Becker - 1 Vegan Epistemology: Reforming Human Knowledge Practices from a Vegan Perspective Elizabeth Anderson argues that the political objectives of feminist epistemology—a line of inquiry concerned with the influence of gender-related issues and concepts on knowledge and research—are compatible with the “fundamental internal commitments” of science, such as commitments to theoretical reason and empirical evidence.1 While some might resist political goals as disruptive to the ‘objective’ standpoint favored in scientific inquiry, Anderson finds that such goals can actually be beneficial for the “self-critical and self-reforming institutions of science” insofar as they raise empirical questions that promote “critical self-reflections” and thereby remove unreliable belief-formation mechanisms and enable reliable ones.2 Thus, mainstream theorists cannot outright dismiss the concerns of feminist epistemologists on grounds of their political motivation alone; rather, Anderson argues, such theorists must contend with “epistemic reasons to reform our knowledge practices” identified by feminist epistemology in order to maintain commitments to methodological improvement.3 But Anderson’s point is not limited to feminism alone; rather, it extends to other motivations with the potential to spark needed reforms of knowledge practices. One such motivation is veganism: the moral and ethical stance predicated on ending the exploitation and slaughter of animals for human purposes, including food and clothing production, animal labor and captivity, and biomedical research.4 Veganism provides a standpoint from which many epistemological errors can be observed, challenged, and corrected. Such errors result from commitments to a series of 1 Elizabeth Anderson, “Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense,” Hypatia 10, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 50-84, 51-56. Anderson defines ‘theoretical reason’ as “the power to acquire, reject, and revise our cognitive attitudes (beliefs and theoretical commitments) and our practices of inquiry through reflection on our reasons for holding them and engaging in them” (52). 2 Ibid., 55. 3 Ibid. 4 The term ‘vegan’ is often wrongly conflated with a plant-based diet, which has led to a distinction between ‘veganism’ as a dietary lifestyle and ‘ethical veganism’ as a normative ideology. I find the term ‘vegan/veganism’ alone suffices to indicate the normative ideology based on its etymological history and origin. Becker - 2 underlying assumptions and beliefs integral to the epistemic condition of the animal-exploiting society. I argue that rational inquiry stands to benefit from vegan epistemology, here understood as a branch of naturalized social epistemology that studies the various influences of ‘carnism’ on knowledge production in order to identify biases and critique problematic practices. I begin by defining carnism, naturalized social epistemology, and vegan epistemology. Then, I identify three categories of carnist influence on knowledge, which vegan epistemology stands to correct: anthropocentrism, speciesism, and testimonial injustice. I conclude by addressing the role of vegan epistemology as a necessary counteragent of carnist social ignorance. ‘Carnism’ and Vegan Epistemology Carnism is the belief system in which the eating of certain animals is considered ethical and appropriate.5 It entails a set of assumptions and biases about humans, non-human animals, and nature, and comprises the ideology upon which the choice to exploit animals for human purposes, especially the choice to consume meat, is founded. Moreover, this belief system is largely “invisible,” Melanie Joy explains, because “we don’t see meat eating… as a choice, based on a set of assumptions about animals, our world, and ourselves. Rather, we see it as a given, the ‘natural’ thing to do.”6 The term ‘carnist’ is necessary to combat this invisibility, Joy continues, because the more familiar term ‘meat eater’ “isolates the practice of consuming meat, as though it were divorced from a person’s beliefs and values. It implies that the person who eats meat is acting outside of a belief system.”7 ‘Carnist’ is also more appropriate than ‘carnivore’ or ‘omnivore,’ as these terms denote biological constitution (the physiological ability or need to 5 Melanie Joy, Why We Love Dogs, Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows (Newburyport: Red Wheel Weiser, 2009), ePub. