Managing Hostile Environments Journalists and Media Workers: Learning to Survive the World’S Difficult, Remote and Hostile Environments

Managing Hostile Environments Journalists and Media Workers: Learning to Survive the World’s Difficult, Remote and Hostile Environments

This document is submitted as an exegesis of a research project with creative outputs, in fulfilment of the requirements for a Masters of Arts (Research) degree. March 2009

Shaun Matthew Filer BA (Media Studies / Political Science) University of Queensland School of Journalism Faculty of Creative Industries Queensland University of Technology

ABSTRACT

The aim of this research is to examine the changing nature of risks that face journalists and media workers in the world’s difficult, remote and hostile environments, and consider the ‘adequacy’ of managing hostile environment safety courses that some media organizations require prior to foreign assignments. The study utilizes several creative works and contributions to this area of analysis, which includes a documentary film production, course contributions, an emergency reference handbook, security and incident management reviews and a template for evacuation and contingency planning.

The research acknowledges that employers have a ‘duty of care’ to personnel working in these environments, identifies the necessity for pre-deployment training and support, and provides a solution for organizations that wish to initiate a comprehensive framework to advise, monitor, protect and respond to incidents. Finally, it explores the possible development of a unique and holistic service to facilitate proactive and responsive support, in the form of a new profession of ‘Editorial Logistics Officer’ or ‘Editorial Safety Officer’ within media organizations.

This area of research is vitally important to the profession, and the intended contribution is to introduce a simple and cost-efficient framework for media organizations that desire to implement pre-deployment training and field-support – as these programs save lives. The complete proactive and responsive services may be several years from implementation. However, this study demonstrates that the facilitation of Managing Hostile Environment (MHE) courses should be the minimum professional standard. These courses have saved lives in the past and they provide journalists with the tools to “cover the story, and not become the story.”

III

STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the thesis itself.

______Shaun M. Filer

BIOGRAPHY

Prior to beginning academic research at Queensland University of Technology, I spent just over eight years as a Hospital Corpsman (Medic) with the United States Marine Corps. During this tenure, the majority of my time was spent travelling and working in South and East Asia. For four years, I worked in an Emergency Medical Department at Yokosuka Naval Hospital, where I was heavily involved with education and training across various military commands throughout Asia. I was later attached to an Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Team working in the region that specialized in clearing landmines and unexploded ordinance. Near the end of my service, I was deployed to several countries with a Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team (FAST). In early 2001, during this travel, a western journalist became ‘embedded’ within our FAST platoon for a short time. It was at the point that I noticed the lack of training, preparation and field support made available to them. I concluded my military service in 2004, but this early observation proved to guide my area of study since that date. I also had the fortune to travel to over 30 countries during these years.

I moved to Australia to complete an undergraduate degree in Media Studies (Film & Television Studies) and Political Science (Asian Studies). While completing this education, I became more aware that my previous life-experience offered some unique contributions, and I received higher distinctions when I incorporated these into my assignments. I wanted to continue my study in a field that could envelop both my interests (journalism, film making and travel) and my previous life experience. Therefore, in 2007, I applied for the Masters of Arts (Research) at QUT, and sought to contribute knowledge within the field of per-deployment preparation and support for journalists in difficult, remote and hostile environments.

Since beginning this research, I have worked with several veteran journalists, including Tim Page, a photojournalist most remembered for his work during the Vietnam and Six Day War. I have been a facilitator and course coordinator of journalist specific Managing Hostile Environment training for major international and Australian media organizations. I have recently travelled to a number of ‘hostile’ environments, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central and West Africa, and revisited a number of other South and South-East Asian countries. I have worked closely with media organizations providing pre-deployment intelligence briefings, emergency evacuation plans and facilitated close protection in these environments. This personal relationship with working journalists and media staff has provided unique access to interview subjects, and has enabled me to collect significant data for further contribution to this unique area of research.

AIM

The aim of this research project is to examine how media organizations can provide a framework to prepare, advise, monitor, protect and respond to incidents that may affect their personnel working in difficult, remote or hostile environments.

WRITTEN AND CREATIVE COMPONENTS

The relationships between the written and creative components of this research are integrated. The written component will expand upon theories and training recommendations outlined in the documentary film, the current course outline, the ‘Vuee Tuee’ (VT) handbooks and also give examples of actionable intelligence (advice) prepared for working journalists in the field. This hybrid composition of materials will provide case-studies into the proactive and responsive support methodologies currently utilized by media organizations that apply a high standard ‘duty of care’ in the industry. The film is capable of being disseminated as a stand-alone output, but the written components are intended to complement the film, and aid in understanding the exegetical framework and events that developed the creative works.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONSIDERATIONS

COMMERCIAL SENSITIVITY Due to the commercial sensitivity within this area of new research and business models, and the previous ownership of and development of intellectual property under Dynamiq Pty Ltd, ownership of intellectual products and concepts within this thesis, and sample materials included, are retained by Shaun Filer and Dynamiq. These works are protected by copyright laws and treaties around the world. All such rights are reserved.

All materials contained in this document and included materials are protected by copyright laws, and may not be reproduced, republished, distributed, transmitted, displayed, broadcast or otherwise exploited in any manner without the express prior written permission of Dynamiq Pty Ltd. These materials are provided for academic and non-commercial use only, without altering or removing any trademark, copyright or other notice from such material.

COPYRIGHT DISCLAIMER The documentary film included as a creative component of this research is provided for academic use only. This film is not for further release or distribution, as some materials included remain under copyright and associated ‘flash fees’ have not been fully remunerated. All material sources have been provided in the film credits, and a comprehensive directory of archival footage is included in Chapter 4 of this document.

VII

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ...... III STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY ...... IV BIOGRAPHY ...... V AIM ...... VI WRITTEN AND CREATIVE COMPONENTS ...... VI INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONSIDERATIONS ...... VII TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... VIII PREFACE – WHAT IS A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT? ...... X

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION ...... 1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ...... 4

CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 5 INTERNATIONAL NEWS REPORTING ...... 6 TRAINING ...... 7 PROTECTION ...... 9 DUTY OF CARE ...... 9 RISKS ...... 11 ANECDOTAL ...... 12

CHAPTER 3 – RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ...... 15

CHAPTER 4 – PROJECT DEVELOPMENT ...... 23 MUMBAI MIRROR INTERVIEW ...... 36

CHAPTER 5 – DOCUMENTARY FILM ...... 39

CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION ...... 47

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 51

VIII

ADDENDUM 1 – MANAGING HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT COURSE (ADVISE) ...... 65 COURSE CONTENT ...... 65 VUEE TUEE HANDBOOK ...... 71

ADDENDUM 2 – SECURITY REVIEW (MONITOR & PROTECT) ...... 81

ADDENDUM 3 – EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLAN (RESPOND) ...... 101

ADDENDUM 4 – INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS: SHAUN FILER ...... 111

ADDENDUM 5 – INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS: MARIANNE HARRIS ...... 127

PREFACE – WHAT IS A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT?

To preface the description of my research methodology and my approach to the analysis of this topic, I first need to define its scope and what is meant by “difficult, remote and hostile environments”. The term “hostile-environment” is used for a variety of domestic and international scenarios that may place the stakeholder – in this case, the journalist – at risk. However, there must be a clearer and definitive separation of these two terms, so that the scope of this research topic is more focused.

The use of the term ‘difficult environment’, for the purpose of this research, will pertain to areas where climate poses the most notable hazards (heat, cold, wet, altitude, etc), but basic infrastructure is present, including: medical facilities, security related infrastructure (police, military) and food-water-fuel amenities.

The use of the term ‘remote environment’ pertains to areas where these same hazards are likely to impact on the journalist, but the availability of basic infrastructure are not present, or are several hours transit away from the area of work. The major element of planning for work in these environments will include extensive contingency planning, both for travel, equipment, communications and medical and non-medical evacuations.

