The Great Carve-Up. Libya's Internationalised Conflicts After Tripoli

NO. 25 JUNE 2020 Introduction The Great Carve-Up Libya’s Internationalised Conflicts after Tripoli Wolfram Lacher The yearlong offensive on Tripoli by Khalifa Haftar’s forces has suffered fatal setbacks, and Libya’s conflicts are changing shape. Russia’s and Turkey’s attempts at carving out spheres of influence are bound to collide with the interests of other foreign powers and with the fluidity of Libya’s political landscape. Haftar could face increasing challenges to his authority over eastern and southern Libya. Rivalries with- in the anti-Haftar alliance will also return to the fore. Foreign intervention and the deep rifts that the war has inflicted on Libyan society will be the key obstacles to a political settlement. Western states should focus on preserving Libya’s unity and countering Russian influence as a matter of priority. With major support from Turkey, forces offensive in April 2019. Military support aligned with the Tripoli-based Government from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, of National Accord (GNA) in April and May and Russia as well as political backing from 2020 inflicted a string of setbacks on Haftar the US and France accorded Haftar a major and compelled his forces in Tripoli to retreat advantage. Turkey, the GNA’s only notable south of the city. A key moment came on foreign supporter, provided limited assis- 23 May with the withdrawal of mercenaries tance in the war’s early months, and sus- by the Russian private military company pended it during autumn 2019, allowing Wagner Group. Airstrikes from Turkish- Haftar’s forces to make progress in Tripoli. operated drones were suspended as the Turkey only resumed its support after mercenaries left, suggesting that Haftar’s forcing the GNA into an agreement over Tripoli offensive ultimately fell victim to maritime rights in November 2019. Con- a Turkish-Russian understanding. Russia trary to the covert foreign support for retains mercenaries in central Libya, where Haftar, Turkish intervention was overt, and it has also recently stationed fighter jets in it rapidly altered the balance of power after Haftar’s support. Russian military support the fighting escalated in late March 2020. remains essential to Haftar’s survival by de- Covert UAE support in the form of drones terring GNA advances beyond Tripolitania. and air defence systems proved ineffective Haftar’s serious setbacks in Tripoli show in the face of Turkish military action. how decisive foreign support has become for both sides since Haftar launched his A Shifting Landscape to Tripoli. It would also establish Turkey as the dominant foreign power in western Haftar’s losses in Tripoli have major impli- Libya, and Russia as the guarantor that GNA cations for Libya’s conflict landscape. The forces will not go on the offensive beyond two warring camps are alliances of con- Tripolitania. venience, and the failure of Haftar’s power bid will reshape them. Armed groups from western Libya that go back to the 2011 war Ramifications East, South, West against Qadhafi form the bulk of the forces fighting Haftar. Many had been in rivalry Turkish and Russian attempts to freeze with each other before uniting against the conflict are bound to collide with the Haftar, and although nominally loyal to the political ramifications of Haftar’s setbacks GNA, they are often deeply resentful of it. in Tripoli. A wide-ranging realignment of Haftar, in turn, mobilised a heterogene- allegiances and alliances is likely to ensue. ous coalition of forces that hoped to sweep The institutions that have served as the to power with him. They include units he interlocutors for Russia and Turkey – the built up in recent years in eastern Libya, but GNA and Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed also armed groups from western and south- Forces – will come under pressure and ern Libya whose loyalty to him is often could ultimately crumble. doubtful. Among them, hardline Salafis In western Libya, Haftar’s offensive and former supporters of the Qadhafi served as a unifying threat. While Haftar’s regime form prominent subgroups. forces were advancing and liable to exploit The immediate question for the trajectory divisions among his enemies, many held of the conflict concerns the fate of Tarhuna, back their anger over corruption in the the city that served as the primary base for GNA and kept their political ambitions in Haftar’s offensive. The militia of the Kani check. These frustrations and rivalries will brothers (or “Kaniyat”) had established its now come to the fore. This is not necessarily control over Tarhuna from 2014 onwards only a negative prospect. The impossibility by killing hundreds of people. Since joining of reforming the GNA without reopening Haftar’s alliance at the beginning of his the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement that Tripoli offensive, the Kaniyat have com- created it has long allowed unaccountable mitted more crimes to maintain