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Home , Adygea, Aliaskhab Kebekov, Caucasus Emirate, Imam Shamil, Ingushetia, Ingush people

Centre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 207 | 04.04.2016 www.osw.waw.pl

Russia’s ‘’: the escalation of religious conflicts in the Northern

Maciej Falkowski

The eastern part of the Northern Caucasus (, and ) is becoming an increasingly distinct region in cultural, civilisational and social terms when compared to the rest of the Russian Federation. The situation on the ground there bears greater resemblance to the Middle East than to : is the key factor organising socio-political life, and conflicts inside the Muslim community, often involving bloodshed, are the driving power of develop- ments in the region. The conflict is between the two main branches of Islam in the Northern Ca- ucasus: linked to the official clergy and government, and Salafism which is gaining more and more supporters among young people in the Caucasus. Tension, including clashes over mosques, attacks, mass detentions, etc. has been observed mainly in Dagestan and Ingushetia. Sufism and Salafism, and the perennial conflict between the two, are essential elements of the Northern Caucasian political puzzle, as is resorting to the use of violence. They have in- fluenced the development of the situation and have been used in political games on many occasions. A similar situation can be seen at present – the Chechen leader, , who wants to strengthen his position in the region, is trying to assume the role of protector of Sufism and suppressor of Salafism. This magnifies the destabilising potential of the conflict and may pose the risk of an escalation of violence in the Northern Caucasus.

Sufism and Salafism in the Northern local elites (they predominate among the offi- Caucasus cial clergy; many Northern Caucasian politicians are members of Sufiwirds )1. Sufism is the mystical trend in Islam. Its external Salafism can in turn be defined as a purist manifestation is the operation of Sufi brotherho- trend in drawing upon the ‘pure’ ods (, such as , Naqshbandiyya). Islam, which was practised in the first ages of It emphasises the need to learn to know God its existence. One of its characteristics is its in the mystical way, beyond the mind, as well extreme legalism and rejection of traditions as the importance of traditional and spiritual which are not justified by the Quran and the leaders (sheikhs or ustazes) who are believed hadiths. Salafism is a very extensive move- to be the intermediaries between God and ment: its nature can be apolitical and peaceful man. Sufism is deeply rooted in the history of the Northern Caucasus. Various local factions 1 Sufism, for example, was the ideological and organisa- of Sufi brotherhoods wirds ( ) are essential ele- tional foundation of the anti-feudal and anti-Russian th ments of the religious and social structure. They uprisings of Caucasian highlanders in the 19 century. Shamil, the best-known leader of insurgents, the also play an important political role, and the le- founder of the in Dagestan and Chechnya th aders and members of Sufi communities form in the 19 century, who is viewed as a national hero by Dagestanis and , was a Sufi sheikh.

