20200606 COVID SNAPSORT (6 June 2020) V3

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20200606 COVID SNAPSORT (6 June 2020) V3

FOOD SECURITY LIBYA 21 K COVID-19 snapshot (as of 6 June 2020) EDUCATION 8 K OVERVIEW OF COVID-19 SITUATION WASH CONFIRMED COVID-19 CASES AND IDENTIFIED SITES ( BY BALADIYA -ADMIN 3-) 12,240 5 $8.9M 270 $ 0.3 K total cases tested samples COVID related deaths funding gap for Suq COVID-19 plan 2 Sites : under Aljuma 1 Site : 43 ICU preparation 3 Sites : 65 bed 1 Site : treatment 53 9 21K 62 2 Sites : under Tripoli ! recovered cases assisted DCs reached with COVID identified centres preparation Tajura related activities Zwara Sabratha Abusliem 2 Sites : under ! 1 Site : under preparation ! preparation ! Ain Zara Surman Azzawya Alkhums NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES BY COVID-19 RESPONSE PILLARS PEOPLE REACHED BY COVID-19 RELATED ACTIVITIES 1 Site : treatment COVID-19 SITES 2 Sites : 15 bed, 2 Sites : under 2 Sites : under 6 ICU preparation 1 preparation Tripoli1 Tarhuna Msallata ! COUNTRY-LEVEL COORDINATION 2 Sites : under Zliten ! preparation 12 SURVEILLANCE Libya RISK COMMUNICATION 32 INFECTION CONTROL AND PREVENTION Al Bayda Derna COVID-19 RESPONSE INDICATORS ! 1 Site : 12 bed, 8 ICU !! ! 1 Site : 40 bed, 2 ICU NO. OF SURVEILLANCE OFFICERS TRAINED FROM MOH AND PARTNERS 1 ! Zliten ! Benghazi ! Misrata 7 Sites : 589 bed, ! NO. OF TRAINING WORKSHOPS FOR MOH AND OTHER STAFF ON RISK COMMUNICATION 2 Nalut Yefren ! Ghiryan 131 ICU Azzintan ! Tobruk NO. OF PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLAN FOR COVID-19 8 Bani Waleed Sirt NO. OF TRAINED HEALTH CARE WORKER 295 2 Sites: 14 bed, 2 Sites under 2 Sites under 1 Site : 10 bed, 14 ICU preparation Ejdabia NO. OF AWARENESS CAMPAIGNS CONDUCTED FOR TARGETED GROUPS ON COVID-19 529 1 ICU preparation 2 Sites : 20 bed, 2 ICU 2 Sites under Albrayga 2 Sites : under preparation 1 Site : 60 bed, 18 ICU DETENTION CENTER ASSISTED WITH COVID-RELATED ACTIVITIES preparation Ghadamis 1 Site : 20 bed, Aljufra 1 Sites under 6 ICU preparation # # # ## # # # # # ! Triq al Sika DC # 6 Sites : under Zwara DC # # ! Brak Tripoli # Triq al Sika DC preparation # # # Sebha # # Abusliem DC ! Sabratha DC Azzawya Al Nasr DC Tripoli 1 Site : under Ubari # Abusliem DC Aljfara ! Janzour DC preparation Azzawya 3 Sites: 100 bed, Tripoli Abu Issa DC !Zwara 10 ICU Suq al Khamis DC Aljfara 1 Site : under Libya Detention center Ghat Azzawya assisted with preparation COVID-related activities Zliten DC Almargeb Alkufra Detention center Zwara! DC Triq al# Sika# DC # #### ####! # # ## # # # # # # # # # # # Collective shelter Sabratha# DC # ! Abusliem DC ! Janzour DC # ! ! Tripoli ! Azzawya Ghiryan al Hamra DC Azzawya Al Nasr DC Abu Issa DC # Zwara 2 Sites : 20 bed, 25 ICU Suq! al Khamis DC Aljfara 114 # Zliten DC 80 ThaherAzzawya Aljabal DC ! 40 Confirmed COVID cases Al Jabal Al Gharbi Almargeb Baladiya (admin 3) with Misrata ! Ghiryan al Hamra DC confirmed COVID cases ! Misrata Baladiya (admin 3) has Al Jabal Al Gharbi medical COVID-sites Thaher! Aljabal DC Creation date: 9 June 2020, Source: WHO, 4W, OCHA, Feedback: [email protected] www.unocha.org/libya COVID-sites capacity shown on the map is what has been reported as “Ready” to receive cases, any updates on the “Ongoing preparation and Planned” COVID-12 sites will be reflected on the map accordingly..

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Gaddafi Supporters Since 2011
Country Policy and Information Note Libya: Actual or perceived supporters of former President Gaddafi Version 3.0 April 2019 Preface Purpose This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the basis of claim section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme. It is split into two main sections: (1) analysis and assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below. Assessment This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note – i.e. the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw – by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment on whether, in general: • A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm • A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies) • A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory • Claims are likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and • If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts. Country of origin information The country information in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), dated April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual, 2013.
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