F a S T Update Georgia Semiyannual Risk Assessment Eanuary to Euly

F A S T Update

Georgia

Semi-annual Risk Assessment

January to July 2006 T

FAST Update

Georgia | January to July 2006 | Page 2

Contents

Country Stability, Conflictive Domestic and International Events (relative) 3

Conflictive Government and Non-Government Events (relative) 5

Domestic Conflictive and Cooperative Events (relative) 7

International Conflictive and Cooperative Events (relative) 9

Appendix: Description of indicators used 11

The FAST International Early Warning Program 12

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Contact FAST International: Country Expert: Phone: +41 31 330 12 06 George Khelashvili Fax: +41 31 330 12 13 mailto:[email protected] www.swisspeace.org/fast

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Georgia | January to July 2006 | Page 3

Country Stability, International and Domestic Conflictive Events (relative)

Average number of reported events: 127 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: • As illustrated by the graph, since January 2006, Georgia has entered a dramatic period of political turmoil, especially in the sphere of its foreign relations. The last six months were remarkable in terms of domestic political contradictions, but international events, especially relations with Russia, have raised tensions higher than ever since the so-called Rose Revolution of November 2003. Domestic violence and heightened tensions with the break-away regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have greatly contributed to the general sense of political destabilization. • The major theme of Georgian politics has been general deterioration of relations with Russia, characterized by accusations of sabotage, “ideological war”, “dismemberment” of the country and “annexation” of territories. These accusations were accompanied with threats to demand the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from conflict zones and to leave the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The generally negative trend in Georgian-Russian relations was briefly reversed to a certain extent after March 31, when an agreement on the withdrawal of Russian military bases was signed between the two countries. • Meanwhile, the deterioration of relations with Russia has been seemingly compensated by increased cooperation with the US and some countries of the former Soviet bloc in Eastern and Central Europe, including the Baltic States and some members of the CIS, first of all with Ukraine. • As far as domestic politics, the main reason for the deepening political confrontation has been the continuous failure of negotiations process with Abkhazian and Ossetian de-facto governments. Despite certain political overtures and expressions of willingness to make compromises earlier in the year, all the talks have been stalled and leading Georgian consensus-builders have been excluded from the negotiations process. Relations with the break-away regions were characterized by a disruption of negotiation processes, mutual accusations of resorting to violence, and demands for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers, occasional shootouts and killings of civilians. • Georgian politics has been marked by violence by government agencies – first of all, power ministries – and, in response, a series of public protests in early spring with permanent demands for resignation of either the president and his whole cabinet or certain ministers, the Interior minister Merabishvili in particular. During almost the entire period covered by this Update, parliamentary opposition boycotted the plenary sessions of the country’s legislative body. Political events have been developing against the backdrop of stagnation or very slow improvement in the economic and social situation, which caused a rise of public dissatisfaction. This was evidenced by the dynamics of personal ratings of president Saakashvili and some members of his team.

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Georgia | January to July 2006 | Page 4

• General trends and developments in both the foreign policy and domestic politics indicate the possibility of a further rise in tensions. The deterioration of relations with Russia seems to be a logical continuation of the present state of relationships, and the trend towards resumption of hostilities in the areas of frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia appears to be very difficult to reverse. • In Georgian domestic politics, both government and opposition seem to head towards failure to find a mutually acceptable platform for political debates in the run-up to local elections in December 2006. With intransigence on the government’s side and very little promise of economic breakthrough, the public opinion on the government continues to remain apathetic or negative, thus vindicating the effectiveness of radical policies by opposition parties.

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Georgia | January to July 2006 | Page 5

Conflictive Government and Non-government Events (relative)

