Intelligence : Turning a Craft Into a Profession

Stephen Marrin University of Virginia 304 S. Courthouse Rd. Arlington, VA 22204, USA [email protected]

Keywords: Building Analysts; Knowledge Discovery and Dissemination; All Source Intelligence

practitioners in addition to their knowledge. According to Dr. Jonathan Clemente--a practicing physician and expert in Abstract the history of —“while much of clinical Even though —which possesses charac- medicine is firmly grounded in basic science research, there teristics of both crafts and professions--is frequently referred is a substantial practical component to medical practice to as a profession, in actuality it has been practiced more which cannot be found written in any textbook, and is in- like a craft. As a result, it lacks many of the benefits of for- stead passed down from attending physicians to resident mal professions, such as structured personnel practices, and physicians to medical students. ... As a result, young medi- possesses no quality control mechanism to ensure the reli- cal students are often admonished that medicine is an ‘art ability of the individual analyst’s output. Turning intelli- and not science,’ and this is something that is ingrained in gence analysis from a craft into a profession would provide physicians from the beginning of medical school educa- the opportunity for evolutionary—and possibly even revolu- tion.” (Clemente, 2005) tionary—improvement in both individual and organizational Intelligence analysis is similar to the medical profession performance due to the adoption of formal personnel prac- in that it requires a combination of skills acquired through tices and standardization of best practices across all intelli- practical experiences and specialized knowledge acquired gence agencies. through academic training. In fact, as Dr. Clemente and I have argued elsewhere, intelligence analysis is very similar 1. Craft, Profession, or Both? to medical diagnosis. (Marrin and Clemente, 2005) Al- Intelligence analysts think of themselves as professionals, though each field has a different substantive focus-- but it is not clear what makes intelligence analysis a profes- intelligence agencies produce analysis and estimates regard- sion. Former Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles ing events in foreign countries to protect and advance the called the intelligence occupation a “craft” in his 1963 book interests of the United States, while medicine produces di- “The Craft of Intelligence,” but whether that holds true for agnoses and prognoses to protect and advance the health of intelligence analysis is debatable. According to the Mer- individuals—the similarities in processes used to analyze riam Webster dictionary, a craft is “an occupation or trade and interpret data are striking. requiring manual dexterity or artistic skill” whereas a pro- Practitioners in both fields use approximations of the sci- fession is a field that requires “specialized knowledge and entific method – observation, hypothesis, experimentation, often long and intensive academic preparation.” (Merriam- and conclusion – as a means to organize and interpret the Webster) information they have collected. In his book on the “Psy- This definitional distinction between a craft and a profes- chology of Intelligence Analysis,” former CIA officer Rich- sion may present a false dichotomy, however. In the infor- ards Heuer has observed that medical diagnosis can be used mation age when knowledge rather than manual dexterity or as an effective analogy for understanding how intelligence artistic skill forms the basis of many occupations, some oc- analysis works. (Heuer, 1999) In addition, Heuer’s “concept cupations require both a practical skill set and academic of the diagnosticity of evidence as presented in the discus- preparation. In other words, they may possess characteristics sion of (the application of an analytic method--Analysis of of both crafts and professions. Competing Hypotheses--to intelligence analysis) …came For example, medicine possesses aspects of both crafts from the medical literature.” (Heuer, 2005). and professions in that it requires a substantial amount of Both intelligence analysts and physicians use technologi- academic training yet relies on the dexterity and skill of its cal tools to assist them in weeding through data and discov-

1 ering patterns, but these tools are less able to assist them in and relay it to prospective entrants via their pre-professional interpreting the information and deriving meaning and im- educational requirements. plications. In other words, both medical diagnosis and intel- Is intelligence analysis—which like medicine requires ligence analysis require critical thinking and judgment to both a practical skill set and academic preparation—a craft, interpret the evidence that goes above and beyond what can profession, or both? be quantified or automated. Accordingly, the accuracy of intelligence analysis or medical diagnosis may rest in part 2. Historic Craft-Based Practices on the knowledge, skills, and abilities of the practitioners. Intelligence analysis possesses some characteristics similar (Marrin and Clemente, 2005) to those