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The Effects of the Expanding Role of the National Security Council and Mitigating the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1970 Brenna Parish Chapman University

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The Effects of the Expanding Role of the National Security Council and Mitigating the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1970 Brenna Parish Chapman University Voces Novae Volume 7 Article 5 2018 "Compromise Becomes the First Casualty": The Effects of the Expanding Role of the National Security Council and Mitigating the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1970 Brenna Parish Chapman University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/vocesnovae Recommended Citation Parish, Brenna (2018) ""Compromise Becomes the First Casualty": The Effects of the Expanding Role of the National Security Council and Mitigating the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1970," Voces Novae: Vol. 7 , Article 5. Available at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/vocesnovae/vol7/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Voces Novae by an authorized editor of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Parish: "Compromise Becomes the First Casualty": The Effects of the Expan “Compromise Becomes the First Casualty” Voces Novae: Chapman University Historical Review, Vol 7, No 1 (2015) HOME ABOUT USER HOME SEARCH CURRENT ARCHIVES PHI ALPHA THETA Home > Vol 7, No 1 (2015) “Compromise Becomes the First Casualty”: The Effects of the Expanding Role of the National Security Council and Mitigating the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1970 Brenna Parish The Nixon Administration vastly changed the nature of foreign policy-making within the U.S. bureaucratic offices. This change was especially evident in the process of shuttle diplomacy during the time, especially within the realm of moderating peace in the Middle East. The Nixon Administration never executed the terms of their initial Arab- Israeli peace plan, called the Rogers Plan, which Secretary of State William Rogers formulated and negotiated in 1969, and the administration ultimately reformulated the plan into a cease-fire agreement after an increase of Israeli military aggression in 1970. Within the Nixon Administration, the mitigation of the Arab-Israeli conflict became complicated due to the competitive relations between foreign policy-making executive bureaucracies. The expanding authority of National Security Advisor (NSA) Henry Kissinger and his role of authority as the head of the National Security Council (NSC) within the U.S. federal government complicated the Nixon Administration’s efforts to implement the Rogers Plan and alleviate the crisis between Arabs and Israelis due to the implications of the tensions and policy dysfunction created by bureaucratic politics within the Nixon Administration. Previous scholars have adopted differing approaches in their research of the Rogers Plan. Some have focused on the role that the politics within the executive branch of the U.S. government, while others examined issues relating to global politics, especially in relation to the environment of détente between the American and the Soviet governments and issues of diplomacy within the Cold War era. According to Craig Daigle, in his work The Limits of Detente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973, the failure of Rogers to implement peace in the Middle East was a result of tensions caused by the U.S.’s desire to avoid conflict with the Soviet Union. Daigle framed the Rogers Plan within the rational choice context as well as an analysis of Cold War ideology, and analyzed the plan as a competition over national interests between the United States and the Soviet Union. He stated that the Nixon Administration’s presentation of the Rogers Plan was not meant to truly implement peace in the Middle East, but was intended as a barometer for Soviet objectives in the region. The plan concurrently served as a means to free the U.S. of the effort of more fruitless negotiations with the U.S.S.R., while maintaining the legitimacy of American interests in the region.1 Nevertheless, these policies aimed primarily toward obtaining superiority of U.S. political power over the Soviet Union, thus, those negotiating did not consider the interests of the states impacted by the plan. Due to this, Middle Eastern nations did find the conditions of the plan favorable and in turn, did not implement these policies. Golda Meir, the prime minister of Israel, did not approve of the Rogers Plan, and claimed that a “psychological change” must be made in the regimes of other Arab nations, such as Egypt, before peace plans could be made.2 On the other hand, Arab nations considered the Rogers Plan too pro-Israel, and the Egyptian government and Palestinian groups claimed that allowing Israel to maintain even partial control over Jerusalem could be deemed a pacification of expansionism.3 Therefore, the obsession of the foreign policy-makers in the United States on maintaining peace with the Soviets created additional tension within the Middle East and lead to a lack of success in their stated goals. Daigle also dismissed the idea that conflict between Kissinger and Rogers caused dysfunction in policy-making in the Middle East, but