Finally, the term ‘hostile environment’ pertains to locations, either domestic or overseas, that are currently affected by “high-profile” hazards that greatly increase the risk of serious injury or death. This definition encompasses a large number of scenarios. These include, but are not limited to:

Current Human Conflict Current Civil Unrest Lack of Security / Police / Military (Level 5 Rating Crime & Assault) Current or Post-Natural Disaster (Fire, Flood, Earthquake, Cyclone) Current Pandemic or Epidemic Presence of Landmines & Unexploded Ordinance (UXOs)

There are environments that extend across more than one of these definitions, as hostile environments regularly lack sufficient infrastructure, but this should provide a framework to understand the scope of research.

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

War reporting has a history as old as written text itself. Many of our most ancient recorded histories are the telling of human civilization being fashioned through the invasion, occupation and subjugation of varying nations of men. Initially, these accounts of human conflict were written in long narrations, depicting the war at its end, and fashioned only by the victors. With each conflict since the First World War, the pace of story reaching its intended audience has continued to increase. These ‘initial drafts of history’ that had taken days, weeks, months, or even years to reach an audience, are now streamed directly from the field in ‘real time’, due to technological innovations in mass communications (Neuman, 1996; Robinson, 1999; Carruthers, 2000). To coincide with the immediacy of obtaining and streaming story and image from the ‘front lines’ of conflict, so too has the exposure to risks increased for journalists and media workers. There are numerous causative factors that have compounded these risks, and there is a great deal of previous research that envelope these issues. However, a single concern remains constant – what preparation and support exists to abet them in the difficult, remote or hostile environments they now operate?

The discourses surrounding ‘adequate’ preparation and field support for journalists and media workers in difficult, remote and hostile environments have a number of stakeholders and contributors. These include the correspondents, technicians, producers, fixers and stringers that have worked, or intend to work in the environments, the chief producers, editors and international assignment managers with a perceived ‘duty of care’ 1 to their personnel in the field, and finally, the organizations that facilitate pre-deployment training and preparation. When considering the vast number of people with a direct relationship to this area, one would assume there are innumerable sources of literature written on the suitability of the training, and what improvements are necessary to ensure journalists are provided the best possible pre-deployment preparation. However, after working and observing developments in this area over the past two years, several unfortunate truths have presented themselves. Most notably, there is little investigation or analysis being conducted into these training programs, and few independent

1 There remain numerous media organizations globally that conduct business with less consideration of ‘duty of care’ responsibilities. “I have my doubts about how SBS operates, sending single people into conflict zones with digi-cams and a set amount of money, and told to look after themselves. I think that breaches a lot of ethics.” (Cave, 2008)

organizations working to review or standardize support provided to contemporary journalists2. Within any developing field of research, there are innumerable areas to offer contributions. I will question some core developmental issues within the field of preparation and support, which, in my belief, has stunted the evolution of programs across numerous media organizations globally. I’ll also provide examples, created as part of this academic research, of the current training and risk management frameworks now employed by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) and Thompson Reuters (Asia). These examples are provided for media organizations that have yet to adopt proactive support methodologies to advise, monitor, protect and respond to incidents that may affect their personnel in difficult, remote or hostile environments. These will consist of creative works, presented in an array of mediums, including: film / television documentary and training tools (advise), security and emergency reviews (monitor & protect) and evacuation planning documents (respond), as ‘real-world measured’ tools for immediate employment in the professional arena.

The first of these creative contributions, covered in Chapter 4, utilizes the medium most interrelated to the area of research, documentary film and television. The film produced, ‘Journalists Under Fire’, provides an open forum for interview subjects (veteran journalists and media workers) to speak about their experiences and the environments they have worked. For those that have attended managing hostile environment courses, it also explores what preparation was available prior to their deployments. None of the interviews used within this documentary production have been seen previously, and the majority of these interviews were obtained during this research tenure.

The second creative contribution, provided for review as Addendum 1 in this document, is the ‘vuee tuee’ pocket handbook, which is now provided as a reference tool for journalists and media workers that have attended the Managing Hostile Environments course. The handbook was designed for use as a teaching tool, for past course attendees to train others they work with, as a reference tool for review,

2 Organizations such as The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and Reporters Without Borders (RWB) have released company lists for facilitators of hostile environment training, and have published their own training handbooks. However, no formal critical review of course content has been conducted.

or in the event of an incident. It provides detailed ‘actions on’3 for initial incident responses, and includes detailed information on: natural disasters, civil unrest and riots, traumatic injury, lost and separated, vehicle convoys and roadblocks, weapons effects and landmines and other core areas.

The third contribution, presented as Addendum 2, will provide a contemporary example of the proactive monitoring and protection of journalists in the field. The preliminary input to achieve this is a location specific security and emergency management review. The review provides recommendations in risk mitigation and safety measures for those working in hostile environments. In January 2009, I conducted one such review for a major international news bureau in Kabul, Afghanistan. This document is presented to illustrate the depth of assessment across varying key areas, including: offices, accommodation, protective equipment, travel safety, medical contingencies, planning and the environment itself. These reviews also offer prioritized lists of the most critical enhancements required within the areas of planning, equipment and protection. These assessments and reviews provide media organizations with the necessary information and support that is often required to appropriate funding to implement security improvements.

The final element within this contribution, covered in Addendum 3, is an emergency evacuation plan. I have provided evacuation details created for a media organization working within the West African Republic of Guinea, which should illustrate the importance of comprehensive planning prior to deployment. The adage, “a plan is only as good as its backups”, is certainly true within the context of working in difficult, remote or hostile environments. Thus, time and expertise should be at hand to ensure response options are capable of providing support to journalists and media workers in these environments, and there should be multiple alternatives in modes of evacuation, sources of medical assistance and options for close personal protection when required. All of these elements come together to increase the resilience of the assignment plan, and lessen the probability that incidents will isolate or endanger media personnel.

This area of research is of vital importance to the profession, and it is my hope that this will introduce a simple and cost-efficient methodology for media organizations that desire to implement pre-deployment training and field-support – as these

3 ‘Actions On’, is a military term for responses to various events, which can include, but not limited to: actions on enemy contact, actions on landmine explosion, actions on lost or separated.

programs do save lives4. The documentary film and creative works will explore the importance of a managing hostile environment framework, and detail numerous developmental issues within early courses that are just now being corrected. Finally, I desire to offer a unique contribution to this field, by exploring the possibility of a holistic training and field-support service offering that is tailored specifically to the requirements of media organizations working in the world’s difficult, remote and hostile environments.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What are the risks faced by journalists and media workers that are assigned or deploy to difficult, remote and hostile environments, and how have these risks changed in recent history?

2. Do journalists believe the recent advancements in training and support are significant to the profession, and do they believe that it works to enable them to make informed decisions about their personal safety, and obtain the story while not becoming a part of the story?

3. If media organizations have a perceived ‘duty of care’ to their staff deploying into difficult, remote and hostile environments, should there be a minimum standard to facilitate managing hostile environment training – even for local staff?

4. With organizations now aware of the safety and training requirements for journalists and media workers, what is the next foreseeable stage in developing cost-efficient models to advise, monitor, protect and respond in difficult, remote and hostile environments?

4 "I do not accept any justification for not getting safety training to journalists. They can find the money to provide life-saving safety training to their journalists and their local fixers and interpreters" (Dhumières, 2008).

CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature reviews are used, primarily, to ensure that writers have studied existing work within their chosen field, with insight (Haywood & Wragg, 1982). Within this chosen field of hostile environment preparation for journalists and media workers, however, there are several complications in the use of a literature review in formulating a comprehensive appreciation. Firstly, the area is a relatively modern development in the field of journalism, and many media organizations have only recently implemented formal training, safety and security frameworks, while a greater percentage of media organizations have yet to assemble any budgets and policies for such support5. Also, the large majority of texts that do give mention to managing hostile environment courses for media are the autobiographies of journalists that have recorded their experiences in a subjective, anecdotal and personalized manner. The main themes throughout these autobiographies regularly surround the stories obtained and the professional and personal relationships developed while on assignment, but there is rarely more than a token mention about their preparation. Finally, there is only a small minority of unbiased stakeholders and contributors within this field of research. In general, working journalists that desire future foreign assignments often refrain from being overly critical of the preparation and support provided by their employing organizations. This ultimately has a negative impact on the continued development of pre-deployment training, as there is a lack of structured comment on course competencies and their applicability to journalists in the field. Other contributors to the written work in this area originate from the companies that facilitate the managing hostile environment training. However, these stakeholders are obviously motivated to present their training product as a ‘best-practice model’6 to increase their client base. These factors all contribute to increase the difficulty in sourcing large numbers of impartial, unbiased and analytical texts pertaining to this area of research.

The most notable of these obstacles is the relatively recent development of the field. The first courses of their type were taught in response to the number of journalists being killed during the Balkans War in the early 1990’s. “This (Balkans War) was the

5 Currently, there are no lists that condemn organizations for a lack of training and support. However, to put the issue into context, of the major Australian media organizations, only the ABC facilitates comprehensive proactive and responsive support. 6 Best-Practice pertains to a business model that is considered innovative and a core contributor to the particular area of business.

first European war that anybody could get to – you could take a train or plane into Sarajevo without the slightest clue of what you were letting yourself in for” (Tumber et al 2006, p. 130). Unfortunately, with the expense involved with these initial courses only the large media organizations with budgets to support them were capable of facilitating this training. This means that despite the number of anecdotal and personalized accounts of journalists that have covered various conflicts since the early 1990’s, there are only a few personnel that have tested the training concepts in a ‘real-world’ context.

INTERNATIONAL NEWS REPORTING

Most journalists killed were local journalists who were murdered in their own countries. But since Daniel Pearl’s murder, U.S. and other Western journalists feel a heightened sense of risk, and there is evidence that today they are more likely to be targeted as journalists. (Smyth, 2003)

In reviewing the literature on training provided to, and the risks taken by, foreign correspondents in their line of work, it was pertinent to first explore the literature on foreign correspondence as a career, and exactly what the job entails. The Military and the Press: An Uneasy Truce (Sweeney, 2006) defines the term ‘foreign correspondent’ as any journalist or reporter who sends news reports, commentary and photographs from a foreign nation for publication or broadcast; a definition which has remained static since reporters first began to document wars. The Military and the Press details the history of foreign correspondents, from the first journalists embedded in inter-country civil war, to today’s correspondents which often find themselves in remote locations their audience have never even heard of. It begins by discussing the first embedded reporters in the Mexican-American War of 1847, in which the world’s first foreign correspondents witnessed and wrote about the war’s campaigns, and created their own courier service via steamship. The book then continues through the United States Civil War and the Spanish American War, detailing how the number of correspondents increased parallel to the rise of telegraph communications across America. It also makes mention of the first use of photojournalism, available in 1900:

“Actual photographs of the war, while not appearing in newspapers and magazines, still caused a sensation. Combat proved too fast and furious to be captured by the cumbersome camera; instead, photographers required live subjects to freeze in place for several seconds, an often impossible task. The dead needed no such instruction to lie motionless- and consequently dominated most post- battle scenes. For the first time, Americans far from battle could witness the carnage of war.”

(Sweeney, 2006)

By the end of the Civil War in the United States, the new economics of the press had been solidified as independent and business-oriented. It was now seen that only the press was capable of providing information about the course of war, and to therefore give people some sense of the nation’s future. During these early ‘booms’ in media, the top publications in America reached circulations of over one million, and journalists had proven themselves indispensible. This book is one of many that provides the definitions and history of foreign correspondents, many of which are referenced throughout this research. Further works include Handbook for International Correspondents (Associated Press, 2005), The Culture of Foreign Correspondents (Pedelty, 1995) Reporting War: Journalism in War Time (Allan & Zelizer, 2004) and Terrorism, War and the Press (Palmer, 2003).

TRAINING Literature that is essential in exploring the field of hostile environment preparation for journalists are the texts describing the various forms of training and protection provided. Of the vast available literature describing journalists and their work, there are only a select few texts that explore pre-deployment training methods and protection. One of these, The Handbook For Journalists (Reporters Sans Frontieres, 2006), is written with a specific focus on the types of risks journalists face, and serves as a self-training manual for those who do not have budgets to facilitate safety courses. It includes key documents that explore the principles of press freedom, as well as ‘practical advice’. This advice resembles the core competencies provided during hostile environment media training, including: situations involving weaponry or landmines, hostage and ransom situations, and checkpoint passing. It also includes first-aid and medical teaching, as a precaution for if the aforementioned precautions fail, and response capabilities are warranted.

Although a valuable resource for newly-deployed foreign correspondents, a limitation to this is that it is merely a text. It is a necessity that professional trainers, with experience in these environments, are available to put these risks into context and aid in training activities. Otherwise, it is improbable that the information will be retained, and the capability to recall these lessons in the event of a high stress incident will be lessened. In a standard hostile environment course, there are training methods employed, exercises performed and scenarios acted out to ensure that vital information is retained, and that a level of ‘muscle memory’7 exists for use in responding to known risks in the field.

Another important text that references training is ‘Journalists Under Fire’ (Tumber & Webster, 2006). It is one of only a few texts with no apparent limitations for use in the textual analysis of this area, as it has been researched in an objective manner, and provides entire chapters on core competencies taught in standard managing hostile environment courses. “There seems little doubt that ‘hostile environment training courses’ are here to stay, and they appear to be improving in terms of what they offer the journalist” (Tumber et al, 2006, p 140). This text supports a number of initial notions; firstly, “the status of journalists has been eroded, and more journalists are targeted” (Tumber et al 2006, p 140), secondly “for an inexperienced reporter or even a more experienced reporter, these courses are vital” (Tumber et al, 2006, p 131) and finally, “some journalists have more experience that the security that often accompany them on difficult assignments” (Tumber et al, 2006 p 137).

‘Journalists Under Fire’ also provides important information regarding course content that is currently provided by security firms based in the United Kingdom, such as AKE, which established their hostile environment training in 1993. Numerous journalists interviewed noted that “the first aid was the most valuable part of the available training courses” (Tumber et al, 2006 p 132), and appreciated that “people have learnt enough to perhaps save a colleague in the field” (Tumber et al, 2006 p 133). However, very little attention is given to the training and support local media personnel receive from their employing organizations, and the implication of providing training and preparation to only expatriate staff. This approach seems to introduce several ethical and logistical concerns. The ethical issues surrounding this process are obvious. When requesting people enter an environment where injury or death may occur, there should be a standard of pre-deployment preparation –

7 Muscle Memory is a military term used to describe a trained response that is easily recalled and enacted, even in high stress situations.

despite where their home residences may exist. Logistically, if an incident involving injury was to affect a team of both local and expatriate personnel, only the expatriate staff with managing hostile environment training would be adequately equipped to manage the incident and treat injuries. This does not bode well if the ‘wrong people’8 are injured and incapable of rendering care after the incident occurs.

PROTECTION There are also very significant contributions provided in ‘Journalists Under Fire’; which describes the recent utilization of security personnel for Close Personal Protection. Mention is given to the varying degrees of capabilities and experience amongst ‘security professionals’ facilitating these services to journalists in hostile environments. There are a number of subjective discourses surrounding the necessity of ‘security advisors’, and the use of armed escorts. Generally, there is a sense that having armed guards during news coverage serves to alienate the journalist and enhances suspicion of their intentions. However, little detail in the text is provided into the ‘Standard Operating Practices’ (SOP’s) for the use of weapons for the organizations accompanied by armed guards, which raises numerous issues. “A whole convoy of CNN people got involved in a fire fight with the Iraqi militias on the side of the road, because they had armed security guys. I think that’s madness and leads us down a terribly dangerous path.” (Tumber et al, 2006 p 139).