possessed by formal professions such as specialized Yet despite the similarities between the two occupations knowledge and academic preparation, but for most of this and their possession of craft-like characteristics, medicine is century national security intelligence analysis has been prac- a fully acknowledged profession but intelligence analysis is ticed as a craft rather than a profession. As Jeffrey Cooper not. So what makes an occupation a profession rather than a notes: “Intelligence remains a “craft culture” operating craft? within a guild and apprenticeship system—in fact, self- In an era when almost all occupations rely on some form consciously referring to “” for example. Such a of specialized knowledge and academic preparation, the culture builds pragmatically on accreted practices that were distinction between “craft” and “profession” now rests less successful in the past, lacks the strong formal epistemology on the dictionary definition than whether or not the occupa- of a true discipline, and is reliant on implicit transmission of tion possesses formal practices. Some professions such as often tacit expertise and domain knowledge to novices.” law and medicine possess structured practices that the others (Cooper, 2004) do not, including minimal graduate educational require- When national security intelligence agencies were institu- ments, a selection process consisting of a formal testing tionalized after World War II, relatively few individuals program, a formal training program, and continuing profes- practiced intelligence analysis compared to today, personnel sional development programs. In addition, these formal pro- practices were based on an apprentice model, and individual fessions also possess mechanisms such as specialized jour- development was more ad hoc than structured. As Professor nals for acquiring knowledge about best and worst practices, Wilhelm Agrell observes, the early period of intelligence enabling cumulative learning and improvement over time. during World War II “was followed by the "guilds," the Formal professions also rely on the autonomy and judg- time of the skilled craftsmen in well-fenced, closed organi- ment of its certified practitioners, subject to standards to zations.” (Agrell, 2002) Even today, intelligence analysts ensure performance competency and a code of ethics that refer to “tradecraft,” or the doctrine and practices used to are enforced by members of the occupation. Finally, formal produce intelligence analysis. (MacEachin, 1994) professions have associations that define and certify the During the Cold War some aspects of professionalism requirements necessary for entry into the profession and the crept into the intelligence analysis occupation. According to standards of professional practice. (Bates, 1994) By way of longtime CIA officer Jack Davis this was primarily due to contrast, occupations without such formal practices may be the efforts of Sherman Kent whose legacy included an ana- called professions but lack the formalized practices that le- lytic code, the beginnings of an intelligence literature with gitimize the use of the term. the establishment of CIA’s intelligence journal “Studies in At first glance, the discussion of craft versus profession Intelligence,” and the creation of CIA’s Center for the Study may appear to be academic, but there are a number of sig- of Intelligence. (Davis, 2002) In 1955, Kent also argued for nificant implications for personnel management and the the creation of a systematic intelligence literature that would accumulation of occupational knowledge stemming from address first principles and a definition of terms in order to this categorization. Each path—craft or profession--can lead foster the elevated debate that is necessary to advance to differing personnel practices. For example, traditional knowledge in any field. (Kent, 1955) In addition, other ef- crafts emphasize skill development through training and forts to advance knowledge of the intelligence analysis oc- experience while professions rely on a structured academic cupation were established such as the creation of the De- curriculum supplemented by an apprenticeship program or fense Intelligence College, since renamed the Joint on-the-job training. The distinction between craft and pro- Intelligence College, and the formation of the Association fession can also lead to different methods for determining of Former Intelligence Officers. quality; crafts tend to rely on word of mouth based on profi- Yet despite these improvements in professional practices, ciency, while professions rely on externally applied certifi- intelligence analysis did not become a formal profession. As cation standards that individual practitioners must meet. Wilhelm Agrell notes, in the 1970s intelligence analysis was There are even implications regarding the ability of the oc- “a kind of semi-profession, resembling an early form of cupation to aggregate knowledge and learn over time. Crafts organized skills like a medieval guild. Here the secrets of rely primarily on the skill of the individual practitioner and the craft were transferred from master to apprentice through this does not change from generation to generation, while a process of initiation and sharing of silent knowledge. The professions aggregate the knowledge of past practitioners

