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9780521850131 Index.Pdf Cambridge University Press 0521850134 - A History of Central Banking in Great Britain and the United States John H. Wood Index More information Index Accord, Treasury-Federal Reserve, on lender of last resort, 69, 75–77, 89–94, 236–238 109, 112, 115, 202 Acheson, Dean, 266, 296 Balderston, C. Canby, 356 Ackley, Gardner, 357 Balke, Nathan S., 144, 200 Acres, Marston, 1 Bank Charter Act of 1833, 68, 398 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Bank Charter Act of 1844, 21, 24, 86–87, 213–214 276 Ahearn, Daniel S., 254 as base rule, 80–81 Aldenham, Lord, 306–307 purpose of, 101 Aldrich, Nelson, 160, 161 relevance of, 89, 93, 107–108, 114 Aldrich plan, 160–161, 163–164 suspensions of, 99–100 Aldrich-Vreeland Act, 162–163 Bank for International Settlements, Alexander, James, 179 319 Althorp, Viscount, 29–30, 67–74, 230 Bank holiday of 1933, 209–210, 213 American Bankers Association, 164 Banking Act of 1933, 357 American/British loan, 293–297 Banking Act of 1935, 2, 196, 218–222 Amiens, Peace of, 12 Banking School, 77, 81–85 Amory, Heathcoat, 305, 313 Bank of England Anderson, Richard G., 7 and American loan, 295–297 Andreades, A., 1 under Bank Restriction Act, 9–12 Angell, Wayne D., 188–189 and Bretton Woods, 267–270 Appropriations Act of 1881, 149 before Bullion Committee, 8–9, 14–20 Ashley, W. J., 364 and the City, 301 Ashurst, Henry, 215 charters of, 2, 37–41, 67–69, 75, 86–87 assignats, 218 as commitment, 390 Astor, John Jacob, 130 compared with Federal Reserve, 94, Attwood, Matthias, 79 277–280 Attwood, Thomas, 49–50, 80, 87 and Competition and Credit Control, 323, 326 Bagehot problem, 112 and controls, 299–300, 306 Bagehot, Walter, 2, 32, 113, 114, 159 directors of, 5, 9, 37, 73–74 on Bank governance, 73, 75, 109 establishment of, 2, 32–38 on Bullion Committee testimony, 13 and economists, 281, 287 425 © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 0521850134 - A History of Central Banking in Great Britain and the United States John H. Wood Index More information 426 Index Bank of England (cont.) joint-stock, 44, 66–67, 69, 76–77, 113 governance, 37, 72–75, 104–105, 109, pet, 140 280–282 structure of, 222 and Government, 10–12, 20, 25, 36, views of Federal Reserve, 160–161, 164 38–41, 43–45, 54–59, 62–66, 326–327 in War of 1812, 126–128 incentives of, 11, 74–75 See also state banks; National Banking independence of, 6, 291, 388–389 System and industrialists, 287 bank reserves Issue and Banking Departments of, 86, 88 100-percent, 336–337 nationalization of, 280, 299–300 and cash ratio, 326 new contract of, 394–396 excess, 223–226 as New Lady, 399 free, 342–344, 359 notes of, 23–24, 68–69 in Great Depression, 202 objectives of, 68 and lagged reserve accounting, 385 and Palmer rule, 69–71, 75–77 requirements on, 221, 225–226 privileges of, 32, 38 Bank War, 2 public duty of, 108 Barber, Anthony, 325, 395 and quantity theory, 283 Baring, 44 reserve of, 10–12, 23, 69, 76, 82, 89–94, Alexander, 56 109–110, 111, 115, 316 Crisis, 2, 111, 112 returns of, 11, 81, 94–100 Francis Thornhill, 77–78, 107–108 and robot, 314–316 Sir Francis, 23, 44, 46–47, 117 secrecy, 11 Thomas, 116 and stop-go, 280, 302–314 See also Cromer, Earl of and Treasury, 291, 301, 303–307, 312–313, Barker, Jacob, 130 321 Beard, Charles, 124 See also central