On The Fault Line European Donor motives for aid allocation to post-genocide Rwanda Master Thesis Kathrin Kirste University of Amsterdam MSc Political Science: International Relations Supervised by Sebastian Krapohl and Farid Boussaid Submission 26/06/2015 Abstract This paper aims at identifying the causal determinants for aid allocation to post-genocide Rwanda despite massive acknowledged human rights abuses. Rwanda has been praised by the political international community as an exceptional post-conflict case that emerged as a ‘model for the African renaissance’ after genocide and mass violence. However, most accounts fail to condemn the engineering of structural social, economic and political suppression of the post-conflict regime and several belligerent incursions in the neighboring DRC under President Paul Kagame. Irrespective, aid has been increased by the majority of donors. Approaching the empirical puzzle of increased aid despite human rights abuses, a disaggregated in-depth four country case study of European OECD donors, the United Kingdom, Belgium, France and the Netherlands, is conducted. The Rwandan paradox is predominantly explained by a so-called genocide credit: donors are driven into ‘voluntary blindness’ of genocide redemption due to their international failure of preventing the tragic events of 1994. The post-genocide regime emerged as donor darling, while the international community produced a success story of post-conflict reconstruction. Contrary, it is shown in this research that a pure examination from the genocide lens falls short on identifying underlying mechanisms of aid allocation ranging from the altruist to the selfish spectrum of motives. In order to close the gap of explanatories, a competitive deductive theory test of the idealist, realist and commercial lens is performed. This paper provides a vanguard for donor-centered research on post-genocide Rwanda by dismantling the altruistic and selfish impetus of engagement beyond a mere genocide credit explanation. It is shown that the donor community does not for a homogenous unit. It is found that aid to Rwanda in the first post-genocide decade is influenced by strong competing geostrategic interests and, for some donors, indeed by a genocide-guilt informed moral obligation. In the second post-genocide decade, when the paradox became even more ubiquitous, aid is mostly determined by growing commercial interests. However, it is also found that donor motivations vary and altruism plays a dominant role in some cases. Overall, it is concluded that donor policy to post-genocide Rwanda repeats the same mistakes from pre-1994 by ignoring a system of constructed suppression. Therefore, the international community is not only identified as bystander but as culprit of failed post-conflict reconstruction. Table of Contents 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 1.1 Empirical puzzle and Research Question ..................................................................... 1 1.2 Research Design .......................................................................................................... 2 1.3 Relevance .................................................................................................................... 2 1.4 Literature Review ........................................................................................................ 4 2 Theoretical Framework ....................................................................................................... 6 2.1 Definition of Variables ................................................................................................ 6 2.2 Idealist lens on aid allocation ...................................................................................... 7 2.3 Realist lens on aid allocation ....................................................................................... 9 2.4 Commercial lens on aid allocation ............................................................................ 11 3 Methodological Framework ............................................................................................. 13 3.1 Methods ..................................................................................................................... 13 3.2 Case Selection ........................................................................................................... 14 3.3 Limitations on the Research Design.......................................................................... 16 4 The Case of post-genocide Rwanda ................................................................................. 20 4.1 The Rwandan success story....................................................................................... 20 4.2 Reconstructing suppression and war ......................................................................... 21 4.3 Funding Fraud ........................................................................................................... 24 5 Egoism versus Altruism in Aid Allocation....................................................................... 26 5.1 The United Kingdom ................................................................................................. 27 5.2 Belgium ..................................................................................................................... 35 5.3 France ........................................................................................................................ 43 5.4 The Netherlands ........................................................................................................ 51 6 Concluding remarks: Do all donors behave the same?..................................................... 60 7 Annex................................................................................................................................ 65 8 References ........................................................................................................................ 67 Abbreviations BBC British Broadcasting Corporation CHRI Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative DAC Development Assistance Committee DFID UK Department for International Development DRC Democratic Republic of Congo GBS General Budget Support GoR Government of Rwanda MDG Millennium Development Goals M23 March 23 Movement (Congolese rebel group) NGO Non-Governmental Organization NRA National Resistance Army ODA Official Development Assistance OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front SBS Sector Budget Support IFC International Finance Corporation UNDP United Nations Development Program UHRC United Human Rights Council UNSC United Nations Security Council 1 Introduction 1.1 Empirical Puzzle and Research Question Rwanda takes its place in the public consciousness as a country that emerged from genocide to “model for the African renaissance” (Zakaria 2009: para. 1). After the country suffered the most brutal genocide since the Holocaust, the nation seemed destined to fail and plunge into a post-conflict spiral. Today, the small country emerged as a key player in the Great Lakes region and the African Union. Rwanda’s leader and acclaimed liberator of the genocide, Paul Kagame, is praised by international politics, media and even some part of the scholarly community for his constant efforts of building a stable and well-ordered post-genocide society. In 2009, the Clinton Foundation awarded him the Global Citizen Award emphasizing that “from crisis, President Kagame has forged a strong, unified and growing nation with the potential to become a model for the rest of Africa and the world” (Clinton Foundation 2009: para. 5). Private investors and media institutions make similarly positive assessments. In 2014, the World Bank Doing Business report granted Rwanda a top position, while the Financial Times named Kagame as one of the fifty most influential people of the new millennium (Financial Times 2009; IFC 2015). Despite Rwanda’s undeniable accomplishments, most accounts of post-genocide Rwanda miss to call attention to the social and political costs of its recovery. Contrary it is argued that the regime of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is based on a system of repression, exclusion and growing inequality that embraces all cultural, economic, political and even spatial arenas of the livelihood of Rwandans (Straus and Waldorf 2011). Since 1994, the Government of Rwanda (GoR) 1 has practiced a deft authoritarianism that not only justified harsh restrictions on domestic opposition and civil society, but also on external critique from NGOs and international media broadcasting (ibid). Yet, the RPF boldness exceeded its own borders when it initiated two wars with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 2 in 1996/97 and 1998-2003. A number of UN reports pointed out committed war crimes and human rights abuses throughout the post-genocide decade. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have repeatedly pinpointed at problems of structural violence and social 1 The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) led by Paul Kagame dominates the Government of Rwanda (GoR). It is the political arm of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). The terms are used in accordance with their military or political attribution. 2 Throughout the paper it is referred to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or synonymously as Congo. 1 inequalities (Reyntjens 2010a; Strizek 2011). Notwithstanding its