The literature discussing the training and protection of foreign correspondents was a vital element of the research, as it provided an up-to-date account of current standards of proactive pre-deployment safety initiatives, and also detailed what the training entailed. Further works that provide supplementary information to this area of the literature review, include Bearing Witness (Leith, 2004), Reporting War (Allan & Zelizer, 2004) and Terrorism, War and the Press (Palmer, 2003).

DUTY OF CARE Contributions to understanding the area of hostile environment and safety training also came from the various international organizations that work to defend press freedom and protect journalists. These organizations include: the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF), the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and the International News Safety Institute (INSI). These

8 It’s an odd exercise, that it’s all meant to be about protection for me, but it was really giving me medical expertise I’d probably use on someone else in the end. (Palmer, 2007)

groups work to establish what ‘standard of care’ currently exists with respect to training and support across various media organizations.

The IFJ was one of the first organizations to establish a policy on media organizations that are not meeting a minimum ‘duty of care’ to their personnel. They have “condemned media organisations which contribute to the perilous situation of journalists by unprofessional activity, excessive competition and a failure to provide resources for the training and protection of journalists” (IFJ, 1998). This speaks in a clear language that those failing in the basic support of their staff are negligent, and are condemned amongst members within these organizations.

Aidan White, the General Secretary of the IFJ, has also initiated programs to train journalists in the world’s most hostile environments, noting that "safety training is of paramount importance for the protection of journalists in high risks locations such as Iraq. We are delighted that our colleagues in Iraq were able to learn skills which will stand them in good stead in their work" (IFJ, 2009). However, there are many that remain unsatisfied with the limited resources available for this training, and what seems to be a ‘culture of neglect’ towards freelancers. The international organizations facilitating the training have a great number of issues to acknowledge in the development of a comprehensive training approach, as pointed out by this unnamed Iraqi journalist:

“How did you choose those Iraqi journalists? I'm one of them and no-one informed us or advertised about this training course... Unfortunately many good meetings, trainings and conferences are taking place in Baghdad and most of the time only the official journalists are invited (no independent journalists, reporters, or freelancers) ... I really wonder why?” (IFJ, 2009)

This is the main issue that presents itself repeatedly, the idea that mainstream9 big- budget media develops ample preparation, equipment and support, but that the lack of ‘duty of care’ provided to local staff often leaves many media workers wanting. There does exist organizations that have taken the initiative in this area, and “since

9 Mainstream – pertains to major media organizations and their staff, which has worked to coin the phrase, ‘mainstream correspondent’. The journalists that often work from story-to-story are referred to as ‘freelancers’, ‘stringers’ and ‘independents’.

the mid-1990s, CNN International has provided hostile-environment training to all of its workers, including fixers, going into potentially dangerous situations” (Witchel,2004). There should now be a concerted attempt to find a cost-efficient model10 to provide such services across medium and small media organizations that do not have the budgets to deliver the same model, and my later contribution in this document will explore one option that will soon be implemented and tested across several media organizations.

RISKS Despite the training that foreign correspondents may receive, historically, the nature of their job has entailed moving towards the risks, and potentially dangerous situations, in order to ‘get the story’. Unfortunately, with more and more journalists being targeted because of their work on overseas assignments, there has been a relative move away from overtly supporting this approach.

“It’s becoming a very dangerous world- I don’t think there’s ever been a period when doing this job [journalism] has seemed so full of risk.” (Julian Manyon, as quoted by Tumber et al, 2006)

Similarly, the non-fiction book Killing the Messenger (Foerstel, 2006) contains an entire chapter also dedicated to ‘Personal Stories of Abduction, Torture and Death’ of six foreign correspondents.

One important text relating to the risks faced by foreign correspondents is ‘Words of Fire’ (Collings, 2001). This work discusses the various risks and separates them into two sections; ‘violence and imprisonment’, and ‘legal and economic pressures’. The first section discusses the physical risks and retaliations that journalists may face as a result of either their deployment to a particular region, or of writing a particular story. However, what makes this piece of literature more unique is that it brings up that whilst many journalists face physical risks (some of which the greater media hear about) many more face legal and economic pressures, those of which are never heard about. This includes the application of libel and slander law (law

10 Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT) often cost between $20,000 to $30,000 USD for 10 personnel. This is due to the extensive use of props, actors, Pyrotechniques, helicopters, military vehicles, etc. Initial training courses opted to simulate conflict, but this is now being disputed for its ineffectiveness in providing journalist specific training competencies.

against the defamation of persons, when written or spoken, respectively), which can result in imprisonment for many correspondents deployed into Non-western countries. There have been innumerable instances of journalists being wrongfully detained and extorted, sometimes in direct response to their work, and other times because they are merely a Western face. It is important to appreciate that each country these foreign correspondents find themselves holds unique challenges, and each situation is dictated by various cultural, religious, economic, legal and personal dynamics. This literature was an essential part of the review, as it categorized risks that face contemporary correspondents. It explored the deliberate targeting whilst on deployment to hostile environments, but also explored the various other risks that pertain, not only to media workers, but to all Western travellers.

Again, one of the most comprehensive references regarding the dangers foreign correspondents face is ‘Journalists Under Fire’ (Tumber et al., 2006). Although the chapters covering risks are compiled almost entirely of quotes and anecdote, it still provides an exclusive look at the varying risks involved. It provides recent statistics on the amount of journalist fatalities in Iraq and previous wars, and acknowledges that said fatalities would have mainly been due to accidental cross-fire in past wars. However, journalists are now being deliberately targeted, kidnapped and murdered.

“So many journalists have been killed in the last few years; we used to have almost an unofficial diplomatic status. We were seen unofficially as objective, and unofficially as neutral. And now we’re actually targets.” (Marie Colvin, as quoted by Tumber et al., 2006)

The book finishes on a note of warning, by listing the stories of over twenty-two journalists who were either maimed or killed whilst covering conflict. The benefit of literature such as this as that it manages to compile the experiences of foreign correspondents across various conflicts, environments and experiences, and contributes information for future journalists, academics, researchers and hostile environment trainers. This information is also supported by several other pieces of literature; including The Media at War (Carruthers, 2000), In the Hot Zone: One Man, One Year, Twenty War Zones (Sites, 2007) and Emergency Sex: True Stories From a War Zone (Cain et al, 2004).

ANECDOTAL It is no new occurrence for foreign correspondents to write books depicting, in detail, their experiences during postings in war-torn foreign nations. These books are important contributions, because of the unique insight into the journalists’ mind-set regarding training and its usefulness after the assignment. Inclusive in this list of books is ‘The View from the Valley of Hell’ (2007), an autobiographical work detailing the Mark Willacy’s (a foreign correspondent with the ABC) posting in the Middle East over a period of four years, during the peak of the War on Terror. Willacy makes particular note of the fact that despite receiving training prior to deployment to the Middle East, that it was not suited to a journalists’ profession. He refers to the training being too ‘military’ in its focus, being a ‘survival course’, and only providing ‘black and white’ training for incident responses that would rarely work in a real-world context (Willacy, 2007). This is a refrain many journalists echo, stating that the training courses currently available do not adequately prepare journalists for the actual tasks and situations that they encounter whilst on deployment.