he did cite documental Copyright © 2015 Brenna Parish Voces Novae, Vol 7, No 1 (2015) 67 Published by Chapman University Digital Commons, 2018 1 Voces Novae, Vol. 7 [2018], Art. 5 Brenna Parish evidence that indicates that the stance of the National Security Council differed from the State Department, which caused the NSC to create policy that drifted away from the goals of stated in the Rogers Plan.4 Salim Yaqub, on the other hand, made the argument in “The Weight of Conquest: Henry Kissinger and the Arab- Israeli Conflict” that Henry Kissinger’s pro-Israel stance combined with the president’s preference for the opinions of his National Security Advisor largely influenced the Nixon Administration’s policy in the Middle East. Yaqub applied the perspective of personality politics to the lack of application of the Rogers Plan, where he attributed the failure of the peace plan to Nixon’s growing reliance on Kissinger’s advisement. Despite Kissinger’s lack of authority or control in Middle Eastern matters in 1969, Kissinger openly shared his opinions on the Arab-Israeli conflict with Nixon. According to Yaqub, Kissinger, influenced by his experience as a Jew, favored the Israeli side of the conflict and persuaded Nixon into taking a more pro-Israel stance.5 Much of this argument relies on the influence of Kissinger’s personal advisement, and Yaqub draws upon the example of when Rogers reported to Nixon in 1970 that Egypt was willing to accept the Rogers Plan’s compromise if Israel could be persuaded to implement their end of the deal. Nonetheless, Nixon still favored Kissinger’s opinion that the U.S. would not pressure Israel into accepting an agreement that might cause the nation to become embittered toward the state.6 Other scholars blamed the Nixon Administration’s failure to create an effective peace plan on other external forces. William Quandt, a member of the NSC during this time, claimed in his book Decades of Decisions that the failure of the first overarching peace plan came from the utilization of negotiations by the Soviet Union and the U.S. to create a peace plan. The concept of “linkage,” or the diplomatic framework where certain nations act as representatives for other nations at a negotiating table as a lawyer might represent their “clients”, was essential to the legitimacy of the talks between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. According to Quandt, these nations upheld different agendas than their respective nations and, therefore, did not formulate an agreement that best fit their “client” nations.7 After the represented nations reacted in accordance to this unpopular peace plan, the U.S. then readjusted their diplomatic initiatives in order to take on more modest approaches. This was followed by a shift in executive power away from State Department officials who focused on regional issues, as those opinions dominated during the formation of the faulty initial plan.8 In Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Crisis, Charles Smith also faulted the Nixon Administration’s inability to draft and execute a significant Arab-Israeli peace plan on Israel’s drastic reactions against the first Rogers Plan, a more drastic and ambitious plan than the later cease-fire agreement. The initial plan garnered such striking public reactions from Israeli politicians and Prime Minister Golda Meir, leading to Israel’s decision to increase their air strikes on Egypt rather than an advent of peace. On top of this, Kissinger’s “globalist” vision focused on Cold War issues rather than Rogers’ “regionalist” perspective that focused on Middle Eastern issues, which lead to the creation of a modest cease-fire instead of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace plan.9 Unlike previous research, this paper will investigate the role that Kissinger’s increasing influence as the NSA within foreign policy-making bureaucracies complicated the execution of the State Department policy known as the Rogers Plan.10 Nixon’s early goals for his administration focused on the re-distribution of power within his cabinet, specifically within the foreign policy-related members. A main factor of this power distribution was his delegation of multiple tasks and responsibilities to the National Security Council, which would have traditionally been delegated to the State Department.11 With this transition of power and responsibility came an increased reliance upon the leadership of the NSA. This contrasted the typical mode of upper-level executive decision-making of previous presidents who relied heavily upon their Secretaries of State, even among those presidents who served in office after the National Security Act created the NSC in 1947. This shift in power among these federal bureaucracies came, in part, due to the types of people Nixon appointed to these perspective positions, which in turn shaped what functions differing departments took within the course of his administration. A New York Times article from 68 Voces Novae, Vol 7, No 1 (2015) https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/vocesnovae/vol7/iss1/5 2 Parish: "Compromise Becomes the First Casualty": The Effects of the Expan “Compromise Becomes the First Casualty” January 1, 1969 examined the possible implications of the choice of appointees to foreign policy positions.
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