REPUBLIC OF RWANDA INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS CHARGED WITH THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE CRASH ON 06/04/1994 OF FALCON 50 AEROPLANE, REGISTRATION NUMBER 9XR-NN. REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE CAUSES AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ATTACK OF 06/04/1994 AGAINST THE FALCON 50 RWANDAN PRESIDENTIAL AEROPLANE, REGISTRATION NUMBER 9XR-NN 1 MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS GENERAL INTRODUCTION 5 History and Mandate of the Committee 5 Methodology used 6 Political context prior to the attack of 06 April 1994 9 SECTION ONE: THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PLANNED ATTACK 17 AND ITS EXECUTION The revelation of a plot targeting the imminent assassination of President 18 Habyarimana before the attack against his aeroplane Intelligence announced by the leaders of Hutu Power 18 Intelligence known by Rwandan military circles 22 Intelligence known by president Habyarimana and foreign sources 25 The organisation and issues of the Dar es Salaam Summit 28 Settlement of the political deadlock prevailing in Rwanda 28 Pressure on president Habyarimana before the Summit 28 Instability in Burundi: the main subject of the Dar es Salaam Summit 29 Questions surrounding the journey of the chief of staff of the Rwandan army 30 The proceedings of the Summit and circumstances of the return flight of the Falcon 50 35 Execution of the attack and its repercussions 29 The absence of an investigation into the attack 40 Questions about the voice recorder known as the “Black Box” 42 Information published soon after the attack: the black box in France 42 Manipulation by Paul Barril and a turnaround from Dassault Service Aviation 43 The Rwandan, Belgian and French sources 44 Further turnarounds: a fake black box in the hands of the UN 46 Convincing testimonies on the recovery of the black box by the French 47 The sequence of events of the attack reported by eye witnesses 50 The airport technicians 50 The soldiers from the presidential guard who were present at the airport 55 The UNAMIR blue helmets posted at the airport and the members of the Belgian technical military 58 cooperation Refusal for the UNAMIR to access the crash site 65 Preferential access to the site of the attack granted to French soldiers 73 The RPF’s Situation at the National Development Council 75 Surveillance and monitoring by the UNAMIR 75 Discreet and constant surveillance of the CND by the presidential guard 78 The RPF’s situation at the CND on the evening of the attack and in the following days 81 Inventing of radio-messages by the FAR and their attribution to the RPF 84 Course of the main questions relating to the shooting down of the aeroplane Falcon 88 50 The Falcon 50’s Approach Trajectory 88 The site of the Falcon 50’s crash 88 The type of weapon used to shoot down the Falcon 50 89 CONCLUSION OF SECTION I ON THE CAUSES AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF 91 THE ATTACK 3 SECTION TWO: RESPONSIBILITIES 94 Different hypotheses put forward about the perpetrators of the attack 94 Accusation of Belgian UNAMIR soldiers 94 Calling into question of Burundian soldiers and opponents 96 Calling into question of President Mobutu 97 Incrimination of the Rwandan Patriotic Front 98 Incrimination of Hutu extremists 101 Evidence of the involvement of the FAR and Akazu dignitaries in the preparation 104 and execution of the attack The motive of the attack: the decision to finally put the Arusha Accords behind them 105 The methods used to carry out the attack 108 The provocation for the withdrawal of the UNAMIR’s Belgian contingent 108 Preparations for going into action in the days prior to the attack 113 The UNAMIR’s prevention from entering the Kanombe camp before the attack 114 The monitoring and abrupt modification of military communication 116 Forced evacuation of the market in Mulindi near Kanombe 119 Deployment of the presidential guard before the attack and its involvement immediately after the 121 attack Other actions which reveal the preparation of the attack by the FAR 126 Coup d’état on the night of 06 April 1994, revealing the motives for the attack 128 Reactions revealing the prior knowledge of the plan for an attack 133 The FAR had specialists in anti-aircraft artillery 134 The possession of missile launchers and missiles by the FAR 136 The different orders for missiles and missile launchers 136 Results of the UNAMIR enquiry and independent investigations 139 The possession of missiles by the RPA is not a recognised fact 143 Weakness of evidence from the French Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry 146 False story of the discovery of a missile in Akagera in 1991 146 The MIP’s suspicious omission to publish a note by General Quesnot attesting to the possession of a 146 new missile by the FAR The contradictions or lies of Colonel Bernard Cussac 147 General Ndindiriyimana’s doubts about missiles held by the RPF 148 The site from which the missiles