“You’re trained to the extent that you’re sent off for a survival course where you’ve got former SAS guys shooting weapons over your head. In a location north of Sydney, up in the scrublands, and for about a week you’re put through your paces. You’re taught survival techniques, medical techniques, how to tell where the fire was coming from and how far away it could be. I still, to this day, can’t tell.” (Willacy, 2007)

This theme continues to present itself in several other autobiographical works written by foreign correspondents, including the Eric Campbell autobiography ‘Absurdistan’ (2005). Campbell writes of his experiences in international news since the late 90’s, and focuses on his time in Afghanistan and Iraq. Campbell’s response to the death of his camera operator, Paul Moran, in Northern Iraq grants insight into the possibility that even veteran correspondents find it difficult to appreciate the dangers they may face. The following quote details a suicide car bombing (just three days after the war began) that severely injured Campbell and resulted in Paul’s death.

“There was a voice in my head, too. It was my own, trying to tell me I wasn’t here. This isn’t real. We don’t get hurt. It’s not our world.

We both have babies. Paul has a little girl. This wasn’t supposed to happen.” (Campbell, 2005).

Comments such as “This isn’t real” and “It’s not our world” indicate a difficulty in appreciating that these dangers to foreign reporters have become so prevalent. Campbell also communicates his displeasure with the training (or lack thereof) that foreign correspondents have been provided with, as he worked in six countries for eight years before being provided with hostile environment training course. However, the culture at the ABC has changed considerably since this period.

‘The World on a String: How to Become a Freelance Foreign Correspondent’ (1997), the written experiences of two freelance foreign correspondents, Al Goodman and John Pollack, is another autobiographical work that provides unique insight into the lack of support that freelance journalists (in particular) have historically received. As Goodman (1997) describes, the chance to be a foreign correspondent is rare, thus freelance correspondents are becoming more and more common. However, a large risk associated with this is that there is no extended duty of care, a benefit which mainstream foreign correspondents are provided with – theoretically. This lack of support occurs across various areas, including a lack of training or hostile environment courses, a lack of insurance, a lack of protection or adequate field support, and a lack of psychological or emotional support upon return from the assignment. This literature is vital within this research, as it brings up not only the inherent dangers associated with the job, but also the disparity between the perceived ‘duty of care’ between mainstream and freelance correspondents. Further works also provide similar information to the literature reviewed above, including Emergency Sex: True Stories From a War Zone (Cain, Postlewait, & Thomson, 2006), Vietnam: A Reporters War (Lunn, 1993), Dining With Terrorists (Rees, 2005), Derailed in Uncle Ho’s Victory Garden (Page, 1995), On the Wire (Williams, 1992), Front Line (Hollingworth, 1990) and Not Always on Horseback (Warner 1997). It should be noted, however, that although these works provide a unique view into the personal beliefs of the foreign correspondents regarding their training and its level of adequacy, they are autobiographical and singular in nature, and reflect the opinion of only one person.

CHAPTER 3 – RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Methods of Data Collection and Analysis: The Creative, Emotionalist, Non-Positivist, Hunch-Following Qualitative Method → To a Privileged, Potential-Participant Observation and Active-Participant or Complete Researcher Method in Fieldwork

The academic definition of ‘research’ could be equated to a collection of practices, or rites of passage, that are strictly adhered to for the purpose of taking a theoretical paradigm to its highest achievable space – a unique contribution to knowledge. When I began my research at Queensland University of Technology, I had no idea that this academic process would work so promptly to find me working and contributing to my chosen area of research, long before my study had reached its end. This portion of the exegesis presents my research methodology and establishes how I utilized a qualitative interviewing method, immersion in the profession and finally contributed to developments in the area of research. I also detail why my original method for analysing and indexing the textual elements took a non-positivist approach, which aided in maintaining a flexible orientation in later my later research phases. Finally, I propose possible meanings that the data collected and analysed may present – this, considered a critical element in the initial research of the interviewee and topic (prior to performing the interview), because it assists in the development of appropriate questions to lead enquiry.

Numerous sources and definitions of qualitative research have detailed why this method was most suitable for the data collection used. Silverman (2004) notes that the “strength of qualitative interviewing is the opportunity it provides to collect and rigorously examine narrative accounts of social worlds” (p. 137). Due to the fact that the majority of literature relating to contemporary foreign correspondents is written in an anecdotal fashion, more focused accounts of this were captured through these qualitative interviewing methods. Hopefully, this has provided evidence of correlating experiences between subjects/ interviewees, and has allowed available information to move from the singular anecdotal accounts which are available now- to reveal reoccurring themes relating to the initial research conceptualisations (i.e. “Why did you, as a foreign correspondent feel unprepared for the challenges you faced while working and living abroad?”).

It is also considered that “while quantitative research focuses on objective structures, it falls to qualitative researchers to give ‘insight’ into people’s subjective states” (Silverman, 2004, p. 361). The sole purpose of this research was to determine how professional international reporters ‘felt’ – subjectively – about the preparations and training granted to them, and then to make meaning of this data (a perfect complement to this “qualitative research focus”). Other texts describe qualitative research – especially interviewing techniques – as “a survey of practice or opinion that involves finding out what other people are doing or thinking and asking them for information” (Evans, 1968, p. 17). Qualitative research methods are therefore a means of obtaining data without lengthy preparation and orientation with more rigid research methodologies. Quantitative research demands very specific practices for capturing and analysing data, however, qualitative research approaches information in a manner that most people living in social conditions comprehend. Speaking to other individuals to retrieve information, to understand their thoughts or to address their concerns is considered standard social interaction. It is even arguable that most people possess these fundamental qualitative research and data-gathering skills, because life provides daily opportunities to engage with, question and analyse the responses of those around us.

An overview of the interviewing process that was utilized is detailed in the Interviewing: People Skills Series (1993). This method encompasses a T.E.L.L. (trust, energize, lead, look) algorithm. With this method, gaining the subject’s trust is the initial concern and believed paramount for obtaining “high-quality information”. The following Silverman (2004) quote describes a particular interviewing technique that serves to establish mutual trust and promote open and freely exchanged expression.

Creative interviewing – the interviewer must establish a climate of mutual disclosure… (and) displays the interviewers willingness to share his or her own feelings and deepest thoughts. This is to assure respondents that they can, in turn, share their own intimate thoughts and feelings. (Silverman, 2004, p. 147)

Some of the details that I – as the interviewer – disclosed include personal experiences during deployments with the United States Marine Corps (as a Hospital Corpsman) to areas experiencing civil conflict and war, or deployments to areas that

have recently experienced a natural disaster (many of these areas having also been visited by the foreign correspondents and war correspondents interviewed throughout this process). I also offer recounts of my very personal feelings of being unprepared, or thinking – “I should have paid more attention during the coursework I did receive”. It may also be reasonable to explain that that while I was deployed with the Marine Corps, I became involved with training recently arrived foreign correspondents in the basics of battlefield first aid, and also fundamental survival training. It was during these experiences that personal interests were raised as to why no standardised tiered training existed to prepare these journalists for life in their new (and often hostile) environments.

Next, interviewing techniques that serve an energizing purpose and successfully lead the interaction were utilized – examples include using open-ended, probing and challenging questions. Silverman (2004) again describes the importance for the interviewer to also experience the interview with a more interdependent methodology. Through an emotionalist or non-positivist method, both the interviewer and interviewee build mutual understanding and ultimately more profound trust.

Emotionalists suggest that unstructured, open-ended interviewing can and does elicit “authentic accounts of subjective experience… (and) it is only in the context of non-positivistic interviews, which recognize and build on their interactive components (rather than trying to control and reduce them), that “inter-subjective depth” and “deep mutual understanding” can be achieved. (Silverman, 2004, p. 125-126)

The final letter in the T.E.L.L. overview is to look and observe the reactions and signifiers given by the interviewee. Brenner (1987) notes that “the assumptions underlying the use of interviews are that people not only can comment on their experiences and feelings, but also that they do this in everyday life” (p. 7). Non- verbal communications (i.e. body language, facial expressions, etc.) are also methods that individuals “comment on experience and feelings” utilized daily, and thus, should not be ignored during the interviewing process. The ability to look and register reactions to particular questions, or the retelling of personal experience, obviously provides cues that lead the direction of the interview, but to a greater extent these cues may be critical to lead the overall research orientation as well.