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 207 1 (Salafi communities focusing on religious life) as the Council of Scholars Ahlus- wa al- as well as political and armed (the struggle, -Jamaa leads Salafis in Dagestan; in turn, Sufis including by use of arms, to set up an Islamic control the Spiritual Boards of in indi- state). Salafi communities are a relatively new vidual republics). They have their own mosqu- phenomenon in the Caucasus. They emerged es, companies, courts, charities, media in connection with the crisis caused by the (including social media)4 and quite often also collapse of the USSR, the renewal of links be- armed groups. Some of the Salafi communities tween post-Soviet Muslims and the Islamic have links with the armed Islamic underground world, and the socio-economic changes (inc- and are a natural source of recruits and serve luding identity issues) that affected this area. as its ideological base. However, these links are not obvious or automatic (numerous Salafi communities have dissociated themselves from Conflicts between Sufism and Salafism armed struggle), and the decision to join the have been an immanent part of religious guerrilla forces is as a rule made by individuals and social life in the Northern Caucasus. (and not communities) very often in effect of The situation is additionally complicat- repressions from law enforcement agencies. ed by the Russian government’s policy, Sufism is the mainstay of local Islam, understo- which contributes to the escalation of od as being derived from local customs (which tension. do not necessarily comply with the Islamic or- thodoxy). It is bound to the global Ummah only on the level of declarations, and is dominated Young people, often originating from social gro- by the older and the middle generations. Its ups which have been pushed to the margins and supporters call it ‘traditional’ Islam, while Sa- deprived of any hope for the future by the politico- lafis see it as a heresy contradicting the basic -economic system based on clan and mafia con- pillar of Islam (monotheism). In turn, Salafism nections predominate among Salafis. The most is a revolutionary, anti-system trend dominated dynamic Salafi communities operate in the cities by young people, attracting active individuals, (although Salafi villages also exist in Dagestan)2. contesting the status quo (including the religio- Both branches have their own leaders3 and in- us one) and it strongly identifies itself with glo- stitutions (for example, an institution known bal Islam. In the post-Soviet area, it is viewed (partly as a consequence of propaganda) as an ideology imported from outside and is iden- 2 At present, for example, Novosasitli, Kvanada and Gubden. A Salafi enclave, uncontrolled by the govern- tified with terrorism. Opponents of Salafism ment, covering the Kadar Jamaat (the villages Kadar, refer to it as ‘Wahhabism’. This term, inaccu- Karamakhi and other) operated in the 1990s in central Dagestan. It was liquidated as a result of a military oper- rate from the academic point of view, is also ation launched by federal troops in 1999. widely used in the media and political life in 3 The best-known Dagestani Salafi leaders include: Israpil post-Soviet countries (for example, by Ramzan Ahmednabiyev (Abu Umar Sasitlinsky, who is at present in exile, in or Lebanon), Nadir Medetov (Nadir Kadyrov) and has a pejorative meaning. Abu Khalid, at present he is fighting in for Islam- Rivalry and conflicts between the two branches ic State), and Nabi Sildinsky. Ingushetia’s most popular preachers are Khamzat Chumakov and Isa (very often involving violence: armed clashes, Tsechoev. The Sufi leaders include Salakh Mezhiev (muf- terrorist attacks, etc.) have been an ever-present ti of Chechnya), Ahmad Abdullaev (mufti of Dagestan), Isa Khamkhoev (mufti of Ingushetia), Muhammadrasul art of religious and social life in the Northern Ca- Saaduev (imam of the central mosque in ), ucasus for a quarter of a century. The situation and the Dagestani sheikhs Badrudin Kadyrov and Magomed Rabadanov. Many leaders have gone missing as a consequence of mafia or attacks plotted by the Islamic military underground (for example, the Dagestani 4 For example, http://vk.com/sovetuchenih, www.http:// sheikhs Said Chirkeysky and Sirajuddin Tabasaransky). serdce-chechni.ru, www.ansar.ru, http://alansar.ru/

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 207 2 is additionally complicated by the Russian gover- targeted at not only Chechen separatists but nment’s policy, which contributes to the escala- also at Caucasian Salafis. The informal co-ope- tion of tension. In Soviet times, the government ration between the Russian secret services and persecuted Sufi communities, viewing them as Salafi groupings was discontinued in Chech- an uncontrolled manifestation of religious life. nya, and crackdowns began. The alliance with a section of separatists led by the Sufi mufti of Chechnya, , became the basis The outbreak of the Second Chechen of the Russian policy towards the republic. Su- War in the Russian Caucasus marked the fism was rehabilitated and in fact became the re- beginning of the persecution of Salafi public’s ‘national religion’ and one of the pillars communities, which have continued to of the Kadyrov clan’s power (in 2004, Akhmad the present day with varying intensity. was replaced by his son, Ramzan, who has built a dictatorship based on terror in Chechnya)6. Brutal repressions against Salafi communities The situation changed in the 1990s, when there began across the Caucasus, and have continu- was a period of revival of religious life and Sufi ed ever since with varying intensity. One of its communities began to be treated as an ally in effects was the setting up of the Islamic military combating independent Islamic movements and underground in the Caucasian republics which organisations treated as a threat. Initially, one paved the way for the Caucasus , which exception was Chechnya, where the indepen- was proclaimed in 20077. The repressions took dence movement was interwoven with Sufism, the most brutal form in Chechnya, where Salafis which is an essential element of the Chechen cannot function openly, and manifesting Salafi national identity5. Between the First and the Se- views (even having such external attributes as cond Chechen Wars (1996–1999), when Chech- a beard without a moustache or shorter trouser nya was beyond ’s control, the Russian legs) can be punished by death. The situation in secret services would regularly use radical Salafi Dagestan and Ingushetia is quite different. Re- groupings (which were often engaged in organi- pressions are also present there, but Salafi com- sed crime, including kidnapping for ransom) to munities can still function, and the government destabilise the situation in a republic governed would even open dialogue with them from time by supporters of independence. The chaos in to time8. At those times when pressure on Salafis Chechnya was expected to provide the Russian government with a pretext for bringing troops 6 Sufis have complete control of the muftiate of Chechn- ya; all mosques are also under their control. Member- there again. ship of one of the Sufi wirds and participation in Sufi The beginning of the (au- rituals is in fact compulsory. Sufism is also propagated by the Chechen media. tumn 1999) was a breakthrough moment for the 7 The which was established in place further development of the political and religio- of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria is, according to its members’ declarations, an Islamic state extending over us situation in the Caucasus. At that time, the the Northern Caucasus under Russian occupation. In so-called ‘anti-terrorist’ operation was launched, fact, it is an underground armed terrorist organisation. Since the deaths of its three subsequent leaders (, and Magomed Suleimanov) 5 Mainly the faction (wird) of the Qadiriyya brotherhood in 2013–2015, the emirate has been leaderless. set up by Kunta-haji Kishiev in the second half of the 19 th 8 In Dagestan, dialogue of this kind was seen under the century to which most Chechens belong (dozens of oth- presidency of (2010–2013). er wirds operate in the republic in addition to this one). It was interrupted after the death of Sheikh Said Chirkeys- Sufism is so strong in Chechnya and Ingushetia partly ky (Dagestan’s most influential Sufi leader) in a suicide because both of these regions were Islamised in the 19th attack plotted by the Caucasus Emirate (August 2013). century mainly with the help of Sufi brotherhoods. Even A similar policy – regardless of resistance from the Spiri- to external observers, the Sufi religious ritual zikr (the tual Directorate of Muslims of Ingushetia – has been pur- ecstatic circle dance) has become a symbol of Chechnya sued for years by the president of Ingushetia, Yunus-bek and of the Chechen craving for independence. Yevkurov.

