NO. 25 JUNE 2020 Introduction

The Great Carve-Up ’s Internationalised Conflicts after Wolfram Lacher

The yearlong offensive on Tripoli by ’s forces has suffered fatal set- backs, and Libya’s conflicts are changing shape. Russia’s and Turkey’s attempts at carving out spheres of influence are bound to collide with the interests of other for- eign powers and with the fluidity of Libya’s political landscape. Haftar could face increasing challenges to his authority over eastern and southern Libya. Rivalries with- in the anti-Haftar alliance will also return to the fore. Foreign intervention and the deep rifts that the war has inflicted on Libyan society will be the key obstacles to a political settlement. Western states should focus on preserving Libya’s unity and countering Russian influence as a matter of priority.

With major support from Turkey, forces offensive in April 2019. Military support aligned with the Tripoli-based Government from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, of National Accord (GNA) in April and May and Russia as well as political backing from 2020 inflicted a string of setbacks on Haftar the US and France accorded Haftar a major and compelled his forces in Tripoli to retreat advantage. Turkey, the GNA’s only notable south of the city. A key moment came on foreign supporter, provided limited assis- 23 May with the withdrawal of mercenaries tance in the war’s early months, and sus- by the Russian private military company pended it during autumn 2019, allowing Wagner Group. Airstrikes from Turkish- Haftar’s forces to make progress in Tripoli. operated drones were suspended as the Turkey only resumed its support after mercenaries left, suggesting that Haftar’s forcing the GNA into an agreement over Tripoli offensive ultimately fell victim to maritime rights in November 2019. Con- a Turkish-Russian understanding. Russia trary to the covert foreign support for retains mercenaries in central Libya, where Haftar, Turkish intervention was overt, and it has also recently stationed fighter jets in it rapidly altered the balance of power after Haftar’s support. Russian military support the fighting escalated in late March 2020. remains essential to Haftar’s survival by de- Covert UAE support in the form of drones terring GNA advances beyond . and air defence systems proved ineffective Haftar’s serious setbacks in Tripoli show in the face of Turkish military action. how decisive foreign support has become for both sides since Haftar launched his

A Shifting Landscape to Tripoli. It would also establish Turkey as the dominant foreign power in western Haftar’s losses in Tripoli have major impli- Libya, and Russia as the guarantor that GNA cations for Libya’s conflict landscape. The forces will not go on the offensive beyond two warring camps are alliances of con- Tripolitania. venience, and the failure of Haftar’s power bid will reshape them. Armed groups from western Libya that go back to the 2011 war Ramifications East, South, West against Qadhafi form the bulk of the forces fighting Haftar. Many had been in rivalry Turkish and Russian attempts to freeze with each other before uniting against the conflict are bound to collide with the Haftar, and although nominally loyal to the political ramifications of Haftar’s setbacks GNA, they are often deeply resentful of it. in Tripoli. A wide-ranging realignment of Haftar, in turn, mobilised a heterogene- allegiances and alliances is likely to ensue. ous coalition of forces that hoped to sweep The institutions that have served as the to power with him. They include units he interlocutors for Russia and Turkey – the built up in recent years in eastern Libya, but GNA and Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed also armed groups from western and south- Forces – will come under pressure and ern Libya whose loyalty to him is often could ultimately crumble. doubtful. Among them, hardline Salafis In western Libya, Haftar’s offensive and former supporters of the Qadhafi served as a unifying threat. While Haftar’s regime form prominent subgroups. forces were advancing and liable to exploit The immediate question for the trajectory divisions among his enemies, many held of the conflict concerns the fate of Tarhuna, back their anger over corruption in the the city that served as the primary base for GNA and kept their political ambitions in Haftar’s offensive. The militia of the Kani check. These frustrations and rivalries will brothers (or “Kaniyat”) had established its now come to the fore. This is not necessarily control over Tarhuna from 2014 onwards only a negative prospect. The impossibility by killing hundreds of people. Since joining of reforming the GNA without reopening Haftar’s alliance at the beginning of his the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement that Tripoli offensive, the Kaniyat have com- created it has long allowed unaccountable mitted more crimes to maintain control. politicians with no meaningful base to pur- The GNA-aligned forces include hundreds sue their rent-seeking activities. To become of men from Tarhuna who have lost family more effective, the government in Tripoli members or homes due to the Kaniyat’s needs to become more accountable to the actions. But many in the anti-Haftar forces forces on the ground. regard Tarhuna as collectively supportive In much of southern Libya, Haftar’s in- of Haftar and the Kaniyat. fluence is tenuous. Politicians and armed A GNA effort to take Tarhuna risks pro- groups in the south declared their loyalty to voking a protracted conflict that would Haftar, expecting him to provide funds and involve retribution both against the Kaniyat services, and betting that he would prevail and the community as a whole. Since there in Tripoli. Now that he can deliver neither, is widespread fear of indiscriminate vio- many will seek to mend fences with the lence in Tarhuna, many in the city would GNA. This process of realignment is likely be likely to join the fight against the GNA to be protracted and prone to trigger con- to defend their families and community. flict, since the region is divided along com- Whether GNA forces can take control of munal lines and between competing armed Tarhuna depends on Russia’s and the UAE’s groups. Russian and Emirati military sup- willingness to continue propping up Haf- port to Haftar could dissuade armed groups tar’s allies in the town. A retreat from Tar- in the south from shifting allegiances, or it huna would remove the threat Haftar poses could lead to conflicts following such shifts.