Average number of reported events: 127 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: • As the graph suggests, the government of Georgia has been ever more assertive since January 2006. This assertiveness has acquired violent forms and has been directed against organized crime, secessionist governments in the break-away regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and domestic opposition political groups. The official motivation of government’s actions has been the strengthening of Georgian statehood in terms of domestic security as well as defense capacity. Opposition political parties have also been active. However, due to disunity and structural disorganization, their activism resulted in isolated acts of boycott or public demonstrations, having a marginal effect on political processes. Similarly, most of the media, especially TV companies, and the NGO sector have been rather conciliatory towards the government or lacked professionalism and cohesion to exert concerted influence on the government’s plans and actions. • The government’s proactive role has been especially prominent in the fight against organized crime, mainly in tackling so-called “thieves in law”(organized crime leaders). The newly reformed Interior Ministry of Georgia, with many newcomers to key positions, including the Penalty Enforcement Department, have failed to observe necessary procedures while enforcing the law. These excesses have been manifested by several unlawful killings of suspects and innocent civilians during arrest operations. Several of these cases have resulted in public protests, especially, the murder of banker Sandro Girgvliani in a downtown Tbilisi café in January, and the suppression of a prison riot in March. These prominent cases have resulted in numerous public demonstrations with demands for resignation of the Interior Minister Merabishvili. However, president Saakashvili chose to keep him in office and refused to seriously reshuffle his cabinet in July. The suspects in Girgvliani’s murder were detained and sentenced, even though the relatives of Girgvliani as well as opposition parties refused to accept these arrests as sufficient actions by the government. • The pro-government parliamentary majority managed to marginalize the opposition parties by sidelining their legislative and political initiatives. Besides, the government refused to be cooperative and make changes to the elections law, which is based on “winner-takes-it-all” model and favors the incumbent party in the upcoming local elections. • Major conflictive actions from the political opposition in Tbilisi and in the regions have manifested themselves in widespread public rallies and in boycotting the plenary sessions of the parliament. Major rallies were held in front of the Parliament, State Chancellery, and Tbilisi State University. Opposition also boycotted the Rustavi-2 TV station which is perceived as pro-governmental. Besides these moves and occasional TV appearances to criticize government’s policies and actions, the opposition parties have demonstrated little cohesion and coordination in influencing the government. However, the opposition’s criticism seems to have raised the level of public awareness of the government’s shortcomings.

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• Considering the increased gap between the government and opposition and the approaching local government elections in December, it is unlikely that the trend of mutual estrangement will be reversed and the level of animosity will decrease. The difficulty of reaching political consensus is further aggravated by the emergence of new political forces that challenge the only established consensual agreement in Georgian politics – the pro-Western orientation in foreign policy. These political forces, most notably the Justice party, which is connected with the former Georgian security minister Igor Giorgadze, currently residing in Moscow, demand the resignation of president Saakashvili and advocate for an increased reliance on Russia in international politics. • One factor that may potentially contribute to the intra-Georgian consensus is a possible remilitarization of conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

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Georgia | January to July 2006 | Page 7

Domestic Conflictive and Cooperative Events (relative)

Average number of reported events: 127 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: • The gap between the occurrence of Domestic Conflictive and Cooperative Events on the graph accurately describes the trends towards increased contradictions in Georgian society. The number of Domestic Conflictive Events exceeds the number of Domestic Cooperative Events, both within the Georgian political spectrum as well as between the central government and secessionist regions. • In the beginning of the year, the Georgian government officially announced a peace plan for South Ossetia, which was formally approved by the OSCE countries, including Russia. Moreover, the new special representative of the president on Abkhazia Irakli Alasania and the state minister for conflict resolution Giorgi Khaindrava actively pursued a policy of rapprochement with both secessionist governments. A donor conference on South Ossetia raised several millions of US dollars for the rehabilitation of the region (donors included EU, Russia and Georgian government). The overtures of the Georgian side to Abkhazians were met by the Abkhazian peace plan entitled “The Key to the Future”. Georgians also spelled out the “Road Map” to conflict resolution in Abkhazia. • Despite a certain rapprochement earlier in the year, later on, the Abkhazian peace plan was rejected, the representative Alasania was removed from office in June, and in July, after the government reshuffle, Giorgi Khaindrava turned out to be the only member of the Cabinet who was dismissed from the government. These changes have been largely perceived as a victory of the “hawks” in the Georgian government – first of all of the Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili. Both Abkhazian and Ossetian sides rejected the conditions of the peace initiatives offered by the Georgian government. • Major conflictive events between the central government and secessionist regimes have developed in a form of mutual accusations of destabilization and preparation for war, shootouts, occasional killings of civilians, kidnapping and hostage taking as well as hiring international mercenaries. Ossetian government floated an idea of uniting with their kin in the North Caucasus and joining the Russian Federation once more. This proposal caused an even greater disagreement between the secessionist and central governments. • Besides the permanent showdown with secessionist regions, types of conflictive events in domestic Georgian politics included public protest demonstrations, boycotts, the forceful detention of armed opposition group members in the mountainous gorge of Kodori in Abkhazia, clashes between local Georgian and Armenian population in the Armenian-populated Samtskhe-Javakheti region, clashes between Georgian customs authorities and police with ethnic Azeri traders over smuggling attempts, hunger strikes by Georgian merchants protesting against the introduction of cash registers and by university professors demonstrating against reforms in the higher education system.