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 207 3 is increased, the military underground becomes Makhachkala, Khasavyurt and Kizilyurt10), for- more active since more desperate people are re- cing upon Salafi communities (for exam- ady to join the guerrilla troops (the war in Syria ple, at the mosque in Makhachkala11), setting (where thousands of residents of the Caucasian fire to Salafi mosques (for example, in ). republics of the Russian Federation have gone to What provoked the greatest outrage among Sa- fight in the ) has served as such a ‘safety lafi communities was the campaign of closing valve’ over the past few years9). The situation usu- the mosques they controlled, for example in ally calms down when the government tolerates Makhachkala and Khasavyurt. This met with or- peaceful Salafi communities and opens dialogue ganised resistance (January 2016). When the Sa- with them (this situation has been seen over the lafi mosque (known as the ‘northern’ mosque) past few years in Ingushetia, one effect of which was closed, thousands of young Salafis took to is the stabilisation of the internal situation). the streets and demanded that the city govern- ment hand back the keys12. The scale of the de- monstration and the fact that it was organised, Despite the persecution, Salafism is cur- as well as open statements from Salafi leaders rently the most rapidly expanding branch of who announced they would fight for their ri- Islam in the Caucasus and among migrants ghts, surprised the government so much that it from the Caucasus. Everything seems to in- was forced to agree to open the mosque again. dicate that this trend will continue. On the one hand, this revealed the weakness of the republic’s government, and on the other it demonstrated the strength and determination Despite the persecution, Salafism is currently of the local Salafi community. the most rapidly developing branch of Islam Ingushetia, in turn, is the scene of the con- in the Caucasus and among migrants from the flict between the republic’s leader, Yunus-bek Caucasus (for example, among Chechens in Eu- Yevkurov (in office since 2008) and mufti Isa rope and among emigrants from the Caucasus Khamkhoev and the official clergy and Sufi settling in other Russian regions). Everything brotherhoods who support Khamkhoev13. The seems to indicate that this trend will continue subject of their dispute is the Ingush govern- because Salafism is ideologically appealing to ment’s policy towards Islam: Yevkurov is trying the younger generation. to convince the muftiate to open dialogue and co-operation with all Muslim communities, The new wave of confrontation including peaceful Salafis, whose presence he tolerated if they did not break the law. The Religious conflicts in the Caucasus clearly esca- official clergy and the Sufi circles from which lated in late 2015/early 2016 (mainly in Dagestan the clergy originates are opposed to this be- and Ingushetia). The Dagestani government (in cause they view the independent communities co-operation with the Spiritual Board of Mus- and the popular Islamic leaders as competi- lims) has intensified anti-Salafi measures, inc- 10 luding arrests and mass detentions of people http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/277411/ 11 http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/272887/ praying in mosques (for example, in Derbent, 12 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CF-p05lgCuo 13 The role of Sufism in Ingushetia is similar to the one it plays in Chechnya. It is an essential element of the ethnic identity. have their own wirds (brother- 9 For more information see: Maciej Falkowski, Józef hood factions), mainly from the Qadiriyya school. The Lang, Homo jihadicus, OSW Report, September largest are the wirds that were established in the 19th 2015, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-re- century by the students of Kunta-haji Kishiev – Batal-haji port/2015-09-21/homo-jihadicus Belkhoroev and Hussein-haji Gardanov.