SWP Comment 25 June 2020

2 Haftar’s grip is strongest in eastern Libya, The more the futility of Haftar’s offensive where many politicians and militia leaders has become evident, the more secessionist will see their fortunes as being tied to his sentiment has gained ground in the east. fate. Much of eastern Libyan society is wary Turkish and Russian intervention also of the instability that would come with Haf- poses obstacles to a political settlement. In tar’s demise. But fighters who are returning negotiations, Libyan parties would demand disillusioned from a lost war in Tripoli could that their adversaries’ backers withdraw turn against him. Benghazi militia leaders foreign elements, including Russian and who have long been latently disloyal to Syrian mercenaries, Emirati drones, Russian him could seize the opportunity to reassert fighter jets, and Turkish military assets. themselves. Political opposition could Moreover, an agreement that would re- coalesce around the head of the eastern- establish a single government, army com- based rump parliament, Agilah Saleh, or mand, and a central bank would also dilute around a movement for eastern autonomy Russian and Turkish influence. A unified that Haftar had suppressed for the past few government might ultimately seek to eject years. The numerous politicians, business- any foreign military presence. Russian and men, and fighters who fled the Haftar- Turkish interests therefore lie in freezing controlled east in the recent past could ally the conflict, rather than resolving it. with Haftar’s opponents in order to return. Haftar’s failure in Tripoli does nothing to Unless Haftar eventually succeeds in his alleviate the growing financial pressure on attempts at illegally selling oil, these strug- both sides. Since January 2020, Haftar has gles will unfold while he faces growing stopped oil exports in areas under his con- difficulties in raising funds. If Haftar’s struc- trol. He is thereby preventing revenues ture founders, the considerable grievances from accruing to the Central Bank in Tripoli, his violent rise caused could return to the which has refused to offer the eastern fore. Violent conflicts would follow. authorities associated with Haftar greater access to finance. To date, Western states have used UN sanctions on illegal oil ex- Challenges to a Condominium ports to block Haftar’s recurrent attempts at selling oil independently. Any agreement Further questions over the sustainability between the two sides to resume oil exports of a Turkish-Russian arrangement in Libya would have to involve a reform of the concern their interest in a Libyan political Central Bank’s executive that reflects an settlement, and the opposition such an arrangement on revenue distribution. arrangement would provoke from other Absent such a deal, fiscal conditions will foreign powers. worsen for both the Tripoli government A Russian-Turkish understanding does and the eastern authorities associated with not necessarily mean an end to fighting, Haftar. This would also limit their ability nor would it be immune to periodic break- to pay for foreign mercenaries and military down and renegotiation. But if Haftar’s hardware, as well as to reward their foreign forces withdraw from Tripolitania, mutual sponsors with opportunities in the energy deterrence by Russia and Turkey may well sector. Russia and Turkey face a dilemma: put an end to large-scale hostilities. Even in Negotiating a political settlement would that scenario, however, the prospects for risk curbing their influence, but merely political negotiations are slim. Since Haftar freezing the conflict will undermine the launched his Tripoli offensive, most politi- economic viability of their interventions. cal actors in western Libya no longer see Additional challenges emanate from him as a credible negotiating partner. foreign powers. A Turkish-Russian under- Moreover, the war has caused a deep rift standing would marginalise Haftar’s other between western and eastern Libya, where foreign backers – the UAE, Egypt, and few voices had spoken out against the war. France – and empower Turkey, whose