2 craft was not developed but reproduced; its knowledge was signed to do, regardless of whether that entails lower-end static and the process cyclic.” (Agrell, 2002) tasks such as data processing or data correlation, or higher- In contrast to the legal and medical professions, even to- end tasks such as expert evaluation and assessment. day intelligence analysis does not have well-defined sys- In addition, with no check on analyst competence or ana- temic formal knowledge such as a coherent doctrine or the- lytic quality, intelligence consumers have no assurance that ory, does not involve high levels of individual autonomy intelligence analysis is consistently reliable. They also have due to involvement of management in approving the dis- no assurance that the informal code of intelligence ethics-- semination of most finished intelligence analysis, and does consisting, in essence, of both independence and objectiv- not have standards that are formulated or enforced by other ity--has been complied with. The end result is misunder- members of the occupation. The various efforts to improve standing and mistrust by decisionmakers of the intelligence organizational performance and advance knowledge such as that is provided to them. Intelligence analysts have much to those advocated by Kent remained isolated from other ef- offer decisionmakers, but the failure to hold them account- forts and the knowledge gained in one area has not been able to formal professional standards prevents their services applied elsewhere. from being fully utilized. Essentially, intelligence analysis as an occupation is only Perhaps most importantly, however, the lack of a single marginally more professional today than it was in 1955 professional focal point for the intelligence analysis occupa- when Sherman Kent first articulated the need for an intelli- tion has led to a failure to gain cumulative knowledge and gence literature as a foundation for an intelligence profes- standardized application in the discipline. As a result, best sion. practices have hit or miss application across intelligence producing agencies, and improvements in intelligence 3. Negative Consequences analysis process are implemented in scattershot fashion. Historically, efforts to improve the practices and manage- While there may be good historical reasons for explaining ment of intelligence analysis have been scattershot because why intelligence analysis has not developed into a formal they have been administered by each individual agency or profession, such as its relatively small personnel base and department that practices intelligence analysis, and the les- lack of external scrutiny, the failure to professionalize has sons from their implementation have been largely lost both led to great variation in the competence and skill of individ- within the implementing institution and others who might ual analysts, uncertainty regarding the very duties of intelli- learn from its experiences. gence analysts, and an overall diminution in the role that For example, CIA's organizational reforms and improve- intelligence analysis could play in decisionmaking. ments frequently result from task force recommendations or The failure of intelligence analysis to become a formal consultations with outside experts. However, each time a profession has led to negative consequences for national change is made in structure or process, the wheel-- security decisionmaking because consumers of intelligence consisting of tying existing practices to theoretical con- cannot trust the reliability of the intelligence production structs of function and purpose--is re-created. Once the rec- processes. A key factor in the quality of the finished intelli- ommendations are made and the task force or consultancy gence produced is the skill and ability of the intelligence disbanded, the lessons learned regarding the conversion of analyst, yet no official standards exist to ensure the compe- theory to practice dissipate. As a result, the field of intelli- tency of individual analysts. Unlike the legal and medical gence management has been for the most part ahistorical professions, intelligence analysis as practiced is unregu- with limited and non-cumulative knowledge of how its the- lated, unstandardized, and lacking in all but the most rudi- ory should be put into practice. (Marrin, 2000) As Paul mentary aspects of a profession. Johnson—the director of CIA’s Center for the Study of In- Some intelligence producers have established more rigor- telligence--observed in early 2005, the intelligence commu- ous standards and development programs than others, but in nity does not do an adequate job recording, documenting, the end each agency creates its own standards for hiring and analyzing, or distilling lessons from its own past experi- developing intelligence analysts. This inconsistency leads to ences. (Johnson, 2005) widely varying analytic duties and quality of performance In essence, intelligence analysis and its management has both within and between each intelligence-producing com- been practiced more as