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 207 4 tors and a threat to their own position. The ticipants passed an ‘anti-Wahhabi’ declaration republic has seen numerous conflicts between in which they undertook to refrain from main- Salafis and members of Sufi brotherhoods taining contacts with representatives of Salaf- (riots, disputes over mosques, etc.). The most ism17. During the congress, Kadyrov announced serious took place in June 2015 (the conflict he would combat ‘Wahhabism’ across the Cau- over the Nasir-kort mosque, where the popu- casus and even across Russia, thus expressing lar Salafi preacher Khamzat Chumakov is the his readiness to help out the governments of imam14; furthermore, an unsuccessful attack the neighbouring republics, which was in fact on Chumakov was staged on 11 March 2016). a threat that the conflict would be escalated. Both he and his milieu (including the mufti of Chechnya, Salakh Mezhiev and the parliamen- The interference from the Chechen lead- tary speaker, Magomed Daudov) have issued er, Ramzan Kadyrov, who wants to be numerous threats to Salafi leaders (mainly from viewed as the one who protects Sufi Islam Ingushetia). They have also criticised the gov- from Salafism/terrorism, is one of the fac- ernments of Dagestan and Ingushetia for what tors escalating the conflicts between the they saw as an overly lenient policy towards various branches of Islam. Salafis. The main motivation behind Kadyrov’s engage- ment in religious conflicts in the neighbouring In 2015, Yevkurov stated that the republics is his political ambition – the desire to mufti had to resign, the muftiate needed to be strengthen his own position and to become the reformed, and its competences had to be re- leader of the entire region (and even of all Rus- stricted15. In turn, Khamkhoev convened a con- sian Muslims). His interference in the Sufi-Salafi gress of representatives of his own clan () conflict is merely an instrument to achieve this and received support from the president of goal. However, Kadyrov’s ambitions are not only Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, who has tense re- a personal issue. They correspond to the tradi- lations with Yevkurov (Kadyrov also supported tionally high aspirations of the Chechen public Khamkhoev financially16). to play a more important role in the Caucasus. These aspirations are the result of the size of the Kadyrov’s play population (they are the largest nation in the re- gion), and the sense of strength, exceptionality, One factor that is stoking the present phase of superiority, and pride in their own achievements the conflict between the various branches of (victory in the in 1994–1996 Islam in Dagestan and Ingushetia is the inter- against Moscow without any external help, re- ference from Kadyrov, who wants to be seen building the republic out of the rubble of war, as the one who protects ‘real’ (i.e. Sufi) Islam in the participation of Chechens in military con- the Caucasus from Salafism/terrorism. An un- flicts outside the Caucasus, for example, in precedented meeting (majlis) of representatives , Syria and Donbass in , Kady- of twenty-four factions of Sufi brotherhoods rov’s exceptionally strong position in Russia18, (representing both Naqshbandiyya and Qadiri- successes of Chechen athletes, etc.). yya) from Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia was held on 2 February 2016 in . Its par- 17 http://www.onkavkaz.com/news/695-kadyrov-i-hamho- ev-objavili-voinu-salafitam-ingushetii.html 14 http://kavpolit.com/articles/molitva_razdora-17260/; 18 See, for example, the report on Kadyrov from the Russian https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9mWFc7dY-Qs opposition activist, Ilya Yashin A Threat to national se- 15 http://galgayche.org/?p=2144 curity; https://vk.com/doc279938622_437299182?hash 16 http://galgayche.org/?p=4302 =44c052d71ac47f6c24&dl=c16291d3cb49537d59