SWP Comment 25 June 2020

3 regional policies are opposed by all three will only be able to act in unison if the states. The US is alarmed over Russia’s de- French position shifts away from its relative ployment of fighter jets and could bolster tolerance for Russia and adversarial stance Turkey’s military posture in order to pre- towards Turkey. Russia’s military presence vent Russia from establishing permanent in Libya represents a far greater menace to bases in Libya. All four powers will try to Europe than Turkish intervention. Reduc- prevent or undermine a Russian-Turkish ing the Russian presence would also dimin- arrangement on Libya. This could exacer- ish the GNA’s dependence on Turkish pro- bate conflicts if different foreign powers tection, thereby addressing the concerns of back competing local actors. Rivalries member states that oppose the GNA due to © Stiftung Wissenschaft between great and middle powers in Libya their dispute with Turkey over maritime und Politik, 2020 will also prevent the UN from regaining its rights in the Eastern Mediterranean. All rights reserved role as a credible mediator between con- Among the tools Europeans have at their flicting foreign and local interests. disposal to pursue these goals, hard power This Comment reflects does not feature prominently. EU member the author’s views. states no longer have the credibility needed The online version of A Marginalised Europe to play a meaningful military role in Libya, this publication contains and would only add to the confusion of for- functioning links to other Europeans stood by and watched as Libya’s eign meddlers in the country. The EU mari- SWP texts and other relevant war raged on and foreign intervention time operation IRINI does little to prevent sources. reached unprecedented levels. The primary arms shipments from reaching Libya. It can, SWP Comments are subject reasons for their inaction were France’s however, be used as a deterrent against to internal peer review, fact- policy of protecting Haftar, the initial tacit illegal oil exports – which is crucial for checking and copy-editing. backing of the US for Haftar and its sub- preventing partition. For further information on sequent indifference to the war, and Euro- Western leverage is strongest in the econo- our quality control pro- peans’ reluctance to confront the UAE and my and in the use of sanctions. Western cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- Egypt over their support for Haftar’s offen- states should continue to use their influ- berlin.org/en/about-swp/ sive. This unwillingness to apply leverage ence in international financial institutions quality-management-for- also marked German diplomacy. as well as the global banking, insurance, swp-publications/ The result of this policy was that Turkey and energy industries to prevent illegal oil and Russia filled the vacuum, while Euro- exports and to work towards reforms at the SWP peans lost credibility and influence. This Central Bank, and ultimately its reunifica- Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik will now limit their ability to mediate and tion. Paralysis in the UN Security Council German Institute for to prod the GNA into taking urgently raises the need for a more extensive use of International and needed steps, such as strengthening its base EU and US sanctions against companies and Security Affairs and accountability, and containing newly individuals involved in violations of the arms empowered armed groups. embargo and attempts at illegal oil exports. Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin Now that the catastrophic consequences The prosecution of war crimes under uni- Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 of European inaction are evident and Haftar versal jurisdiction is essential as a deterrent Fax +49 30 880 07-100 no longer has a chance to seize power, a for armed groups empowered by foreign www.swp-berlin.org policy shift is both possible and indispen- sponsors. [email protected] sable. A Russian-Turkish condominium To curb Russian influence, the EU should

ISSN 1861-1761 would neither reunify Libya nor serve the wield sanctions to undermine Haftar, on doi: 10.18449/2020C25 EU’s interest, even if it was sustainable. But whom Russia depends as a host and part- opposing Russia and Turkey at the same time ner. In parallel, Western states should will not work, since this would push both finally push their interests in a stable Libya states closer together. Two key goals should more strongly when engaging with Haftar’s guide European policies: First, safeguard other foreign supporters, particularly Egypt Libya’s unity; second, counter Russian and the UAE, to dissuade them from further influence in Libya as a matter of priority. cooperation with Russia. The US shares both goals. But Europeans

SWP Comment 25 Dr. Wolfram Lacher is a Senior Associate in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. June 2020

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