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Court of Remorse Inside the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

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Court of Remorse Inside the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Court of Remorse Critical Human Rights Series Editors Steve J. Stern Scott Straus Books in the series Critical Human Rights emphasize research that opens new ways to think about and understand human rights. The series values in particular empirically grounded and intellectually open research that eschews simplified accounts of human rights events and processes. In Court of Remorse, Thierry Cruvellier offers a nuanced and complex under- standing of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, a central post– Cold War human rights institution that helped to establish a now common pattern of creating justice mechanisms to account for past human rights atroc- ities. The atrocity in question is the Rwandan genocide of 1994 in which more than half a million civilians were killed. Cruvellier is one of the most knowl- edgeable outside observers of the court, having watched proceedings and interviewed key actors day after day for nearly a decade. In Court of Remorse, Cruvellier draws on these daily observations to render a subtle, eloquent, and intelligent account of the tribunal, and in so doing he helps us understand a critical human rights institution in new and profound ways. Court of Remorse Inside the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Thierry Cruvellier Translated by Chari Voss The University of Wisconsin Press Publication of this volume has been made possible, in part, through support from the A F C L S at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. The University of Wisconsin Press 1930 Monroe Street, 3rd Floor Madison, Wisconsin 53711-2059 uwpress.wisc.edu 3 Henrietta Street London WCE 8LU, England eurospanbookstore.com Originally published as Le tribunal des vaincus: Un Nuremberg pour le Rwanda? Copyright © 2006 by Calmann-Lévy Translation copyright © 2010 by the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any format or by any means, digital, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, or conveyed via the Internet or a Web site without written permission of the University of Wisconsin Press, except in the case of brief quotations embedded in critical articles and reviews. 54321 Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cruvellier, T. (Thierry) [Tribunal des vaincus. English] Court of remorse: inside the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda / Thierry Cruvellier; translated by Chari Voss. p. cm.—(Critical human rights) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-299-23674-8 (pbk.: alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-299-23673-1 (e-book) 1. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 2. Rwanda—History—Civil War, 1990–1993—Atrocities. 3. Rwanda—History—Civil War, 1994—Atrocities. 4. Trials (Crimes against humanity)—Rwanda. 5. War crime trials—Rwanda. 6. Genocide—Rwanda. I. Title. II. Series: Critical human rights. KTD454.C7813 2010 345.67571´0251—dc22 2009046343 To Contents Geographic Landmarks viii Historical Reference Points xi Prologue 3 1. The Addis Ababa Departure Lounge 9 2. The Eagle Eye 15 3. At the First Judgment 20 4. Lines of Defense 32 5. The Fool’s Game 38 6. Counting Up the Interahamwe 49 7. The White Man’s Grave 58 8. A Little Murder among Friends 74 9. Opening Up Kibuye 78 10. Be like the Arab (Reason to Doubt) 83 11. Closing Up Shop 102 12. A Mayor in Turmoil (The Doubt in Reason) 115 13. The Principle of Ignorance 131 14. The Betrayal of the “Moderates” 136 15. Like a Flight of Termites 154 16. Loser’s Justice 164 17. Giving and Taking Back 168 Acknowledgments 175 Notes 177 Index 185 vii Geographic Landmarks viii Historical Reference Points Colonization and Independence In 1896, Rwanda, a country where Hutus and Tutsis had lived for several centuries, became a German protectorate and was incorporated into the German empire. In 1919 the World War I victors gave this territory to Belgium. The colonial power based its authority on the royal Tutsigovernment and reinforced the Tutsi monopoly in administrative and political spheres. In 1959 the monarchy was overthrown by the Hutu social revolution. The first po- groms were carried out against the Tutsicommunity, causing tens of thousands of Tutsis to flee to neighboring countries. Three years later, in 1962, Rwanda gained its independence. Grégoire Kayibanda, a Hutu from central Rwanda, became the first president. The Tutsi guerilla warfare continued until the mid-1960s. It was accompanied by a new round of anti-Tutsi pogroms within Rwanda, particularly in 1963 and 1964, resulting in a fresh wave of Tutsi refu- gees fleeing to neighboring Uganda, Burundi, and the Congo. In 1973 General Juvénal Habyarimana, a Hutu from the north, took power following a coup d’état. He created the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND), which