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 207 5 The risk of an escalation of violence the Northern Caucasus; they are viewed as re- gional imperialists. Tension between Chechnya Given the vast significance of Islam in the so- and the neighbouring republics is addition- cio-political life of the present-day Caucasus ally stoked by the Chechen territorial claims and the polarisation of local societies concern- (Khasavyurt in Dagestan and District in ing religious issues, the escalating conflict be- Ingushetia) and the issue of the Chechen mi- tween the Salafi and the Sufi communities has nority in Dagestan19. a great destabilising potential. Additional risk In political terms, the present situation is to factors include the deteriorating economic sit- some extent reminiscent of that in 1998–1999. uation in Russia and the increasing pauperisa- Back then radical Chechen groupings (led by tion in the Caucasian republics; and this may and the commander of foreign contribute to a radicalisation of sentiments. militants, Khattab) made efforts to reinforce their own political position by interfering with the situation in Dagestan (offering support to Given the vast significance of Islam in Dagestani Salafis). Two so-called Congresses of the socio-political life of the present-day Muslims of Chechnya and Dagestan were held Caucasus, the escalating conflict be- in Grozny (1998, 1999). During the congress- tween the Salafi and the Sufi communities es, Salafis from Chechnya and Dagestan an- has a great destabilising potential. nounced they would ‘liberate’ Dagestan from Russia. Then a Chechen military intervention in Dagestan took place (end of summer and be- However, the potential engagement of Chech- ginning of autumn 1999), which led to the out- ens in the conflict may be of key significance, break of the Second Chechen War. since this multiplies the risk of an escalation of In the preceding years, Ramzan Kadyrov would violence. make numerous attempts to interfere with the Regardless of endless conflicts and tensions, internal affairs of the neighbouring republics the political, ethnic, religious and clan-mafia (for example, attempts by Chechen troops to system in Dagestan, whose society is a con- conduct special operations in Ingushetia), but glomerate of various ethnic groups, local ja- this met with a negative reaction from Mos- maats (informal historically conditioned terri- cow and convinced Kadyrov to withdraw. Nev- torial communities), religious groups, etc., is ertheless, the fact that Kadyrov is playing the relatively stable. Their large number and the ‘anti-Wahhabi’ card places the Kremlin in an fact that neither of them clearly predominates awkward situation. It appears that a further in society have forced them to develop compro- strengthening of the Chechen leader and in- mises over the past twenty-five years based on tensifying tension in the Northern Caucasus the fragile balance of power. The situation in are not in the Kremlin’s interest. On the oth- Ingushetia is reminiscent of that in Dagestan, er hand, the government would find it diffi- although the ethnic variety factor is missing cult to present any arguments negating the there (ethnic Ingush account for over 95% of the population). External interference with the 19 There are around 100,000 ethnic Chechens (also known situation in any of the republics might lead to as Akkintsy) in Dagestan. They live mainly in Khasavyurt (where they make up around 30% of the residents) and the balance of power being upset, to internal in Novolaksky District which borders Chechnya. Dages- chaos and an escalation of violence, especially tanis fear that, with support from Grozny, local ethnic Chechens may in future demand that the region become if this were Chechen interference. The attitude part of Chechnya. See, for example, http://kavpolit.com/ towards Chechens is definitely negative across articles/v_dagestane_ubezhdeny_chto_vosstanovlennyj_ auhovsk-4473/

