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F a S T Update Georgia Semiyannual Risk Assessment Eanuary to Euly

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F a S T Update Georgia Semiyannual Risk Assessment Eanuary to Euly F A S T Update Georgia Semi-annual Risk Assessment January to July 2006 T S A F © swisspeace FAST Update Georgia | January to July 2006 | Page 2 Contents Country Stability, Conflictive Domestic and International Events (relative) 3 Conflictive Government and Non-Government Events (relative) 5 Domestic Conflictive and Cooperative Events (relative) 7 International Conflictive and Cooperative Events (relative) 9 Appendix: Description of indicators used 11 The FAST International Early Warning Program 12 FAST Update Subscription: www.swisspeace.org/fast/subscription_form.asp Contact FAST International: Country Expert: Phone: +41 31 330 12 06 George Khelashvili Fax: +41 31 330 12 13 mailto:[email protected] www.swisspeace.org/fast © swisspeace FAST Update Georgia | January to July 2006 | Page 3 Country Stability, International and Domestic Conflictive Events (relative) Average number of reported events: 127 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: • As illustrated by the graph, since January 2006, Georgia has entered a dramatic period of political turmoil, especially in the sphere of its foreign relations. The last six months were remarkable in terms of domestic political contradictions, but international events, especially relations with Russia, have raised tensions higher than ever since the so-called Rose Revolution of November 2003. Domestic violence and heightened tensions with the break-away regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have greatly contributed to the general sense of political destabilization. • The major theme of Georgian politics has been general deterioration of relations with Russia, characterized by accusations of sabotage, “ideological war”, “dismemberment” of the country and “annexation” of territories. These accusations were accompanied with threats to demand the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from conflict zones and to leave the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The generally negative trend in Georgian-Russian relations was briefly reversed to a certain extent after March 31, when an agreement on the withdrawal of Russian military bases was signed between the two countries. • Meanwhile, the deterioration of relations with Russia has been seemingly compensated by increased cooperation with the US and some countries of the former Soviet bloc in Eastern and Central Europe, including the Baltic States and some members of the CIS, first of all with Ukraine. • As far as domestic politics, the main reason for the deepening political confrontation has been the continuous failure of negotiations process with Abkhazian and Ossetian de-facto governments. Despite certain political overtures and expressions of willingness to make compromises earlier in the year, all the talks have been stalled and leading Georgian consensus-builders have been excluded from the negotiations process. Relations with the break-away regions were characterized by a disruption of negotiation processes, mutual accusations of resorting to violence, and demands for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers, occasional shootouts and killings of civilians. • Georgian politics has been marked by violence by government agencies – first of all, power ministries – and, in response, a series of public protests in early spring with permanent demands for resignation of either the president and his whole cabinet or certain ministers, the Interior minister Merabishvili in particular. During almost the entire period covered by this Update, parliamentary opposition boycotted the plenary sessions of the country’s legislative body. Political events have been developing against the backdrop of stagnation or very slow improvement in the economic and social situation, which caused a rise of public dissatisfaction. This was evidenced by the dynamics of personal ratings of president Saakashvili and some members of his team. © swisspeace FAST Update Georgia | January to July 2006 | Page 4 • General trends and developments in both the foreign policy and domestic politics indicate the possibility of a further rise in tensions. The deterioration of relations with Russia seems to be a logical continuation of the present state of relationships, and the trend towards resumption of hostilities in the areas of frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia appears to be very difficult to reverse. • In Georgian domestic politics, both government and opposition seem to head towards failure to find a mutually acceptable platform for political debates in the run-up to local elections in December 2006. With intransigence on the government’s side and very little promise of economic breakthrough, the public opinion on the government continues to remain apathetic or negative, thus vindicating the effectiveness of radical policies by opposition parties. © swisspeace FAST Update Georgia | January to July 2006 | Page 5 Conflictive Government and Non-government Events (relative) Average number of reported events: 127 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: • As the graph suggests, the government of Georgia has been ever more assertive since January 2006. This assertiveness has acquired violent forms and has been directed against organized crime, secessionist governments in the break-away regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and domestic opposition political groups. The official motivation of government’s actions has been the strengthening of Georgian statehood in terms of domestic security as well as defense capacity. Opposition political parties have also been active. However, due to disunity and structural disorganization, their activism resulted in isolated acts of boycott or public demonstrations, having a marginal effect on political processes. Similarly, most of the media, especially TV companies, and the NGO sector have been rather conciliatory towards the government or lacked professionalism and cohesion to exert concerted influence on the government’s plans and actions. • The government’s proactive role has been especially prominent in the fight against organized crime, mainly in tackling so-called “thieves in law”(organized crime leaders). The newly reformed Interior Ministry of Georgia, with many newcomers to key positions, including the Penalty Enforcement Department, have failed to observe necessary procedures while enforcing the law. These excesses have been manifested by several unlawful killings of suspects and innocent civilians during arrest operations. Several of these cases have resulted in public protests, especially, the murder of banker Sandro Girgvliani in a downtown Tbilisi café in January, and the suppression of a prison riot in March. These prominent cases have resulted in numerous public demonstrations with demands for resignation of the Interior Minister Merabishvili. However, president Saakashvili chose to keep him in office and refused to seriously reshuffle his cabinet in July. The suspects in Girgvliani’s murder were detained and sentenced, even though the relatives of Girgvliani as well as opposition parties refused to accept these arrests as sufficient actions by the government. • The pro-government parliamentary majority managed to marginalize the opposition parties by sidelining their legislative and political initiatives. Besides, the government refused to be cooperative and make changes to the elections law, which is based on “winner-takes-it-all” model and favors the incumbent party in the upcoming local elections. • Major conflictive actions from the political opposition in Tbilisi and in the regions have manifested themselves in widespread public rallies and in boycotting the plenary sessions of the parliament. Major rallies were held in front of the Parliament, State Chancellery, and Tbilisi State University. Opposition also boycotted the Rustavi-2 TV station which is perceived as pro-governmental. Besides these moves and occasional TV appearances to criticize government’s policies and actions, the opposition parties have demonstrated little cohesion and coordination in influencing the government. However, the opposition’s criticism seems to have raised the level of public awareness of the government’s shortcomings. © swisspeace FAST Update Georgia | January to July 2006 | Page 6 • Considering the increased gap between the government and opposition and the approaching local government elections in December, it is unlikely that the trend of mutual estrangement will be reversed and the level of animosity will decrease. The difficulty of reaching political consensus is further aggravated by the emergence of new political forces that challenge the only established consensual agreement in Georgian politics – the pro-Western orientation in foreign policy. These political forces, most notably the Justice party, which is connected with the former Georgian security minister Igor Giorgadze, currently residing in Moscow, demand the resignation of president Saakashvili and advocate for an increased reliance on Russia in international politics. • One factor that may potentially contribute to the intra-Georgian consensus is a possible remilitarization of conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. © swisspeace FAST Update Georgia | January to July 2006 | Page 7 Domestic Conflictive and Cooperative Events (relative) Average number of reported events: 127 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: • The gap between the occurrence of Domestic Conflictive and Cooperative Events on the graph accurately describes the trends towards increased contradictions in Georgian society. The number of Domestic Conflictive Events
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