On The Fault Line European Donor motives for aid allocation to post-genocide Rwanda
Master Thesis
Kathrin Kirste
University of Amsterdam MSc Political Science: International Relations Supervised by Sebastian Krapohl and Farid Boussaid Submission 26/06/2015
Abstract
This paper aims at identifying the causal determinants for aid allocation to post-genocide Rwanda despite massive acknowledged human rights abuses. Rwanda has been praised by the political international community as an exceptional post-conflict case that emerged as a ‘model for the African renaissance’ after genocide and mass violence. However, most accounts fail to condemn the engineering of structural social, economic and political suppression of the post-conflict regime and several belligerent incursions in the neighboring DRC under President Paul Kagame. Irrespective, aid has been increased by the majority of donors. Approaching the empirical puzzle of increased aid despite human rights abuses, a disaggregated in-depth four country case study of European OECD donors, the United Kingdom, Belgium, France and the Netherlands, is conducted. The Rwandan paradox is predominantly explained by a so-called genocide credit: donors are driven into ‘voluntary blindness’ of genocide redemption due to their international failure of preventing the tragic events of 1994. The post-genocide regime emerged as donor darling, while the international community produced a success story of post-conflict reconstruction. Contrary, it is shown in this research that a pure examination from the genocide lens falls short on identifying underlying mechanisms of aid allocation ranging from the altruist to the selfish spectrum of motives. In order to close the gap of explanatories, a competitive deductive theory test of the idealist, realist and commercial lens is performed. This paper provides a vanguard for donor-centered research on post-genocide Rwanda by dismantling the altruistic and selfish impetus of engagement beyond a mere genocide credit explanation. It is shown that the donor community does not for a homogenous unit. It is found that aid to Rwanda in the first post-genocide decade is influenced by strong competing geostrategic interests and, for some donors, indeed by a genocide-guilt informed moral obligation. In the second post-genocide decade, when the paradox became even more ubiquitous, aid is mostly determined by growing commercial interests. However, it is also found that donor motivations vary and altruism plays a dominant role in some cases. Overall, it is concluded that donor policy to post-genocide Rwanda repeats the same mistakes from pre-1994 by ignoring a system of constructed suppression. Therefore, the international community is not only identified as bystander but as culprit of failed post-conflict reconstruction.
Table of Contents 1 Introduction ...... 1
1.1 Empirical puzzle and Research Question ...... 1
1.2 Research Design ...... 2
1.3 Relevance ...... 2
1.4 Literature Review ...... 4
2 Theoretical Framework ...... 6
2.1 Definition of Variables ...... 6
2.2 Idealist lens on aid allocation ...... 7
2.3 Realist lens on aid allocation ...... 9
2.4 Commercial lens on aid allocation ...... 11
3 Methodological Framework ...... 13
3.1 Methods ...... 13
3.2 Case Selection ...... 14
3.3 Limitations on the Research Design...... 16
4 The Case of post-genocide Rwanda ...... 20
4.1 The Rwandan success story...... 20
4.2 Reconstructing suppression and war ...... 21
4.3 Funding Fraud ...... 24
5 Egoism versus Altruism in Aid Allocation...... 26
5.1 The United Kingdom ...... 27
5.2 Belgium ...... 35
5.3 France ...... 43
5.4 The Netherlands ...... 51
6 Concluding remarks: Do all donors behave the same?...... 60
7 Annex...... 65
8 References ...... 67
Abbreviations
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
CHRI Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DFID UK Department for International Development
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
GBS General Budget Support
GoR Government of Rwanda
MDG Millennium Development Goals
M23 March 23 Movement (Congolese rebel group)
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NRA National Resistance Army
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army
SBS Sector Budget Support
IFC International Finance Corporation
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UHRC United Human Rights Council
UNSC United Nations Security Council
1 Introduction
1.1 Empirical Puzzle and Research Question
Rwanda takes its place in the public consciousness as a country that emerged from genocide to “model for the African renaissance” (Zakaria 2009: para. 1). After the country suffered the most brutal genocide since the Holocaust, the nation seemed destined to fail and plunge into a post-conflict spiral. Today, the small country emerged as a key player in the Great Lakes region and the African Union. Rwanda’s leader and acclaimed liberator of the genocide, Paul Kagame, is praised by international politics, media and even some part of the scholarly community for his constant efforts of building a stable and well-ordered post-genocide society. In 2009, the Clinton Foundation awarded him the Global Citizen Award emphasizing that “from crisis, President Kagame has forged a strong, unified and growing nation with the potential to become a model for the rest of Africa and the world” (Clinton Foundation 2009: para. 5). Private investors and media institutions make similarly positive assessments. In 2014, the World Bank Doing Business report granted Rwanda a top position, while the Financial Times named Kagame as one of the fifty most influential people of the new millennium (Financial Times 2009; IFC 2015). Despite Rwanda’s undeniable accomplishments, most accounts of post-genocide Rwanda miss to call attention to the social and political costs of its recovery. Contrary it is argued that the regime of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is based on a system of repression, exclusion and growing inequality that embraces all cultural, economic, political and even spatial arenas of the livelihood of Rwandans (Straus and Waldorf 2011). Since 1994, the Government of Rwanda (GoR) 1 has practiced a deft authoritarianism that not only justified harsh restrictions on domestic opposition and civil society, but also on external critique from NGOs and international media broadcasting (ibid). Yet, the RPF boldness exceeded its own borders when it initiated two wars with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 2 in 1996/97 and 1998-2003. A number of UN reports pointed out committed war crimes and human rights abuses throughout the post-genocide decade. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have repeatedly pinpointed at problems of structural violence and social
1 The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) led by Paul Kagame dominates the Government of Rwanda (GoR). It is the political arm of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). The terms are used in accordance with their military or political attribution. 2 Throughout the paper it is referred to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or synonymously as Congo. 1
inequalities (Reyntjens 2010a; Strizek 2011). Notwithstanding its uneven record, Rwanda is illustrated as a success story and remains a ‘donor darling’ among politicians of Western governments and multilateral institutions. Yet, the unflagging amount of aid to an authoritarian regime throughout the last 20 years constitutes a critical case. This paper aims at solving the puzzling paradox of growing foreign aid despite human rights violations by asking; w hy do European donor governments support the Rwandan Government with growing development assistance despite its widely recognized human rights abuses?
1.2 Research Design
To shed light on this empirical puzzle, a qualitative comparative case study on aid allocation on four European donor governments, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and France, between 1994 and 2013 will be conducted. Therefore, the theoretical angles and their contribution to explain aid allocation will be assessed in the first place. The paper takes a three-fold approach that attempts to broadly cover all ends of the spectrum for aid motivation. Therefore, idealist, realist and commercial theory are chosen to test for the normative, geostrategic and geopolitical as well as economic motivations of donors. Subsequently, the methodological framework will inform about the major methodological pillars of the conducted study. The disaggregated case study design as well as case selection and observation limitations will be outlined to assure validity and reliability of the research design. The empirical part is dedicated to the in-depth case analysis. Firstly, the empirical puzzle is illustrated in more depth. Distinct evidence on suppressive post-conflict reconstruction and increasing donor contributions is provided. Accordingly, the puzzle is assessed by conducting an in-depth four case country study of the United Kingdom, Belgium, France and the Netherlands. The theoretical assumptions will be tested for each case and thus a comprehensive picture on post-genocide aid allocation is revealed that exceeds the limited scope of former research on post-genocide Rwanda.
1.3 Relevance
The academic contribution of this research is two-fold. First, a qualitative disaggregated country case study adds to the prevailing quantitative research on donor-centered aid literature that discusses the primacy of self-interest motives as the overwhelming rationale
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vis-à-vis an altruistic impetus that is considered to be mainly epiphenomenal (Berthélemy 2006a,b; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). The research finds that aid to Rwanda is mainly based on selfish motives. The first post-genocide decade is highly determined by geostrategic and geopolitical interests. Post-genocide support is characterized by new, mainly Anglophone, donors that tried to consolidate their power while old Francophone donors withdrew or used aid to restore their lost influence. However, aid to Rwanda experienced unflagging increase particularly in the second post-genocide decade. The sharp upsurge is best explained in commercial terms. In recent years, the small land-locked East African country emerged as a hotspot for innovation, information technology and service industry. With being a hub for the regional market, equally new and old donors were keen to guarantee their share on the quickly developing economy. Accordingly, the paper provides support to the paradigmatic shift of realist informed aid allocation towards commercially informed aid throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s. The research also founds that altruism is not purely epiphenomenal and that the rationale of genocide redemption, in fact, has a genuine causal power in some cases at some times. In other cases it is exploited as disguise to justify unremitting amounts of aid to the geostrategic and commercial partner Rwanda. Accordingly, proof is also provided that the donor community does not necessarily constitute a homogenous unit. Second, this research overcomes an academic examination of Rwanda that is highly dominated by normative approaches that explain aid allocation almost exclusively in terms of ‘genocide guilt’. Most analyses fail to include a variety of variables and thus fall short on providing a valid and reliable explanation for dubious post-genocide construction (Reyntjens 2010a; Hayman 2006 and 2011). Disclosing aid allocation from the spectrum of idealist, realist and commercial theory, this paper enlightens determinants that hitherto have been left in the shadows. Additionally, this paper adds remarkably to contemporary Rwanda research. Most accounts are limited on the first post-genocide decade (1994-2004). It is shown in this paper that the Rwandan paradox becomes more ubiquitous throughout the second post-genocide decade (2004-2014). Covering the full range of 20 years of post-conflict reconstruction, it is proven once more that self-interests beyond the paradigm of genocide guilt prevail. Finally, this paper constitutes a vanguard for development aid research in Rwanda. It is shown that the international community acted mostly on selfish reasons before, throughout and after the genocide. Aid allocation to Rwanda is a mixed result of genocide guilt as well as geostrategic, geopolitical and commercial interests that were perpetually pursued throughout 3
post-genocide decades. Accordingly, unflagging amounts of aid were released to a regime that fosters political, economic and social suppression. Then and now, the international community did not only act as a bystander but as a proactive culprit of failed genocide prevention and, again, of failed post-genocide reconstruction.
1.4 Literature Review
Accessing the case of Rwanda as a post-conflict case is subject to a wide-range of political, academic but also established media research. This paper takes an International Relations approach that broadly speaking examines the interaction between Western donors and the post-genocide government of Rwanda (GoR). On part of the theoretical classification, the paper is allocated among a growing amount of donor-centered aid literature. Important contributions by Alesina and Dollar (2000) or Berthélemy (2006a) identified political, geostrategic and commercial interest as main determinants for aid allocation. At the same time, World Bank researchers (Dollar and Levin 2004) claim that the altruistic elements have increased, especially throughout the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The case study at hand adds to the debate of aid determinants by a disaggregated selection that, to my knowledge, has not been conducted before. Empirically, the paper follows up a remarkable body of IR literature that dealt with the dynamics of foreign assistance already before and during the 1994 genocide. It is generally referred to the works of Peter Uvin’s “Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda” (1998), Andy Storey’s “Structural adjustment, state power and genocide: the World Bank and Rwanda” (2007), Alison des Forges’ “Leave None to Tell the Story. Genocide in Rwanda” (1999) and Linda Melvern’s “A People Betrayed. The Role of the West in Rwanda’s genocide” (2000), who all added to the understanding of the genocide by including foreign determinants. However, the post-conflict literature took a rather positive approach on assessing the Western engagement in Rwanda’s recovery that is particularly explained by its genocide guilt. Early on, several scholars praised the Rwandan achievements with the support of Western aid agencies (Clark 2010; Clark and Kaufmann 2009; Ensign and Bertrand 2009) and therefore joined the bandwagon of the Rwandan success story that was reproduced by several international bi- and multilateral aid institutions such as the World Bank, the OECD but also the DFID and several other European donor countries (Muwanga 2008; Straus and Waldorf 2011).
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Only recently, research emerged that developed concern about Rwanda’s recovery and especially the debatable involvement of donors. A critical assessment in Anglo-Saxon academia is rare. Eugenia Zorbas (2011) added a contemporary publication with “Aid dependence and Policy Independence: Explaining the Rwandan Paradox”. With “Remaking Rwanda- State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence” the first anthology was published that came to different conclusion than the established positive assessments of post- genocide Rwanda (Straus and Waldorf 2011). A comprehensive picture is also offered by Belgian Rwanda expert Filip Reyntjens 3 who claims that the international community has fallen prey to the RPF spin of manipulation. Due to its genocide credit, and thus, due to a deeply flawed donor assessment, the Kagame leadership was able to build an unchallenged regime of political and social suppression (Reyntjens 2004, 2010a, 2011). Recently, a growing openness for a critical narrative that includes the role of Western agents can also be noticed among established media. (Peterson and Herman 2011, BBC 2014) In an even more radical narrative, the Kagame leadership is not only convicted of post- genocide crimes. ”The Myth of the Akazu Genocide Conspiracy and Its Consequences” asserts, among few, that the Rwandan genocide is centered upon a totally false claim. Therefore, not an extremist Hutu elite but the Kagame-led RPA itself triggered the genocide 4 (Collins 2014). Evidence for Collins’ claims is supported by a growing scholarly (Erlinder 2014; Philpot 2004 and Strizek 2011). Proponents of a critical narrative also disclosed the crucial engagement of Anglophone actors from US and UK administrations that pursued own regional goals and therefore critically supported the RPA prior and post-genocide (Cameron 2013; Strizek 2011). Considering the two competing narratives, implications for post-genocide research are inevitable. This paper therefore builds upon the claim that the academic revision of post- genocide Rwanda is highly politicized. It is further argued that a comprehensive and objective analysis of international involvement during and after the genocide is highly biased. While not only academia and media but also human rights agencies such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch push forward charges, a positive perception of the Kagame regime remains within the political arena. The debates about Rwanda’s contemporary governance are therefore polarized between a “visionary leadership” (Blair
3 Reyntjens was banned from Rwanda as a persona non grata in 1995 when he first published critical articles about the authoritarian nature of Kagame’s Leadership. 4 It is not the aim of the paper to uncover the truth about the dynamics of the genocide. The evidence will be conducted as far as it is relevant to the research at hand. The condemnation of human rights abuses by the Kagame regime is purely based on factual findings from several UN reports. For further reads on the genocide and the competing narratives see Collins 2014. 5
2009: para.1) vis-à-vis Paul Kagame being labeled as “the greatest war criminal in office today” (Erlinder 2014: para.1). Acknowledging the contradicting narratives of the genocide and post-genocide regime, this paper aims to enlighten the gap between academia and politics with an objective assessment of political motivations of European governments. It therefore contributes to a growing body of donor-centered European literature on the Rwandan case that, more than 20 years after the genocide, lacks a comprehensive and unbiased reappraisal.
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Definition of Variables
Dependent Variable
In accordance with the aid literature, the dependent variable will be limited to Official Development Assistance (ODA) disbursements as complied by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 5 Although the size of donors to Rwanda is determined by their total ODA contributions, this paper will also include ODA per capita allocation that is suitable for a comparative approach (see figure 3 and 4). ODA can be allocated through different modalities 6 of general budget (GBS) or sector budget support (SBS).
Independent Variable
This x-focused research aims at identifying the competing causal power of motives, and thus, interests of donors as determinants for aid. According to the theoretical aid literature, one can distinguish between two major objectives of self-interest vis-à-vis altruistic interest. In broad terms, realist and commercial theory explain aid allocation on the ground of selfish donor motives. Objectives differ from geostrategic, geopolitical to commercial interests. On the other hand, altruistic motives along the needs and merits of the recipient countries are emphasized by an idealist approach. For the case at hand, a dimension of genocide guilt
5 The Aid literature distinguishes between commitments and actual disbursements. Canavire- Bacarreza et al. (2006) argue that disbursements more accurately reflect the actual transfers taking place. Contrary it is argued by Berthélemy (2006a) that commitments mirror the decision and intentions by donor governments better than the real capacity to disburse or implement aid on part of the donor and receiver government. For the research at hand, this distinction exceeds the scope of this paper. For the sake of simplicity, general ODA disbursements are considered. 6 The modality of aid allocation is, nevertheless, not a dependent variable itself. They are rather discussed as indicators for interests within the theory section. The dependent variable is limited to its behavior of increasing or decreasing aid allocation. 6
among donors becomes particular important within the idealist scope of explanatory variables. In the following, the theoretical counterparts of the hitherto outlined relevant variables will be introduced.