bankers; central banks; Beaverbrook, Lord, 270 Monetary Policy Committee; lender Beck, James, 147, 149 of last resort; crises; Bank Rate Benton, Thomas Hart, 6, 133–134, 157 Bank of England Act of 1998, 3, 394 Bernholz, Peter, 381–382 Bank of France, 76, 83 Beveridge, William, 364 Bank of Mutual Redemption, 122–123 Biddle, Nicholas, 2, 132–133 Bank of the United States, first, 2, 3, 26, bills only, 244–245, 247–256 119–120, 123–126 bimetallism, 13, 151 Bank of the United States, second, 119 Birch, Nigel, 313 and Andrew Jackson, 2, 6, 123, 131–134 Black, Eugene, 218 establishment of, 3, 128–130 Blackstone, Sir William, 217, 390 monetary policy of, 2, 131–134 Blaine, James G., 143 and resumption, 131 Blinder, Alan S., 366 Bank Rate Bloomfield, Arthur I., 272 before 1914, 76, 111, 114–116 Blount, William, 365 decisions, 303–304, 310–311 Blumenthal, Michael, 378 effects of, 115–116, 284, 297–298, 323 Bolton, George, 314 with film of gold, 115 Boothby, Robert, 293 history of, 68 Bosanquet, Henry, 98 legal ceiling on, 68 Bosanquet, J. W., 331 See also Bank of England; interest rates; Boutwell, George S., 143–144 Cheap Money Bowley, A. L., 364 Bank Restriction Act of 1797, 10 Boyd, Walter, 11, 29 banks, commercial Bradbury, Sir John, 287 country, 10, 43–44, 69, 113 Brand, Robert, Lord, 295 failures, 202 Brandeis, Louis, 165 © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 0521850134 - A History of Central Banking in Great Britain and the United States John H. Wood Index More information Index 427 Brash, Donald, 394 and economists, 4–6, 52–53, 191–192, Bretton Woods 246–247, 253–254, 277–280, 299–300, agreement, 3, 261–267 301–302 breakdown of, 273–275, 350–352 knowledge of, 4, 13–14, 27–31, 74, 82–83, system, 247, 270–272 156, 158, 282–285 See also International Monetary Fund and uncertainty, 4–5, 52–53 Brittan, Samuel, 305, 312 central banks Brooke, Edward, 366 American, 119–120 Brown, George, 319, 320–321 as bankers’ banks, 117 Browning, Peter, 322 of Canada, 395 Brunner, Karl, 206, 343 commitments of, 3 Bryan, William Jennings, 151, 164, 364 continuity of, 2–4 Budd, Sir Alan, 5 contracts of, 41–42, 377, 389–400 Buiter, Willem, 5 credibility of, 390–391 bullion, 13 and determination of monetary Bullion Committee, 2, 4, 8–9, 14–20, 49 arrangements, 267–270 Bullock, Charles, 185, 188 different after 1914, 277, 280–282 Burgess, W. Randolph, 2, 186 discovery of, 8, 32 Burns, Arthur F. European, 398 compared with Eccles and Strong, and financial stability, 108–109, 114, 399 363 future of, 7, 399–400 as Federal Reserve chairman, 2, 362–374, and Governments, 2, 6, 10–12, 41–42, 377 174, 398–399 on Federal Reserve independence, histories of, 1 361–362 incentives of, 22–24, 25–27, 74–75, and Nixon, 354 388–389, 390 as policy activist, 361–362 independence of, 6, 41–42, 168–169, Burns, Helen M., 222 388–389 Busby, Thomas Jefferson, 207–208, 211, as lenders of last resort, 20–27, 117 285 in markets, 2–3, 22–24 Butler, R. A. as monetary authorities, 117 interest policy of, 303–304, 305–308 of New Zealand, 391–394 and robot, 314–315 objectives of, 3–4, 389–390 Butterworth, Benjamin, 149 populist fear of, 157 role of, 1, 62, 69–70 Cairncross, Alec, 300 of Sweden, 395 Calhoun, John C., 129–130 transparency of, 7, 71–72, 245–246, Callaghan, James 390–391 bitter harvest of, 316 See also Bank of England; Banks of the and end of cosy world, 