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ANNEX 4D.4 PUBLIC #Printmode Page 1 of 2 ICC-01/11-01/11-216-Anx4d.4 03-10-2012 2/3 RH PT ICC-01/11-01/11-216-Anx4D.4 03-10-2012 1/3 RH PT ANNEX 4D.4 PUBLIC #printMode Page 1 of 2 ICC-01/11-01/11-216-Anx4D.4 03-10-2012 2/3 RH PT Dow Jones Reprints: This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. To order presentation-ready copies for distribution to your colleagues, clients or customers, use the Order Reprints tool at the bottom of any article or visit www.djreprints.com See a sample reprint in PDF format. Order a reprint of this article now OPINION EUROPE August 29, 2012, 3:45 p.m. ET The Real Threat to Libya's New Government Emboldened Islamic extremism, not Gadhafi loyalists, could spoil the new Libya's potential. By DANIEL NISMAN All things considered, Libya's revolution hasn't been the disaster it was predicted to be. Fears of inter-factional violence and boycotts were put to rest by a smooth national election and transition period this summer. Over the past year, the National Transitional Council (NTC) government has pacified Libya's regional tribes almost as well as the Gadhafi regime—albeit with political savvy instead of bribery and violence. As a result, the new Libya hasn't become pixelated by bloody tribal rivalries, nor has it descended into Iraq-style sectarian violence. At least not yet. But while the newly elected politicians of the General National Congress bicker over a governing coalition in the air- conditioned halls of Tripoli's Rixos Hotel, tensions are boiling in the streets. In the last several months, a spate of bombings, kidnappings and assassinations has spread to Tripoli from the eastern city of Benghazi, most recently with a deadly triple car bombing in the capital's downtown district on Aug. 19. No group has claimed responsibility for these attacks, though the government has pointed the finger at elusive bands of Gadhafi loyalists. This fits into the NTC's broader obsession with the obscure possibility of a counterrevolution. But in fact, Libya's security woes are being fomented by other factors entirely. Muslim extremists, whose political representatives did poorly in the July elections, have embarked on a violent campaign to rid Libya of anything they consider heretical to their strict interpretation of Sunni Islam. Militants have spent the summer attacking Red Cross facilities and their "proselytizing" symbols with grenades and rockets. Foreign diplomats have been targeted with roadside bombs. Benghazi has also seen a string of assassinations. Islamist violence finally spilled onto the national stage this week, when two major shrines belonging to the mystic Sufi stream of Islam were destroyed by Salafist militants in Tripoli and Zliten. The incident sparked outrage among Libya's largely secular population, many of whom are practicing Sufis. Emboldened Islamic extremism represents a clear policy failure of the NTC, which has refused to brand the violence as a national threat. Dangerous as they are, Islamists are the tip of the iceberg when it EPA comes to ignored threats to Libya's national security. Car bombs in Tripoli on Aug. 19 were the first since Gadhafi's ouster. For instance, residents in old Gadhafi strongholds continue to suffer collective punishment for their tribal ties to the ousted dictator. These communities are being ignored by government services, while suffering under continued harassment by NTC-affiliated militias. In July, a militia from Misrata nearly invaded the town of Bani Walid in order to free a number of Misratans supposedly being held by Gadhafi loyalists. In fact, the Misratans had been jailed after they'd been captured by Bani Walid militiamen who were looking to free their own citizens being held in Misratan jails. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443864204577618851069298574.html 31/08/2012 #printMode Page 2 of 2 ICC-01/11-01/11-216-Anx4D.4 03-10-2012 3/3 RH PT The narrowly averted spat came after months of complaints by Bani Walidian civilians, who charged that NTC militias had looted their homes and harassed their families in the name of the revolution. The situation is even worse in Gadhafi's coastal hometown of Sirte, where countless buildings still lie in ruin from the revolution's final battle. Earlier this month, miserable economic conditions and lawlessness in Sirte drove workers at a local oil installation to strike in protest against government neglect. While both Sirte and Bani Walid remain notorious as the sites of Moammar Gadhafi's last stand, the reality is that the majority of their inhabitants want nothing to do with the old regime. These towns and their militias pose a threat to national security not because of their supposed hatred for the revolution, but for the new government's exclusionary policies and the marginalization of their citizens. As they hunt for the perpetrators of the Aug. 19 bombings, the Libyan army will need the cooperation of these towns more than ever. Investing in these communities instead of neglecting them would yield high returns in the form of trust and cooperation, ultimately stripping militant Gadhafi loyalists of any safe havens they may have had. It was Ambrose Bierce, the 18th-century American journalist, who said that "Revolution is an abrupt change in the form of misgovernment." As Libya's new leadership takes form, they would be wise to heed the lessons behind Bierce's cynicism. There is little doubt that some of Gadhafi's henchmen still lurk in the alleyways of Tripoli's Abu Salim district and on the rustic streets of Tarhuna or Bani Walid, seeking futile revenge against the revolution. But the government-inspired witch hunt for Gadhafi loyalists has only fueled the Libyan people's hatred for remnants of the past, while distracting them from the true hindrances to a prosperous future. Libya is a nation full of potential, one whose young, relatively liberal population sits atop some of Europe's most desired oil reserves. Realizing this potential requires a focused, national effort toward reconciliation among all Libyans, while stamping out radical and uncompromising ideologies before they take hold. Until the new leadership accepts this reality, Gadhafi's divisive and oppressive legacy will remain alive and well. —Mr. Nisman is an intelligence manager at Max Security Solutions, a geopolitical-risk consulting firm based in Tel Aviv. Follow him on Twitter @DannyNis Copyright 2012 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. Distribution and use of this material are governed by our Subscriber Agreement and by copyright law. For non-personal use or to order multiple copies, please contact Dow Jones Reprints at 1-800-843-0008 or visit www.djreprints.com You Might Like From Around the Web Content from Sponsors What's this? In Ad, Voters Break Up With Obama If You Have Gmail... You Must Have This Another California Brainstorm (Charles Hudson's Weblog) Study: Calorie Cuts Don't Equal Longer Life How Afghanistan’s Mineral Wealth Undermines NATO Mission Fukuoka Girls: Don’t You Wish You Were (www.internationalpolicydigest.org) Cute Like Me? 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