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• In July, a Georgian militia leader was expelled from the Kodori Gorge – the only Georgian-controlled territory in Abkhazia. The military operation created additional tensions between the government and opposition as political parties accused the power ministries of excessive and unlawful use of force, especially after the detention of the opposition politician Irakli Batiashvili on charges of “intellectual assistance” to the rebel militia leader. • The key reason for the conflictive political situation was the haste in which most reforms have been undertaken along with intransigence of the government, which enjoys a comfortable majority in the parliament, rather high approval ratings of president Saakashvili and defense minister Okruashvili, and a unified, like-minded Cabinet. • Cooperative events in Georgian politics were extremely rare, but were mostly based on a unified position towards Russia – including the withdrawal of Russian military bases, a possible termination of Russian peacekeepers’ mandate, and the possibility of quitting the CIS. A cooperative stance was also evident in matters related to the perspective of Georgia’s membership in NATO and cooperation with the US, Turkey, and Ukraine. However, in some cases, even foreign political issues caused frictions between the government and the opposition, as opposition parties blamed the government for being excessively “pro-Russian” on the issue of selling or intending to sell state property, including what opposition calls “strategic assets in the energy sector” to Russian companies (Gazprom, etc.). • A positive development in domestic politics of Georgia has been a rather calm acceptance by the local population of the withdrawal of the Russian military base from the Samtskhe-Javakheti region, populated by ethnic Armenians. The military base served as major source of income for many locals. Instead, the Georgian government promised massive investments in local infrastructure rehabilitation, mostly through the US- funded Millennium Challenge program. • It is highly possible that tensions either in Abkhazia or South Ossetia will develop into an armed conflict. The military buildup on the Georgian side, which, in relative terms, is one of the highest in the world, as well as the military preparations by Abkhazians and Ossetians, along with very little barriers to remilitarization create a very fertile ground for a military conflict. At least in their rhetoric, all sides declare the readiness for military action. The actual showdown of government forces, local militias and mercenaries can at any moment escalate to hostilities, leading to a full-scale armed conflict.

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International Conflictive and Cooperative Events (relative)

Average number of reported events: 127 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: • The intertwined curves of the graph depict a dual nature of Georgian foreign policy, which suffers from extremely tense relations with Russia and enjoys a relatively smooth cooperation with other international partners. Georgian foreign policy during the first half of 2006 was aimed to balance perceived threats from Russia, simultaneously looking for alternative sources of foreign investment and energy, alternative markets for agricultural products, and political support in dealing with domestic problems. • Georgia’s relationship with Russia has been marked with three major events in the first half of 2006 – the gas crisis in January, the decision to withdraw Russian military bases in March, and a fierce disagreement over the policy towards the break-away regions and the Russian peacekeepers’ role in conflict resolution. • The explosion in January of the main gas pipeline delivering Russian gas to Georgia resulted in energy shortages felt by most of the Georgian population during the coldest period of winter. As a consequence, the Georgian government repeatedly accused Russia of sabotaging Georgia and dedicated itself to the search for alternative energy sources, including those in Iran and Central Asia. Throughout the period covered by this Update, the Georgian parliament demanded the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, accusing them of ineffectiveness and provision of support to the separatists. Simultaneously, the parliament has repeatedly raised the issue of quitting the CIS as a defunct organization. In fact, Georgia stopped its membership in the Council of Defense Ministers of the CIS. Other sources of frictions between the two countries have been: (a) the Russian refusal to grant entry visas to Georgian citizens, including members of parliament in early spring, (b) frequent detentions of Russian military personnel in South Ossetia by Georgian police and armed forces, (c) a fight between Russian peacekeepers and Georgian police in February, (d) accusations of “ideological war” against Georgia and of funding particular Georgian opposition parties by the Russian government, (e) accusations of fanning separatist and irredentist aspirations of Abkhazians and Ossetians up to the willingness of dismemberment of Georgia, (f) banning Georgian wine and mineral water on Russian markets, which has delivered a major blow to the whole agriculture industry, and (g) boycotting the CIS informal Moscow summit by the Georgian president in July. • Despite the uneasy relationship, the agreement on the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Batumi and Akhalkalaki – reached in late March – only temporarily mitigated tensions between the two countries. Russian military are due to leave Georgia by the end of 2008.