a craft dependent on the skill of its ponent. On one end of the scale, some analysts perform the individual practitioners than a profession that aggregates role of information processor by sifting knowledge and is able to improve over time by teaching data for possible patterns and correlations, while on the accumulated best practices to incoming entrants. If these other end of the scale senior analysts engage with national problems resulting from lack of formal practices and stan- security decisionmakers to discuss on a high concept level dardization are to be overcome, greater efforts towards for- the implications of various international events on US for- mal professionalization may be necessary. eign policy. The lack of a single definition for intelligence analysis or a defined set of practices and procedures means that intelligence analysts do whatever it is that they are as-

3 4. Turning a Craft Into a Profession sions such as medicine. Harvard Business School Professor David Garvin has observed that best practices can be Intelligence analysis may have predominantly craft-based adapted from other fields and used as catalysts for creativity practices, but it should be possible to turn it from a craft into in application if not necessarily replication. (Garvin, 2005) a profession and thereby reap the benefits that accrue to In terms of intelligence analysis best practices, Dr. other formal professions. The skill of the individual intelli- Clemente and I have previously argued that intelligence gence analyst will remain the centerpiece of intelligence agencies can look to the medical profession for ideas to im- production, just as the skill of the physician remains at the prove the accuracy of intelligence analysis and its incorpo- core of medical diagnosis and treatment, but the practices ration into policymaking. Intelligence agencies can also that shape the creation of the intelligence analyst and the look to the medical profession for ideas to increase intelli- methods he or she uses can be improved through the adop- gence analysis professionalism. tion of formal personnel practices, the standardization of One benefit arising from modeling intelligence analysis best practices, and centralized knowledge accumulation professionalism on medicine is that it provides a mechanism efforts. for the integration of the various analytic sub-disciplines. Increasing intelligence analysis professionalism through There are many different kinds of intelligence analysts, but the adoption of professional practices such as a formalized this variety does not preclude greater professionalism selection process; training, education and development pro- through common personnel practices and standards. Instead, grams; performance standards; and a code of ethics would it requires a more nuanced understanding of the similarities likely increase the competence of individual analysts and and differences between the various analytic disciplines. reliability of the analysis they produce, and this may lead to The medical profession is able to find common ground and greater policymaker acceptance of the information and as- bridge differences between many different medical special- sessments they provide. In addition, the creation of a cen- ties that have very different substantive knowledge bases by tralized focal point for the knowledge regarding best prac- binding its different specialties together under the overall tices would enable intelligence analysis as an occupation to mission of improving the health of the patient. Since all learn and improve over time as best practices are standard- intelligence analysts use similar techniques to achieve the ized throughout the intelligence community. same goal--providing information to improve decisionmak- Unfortunately, while greater professionalism may provide ing—binding them together into a single profession should a mechanism for improving the intelligence analysis occu- be achievable by using their common characteristics to build pation, other factors contribute to weaknesses in analytic a core set of best practices that can be standardized across competence. For example, limited resources, organizational the entire intelligence community. policies that emphasize current intelligence over in-depth Yet greater professionalism does not have to require uni- reports, and policymaker dissatisfaction with intelligence formity. The various intelligence analysis specialties may resulting from unrealistic expectations each lead to some require different kinds of education, training, and develop- diminution in the quality or utility of intelligence analysis. ment, but the medical profession again provides a model. Nonetheless, greater professionalism can address some of The medical profession provides flexibility in the standards these problems, and for that reason should be implemented. that apply to different medical specialties by establishing One approach to professionalizing intelligence analysis specialty boards that define the knowledge, skills and abili- might be to build an intelligence analysis profession from ties required for that specialty. Where differences between scratch by relying on the new Director of National