2.2 Idealist lens on aid allocation
Idealism emphasizes values and norms and therefore assumes that aid allocation is an altruistic mean to address the needs and merits of a receiver country. The logic of appropriateness serves as an imperative to social and political behavior and decisions and therefore trumps a mere rational logic of consequences. Idealist scholars argue that the driving forces behind aid programs are humanitarian motives and that states have an ideological commitment to poverty alleviation. The moral argument draws on broad statistical evidence examining the amounts of aid given by donor countries and the income- level of recipient countries. Consequently, major recipients of aid have been the poorest countries in the world (Lumsdaine 1993). Still, the humanitarian motive is controversial among development scholars. The normative argument is seen as purely rhetoric and is contradicted by a huge body of literature that classifies altruistic interests at best as secondary and at worst as motives that do not matter at all. The main realist critique therefore suggests “if aid [was] provided purely on a needs basis, [one] might expect the most aid to go to the poorest nation. This is not the case" (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009: 330). Values and norms therefore appear to be epiphenomenal motives of aid allocation. Despite the strong critique from realist strands, it is claimed that the influence of altruistic motives has increased under the emergence of multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the OECD (Berthélemy 2006a). Moreover, in accordance with the human development approach, inclusive institutions embodied in the principles of good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law were highlighted (Easterly 2002). The theoretical reorientation towards human development trickled down into the political sphere and was manifested in, inter alia , the OECD’s guidelines on Peace, Conflict and Development Cooperation or in a commitment of European Union States to direct aid to countries with better policies and institutions (DAC 1997; UN 1998; Woods 2005). 7 At latest with the
7 However, several studies being concerned with the causal relationship of aid allocation and human rights conclude that merits have no strong explanatory power for aid allocation (Berthélemy 2006a; Neumayer 2003). The initial assumption that a commitment to the UN Charter of Human Rights would automatically influence 7
formulation of the MDGs, aid was redefined with a focus on human security. While the Cold War was considered to have distorted foreign aid for geostrategic goals, emphasis was later put on the reduction of poverty, diseases, illiteracy and human insecurity (UNDP 2002). Yet, the case of post-genocide Rwanda is not a mere case of altruism to an impoverished nation. A strong impetus of ‘genocide guilt’ and therefore value-informed redemption determined aid considerations among donors. It is thus occasionally referred to the ‘genocide lens’ which means a sub concept of the idealist approach that addresses merely the moral obligation due to genocide guilt. Coining the term ‘genocide credit’, the avant- garde Rwanda critic Filip Reyntjens argues that most donors are informed by feelings of guilt that result from the international failure to prevent the large-scale massacres in 1994. Therefore, the framing 8 of Rwanda as a victim of genocide becomes particular important. Thus, it can be assumed that aid allocation is guided by a moral obligation to repair the heavy hypothec of a genocide burden (Reyntjens 2010a). However, with regard to the earlier outlined competitive narratives of a post-conflict Rwandan regime, the possibility for a diverging framing becomes central for the research at hand. If the GoR under Paul Kagame is either framed as liberating or perpetrating presumably determines the moral obligation to allocate aid.
Hypothesis and Operationalization
Subsuming the theoretical pillars of idealism, it is assumed that aid allocation is determined by altruistically informed norms and values . Normatively informed aid allocation is most probable indicated by development policy that emphasizes human development vis-à-vis mere economic development. Aid should be most likely channeled to the humanitarian sector, for example through sector budget support (SBS). However, humanitarian aid is typically defined as emergency relief and therefore channeled to nations in need of immediate support after a human crisis (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2015). Since Rwanda is predominantly framed as ‘post-conflict’, aid allocation to emergency relief is expected to decrease with progressing post-genocide years. Humanitarian sector allocation thus appears to be insufficient to indicate humanitarian motives. Nielsen (2010) identifies allocation to the social infrastructure sector with a focus on health and
aid allocation as a foreign policy tool to exercise instrumental power is not consistent with broad-scale empirical findings: bad performance has in a number of cases led to both, increase but also decrease of aid (Neumayer 2003). 8 Frames can be ideologies or shared cultures of understanding and serve the organization and interpretation of knowledge (Goffman 1979). 8
education, water, food and energy, as well as communication and roads as a classic indicator for a normatively-led aid policy. However, it can hardly be determined with certainty if sector allocation to the social infrastructure sector is led by altruistic or selfish motives. Improved human capital can equally serve to enhance the economic capability of receiver nations, and in turn, commercial benefits of donor countries (see commercial lens). Therefore, it appears to be impossible to identify the causal power of altruistic motives in the presence of evidently trumping geostrategic or commercial determinants. In accordance with the dominant aid literature, it is presumed that altruism is rather epiphenomenal than determinant. A dominant causal power will be claimed if, and only if, indicators for commercial or realist variables are very low. Additionally to sector assessment, it will be checked for the rhetoric emphasis on normative joint values such as the respect for human rights or the alleviation of poverty. However, rhetoric claims are hardly a strong indicator by itself and will be investigated in synergy with its actual materialization through, for example, a stronger conditionality in the presence of human rights abuses. At the same time, the moral obligation for genocide redemption will be examined. Acknowledging that this is methodologically hard to grasp, it will be assessed how the relationship between Rwanda and the respective donor government was designated towards reparation of genocide guilt through, for example, political communiques or speech acts.
2.3 Realist lens on aid allocation
For long time, relations between the North and the South, particularly aid-relations, were mainly ignored by realist strands. With the emergence of globalization, more attention is given to the development paradigm also within realist theory. The realist lens emphasizes security concerns, relative gains and power relations between actors of the North and South, and thus, between the donor and the receiver of aid. Southern, especially, emerging nations therefore pose a potential threat to the dominant role of Western nations. 9 Since development aid is highly politicized, economic growth and development do only play an epiphenomenal role to the aid agenda (Cohn 2008). Contrary, it is a well-established result within the aid literature that many donors pursue their own overwhelming interest of power and security. Thus, aid is highly determined by geostrategic goals of military power and geopolitical
9 Despite its remarkable achievements, Rwanda is still classified as developing country and not as an emerging nation (World Bank 2014a). 9
motives of gaining political influence. 10 Within North-South relations, colonial legacy 11 becomes particular important to donors that want to maintain or even increase their geopolitical and geostrategic salience in former colonies through aid allocation (Bearce and Tirone 2010; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). While realist interests appeared to dominate aid allocation during the Cold War era, a decrease of aid distortion towards geostrategic and geopolitical ends decreased thereafter. Especially with the formulation of the MDG, a shift towards aid as a means to reduce poverty and human insecurity took place (Cohn 2008; Neumayer 2003). However, since 9/11, security concerns have come to dominate foreign policy again, and thus, inevitably spill over into aid policy. Post-conflict reconstruction and the stabilization of failed states became a priority to the donor community. With Afghanistan being by far the biggest receiver of aid, evidence is provided that aid is primarily channeled to ‘failed states’ that pose a threat to international security, and not necessarily to the poorest countries that need it the most (Woods 2005). Based on these empirical findings, it can be theoretically assumed that mere humanitarian aid remains typically low while geostrategic informed aid is given in large quantities.
Hypothesis and Operationalization
As a result from the theoretical discussion, the theory test from a realist lens is guided by the main assumption that aid allocation is determined by geostrategic and geopolitical interests. To measure the realist informed interests, a set of indicators is suggested. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) advocate a radical version of realist political economy of aid assuming that aid serves primarily as a tool of political survival to the elite of the donor but also the receiver government. According to their argument, aid is a mean to buy political concessions by converting it into public and private goods for the winning coalition of the recipient government. Policy decisions, including aid and goods distribution, are made by leaders. Therefore, aid is most likely channeled directly to the government through general
10 In this paper emphasis is put on the variables of geostrategic interest (military power) and geopolitical interest (political influence). The literature on realist interests is rather fragmented and hardly provides a consistent measurement since various studies emphasize different variables (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Strictly speaking, relative economic power is also captured by realist theory. However, economic interest will be clearly assigned to the second lens of commercial interests. 11 Here, colonial legacy is not an independent variable in terms of determining aid allocation per se. It is rather seen as a variable that is omnipresent in all lenses and therefore does not constitute a distinct object of analysis. In realism, the power relations are emphasized, while commercial theory highlights the already established economic links. The idealist lens assigns importance to the morally constituted responsibility that grew out of a long-term relationship. 10
budget support (GBS). GBS is seen as a tool to increase the ownership of the receiver country since the government is able to allocate the donation according to its own preferences. Hence, aid can also be channeled easily towards the military sector that constitutes a crucial pillar of power to authoritarian regimes. At the same time, GBS increases the possibility to buy policy concessions from the receiver leadership and therefore to put forward the interests of the donor government (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Hayman 2006). A second indicator for geostrategic interests is constituted by military support beyond the dimensions of GBS. This might be logistical or financial but also rhetorical support of military goals of the receiver government that equally put forward the donor government’s geostrategic interest. Nevertheless, a contrasting dimension considers geostrategic and geopolitical donor interests that do not coincide with the winning coalition of the receiver government. Therefore aid is most likely channeled to coalitions that put forward the donor’s diverging interest; this might be political or military oppositional forces or civil society organizations.
2.4 Commercial lens on aid allocation
A second strand of selfish donor motives is constituted within the liberal assumption of commercial interests .12 Opposing the realist emphasis on geostrategic and geopolitical interests, it is assumed that economic interests primarily determine political actions. Aid serves to promote economic development for the receiver government that, in turn, enhances the economic prospective of the donor (Cohn 2008). While security motives do not always apply for all donors, it is assumed that aid allocation is permanently influenced by trade linkages. Therefore, aid is given to enhance the export of goods and services to recipient countries (Berthélemy 2006a; Neumayer 2003). Although the liberal approach can be justified on grounds of Western security and prosperity objectives as well, it differs from realism by emphasizing absolute gains and mutually benefitting relations (Cohn 2008). Development is seen as the efficient use of scarce resources and the imitation of a Western model of liberal democracy as the final form for human government and self-sustaining growth. Following the approach of modernization theory, the increase of a state’s per capita
12 Commercial theory is a sub-theory of liberalism that provides a juxtaposition of variables that range from morally informed state preferences within the scope of ideational liberalism to factors of representation within republican liberalism (Moravcsik 1997). Here, the level of analysis is limited to the three-fold distinction of power vis-à-vis commercial interests and morally informed altruistic motives. For a further discussion on the limitation of variables see below. 11
income through donor-based investment is advocated. Aid is aimed at capital accumulation, increased investment, social mobility, efficient division of labor and the diffusion of advanced technology and innovation (Sachs 2005). Developmental programs promote incentives for a growing private market economy through inclusive institutions that enhance private property rights and the rule of law (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Hartwick and Peet 2009). Aid is seen as a means to an end of economic integration through free trade and capital flows. Albeit liberal theory emphasizes development aid as a positive sum game, the commercial lens stresses how economic development in turn advances the selfish economic interests of the donor government.
Hypothesis and Operationalization
Accordingly, the commercial lens assesses the empirics from the main assumption that aid allocation is determined by economic interests . It is repeatedly suggested in the IPE literature that commercial interests are at play when the trade index between donor and recipient countries is high (Berthélemy 2006a; Canavire- Bacarreza et al. 2006 ). However, due to the lack of comprehensive data on all cases, the flow of exports and imports are checked to the extent they are available.13 The trade index approach, however, appears to lack a broad set of indicators for commercial interests. Especially since Rwanda does not constitute a significant trading partner to any of the here examined donor countries, it appears hardly representative for actual commercial links. In 2001, a UN report revealed the engagement of companies from almost all here examined donor countries in illegal resource exploitation in the DRC that is highly facilitated by Rwandan actors (UN 2001). Therefore, regional trading structures beyond official records will be taken into account to capture the whole scope of commercially informed interests of aid allocation. However, it needs to be noted that the involvement of companies from donor nations does not necessarily indicate a direct causal link for commercial interests of the donor government. Bearing in mind the risk of producing speculative arguments, it will be tested for further indicators. In accordance with an earlier approach of sector examination, a check for aid allocation towards the economic sector, covering the economic infrastructure and production sector will be included. Nevertheless, social infrastructure sector support can likewise advance
13 It is acknowledged that the trade index is a preferred method of making trade relations comparable. However, a comprehensive data set on all cases was not available. Moreover, some cases lack sufficient data on export and import figures. 12
commercial interest by improving the human, and thus, economic development of a favored commercial partner. It is therefore assumed that distinct human capital building within the social infrastructure is aimed at ‘hard’ economic development when sectors such as higher education, labor security, infrastructure and roads, agriculture and production sectors are addressed. This might be contradicted by social infrastructure support that rather focuses on ‘soft’ areas such as health, gender equality and youth education, which are classical sectors of human development (Nielsen 2010). A strong interest in economic partnership is further indicated by common economic institutions and a rhetorical emphasis on economic integration in diplomatic statements.
Hitherto the range of selfish and altruistic motives that determine aid allocation and their respective indicators were outlined. In the following, methodological pillars of the research design, its conceptual scope and its methodological limitations will be addressed.
3 Methodological Framework
3.1 Methods
In order to conduct an in-depth empirical investigation, the case study design appears to be the most suitable option. Being qualitative in nature, the paper consists of a contextual analysis of donor motivations from a comparative perspective. Variance is generated through a case selection with variance on the dependent variable and independent variable, and therefore cannot be assigned to a purely similar or dissimilar case design. It is not the aim of the paper to establish new theories; therefore, partly competing, theoretical concepts will be tested in a deductive manner. Moreover, it is not necessarily the primary aim to produce strong generalizable findings. Since the design will operate with a relatively small number of cases (small n), it might be difficult to control for third variables and to determine causality. It is acknowledged that generalizable findings are at the heart of the positivist case study design; however, the exceptional case of Rwanda captures a highly politicized struggle over Rwanda’s historical and contemporary reality (see literature review, Uvin 1998). Hence, the case study design offers unique possibilities to assess the exceptional case of Rwanda’s context that statistic studies on an aggregated level were not equipped for. Yet, the case of Rwanda holds implications for further research on donor engagement with hybrid post- conflict systems in Africa. Despite its exceptional genocide background, Rwanda is seen as a
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laboratory for a new post-conflict agenda of donors that was implemented in the late 1990s (Uvin 2001). Therefore, cases such as Liberia, South Sudan and Burundi come to mind for ‘lessons learnt’ that might derive from this case study. To identify the determinants for aid allocation a set of various methods will be applied. Content analysis of primary and secondary literature, press releases and secondary authority interviews will be conducted. Process tracing becomes particularly important to understand the relationship and therefore to provide evidence for the ‘genocide guilt’ variable. Examining the commercial motives, quantitative data will be gathered and interpreted in synergy with a contextual analysis.
3.2 Case Selection
The case selection concentrates on bilateral OECD donors within the European Union and therefore excludes multilateral institutions and non-European bilateral donors from the population of cases. 14 In the aid literature it is assumed that a variety of actors has different objectives and aid allocation therefore varies to a large extent between groups of bi- and multilateral actors. Alesina and Dollar (2000) assume that multilateral institutions are driven by altruistic objectives and therefore are less prone to political-strategic interests than bilateral donor countries. 15 Canavire-Bacarreza et al. also find that bilateral aid is stronger influenced by export and trade considerations than multilateral aid. However, bilateral aid objectives cannot be generalized. Berthélemy furthermore argues that an aggregation of donors is only legitimate under the presumption that all donors behave the same; however, his research finds otherwise (2006b). Consequently, a disaggregated bilateral case approach is more likely to generate an ‘unpolluted measurement’ of donor-centered interests of aid release. Logically, the six biggest European donors the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Sweden and France were selected for a preliminary empirical test round. Hayman distinguishes the donor structure along old and new donors. Germany, Belgium and France have been active donor countries already before the genocide, while the United Kingdom,
14 Non-European donors are excluded for two reasons; First, Berthélemy criticizes that the aid literature is highly focused on the US influence while European research still lacks comprehensive case studies (2006a). The US is the biggest donor to Rwanda. Interesting insights on geostrategic motivations for high aid allocation are given by Strizek (2011). An inclusion of non-Western donors such as Japan, Korea or New Zealand seems to be less important considering the low amount of aid allocation. 15 Contrary, Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland , inter alia, provide evidence that the IMF and World Bank are highly politicized and aid allocation is influenced by geostrategic interest of major shareholders (2009). See also Berthélemy (2006a). 14
Sweden and the Netherlands became involved into aid allocation with a drastic eruption in 1994 (Hayman 2006). To what extent this distinction contributes to solve the empirical puzzle, will be shown throughout the course of the empirical analysis. For the sake of an in-depth research, four cases remained after a preliminary test: The United Kingdom, Belgium, France and the Netherlands. France was selected to create variance on the dependent variable. In contrast with the majority of donors, ODA remained significantly low during the post-genocide period while, at the same time, a particularly bad diplomatic relationship with the Rwandan government remained. The same applied partly for Belgium, while ODA generally increased. Therefore, a crucial dissimilarity on the dependent variable was already generated by including Belgium and France. The United Kingdom was chosen because of its genuine importance as international donor and because its position as biggest European donor to Rwanda. In contrast, Sweden was excluded because the ODA curve is, except for the difference in amplitude, very similar to the UK case. It is also argued in the literature that Sweden acts as a ‘silent partner’16 through UK aid policy. Roughly examining the Swedish and British case, it became evident that the same sectors are indeed addressed with a similar outcome in ODA allocation. Acknowledging that minor differences would have been revealed in an in-depth research, the Swedish case was excluded on the basis of high similarity. The same logic applied for Germany and the Netherlands. Both donors have a roughly speaking similar aid allocation with negligible differences between 2009 and 2013. At the same time, Germany’s per capita aid is almost as low as the French allocation. In contrast to France, it is assumed that the low donation derives from a rather spotless historical relationship 17 , and therefore from a limited interested in its former colony (1891-1919). Finally, the Netherlands were chosen because of its limited prior engagement with the East African region. In contrast to the three other cases, geostrategic or geopolitical engagement is expected to be modest. The Netherlands have had a relatively small influence of colonial legacy in the region. The Netherlands therefore add remarkably to the research design by fore coming omitted variable bias.
16 The term ‘silent partnership’ refers to one donor giving another donor a mandate to act on its behalf in policy discussions in a given sector (Hayman 2006). 17 However, just recently the Green and Left opposition parties called on Germany’s parliament to examine the events in Rwanda since Germany’s role during the genocide remains unclear. Official records to German engagement remain confidential or are unavailable. Germany maintained exceptionally close relationships to the post-genocide regime and was one of the first governments to acknowledge the RPF as legitimate leadership (Strizek 2011). Development agencies are omnipresent and diplomatic ties are strong. Although a strong deviation is not expected from the exclusion of the German case, it is emphasized as remaining case study that would close a gap in Rwanda Research.
15
The case selection results in four cases and an equal distribution of old (France and Belgium) and new donors (the United Kingdom and the Netherlands). High variance is created on the dependent variable with three donors of increasing aid through different modalities (GBS or SBS) and one donor decreasing aid. Therefore, a counterfactual test case is included. The design does not constitute a purely perfect similar case design. However, a general commendation of Rwandan achievements and a tendency to intensify aid relations is at play. Acknowledging the imperfect conditions of reality and, nevertheless, include them into the positivist approach, forestalls an often criticized abstract theorization of our real environment.
