘swing supplier’ between Europe a whole new ministry for the Russian Previously price had been an issue and Asia, but this is a difficult Far East was created. The only other for Russia, but given the economic strategy because Europe has become region with its own ministry is ramifications of the Ukrainian crisis, quite an unstable market in energy Chechnya. Moscow appeared to have run out terms. So the markets of East Asia, Until the Ukraine crisis, Moscow of options, making China—with its and China in particular, appear had been talking about diversifying its huge economic potential—a far more increasingly attractive to Russian Asia Pacific policy, which under the attractive partner than before. Some energy companies. Yet the amount of Putin administration had previously suggested that the deal would barely gas going to China is still only around been heavily reliant on China. cover Gazprom’s costs. one-quarter of what Russia supplies At first glance relations between While on paper the deal looked to Europe. Russia risks becoming China and Russia look like a success impressive, on closer examination it over-dependent on China in the story particularly in the field of left much to be desired. In September energy sphere, while at the same time energy. In 2014, China’s purchases 2014, Kyrgyzstan and China signed a remaining a minor supplier in relative of Russian oil increased by 36 per deal to construct the fourth branch terms. This suggests the chances of cent. In the longer term, if the much- of the Central Asia–China gas Russia’s becoming a ‘swing supplier’ touted Sino–Russian gas deal of May pipeline. China also bought Manas between Europe and Asia are low. 2014 materialises, this would create a Airport from Russia’s Rosneft oil Russia has put all its energy eggs into mutual dependence. company, leading to speculation that one basket.

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 21 asian review: moscow’s recalibration

picture: Misha Japaridze / ap photo / AAp

Chinese President Xi Jinping at a wreath-laying ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Moscow during his visit to Russia in March 2013—his first foreign destination after taking office. His talks with the Russian leadership included discussions on energy supplies.

For some time now, despite military threat. Critics often repeat The OBOR is still a rather undefined the outward show of a ‘strategic phrases like ‘the level of relations, project but it highlights China’s partnership’ with China, Russians particularly in the economic sphere, and Russia’s different approaches to have been sceptical about the longer- needs to be improved’. Russian officials regionalism. China seemed critical of term prospects of the partnership. regularly make reference to the fact the Eurasian Economic Union for its Although the subject of the ‘China that Russia remains an exporter of raw exclusive approach and for cutting off threat’ has been virtually taboo since materials (principally hydrocarbons China from Central Asia. the mid-2000s, more recently it has and minerals) to China, while China Russia still needs investment been referenced at least privately by finds in Russia an easy market for and the credit lines that Chinese officials. While successive official consumer goods and manufactured companies can offer. So far China has Russian speeches and documents— products. Reference is also made to the invested little and Chinese companies such as the Foreign Policy Concept— issue of Chinese migrants along the do not yet have the technological do not directly refer to a ‘threat’ Sino–Russian border in the Russian know-how to help Russia to exploit from China, the potential threat Far East. the new oilfields (for example in the is subsumed into the sphere of In Central Asia, the May 2015 Arctic) that it desperately needs. Given economics. agreement on cooperation between continued Chinese penetration of Economic and trade relations have the Eurasian Economic Union and the Central Asian energy markets, Russia become a ‘safe area’ from which to One Belt One Road initiative (OBOR) may be squeezed even further. criticise Sino–Russian relations in signalled to many that Russia was In the wider Asia Pacific, Russia Russia, given the sensitivity around again making concessions to China has attempted to diversify relations direct references to any hypothetical in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. with other countries, such as Vietnam.

22 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 asian review: moscow’s recalibration

Yet China was able to restrict Russia’s The political dimension of Sino– academics recently told their Russian room for manoeuvre by interfering Russian bilateral relations has long counterparts that this image doesn’t directly when Gazprom allegedly tried been the locomotive of relations, square with reality and urged Russians to develop an area with a Vietnamese without which it would be difficult to to be more ‘objective’: China accounts oil company inside the so-called ‘nine- make progress in other areas. Both for only 10 per cent of all Russian dashed line’ in the South China Sea, Moscow and Beijing have highlighted oil exports. By contrast, Russia’s gas which China perceives as being inside their perception that the economic exports mainly go to Europe, while its maritime boundary. Subsequently, relationship has long been lagging China has imported virtually no Gazprom was forced to abandon the behind. natural gas from Russia. Tensions in idea at the request of the Chinese As one economist has pointed the relationship clearly remain. authorities. out, because the focus on increasing Russia needs to be careful not to economic ties between the two T THE ideological and symbolic align itself too closely with China countries is primarily a political A level, Russia and China can take in the Asia Pacific. This would risk project built on grandiose deals, comfort from each other in the shared alienating potential alternative China’s economic downturn will make discourse on ‘anti-fascism’ evident in partners like Vietnam, which fear little difference to major projects. their joint commemoration of the 70th China’s military might and its But China’s longer-term position as anniversary of the Chinese victory in territorial claims. In any case, Russian a driver of global economic growth the War of Resistance Against Japan. tactics and its use of the energy could now be called into question. But joint naval exercises carried out weapon work far less well in Asia than China’s emphasis on its internal at the end of August in the Sea of in Europe: many Asia Pacific countries development means it cannot Japan were mainly about confidence already have significant diversity of waste resources on projects that are building, rather than a guide to any supply and any increase in energy irrelevant to this objective. strategic intentions or an alliance. In imports from Russia is meant mainly Trade between the two countries a May 2015 report by the influential to reduce supply risk. has been declining. Chinese exports Russian International Affairs Council, to Russia fell by 36 per cent in the first Chinese researchers hinted that the HILE discussion of any military half of 2015 and trade has stalled at current ‘comprehensive strategic W threat from China remains US$90 billion, although the agreed partnership’ could be ‘transformed taboo, Russia has reinforced its Pacific target was US$100 billion by 2015. into an alliance without lengthy Fleet and strengthened forces in the Further, the economic slowdown preparation and without having to Far East close to the Chinese border. means less demand for key Russian define mutual obligations’. Yet a fully- Tactical nuclear weapons are viewed goods—such as metal and chemicals. blown alliance between the two seems by Russia as key to countering a In the Russian Far East, trade unlikely. potential threat from China, so while between Russian border provinces For now, it appears that Russia’s Russia does not openly acknowledge and Heilongjiang and Jilin has more Asian pivot is still all about Beijing, a military threat from China, plans than doubled between 2009–13. Yet despite attempts at diversification. have been made to offset it to some China complains that infrastructure, The debates that raged in the 1990s degree. The economic ‘threat’ remains transport and logistics remain and in the early Putin years about the far more tangible than the military woefully underdeveloped, which extent to which Russia should hitch menace. has slowed the pace of cross-border its wagon to the Chinese economic Overall, Russia’s position vis-à-vis cooperation. Chinese researchers locomotive have largely subsided. But China is to continue the economic attribute this to Russia’s ‘conservative as the Chinese locomotive loses speed, relationship—which brings economic attitude towards Chinese participation Russia may find itself wishing it could rents for Russian elites—but to in the development of Siberia and the change trains. EAFQ maintain a policy of equidistance in Far East’. the Asia Pacific and not to clash with There are signs too that China is Natasha Kuhrt is a lecturer in the China directly, whether along the irked by the securitising discourse Department of War Studies at King’s Sino–Russian border, in Central Asia in Moscow that portrays Russia as a College, London. She can be found on or in the global arena. resource appendage of China. Chinese twitter at @NKuhrt.