387 United States; Suffolk Bank System; relations with governor, 322 Independent Treasury; Callaway, Oscar, 172 clearinghouses; money markets; Canada, Bank of, 395 Federal Reserve; New Zealand Cannan, Edwin, 12, 17 Reserve Bank; price stability Canning, George, 56 Chamberlain, Austen, 287 Cantillon, Richard, 13 Chamberlain-Bradbury Committee, 51, Carter, Jimmy, 375–379, 383 287–288, 290 Castlereagh, Lord, 30 Chamberlain, Neville, 213 Catterall, Ralph C. H., 132 Chandler, Lester V., 2, 185 Catterns, Basil G., 75, 282 Chapman, Richard A., 311 central bankers Chappell, Henry, 349 backgrounds of, 37, 73 Charles I, 34 © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 0521850134 - A History of Central Banking in Great Britain and the United States John H. Wood Index More information 428 Index Charles II, 34, 35, 36 contingencies Chase, Salmon P., 154 in Currency and Bank Notes Act of 1928, Cheap Money, 212–213, 280, 298–302 105–107 Cherwell, Lord, 315–316 provision for proposed by Lowe, 105 Chicago School, 336–339 recognized by House of Lords, 101–105 See also monetarism; Simons; Friedman; contracts, see central bank Meltzer controls Child, Josiah, 332 by Bank of England, 299–300, 303, 306, Churchill, Winston S. 324 on American Loan, 294 credit, 173–175, 176–181, 307–308 on Bank nationalization, 280 on interest rates, 68, 226–238, 299–300, chancellor, 59, 288–293 332, 357–360 exercise of, 289 opinion polls on, 366 and Norman, 292 price, 365–366, 369–370 prime minister, 267, 314–316 convertibility, see sterling and Treasury View, 320 Corn Laws, 112 Civil War, 141–142 Cortelyou, George B., 152–153 Clapham, John H., 1, 37, 42, 110, 282 cost-push inflation, 301–302, 313, 330–332 Clark, Champ, 170 Cotton, William, 103, 104 Clarke, Otto, 314 Council of Economic Advisors, 258–260, Clay, Henry (American), 134 352 Clay, Henry (British), 364 Council on Prices, Productivity and clearinghouses, 3 Incomes, 309 as central banks, 136–139 Crawford, William, 126, 131 certificates, 136–137 credibility New York, 136–137 of gold standard, 51, 112, 272–273 proposed support by Federal Reserve, of fiat standard, 390 169 of new contracts, 391–394, 396–397, Clementi, David, 5 398–399 Cleveland, Grover, 149, 150–151, 211 credit Clinton, George, 126 Bagehot on, 91–94 Cobb, Howell, 141 Bank restrictions of, 15, 299–300, 306 Cobbett, William, 49, 50 Baring on, 46–47 Cobbold, Cameron, 2, 268, 299 crunch of 1966, 256 and chancellor, 303–304 Federal Reserve Board model of, on resumption, 297 181–184 on stop-go, 302–303, 306–312, 321 Thornton on, 21–25 Collet, Sir Mark, 281 view, 182 Commission on Money and Credit, 342 Cripps, Sir Stafford, 270, 298–299 commitments crises, British in Bank Act of 1833, 398 of 1696, 42 under gold and paper standards, of 1745, 42–43 272–273, 379 of 1793, 43–45 in new contracts, 3, 390 of 1797, 10, 45–46 Supreme Court on Government, of 1825, 65–66 217–218, 390 of 1847, 96–100 See also lender of last resort of 1857, 111 Committee of Treasury, 72–75 of 1890, 2, 111, 112 Competition and Credit Control, 323, 326 of 1931, 212–213 Comptroller of the Currency, 138, 153, 181 of 1946, 297 Connolly, John B., 368 in Bank first century, 42 © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 0521850134 - A History of Central Banking in Great Britain and the United States John H.
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