3.3 Limitations on the Research Design
Observation Period
The research at hand captures the post-genocide period of Rwanda from 1994 until 2013. Data collection afterwards was mostly constrained, but significant events will be taken into account in the outlook. Although human rights abuses and restrictions of civil liberties are on the daily agenda, a meticulous examination of each case in every year of aid allocation appears to be highly unfeasible. Due to the scope of the paper, the analysis will limit itself to critical events of human rights abuses for each country case throughout the observation period. Significant markers for human rights abuses are the UN reports that were published in 2001, 2008, 2010 and 2014 18 .
Agents and Structures
The analysis will be limited to bilateral aid allocation and therefore perceives the state as an actor. However, various theoretical strands of the here discussed lenses would include a variety of further variables that could obtain explanatory power but exceed the here suggested level of analysis. For example, ideational and republican strands of liberalism as well as constructivist notions of idealism perceive the state as a multi-layered actor. Opening up the black box, ODA is not only determined by the government level but the several layers of identities that form the state. Thus, individual actors, civil society, political fractions or distinct interest groups (such as a Rwandan diaspora) are emphasized as agents that shape preferences of the state apparatus (Moravcsik 1997; Noel and Therian 1995). Yet, this desirable all-encompassing approach appears to exceed the possibility to examine all micro-
18 A draft of the 2014 report was leaked in 2012. 16
level causal determinants to a satisfying degree. To identify their causal power that precedes the preference construction on the state level exceeds the limits of this paper. Acknowledging their undeniable influence, they will be included on a contextual basis (see figure 1). 19
Exclusion and Causal Power of Variables
Classical aid-research variables such as geography and population size (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) are excluded since the comparative case study obtains variance on the donor side. Further, no distinct causal power is assigned to the relationship between donor and receiver country and the respective framing of the GoR by the donor government. Framing serves rather as an indicator for genocide guilt that is incorporated in value creation within the normative approach of idealism. However, the causal nature of frames and relations remains debatable. Evoking the hen-egg problem it appears problematic to identify frames, including the donor relationship to Rwanda, as a cause or a consequence to or from aid allocation. Therefore the relationship and framing of Rwanda will be examined empirically merely for a contextual understanding. The test of causal determinants is limited to the above outlined variables. Finally, the question of most dominant motives as part of a broad debate in aid literature needs to be addressed. Empirical findings constitute that both altruistic and selfish tendencies matter in allocation of aid (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Berthélemy 2006a and 2006b). It is therefore acknowledged that explanatories are not necessarily mutually exclusive and geopolitical, geostrategic, commercial but also altruistic motives can exist analogously. Yet, a methodological problem remains when it comes to rank the strongest causal power of competing explanatories. So far, there is virtually no solid evidence on the relative importance of various variables (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Proponents of realist and liberal approaches argue for the trumping power of selfish variables, while idealists claim that altruistic motives are beyond a mere epiphenomenal influence (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Nielsen 2010). In accordance with the aid literature, selfish motives are expected to be present in assumedly every country case. A counterfactual test for altruistic motives in the absence of selfish stimuli will most likely not be feasible. Nevertheless, it is suggested that the dominance of variables will be discussed individually for each case on the basis of
19 In a more comprehensive approach it could be discussed if agents shape state preferences in the first place or it they rather adhere to an already prevalent superstructure of state preferences. It is not expected that approaching state preferences and their agents in a rather mixed approach will pollute the findings since the focus of this research is not how preferences come into being. 17
dominant indicators throughout the empirical assessment. Accordingly, conclusions about the initial objectives of aid allocation, coherent with the theoretical assumptions, will be derived.
18
Figure 1: Level of Analysis and Causal Relationships between Variables 20
20 The main level of analysis within the here presented paper are the state interests (state preferences). A micro-level analysis including the level of state actors cannot be conducted in an all-encompassing manner. It is also not the aim of this paper to identify the causal or consequential nature of the relationship/framing variable. However, they will be included to a certain degree on a contextual basis 19
4 The Case of post-genocide Rwanda
4.1 The Rwandan success story
“Rwanda has rebelled against its destiny. It has recovered from civil war and genocide more fully than anyone imagines possible and is united, stable, and at peace. Its leaders are boundlessly ambitious. Rwandans are bubbling over with a sense of unlimited possibility”
(Kinzer 2008: 2)
With the end of the civil war in 1994, the post-genocide regime of Rwanda made tremendous effort to reconstruct its society. The consequences of one of the most brutal genocides the world has ever seen can hardly be overestimated. Shortly after the plane of President Habyarimana and his Hutu-Elite was shot down, a 100 day long well-planned massacre erupted in which between 500.000 up to 1 million Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed. 21 Not only economic and political devastation was the result. Still today, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons suffer from inhumane conditions (Straus and Waldorf 2011). In the official narrative, it were radical Hutu triggering the mass slaughter, while Tutsi Paul Kagame 22 and his RPA victory brought an end to civil war and pervasive killings (UNHRC 2015). A contradicting chronicle of events, inter alia, claimed by French authorities, considers the genocide being triggered and effectively organized by Kagame’s Tutsi elite himself (Strizek 2011; Collins 2014). 23 In autumn 1994, a transitional government was installed that was considered by the international community as a model of democratic post-conflict consolidation (Uvin 2001). Quickly a strong centralized state evolved on the foundations of an all-encompassing military apparatus with Paul Kagame being the Minister of Defense and Vice President of Rwanda. During the constitution phase between 1999 and 2003, Rwanda was provided with significant
21 The number of victims differs according to the competing narratives of the genocide. Officially a victim ratio of 500.000 up to 1 million Tutsi is stated (Des Forges 1999). According to a competing narrative, Tutsi and Kagame’s RPA were, in fact, the real perpetrators during the genocide. Therefore a victim ratio of 280.000 Tutsi vis-à-vis 750.000 Hutu is considered to be at the heart of the truth (Strizek 2011). 22 Paul Kagame and his Tutsi family fled during the social revolution in the early 1960s from Rwanda to Uganda. His attempt of liberation throughout the early 1990s is interpreted differently throughout the region and the globe (see literature review). There he became a senior Ugandan army officer conducting military training in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, US and The United Kingdom (Cameron 2012). 23 The whole spectrum of causal mechanisms, motives and actors of both narratives cannot be outlined in this paper. For a comprehensive analysis see Collins (2014) or Strizek (2011). 20
logistical and financial support from donors. In 2003, Paul Kagame became the elected President with more than 95 per cent of votes. He was reconfirmed as President for another seven years with more than 93 per cent in 2010. EU observer missions reappraised the democratic progress made in post-genocide Rwanda (Hayman 2011). Political institutions were built from scratch with noteworthy pace. Concerning the quota of women in parliament, Rwanda is known for having the highest gender equality worldwide. Most of the MDGs are expected to be met by the end of 2015; child mortality dropped by two thirds and nearly universal primary school enrolment is attained (World Bank 2014a). Economically, Rwanda provides a remarkable development success including high growth rates, rapid poverty reduction and reduced inequality. Rwanda seeks to become a middle- income country in 2020 by transforming its low-income agriculture-based economy to a knowledge-based, service-oriented economy. As a hub for information technology, Rwanda envisions to become a so-called ‘Singapore for Africa’ (Straus and Waldorf 2011). Rwanda repeatedly was a top performer in the World Bank’s Doing Business report, and thus, became an attractive country for investments (IFC 2015).
4.2 Reconstructing suppression and war
“A prince must not have any other object nor any other thought but war, its institutions, and its discipline; because that is the only art befitting one who commands.” (Machiavelli 1532: XVIII)
Despite Rwanda’s remarkable economic success of post-conflict reconstruction, most accounts fail to call attention to the social and political costs of its recovery. Under the disguise to guard against the recrudescence of ethnic violence, several genocide-ideology laws were passed that restrict free speech and paralyzed political opposition, civil society and media institutions. Two powerful intelligence service agencies, the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and External Security Organization ( ESO), build up an omnipresent security apparatus, and accordingly, a general attempt to control people and political space (Human Rights Watch 2014; Reyntjens 2010a). Politically, mechanisms from heavy-handed repression to subtle cooption are exercised to oppress opposition. Hutu and moderate Tutsi politicians are consistently sidelined as a threat to RPF hegemony, cabinet constellations are regularly shaken-up and corruption is on the daily agenda (Straus and Waldorf 2011). Considering the 95 per cent victory of the RPF, Rwanda is effectively a one-party state. Countless examples of political suppression illustrate
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that there is no space for dissenting views: Joseph Sebarenzi, the former parliament speaker was removed from office after democracy strengthening efforts, and Victoire Ingabire, the opposition leader was imprisoned on utter political motivations (Human Rights Watch 2010). Only few other countries have such a high record of ministers, parliament members, army- officers, civil servants and judges that were victims of extra judicial killings or were in jailed in the absence of any regime change during post-genocide decades. In fact, Paul Kagame is the only sitting President worldwide with more than 30 high ranking military officials in his government that are accused in UN reports of several war crimes (Straus and Waldorf 2011). The 2003 elections confirmed the limited political pluralism. Observers raised “Stalinist procedures” (Reyntjens 2010a: 11) of fraud, intimidation, ballot-box stuffing and major lacks of transparency. Economically, the development achievements appear to be a mirage. Despite its MDG achievements, large inequalities exist between social classes, geographic regions, and not to mention, Hutu and Tutsi (Straus and Waldorf 2011). Comparatively, the GDP per capita in Rwanda is one of the lowest in Africa. Before the RPF took over power, Rwanda ranked on the top position (World Bank 2015a). The majority of Rwandan economy is further made of non-tradable goods which capture services and goods that are used for domestic consumption and are not comparable to imports and exports. Foreign aid still accounts for more than 30 per cent of Gross National Income and is by comparison with neighboring countries among the highest in Sub-Sahara Africa which average lies by 3.4 per cent (World Bank 2014b). In 2001, a UN report exposed findings on illegal exploitation of mineral resources and the extraction of considerable revenues in the DRC that was conducted by Rwandan actors (UN 2001). Accordingly, the small, land-locked and resource scarce country opted for hazardous avenues to foster its economic development that was just appraised by the international community. Aid subsidies and illegal resource extraction appeared to have contributed strongly to non-sustainable growth objectives. Regarding free media, independent coverage risks violence, fines or even imprisonment. The BBC Kinyarwanda service was banned from Rwanda after broadcasting a Kagame-regime critical documentary. Reporters without borders denounce the government for constantly harassing journalists domestically and abroad (Reporters without borders 2014; BBC 2014). External critique by International NGOs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch or the UN is refused on behalf of the Rwandan government. Rather, the GoR accuses
22
criticism as an action of ‘harboring génocidaires’24 . Their reports are considered to produce dangerous lies and inaccuracies that endanger the national unity and security of Rwanda’s post-conflict society. The most serious onslaught on civil society took place in 2004 when a number of civil society organizations were dissolved with the claim that they would spread genocidal ideology (Amnesty International 2003; Reyntjens 2010a). At the same time, Kagame justifies his authoritarian rule on grounds of a little empowered and submissive Rwandan citizenry that already enabled the dynamics of the 1994 genocide (RPF 2008). A Machiavellian enlightened leadership therefore forestalls divisionism and fosters Rwandan unity. The RPFs boldness exceeded its own borders when two wars against the Congo were initiated in 1996/1997 and 1998. The second war lasted until 2003 and became known as Africa’s World War (Prunier 2009). Rwanda’s belligerent incursions did not only force a regime change 25 , but caused extensive suffering and death. Backed by an overriding security concern of the post-genocide elite against external and internal threats of Hutu refugees, massive human rights abuses were undertaken against refugee camps inside and outside the Rwandan borders. The Gisenyi or Kibeho instances are only two among several massacres carried out by RPA soldiers against thousands of Hutu civilians (UHRC 1994 26 , Prunier 2009). The humanitarian impact for Congolese and Rwandan people was devastating. Millions of civilians were displaced and hundreds of thousands killed and raped by the RPA and armed groups. A series of reports and investigations found Rwanda motivated as much by profit as by an overwhelming self-defense rationale. Kagame reasoned the involvement on the continued threat to Rwanda posed by Congolese Hutu that included remnants of perpetrators of the 1994 genocide (Prunier 2009; Strizek 2011). However, with elections taking place in Rwanda at the same time, the international community set up a priority for stability versus accountability. Seeing Rwanda’s need for security through the prism of genocide, rarely any action was undertaken on part of the international community (Hayman 2011; Uvin 2001). Yet, UN reports continuously detected new revelations. In 2008, the Rwandan support
24 The term génocidaires was labeled by the post-genocide regime to generally condemn Hutu and former government members and proponents. The French term bares linguistic importance since France is seen as an ally of the former regime and a supporter for the Hutu fraction during the genocide. The French language was banned as official language from schools and public institutions throughout the post-genocide years. 25 In 1996, a regime change in the Congo was initiated by the AFDL, a rebel movement that was largely under the command of the RPA. The AFDL was led by Laurent Kabila who later became the president of the DRC (Stearns and Borello 2011). 26 The GoR pressured the UN into suppressing the Gersony Report that proved the RPA’s killings of Rwandan civilians. Likewise, it blocked the ICTR from indicting any RPA soldiers for war crimes (Stearns and Borello 2011). 23
for Laurent Nkunda, a leading warlord in the Kivu provinces was made public. Finally in 2010, it was confirmed that Rwandan forces deliberately committed genocide on Hutu refugees throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s (Stearns and Borello 2011; UN 2008 and 2010). 27 Despite the formal end of the Second Congo War and Rwanda’s commitment to Peace in 2002, violence and human rights abuses persisted in the fragile DRC. Ten years later, a new UN report investigated the perpetrating role of Rwandan forces in backing M23 rebels to further destabilize the Congo. The Rwandan military took a proactive role in recruiting child soldiers, provided logistical and military support and training. In exchange, the illegal resource extraction of rare materials such as gold and ivory was perpetuated (UN 2014). Consequently, the UN reports from 1994 (known as Gersony Report), 2001, 2008, 2010 and 2014 (with a draft leaked in 2012) confirmed that the RPF regime with certainty exceeded its legitimate, short-term security prerequisites.
4.3 Funding Fraud
Nevertheless, neglecting the fundamental human rights fraud, the international political reappraisal of Rwanda’s economic and human development continued and trickled down into growing aid allocation. In the first post-genocide decade, ODA represented approximately 50 per cent of Rwanda’s budget. Although the GoR emphasizes its willingness to increase its independency from aid, ODA still constitutes between 30 to 40 per cent of the total state’s expenditure (World Bank 2014a). Since the 2000s, SBS has picked up in the education and health sector. However, the Rwandan Government repeatedly indicated that its preferred aid modality is GBS. Today, the three most important donors to Rwanda are the World Bank, the European Commission and, interchangeably, The United Kingdom and the US which covered 85 per cent of total ODA in 2005 (GoR 2006). Throughout the 20 years of post-genocide recovery, aid to Rwanda experienced an overall tendency of upsurge. Crisis relief peaked in the immediate genocide aftermath, with a high proportion of emergency and food aid until 1996. Although the late 1990s experienced a negligible slowdown of aid allocation, total ODA to Rwanda increased again significantly from 2004 onwards. Due to the 2003 presidential elections and increased regional stability a growth of +45.3 per cent in 2004 and again +20.6 per cent in 2005 took place. With the 2010
27 The GoR pressured the UN to quash the report. At a meeting with Ban Ki-Moon, Kagame threatened to withdraw three thousand soldiers from the UN and AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur if the official version of the report will be leaked (French and Gettleman 2010). 24
and 2012 UN revelations, comparatively minor aid freezes took place. However, in 2013 contributions were restored and most donors, with the exception of France, reached an overall aid allocation that exceeded the levels of immediate post-genocide relief (see figure 3 and 4). The outlined paradox of increasing aid contributions despite the overwhelming evidence for human rights abuses is at the heart of the here presented research. It is argued frequently that donors are driven into a practice of “voluntary blindness” (Uvin 2001: 177) by jumping on the bandwagon of Rwanda’s genocide credit. Therefore, injustice is tolerated as rather natural action of revenge or mechanisms of long-term post-genocide digestion (Amnesty International 1997). However, even human rights abuses that are barely linked to Rwanda’s past are thrown into a pot of genocide redemption and signals of impunity are sent repeatedly. Likewise, ‘the time is not ripe’ arguments remain to justify precarious democratic conditions throughout the presidential and parliamentary elections. Democracy is rather seen as conflict-fuelling, while a strong leadership is considered as best maneuver available to a post-conflict society (Uvin 2001; Reyntjens 2010a). This attitude is shared among the majority of donors. A North-American aid agency manager emphasizes that “if you are going to understand (…) Rwanda today, you have to understand (…) the enduring consequences of genocide. It permeates, affects and influences human behavior so totally that it is remarkable that the (…) government have been able to exercise the degree of restraint the have been exhibiting” (Uvin 2001: 179). Also, by putting a rhetoric emphasis on good governance and the rule of law, the regime is skillfully playing into preferred goal setting and expectations of the donor community (Reyntjens 2010a). 28 Moreover, a simple reasoning is at play when it comes to understand the Rwandan paradox: with the genocide being brand marked as international failure, donors are eager to turn Rwanda into a success story of post-conflict recovery. Therefore, the unpleasant task of condemning domestic repression, exclusion and inequality is largely avoided for the sake of window-dressing (Straus and Waldorf 2011). Accordingly, a permissive international community has been central to the RPF’s ability of shaping their precarious political and social landscape. Yet, the regime itself wields its genocide credit proactively by exploiting feelings of guilt among its donor countries. Using an ideological weapon, the regime perpetuates its victim status. A diplomat states that “any action undertaken against the regime in Kigali is always
28 Reyntjens for example argues that enhancing its gender equality in parliament, Rwanda is making concessions on less important issues, while good governance indicators that threat the RPFs hegemony, such as allowing a broad opposition, are highly neglected. Donors therefore rather praise those remarkable achievements but stay pliant on hard concessions (Reyntjens 2010a). 25
perceived as offering moral support to those guilty of genocide; it is true that the Rwandan regime is benefiting from this ambivalence, and we know it” (Le Monde, 26 October 1996, quoted by Reyntjens 2010a: 27). Hence, the assessment of the Rwandan regime appears to differ among donors. Some donors acknowledge the weak system of checks and balances, repression of critical voices and major human rights abuses. A Scandinavian foreign aid manager claims that “a strong sense of confidence and pride seemed to have led the Government of Rwanda to adopt what appears to be a very arrogant attitude with the donor society; it seems [Rwanda] is using the genocide as political capital in order to avoid a dialogue, let alone criticism, of its policies” (Uvin 2001: 179). Nevertheless, aid has been withdrawn only in very few instances by the minority of donors and on a short-time basis. Exceptions to the general positive assessment have been made when Rwanda overreached into the DRC or support to Congolese warlords was revealed. A strong shift towards condemnation took place only in 2014 when a UN report confirmed the continued support to rebel groups in the DRC (UN 2010; UN 2012; UN 2014). Still, a general satisfaction with Rwanda moving in the right direction seems to dominate the donor’s assessment. The Machiavellian rule of the GoR is played down as ‘good enough’ democracy and human rights abuses are undermined by being caught up with Rwanda’s development success story. Overall aid allocation throughout the two post-genocide decades was generally increasing (Hayman 2011; OECD 2015a).