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 23 asian review: counting contentment

picture: AAp

Uncertain times cast a cloud over happiness in Asia

Takashi Inoguchi consumption and production become the European Union. more difficult. It is also more common Yet when we ask people in Asia and HE new normal of a global to see government attempts to lift around the world how happy they are, T economy seems to be that growth fall flat. Far from experiencing how do they respond? happiness is harder to grasp for tangible economic gains and a The 2014 Pew Research Center ordinary people. There are two major modicum of economic happiness, survey into global happiness covered reasons for this. ordinary people find themselves more 43 countries. Responses were collected First, the economic outlook is and more economically insecure. The on a ten-point scale with a score of 10 growing more difficult to predict. changing macroeconomic landscape being the happiest and one the least Japanese think tanks, for example, has substantial implications for happy; individuals who expressed a consistently fail to predict the possibilities for growth and attaining score of seven out of 10 or are rated as economic outlook for Japan, such as happiness in Asia. ‘happy’. the annual growth rate and the yen– Second, these hopes are buffeted Wealthy countries like the United US dollar exchange rate. If people by big structural changes inside the States, Germany, the United Kingdom cannot anticipate when an income rise region, like demographic change, and and Spain registered high happiness is coming or if it is stalled, decisions shocks from outside like quantitative scores, with the percentage of people about investment and saving or about easing in the United States, Japan and with a score of seven or above coming

24 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 asian review: counting contentment in at 65, 60, 58 and 54 per cent What is fascinating about this result is Hong Kong, Macau, India, Pakistan, respectively. But several emerging the counterintuitive reverse positions Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, market countries—including Mexico, of East and South Asia in terms of Myanmar and the Philippines. Only Israel, Vietnam, China and India— income and happiness. This suggests a single question was asked: ‘How were no less happy, with scores of 79, that wealth is not the dominant factor satisfied are you with the following 75, 64, 59 and 44 per cent respectively. in determining happiness in Asia, as aspects of daily life: family, food, The Asian countries represented in East Asia is overall the richest and housing, health, income, job and the survey included Vietnam, China, most developed Asian region. neighbourhood?’ Respondents were Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, South One possible explanation as to why asked to choose one of the following Korea, India, Japan, the Philippines, poorer nations in Asia are happier options: very satisfied, satisfied, Thailand and Bangladesh. The rated is religion. South Asia is the most neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, happiness of their populations ranged religious of the four subregions. The dissatisfied, very dissatisfied. The from 64 to 34 per cent. world’s largest Hindu populations live difference is calculated between the While the Pew survey suggests in India and Nepal, and the world’s top and bottom quartile in these that money or living standards largest Muslim populations—more aspects of daily life for each society. might matter the most among all the than 550 million people—reside Curiously, while there was determinants of happiness, there are in South Asia, especially in India, dissatisfaction with income in places many other factors that influence Pakistan and Bangladesh. East Asia, such as India, China, Hong Kong, happiness. The survey found that on the other hand, boasts the highest Macao and Taiwan, there was wide women were generally happier than income but is the least religious of the satisfaction with family. One relevant men, married men were on average four subregions. On this measure, it issue is the extent to which extended happier than unmarried ones and also is the least happy. family members live in adjacent Asians were generally more optimistic Recent research sought to gain neighbourhoods. Another is that in than the citizens of other regions. insight into similar cross-country these countries wives tend to share This confirms one of the findings of comparisons by examining differences household chores with husbands and Pew surveys in the early 2000s, which within and between nations at the maids, whereas in the nuclear family found that the gender gap in happiness regional level. In a time of deep and households of South Korea and Japan, is positive and very large in Asian complex globalisation such diverse husbands commonly avoid their share countries. The average gender gap in metrics are of crucial importance for of housework. happiness in Asian societies, including understanding happiness. The picture of Asia’s happiness that Pakistan, Japan, the Philippines, Surveys were conducted in 12 emerges from this research seems to Vietnam, India, Indonesia, Uzbekistan, societies in Asia: Japan, Taiwan, China, be shaped by two powerful forces: China and South Korea, was 9.4 demographic change and quantitative percentage points. In comparison, the . . . while there was easing (QE). gender gap in happiness was just 4 A nation’s population can be percentage points in the United States. dissatisfaction with divided into productive and non- The AsiaBarometer is another productive members. The former collection of happiness surveys from income in places such as refers to the working age population, the early 2000s that specifically typically between 15 and 65 years of targeted 32 Asian societies and their India, China, Hong Kong, age, whereas the latter is dependent neighbours, Russia and Australia, on support—typically those below with the United States included as a Macao and Taiwan there 15 and above 65 years. When the reference point. The surveys provide non-productive population is divided an overall picture of happiness across was wide satisfaction with by the productive population the Asian sub-regions. resulting ‘dependency ratio’ indicates According to the AsiaBarometer, family how effectively the productive the happiest Asian sub-region is South population can sustain the non- Asia, second is Southeast Asia, third productive population. When the is Central Asia and fourth is East Asia. ratio is below one, there is said to be