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• Cooperative trends in Georgian foreign policy have been associated with security cooperation with its allies – the United States, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and with a group of Central and East European countries, including Baltic states, and other new members of NATO. The US government has been the staunchest political supporter of Georgia, especially on conflict resolution and relationship-building with Russia. The Georgian government has accelerated its pace towards NATO membership, hoping to bring it to a new stage of Intensified Dialogue (ID) or even the Membership Action Plan (MAP) by the end of 2006. • Georgia’s relationship with the European Union has been not so smooth. The terms of the EU’s New Neighborhood Policy towards Georgia have not been agreed ever since the policy’s initiation in summer 2005 and talks over the Action Plan for closer ties have not been concluded yet. Also, the EU finally refused to be the guarantor of the South Caucasus Stability Pact in May 2006. However, the EU’s role in conflict resolution matters appeared to be more promising in the first half of 2006 than before – especially after broadening the mandate of the EU representative to the South Caucasus and the appointment of the new ambassador Peter Semneby. • The Georgian government, in cooperation with some other CIS states, tried to create a counterbalance to the Russian dominance in the former Soviet space, thus creating the “Organization for Democratic and Economic Development – GUAM” in May. However, these attempts have been rather ineffective due to the weak ties between the participant countries and their domestic political and economic weaknesses. • The Georgian government has been especially upbeat about the opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in July, which is expected to bring a new geopolitical importance for Georgia and help to partially lift its energy dependence on Russia. • It is highly probable that as Saakashvili’s government continues to rule in Georgia, trends in foreign policy will remain unchanged in the next months. The Georgian government will try to get the desired “Intensified Dialogue” with NATO as scheduled or even a more ambitious “Membership Action Plan” that paves the way to Georgia’s accession to NATO. • The conflictive trend in relations with Moscow will probably continue as the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia continue to dominate the political agenda in Georgia and to a very great extent – in Russia’s policy towards the South Caucasus.

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Appendix : Description of indicators used | Page 11

Country Stability The Country Stability index reflects three independent factors: (i) challenges by non- government actors to the state's monopoly of force; (ii) state repression; and (iii) violence entailing physical force against persons or property. The index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability. Conflictive International Number of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation Events (relative) scale* and (ii) where at least one actor comes from outside the country divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1. Conflictive Domestic Events Number of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation (relative) scale* and (ii) where all actors come from inside the country divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1. Conflictive Non- Number of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation government Events scale* and (ii) where at least one Initiator is a non-government actor divided by the (relative) number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1. Conflictive Government Number of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation Events (relative) scale* and (ii) where at least one Initiator is a government actor divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1. Cooperative Domestic Based on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale: Average weight of Events: (i) that Events (relative) have a positive value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where all actors come from inside the country divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1. Cooperative International Based on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale: Average weight of Events: (i) that Events (relative) have a positive value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where at least one actor comes from outside the country divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1.

*The IDEA cooperation-conflict scale is a general weighting scale that attaches a weight to every event. The scale has a range from –13 to +8. Event types that are regarded as cooperative have positive values, conflictive event types have negative values.

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The FAST International Early Warning Program | Page 12

Who are we? FAST International is the early warning program of swisspeace, based in Berne, Switzerland. The program is funded and utilized by an international consortium of development agencies consisting of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC).

What do we want to achieve? FAST International aims at enhancing political decision makers’ and their offices’ ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner so that coherent political strategies can be formulated to either prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or identify windows of opportunity for peacebuilding.

How do we work? FAST International uses both qualitative and quantitative methods, with the combination of methods being determined in each case by customer needs. The centerpiece of FAST International is the collection of single cooperative and conflictive events by means of a web-based software, applied by local staff using a coding scheme called IDEA (Integrated Data for Event Analysis), which is based on the WEIS (World Interaction Survey) coding scheme. The monitoring by FAST International is done independently from Western media coverage, thus providing for a constant influx of information. This information is collected by FAST International’s own Local Information Networks (LINs). The quantitative empirical analysis is based on composed indicators developed within the IDEA framework. Since even the most profound quantitative analysis requires interpretation, FAST International cooperates with renowned country/area experts.

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