5 Egoism versus Altruism in Aid Allocation
Explaining the outlined paradox of aid allocation despite human rights abuses is the main aim of this paper. The hitherto provided explanations suggest a predominant narrative of aid allocation that can be understood primarily through the genocide lens. In the following investigation, a broader spectrum of motivation for aid will be examined that reaches from altruistic purposes of humanitarian concern to selfish motives of commercial as well as geostrategic and geopolitical interest. At the same time, the paper sheds light on Berthélemy’s (2006b) question, if all donors behave the same. By conducting a disaggregated four country case study and disentangling the rather assembled beliefs about aid allocation in Rwanda, the uniform donor performance will be challenged. Berthélemy (2006b) also found that the UK and Belgium have a mixed behavior of aid allocation, while France and the Netherlands are respectively selfish and
26
altruistic. This research aims to test the donor behavior for the distinct case of Rwanda. Accordingly, this research contributes to unravel general assumptions about donor’s behavior by dismantling both, motivations and actors into its single components. In the following, the motives for aid allocation will be tested for the four suggested cases; the United Kingdom, Belgium, France and the Netherlands from the corresponding lenses of idealist, realist and commercial theory.
5.1 The United Kingdom
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” (Adam Smith 1776: II)
The UK is one of the world’s largest development assistance providers whose performance increased remarkably in 1997 with the creation of the Department of International Development (DFID). Since then, the UK concentrates on low-income countries and joins the EU objectives of eradicating poverty worldwide. At the same time, a rapid expansion of security commitments took place by stepping in behind the US aid allocation to allied countries in the so-called ‘war on terror’ (Woods 2005). Interchangeably with the US, the UK is the biggest bilateral donor engaging in post-genocide Rwanda. The 1994 emergency response led to a rapid expansion of relations and allocation of military and humanitarian assistance. The UK presence in Rwanda grew remarkably since 1997 and a fully-developed country representation by 2003 (Hayman 2006). Sharp upsurges of aid took place in 1999 and 2011 with a tremendous drop in 2012 when all European donors froze aid due to the UN revelations of M23 support (UN 2012). However, aid allocation reached an unprecedented peak in 2013. The UK is known to be the least critical donor regarding Rwanda’s frequent violations of human rights. The existing literature suggests a strong explanation in terms of a genocide credit (Hayman 2006; Reyntjens 2011; Zorbas 2011). However , the UK aid direction is extremely high compared to Rwanda’s population size, its poverty burden and compared with regional aid allocation (Zorbas 2011; DFID 2003). It is suggested that motives beyond a mere idealist imperative are at play.
27
Idealist lens
Being highly engaged in its former colony Uganda, the UK had no presence in Rwanda and extremely limited relations to the region prior the genocide . The clean slate of the UK is considered as foundation for a remarkable close relationship to Rwanda. While the international community, especially the Belgians and the French, are recriminated for their universal failure during the 1994 genocide, an enthusiastic picture is paint by the GoR on its new and wealthy donor. The strong support to the RPF is based on highly interlinked personal relationships: Clare Short, Secretary of State for International development, and Lynda Chalker, Minister of Oversee Development, handled the Rwandan case with enthusiastic engagement and a remarkable faith in the new regime’s commitment to poverty reduction and democratization (Hayman 2006; Cameron 2013). Even when „the country’s traditional donors (…) were unwilling to re-engage, the UK, (…) committed itself to becoming Rwanda’s major bilateral development partner“ (DFID 2003:15). Generally, a broadly sympathetic view prevails among the UK parliament. An UK official states that “this is not the case with the Dutch or Belgians. Also, the UK doesn’t have a large Rwandan Diaspora community 29 which itself exerts pressures on Parliaments and is often quite critical of the government of Kigali” (Zorbas 2011: 111).. In accordance with the genocide credit lens, the UK appears to join in the skillfully mastered narrative of the Rwandan public relation apparatus. In retrospective, government officials admit that there was little socio-political knowledge on Rwanda 30 , and hence, great naivety when it came to the indiscriminate commitment to the post-genocide regime. Especially among contemporary politicians such as Tony Blair, Rwanda’s destiny is repeatedly associated with a prodigious genocide legacy:
“I'm a believer in and a supporter of Paul Kagame. I don't ignore all those criticisms, having said that. But I do think you've got to recognize that Rwanda is an immensely special case because of the genocide. Secondly, you can’t argue with the fact that Rwanda has gone on a
29 The Rwandan diaspora faces severe threats domestically and abroad when they engage in oppositional activity. In 2011, two Rwandan dissidents living in London were informed by the British police that the Rwandan government is plotting to kill them. The threats were serious since numerous well-known dissidents have been killed in Kenya and South Africa. No actions on part of the UK authorities were undertaken against that threat (Gettleman and Kron 2011). 30 It is also pointed out that language gaps play a major role in the 1990s. Rwanda was dominantly Francophone with Kinyarwanda being its first national language. English became only dominant in 2008, enhanced by the engagement of the UK (Hayman 2006). 28
remarkable path of development. Every time I visit Kigali and the surrounding areas 31 you can just see the changes being made in the country” (the Guardian, McGreal 2010: para.6).
However, taking into account the acknowledged UN Reports, one can exclude the assumption that British aid was proliferated without knowledge on major human rights fraud (Cameron 2013; Reyntjens 2011). The UK has been particular hesitant with freezing their contributions. Equally, aid has been restored quickly when common withdrawals among OECD donors took place in 2010 and 2012. The UK’s indiscriminating behavior has been subject to critique by several human rights organizations (Tran 2012). Even when the renowned international British Broadcast Corporation (BBC) was banned from Rwanda due to a Kagame-critical documentary, there was no action taken on behalf of British authorities. The discriminating behavior against press freedom was accepted silently (BBC 2014). Unquestioning moral shortcomings, an unwavering support of the post-genocide regime appears to be at hand. Still, examining the idealist lens beyond the genocide credit, a focus on values of human security is suggested. In accordance with the OECD and MDG agenda, the DFID agenda is dedicated to poverty reduction, peace building in Rwanda and the region, good governance as well as socio-economic development and human rights (DFID 1999 and 2000). Accordingly, aid with a special focus on institution building and the socio-economic sector has increased remarkably throughout the last two decades. Social infrastructure, including education, good governance, the rule of law and human rights, constitutes by far the bulk of sector support with 123 million US$. 32 It is followed by aid to the production sector (24 million US$) and multi-sector support 33 (8 million US$). Only a comparatively small amount is allocated in economic infrastructure (5 million US$). Humanitarian aid that is released in the presence of human crisis is deemed the least important with only 3 million US$ (Compare Your Country 2013; OECD 2013a). Sector allocation with emphasis on human development and the rhetorical emphasis on post-genocide achievements indicate a strong idealist imperative towards altruistic motives. However, the genuine overarching motive of idealist aid allocation is doubted. Despite the
31 Critics point out that major development and modernization efforts are exclusively accomplished in the urban areas of Rwanda where the majority of Tutsi lives. Therefore, spatial inequality and discrimination is put forward against the foremost Hutu-populated rural areas (Straus and Waldorf 2011). 32 The social infrastructure sector entails scholarships for education, democratic participation, civil society, health education, human rights, women’s equality, peace-building, legal and judicial development, early childhood education, teacher training, educational research, social welfare, capacity building, basic life skills for youth and adults. For a detailed list see OECD 2013a. 33 Multi sector support entails cross-sector projects such as rural development, bio-diversity, environmental policy, research and women’s rights (ibid). 29
evident humanitarian focus in sector allocation, there was no condemnation of human rights abuses. Finally, only an additional test for geostrategic and commercial interest can reveal the actual causal power of altruistic motives. Hitherto, the idealist explanation remains challenged.
Realist lens
Aid to Rwanda is predominantly allocated in the social infrastructure sector which, at first sight, suggests an altruistic interest in human development vis-à-vis a selfish economic concern. However, most aid to Rwanda is provided as general budget support. GBS remarkably increases the ownership of the receiver country, and thus, illustrates considerable trust that is put into the Rwandan regime by the UK government. GBS is largely avoided by other donors, only Sweden as a silent partner (see above) allocates aid through GBS as well (Hayman 2006). Rwanda has been called “an army with a state rather than a state with an army” or even was nicknamed as “soldiers without borders” (Reytnjens 2011:147). Thus, the UKs sole approach of focusing on GBS was highly criticized among the OECD roundtable for opening possibilities to distract development aid to military ends (Hayman 2006; Straus and Waldorf 2011). During the last decade, Rwanda has emerged as one of the largest and most effective contributors to UN peacekeeping missions. With more than 4.000 troops in seven missions, the small state constitutes the biggest troop provider per capita to UN peacekeeping missions (Rwanda UN 2015). Keeping in mind that the UN faces problems of recruiting qualified staff, the permanent members of the UNSC have a naturally strong interest in preserving Rwanda’s commitment. The UK is not only among the top financial contributors of UN missions but also takes over numerous leadership roles (UN 2015). It is not implied that the allocation of aid is directly linked to Rwanda’s UN troop deployment. However, there is no denial that UK GBS remarkably enhances the possibility of Rwanda’s military apparatus to provide and therefore boost the success of UN peacekeeping troops. Above all, the prevailing canon that “for the UK, Rwanda is of no real strategic importance” (Hayman 2006: 161) is challenged, since it undermined the UKs bystander criminality before and during the genocide, which also had significant implications for UK geostrategic and commercial interests in the aftermath of the genocide. Mainstream explanations fail to take into account that the RPA was supported militarily and ideologically by the UK prior to its 1990 invasion into Rwanda from Uganda, throughout the ensuing civil war and during the
30
genocide in 1994 (Cameron 2013). To understand the UK’s involvement, the context of Uganda’s and Rwanda’s contemporary links needs to be elucidated. When Rwanda reached independence from Belgium in 1959, a violent Hutu revolt drove almost half a million of Tutsi to exile in Uganda. The Tutsi diaspora did not only develop a revisionist plan of return themselves, they also bolstered the removal of Milton Obote under Museveni’s 34 popular National Resistance Army (NRA) in 1985. Then, the Rwandan refugees formatted the RPA, an explicitly militant organization whose political wing is today known as the RPF that rules Rwanda under the presidency of Paul Kagame (Waugh 2004). Although the UK initially had no direct political or economic concern in Uganda’s neighbor, it was highly interested in extending its leverage from Anglophone Uganda to the Francophone sphere of influence in Central Africa. After Museveni’s power takeover was boosted by Kagame and his military force, Kagame received military training in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and strategic military training in The United Kingdom. The RPA was also provided with military training in the British base in Jinja, Uganda (Cameron 2012; Destexhe 1995). In 1990, the RPA invaded Rwanda and triggered a long-term civil war. A number of African analysts claim that the invasion took place with the knowledge, approval and active assistance of the Pentagon’s CIA and Britain’s MI-635 (Madsen 1999). Throughout the early 1990s, The United Kingdom maintained a close relationship to the RPA and continued military training to its guerilla forces. Hence, the UK was fully aware of the RPA claims to be able and willing to take over Kigali. When the 1994 genocide erupted, it were the US, China and the UK who resisted to use the word ‘genocide’ since it would have bound the members of the UNSC to legally act in terms of the genocide convention (Cameron 2012). It is commonly known that these objections were eventually accepted and led to one of the most famous bystander crimes in the history of contemporary international politics. Accordingly, the UK failed to provide logistical and military support to the UN blue helmets in Rwanda. In the search for explanations, it is referred to the occupation with the Bosnia crisis and the incapacity to act or even a lack of obligation (ibid). Finally, the RPA was permitted to take full control of Rwanda and therefore advanced British interrelated goals of exceeding its power status and ensuring its economic interest in
34 Since 1986, Yowereni Museveni has been the president of Uganda. He was the leader of the Ugandan NRA and therefore the immediate superior to Paul Kagame. Then, Kagame was the military intelligence officer of the NRA. It is a poorly protected secret that the now two presidents rule in enmity (Kamuzinzi 2011). 35 Both agencies were heavily engaged in Uganda during that time. It is claimed by Strizek (2011) that the RPA invasion was deliberately prepared and supported by the CIA and with knowledge of President Clinton. Broad- scale geostrategic and geopolitical US interests were closely interlinked with the replacement of Congo’s president Mobutu through Rwandan forces. 31
key areas of Africa. The British support of the RPF on military issues continued throughout the following decades. While the majority of donors highly condemned the repeated incursions by the RPF- regime into the DRC, there was no overt disapproval on part of the UK. A former British diplomat claimed that “you never have hard, documentary proof for these allegations” and he continued with stating that “on the other hand, we had invested so much in rebuilding Rwanda- did we want to give that all up on the basis of rumors ?”(Stearns and Borello 2011: 161). Accordingly, the belligerent actions of the Rwandan Tutsi elite were seen as legitimated by its security objective to eliminate the threat of Hutu returnees in the Eastern areas of the DRC. 36 In fact, support to Rwanda was considered as essential safeguard to stability in the region (Zorbas 2011). Thus, training, strategic and tactical advice has been provided to Rwandan troops in respect to the RPA invasions. During a meeting to discuss regional security issues with Paul Kagame in 2009, British army chief General Sir Richard Dannat states that the UK “fully supports what you are doing in securing peace and stability for this region, especially considering the negative influences in the Eastern part of the [DRC] which pose a security threat to Rwanda” (Edmund 2009: para. 3). At that time, four UN reports finally reaffirmed the hard, documentary proof that UK authorities assumedly lacked beforehand. However, a pious dialogue between the United Kingdom and Rwanda over its military actions in Eastern DRC continued. Consequences for aid allocation followed only when Rwanda’s aggressive approach towards the DRC exceeded the donor’s interest in regional stability. In accordance with a realist assumption, aid was withdrawn when the financial and diplomatic capital invested in security and peace in the region was in jeopardy. In 2004, a Rwandan military intervention into the DRC led to the cut of one quarter of GBS on part of the UK. 37 However, shortly after, frozen aid was reinstated on part of the UK mostly because of a skillfully established image of the RPF as peacekeeper in the region (Zorbas 2011). After being accused of fuelling the war in the DRC, Rwanda increased its bilateral relations with the DRC, established joint military operations and adjusted its language with donor-pleasing terminology especially towards the UK’s conservative party. In 2006, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the
36 More than two million Hutu fled to Rwanda’s neighboring countries. The majority, 1.5 million settled in refugee camps in the Eastern border regions of the Congo. They were propagated by the RPF regime as génocidaires who threatened the unity and stability of post-genocide Rwanda. To prevent their return was seen as legit rationale of the post-.genocide regime to initiate belligerent actions in the DRC: 37 Considering that UK GBS accounted for 10 per cent of Rwanda’s general budget in 2004, this step had severe short-term consequences for the GoR (Zorbas 2011). However, as illustrated in figure 2 and 3, the cut was comparatively small with regard to overall UK aid allocation. 32
two partners that guaranteed aid disbursements of at least 46 million pounds over ten years. For the first time, the UK signed an agreement with such an exceptionally strong commitment. In 2012, when for the first time a joint withdrawal of aid took place due to the revelation of Rwandan support to M23 rebels, the accusation were played down again by the UK government. Despite internal critique by the UK parliament, aid was reinstated in 2013 and reached an unprecedented peak (House of Commons 2012). Taking into account the close relationship between Rwanda and its biggest donor, especially the personal friendship between Paul Kagame and Tony Blair 38 , it appears that the Anglophone objectives of regional dominance succeeded. With an innovative education program funded by the DFID, French was replaced by English as language of instruction in 2008 (McGreal 2008). Hitherto there is no denial of the UKs strong geostrategic and geopolitical interests throughout the early 1990s. Taking into account the massive amounts of UK aid that were channeled through GBS and the overwhelming military support, the realist assumption can be confirmed empathically. Still, an analysis from the liberal lens will inform about the implications of the UKs commercial interest in the following decades.