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 25 asian review: counting contentment

picture: NARINDER NANU / afp photo / aap ‘demographic onus’. When the ratio is above one, there is ‘demographic bonus’. In several Asian countries the process of development is steadily transforming demographic bonuses into demographic onuses. South Asian countries are on the whole still in the early stage of development and have demographic bonuses. The developed nations of East Asia, on the other hand, are increasingly burdened by demographic onus, which puts pressure on income growth and intergenerational equity. Japan’s low reproductive rate has prompted substantial policy changes to motivate young people to have more babies. From a record low of 1.26 in Children dressed as Hindu gods for a religious festival. Religiosity is important in life satisfaction. 2005 the fertility rate has climbed back up to 1.46 in 2015. But the number US financial bubble in 2008. Japan they had very little control. of women of childbearing age in followed in March 2013 in an attempt Asia’s circumstances provide Japan is still said to be far below the to end two decades of deflation. interesting insights into happiness number needed for maintaining the Japanese stock prices have more generally. Happiness does not reproductive rate at level that would subsequently shot up, hitting the seem to equate directly and exclusively sustain the current population size. 20,000 yen mark in early 2015. The with wealth—the higher-income Curiously, although highly educated lower yen–US dollar exchange rate has sub-region of East Asia does not Japanese women do not emigrate on encouraged the sales of manufacturing seem to be the happiest whereas the the same massive scale as their South companies abroad. But QE has also lowest-income sub-region of South Korean counterparts, they do make up aggravated already astronomical Asia is not the least happy. Many about 80 per cent of Japanese-origin government deficits. While the anti- other factors, like high religiosity and employees in UN institutions. This deflation measures are necessary to intimate family connections, seem to suggests that highly educated Japanese promote growth, QE could lead to a play an important role in determining women are unhappy at home. To further downgrading of the Japanese people’s life satisfaction. Context may improve the birth rate, policymakers government’s fiscal position, with be everything, with the new reality of a may need to come up with ways to potentially severe consequences. global economy presenting a range of make life in Japan more enjoyable for The uncertainty surrounding challenges to the happiness of the well- women, perhaps by encouraging men these economic circumstances is off that need to be negotiated. EAFQ to do their share of the housework! likely to put downward pressure on The second pressure affecting happiness in Japan and its neighbours Takashi Inoguchi is emeritus professor happiness in Asia is the central because people don’t like uncertainty. of economics at the University of banks’ policy of QE because of its Some curious evidence for this has Tokyo, President of the University of unpredictable effects on the economy. emerged from research into China’s Niigata Prefecture, and Director of QE is a policy tool that is used to experience of growth. In the early the AsiaBarometer Survey. His recent promote growth where there is days of China’s period of economic works include The Quality of Life in persistent deflation of the economy liberalisation, people’s happiness took Asia (co-authored with Seiji Fujii, by aggressively expanding the money a tumble even as growth rates shot up, Springer, 2011) and Asia no Kofukudo supply. The United States adopted it in part because people experienced (Measuring Happiness across Asia) first in the wake of the collapse of the enormous, rapid change over which (Iwanami Shoten, 2014).

26 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 asian review: ‘national interest’ Indonesia’s foreign policy takes an economic turn

Nobuhiro Aizawa a lot of profit, and suggested that the for all of Southeast Asia. Thus there economy not only defined the national was always an incentive to consider INCE President Joko Widodo interest, but friendships too. He political or economic development in a S (Jokowi) took office, he has been restated the principle before visiting regional context, a platform that would clear and consistent in explaining his Singapore in July 2015, saying that make Indonesia more important foreign policy priorities, enunciating ‘National interests are the motivation globally. The economic aspect of the principle of putting ‘national for cooperation with other countries’. national interest was very weak in interest’ first. Remarks such as ‘Having This economic-led approach 2005. many friends and losing—what is has not been confined to rhetoric In 2004–2005, when SBY began his the point?’ suggested to concerned but also shown by the amount of first term, the Bush administration’s foreign observers that Indonesia was precious presidential time Jokowi war against terrorism was at its turning inward and moving towards has devoted to the idea. Apart from height, with US military operations protectionism. multilateral conferences, his bilateral in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Bali Putting national interest first is to visits have included Malaysia, Brunei, bombings and Jemaah Islamiah’s be expected in a leader’s foreign policy. the Philippines, Japan, China and activities showed that Indonesia also What has been notable is the way that Singapore, a schedule that covered had a security problem. With security Jokowi has defined ‘national interest’. the top three countries in terms of concerns dominating international Put simply, Indonesia’s policy has foreign direct investment, exports politics, preventing foreign political shifted from one based on values to and imports. By comparison, or military intervention was at the one based on economics. former president Susilo Bambang top of Indonesia’s diplomatic agenda. In his first year Jokowi has seized Yudhoyono—known as SBY—gave Its strategy was to emphasise that it foreign media attention by sinking priority to neighbours like Malaysia, was not a country of extremists, but illegal fishing boats, executing foreign Singapore, Australia, Timor Leste a nation of moderate and modern drug offenders and advancing the and New Zealand, and to key security Muslims and a successful democracy. concept of Indonesia as a maritime partners like the United States. fulcrum between Indian and Pacific The policy shift is made clearer by HIS was also why SBY projected Ocean powers. But his strongest comparing the idea at the centre of T its image in terms of values perspective is making the economy the SBY’s approach. In his first speech rather than the economy. In contrast, defining factor of national interest. on foreign policy in May 2005, SBY Jokowi came to office during a major The changed approach was signalled described Indonesia as ‘the world's economic power shift. He had to in Jokowi’s first speech on foreign third largest democracy . . . where project an image of Indonesia as a affairs, at the Association of Southeast democracy, Islam and modernity go careful economic player that would Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in hand-in-hand’. Indonesia’s strategy not easily fall behind. November 2014. While agreeing on was to raise its international status Three elements stand out when we ASEAN’s importance, he emphasised by upholding values such as human examine the new foreign policy. that ‘We have to make sure the rights and democracy, and by playing First is the Indonesian people’s national interest cannot be lost’. an active part in global governance frustration in the final years of the He elaborated to journalists on the through institutions like the United SBY administration. Although his way back to Jakarta. Referring to his Nations (UN). ASEAN was seen as a foreign policy can be credited with predecessor’s ‘million friends but zero means of achieving greater leverage raising Indonesia’s international enemy’ foreign policy, he said that for Indonesia’s diplomacy—ostensibly, profile, leading ASEAN into a more ‘having a lot of friends’ implied having SBY would speak as de facto leader reliable regional architecture and