were fired 149 Masaka-CEBOL 150 Alleged discovery of missile launch tubes in Masaka 152 Questions raised by the alleged discovery of missile launch tubes 156 Questions which arise from the photos of the alleged missile launchers handed over to France by Lieutenant Colonel Ephrem Rwabalinda 157 Conclusion on the hypothesis of Masaka as the missile firing site 158 Different locations in Kanombe 159 From the fence around the presidential residence, or very close to this residence 160 In Nyarugunga and Nyandungu 162 In the area around the Kanombe military camp 162 In the Kanombe military camp 164 Assessment of the witnesses and their accounts 165 The perpetrators of the attack 166 GENERAL CONCLUSION 167 4 GENERAL INTRODUCTION History and Mandate of the Committee The Independent Committee of Experts charged with the investigation into the crash on 06 April 1994 of the Falcon 50 aeroplane, registration no. 9XR-NN (hereinafter the Committee) was created by Prime Ministerial Decree no. 07/03 of 16/04/2007 for an indeterminate period. It is placed under the authority of the Minister whose remit covers justice, to whom it submits its reports. In accordance with article 3 of the Decree, “The Committee of Experts has the general task of establishing the truth regarding the circumstances of the crash of the Falcon 50 aeroplane, registration number 9XR-NN on 06/04/1994, taking the life of the following persons: - MR HABYARIMANA Juvénal, former President of the Republic of Rwanda, and the members of his entourage; - MR NTARYAMIRA Cyprien, former President of the Republic of Burundi, and the members of his entourage; - The French crew members of the aeroplane. Within this context, the Committee of Experts has in particular the specific tasks of: - gathering all the information relating to the aeroplane crash; - analysing the information thus gathered with a view to obtaining a general direction for the investigations; - looking for, gathering and examining evidence relating to the aeroplane crash; - establishing the causes and circumstances of the aeroplane crash and determining the responsibility for the crash. ” The members of the Committee, who number seven, were appointed by Prime Ministerial Decree no. 29/3 of 20/11/2007, for a mandate of one year as of 1 st December 2007, the date of the start of their activities. This mandate has been renewed twice, first for a period of three months from 1 st December 2008 to 28 February 2009 dedicated to the finalisation of the investigation report, the ballistic study and the technical analysis of the remains of the aeroplane; then for two months from 1 st March to 30 April 2009 dedicated to the translation of the report into English and Kinyarwanda. The first two months of activities were dedicated to the setting up of the Committee, the internal organisation, the establishment of the support staff, the drawing up of the by-laws and of the organisational framework, the defining of the action plan with its provisional budget, the adoption of research and investigation methodology, the scheduling of the timetable of activities, and the collection and reading of available information. The Committee then concentrated on the definition of the methods of execution of its mandate in accordance with a methodological approach likely to enable it to carry out a professional, rigorous investigation. 5 Methodology used With a view to fulfilling the objectives assigned to it, the Committee first identified sources and collected information within and outside the country. Within the country, the Committee visited the site of the crash and its surroundings, and heard witnesses who lived at the site in 1994 or who were there for various reasons, and anyone who could have had information directly related to the attack. Priority was given to eye witnesses and ear witnesses to the facts. The Committee travelled up and down the entire country to hear the soldiers from the specialist units of the former Rwandan armed forces, such as the Reconnaissance Squadron, Para-Commando, Anti-aircraft (LAA), Presidential Guard, Transmission Unit and Military Engineering battalions; the gendarmerie company which was in charge of security at Kanombe Airport, and the soldiers of the former RPA, plus in particular those who formed part of the contingent appointed to the National Development Council (NDC) from December 1993 to April 1994. The Committee also interviewed technicians from Kanombe International Airport, in particular those who were on duty during the night between 06 and 07 April 1994, including the commander on duty, control tower officers, electrical and communication maintenance technicians and fire officers. As far as possible, the Committee has always favoured the collecting of testimonies via direct recording with the express agreement of the witnesses. From the outset, in the documents and testimonies, the Committee laid down for itself the rule of constantly looking for evidence which meets the criteria of objectivity, impartiality and credibility.