Liberal lens
In accordance with the DFID’s overall development objective, support is provided to achieve the MDGs. The UK especially highlights the focus on regional trade, the support for economic growth and wealth creation in several publications (DFID 1999, 2000, 2015). Focal points are the transition for an agricultural economy to private sector led growth, increasing capacity building and the accountability of the state to citizens. Since 2010, there has been a shift from British GBS to sector specific support towards the private sector and civil society (Compare your country 2013; DFID 2012). Assumedly, aid allocation shifted from a realist motivation in the 1990s and 2000s to a liberal impetus since 2010. Still, trade with Rwanda is comparatively low and shows no remarkable development throughout the post-genocide period. In total amounts, British exports to Rwanda are even lower than those of other donors (see figure 5). Imports from Rwanda are traditionally
38 Tony Blair’s Africa Governance Initiative (AGI) illustrates Rwanda as Africa’s success story. After the UN withdrew aid in 2013, Blair co-authored an article in the Foreign Policy magazine supporting the denial of the allegations. The London ambassador for the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bernabé Kikaya Bin Karubi, wrote to Blair in response to the article: “Can I presume that your remarks were made in your capacity as founder of the charity and after consultation with your team embedded in the Rwandan government? Naturally that would explain your conduct as an apologist for the actions of the Rwandan Government.” (Russia Today 2015). 33
agriculture and consumer goods (WITS 2015a). Hence, indicators for a trade-informed interest are low. However, taking into account the regional context, strong commercial interests are disclosed. In 2001, a UN report reveals that Rwandan elites are proactively involved in supporting Congolese rebel groups in the DRC, and consequently, in illegal resource exploitation of minerals and other valuable raw materials. Without even being endowed with rare earths, Rwanda’s exports grew rapidly throughout the last decade. The UN report publishes a list of over 80 business enterprises that benefit from the illegal resource exploitation and therefore act in violation of the OECD Guidelines- among them are 12 British companies. In fact, examining the trade statistics, the import of raw materials and especially metals from the DRC to the UK increased remarkably throughout the UN observed timeframe (UN 2001, WITS 2015a). 39 Afrimex, one of the listed UK companies, did not only make payments to rebel groups to extract resources, the company also produced under conditions that included child and forced labor. The UK national contact point, a government body that considers abuses of OECD guidelines, affirmed the accusations and acknowledged that Afrimex’s coltan trade contributed to the brutal conflict and ongoing human rights abuses in the DRC. However, no action on part of the British authorities was taken. The same behavior accounts for numerous other cases such as for the well-known companies Barclays Bank and DAS AIR, a British Air company (Global Witness 2008). In reaction, the controversial recommendation of the UN report was played down by the UK government and Rwanda’s behavior is repeatedly defended with its genocide credit (DFID 2003). Once again, the UK used its position in the UNSC to protect its interests in the region and, to the confusion of its observers, there were no consequences drawn out of the scandalous results of the UN report (Global Witness 2008) Given these close ties, it is not surprising that in 2009 Rwanda joins the British Commonwealth of Nations being only the second country 40 which has no colonial ties to the UK. Prior to Rwanda’s accession, the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative sharply criticized the human rights abuses and Rwanda’s ability to shape its image with an excellent
39 Interestingly, all of a sudden there is no data available for the export of, exclusively, minerals and raw materials from the DRC to the UK for the immediate period after the publication of the UN report in 2001 (WITS 2015a). 40 The first country without British colonial ties was Mozambique, a former Portuguese colony. 34
public relations machinery. 41 It was clearly recommended to refuse Rwanda’s bid for membership (CHRI 2009). Today, Rwanda contributes to a growing share of non-free countries in the Commonwealth (Freedom House 2014). However, benefiting from the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation, Rwanda is able to boost its socio-economic development. At the same time, tariff and non-tariff barriers are lowered which enhances the possibility for investment and trade. British firms have easier access to the Rwandan, and thus, the East African market. Based on the pillars of economic integration, it can be assumed with confidence that integrating Rwanda in the UKs renowned Commonwealth had significant implications of economic benefits on both sides. 42
Synthesis
Consequently, strong commercial, geostrategic and geopolitical interests are indicated by the presented findings. Development aid is not primarily allocated to enhance the human security of Rwandan citizens. Although moral obligations and altruistic informed motives might be authentic, human development undeniably occurred epiphenomenally. In accordance with broader empirical findings and theoretical assumptions, realist and commercial motives appear to be trumping. Geostrategic interests are enhanced through GBS and appear to dominate the agenda throughout the first post-genocide decade. Sharp upsurges occur especially under closer economic ties throughout the second post-genocide decade. Berthélemy’s findings that the UK is an average altruistic donor can be confirmed partially. However, altruistic motives appear to be hardly deterministic for the high quantity of British aid allocation. Aid allocation can rather be explained in terms of elite interests of the British and Rwandan government.
5.2 Belgium
“It is better to risk saving a guilty person than to condemn an innocent one” (Voltaire 1747: VI)
Following the DRC, Rwanda is Belgium’s second biggest partner country of official development assistance. Being the second biggest OECD donor in total amounts, Belgium
41 The claims were refuted by the British Ambassador to Rwanda, Nicholas Cannon who stated that the authors of the report had „limited experience of Rwanda ‟, and that the criticisms raised were „either unfair or some of them applied to earlier stages in Rwanda’s history ‟ (Mwasa 2009: para.2). 42 So far, there has been no dissertation or equal academic publication on the acceptance of Mozambique and Rwanda in the Commonwealth. A comparable case study on the underlying rationale to accept these two particular countries and the actual economic benefits is a topic that undeniably warrants further research. 35
exceeds British aid allocation by far when it comes to comparison of per capita aid (see figure 3 and 4). Belgian aid is primarily allocated in its former colonies. Belgian aid provision is traditionally located in the middle of the altruist and selfish sphere. Aid was largely determined by geostrategic interest until a shift towards rather altruistic motives took place in the post- Cold War era (Vandaele 2008). Aid to Rwanda remained modest throughout the first post-genocide decade. Support was rather restrained due to recognized human rights abuses. Aid increased in 2004 with the signing of a General Convention and Indicative Program (ICP) and has, ever since, grown remarkable with a new peak in 2009 when Belgium agreed to concentrate more aid on fewer countries (OECD 2010). Yet, Belgium is among Rwanda’s strongest critics and with the publication of critical UN reports a downward trend has taken place since 2010. Generally, the mutual distrust between Belgium and Rwanda is explained by Belgium’s genocide burden and colonial legacy that was only surmounted by changes in domestic Belgian policies (Hayman 2006). This paper attempts to identify causal variables beyond a mere domestic genocide discourse.
Idealist lens
The Belgian-Rwandan relationship is highly determined by its colonial legacy. Belgium plays a central role in Rwanda’s history with official links dating back to 1924 when control over the Ruanda/ Urundi 43 territory was achieved. Belgium established a system of indirect rule that was based on the principles of racial hierarchy. While rarely any distinction between Hutu and Tutsi was made in pre-colonial times, ethnic group classified ID cards were introduced under Belgian rule. After independence in 1962, Belgium became Rwanda’s principal donor that financially and militarily supported the Hutu-dominated elites of the Kyibanda and Habyarimana regimes. It is commonly accepted in the literature that Belgium’s system and labeling of Hutu-preference largely facilitated the speed and magnitude of 100 days of mass killings in 1994 (Melvern 2000). Leaving a heavy colonial imprint, the post- genocide atmosphere was earmarked by mutual distrust between the old Belgian government and the new Tutsi-dominated GoR. While no critique was raised on the British approach during the genocide, bitterness over the withdrawal of Belgian troops, after ten Belgian paratroopers were assassinated, was expressed. Paul Kagame repeatedly perpetuated the sentiment of guilt and urged Belgium and
43 Name of the territory occupied under Belgian rule between 1922 and 1962. The territory is covered today by Rwanda and Burundi (Melvern 2000). 36
other members of the international community to confess their responsibility (Reyntjens 2004). However, Rwanda’s aggressive behavior towards the DRC, Belgium’s biggest receiver country, raised concerns among the Belgian government. Rwanda remained labeled a ‘crisis country’ due to its incursions into its neighboring country. Belgium therefore contradicted the mainstream donor approach of labeling Rwanda as ‘post-conflict’. Despite the rocky relations, Belgium never stopped giving ODA to its former colony. It remained a major donor and provider of peacekeeping measurements after 1994 (Hayman 2006; Vandaele 2008). Nevertheless, Belgian aid modality was fundamentally different to the UK approach. It was among the few donors that applied conditional aid (Hayman 2006). In 1995, Belgium and France drastically reduced their aid allocation to Rwanda after a short-term emergency relief. Speaking out critically on OECD roundtables, Belgium was highly responsive to human rights abuses in the immediate aftermath of the genocide (Renard and Reyntjens 1995). For example, aid was dropped in response to the Kibeho massacre on Hutu refugees committed by RPA forces in 1995 (see figure 4). Although aid experienced a dramatic increase after signing the ICP, Belgium maintained a strong conditionality. The UN report publication caused a sharp drop in 2010 and the ICP was renewed in 2011 with imposed conditions to improve progress in the field of democratic governance and press freedom. In coherence with other donors, aid was withdrawn in 2010 and 2012 with the leaking of a new UN report. Unlike the UK, Belgium did not resume its full support. Calls for stricter conditionality and harsh cuts followed in 2013 and 2014 ( Uwiringiyimana 2014). In contrast to the UK case, Belgium drew normatively informed consequences on several instances of human rights abuses. Belgium’s strict approach is largely explained by its domestic discourse on genocide guilt. The first post-genocide years were characterized by a controversial introspection regarding Belgian’s role in Rwanda. Then, a division existed between technocrats and politicians advocating Rwanda support on the one hand, and a big Rwandan diaspora and academics critical of aid on the other hand, (Hayman 2006). Overall, strong skepticism overshadowed the normative discourse over Rwanda until 1999. Aid allocation remained modest. However, aid increased remarkably in the second post-genocide decade. This is largely explained by domestic changes within Belgian politics and society that triggered a change in Belgian values and norms regarding the Rwanda discourse. A domestic power shift that ended 30 years of Christian-Democratic rule triggered a thawing of Rwanda relations. An in- depth parliamentary enquiry brought to light profound flaws of Belgium’s Rwanda approach 37
during and beyond the genocide. Based on a rationale of redemption, the new authorities remarkably reformed Belgium’s country programs in development cooperation. A more diplomatic approach with a significant focus on poverty reduction, peace building, sustainable development and human rights was put forward. Belgium’s Rwanda policy shifted from ‘disengagement’ to ‘cautious engagement’ and constructive critique. Without ‘rushing into it’, distinct key sectors of human development were emphasized. In 2000, the newly assigned Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt brought an end to years of frozen diplomacy with a public apology to Rwanda. Evidently, Belgian aid to Rwanda was normatively informed by skepticism in the first years, and genocide redemption with the beginning of the 2000s (ibid). As a result, aid increased remarkably (see figure 3 and 4). However, contrasting the UK approach, Belgium did not join the unwavering support based on a genocide credit to the post-genocide regime. Belgium established a mixed approach of remaining a critical but not pushy donor.44 Characteristically, Belgium equally chose a middle course of skepticism and altruism in their aid modality. Aid was allocated purely through SBS. With 34 million US$, the overwhelming majority of ODA is allocated in social infrastructure with a strong focus on health and medical education (Compare your country 2013). Belgium showed little engagement with the GoR and avoided aid through GBS. Especially when aid was largely withdrawn following the UN revelations in 2010 and 2012, a huge growth of aid allocation to the non-governmental sector took place (Kingdom of Belgium 2012a). Subsuming the idealist lens, Belgium appeared to be informed by a drastic change in its normative approach towards Rwanda. Genocide redemption indeed played a crucial role in increasing aid from 2000 onwards. However, the support remained government-critical and concentrated on soft areas such as gender equality, children’s rights and remarkably on health and energy. Thus, Belgium appeared to be largely informed by humanitarian objectives towards civil society. It refrained from unquestioned altruism toward the post-genocide regime. Still, aid allocation experienced an exceptional high after 2000, which does not coincide with the assumption that altruistic informed aid is exercised rather in low quantities (Buena de Mesquita and Smith 2009). To pin down the determining altruist impetus, the causal power of realist and commercial arguments needs to be checked.
44 It is argued that Belgium’s rather mixed approach of cautious engagement is best explained by the compromising objectives of various party fractions, since the Belgian political system usually produces government coalitions of at least four different parties. This led like in the Dutch case to a rather dynamic and multifaceted development policy and limited a coherent and visionary approach of development cooperation with Rwanda (Vandaele 2008). 38
Realist lens
Despite the rocky relations, Rwanda remained a cornerstone for Belgian foreign and cooperation policy in the region. Taking an approach of ‘Afrique aux Africains’ in the immediate post- Cold War era, Belgium’s presence at the Great Lakes was only invigorated during the Verhofstadt administration between 1999 and 2008. Not only ODA increased remarkably, a special ambassador was assigned and Foreign Minister Louis Michel emphasized Belgium’s role as peace broker in the region (Hayman 2006). Eventually, the Great Lakes region is the only area where the small country of Belgium could exercise considerable influence beyond the European Union. However, holding the world leadership in research on tropical diseases in central Africa, Belgium achieved remarkable reputation regarding issues of humanitarian relief and health care rather than in exercising a geostrategic power profile (Vandaele 2008). Belgium did traditionally limit its geostrategic leverage to non-lethal support focusing on military hospitals and academies (Hayman 2006). Aid was preferably channeled through sector or non-governmental support. Refusing to allocate GBS in conflict countries, Belgium refrained from this distinct tool of government support that could easier divert aid to military ends (Hayman 2006; OECD 2010). Therefore, the assumption that Belgium tried to maintain its geopolitical influence by establishing itself as a close friend of the regime lacks evidence. Belgium’s ‘do no harm’ approach became particularly overt since aid was most evidently withdrawn when incursions into the DRC or massacres on Hutu in border regions took place. Remarkably different from the UK approach, Rwanda is not seen as a stabilizer in the region. On part of the Belgium’s, there are no apologetic justifications on Rwanda’s incursions into the DRC as retaliation of their genocide past. In fact, Rwanda’s belligerent behavior is repeatedly condemned as jeopardizing all peace building attempts in the Great Lakes region: Belgian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Didier Reynders confirmed that Belgium “cannot train soldiers who are contributing to the destabilization of DRC ” (Rutayisire 2013). Traditionally, Belgium had a much greater engagement in the Congo which was not only the biggest Belgian colony but also of bigger economic and geostrategic importance than its small neighbor Rwanda. Today, the DRC is Belgium’s biggest aid receiver (Kingdom of Belgium 2012b). The DRC conflict has proven to challenge Belgian-Rwandan relations on large scale. After aid withdrawal due to the Kibeho massacre in 1995, aid was re-allocated in 2004 when the two Congo wars (1996/7 and 1998-2003) were officially over. Based on the 2010 and 2012
39
UN findings, the relation deteriorated and dramatic aid withdrawals took place. Belgian Defense Minister Pieter de Crem briefed the parliament that “all the development projects for this year have been suspended and 2013 the Belgium government has no aid for development projects for Kigali’s government” (Gasasira 2012: para.2). Finding strict words, conditionality was not applied as strictly as communicated. The crucial support to Rwanda’s healthcare system was maintained while non-humanitarian support was suspended wholly (Rutayisire 2013). Therefore, the altruist argument is confirmed empathically while evidence for putting forward geostrategic interest through aid provision remains low. Since 2014, Belgium-Rwanda relations have reached a historical low point after the exchange of rhetorical blows (Rutayisire 2013). Belgian Minister of Development Cooperation Alexander De Croo announced his intention to place stricter conditionality and suspend more aid to Rwanda (EurActiv 2015). Rwanda was urged repeatedly to cooperate in defeating M23 and other rebel groups in the DRC (Minaffet 2015). In accordance with Belgium’s condemnation of the aggressive GoR approach, a strong diversion of aid from the government to non-governmental support since 2010 can be traced in ODA statistics (Kingdom of Belgium 2012c). However, aid remained purely humanitarian. No evidence for supporting political or military opposition could be indicated. It is therefore summarized that aid was not compromised to re-achieve geostrategic power in Belgium’s former colony. At its best, it can be argued that influence and security was pursued in the geostrategic and geopolitically more important neighbor Congo. However, Belgium did not oppose the winning coalition of Rwanda’s government by channeling support to military or radical political opposition. At most, support to the civil society and NGOs can be interpreted as attempt to exercise at least some geopolitical grip in the former sphere of influence. Evidence for realist informed aid remains rather low.