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 27 asian review: ‘national interest’ enhancing the grouping’s importance But the limits of value-based Asian Development Bank. through initiatives such as the East diplomacy became clear after the coup As Jokowi’s perception of Asia Summit, diplomatic credit for in Thailand in May 2014, after the the regional and global order these achievements was given very ASEAN charter had taken effect. As is fundamentally anchored in much personally to the leadership. The the charter prohibits the acquisition of economics, it was natural for him to intangible assets were left unnoticed. power by extra-constitutional means, see Indonesia’s national interest in Unfortunately, towards the end of the coup violated its principles. the same terms. The aim is to ensure his presidency, SBY’s ‘million friends SBY and then foreign minister that Indonesia’s economy is in the and zero enemies’ policy sounded Marty Natalegawa demanded that winner’s circle as global dynamics more like an excuse to avoid taking Myanmar, the 2014 ASEAN chair, change. Looking forward, there is no responsibility to advance domestic issue a statement criticising or hint that Jokowi’s foreign policy and its demands than anything else. expressing serious regret about the economic focus will change. Jokowi and his team were aware events in Thailand. They did so in vain. of these frustrations. It appeared that On the contrary but unsurprisingly, PTIMISTS and pessimists alike the new president’s plan to overcome Myanmar was quick to acknowledge O will agree that this focus is good the shortcomings of his predecessor’s the Thai junta and the importance for Indonesia’s prospects. Optimists platform was to share the diplomatic of the military’s need to intervene at consider that, with Indonesia’s dividend with the people. The easiest certain times. Cambodia followed suit, demographic bonus, there is great way to do that would be by sharing the acknowledging the junta because it potential for it to be the next Asian economic benefits of trade, investment was endorsed by the Thai monarchy. growth engine. Emphasis on economic and employment. Failure to condemn the Thai coup national interest will therefore promise weakened the charter and Indonesia’s a gain in Indonesia’s global political HE limitations of value-based diplomatic influence in creating it. It power. Pessimists will see Asia’s T or ‘democracy’ diplomacy has showed the limits of what Indonesia, growth slowing and protectionism been the second key factor in changing despite being the group’s de-facto setting in. In this scenario, the foreign policy. One milestone of leader, could hope to achieve through government would gain credit for SBY’s diplomacy was establishing its diplomacy in ASEAN and through seeking to secure Indonesia’s economic the ASEAN charter. This not only value-based diplomacy. interest by crafting a friendly regional institutionalised the association and Third, the shift towards a greater and global environment. raised its credibility but, with strong economic focus fits within the current The economic turn in foreign policy impetus from Indonesia, ASEAN administration’s broader views is more structural than based on also embraced the idea of shared on global dynamics and a shift in leadership. Given how similar Jokowi political values: human rights and economic power to the East. Jokowi’s and Prabowo Subianto’s comments democracy. Winning agreement from statements at the East Asia Summit in were in pre-election debates on foreign the politically diverse membership November 2014 make this view clear: policy, it seems likely that even if was a significant achievement—a rare ‘[t]he centre of global geo-economy Prabowo had won the presidential case of consent that matters such as and geo-politics is currently shifting election, he would have defined democracy and human rights were from the West. . . . The East Asian ‘national interest’ in similar terms. to be concerns of member states in region is the most dynamic in terms of Domestic economic benefits will the first instance. This was not just an economy. Almost 40 per cent of world continue to be electorally popular and ethical decision but aimed to create a trade is taking place in this region’. critical in Indonesia and define what bulwark against external intervention At the 60th Asia–Africa Conference is and isn’t in the national interest. in regional affairs. in April 2015, Jokowi elaborated on As a result, it will continue to drive Shared-value diplomacy also had a this view, saying that ‘we must build Indonesia’s foreign policy—at least strategic purpose, for it was designed a new global economic order that until the next turn. EAFQ to create greater international leverage is open to new, emerging economic both by enhancing ASEAN’s strategic powers’ and not one based only on Nobuhiro Aizawa is an associate value and increasing Indonesia’s global institutions such as the World Bank, professor at the Kyushu University status as the de facto leader. International Monetary Fund and School of Cultural and Social Studies.

28 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 locked together Economic embrace is warm enough to thaw the politics picture: EPA / AAp Shiro Armstrong

HINA and Japan are locked into C each other economically. The bilateral relationship is the third- largest in the world, with a US$340 billion trade relationship in 2014. China is Japan’s largest trading partner, accounting for one-fifth of its trade, and Japan is China’s second-largest trading partner after the United States. Japan is the largest investor in China, with a stock of direct investment at more than US$100 billion in 2014. Compare that to the next largest source, the United States, which has at most a direct investment stock estimated at US$70 billion in China. But even those massive trade and investment figures do not demonstrate just how intertwined the two Asian giants are. The importance of the Japan–China Workers on the assembly line at the Sichuan FAW Toyota Motor Company’s Chengdu plant. Japanese relationship is beyond bilateral. The investment has brought capital, technology, know-how and jobs to China. relationship is embedded in a deeply integrated region where supply chains Japanese manufacturing has had to Disruptions to trade are costly and thick trade and investment shift offshore to remain competitive in even though supply and procurement flows with third countries mean that the wake of the rapid yen appreciation of goods are done at arms-length there is another dimension to the in the 1980s after the Plaza Accord and alternatives can be found when interdependence. Much of Japanese and the stagnant domestic economy necessary. The Fukushima disaster in investment in Southeast Asia relies and shrinking population later in the 2011 demonstrated how quickly supply on assembly and, increasingly, value 2000s. Much of that capacity went chains can adjust within and between add, in China. Trade and investment to China, but Japan also invested in countries. But investment involves are beyond bilateral in East Asia and other nearby countries like Vietnam. closer and more intimate economic interdependence in the region has This gave birth to the often quoted relations than trade, with the setting been achieved with political relations ‘China plus one’ investment strategy. up of factories or businesses in the often lagging behind economic Some may have thought that this was host country involving sinking large relations. Countries committing to a response to the risk of over-exposure capital expenditures, hiring local openness for their development has in China—with which Japan was not labour and developing business and meant that past political enmity and getting along politically—but this was consumer relationships in the foreign unresolved history comes a distant simply a normal risk diversification environment. second to the interest of prosperity. strategy. The US$100 billion investment