The search for the particular ‘angle’ that was to guide both the interview and the overall research orientation led me to consider the initial method for engaging with early findings. It was essential to keep research strategies flexible in the early stages of development, because of the unknown nature of the findings that were to be revealed in interview collected data. The method most likely to allow for this flexibility- even during the process of interviewing- proved to be “an open-ended life story interview, (where) a researcher-interviewer is likely to be in a hunch-following mode” (Brenner, 1987, p. 169). This “hunch-following mode” seemed to correspond best with my initial research goals, as I too had only a ‘hunch’ that- like myself- numerous individuals deployed to ‘weird and dangerous’ areas of the world felt unprepared. Despite years of formal training to understand what roles and responsibilities my duties entailed (as a military operator) – I have always remained adamant that I was not trained or prepared enough. It was this ‘hunch’ that led me to believe that international reporters, who, on average, may experience merely a few weeks of training and orientation prior to embarkation, may have experience a similar lack of comfort- if not far more. My initial ‘hunch’ wasn’t grounded in personal experiences from work in this field, but this quote details my process, and how I developed an intimate understanding of the challenges.

As researchers, we acknowledge the non-linear nature of research. Analysis in research using in-depth interviewing does not occur in a neat ordered fashion immediately after the data gathering but in fact simultaneously with it. (Minichiello, 1990, p.179)

Brenner, Brown & Canter (1987) describe methods of textual analysis and textual indexing that allow for easier comparability and interpretation of interview material. These include, (1) purely qualitative quoting; (2) descriptive uses, as illustrations to developing conceptualization and theories; (3) theory oriented content analysis or indexing (pp. 177-179). This appears to be one example of practice-led research – where data obtained is understood to develop theories pertaining to the initial desired research goal. This is true, especially if unforeseen trends are located during the indexing of interview materials or original ‘hunches’ prove unfounded in the results of materials. Throughout this process, I have utilized all three of these methods of textual analysis in order to curtail my initial data collection method. This process worked in three tiers.

Firstly, all acquired interview materials were taken at ‘pure face value’ – meaning: the initial information received was used as a portion of my textual review, and my knowledge of the field of foreign reporting grew with a more personal engagement with “what it was like on the ground”. The second tiered usage of interview materials assisted in conceptualising theories that pertain to the data received. Throughout this process, numerous theories were culminated, due to the varying experiences of each subject interviewed; however, this was taken as an essential step towards the desired development and application of the single theory. Finally, the third and last tier allowed the chosen orientation of the research to form interview material into comprehensive and comprehendible meaning; however, the final theoretical orientation was not evident until I followed several ‘hunches’ to no avail. “During the first days of a research project, the focus of the researcher will be general. As the research progresses, and themes and concepts are identified, the notes will become more focused, ‘dense’ and selective” (Minichiello, 1990, p.217). This quote reinforces what I believe to be a sound conceptual approach to collecting and analysing the interview obtained data that I intend to compile and work with in great depth.

One article in the Carter & Delamont (1996) text details how the presentation of self (of not showing ‘fear’), often invokes a firm official ‘face’ or an air of relaxed informality under extreme working pressures (pp. 98-99). I have provided in my research statement the framework and orientation that led the interview questions posed to these professionals. I believed the answers were related to the above – professional ideology, that enabled a “firm official face” to be presented in the field (even under the most dangerous and extreme conditions), and that the field of foreign correspondents was filled with very ‘brave’ individuals that were able to carry out their duties despite the known and obvious hazards. However, the interviews and textual analysis revealed this ‘hunch’ was not entirely correct, and these abilities were more inherent in the people that senior management and editors selected for these assignments.

To facilitate a more comprehensive method of data collection, and ensure more privileged access to the required data, it was essential to evolve my approach from mere interviews to a participant’s role.

The validity of participant observation derives from being there. Observing and participating work in concert, if not always seamlessly, and competence

develops in two parallel directions: (a) The researcher becomes skilled in the standards of performance honoured by the group or individual; and (b) the researcher becomes increasingly skilled at creating sharp, detailed, and theoretically informed descriptions. (Lindlof, 1995, p 135)

There were a number of reasons I desired to attend a managing hostile environments course, but one of the most important contributions to the research was that it developed validity within this group of journalists. Many people involved with the courses, I had already met previously whilst performing interviews, and there was an immediate degree of credibility from these numerous meetings. It proved that I was passionate about the area of research, and opened up more contacts for interviews. Miller and Tewksbury describes the ideal role of a participant observer as “a real setting member, whose science activities are conducted in covert manners, and to anyone noticing the potential participant, the researcher is a real member of the setting being studied” (Miller and Tewksbury, 2006, p 5). The noted area of difference between being a “real member” of a group of journalists is that the “science” (filming, recording, editing, retelling), is a formal component of validation as part of the group. Therefore, the initial stage of my participation was the overt collection of video footage of the course, and provided further inclusion of this research within a professional context within journalism, filmmaking and storytelling.

The following Bertrand and Hughes excerpt demonstrates how the participant observation approach also worked seamlessly with previous research models:

Participant-Observation rarely occurs in isolation: it may be backed up with document analysis, interviews with participants, and possibly questionnaires and surveys, in which case, it may well be described as a ‘case study’. (Bertrand and Hughes, 2005, 146)

When I was granted the opportunity to work as an instructor of a Managing Hostile Environment course, develop travel advice and give pre-deployment briefing and travel to potential hostile environments overseas to plan contingency and evacuation plans, my research methodology changed again to an active or complete participant’s role. However, the contributions of the previous approaches were still palpable. In October 2008, I facilitated my first course with the ABC as the sole instructor, and several participants that I had interviewed previously continued to

regard me as a journalist and filmmaker, one which also had knowledge through military travel and experience.

The active participant has a job to do in the setting addition to the research; the privileged observer is someone who is known and trusted and given easy access to information about the context. (Ely, Anzul, Friedman, Garner, and Steinmetz, 1991, 45)

It was at this point that I needed to consider the ethical implications of the further evolution of my research as an active participant and privileged observer. I began to make contributions to the area of training and pre-deployment preparation for journalists, and was provided with detailed information regarding the travel itineraries of media personnel, and assignment planning details. Due to these ethical issues, I have refrained from passing information that is considered sensitive in nature, as I do not wish to disaffect my position in the professional arena or create distrust amongst colleagues after the submission of this research. “The complete observer takes the role of observer-as-participant to what might be its logical conclusion: observing without being “present” to the participants. The participants do not recognize the complete observer as a researcher at all” (Lindlof, 1995, p 148). I believe that this research methodology has taken me through various “rites of passage” to bring me to this “logical conclusion”, and be recognised only as a part of the group – not a researcher.

This established firstly, why I chose to utilize qualitative interviewing techniques (creative, emotionalist, non-positivist, hunch-following) to capture materials for the evolution of my research goals, and secondly, how fortunate I was to meet the appropriate people in this area to provide me the opportunity to develop this method into a complete observer’s role. I have detailed how gaining trust using a creative method orientated my approach to the interviewees, and how it revealed the necessary “high-quality information”. I have also detailed how I utilized techniques to energize, lead & look using an emotionalist and non-positivist approach. I then addressed how a hunch-following method of analysing and indexing these textual elements helped me maintain flexibility in its scope and orientation.