Commercial lens
With a steady growth since 2000, Belgium does constitute, by far, the biggest exporter to Rwanda while it, at the same time, is one of Rwanda’s biggest importers of agricultural products compared to other important OECD donors (see figure 5, WITS 2015b). Chemical products, primarily medicine, account for more than half of Belgian exports to Rwanda and therefore provide another evidence for Belgium’s strong engagement in the health sector. Vegetable products traditionally account for more than 99 per cent of Rwandan imports to Belgium. Despite the remarkable growth since 2011, trade relations between the two
40
countries remain relatively marginal. In comparison with the region, Rwanda ranks as 123 rd client and 141 st supplier in 2013 and therefore at the bottom of Belgian trading partners. It therefore significantly lags behind the DRC which as 64 th client and 70 th supplier constitutes one of the most important regional economic partners (Belgian Foreign Trade Agency 2014). Still, just like in the British case, trading numbers do not indicate a strong commercial interest. Nevertheless, acknowledging the shaky diplomatic relationships, trade was emphasized just recently as a new mean of closer cooperation (Minaffet 2015). In 2015, Belgium withdrew 40 million US$ of aid by pinpointing at Rwanda’s responsibility in defeating the rebel groups in the DRC. Eventually, both parties agreed that the future partnerships between the two countries will be based on relationships focusing on trade and investment, and less on aid. Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Louise Mushikiwabo emphasized that “Belgium's decision to not disburse 40 million is its decision and focusing on it takes away from the great progress made. We have many Belgian companies working in Rwanda and many prospecting here, so trade and investment are important priorities" (ibid: para 3.). Concentrating on the promotion of economic relations and investments, De Croo emphasized that “we look forward to boosting and encouraging Belgian business investment in Rwanda - especially in the energy sector” (ibid). Currently, there are several Belgian mega-companies that have extended their operations in the country, including Skol Breweries and SN Brussels. Especially, Belgian mining companies like Minetain, GeoRwanda, Somuki and Corem have explored the Rwandan market (Musoni 2015). However, the increasing economic engagement of Belgian companies, and thus, the growing commercial interest has taken off only recently. Making assumptions about their influence on aid allocation cannot be examined within the current research. Commercially motivated determination of aid was not evident throughout the former 20 post-genocide years. If evidence arises for commercially informed aid through diverting funds from the social towards the economic sector, remains to be seen. However, a strong role of Belgian companies in the illegal mining exploitation report of the UN in 2001 was revealed with 25 Belgian companies being listed. A Belgian national, George Forrest, even pioneered exploitative joint venture agreements between private international companies and Gécamines, the DRC’s biggest state-owned mining company that already made headlines for diverting revenues under Mobutu. Forrest owns several companies in Belgium, among them New Lachausseé, a leading manufacturer of cartridge cases, grenades, light weapons and cannon launchers. The UN report revealed how he built the most wide-ranging illegal mining portfolio for personal gains with a strong backing from 41
political quarters in Belgium (UN 2001: 8). However, despite the evidence for a strong lobby among some Belgian politicians, the findings about a Belgian involvement in illegal resource exploitation prompted a public outcry. In contrast to the ‘playing it down’ approach of the UK, a wide-ranged parliamentary and public debate was triggered within the Belgian society. Karel de Gucht, former Minister of Trade, condemned the findings and emphasized that mining in the DRC should benefit the local population and not multinational companies (Vandaele 2008). Moreover, evaluating the reaction of end user countries, the UN report names Belgium as the only country that suggested the possibility of imposing targeted trade sanctions against enterprises and individuals. Belgium further highlighted the necessity to re-establish state authority and the defeat of M23 that is deliberately involved in the resource exploitation and supported by Rwanda to increase its leverage in the DRC (UN 2001). Accordingly, the links between Rwandan authorities, Congolese resource exploitation, George Forrest and bribed Belgian politicians are highly blurred. To assume that the nebulous relationships had a direct impact on Belgian aid allocation seems to be speculative. Nevertheless, the evidence at hand suggests that the overall tonus among the Belgian administration consistently condemned the UN findings as well as the illegal engagement of Rwandan authorities, and thus, highly contradicted the UK approach where obvious commercial interests were at play. Accordingly, there is no particular strong evidence for selfish commercial interests that were enhanced by trade relations or Congolese resource extraction.
Synthesis
Finally, Belgian aid appears to be informed predominantly by humanitarian motives, and thus, a strong altruistic focus on human development in the sector of health care and education. Yet, aid allocation reached remarkable high quantities and thus reveals a flaw of the realist critique that humanitarian aid assumedly is allocated in low quantities. A strong diversion of aid to buy of geostrategic and geopolitical concessions or to enhance commercial interests is not indicated with strong evidence. However, the morally informed allocation of aid was deliberately channeled to civil society, which can also be interpreted as a geopolitical empowerment of oppositional forces. Still, Belgium did not deliberately support oppositional military forces and thus indicators for a geostrategic interest remain modest. Yet, it can be argued that Belgium’s cautious engagement was led by both a moral
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obligation towards Rwandan citizens and a geopolitical interest in holding grip towards its former colony. High quantities are therefore not explained by a strong contribution to buy off concessions from a rather disliked government, but by strong normative and partly geopolitical motives. Berthélemy’s prediction that Belgian aid is located in the middle sphere of motives can be contradicted with a rather strong altruist argument.
5.3 France
“God created war so that Americans would learn geography.” (Mark Twain, n.d.)
France keeps a very low profile on the ground. Although it is the sixth biggest bilateral European donor, aid allocation remains remarkably small. After emergency relief in 1994, an overall trend of diminishing support marked the French-Rwandan relationship throughout the two post-genocide decades. Major drops took place in 1999 and 2008. The autonomous aid implementation agency AFD has been inactive for several years due to the cut off of diplomatic relationships in 2006 (AFD 2013). In contrast to other donors, France distributes aid through debt relief, which led to small peaks in 1997 and 1998 (see figure 3 and 4). A slow reconstruction of diplomatic, and thus, developmental relations only started again in 2010 (French Embassy 2011). Nevertheless, French aid remains particularly far behind the allocation of other donors. France’s per capita allocation of 0.10 million US$ in 2013 remains 43 times smaller than Belgian aid and 25 times smaller than aid allocation by the United Kingdom or the Netherlands. French aid is said to be based strongly on selfish reasons (Bertélemy 2006b). The differences are noteworthy since France has been the largest aid provider prior to the genocide with a presence since the 1960s (Hayman 2006). Rwanda, under the Hutu-led Habyarimana regime, has long time been part of ‘Francafrique ’- the French sphere of influence on the African continent. Since the allied regime of Hutu was replaced by an Anglophile Tutsi-regime, the relations are very strained. France appears to be the most critical donor who acknowledges critical narratives of Paul Kagame being a war criminal. The French case serves as a counterfactual example that helps to identify the factors that lead to aid decrease. It is expected that conclusions can be drawn on the behavior of other less critical donors.
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Idealist lens
The majority of 5 million US$ of the overall small amounts of aid is given to the social infrastructure sector with a special focus on education, waste management, health and infectious disease control as well as culture and recreation. Support is largely given to the non-governmental sector, while no GBS is allocated (Hayman 2006). In contrast to the practice of other donors, aid is largely channeled to a Rwandan diaspora of refugees in France (Compare your country 2013; OECD 2013b). At a first glance, sectors of human development seem to determine the French aid allocation. However, the impetus for altruistic aid does not derive from a genocide guilt informed relationship to the post-genocide regime. Contemporary French-Rwandan relationships are profoundly affected by its history. Both countries shift the blame for genocide onto each other. Providing political and military support to the Hutu-led government of former Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, France’s role is seen as directly contributing to the genocide (Prunier 2001). Since then, the two countries seem to be engaged in an intense diplomatic conflict filled with vague public accusations and severe charges. At the tenth commemoration ceremony in Kigali, Paul Kagame lashes out at France: “[The French] have knowingly trained and armed the soldiers and militiamen who were about to commit genocide and they knew that they were going to commit genocide”. Directly addressing the French Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs who was present at the ceremony, Kagame blamed the French that they “have the audacity to stay here without apologizing” (The Guardian, 8 April 2004, quoted by Reyntjens 2010a). At the French side, political inquiries as well as academic introspective explored their engagement in the genocide. In contrast to the Belgian case, the French sentiment remained predominantly anti-Rwandan (Hayman 2006; Prunier 2001). In 2004, the strained relations reached a historical low point with the publication of the famous Brugiére report. After a more than six year long investigation, French anti-terrorist judge Jean-Louis Brugiére accuses Paul Kagame and nine high-ranking officials from his administration to be guilty of genocide crimes in 1994. 45 The report reveals crucial findings on the actual background of the suspected plane crash of former Rwandan President Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart who just returned from peace talks in Arusha
45 A similar report was conducted by Spanish Judge Andreau Merelles who accused 40 officers of the RPF of being guilty of genocide crimes. Rwanda’s reaction was swift and furious. Paul Kagame accused Merelles of judicial terrorism and stated “if I met him, I would tell him to go to hell”(Reuters, Kigali, 1 st April 2008, quoted in Reyntjens 2010a: 24). 44
after a four year long civil war in Rwanda. The plane crash and immediate death of the two presidents and its six French crew members is commonly referred to as tipping point to the Rwandan genocide. Brugiére reveals that an extremist Hutu militia did not shoot down the plane, as originally assumed, but in fact Kagame and his intelligence initiated the shooting and therefore deliberately contributed to the eruption of large-scale massacres (Philpot 2004). 46 When Brugiére issued arrest against nine Rwandan officers and President Kagame, relations between the two countries were immediately broken off. 47 Accordingly, the French ambassador was ordered out and French schools as well as cultural centers were closed. Relations between the two countries were completely frozen between 2006 and 2009. Consequently, there was no normative impetus to allocate aid in the first post-genocide phase. Mutual condemnation determined the relationship. With the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, a shift in French Rwanda policy took place. A thaw was reached in 2010, when Sarkozy visited Rwanda and admitted errors of judgment. Sarkozy’s direct personal engagement largely contributed to re-establishing a reasonable French working relationship with Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame (Melly and Darracq 2013). Although Sarkozy remained short on an official apology, Kagame accepted the position as sufficient basis for rebuilding constructive relations 48 : "Rwanda and France have had a difficult past (...) it is important for the people of France and Rwanda to build a new partnership (...) we refuse to be hostages of the past" (The Telegraph 2010: para.4). Despite the tentative fence-mending, tensions remained that were fuelled by aftermath trials due to the Brugiére report 49 . However, further rapprochement was reached under the
46 In the official narrative the plane of Rwandan president Habyarimana and Burundian president Ntaryamira was shot by extremist Hutu with Russian-made SAM-16 gimlets that were captured by French troops from Iraq during the gulf war. The Brugiéré report reveals that Tutsi corps shot the plane with the SAM-16 which, in fact, was captured by US troops in the Iraq war and later on supplied to the RPA via Uganda (LeClerq 1998). 47 Kigali opened backfire and responded with the independent Muyco commission that found 30 senior French political and military authorities guilty for complicity in genocide ( République du Rwanda 2007) . Reyntjens conducts an in-depth analysis of the Rwandan Muyco and Mutsinzi reports and finds that they are flawed with unlikelihood, doubtful testimonies and entail forged documents. The Rwandan counterstrike therefore appears to be a hazardous attempt to disprove the RPA involvement in taking down Habyarimana’s plane (Reyntjens 2010b). 48 Hayman outlines that Rwanda accepted aid from France not only because of its dependency on aid. Several informants admit that Rwanda would happily do without French aid, but that it was important to maintain relations with France because of its importance on the world stage. Good external relations to profile its good image among donors also call for the need to accept aid from countries that are not necessarily considered as “friends” (Hayman 2006). 49 For example, in 2008, Rose Kabuye, the highest ranking female Lieutenant Colonel in the Rwandan Army, was arrested in Paris. Knowing that Kabuye is listed as suspect by Brugiére she was sent to Germany where she was arrested and transferred to Paris. It is argued that the arrest was designed by the Rwandan intelligence to gain access to the Brugiére files. Paradoxically, Rwanda and France restored diplomatic relations after the incident. Puzzlingly, an increased number of Hutu suspects were sentenced instead (Penketh 2014). The abrupt 45
presidency of Francoise Hollande. Only in 2015, the French government declassified documents that admit that French authorities made serious errors of judgment and even had a proactive role in preparing and executing the genocide. Former French Prime Minister Alain Juppe, President Francois Mitterrand's Foreign Minister at the time of the genocide, termed the accusations "intolerable" and urged Hollande to "defend France's honor" (Telegraph 2015: para.6). Evidently, a normative shift took place towards genocide redemption that strongly contradicted the condemning approach of French authorities before Sarkozy and Hollande. At a first glance, certain similarities with the Belgian case arise and it could be concluded that a critical stance towards the GoR results in rather altruistic behavior towards non- governmental actors. Still, the amount of aid given to Rwanda differs remarkably between the two old donors. Less nuanced than the Belgian relationship, the relation between Rwanda and France was characterized by putting blame onto the other. Moreover, a proactive military engagement of France in the Rwandan genocide was only revealed in 2015. It is therefore concluded that an impetus of genocide guilt reparation did not determine the aid allocation of France. From a value-driven point of view, one could argue at the utmost that minimum aid was given due to a moral obligation to give some aid at all. However, a roughly similar constellation led to high aid allocation in the Belgian case. It is therefore assumed that the strong lack of altruism is informed by a different constellation of realist or commercial variables.
Realist lens
France chequered history to the African continent is dominated by the so-called ‘Francafrique’. The term, coined in the 1950s, entails the interventionist approach to France’s former colonies under Charles de Gaulle that now is associated negatively with French neocolonialism. Since then, French successor administrations, including the Mitterrand government, are commonly known to have pursued geostrategic influence as key pillar of their rather self-interested informed foreign policy (Mengara 2010; Winter 2013). Strong personal, military and economic ties persist between French and governing African elites. Bilateral treaties for military cooperation were set up with its former colonies. Some of the arrangements expanded on former Belgian colonies such as Rwanda, Burundi or the DRC (Hansen 2008). shift from dropping charges against Tutsi and sentencing Hutu is remarkable but could not be enlightened in this research 46
Still, France had no colonial relationships to Rwanda. Hayman (2006) even argues that few geostrategic interests were at play since no specific regional great lakes policy, such as in the case of Belgium or the UK was conducted by the French. Because of the ongoing dispute between the French and Rwandan government, neither GBS nor direct SBS to ministries was provided. In accordance with realist theory, it can be assumed that the GoR did not enhance geopolitical or geostrategic goals of French donors. Therefore evidence for geostrategic interest must be indicated elsewhere. To understand the French geostrategic politics of interests today, a comprehensive picture of regional power politics surrounding the genocide has to be outlined. France is seen as an actor with distinct geostrategic interests to maintain power in Francophone Africa. Weapon support, training of police, army and presidential guards and especially two military operations, ‘Amaryllis’ and ‘Turquiose’ 50 that evacuated European civilians, Hutu extremists and parts of the Rwandan government, are labeled as brand marks for a proactive French support to the beleaguered Rwandan allies (LeClerq 1998). Although there is evidence that both France and Belgium but also the United Nations knew in advance that preparations on mass-scale Tutsi exterminations were made, none of the members of the international community took action (Melvern 2000). Today, a simple narrative of French (and Belgian) pursuit to maintain their post-colonial influence in Francophone Africa is evoked to explain their support to the Hutu regime (LeClerq 1998; Power 2003; Prunier 2001). Likewise, it is repeatedly claimed by mainstream accounts that Anglophone actors had barely any political interest in Rwanda (Hayman 2006). Contrary, it is argued here that the Rwandan civil war and RPF power takeover were an integral part of a US foreign policy approach 51 that was carefully staged to achieve strategic and economic objectives. As a result, Washington’s hidden agenda aimed at establishing an Anglophone sphere of influence in a historically dominated French and Belgian region. Therefore, the American design provided large-scale military and financial support to the RPA and Paul Kagame who accordingly led the civil war and liberation in the Rwandan genocide. Uganda, the Anglophone country on the border to Francophone East Africa, therefore served as Launchpad for US sponsored guerilla movements that took action, inter alia , in Rwanda and the DRC. The overall regional US objective was to replace the undesirable regime under Mobutu in the Congo- a stronghold
50 The legitimacy to protect the Hutu-government derives from above mentioned bilateral military arrangements that serve to protect French civilians and allies (Hansen 2008, LeClerq 1998). 51 It is not the aim of this paper to examine the US interests in Rwanda. However, they are crucial to understand the constellation of geostrategic interests in the French and British case. The UK therefore is understood as an ally or regionally acting proxy to US American interests. For detailed insights in US motives see Strizek (2011). 47
of French and Belgian influence. 52 Eventually, reliable US partners in Rwanda and the DRC were installed with Paul Kagame and Laurent-Désiré Kabila, followed by Joseph Kabila (Chussodovsky 2003; Strizek 2011). 53 Additionally, influence over one of Africa’s most resource endowed regions, and thus, strategic reserves of cobalt in Eastern and Southern Congo could be obtained. With the installment of Kabila, several mining contracts with several US and British mining companies were renegotiated (Chussodovsky 2003). The Anglophone support does by no means diminish the proactive role of French military throughout the genocide. However, both sides of the civil war were financed by regional powers. Former Cooperation Minister Bernard Débre captures the events in a nutshell: “What one forgets to say is that, if France was on one side, the Americans were on the other, arming the Tutsi who armed the Ugandans. I don’t want to portray a showdown between the French and the Anglo-Saxons, but the truth must be told” (Chussodvsky 2003: para. 11). Eventually, the simply much better equipped and well-trained RPA achieved victory over the Hutu forces. Today, the former ‘Francafrique’ in Rwanda and other East African countries is replaced by an Anglophone foothold. 54 English became the dominant language in the government and private sector. 55 The GoR but also universities that were formerly linked to France or Belgium moved closer to Anglophone partner countries. A closer look at French aid allocation to the education sector reveals that most programs are aimed at promoting the French language and culture (OECD 2013b). While the US installed an Anglo-American protectorate under Paul Kagame, French aid allocation to Rwanda diminished dramatically for geostrategic and geopolitical reasons.