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 29 from Japan—a figure that accounts the two countries, the unresolved It’s likely that China would not have for depreciation and divestment history and politically turbulent been Abe’s first choice, but repairing over the years—has brought jobs, relationship. Often characterised by the relationship was a top priority technology, know-how and capital to the soubriquet ‘hot economics and and a policy he had campaigned on. It China. Growth in that investment is cold politics’, the strong economic was the importance of the economic slowing due to rising labour costs (as ties and awkward politics are not relationship that drove the political Rumi Aoyama discusses on page 33) mutually exclusive. So far the cold imperative. Subsequent state visits by but investment into higher value- politics have not disrupted or leaders on both sides helped to thaw added manufacturing and services is damaged the economic relationship and melt the ice. becoming more important. Chinese to any significant degree and the hot In China, the official mood towards investment into Japan is in its infancy, economics seems to have constrained Japan improved and there were no with a stock of close to US$600 million the cold politics. protests until relations hit rock bottom in 2014, yet it is growing rapidly from Relations have been at a low point after the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands a low base of just US$90 million a in the past few years but trade and flare-up in 2012. In Japan, no leader, decade earlier. Much of Chinese investment have kept up. Earlier on, including Abe in 2006 or 2007 and investment into Japan is in commercial during former Japanese prime minister Taro Aso later on, visited Yasukuni real estate, but Chinese investment Junichiro Koizumi’s leadership until Abe did so in 2013, when there is also seeking to acquire between 2001 and 2006, relations were relations were already at a low point technology and Japanese know-how. also at a low, with leadership visits and his domestic popularity high. But For China, Japan’s technological suspended and large-scale anti-Japan even in bad times things did not get prowess is indispensable as it protests in China in 2005. Yet the out of control because there is too continues to climb the value ladder economic relationship was expanding much at stake. towards a high-income country. rapidly, with trade growing rapidly After an icy meeting between People-to-people ties are strong, from US$85 billion in 2000 to US$211 Chinese President Xi Jinping and have a long history and provide billion by 2006. Abe at APEC in November 2014, the ballast to the relationship. That When Shinzo Abe was elected two leaders had a warmer meeting in is unsurprising given the two prime minister for the first time in April 2015 in Jakarta on the sidelines countries’ geographical and cultural 2006, his first state visit was to China, of the Asian–African Conference. proximity but is often overlooked or ‘breaking the ice’ in the relationship. Xi appeared in front of a Japanese underappreciated. More than half delegation led by Toshihiro Nikai, of all 184,000 international students So far the cold politics chairman of Japan’s ruling Liberal currently in Japan are Chinese, with Democratic Party's General Council, the proportion averaging 60 per cent have not disrupted or in May 2015, receiving a letter over the past decade. China is the from Abe and also announcing his second-largest destination for Japanese damaged the economic intentions to improve relations. The students studying abroad, after the ongoing China–Japan–Korea Summit, United States. Japanese students are relationship to any which has continued to bring leaders the third-largest cohort of foreign together each year since 2008, will be students in China. And 2.4 million significant degree and another chance for Abe and Xi to meet Chinese tourists visited Japan in 2014, and develop trust. with another 5 million waiting for the hot economics seems Things are looking up again for visas. Yet polls in both countries report political relations, encouraged on a very high proportion of citizens— to have constrained the both sides by overwhelming common more than 90 per cent of respondents economic interests. EAFQ in some years—with unfavourable cold politics views of the other country. Shiro Armstrong is co-director of the China and Japan have achieved this Australia–Japan Research Centre and level of economic interdependence co-editor of East Asia Forum at The despite the political mistrust between Australian National University.

30 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 regional leadership Could Sino-Japanese competition benefit Asia? picture: AAp He Ping

INO–Japanese relations haven’t S yet escaped from their most difficult period since the normalisation of diplomatic relations. Historical and territorial issues mean that mutual perceptions between these two Asian powers are still in the doldrums. In the context of a shifting balance of power and disagreement over specific regional issues, some Sino–Japanese competition seems inevitable. But how will this affect the region? China and Japan are now competing with each other in providing public goods for the region. From a positive perspective, this competition could mean that Asia Pacific countries enjoy a greater choice when forum shopping and an extended menu of regional public goods. For instance, the Japan-dominated Asian Development Tea merchants and their laden camels pass the Bell and Drum Tower in Zhangye, northwestern China. The Bank is undoubtedly the primary ancient Silk Road has a modern counterpart in Xi Jinping’s One Belt One Road framework. rival of the China-proposed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. On and of the other nation. At the risk of has offered regional public goods of the other hand, in response to the oversimplification, it may be argued various kinds that suited its situation rapid progress of the One Belt One that Japan’s status in the Chinese at the time. This was critical to Road framework initiated by China, worldview is constantly declining. Japan’s efforts to promote regional the Abe administration has also coined Japan is less and less important to integration and to enforce its own the concept of ‘Quality Infrastructure China in many Chinese people’s eyes. diplomatic strategy as a regional Investment’. But this could also lead to Since the reform period Japan had power. China may draw important another spaghetti bowl of overlapping provided a mirror through which lessons from Japan’s experience such regional governance institutions. to judge China’s economic growth as disaster relief assistance, water Competition for regional leadership and social development, but this management, medical diplomacy, actually provides an opportunity for is gradually becoming a historical and food information sharing system, China and Japan to stop the ever- memory. in terms of its basic human needs accelerating ‘appreciation deficit’ It’s time for both Japan and China orientation, grass-root and face-to- felt by both. In the past few years, to re-evaluate the counterpart’s face approach, concerted efforts by in both countries there have been neighbourhood diplomacy and multiple stakeholders, and the “best- profound changes in assessments of regional achievements. Throughout shot” and “weighted summation” the importance of bilateral relations its post-World War II history, Japan practices. At the same time, China’s

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 31 own performance may serve as a good and competition for regional regional identity. It can be carried reference for other regional partners leadership offers an arena to practise out at the sub-national and super- as well, Japan included. Although the and sharpen its soft power and smart national level, minimising tensions existence of ‘best practices’ is an open power. over territory, natural resources and question, we can certainly welcome It is imperative that both China other sensitive issues, as we have seen new practices and better practices. and Japan re-interpret the importance in the cooperation in the Mekong When it comes to regional of functional cooperation in regional region and the pan-Yellow Sea region. leadership, money is not everything. integration. There has been an The aggregation and consolidation As the historical experience of the undeniable decline in Sino–Japanese of common practices at different British–American power transition cooperation and coordination in many levels of cooperation could take the shows, it takes some time for functional areas during the past few region one step towards a verbal or comprehensive national strength, years. Functional cooperation itself, written consensus. Hopefully, the and particularly economic power, either in quantity or in quality, moves interconnection and overlap of these to translate into the institutional at a sluggish pace as the perceived different cooperative mechanisms advantage of setting agendas benefits of this cooperation decrease. will lead to their becoming and building institutions. The This also reduces the spill-over institutionalised, and eventually accumulation and effective exercise of effects from functional cooperation, contribute to political reconciliation leadership intelligence demands even as collaborative efforts are only able and regional integration. more time and requires long-term to continue in niche sectors, are For China, perceptions of Japan planning. Therefore, Japan will likely incapable of rising to higher levels are made up of intertwined identities continue to utilise its comparative and are limited to ministerial contact. and images: a former invader and advantage or first-mover advantage Cooperation in ‘low politics’ is less and aggressor, a counterpart of long- in promoting regional cooperation less regarded as a necessary political time exchanges, a model of success, by maintaining, and even increasing, glue. a source of learning and assistance, investment in institutional regional Ultimately functional cooperation an indispensible neighbour, and public goods. It is also in the interests still exerts a cumulative effect on an existing regional power and of Japan’s neighbours to learn from potential competitor in the same its experience in the spirit of healthy Hopefully, the region. Cooperation and competition competition, mutual benefit and for regional leadership adds more complementarity to jointly promote interconnection and variables to this complicated and the prosperity and stability of the delicate bilateral relationship. China region. overlap of these different is still adapting and learning how to Scholars like Joseph Nye have use its own increasing power. At the correctly pointed out that to cooperative mechanisms same time, Japan and other countries build ‘alliances, partnerships, and are also coming to terms with and institutions’ is the first pillar in will lead to their becoming accommodating China’s rising power. creating and maintaining ‘smart There is every reason to wish, for power’. Traditionally, China has institutionalised, and all of these processes, a peaceful, been short of both the willingness constructive and sustainable future. and capability to engage in regional eventually contribute to After all, the Asia Pacific kitchen is big agenda-setting, rule-making and enough to accommodate two chefs. institution-building. But recently political reconciliation and EAFQ this has been changing. To build a community of shared interests, destiny regional integration He Ping is an associate professor of and responsibility, China is even international political economy at the welcoming other countries to ‘free Center for Japanese Studies, Institute ride’ on its growth. Beijing is catching of International Studies, Fudan up with Washington and Tokyo in University. terms of hard power. The cooperation