control. politicians with no meaningful base to pur- The GNA-aligned forces include hundreds sue their rent-seeking activities. To become of men from Tarhuna who have lost family more effective, the government in Tripoli members or homes due to the Kaniyat’s needs to become more accountable to the actions. But many in the anti-Haftar forces forces on the ground. regard Tarhuna as collectively supportive In much of southern Libya, Haftar’s in- of Haftar and the Kaniyat. fluence is tenuous. Politicians and armed A GNA effort to take Tarhuna risks pro- groups in the south declared their loyalty to voking a protracted conflict that would Haftar, expecting him to provide funds and involve retribution both against the Kaniyat services, and betting that he would prevail and the community as a whole. Since there in Tripoli. Now that he can deliver neither, is widespread fear of indiscriminate vio- many will seek to mend fences with the lence in Tarhuna, many in the city would GNA. This process of realignment is likely be likely to join the fight against the GNA to be protracted and prone to trigger con- to defend their families and community. flict, since the region is divided along com- Whether GNA forces can take control of munal lines and between competing armed Tarhuna depends on Russia’s and the UAE’s groups. Russian and Emirati military sup- willingness to continue propping up Haf- port to Haftar could dissuade armed groups tar’s allies in the town. A retreat from Tar- in the south from shifting allegiances, or it huna would remove the threat Haftar poses could lead to conflicts following such shifts. SWP Comment 25 June 2020 2 Haftar’s grip is strongest in eastern Libya, The more the futility of Haftar’s offensive where many politicians and militia leaders has become evident, the more secessionist will see their fortunes as being tied to his sentiment has gained ground in the east. fate. Much of eastern Libyan society is wary Turkish and Russian intervention also of the instability that would come with Haf- poses obstacles to a political settlement. In tar’s demise. But fighters who are returning negotiations, Libyan parties would demand disillusioned from a lost war in Tripoli could that their adversaries’ backers withdraw turn against him. Benghazi militia leaders foreign elements, including Russian and who have long been latently disloyal to Syrian mercenaries, Emirati drones, Russian him could seize the opportunity to reassert fighter jets, and Turkish military assets. themselves. Political opposition could Moreover, an agreement that would re- coalesce around the head of the eastern- establish a single government, army com- based rump parliament, Agilah Saleh, or mand, and a central bank would also dilute around a movement for eastern autonomy Russian and Turkish influence. A unified that Haftar had suppressed for the past few government might ultimately seek to eject years. The numerous politicians, business- any foreign military presence. Russian and men, and fighters who fled the Haftar- Turkish interests therefore lie in freezing controlled east in the recent past could ally the conflict, rather than resolving it. with Haftar’s opponents in order to return. Haftar’s failure in Tripoli does nothing to Unless Haftar eventually succeeds in his alleviate the growing financial pressure on attempts at illegally selling oil, these strug- both sides. Since January 2020, Haftar has gles will unfold while he faces growing stopped oil exports in areas under his con- difficulties in raising funds. If Haftar’s struc- trol. He is thereby preventing revenues ture founders, the considerable grievances from accruing to the Central Bank in Tripoli, his violent rise caused could return to the which has refused to offer the eastern fore. Violent conflicts would follow. authorities associated with Haftar greater access to finance. To date, Western states have used UN sanctions on illegal oil ex- Challenges to a Condominium ports to block Haftar’s recurrent attempts at selling oil independently. Any agreement Further questions over the sustainability between the two sides to resume oil exports of a Turkish-Russian arrangement in Libya would have to involve a reform of the concern their interest in a Libyan political Central Bank’s executive that reflects an settlement, and the opposition such an arrangement on revenue distribution. arrangement would provoke from other Absent such a deal, fiscal conditions will foreign powers. worsen for both the Tripoli government A Russian-Turkish understanding does and the eastern authorities associated with not necessarily mean an end to fighting, Haftar. This would also limit their ability nor would it be immune to periodic break- to pay for foreign mercenaries and military down and renegotiation. But if Haftar’s hardware, as well as to reward their foreign forces withdraw from Tripolitania, mutual sponsors with opportunities in the energy deterrence by Russia and Turkey may well sector.

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