52 Mobutu was not per se an undesirable leader to the US. Especially before the end of the Cold War the relations to the US were remarkably close to forestall a rapprochement between the Mobutu regime and the Soviet Union. However, with the end of the bipolar system, Mobutu became less important to the US and his dubious political deals became an unwelcomed leadership in Africa’s great resource endowed country (Strizek 2011, Wrong 2001). 53 The US and UK support to the RPA throughout the genocide is already outline in Chapter 5.1. The power takeover in the DRC was a continuation of the covert support. Kagame conceived the plan to back a rebel movement in Eastern Congo that was headed by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. With the help of Rwandan forces, they marched through Africa’s third largest nation in seven months. Mobutu was replaced by Kabila. U.S. officials deny that there were any U.S. military personnel with Rwandan troops in Congo during the war, although reports of a U.S. advisory presence have circulated in the region since the war’s earliest days (Duke 1998 Cameron 2013; Chussodovsky 2003; Strizek 2011). 54 The French influence on the continent diminished gradually. Since unstable African regions were seen as havens for terrorists, the US had a growing interest in military stabilization. This materialized with the establishment of the new joint military command AFRICOM in 2006. In a broader context it can be argued that the permanent Africa-based military command AFRICOM could be taken as a sign that the era of exclusively French military influence on the continent is effectively over (Hansen 2008). Rwanda served as a watershed for this historical turn. 55 The entrance sign on the cover page indicates English as the first language, followed by French and Kinyarwanda. Earlier signs had French listed on top. 48
Yet, a fundamental distinction to the Belgian case is derived. Aid allocation in Belgium remained high with a strong focus on the non-governmental sector and human development. French former strong political and military ties were dissolved. Rhetoric or material support to the GoR’s opposition remains weak (AFP 2011). It seems as if the French accepted defeat. Aid allocation in post-genocide Rwanda reflects the French withdrawal.
Commercial Lens
Commercial links between France and post-genocide Rwanda appear to be insignificant. Overall, French trade with the African continent diminished as much as it geostrategic and geopolitical influence. While merchandise exports and imports have significantly increased since 1960, the French market share declined consistently from 7.73 per cent of exports and 9.08 of imports in 1960 to 2.82 per cent and 2.05 per cent respectively in 2011 (Melly and Darracq 2013). Rwanda’s main trading partners became China, the UAE or regional partners such as the DRC. In 2011, Rwanda signed a bilateral agreement with the US. While Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands are among the top ten suppliers to Rwanda, France attains a retrograde position with less than 1 per cent share on Rwanda’s imports (Sud de France 2015; OEC 2012). Overall, Rwanda is located at the very bottom among all French Sub-Saharan trading partners (Védrine et al. 2013). Likewise, sector allocation of aid does not indicate an emphasis on economic development or cooperation. The production and economic sector is not addressed at all, while the social infrastructure support exclusively focuses on culture, health and education aspects (Compare your country 2013). In contrast to the UK and Belgium, French companies play a negligible role in the UN report. Evidence for French engagement to enhancing their economic interest in the region through illegal channels was not found (UN 2001). Nevertheless, with the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy a significant change in French Africa policy took place. While former administrations of Francois Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac focused on geopolitical and geostrategic influence, Sarkozy put forward the importance of economic ties to normalize the French-African relations (Viscusi 2010). Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Louise Mushikiwabo responded “Whenever countries create an environment that has no tension, it's good for business. I think individual businesses would feel more comfortable coming to Rwanda” (Holliday 2012: para. 4). Following the restoration of diplomatic ties in 2010, joint steps towards a comprehensive economic
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partnership were taken. The formerly inactive AFD increased its commitments remarkably by doubling them in 2011. Programs for electricity and geothermal energy access were initiated- fields in which classically China is the biggest partner of Rwanda. Regional economic integration, the local banking sector as well as multilingualism promoting the French language were put forward during talks between Sarkozy and Kagame (French Embassy 2011). The approach of dismantling a negative image of ‘Francafrique’ was continued by Francois Hollande. Facing the growing influence of Chinese economic actors, Hollande established a rather economic informed policy than military engagement (Aggad-Clerx 2013). Since 2010, export values to Rwanda grew slightly (see figure 5). Still, indicators for an economic informed allocation of aid to post-genocide Rwanda remain low. A minimal recovery since 2006 when the relations were frozen is observable, but overall aid maintained a low level. Evidence for a commercially informed increase of aid is not strong enough. If the newly evoked economic partnership will bring a growing commitment of aid towards the economic sector remains to be seen.
Synthesis
France constitutes a strong counterfactual case with decreasing aid contributions to the post- genocide GoR. Aid is substantially allocated in sectors that enhance social infrastructure and human development. However, evidence for a morally informed behavior is low. French aid remained low because the winning coalition of Rwanda opposes strongly the geostrategic and geopolitical interests of the French donor. However, in contrast to the Belgian allocation, France has obviously no interest in supporting non-governmental oppositional actors or at least to allocate aid by altruistic means. The French withdrawal is purely explained in selfish terms of geostrategic defeat. Berthélemy’s prediction is confirmed enthusiastically. Accordingly, the geostrategic notion can hardly be overestimated. The case of Rwanda serves as a horrific example of a geostrategic power struggle between France and the US and their British ally to further their influence in the region. The genocide was a byproduct of a proxy war between the Francophile Hutu government and the Anglophile Tutsi RPA. Ethnic rivalries were deliberately exploited in pursuit of geopolitical and geostrategic objectives (LeClerq 1998; Melvern 2000; Winter 2013). Rwanda’s citizens therefore suffered a humanitarian catastrophe because the country was unfortunately located at the political fault line between Francophone and Anglophone East Africa.
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5.4 The Netherlands
“It's the economy, stupid” (James Carville 1992)
The Netherlands are among the new donors to post-genocide Rwanda. They had no direct presence in Rwanda prior to 1994 and contributed their aid mostly through regionally located NGOs. After the 1994 genocide, a temporary presence of the Netherlands developed towards a full-scale embassy with a close bilateral partnership. ODA experienced a substantial increase with strong emphasis on post-genocide reconstruction. From emergency support in the direct aftermath of 1994, the Netherlands moved towards a more orthodox support. Today, they are considered as an important partner to the GoR with a strong faith in its commitment to peace, stability and socio-economic development. With some fluctuations, the Netherlands established themselves as one of the top three European donor countries and therefore became even more important than Rwanda’s former colonial powers, Germany and Belgium (Government of the Netherlands 2015a; Hayman 2006). Overall, Dutch aid is said to be informed rather altruistically.
Idealist lens
Contrary to Belgium and France, the Netherlands were considered as relatively innocent since no open support to the former Hutu-leadership was expressed. While several multi- and bilateral partners lost their credibility, the Netherlands were immediately considered to be a friend of the regime. Just as in the UK case, the formerly controversial behavior of new donors was simply ignored and reversed into a partnership with a clean slate (Douma 2000; Hayman 2006). The strong commitment to post-genocide reconstruction was initiated and determined by the keen interest of Jan Pronk- the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation at that time. The events of 1994 made a lasting impression on Pronk and the commitment to genocide redemption was overt throughout his whole political career:
“I flew to Rwanda several weeks after the beginning of the genocide in April 1994. The horror was beyond imagination. I saw terror and fear in Kigali, dead bodies in the villages around, mutilated corpses in the river, an endless flow. Death was everywhere; you could smell it. (…) I had witnessed mass killings, but Rwanda was the worst ever. (…) As far as Rwanda was concerned there was no excuse whatsoever. (…) What happened in Rwanda was the deliberate, politically motivated massacre of an ethnic group. The
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international community could not plead ignorance and shoulders part of the responsibility. (…) The crime against humanity which took place in Rwanda should never happen again. We have said so before, we failed, but it is worth repeating and it is worth working for” (Pronk 2014).
Although similar notions of genocide guilt can be found among the majority of the international community, the Dutch pledge constituted a special case. Pronk was the only OECD representative who visited Rwanda only a few weeks after the mass killings. In 1995, he was the only external official to attend the first year commemoration ceremony in Kigali. Pronk remembered that “as a matter of fact I was the only speaker from outside Rwanda. So, I spoke more or less as a representative of the international community” (Pronk 2014). Based on Pronk’s personal commitment, the Netherlands heavily invested in humanitarian aid operations. During the genocide, the Dutch verbal assurance to halt the genocide was never matched by actual military contribution. However, when the public outcry over genocide guilt had erupted, specialized military personnel to provide water facilities and food supply was delivered in goodwill. A main focus was put on conflict resolution and internal security as well as refugee camp support in Tanzania and the neighboring Congo. Important sector support was allocated in the justice and security sector and therefore served the rehabilitation of the GoR (Douma 2000). With the Kibeho massacre in 1995, the Netherlands displayed a rather indiscriminate behavior. Although funding has been suspended and official complaints have been dispatched, a commitment to dissolve another 10 million US$ was pronounced shortly after. Then, the political situation in Rwanda deteriorated and several government officials were dispelled on politically motivated reasons. Despite the critical stance of other donors and although the Dutch government was briefed on repeated human rights abuses, Pronk and his administration decided to continue support to the GoR. His rationale was based on a credo of faith rather than condemnation. Accordingly, the Netherlands appeared to move closer to a rather unconditional behavior of aid allocation that was similar to the approach of the UK and its silent partner Sweden 56 (Douma 2000; Hayman 2011; Pronk 2012). In 2001, the Dutch parliament decided that Rwanda is eligible for regular development cooperation. Since then, the Netherlands provided growing ODA with an evident focus on
56 Thus, in the early aftermath of the genocide, a clear divide between old and new donors became evident. The UK, Sweden and the Netherlands maintained close personal relationships and gained access to highest Rwandan authorities, while old donors either withdrew their commitments or remained neutral as in the case of Germany (Douma 2000, Hayman 2006). 52
human development and security. In line with the MDGs, aid allocation trickled down into sectors that enhanced regional security, good governance, the rule of law, food security and water management (Development Partners 2014; Government of the Netherlands 2014; Hayman 2007). The hitherto presented evidence indicates a Dutch engagement on grounds of an overwhelming rationale of genocide redemption. Human security and post-conflict reconstruction were not only supported rhetorically but were equally implemented with distinct policies of human development. The Netherlands were, just as other new donors, in strong favor of the Kagame-regime and aid was provided without questioning human rights conditions. However, in the early 2000s the picture of an undifferentiated donor that acts fully on behalf of blind genocide redemption became marred. The successor of Jan Pronk, Eveline Herfkens, introduced a much more critical policy approach to Rwanda. The UN 2001 revelations over the DRC crisis provoked a discussion on stronger conditionality within the Dutch parliament. Accordingly, a more rigid approach was applied that included political conditionality and benchmarking as well as stronger monitoring and supervision mechanisms on aid allocation. The approach of the new development ministry marked a watershed in which the Dutch donors attributed a clear relationship between human rights abuses and aid contributions. Particular special for the Dutch case is also the influence of civil society actors that shaped the rationale of the state to engage. 57 In 2004, four Dutch NGOs, Cordaid, ICCO, Kerkinactie and Novib, urged not only the Dutch government but also Sweden and the United Kingdom to freeze ODA and stop negotiations on Memorandums of Understanding. Their claim was based on a monitoring report that emphasized the exacerbating human rights situation in Rwanda. Shortly before, five people, among them political opponents to the RPF, went missing and it was further addressed that “space for political debate has nearly disappeared, a climate of fear, abuse of power and exclusion [was] dominating Rwanda” (Cordaid, ICCO, Kerkinactie and Novib 2003). Accordingly, ODA was cut by 50 per cent during the election process of 2003 (Zorbas 2011).
57 Although it is not the aim of the paper to investigate the causal power of actors beyond the layer of the state (see figure 1), it appears necessary for the Dutch case to understand the nature of the versatile motivation for aid allocation. A diplomat states that Rwanda is a heavily debated topic in the Dutch parliament and that political pressure exercised by NGOs and the media can hardly be found as much in any other donor case (Zorbas 2011). It can therefore be assumed that the multifaceted Dutch interests are a result of compromising various strands of interests among civic, governmental and commercial actors. The nature of a highly participatory political system could therefore be a determinant to a rather mixed picture, while a system characterized by less representation (measured by parties), such as the UK, is more prone to push through selfish interests. 53
Yet, although the Herfenks administration refused to engage in long-term commitments, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 2005. Even though Dutch criteria on good governance systems have not been met, Rwanda featured as one out of only fifteen countries with which the Netherlands maintains partnership country status (Douma 2000; Government of the Netherlands 2014; Zorbas 2011). The Dutch approach towards the GoR appeared to be versatile. Although the GoR has asked for GBS, the Dutch government remained critical about the accountability of the Kagame- regime and put limitations on its aid program. Stability was favored over ownership (Douma 2000; Hayman 2006). Budget support was suspended in 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014 as the result of UN findings which pointed to Rwanda’s responsibility with regard to the security situation in eastern DRC. 58 Despite the short-term withdrawal of budget support, ODA to Rwanda experienced a trend to increase and reached higher digits then the immediate post- genocide aftermath (see figure 3). A further indicator for the Dutch idealist impetus to repair genocide guilt is its remarkable engagement in judicial reconciliation. The Netherlands were the main external funder of the Gacaca Courts 59 and therefore contributed to the reconstruction of the judicial sector as no other donor country did (Rwandan Embassy in the Netherlands 2014). Yet, roughly ten years after the Gacaca courts came into existence, a harsh criticism erupted against the Rwandan government but also against donors supporting the controversial judicial system. Multiple allegations of miscarriages of justice such as the lack of fair trials and just defense mechanisms emerged (Human Rights Watch 2011). However, the report was challenged by Dutch officials for not acknowledging the great efforts Rwanda made in the justice sector. It was further argued that Gacaca courts had its serious shortcoming but still were the best option to deal with just reconciliation after the genocide. Still, only one year before, the Netherlands had stopped its aid because the government expressed some concerns about the judicial system and the way politics and democracy are carried out (Mazimpaka 2011). Hence, the main tonus on the Dutch side appeared to allow substantial critique but nevertheless continued to uphold faith in the post genocide regime (Pronk 2012).
58 The Netherlands and Sweden were the only ones to cut their budget support in late post-genocide years. The Netherlands have resumed their aid whereas Sweden has ceased for the foreseeable future (OPEV 2011, Zorbas 2011). 59 Gacaca means ‘grass’ and points to the form of community law to achieve reconciliation through traditional justice. In 2000, approximately 130.000 alleged genocide perpetrators were imprisoned in Rwanda. With the justice system in place, including the capabilities of the ICTR, the trials would have taken over 100 years (Reyntjens and Vandeginste 2005). Instead, the traditional Gacaca system was implemented which handled more than a million cases by 2011. While the GoR appraises their achievement in building a fair justice system, it is claimed by critiques that the courts were used for personal vendettas (Human Rights Watch 2011). 54
Despite the particular focus on building a strong judicial system, the Dutch government remains particular silent on human rights abuses in recent years. In 2010, the main opposition leader Victoire Ingabire was imprisoned on speech- and terrorism-related charges in the run for the presidential election. 60 Ingabire and her family are naturalized Dutch and have lived and worked in the Netherlands for more than 15 years. Although the trial attracted widespread international attention for its lack of fairness and Dutch media and NGO took up on the case, there was no action undertaken on part of Dutch authorities. Considering themselves as a main partner in reconstructing the Rwandan judicial sector, Dutch diplomats remained silent on diplomatic meetings between Dutch and Rwandan government officials in the following years. Quite the contrary, new tranches were released to the justice sector and Ambassador Leoni Cuelenaere stated that “the Netherlands believe Rwanda will use the support appropriately” (Tumwebaze 2014: para.3). Consequently, the Netherlands appear to depict a rather obscure idealist motivation that was highly determined by an impetus of genocide guilt in the beginning of the post-genocide period. To reconstruct the post-genocide regime was the unchallenged value of aid allocation. However, blurring the distinct divide between skeptical old and lenient new donors, the Netherlands became more critical throughout the 2000s. It seemed as if respect for human rights vis-à-vis an unhampered post-conflict construction was added to the Dutch set of aid allocation ethics. Still, unjust treatments of Rwandan oppositionists and members of the Rwandan diaspora in the Netherlands were swept under the carpet. The normative conception of the Dutch government as advocate of a fair judicial system is challenged and motives from selfish explanatories are expected.