32 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 politics or wages? What’s pushing Japanese firms out of China?

picture: Frederic J. BROWN / afp photo / aap Rumi Aoyama

ARLY in 2015, Japanese E companies, Panasonic and Toshiba, announced that they would stop producing television sets in China. As Japan continues to decrease its investment in China, the two multinational corporations’ partial exit seemed to underscore an overall trend of Japanese firms withdrawing from China. On 23 February 2015, Nikkei News reported that Citizen Watch Company had suddenly closed down its parts factory in Guangzhou, laying off all 1000 employees there. The Sino–Japanese relationship has hit its worst downturn since normalisation of diplomatic ties. High- level dialogues, including summit talks, have been suspended since the Japanese government nationalised the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in September 2012 and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013. With its One Belt One Road strategy in 2013, Beijing launched its own diplomatic offensive to improve ties with neighbouring states, resuming intergovernmental contacts with Japan as well. But China has not Camera-shopping at a tech mall in Beijing. Japanese multinational companies expect sales in the shown any sign of compromise on the expanding Chinese domestic market to continue to grow. history or the Senkaku/Diaoyu issues. Meanwhile, Japan is moving toward its Despite the political predicament, China does not indicate dwindling alliance relationship with the United it is conditions in the labour market business opportunities for all Japanese States and has been developing a that have been the most important companies in the mainland. new collective security regime. There factor affecting these developments Japanese firms entered China remains a deep-rooted mistrust in the economic relationship between ahead of other countries after Beijing’s between the two sides in both political the two countries. Since large- and reform and opening-up policy in the and security areas. medium-sized corporations alike late 1970s. According to the Chinese It was against this backdrop that still yield profit in the market, the Ministry of Commerce, by the end Japanese firms began to leave China. withdrawal of Japanese firms from of 2012, 23,094 Japanese firms had

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 33 set up in China. The current Chinese same time, Japanese firms also see more than 1 trillion yen in this market, Ambassador to Japan, Cheng Yonghua, such growth as a positive factor for and they only expect that to grow. evaluates these firms’ investment market expansion. Most importantly, Japanese firms activities in China highly, stating that So while the amount of new believe that the Chinese market will ‘by May 2015 Japanese accumulated investment from Japanese firms continue to expand, and they are investment in China had reached is decreasing, the Chinese market confident about generating profits US$100.4 billion, making it the first remains attractive. there. In JETRO’s yearly survey in country to surpass US$100 billion’. Regardless of the political 2014, 64.1 per cent of Japanese firms But recently circumstances have downturn, Japanese firms fare replied that they expected profit from changed for many Japanese firms, relatively well in the Chinese market. sales, an increase from 60.7 per cent of which have been in the Chinese The Japanese Ministry of Economy, firms on the year before. mainland market for nearly four Trade and Industry notes that the total The idea that all Japanese firms are decades. Annual Japanese investment amount of sales by Japanese companies on the way out of China is a myth. For in China has decreased since 2012, in China reached 36.4 trillion yen Japanese companies, China’s role has when it peaked at US$7 billion. The (approximately US$300 billion) in changed from ‘the factory of the world’ amount in 2014 was US$4.3 billion, 2013 (over 44 trillion yen if Hong Kong to ‘the market of the world’, as Chinese 38.8 per cent lower than the previous is included) only one year after the wages and consumption trend up. year. The business model in China nationalisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu China’s rise has forced structural has also started to change. Previously, islands. change within the international foreign firms produced goods in China Japan’s core businesses are community, and with it a deteriorating using abundant and cheap local labour, gaining footholds in China. Sales political and security relationship and sold their products to foreign volumes in 2013 for automobiles, with Japan. Realists argue that markets. But increases in labour costs data communication and electronic Sino–Japanese confrontation in the (particularly as a result of the 2008 industries were 9.4 trillion, 3.9 trillion political and security realms will likely labour contract law) have affected and 2.2 trillion yen (approximately adversely affect their economic ties as the profitability of firms seeking good US$80 billion, US$30 billion and well. In contrast, liberals predict that returns. A survey conducted by Japan US$20 billion) respectively. Japan’s mutual economic dependence between External Trade Organization (JETRO) multinational corporations, such as the two will eventually contribute to shows that 83.9 per cent of Japanese Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Hitachi and stability in their political relationship. firms believe that wage increases are a Panasonic, sell products valued at It is true that the politics of the significant problem for their business bilateral relationship have not always activities in China. For Japanese companies, been positive for Japanese firms On the other hand, expectations operating in China. Yet Sino–Japan for China as a consumer market have China’s role has changed relations are not easily described by been rising steadily among Japanese either the realist or liberal paradigms. firms as Chinese purchasing power from ‘the factory of the The relationship, characterised by has increased dramatically in tandem ‘cold politics, hot economics’, is an with its booming economy. In 2014 world’ to ‘the market of important case study in international the Japan Bank for International relations in an era of globalisation, the Cooperation raised its yearly the world’, as Chinese nature of which is unprecedented. For evaluation of China from the fourth now, confrontation in the political and to third most promising destination wages and consumption security sphere continues to appear for business activities in the mid-term compatible with deep interdependence EAFQ (approximately three years in the trend up in the economic sphere. future). Expectations for local market growth and current local market size Rumi Aoyama is a professor at the were the top two reasons for the high Research Institute of Current Chinese ranking. Income growth has inevitably Affairs, Waseda University. increased running costs, but at the