In conclusion, “the investment of personal commitment to the research task must rest on some belief that research can contribute to effecting change – in the perspectives of decision-makers, in the trajectories of policy and in the parameters

of practice” (Carter & Delamont, 1996, p.36). The possibility of contributing knowledge that will someday affect change to an industry, that for some organizations, depends on realities thirty-years outdated (such as the Vietnam War era where journalists were considered neutral and independent – able to investigate stories without fear of kidnapping and murder) is a daunting one, but the possibility that even a single statement recorded may promote change and further education that could save a life is certainly meaningful. We trust foreign reporters to be our messengers – to analyse, sort and convey meaning of distant events in unfamiliar cultures – these professionals should be empowered with knowledge and training of their environment to ensure their reasonable safety. My hope is that the time and energies put into this research can at some point in the future develop and solidify the necessity of the managing hostile environments training and support, and that more organizations (media, businesses, NGOs and governments) will facilitate this training – it has, and does, save lives.

CHAPTER 4 – PROJECT DEVELOPMENT

This chapter will provide a personalised, yet important contribution to understanding the evolution of my academic research experience. It is presented because the central focus of my life over the last two years has been this field of study and fieldwork, and the process of obtaining the interviews, the chance meetings, the professional opportunities, the employment and the travel have all been significant in developing my comprehension of the travel safety profession, risk mitigation and international journalism. I will provide an abridged timeline of the past two years, and detail elements of project development, personalised experience and fieldwork.

Although my undergraduate degree from University of Queensland was in media studies and film & television production, the majority of this coursework was theoretical. Thus, when I began my study in February 2007, the supervisory team at QUT, consisting of Alan Knight and Geoff Portmann, advised that I attend courses in documentary film production and post-graduate journalism. For the first six months of my study, I developed my understanding of international journalism through this course study, continued to review core texts in the area, developed my literature review and also my competency in film production with foundations and documentary film courses (dedicating time to become proficient in the use of Avid and Final Cut editing software and cameras ranging from small DV-Cam to professional HD models).

By June, I felt comfortable to begin my on-camera interviewing process. Initially, there were a number of issues regarding sourcing equipment to compile the interview rushes, due to a lack of equipment for research student, however, I used the available equipment (camera range: Sony DRS-PD150, DSR-PD170, DSR-250, HVR-A1P, HVR-V1P and the Canon XL1). Therefore, it should be noted that the variation in the quality of cameras provided a slight discernable difference in image quality. I believe the content11 of the interviews captured, however, has worked to mask these slight variations in quality.

At an early stage in the research, I discovered that approaching this topic as a student would require twice the effort to obtain the applicable interviews. Many in the

11 The ‘poor-quality’ silent 8mm film by Abraham Zapruder of President John F. Kennedy’s assassination is one of the most ‘significant’ pieces of footage ever captured. (Bugliosi, 2007)

profession of journalism are wary of those requesting detailed accounts of their personal experiences and private lives, and most possess an understanding of interview techniques utilised to attain information. In general, I also perceived there to be a lack of respect for researchers and students by professional journalists. This meant I was rarely able to select an ideal location for the interviews, which inevitably meant inadequate lighting and background noise. I routinely obtained the interviews alone, or with a single assistant, and took them when and where they became available.

Through the recommendations of my research supervisor, Alan Knight, I sought out the legendary photojournalist Tim Page for my initial interview. Tim Page made his name during the Vietnam War, and has covered several conflicts for AFP (Agence France-Presse), and UPI (United Press International), as well as through being an independent photographer. The interview lasted more than four hours, covering my research question, the psychological impact of covering conflict, current embedding and the changing space that Western journalists now occupy working abroad, especially in the Middle East. Within the year, I would be working with Tim.

In July 2007, I embarked on my first travel as part of the research, and visited the Australian Broadcasting Company’s (ABC) Ultimo office in Sydney, Australia. I lined up several interviews, including: Tony Hill (ABC, Head of International News and Current Affairs), Heather Forbes (ABC, Manager Staff Development and Training) and Tim Palmer (ABC, Walkley Award Winning Foreign Correspondent). After these interviews, it became increasingly clear that the core focus for the research and documentary film should remain the ABC’s standard of training, due to their efforts to standardize training and provide all employees with Managing hostile environment training prior to overseas assignments. I also obtained the contact details of the Sydney-based international security, travel risk and crisis management firm that coordinate this pre-deployment training for the ABC, Reuters (Asia), NGOs, businesses and other government and media organizations. Once again, within twelve months, I would be employed with this company.

After obtaining these initial interviews with ABC personnel, I sought to read a number of the books recently released by foreign journalists that had worked in areas affected by conflict. Although these texts were regularly anecdotal and personalized (only a retelling of their experiences) they did provide unique insight into the mechanics and complications of the work. The autobiographies: Mark

Willacy and Eric Campbell, both ABC foreign correspondents, were essential readings, due to the likelihood of obtaining future interviews with them. These reading provided a more comprehensive appreciation of the training they received prior to deploying, the stories they had filed, and the difficult situations they had encountered. In August 2007, I interviewed Eric Campbell to discuss in-depth his perception of the MHE courses, the current support / lack of support journalists often receive overseas, the war in Iraq and his time in Afghanistan and finally the loss of Paul Moran (his camera technician) in Kurdistan.

My original research question was, “How can media organizations ‘adequately’ train their foreign correspondents, producers, camera operators, technicians, fixers and other support staff for work in difficult, remote or hostile environments?” However, after the interview with Eric Campbell, it became clear that individual training is only a diminutive portion of preparation, and that overall risk mitigation and emergency management processes extends far before and after the Managing Hostile Environment course.

In late 2007, I scheduled several other interviews and prepared a pitch for my documentary film within the university faculty. During my film coursework at QUT, the opportunity to produce a 10-minute film trailer presented itself, and approval of this pitch was important to drive the progress of my research and the creative project. I was also able to interview several other journalists, international news editors for both print media and television and academics. In October, I was invited to attend and film the proceedings of a forum and photographic exhibit at the Gold Coast Art Centre titled, ‘Focus: Photography & War 1945-2006’. It was at this forum that I again met Tim Page, the keynote speaker for the event, and a working relationship was formed.

In the following months, I began work with Tim Page in an assistant’s role, archiving photographs and organising sales, however the important contribution to my research came from the consistent introduction to Tim’s network of fellow journalists. I met several freelance journalists, those working for major media organizations and members of his photographers’ collective, Degree South.

In early 2008, I travelled, as part of my research, to obtain interviews in Melbourne, Australia. One of these included an interview with Cait McMahon (Director of the

DART12 Centre for Trauma in Journalism - Australasia), which covered a number of psychological considerations pertaining to working journalists, including: emotional resilience, dealing with work related stress, post-incident counselling, the use of medications to suppress traumatic events and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

It is after this interview that I formed an outline for the 10 min documentary film trailer. The interview materials gathered covered a timeline from the Vietnam War to contemporary conflicts. A plan was also solidified to refrain from voice-overs, and to allow interview subjects to speak for themselves about their experience and the changing conditions journalists now face in difficult, remote and hostile environments.

In February 2008, I was invited to move into Tim Page and his partner Marianne Harris’ home, and assist them in establishing an office to continue the cataloguing of Tim’s work. I continued to meet and interview people from his network of acquaintances, both on-camera and off, the most notable interview from this process being with Simon Dring. Simon is a British journalist that had worked for Reuters during the Vietnam War, and later as one of the BBC’s most experienced foreign correspondents that covered over 30 wars in his tenure with them. The interview covered a number of key research areas, including the lack of formal training available during his initial years covering conflict, the first hostile environment courses established in the early 90s and the effects of landmines and unexploded ordinance (UXOs). His press vehicle convoy was caught in a minefield where several of his colleagues were severely injured, and his soundman was killed. His interview reinforced the importance of adequate situational awareness and planning prior to each assignment.