60 Ingabire was active in various oppositional groups in the Netherlands throughout the post-genocide period. In 2010, she returned to Rwanda to run in the presidential elections. After giving a speech on problems of reconciliation and ethnic violence, she was arrested (Amnesty International 2013). Moreover, the family of Ingabire faces severe charges of genocide complicity. Dutch authorities withdrew the passport of Ingabire’s husband, Lin Muziere, who now faces extradition to Rwanda. A Belgian attorney for Rwandan diaspora members argues that “the death penalty doesn’t exist in Holland anymore, but if you send this man to Rwanda, you send him to his death and it will be the death penalty” (Flammé 2014). A whistleblower from the Dutch Embassy in Rwanda claimed in 2014 that the genocide charges against naturalized Dutch citizens from Rwanda were manipulated and corrupted by Dutch government officials that work in close collaboration with the Kagame government (De Poel 2014). The Government of the Netherlands rejected all claims in a parliamentary enquiry (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2014). This research was not able to clarify the competing claims. Nevertheless, they are considered important since underlying motives for these allegations are assumed. A clarification if Dutch authorities indeed have acted on spurious morality would substantially support the argument that the Dutch-Rwandan relations are informed by selfish interests that trickles down into aid allocation. 55
Realist Lens
The Netherlands maintain a Great Lakes regional policy with a special focus on Rwanda’s security situation. Several multi-annual strategic plans on the Great Lakes region have been passed that state that Rwanda has a major significance for stability in the Great Lakes region (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2011). Still, hard proof for the actual geostrategic regional engagement of the Netherlands appears to be very low. Already prior and during the genocide, there has been almost no military contribution. Several requests from the UN or US President Clinton have been rejected on the basis of the body bag syndrome. The only military contribution was to evacuate Dutch nationals in missions that were similar to the Belgian and French military approach. 61 After Kofi Annan reprimanded the passive position of some international community members, the Netherlands started to provide refugee aid outside of Rwandan borders. No evidence could be ascertained that underlying geostrategic or geopolitical motives determined the passive military engagement of the Netherlands. Contrary to the French, Belgian and especially British approach, there seemed to be no geopolitical motives at stake (Grünfeld and Huijboom 2007). Accordingly, the presumption that Pronk, who had no influence on military issues, acted out of a genuine genocide redemption becomes even more substantial. Overall, the Netherlands refrained to engage with the GoR by any means that could have been diverted for military ends. Contrary to other new donors such as the UK and Sweden, the Netherlands avoided ODA allocation through GBS that was rather seen as an elite privilege. Aid contributions were directed through the humanitarian relief channel or other physical and durable forms of capacity building. Emphasis was put on the justice and education sector to enhance the reconciliation process through the reintegration of refugees and demobilization of child soldiers (Douma 2000). Despite their high awareness for distracting funds to military ends, the Netherlands remained quite passive on solving the refugee crisis and improving the security situation in the DRC. 62
61 It appears as if the GoR has a rather random attitude in blaming its donors for their behavior during the genocide. On the one side, the UK and the Netherlands are perceived as having a clean slate despite their evident belligerent engagement or passive behavior. On the other side, Belgium and France are reprimanded for their failure to intervene or the support to Hutu civilians. A well-founded suspicion arises that the GoR deliberately selects its friends among new donors since a lack of historical knowledge increases the chance to play on genocide guilt. Old donors, in contrast, seem less prone to get fooled by the RPF spin of manipulation. However, it is not the aim of this paper to analyze the receiver position and motives to cooperate with distinct donors. 62 Only in 2008, when the Netherlands provided workshop training to Congolese military staff in the field of military justice within the MONUC mission, non-humanitarian aid was withdrawn in Rwanda due to its destabilizing behavior in the DRC (The Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations 2008). Accordingly, it can be argued that the Dutch geostrategic interest became more prominent as 56
The military reluctance appears to be a thread running through the Dutch post-genocide engagement. Dutch priorities rather lie in regions where a rationale to fight terrorism or to protect European stability prevails. Also, the Netherlands strive towards a comprehensive approach and therefore deploy more likely in regions where they are a major donor. Although the Great Lakes region is, in fact, among the three main receiver regions, there is no evidence that actual military engagement is prioritized. Although the Great Lakes region is considered as major conflict region, Dutch military missions are limited to Mali, South Sudan and Somalia (Government of the Netherlands 2015b). Despite the lack of geostrategic engagement, geopolitical motives can be assumed in terms of profiling the Netherlands as an international actor for post-conflict reconstruction. Rwanda constituted a pilot case for Dutch post-war rehabilitation policies. In line with the approach of other new donors, the Netherlands employed new strategies with emphasis on capacity building, ownership and an integrated poverty reduction approach. The strong personal engagement of Minister Pronk and the outstanding focus on judicial reconstruction did not only enhance the international recognition of the new GoR. At the same time, the generous Dutch contribution allowed the Netherlands to profile itself as a competent actor in post- conflict reconstruction on an international level (Douma 2000). Accordingly, evidence for aid allocation due to geostrategic interests on-site is low. However, it can be assumed that geopolitical objectives were enhanced through aid allocation by using Rwanda and the Great Lakes region as a stepping stone for an image boost of the Netherlands as post-conflict reconstruction agent on a global stage.
Commercial Lens
With progressing time, it became evident that the Netherlands used their international profile in the region less to advocate geostrategic interests but rather to establish itself as a regional economic player. The global trend to link aid to economic development was ambitiously implemented by the Dutch government already under Minister Herfkens. Likewise, her predecessor Minister Pronk advocated macroeconomic support to post-war reconstruction in Rwanda (Douma 2000). Then, traditional aid was replaced with modern cooperation that gave priority to private sector development and economic progress in developing countries. Therefore, the Dutch strategy is geared to create a favorable business climate, while it aims at
soon as its own military contributions in the region were jeopardized. However, the correlation for the outlined instance does not suffice to deduce a coherent geostrategic informed approach of the Netherlands for the whole post-genocide period 57
gradually phasing out development assistance (Government of the Netherlands 2015a). 63 The commercial impetus becomes particularly evident when sector allocation is examined. No other bilateral European donor puts an equal emphasis on economic sector aid allocation. 64 In recent years, the bulk of ODA, namely 16 million US$ were allocated in economic infrastructure such as in electricity access programs, road consolidation and administrational support to the chamber of agriculture. Equally, 16 million US$ were distributed to social infrastructure that emphasized sectors of good governance and rule of law. Yet, social infrastructure programs also covered promotion of inclusive economic institutions and food access programs. At the same time, multi-sector support concentrated equally on economic development such as the improvement of market access and labor security. While few other donors released aid in terms of production or program support, the Netherlands channeled 4 million US$ to each sector to enhance the ownership in building economic capacity, to foster development in the agricultural, forest and tea sector (Compare your country 2013; OECD 2013c). The emphasis on economic development in aid allocation mirrors enormously in Dutch private and public investment. Dutch companies are highly engaged in the same sectors that are addressed by Dutch government aid. Together with the Clinton Foundation climate-smart farms have been launched to boost food security and strengthen local economies. At the kick- off, Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Lilianne Ploumen, emphasized the importance of agricultural cooperation with Rwandan suppliers. To enhance the economic innovation in Rwanda, the Dutch company GigaWatt developed Rwanda’s biggest-ever solar energy plant (Hollandtrade 2013a, b). Accordingly, not only Rwanda, which aims to ascend as the Singapore of Africa, increased its access to sustainable energy. At the same time, accessing and generating affordable and reliable electricity has been secured for the broad spectrum of international service and industry investors- with the Netherlands being one of the big players among them. Equal examples of economic mega projects that are funded by the Dutch government can be found in the aviation and banking sector (Government of the Netherlands 2015a; Kwibuka 2013). The Dutch beer sector is the largest source of private investments. Dutch beer is literally developing as a brewing giant in the region of Eastern and Central Africa. Heineken International owns several regional breweries worldwide and holds the major market share in
63 The Dutch approach remarkably coincided with the Rwandan desire to become less dependent on ODA. 64 Most donors emphasize a rather multifaceted approach on social infrastructure and multi-sector capacity building. The only bilateral donor that equally emphasizes the economic sector is Japan (Compare your country 2013). 58
several African countries such as the DRC, Rwanda and Kenya. Bralirwa, the Rwandan company hold by Heineken International, is the largest brewer and soft beverage company in Rwanda. Beer sales are rocketing on the African continent for years and global brewers seek a larger foothold on the emerging market. Thus, holding its monopole position is crucial for Dutch companies (Sabiiti 2014). Accordingly, Dutch companies have worked eager to assure their commercial interests in the region and they have been supported strongly by the Dutch government. Several diplomatic visits of Dutch Minister Ploumen were dedicated to explore investment opportunities in Rwanda. Diplomatic delegations have repeatedly been accompanied by executives from multiple Dutch companies with interests in agribusiness, logistics, energy, hospitality, horticulture and real estate (Tumwebaze 2014). The Dutch interest has been welcomed by the Rwandan Ministry of Trade and Industry. A delegate points out that “investing in the country opens a broad market due to linkages within the East African Community, apart from other advantages Rwanda offers as a business destination” (Muyagu 2014: para.3). The close diplomatic cooperation throughout recent years bears fruit. Export values to Rwanda grew continuously since the beginning of the 2000s. By now, the Netherlands are positioned as second biggest exporter to Rwanda among the top European donors countries (see figure 5). Consequently, the Netherlands constitute a classic case of linking its trade and business objectives to the governmental aid agenda. No other country shows such a strong overlap of sector aid allocation and investing in the same sectors. A strong correlation occurs between the increase of aid and export values. It was stated overtly on several diplomatic occasions that Dutch aid is aimed at improving the business environment. A strong selfish commercial interest for aid allocation is therefore undeniable.
Synthesis
At first sight, the Netherlands constitute a classic case of genocide redemption. Contrasting the prevailing tenor in the literature, however, the pure rationale of genocide guilt is challenged The Dutch line on aid allocation was occasionally influenced by a strong humanitarian endeavor and an attempt of genocide reconciliation. Despite the cut backs on budget support in 2008, 2010 and 2012, a strong condemnation on human rights abuses remains missing. The moral responsibility put on the Dutch government to represent the comparatively big group of Rwandan expatriates did not bear fruit. The internationally recognized Ingabire trial remains untouched by Dutch authorities.
59
Explanation is easily found in the political economy of aid literature. Commercial interests were mirrored strongly in allocation of aid. At the same time, both trade and ODA increase continuously. While Rwanda develops towards a hub for economic innovation in the region, the Netherlands were ambitious enough to get their biggest slice of the cake. Thus, the Dutch case is the only case that provides clear evidence for the causal power of commercial interests in the absence of realist determinants. Human rights condemnation was compromised for a favorable diplomatic business climate. Dutch altruistic aid allocation is strongly contradicted in the second post-genocide decade.
6 Concluding remarks: Do all donors behave the same? 65
The Rwandan genocide constituted a watershed in aid allocation. While contributions of old Francophone sponsors dried out, new donors from the Anglophone sphere took over. In the literature it is argued that the lenient position of new donors versus a critical approach of old donors can be linked to historical trajectories of Rwanda and its donor countries. Little knowledge on the underlying mechanisms of the genocide is said to have led to a rather naïve acceptance of the GoR genocide narrative among new donors. While the genocide credit explanation can be accepted partly for the case of the Netherlands, it is certainly rejected in the UK case. Despite the prevailing tonus in the literature on post-genocide Rwanda, I argue that a mere explanation through the genocide lens does not suffice to explain the excessive aid allocation to the small African state. The argument that “the main rationale for donor programs in Rwanda since 1994 has evolved from a response to the genocide” (Hayman 2006: 352) remains superficial and neglects the underlying mechanisms of geostrategic, geopolitical and commercial self-interests that determined the agenda of donor countries. Rwanda did not receive aid purely because of its genocide. The genocide was an adverse reaction of a new struggle for Africa in which the small East African state was not only coincidently located on the fault line between the Anglophone and Francophone sphere of influence. At the same time, it served as a gateway to one of the most resource rich but equally conflict torn countries in the world - its giant neighbor the Congo. This paper provided support to the paradigmatic shift of realist informed aid allocation towards commercially informed aid throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s. Aid allocation
65 Research question posed by Berthélemy (2006a). 60
in the direct aftermath was a result of competing geostrategic interests. In the last decade, aid developed as a mean to guarantee the donor’s biggest share of the cake with Rwanda emerging as a hub for innovation and business. However, taking into account the variety of the four depicted case studies, the following conclusion can be drawn: Not all donors behave the same. Not all donors pursue the same motives for aid allocation and even if they do, they are neither coherent nor static. In early post-genocide years, the split between new and old, between Anglophone and Francophone and between pro-Kagame and anti-Kagame was particularly tangible. Limiting the analysis to the first post-genocide decade, the result would have most likely been that old donors lost their power grip and new donors excelled in gaining influence. The comparison of the French and British case revealed a dichotomy of realist interests that has led to an exemplary curve of realist theory: aid increased with victory and decreased with defeat. Donors would have been considered to behave the same with regard to their position on the opposite side of the realist-informed spectrum. The Belgian and the Dutch case would have been hardly significant and considered as ‘copycats’ of their Anglophone or Francophone fellows. Throughout the second post-genocide decade, the results begin to deviate. Former research failed to include a variety of cases or stopped observing Rwanda after the first post-genocide decade. While doing so, the empirical puzzle addressed in this research became even more ubiquitous. Instances of human rights abuses increased, but aid to Rwanda amplified dramatically, at least among the majority of donors. The only donor that constituted a counterfactual example is France. French aid remained comparatively static and showed a clear link between the condemnation of the Kagame- regime and low aid allocation. However, the case analysis revealed that no geostrategic, geopolitical and commercial interest was pursued (anymore). Selfish interests were so low that not even a moral obligation was worth it to reconcile with the regime. While the French case answers the question why aid decreases, we are left with three cases to explain the increase of aid. The British case indicated a strong geostrategic and commercial interest. Their victory in gradually gaining influence in the former Francophone sphere of influence resulted in becoming one of the main partners of the small East African country. Genocide remedy was only a disguise since it was demonstrated that the UK had a proactive role in the events of 1994. However, the chronological analysis also shows that geostrategic interests indeed dominated aid allocation in the first decade. But a sharp upsurge took place only with 61
increasing commercial links. The UK case is undoubtedly the strongest example of selfish- informed aid allocation. Competing studies locate the UK either in the middle- or selfish spectrum of aid motivations (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Berthélemy 2006b). This paper provided a case study that emphasizes the selfish classification. The Belgian case is one of the most puzzling but equally most interesting ones. Despite a remaining condemnation of the Kagame regime, Belgium became the per capita biggest donor to Rwanda. As Francophone old donor it suffered from a loss of influence in its former colony that moved closer and closer to the Anglophone sphere. Evidence that aid is used to pursue geopolitical and geostrategic interests by circumventing the government sector and empowering oppositional forces was not particularly high. The empirics rather suggest that Belgium, in fact, is motivated by a prevailing moral obligation. Contradicting the dominant realist literature, altruist motives resulted in increased aid. Likewise, there were no geostrategic interests on part of the Dutch government. Geopolitical objectives were limited to profile itself on the international stage. The Netherlands rationale of aid allocation was equally determined by altruism and a strong impetus of genocide guilt- at least in the first decade. However, aid increased remarkably only under growing commercial links. Altruism had a relatively low causal power in comparison to the exemplary political economy curve in the second decade. The selection of cases had important implications on the validity and reliability of findings. A mere comparison of the British and the French case would have overestimated the realist variables. At the same time, an analysis of either the Dutch or the Belgian case would have led to omitted variables bias by overestimating either the commercial or the idealist variable. A fortiori , the case selection serves to emphasize that donor motivations occasionally fluctuate. Condemnations occur despite strong interests and aid increase occurs despite the lack thereof. The individuality of cases reinforces difficulties to generalize the variety of our real social and political environment. Nevertheless, acknowledging the aim of a positivist research, the following findings can be derived with confidence. Firstly, it was proven that most donors allocate or withdraw aid for selfish reasons. The much-invoked rhetoric that aid is chivalrously linked to the respect for human rights was contradicted. Equally, the mere idealist impetus of genocide guilt is an overestimated determinant. However, altruism in terms of mere humanitarian aid has a bigger influencing power than expected. Altruist motives were strong when no realist or commercial variables intervened. Epiphenomenalism, however, is hard to exclude but the realist assumption that humanitarian aid is always epiphenomenal or at least distributed in low quantities could not 62
be reinforced due to the strong findings of the Belgian case. Secondly, not only geostrategic and geopolitical interests have a strong upward effect in aid allocation. It was demonstrated that commercial interests have an equal causal power on aid increase in the absence of realist variables. Accordingly, the primacy of realism was contradicted by a classical example of political economy rationale. Thirdly, the international donor community does neither form a homogenous nor a static unit. Although selfish interests seem to prevail, there is plenty evidence that selfish and altruist objectives are prioritized differently and are subject to change. Moreover, individual agents of the state or non-governmental actors appear to shape the state preferences to a remarkable extent. Primary state interests appeared to be partly compromised due to the determining power of non-governmental actors. Although this mechanism did not receive the attention it would deserve due to the scope of the paper, it is assumed that the individual actor level has a respectful share on determining the detailed variety of motives for aid allocation. It is assumed that the representative nature and the degree of democratic participation alter the way aid allocation is compromised. Further research on the different layers of state preference building is warranted. After drawing conclusion for the academic sphere, implicit recommendations for the political community are derived: In spring 2015, it became public that Rwanda’s Parliament is expected to consider an amendment to the country’s constitution in order to lift the two-term limit. This potentially enables Kagame for a third term which lasts another seven years. Adding this to his Vice-Presidency between 1994 and 2000, Kagame would obtain power for more than 30 years. Several regional observers consider Kagame’s leaving office as ‘national suicide’ because no suitable successor has emerged (Manasseh 2015; Mugabe 2015). Especially under these circumstances, the question prevails why Rwanda lacks a variety of political personalities and potential representatives. As argued in this paper, political space has been enormously constrained under the RPF leadership, opposition and non- governmental actors have been muted, intimidated, imprisoned or even assassinated. The much-invoked socio-economic success of Rwanda is the result of partly dubious activities and spurious achievements and hardly the accomplishment of a single man. Not only in 1994 but throughout the 20 years after the genocide, the donor community turned a blind eye, deliberately or not, to massive human rights abuses and the cultural, political, spatial and economic suppression throughout the social engineering of the RPF rule. Allowing for a prolongation of Kagame’s rule undermines the good governance efforts made by the donor community. Accountability should not be fully compromised for the sake of 63
stability. Institutions should not rely on its leader but on its capacity. Humanitarian development should not be compromised for economic elite benefit. A strong condemnation of violations of the rule of law should follow. Otherwise the international community repeats the same mistakes from 1994 and, once again, is not only a bystander but a culprit of failed post-conflict reconstruction.
64
Annex
Figure 2: ODA disbursements to Rwanda (six biggest donors) Source: own illustration based on QWIDS data (2015)
180 160 140 120 UK 100 Belgium 80 Netherlands 60 Germany 40 Total amounts in US $ 20 Sweden 0 France 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Year
Figure 3: ODA disbursements to Rwanda (total amounts) Source: own illustration based on QWIDS data (2015)
180 160 140 120
100 UK 80 Belgium 60 Netherlands
Total amounts in US $ 40 France 20 0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Year
65
Figure 4: ODA disbursements to Rwanda (per capita) Source: own illustration based on QWIDS data (2015) 8
7
6
5 UK 4 Belgium 3 Netherlands 2 France
Total amounts in US $ 1
0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Year
Figure 5: Export Values to Rwanda Source: own illustration based on the data of World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS 2015d)
70.000,00 UK 60.000,00
50.000,00 Belgium
40.000,00 Netherlan 30.000,00 ds
20.000,00 France
10.000,00
0,00 TradeValue in total amounts in US $ in thousand 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Year
66
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