34 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 interpretING CHANGe IN ASIA picture: Guang NiU / EPA / AAp

Seapower: Chinese naval vessels in line astern. From modernisation to great-power relations

Zhang Yunling to more and more economies. Normal networks, which now makes China state-to-state relations between Asian an integrated part of the regional and SIA is changing. countries developed only gradually global community. Asian countries, A After World War II and the after the Cold War, but multi-layered despite political differences, share a end of Japanese military expansion, sub-regional cooperation mechanisms common interest in open markets many countries fought for and won have continued to bring Asian and a stable, secure environment for their independence in Asia. In 1949 countries closer. continuing modernisation. China ended its internal disorder by Japan’s modernisation started The Asian miracle has been based establishing the People’s Republic after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, on open policies that permitted of China. But Asia was divided and it recovered in the post-World integration into the global trade because of the Cold War, and these War II era. For South Korea and system. The key has been to create a divisions continued until the Soviet many Southeast Asian countries, coordinated link between business Union collapsed. As Asian countries the modernisation process is quite and government that allows a market embarked on their own development new. A key feature of China’s new network to develop among different processes, they began to reshape the modernisation, after reform began economies. In the flying geese model, region. Economic integration based in 1978, has been participation in with Japan as the leading goose, the on market forces gradually extended regional and global production market ‘Four Dragons’—Singapore, Hong

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 35 picture: koji sasahara / ap photo / AAp

Maritime confrontation: viewers in Tokyo watch a TV report of a collision between a Chinese fishing boat and Japanese coast guard vessels in 2010.

Kong, Taiwan and South Korea— happened in Japan and tried to learn almost 40 per cent of the world’s followed and then so did the other from it. They opened their markets, population. Modernisation has economies like ASEAN members and tried hard to attract investments from significantly increased their demand China. the outside—especially from Japan for food, water, energy and natural Although Japan was defeated in and the United States—and targeted resources, and will continue to do World War II, it was able to rebuild by Western markets. These East Asian so. The catch-up model has added to drawing on the foundations of its early countries started from a lower level, pollution and global climate change. industrialisation and modernisation, but they upgraded their technology in This creates new challenges and issues including technological expertise, order to catch-up. As more and more of sustainability that all countries will an educated population and economies joined the production need to address. organisational skill. The United States chains created by foreign direct Considering the size of Asia’s forced Japan to change its political investment, a network based on a population and speed of its system, but it also supported Japan’s changing division of labour developed modernisation, the challenge of social economic recovery and further in Asia. transition is very serious. The West modernisation. The rise of Asia’s economies has has experienced industrialisation The Four Dragons, or Tiger brought new challenges to the world. and modernisation for 200 years. In economies, closely watched what China and India alone account for Asia, the process is moving too fast. How do we manage the demands and pressure from people who want In our next issue . . . EASTASIAFORUM things to improve as quickly as Quarterly possible? Individual governments will have to find something new, rather The intergenerational challenge than just following existing patterns. New technology helps people to

36 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 live new lives, but it is not an easy the crew of a Chinese fishing vessel quick solution. A delay of one day solution. For instance, China now were detained after colliding with more would have increased pressure consumes 40 per cent of the world’s the Japanese Coast Guard outside of on China. In the end, the crisis was cement just for construction and this China’s agreed fishing area—what managed well enough to allow a demand continues to rise. Similar made the Chinese angry was that the leaders’ meeting during the Asia– demand pressures exist in other Asian Japanese government announced it Europe Meeting summit in October countries. would use domestic law to punish the that year. China’s economic rise has brought Chinese fishermen. The implication The real challenge for Sino– both benefits and challenges. While all was that Japan totally refused to Japanese relations now is how to countries are benefiting from the fillip recognise the existence of a dispute manage the historical reversal of that China’s fast economic growth over the islands and treated the the power balance between the two has provided to the global economy, incident as a Japanese internal matter. countries. In modern history, Japan countries are also working on how to Japan generally handled the fishing used to be stronger than China. A deal with competition from China. But boats carefully and released the strong Japan invaded China and as the country develops and the old fishermen quietly. But, during the many other Asian countries. But now growth model becomes unworkable, election, Japanese politicians used China’s economic size is much larger China will not stand still by using the issue to garner more domestic than Japan, and the gap will continue the advantage of cheap labour. It will support, holding the fishermen until to widen. For Japan, it is necessary to upgrade its technology and invest after the election. In the face of a adopt a policy of living with a rising abroad. This will create opportunities rapidly developing diplomatic crisis, China. At the same time, China needs elsewhere. Chinese leaders were also under great to accept Japan as what Ichiro Ozawa There is also a security dimension domestic pressure to respond strongly. would call a ‘normal country’—with to all this. People are talking about If the Japanese had released the all the instruments of foreign policy China’s rising power and its future fishermen earlier and not announced at its disposal, including a modern behaviour. While China is rising to that they would be punished under and independent Self-Defense Force. big-power status, it has many unsolved domestic law, the result would have Sino–Japanese relations must be problems with its neighbours. been quite different. based on mutual understanding and China’s transition process is still China was in fact very restrained. cooperation. very long. Peace and development An early morning summons of the While history issues need more will be needed for a very long time. Japanese ambassador reflected, to time to be solved, China and Japan can If anything happens now—not just some extent, Chinese culture: in a and should continue to cooperate on on a large scale, but even if there time of urgent crisis we should not let both bilateral and regional economic is a smaller confrontation with a you sleep well. It shows soft pressure. cooperation, which is beneficial to neighbour—it would seriously damage But there was very high pressure both sides for generating new growth. the whole process. China’s leaders on the Chinese leader to ensure a The two nations should sit down need to think about the country’s vital to discuss the sensitive and risky priorities and the costs of war. Many The real challenge . . . challenges caused by their disputes problems are emerging. In the past and establish risk management they could be easily managed, but is how to manage the schemes. Such open dialogue on they could become more difficult in challenges in both traditional and non- the future. Generally, the top leaders historical reversal of the traditional security areas is critical to are aware of the situation and know the prosperity of both countries. EAFQ how to manage it. The danger is that power balance between if something should happen suddenly Zhang Yunling is a professor at the and social pressure became too strong, the two countries Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. leaders may struggle to find a balance. This article is based on an extract of The dispute with Japan over a conversation between Zhang and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands is one Ezra Vogel, a distinguished professor at example. In September 2010—when Harvard University.