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 207 6 need to combat ‘Wahhabism’/terrorism, since EU (at least 100,000 are al- it has itself employed similar rhetoric in do- ready resident there) that could be deliberately mestic and foreign policy. Furthermore, the fomented by the Russian government. proven Chechen model (ensuring stability through terror), especially in the situation of The Russian ‘Middle East’ aggravating deteriorating economic crisis, may appear appealing to Russian decision-makers. The developments observed at present illustrate more extensive processes which have been tak- ing place in the eastern part of the Northern The situation in the Northern Caucasus fits Caucasus for decades. The region has been un- in with the process of the cultural and ci- dergoing a rapid re-Islamisation and de-Russifi- vilisational de-Sovietisation and de-Rus- cation, and has been moving away from Russia sification of the former USSR. However, in civilisational and cultural terms. At present, this does not have to mean a weakening Islam plays the key social and political role in of Russian political influence. Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia (and to a lesser extent also in the other republics21); it organises life in the republics and is the driving Moscow, wishing to avoid the scenario of force of events in the region. The signs of the en- a regional struggle against radical Islam under croaching Islamisation include: participation in Kadyrov’s leadership, may – as a pre-emptive religious life on a massive scale, the existence of measure – intensify repressions against Salafis Sharia courts (including applying Sharia to civil in Dagestan and Ingushetia, employing fed- issues), the vats socio-political impact of the di- eral law enforcement agencies in the process. vides between the various branches of Islam, the However, the Salafi communities there as so increasingly frequent cases of polygamy, the fact strong and hardened (hundreds of thousands that Islam dictates what should and what should of young people who have their own structures not be done in public life (for example, women and leaders) that an attempt to destroy them working for the state administration in Chechn- completely (as was the case in Chechnya after ya are obliged to wear headscarves, restrictions 1999) might end up in a large-scale military on the sale of alcohol and public smoking during confrontation. Furthermore, intensifying the Ramadan, etc.), the fact that politicians partici- persecution of Salafis would serve the interests pate in religious life and religious leaders in po- of the armed Islamic underground in the Cauca- litical life, treating imams and Sharia courts as de sus (the Caucasus Emirate and the troops who facto state institutions, the increasingly frequent have sworn loyalty to Islamic State20), which use of the language and Arabised ver- has found itself in a serious crisis partly due to sions of surnames in place of Russian ones, etc. the outflow of volunteer fighters to the Middle In turn, the Russian social, political, legal and East. This might trigger it to resort to armed cultural reality are becoming something alien and terrorist activity. to residents of the eastern part of the Cauca- A possible escalation of violence in the Northern sus. In effect, the region, with a population of Caucasus would also pose some threats to Eu- almost 5 million22, is part of the Russian Fed- rope. It might provoke an upsurge in the num- ber of refugees fleeing from the region to the 21 Northern , Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cher- kessia and . 20 A schism took place in Caucasus Emirate in late 2014/ear- 22 According to official data (census of 2010), 2.9 million ly 2015 when most of the commanders and fighters in people live in Dagestan, 1.26 million live in Chechnya Chechnya and Dagestan swore an oath to Islamic State. and 400,000 live in Ingushetia.

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 207 7 eration but has more and more in common unattractive the modern Russian socio-cultural with the Middle East than with Russia. This is model is. The process of a cultural and civili- taking place with the tacit acceptance from the sational de-Sovietisation and de- Russian government, who lack ideas as well as of the former USSR, however, does not have the financial and human resources to make an to mean a weakening of the Russian political attempt to re-integrate the Caucasus with the influence. For centuries, empires, including the rest of Russia. Russian one, have successfully managed terri- The situation in the Northern Caucasus – along tories that are completely different from the with the developments in Ukraine, Central Asia metropolises in cultural, social, religious and and Georgia – fits in with the process which is other terms. The conditions which have been gradually taking place all over the former USSR. changing since the collapse of the This is an ongoing, albeit slow, disintegration have only forced the Russian government to of the post-Soviet area (which is for Moscow make hasty adjustments and to make its pol- synonymous to the ‘natural’ area of Russian in- icy towards such areas as the Caucasus more fluence) in the social, political and cultural-ci- flexible. Moscow has done this successfully (for vilisational dimensions. This process is taking example, with regard to Chechnya23, , place in a natural way, regardless of Russia’s and , adopting various intense attempts to slow it down (for example, management strategies to these areas). in the information and propaganda area). This undermines the civilisational efforts the Tsarist 23 For more information, see: Maciej Falkowski, Ramzani- and the Soviet empires made for more than stan. Russia’s Chechen problem, OSW Point of View, Au- gust 2015, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point- two hundred years, and is also proof of how view/2015-08-25/ramzanistan--chechen-problem

EDITORS: Adam Eberhardt, Krzysztof Strachota Centre for Eastern Studies Anna Łabuszewska, Katarzyna Kazimierska Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw TRANSLATION: Ilona Duchnowicz phone: +48 | 22 | 525 80 00 CO-OPERATION: Nicholas Furnival e-mail: [email protected] DTP: Bohdan Wędrychowski

The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not Visit our website: www.osw.waw.pl necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities

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