became the country’s single party. The Civil War On October 1, 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel group consisting primarily of Tutsi refugees who had lived outside Rwanda since 1959, started a civil war by invading Rwanda from Uganda. Within the country, there were massive arrests of Tutsis.In April 1991 the MRND agreed to the principle of reintroducing a multiparty system. In November it started a xi youth wing called Interahamwe, which progressively morphed into an armed militia group. In March 1992 approximately three hundred Tutsis were massacred in the Bugesera region, south of the capital city, Kigali. In April a new government was formed that included all the main Habyarimana opposition parties inside Rwanda, and named a Hutu as prime minister. In February 1993 a new RPF offensive in the north resulted in the displacement of a million people in Rwanda. In July the extremist Hutu radio station Radio-Télévision libre des milles collines (RTLM) began broadcasting. That same month a new govern- ment was formed, led by opposition leader Agathe Uwilingiyimana. On Au- gust 4 the government of Rwanda and the RPF signed the Arusha Peace Ac- cords in Tanzania. This agreement was supposed to end the civil war, organize power-sharing among the various political factions, and enable the return of Rwandan refugees, who had been living abroad for thirty-five years. In Octo- ber the UN Security Council approved the deployment of 2,500 peacekeepers to form the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). On October 21, Tutsi soldiers in neighboring Burundi assassinated the country’s first Hutu president, who had been democratically elected four months earlier. Widespread ethnic violence ensued, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths and causing several hundred thousand people to flee to neighboring countries, including Rwanda. Political and ethnic violence in Rwanda continued to esca- late. The transition government was not functioning, and the parties were blaming each other for the failure. The Genocide On April 6, 1994, Rwanda’s presidential plane was shot down by missiles upon its descent into Kigali, killing President Habyarimana, the new Burundian president (Cyprien Ntaryamira, a Hutu) and two of his cabi- net ministers, the Rwandan army chief of staff, and the head of presidential se- curity. Starting at dawn on April 7, the presidential guard assassinated Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana along with several ministers and Hutu per- sonalities from the democratic opposition. Ten Belgian peacekeepers assigned to guard the prime minister were also killed. In Kigali, Hutu soldiers and mili- tias, notably the Interahamwe, began to hunt down and systematically kill Tutsis. This was the beginning of the genocide and the resumption of the civil war. On April 8 Jean Kambanda was appointed prime minister of an interim government made up solely of Hutus loyal to the president. On April 11 Bel- gium began to withdraw its peacekeepers. Four days later the UN Security xii Historical Reference Points Council ordered the withdrawal of the international force, reducing the num- ber of troops from 2,500 to 270. General Marcel Gatsinzi, who had been ap- pointed chief of staff of the Rwandan army on April 7 and who publicly stated his opposition to the massacre of civilians on April 12, was dismissed. Starting on April 19, the Tutsi genocide began to spread to the entire territory under government control. On July 4 the RPF seized control of the capital. By July 17 the Rwandan armed forces had been defeated. After more than three months of uninterrupted killing, soldiers and militiamen began to flee Rwanda taking with them in just a few days nearly two million Rwandans, who congregated in huge refugee camps on Rwanda’s borders, particularly in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). The RPF victory brought an end to the gen- ocide of the Tutsis. On July 19 a national coalition government was formed, led by a Hutu who had escaped the massacres and who had been appointed to this position under the Arusha Peace Accords. General Paul Kagame, the RPF commander and Rwanda’s new strongman, was named vice president and minister of defense. The International Tribunal On November 8, 1994, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to try the primary perpetrators of the crimes committed in Rwanda in 1994. Its prosecutor, Rich- ard Goldstone from South Africa, was also the prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which had been set up a year and a half earlier in The Hague. In February 1995, Arusha, Tanzania, was chosen as the seat of the ICTR. The Office of the Prosecutor was based in Ki- gali and headed up by a deputy prosecutor, while the prosecutor and the ap- peals chamber were based in The Hague. In May the UN General Assembly elected six trial judges for the ICTR, and the first investigators arrived in Rwanda.
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