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 37 remembering the war picture: AAp

No shared vision yet on a strategic order in Asia

AMY KING prime minister Tomiichi Murayama New weaponry featured in the commemorative in 1995, by using key phrases such as parade in Beijing marking victory in World War II. N AUGUST and September 2015 ‘deep remorse and heartfelt apology’ I Japan and China commemorated (tsusetsuna hansei to kokoro kara no of freedom, democracy, respect for the 70th anniversary of the end owabi), ‘invasion’ (shinryaku) and human rights and the rule of law. He of World War II. The observance ‘colonial rule’ (shokuminchi shihai). also argued that international disputes activities were keenly anticipated as But Abe’s use of the latter two should not be settled through the use a way of gauging the temperature of phrases came only within the context of force. In doing so, Abe implicitly the China–Japan relationship. The of his pledge that Japan would ‘never depicted Japan as a supporter of the commemorations showed that the two again’ resort to practices of invasion international order that China was governments worked hard to prevent or colonial rule. Though Abe referred attempting to challenge. further deterioration in the bilateral to the ‘immeasurable damage and The response to Abe’s statement relationship, but that China and Japan suffering’ that Japan caused innocent from China was one of muted are still far apart on Asia’s future people at home and abroad, he did criticism. Xinhua news agency strategic order. not explicitly describe Japan as having described the statement as ‘lacking Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo been responsible for invasion and sincerity’ and criticised Abe for Abe marked the 70th anniversary of colonial aggression in Asia. ‘beautifying’ the history of the Meiji Japan’s surrender with a statement that Crucially, Abe’s statement linked era. Xinhua also criticised Abe’s came far closer to an official apology Japan’s history of wartime aggression statement that future generations of than most Japan-watchers expected. with Japan’s post-war and future Japanese should not be ‘predestined In his 14 August statement, Abe contributions to international peace to apologise’. But, in contrast to repeated the language of past official and prosperity. He pledged that Japan past practice, official media did not statements, including that of former would continue to support values encourage popular anti-Japanese

38 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 protests. Instead media reports in others, most Western heads of state Instead, the commemoration the lead-up to Abe’s speech sought and many of China’s Asian neighbours activities were much more about to foster calm, rational responses by declined the invitation. Unsurprisingly, China than about Japan. The key Chinese netizens to the Japan history Japanese Prime Minister Abe was message the CCP sought to convey issue. among those who declined to was that World War II marked an The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s participate. Yet in a sign that Xi Jinping important transition for China. In response was also carefully phrased and South Korean President Park are his speech, Xi Jinping stated that to avoid inflaming anti-Japanese eager to improve relations with Japan, 1945 ‘re-established China as a major sentiment and cause tensions in Xi and Park used their meeting on the country in the world’ and ‘opened up the China–Japan relationship. The sidelines of the parade to agree to hold bright prospects for the great renewal foreign ministry merely reiterated past a trilateral summit with Japan in late of the Chinese nation’. This rebirth statements about the importance of October or early November 2015. was depicted most clearly by the ‘looking at history squarely’ and would There is no doubt that China’s seemingly endless parade of high-tech have been pleased that Abe’s statement military parade was focused on the air, naval and nuclear capabilities along repeated this phrase almost verbatim Chinese people’s ‘triumph’ in having Chang’an Avenue. (kako no rekishi ni masshōmen kara ‘crushed the plot of the Japanese The commemoration activities were mukiawanakereba narimasen). More militarists to colonise and enslave carefully designed to avoid further significantly, in response to the visit China’, as Xi Jinping put it. In the poisoning the bilateral relationship, to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine weeks leading up to the parade, but the events still depicted two on 15 August by a number of Japanese China’s CCTV aired many television countries that are deeply at odds over cabinet members, the foreign ministry dramas and documentaries telling Asia’s future strategic order. noted China’s ‘strong dissatisfaction the story of China’s War of Resistance Prime Minister Abe has declared and resolute opposition’ but did not against Japan. that Japan had learned from the past condemn Japan or urge retaliation. Yet there were very few references and was determined to make a more Three weeks later it was China’s to actual acts of Japanese wartime ‘proactive contribution’ to the post- turn. On 3 September, the Chinese aggression during the parade. There war international order. Yet Japan’s Communist Party (CCP) held a parade was certainly no mention of the most ‘proactive contribution’ comes in the that was simultaneously designed to heinous Japanese acts, such as the form of new security legislation and commemorate China’s victory over Nanjing massacre or the imperial US–Japan alliance guidelines that will Japanese aggression in 1945 and army’s use of ‘comfort women’. As allow Japan to play a greater military display China’s formidable military official Chinese media explained it, role in contingencies involving capabilities. The three-hour parade China’s commemoration parade ‘is China. At the same time, President along Chang’an Avenue, in front of not targeted at the Japan of today, is Xi states that China ‘will never Tiananmen Square, was observed by not targeted at the Japanese people, inflict its past suffering on any other CCP leaders, past and present, and and has no direct relationship with the nation’. Yet China’s massive military involved 300 veterans of the War present-day China–Japan relationship’. modernisation—displayed in the 3 of Resistance against Japan, 12,000 September parade—is designed to People’s Liberation Amy troops and deter any state that tries to change the hundreds of pieces of new military The key message the CCP post-war international order. equipment. Though the China–Japan Seeking to place China’s sought to convey was that relationship has improved since the contribution to the defeat of worst days of 2010–13, these two Japanese aggression in a wider global World War II marked an countries have yet to work out how to context, the CCP was eager for the pursue a mutually acceptable future participation of foreign governments. important transition for order in Asia. EAFQ Yet although the military parade was observed by Russian President China Amy King is a lecturer at the Strategic Vladimir Putin and South Korean and Defence Studies Centre, The President Park Geun-hye, among Australian National University.

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JULY — SEPTEMBER 2015 39 JOIN THE PUBLIC POLICY THOUGHT LEADERS

ANU Crawford School Crawford School staff and Explore your options for of Public Policy is visitors are active on government research partnership, postgraduate committees and work in advisory study and executive education renowned for world-class roles across government, in the following: research, education business and civil society. > Public policy and policy engagement, Join our vibrant policy community, > Public administration leading and shaping which brings together scholars, > Applied economics policy thinking in Australia, students, policy-leaders and > International development Asia and the Pacific. policy practitioners from the > Environmental and resources public, private and NGO management, and sectors in Australia, the region > National security. and globally.

Enquiries W crawford.anu.edu.au E [email protected] CRICOS# 00120C | MO_CAP15517