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Libya Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMMI) Libya Cash Working Group 3 - 13 October 2020

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Libya Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMMI) Libya Cash Working Group 3 - 13 October 2020 Libya Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMMI) Libya Cash Working Group 3 - 13 October 2020 INTRODUCTION METHODOLOGY KEY FINDINGS JMMI KEY FIGURES In an effort to inform cash-based interventions • Field staff familiar with the local market conditions identified • In October 2020, the cost of the overall MEB and better understand market dynamics in Data collection from 3 - 13 October 2020 shops representative of the general price level in their respective increased by 4.3%. This month's MEB is 14.3% more Libya, the Joint Market Monitoring Initiative locations. expensive than pre-COVID levels in March 2020*. 3 participating agencies (JMMI) was created by the Libya Cash & (REACH, WFP) • At least four prices per assessed item were collected within The increase in the MEB from September - October Markets Working Group (CMWG) in June 33 assessed cities each location. In line with the purpose of the JMMI, only the price 2020 may be attributed to seasonal production cost 2017. The initiative is led by REACH and 45 assessed items of the cheapest available brand was recorded for each item. increases for domestically grown agricultural products, supported by the CMWG members. It is such as potatoes (+20.0%), peppers (+18.8%) and 635 assessed shops funded by the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster • Enumerators were trained on methodology and tools by REACH. tomatoes (+18.2%). Assistance (OFDA) and the United Nations Data collection was conducted through the KoBoCollect mobile • After the lifting of the oil blockade on the 18th Sepember High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). application. 4 2020, Libya has rapidly increased its oil output. On EXCHANGE RATES Markets in key urban areas across Libya are • Following data collection, REACH compiled and cleaned all the 13th November 2020, Reuters has reported assessed on a monthly basis. In each location, partner data, normalising prices, cross-checking outliers and that oil production has risen to 1.2m barrels per 1.373 6.170 7.050 field teams record prices and availability of calculating the median cost of the MEB in each assessed day (bpd).1 The rise in oil production may have USD/LYD USD/LYD EUR/LYD basic food and non-food items (NFIs) sold market. led to the decrease in parallel market gasoline official parallel market parallel market in local shops and markets. This factsheet • Qualitaive information is also gathered from local sources and (-12.5%) and cooking fuel (-16.5%) prices in across ▲ +0.8% ▼ -4.3% ▼ -6.0% presents an overview of price ranges and economic experts through key informant (KI) interviews. Libya. West and East Libya have witnessed cooking medians for key food items and NFIs in • REACH has extracted prices on a daily basis from the website, fuel prices reverting back to pre-oil blockade levels the assessed areas, as well as the costs (December 2019), whereas the cost of fuel in South "Open Souq" and conducted KI interviews to better understand KEY MONTHLY CHANGES IN MEB associated with key elements of the Minimum Libya continues to be more than twice as expensive the rental market in Libya. Expenditure Basket (MEB). compared to December 2019. Median cost of overall MEB • Enmuerators have also surveyd customers from a number REACH has also conducted analysis • After lengthy protests on both sides of the Libyan/ 719.61 LYD ▲29.49 LYD ▲ +4.3% of shops to ask questions focused on access to cash and highlighting economic vulnerability for at- Tunisian border, authorities decided to allow all alternative payment modalities. 9 risk population groups that can be accessed types of trade to continue at the Ras Jedir border Food items Hygiene items Cooking fuel. through an interactive dashboard. • More details are available in the Methodology section of the crossing.2 The reopening of the border comes as ▲+5.1% ▲+7.1% ▼-14.3% Appendix. a relief for those dependent on transporting goods COVERAGE between the two countries and may reduce the cost Albayda Derna of the MEB in western cities close to Tunisia. Benghazi Almar • The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United MEDIAN COST OF MEB BY REGION Nalut Sirt Tobruk Nations (FAO) reports that the 2020 cereal crop West 657.0 LYD ▲+8.2% Ghadamis West Edabia production is 5% lower than the previous year, while East 712.2 LYD ▲+3.3% crop yield is 12% below average. The low output may South 919.6 LYD ▲+11.2% Alufra only have marginal effect on wheat prices, as the country Brak imports 90% of its cereal consumption requirments. Ubari Sebha Farmers report that "power cuts, insecurity as well as East Wadi Etba South expensive inputs, including seeds, water, fuel, tools MARKET SHORTAGES Ghat Algatroun and machinery, continue to constrain their ability to Tripoli Area Alkufra produce". Along with movement restrictions, these • None reported challenges have likely led to a decrease in farmer Sabratha Tripoli wara Alkhums income, and may cause additional price spikes for Azzawya Janzour liten Al Aziziya Msallata locally produced products. 