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. Becker - 3 ingest certain things) rather than philosophical choice. “Carnists eat meat not because they need to, but because they choose to,” Joy concludes, “and choices always stem from beliefs.”8 Thus, carnism is an ideology: a system or set of ideals and beliefs, each of which contributes to satisfying one’s conception of what is moral or true. Carnism is an ideology upon which animal exploitation depends. Like all ideologies, carnism is capable of infusing bias into self-purportedly ‘objective’ rational inquiry. Moreover, as an ‘invisible’ ideology that is pervasive in human society and institutions, it is especially dubious and yet remains largely unchecked even in the growing field of ‘meta-research’—a line of inquiry which seeks to improve research methods and practices in order to eliminate biases in performing, communicating, verifying, evaluating, and rewarding research.9 Furthermore, as an ideology deeply rooted in cultural identity and custom, carnism manifests in ways that are particularly resistant to criticism and reform. While vegans have done much work in the field of value theory, few have investigated the effects of carnism on knowledge and inquiry. Vegan epistemology, modeled after Anderson’s interpretation of feminist epistemology, serves to benefit institutions of science and inquiry as a ‘naturalized social epistemology’ with a commitment to ‘modest empiricism,’ which are defined as follows. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge, particularly the theory of justification for belief. Naturalized epistemology, as defined by Theresa W. Tobin and Alison M. Jaggar, is a “methodological turn… toward more empirically informed philosophical research,” which is necessary for making research “more continuous with results from empirical 8 Ibid. 9 John P.A. Ioannidis, Daniele Fanelli, Debbie Drake Dunne, and Steven N. Goodman, “Meta-Research: Evaluation and Improvement of Research Methods and Practices,” PLOS Biology 13, no. 10: 1-7. Becker - 4 science.”10 Just as clinical drug trials may be successful under controlled conditions and yet fail in various real world conditions, Tobin and Jaggar explain, models of justification created in the “controlled conditions of the philosopher’s imagination” (albeit with unacknowledged assumptions) may similarly fail to justify claims in the context of real life.11 Naturalized epistemology, then, is a form of meta-research, which aims to improve our knowledge practices (such as scientific methodology and rational inquiry) by grounding them in empirical terms. Social epistemology is a branch of naturalized epistemology focused on social aspects of inquiry; that is, it investigates social, collective, or interactive paths to knowledge, examines the spread of information across group membership, and examines social environments of inquirers such as economic and political situation.12 Social epistemology provides a much-needed correction to traditional epistemology’s focus on the mental operations of individuals in isolation or abstraction from others, Alvin I. Goldman argues, because it accounts for “the deeply collaborative and interactive nature of knowledge seeking,” especially in the modern world.13 Social epistemologists investigate the influence of specifically social factors on knowledge production, including the formal and informal inclusion or exclusion of types of people from research, the prestige of different fields and styles of inquiry, and facets of the inquirers, their subjects of study, and their investigational and cultural environment such as political and economic conditions, social settings, ideologies, biases, prejudices, assumptions, and cultural narratives used to structure observations and interpretations of results.14 10 Theresa W. Tobin and Alison M. Jaggar, “Naturalizing Moral Justification: Rethinking the Method of Moral Epistemology,” Metaphilosophy 44, no. 4 (July 2013): 409-439, 411-412. 11 Ibid., 410. 12 Alvin I. Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3. 13 Ibid., 3. 14 Anderson, “Feminist Epistemology,” 54. Becker - 5 Empiricism is the philosophical belief that all knowledge is derived from sensory experience. Modest empiricism, as defined by Anderson, is the view that “observation provides the least defeasible evidence we have about the world”—a less controversial claim, which avoids the absolute position of traditional empiricism and thus prefers certain types of evidence without eliminating the possibility of the existence of other types.15 Commitment to modest empiricism, then, requires framing questions of epistemology as empirical questions (constrained only by empirical adequacy) that cannot be responsibly ignored or dismissed; questions that pertain to phenomena and practice that are, at least in principle, empirically observable. Vegan epistemology, therefore, is a branch of naturalized social epistemology that seeks to raise empirical questions meant to improve knowledge practices and to identify social dimensions of carnist ideology in both the production and content of knowledge. I propose three dimensions of the carnist