Intelligence Analysis: Turning a Craft Into a Profession

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Intelligence Analysis: Turning a Craft Into a Profession Intelligence Analysis: Turning a Craft Into a Profession Stephen Marrin University of Virginia 304 S. Courthouse Rd. Arlington, VA 22204, USA [email protected] Keywords: Building Analysts; Knowledge Discovery and Dissemination; All Source Intelligence practitioners in addition to their knowledge. According to Dr. Jonathan Clemente--a practicing physician and expert in Abstract the history of medical intelligence—“while much of clinical Even though intelligence analysis—which possesses charac- medicine is firmly grounded in basic science research, there teristics of both crafts and professions--is frequently referred is a substantial practical component to medical practice to as a profession, in actuality it has been practiced more which cannot be found written in any textbook, and is in- like a craft. As a result, it lacks many of the benefits of for- stead passed down from attending physicians to resident mal professions, such as structured personnel practices, and physicians to medical students. ... As a result, young medi- possesses no quality control mechanism to ensure the reli- cal students are often admonished that medicine is an ‘art ability of the individual analyst’s output. Turning intelli- and not science,’ and this is something that is ingrained in gence analysis from a craft into a profession would provide physicians from the beginning of medical school educa- the opportunity for evolutionary—and possibly even revolu- tion.” (Clemente, 2005) tionary—improvement in both individual and organizational Intelligence analysis is similar to the medical profession performance due to the adoption of formal personnel prac- in that it requires a combination of skills acquired through tices and standardization of best practices across all intelli- practical experiences and specialized knowledge acquired gence agencies. through academic training. In fact, as Dr. Clemente and I have argued elsewhere, intelligence analysis is very similar 1. Craft, Profession, or Both? to medical diagnosis. (Marrin and Clemente, 2005) Al- Intelligence analysts think of themselves as professionals, though each field has a different substantive focus-- but it is not clear what makes intelligence analysis a profes- intelligence agencies produce analysis and estimates regard- sion. Former Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles ing events in foreign countries to protect and advance the called the intelligence occupation a “craft” in his 1963 book interests of the United States, while medicine produces di- “The Craft of Intelligence,” but whether that holds true for agnoses and prognoses to protect and advance the health of intelligence analysis is debatable. According to the Mer- individuals—the similarities in processes used to analyze riam Webster dictionary, a craft is “an occupation or trade and interpret data are striking. requiring manual dexterity or artistic skill” whereas a pro- Practitioners in both fields use approximations of the sci- fession is a field that requires “specialized knowledge and entific method – observation, hypothesis, experimentation, often long and intensive academic preparation.” (Merriam- and conclusion – as a means to organize and interpret the Webster) information they have collected. In his book on the “Psy- This definitional distinction between a craft and a profes- chology of Intelligence Analysis,” former CIA officer Rich- sion may present a false dichotomy, however. In the infor- ards Heuer has observed that medical diagnosis can be used mation age when knowledge rather than manual dexterity or as an effective analogy for understanding how intelligence artistic skill forms the basis of many occupations, some oc- analysis works. (Heuer, 1999) In addition, Heuer’s “concept cupations require both a practical skill set and academic of the diagnosticity of evidence as presented in the discus- preparation. In other words, they may possess characteristics sion of (the application of an analytic method--Analysis of of both crafts and professions. Competing Hypotheses--to intelligence analysis) …came For example, medicine possesses aspects of both crafts from the medical literature.” (Heuer, 2005). and professions in that it requires a substantial amount of Both intelligence analysts and physicians use technologi- academic training yet relies on the dexterity and skill of its cal tools to assist them in weeding through data and discov- 1 ering patterns, but these tools are less able to assist them in and relay it to prospective entrants via their pre-professional interpreting the information and deriving meaning and im- educational requirements. plications. In other words, both medical diagnosis and intel- Is intelligence analysis—which like medicine requires ligence analysis require critical thinking and judgment to both a practical skill set and academic preparation—a craft, interpret the evidence that goes above and beyond what can profession, or both? be quantified or automated. Accordingly, the accuracy of intelligence analysis or medical diagnosis may rest in part 2. Historic Craft-Based Practices on the knowledge, skills, and abilities of the practitioners. Intelligence analysis possesses some characteristics similar (Marrin and Clemente, 2005) to those possessed by formal professions such as specialized Yet despite the similarities between the two occupations knowledge and academic preparation, but for most of this and their possession of craft-like characteristics, medicine is century national security intelligence analysis has been prac- a fully acknowledged profession but intelligence analysis is ticed as a craft rather than a profession. As Jeffrey Cooper not. So what makes an occupation a profession rather than a notes: “Intelligence remains a “craft culture” operating craft? within a guild and apprenticeship system—in fact, self- In an era when almost all occupations rely on some form consciously referring to “tradecraft” for example. Such a of specialized knowledge and academic preparation, the culture builds pragmatically on accreted practices that were distinction between “craft” and “profession” now rests less successful in the past, lacks the strong formal epistemology on the dictionary definition than whether or not the occupa- of a true discipline, and is reliant on implicit transmission of tion possesses formal practices. Some professions such as often tacit expertise and domain knowledge to novices.” law and medicine possess structured practices that the others (Cooper, 2004) do not, including minimal graduate educational require- When national security intelligence agencies were institu- ments, a selection process consisting of a formal testing tionalized after World War II, relatively few individuals program, a formal training program, and continuing profes- practiced intelligence analysis compared to today, personnel sional development programs. In addition, these formal pro- practices were based on an apprentice model, and individual fessions also possess mechanisms such as specialized jour- development was more ad hoc than structured. As Professor nals for acquiring knowledge about best and worst practices, Wilhelm Agrell observes, the early period of intelligence enabling cumulative learning and improvement over time. during World War II “was followed by the "guilds," the Formal professions also rely on the autonomy and judg- time of the skilled craftsmen in well-fenced, closed organi- ment of its certified practitioners, subject to standards to zations.” (Agrell, 2002) Even today, intelligence analysts ensure performance competency and a code of ethics that refer to “tradecraft,” or the doctrine and practices used to are enforced by members of the occupation. Finally, formal produce intelligence analysis. (MacEachin, 1994) professions have associations that define and certify the During the Cold War some aspects of professionalism requirements necessary for entry into the profession and the crept into the intelligence analysis occupation. According to standards of professional practice. (Bates, 1994) By way of longtime CIA officer Jack Davis this was primarily due to contrast, occupations without such formal practices may be the efforts of Sherman Kent whose legacy included an ana- called professions but lack the formalized practices that le- lytic code, the beginnings of an intelligence literature with gitimize the use of the term. the establishment of CIA’s intelligence journal “Studies in At first glance, the discussion of craft versus profession Intelligence,” and the creation of CIA’s Center for the Study may appear to be academic, but there are a number of sig- of Intelligence. (Davis, 2002) In 1955, Kent also argued for nificant implications for personnel management and the the creation of a systematic intelligence literature that would accumulation of occupational knowledge stemming from address first principles and a definition of terms in order to this categorization. Each path—craft or profession--can lead foster the elevated debate that is necessary to advance to differing personnel practices. For example, traditional knowledge in any field. (Kent, 1955) In addition, other ef- crafts emphasize skill development through training and forts to advance knowledge of the intelligence analysis oc- experience while professions rely on a structured academic cupation were established such as the creation of the De- curriculum supplemented by an apprenticeship program or fense Intelligence College, since renamed the Joint Military on-the-job training. The distinction between
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