3 Tarhuna Reported changes are month-on-month Yefren Misrata Ghiryan Bani Waleed Azzintan * Erratum: the previous factsheet reported that the September MEB was 21.3% Ashshgega more expensive than March 2019, but this should have been 9.6% more expensive. Access the JMMI online dashboard MEDIAN MEB COST BY LOCATION EXCHANGE RATES OVER TIME6 MINIMUM EXPENDITURE BASKET (MEB) Location Cost of MEB Since Since January 2016-July 2019 Since July 2019 Key Elements: Food Items (LYD) Sep 2020 March 2019 Bread 32 kg Tomatoes 10 kg Ashshgega 825.0 11.2% 26.7% Rice 10.5 kg Potatoes 12 kg Azzintan 823.0 -2.7% 22.2% 12 Pasta 9.5 kg Onions 7 kg 7.050 Yefren 806.6 14.3% 18.5% 1st October 2020 Couscous 5.5 kg Peppers 4.5 kg Beans 6 kg Tomato paste 6 kg Nalut 799.1 1.1% 13.1% 10 Chicken 7.5 kg Black tea 2 kg Msallata 781.8 6.4% 32.6% 6.170 1st October 2020 Tuna 4 kg Vegetable oil 5 L Ghiryan 773.7 -3.9% 10.6% Eggs 4 kg Sugar 2 kg 8 Zwara 732.9 10.4% 10.5% Milk 8.5 L Salt 1 kg Tripoli 725.7 11.2% 12.4% Key Elements: Non-Food Items LYD Zliten 712.0 12.6% 8.7% 6 Bathing soap 1.4 kg (9 150-g bars) Sabratha 705.7 8.1% 10.3% 3.618 Toothpaste 0.5 kg (5 100-g tubes) 1st October 2020 Azzawya 702.3 8.8% 8.4% Laundry detergent 1.3 L 4 Dishwashing liquid 1.3 L Ghadamis 692.2 10.5% 0.2% Sanitary pads 4 packs of 10 Al Aziziya 687.2 11.0% 8.8% 1.373 1st October 2020 Cooking fuel (LPG) 22 kg (2 11-kg refills) 2 Sirt 651.3 6.1% 11.7% Optional Elements7 Bani Waleed 649.4 17.8% 3.6% Water (drinking use Tarhuna 647.7 12.7% 1.7% 0 only) 458 L Jan 2016 Jul 2016 Jan 2017 Jul 2017 Jan 2018 Jul 2018 Jan 2019 Jul 2019 1 Jul 1 Aug 1 Sep 1 Oct 1 Nov 1 Dec 1 Jan 1 Feb 1 Mar 1 Apr 1 May 1 Jun 1 Jul 1 Aug 1 Sep 1 Oct 1 Nov Alkhums 618.9 7.1% -2.9% Median rent for 3-rm flat 1 month USD/LYD (official) USD/LYD (official) + tax USD/LYD (parallel market) EUR/LYD (parallel market) Linear (EUR/LYD (parallel market)) Float8 20% of key elements Misrata 598.0 3.0% -4.1% Janzour 567.1 0.3% -2.4% MEB PRICE INDEX The Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) represents the minimum culturally adjusted group of items required Median West 695.0 8.2% 7.8% Since November 2019 (normalised, November 2019 = 1.00)9 to support a five-person Libyan household (HH) for one Albayda 924.6 7.5% 51.2% month. The cost of the MEB can be used as a proxy Benghazi 764.7 4.6% 26.3% 1.50 for the financial burdens facing households in different Derna 731.6 12.2% 18.7% 1.45 locations. The MEB's contents were defined by the Alkufra 717.0 1.2% 8.4% CMWG in consultation with relevant sector leads. 1.40 Ejdabia 701.1 -3.1% 12.8% 1.35 Only the MEB's key elements (food and non-food items) Tobruk 672.5 3.3% 8.7% were incorporated into the calculations in this factsheet. 1.30 Almarj 668.4 12.6% 11.5% 1.25 Median East 724.6 3.3% 18.1% 1.20 Ghat 1380.7 6.1% 31.2% 1.15 COST OF MEDIAN OVERALL MEB Ubari 1284.1 8.2% 30.1% Algatroun 1209.5 9.7% 14.5% 1.10 719.6 LYD Wadi Etba 959.8 0.3% No data 1.05 Change since Change since Sebha 824.6 -3.7% 19.9% 1.00 September 2020 March 2019 Brak 812.6 12.2% 15.7% 0.95 Aljufra 777.3 -2.9% 3.7% ▲ +29.49 LYD ▲+49.98 LYD 0.90 (+4.3%) (+7.5%) Median South 950.3 11.2% 11.4% Nov-19 Dec-19 Jan-20 Feb-20 Mar-20 Apr-20 May-20 Jun-20 Jul-20 Aug-20 Sep-20 Oct-20 Median Overall 719.6 4.3% 7.5% Median Overall Median West Median East Median South 2 Libya Cash Working Group Libya Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMMI): 3 - 13 October 2020 Cost of MEB Key Elements by Location View interactiveView interactive dashboard dashboard Geographic distribution of the cost of the MEB and Geographic distribution of livelihoods vulnerability economically vulnerable housholds Libya Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMMI): 3 - 13 October 2020 Libya Cash Working Group 3 Liquidity and Financial Infrastructure Key findings • A number of recent reports have indicated that the liquidity crisis in Libya is a growing concern for the population, as households are not able to withdraw sufficient amounts to meet needs.10 Only 3.7% of customer respondents in Libya overall were able to purchase the items necessary to meet their basic needs using cash withdrawn from banks within the last 30 days.
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