Intelli- intelligence analysis specialties are too great to be combined gence (DNI) to standardize the processes for intelligence under a single common standard, intelligence analysis can analyst selection, hiring, training, and education across the follow the medical model by establishing similar boards or intelligence community. The WMD Commission apparently committees. In fact, a prototype has already been developed. supports this approach, for in its report it observes that “the In the late 1990s, CIA’s Council of Intelligence Occupations creation of the DNI provides a unique opportunity to recon- defined the knowledge, skills and abilities needed for each sider implementing some elements of Community training. of eleven different “occupations” or specialties related to the The benefits will be enormous: it will teach common trade- production of intelligence analysis. Although the standards craft standards (and) standardize teaching and evaluation” they developed were not adopted by the organization, their particularly through the proposed National Intelligence Uni- research provided more nuanced understanding of the edu- versity. (WMD Commission, 2005). However, the downside cation, training and development needed for each specialty. of this approach is that it would likely be evolutionary by Similar differentiations both within and between organiza- building on programs and practices already implemented in tions that produce intelligence analysis can be used as a intelligence agencies, and would not provide much opportu- source for specific standards and expectations that apply to nity for revolutionary change. each of the various analytic disciplines. A more radical push towards intelligence analysis profes- Modeling intelligence analysis professionalization on the sionalization might entail modeling professional aspects of medical profession might also lead to the creation of profes- intelligence analysis practices on one of the existing profes- sional organizations and entities that do not yet exist in the

4 intelligence analysis context. For example, the role played by the American Bar Association in the legal profession and Garvin, David. “The Dynamics of a Learning Organization: the American Medical Association in the medical profession Lessons from the Private Sector.” Presentation at the Intelli- has no equivalent in intelligence, yet such an association gence ‘Lessons Learned’ Conference sponsored by CIA’s might provide a venue for knowledgeable practitioners to Center for the Study of Intelligence. January 14, 2005. discuss best practices with the goal of improving both indi- vidual and institutional performance. Additional repositories Heuer, Richards J. Email Correspondence. January 5, 2005. or centers where knowledge regarding intelligence best practices could be stored and transmitted to the next genera- Heuer, Richards J. Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, tion of analysts might also replicate the role played by CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, Washington, D.C., medical and law schools. 1999. 61-62 Regardless of the means chosen for implementation, turn- ing intelligence analysis from craft-based to more formal Johnson, Paul. Presentation at the Intelligence ‘Lessons professional practices should over time lead to greater con- Learned’ Conference sponsored by CIA’s Center for the sistency and reliability in intelligence production, and im- Study of Intelligence. January 14, 2005. provements in both individual and organizational perform- ance. Intelligence agencies have endured examination after Kent, Sherman. “The Need for an Intelligence Literature.” examination in the wake of multiple intelligence failures Studies in Intelligence. September 1955. with little thought given to broader issues of professionali- http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/shermankent/2need.html zation. In addition to structural changes such as those rec- ommended by the 9/11 Commission, effectively reforming MacEachin, Douglas J. The Tradecraft of Analysis: Chal- the intelligence community will require changing the mind- lenge and Change in the CIA. Working Group on Intelli- set and practices of intelligence practitioners so that they gence Reform Papers. Consortium for the Study of Intelli- continue to focus on improving per- gence. 1994 formance during and after structural changes are imple- mented. Turning intelligence analysis into a more formal Marrin, Stephen. “The CIA's Kent School: A Step in the profession will go far towards changing the culture of intel- Right Direction.” Intelligencer 11, no. 2 (Winter 2000): 55- ligence analysts and providing the mechanism for improv- 57. ing the performance of the entire intelligence analysis occu- pation far into the future. Marrin, Stephen and Dr. Jonathan Clemente. “Tumors Don’t Read Textbooks: Looking to the Medical Profession for 5. References Ideas to Improve Intelligence Analysis.” International Jour- nal of Intelligence and . Forthcoming Agrell, Wilhelm. “When Everything is Intelligence, Nothing 2005. is Intelligence.” The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence

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