Marianne Harris, who worked in the Australian film and television industry for years, had recently held the role of executive producer on a film titled, “Shooting the Messenger”. The film had sourced 32 interviews from the correspondents and photojournalists that had lived and worked in Saigon during the Vietnam War, but had never been completed. There was a necessity in the documentary film to form a comprehensive depiction of media work during World War II, Vietnam and Cambodia, and their variation between contemporary conflicts. I assessed the

12 The Dart Centre is the premiere global resources for journalists covering violence and trauma. http://www.dartcenter.org/

content of interviews obtained for “Shooting the Messenger” (including contributions depicted in ‘Journalists Under Fire’, from Walter Cronkite, Joe Galloway, Peter Arnett and Eddie Adams), which worked to form a timeline for journalism in conflict zones. Marianne’s stipulation for interview usage was for the single inclusion in this academic research production.

These interviews established that journalists were ‘protected’ or even ‘countenanced’ due to their perceived neutrality, which has certainly seemed to change with contemporary conflicts. Establishing these early perspectives worked in partnership with the interviews that I gathered, and assisted defining the changing nature of risks affecting media workers.

In April 2008, after several correspondence emails with Steven Dunn, Director of Dynamiq, I was invited to travel to Sydney and attend a five day MHE to participate in and film the course. At this point, there was a shift from the qualitative interviewing research methodology that built my understanding of the field, to a participant observer’s role. I continued to obtain interviews for the film, but being involved in the training was a definitive change in the scope and approach to the research.

Before attending this course, my thesis was focused on how ‘inadequate’ I perceived the duration of training to be, and my belief that five days could never provide the knowledge necessary to increase survivability in the field. It is now evident that this notion was firmly entrenched from my military experience, and the substantial amount of time personally spent in military training commands. Soldiers and Marines, who regularly work in isolation and are likely to expose themselves to similar risks that journalists regularly face, receive training for several months, or even years, however, there are innumerable differences between the tasks and expectations between military and media operators.

Attending the contemporary MHE course offered an example that differed greatly from the courses researched previously, because the focus was on the specific tasks faced by journalists and the associated risks. Whereas, one of the initial complaints repeatedly expressed in the interviews I obtained was that these courses

were “too military in their orientation”13. This course observed integrated several ‘veteran’ correspondent guest lecturers, and took a non-positivist approach to lecturing with activities, discussions and scenarios that compelled attendees to share their experiences and knowledge.

It became clear to me that the budget and timeline available to working journalists only accommodated this week of intensive training prior to work overseas. This is the standard for all ABC and Reuters personnel, but most media organizations still lack any structured training. It is therefore unreasonable to assume that the expense of several weeks of training will be provided until standards exist across all organizations, which may take several years or even decades to achieve. These five-day courses are the current standard, and adequate utilisation of this time is essential to meet the necessary training objectives.

I was able to collect interviews from Peter Cave and Phil Williams, two of the most experienced of ABC’s foreign correspondents. Their collective experiences covered several conflicts, including the Balkans, Middle East, Afghanistan and Iraq. I also held an off-camera interview with a senior Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) psychologist, who was attending the MHE as a guest instructor in psychological resilience. His contributions were significant; however, he asked to remain unnamed.

13 Early Hostile Environment Training would include hours on rifle ranges were course coordinators demonstrating weapon sounds and effects, utilized pyrotechnics and explosives and often incorporated helicopters or military-style vehicles. Not only do these increase the expense of the courses and limit accessibility, but are also clearly removed from work representative of most journalists. There are also arguments that the use of these embellishments do little to reinforce the core competencies in training, and are merely a means to acquire capital per-attendee.

ABC - April 2008 (Sydney, Australia) – 5 Day Managing Hostile Environments

Ake Prihantari Mike Coggan Firman Nanol Paul Gates Jiang Xin Phil Williams Josephine Cafagna Simi Chakrabarti

In June 2008, the MHE training company recognised my interest in the area of research, and requested my involvement in training the ABC’s June MHE course. I had come to know several veteran correspondents while collecting interviews, and saw the value in allowing their stories to be told during the course. Clearance was received, and footage from various interviews was shown during the course. This is one element that clearly developed the scope of the ABC’s training.

Some of the medical training also required improvements. Although the Cardio- Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) training was good, there was room to incorporate more specific training elements (such as those that I had taken from my experience as a paramedic). This would evolve from the previous courses’ CPR and wound dressing lesson into a pseudo-Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) course with core competencies in: lifting a moving patients, cervical spine stabilization, extrication of patients from motor vehicles, triage (patient sorting) training, intermediate airway management techniques and other advanced trauma management techniques (severe head-neck-spine injuries, chest trauma, sucking chest wounds, fractures, burns and wound dressing). It was important to acknowledge that this level of medical training is necessary, because the locations that foreign correspondents and media staff often work do not have adequate emergency medical services. Many do not have ambulances, so in the event of a medical related emergency or accident, they may be required to treat and transport the injured to the next echelon of medical support (hospitals and clinics).

There was also a need to evolve the preventative medicine component of the courses, and attention was placed on items such as practical prevention of disease, food and water safety, and management of extreme environments (cold, hot, altitude, etc.). There was also more focus placed on pre-deployment immunizations and equipment requirements, including a personal supply of needles and syringes.

The MHE courses have continued to evolve, and it remains a dynamic process of feedback and reworking of course content. The 2009 courses have taken into account this feedback, and more attention will be placed on landmine and UXOs awareness, medical triage / multi-casualty drills and provide more destination specific information.

A major progression in the production of the documentary film came as I began to understand the various elements of pre-deployment and assignment planning, risk mitigation and hostile environments safety considerations. This provided a “tempo” for film editing that would begin at a fast rate and slowly decrease. This would mirror the approach to training as initially, these risks may seem overwhelming and impossible to extract meaning. However, as training elements are learnt and employed, the tempo slows and these risks can be considered and managed. This gives new meaning to ‘live by your wits’, because this now includes prior-prudent- planning and the implementation of awareness.

ABC - June 2008 (Sydney, Australia) – 5 Day Managing Hostile Environments

Ari Wuryantama Jonathan Flynn Charles Li Khun Jum Daniel O’Connor Kylie McKiernan David Leland Scott Waide Emma Alberici

In July, I received the opportunity to begin work with the international security and training firm on a part-time basis. This was, and continues to be, an important opportunity for gathering information on the proactive and responsive support services that are available to media organizations. The approach to the research changed again, as I now began an active-observer’s role. I would soon be facilitating the MHE courses alone, and developing core competencies for the training.

I was requested to travel to West Africa in order to review emergency evacuation plans, perform office and accommodation security reviews, and rate medical facilities for media clients working in the region (Sénégal, Mali, Mauritania, Guinea, etc). Prior to deploying on this trip, I underwent the same training and received travel advice from the same framework provided to working journalists. One element in the pre-deployment phase was providing a “proof of life” statement, to be used as an

incident response and negotiation tool in case of Kidnap & Ransom (K&R) incidents (see Figure 1).

Physical Details

Hair colour: Scars:

Birthmark: Eye colour: Distinctive features: Complexion: Height:

Body type:

Proof-of-Life Statement

Statement One: Statement Two:

Figure 1. An Example of a ‘Proof of Life’ Statement.

I felt adequately prepared for this trip, and felt that that the potential risks had been thoroughly disclosed14. From the pre-deployment advice, I felt comfortable with the task planned, and this worked to alleviate any stress that might have been associated with travelling alone into a remote and potentially hostile environment, as civil unrest and high crime rates continued to afflict the region. (iJet, 2008)

In September 2008, I was given the opportunity to facilitate a MHE course as lead instructor in Bangkok, Thailand. This was for a group of journalists living and working in South and South-East Asia, including local and foreign correspondents working in the Bangkok Bureau and correspondents that had just returned from South Asia (Afghanistan & the tribal region of Pakistan). The People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) had been protesting the Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, for

14 Ample notification of immunizations required, and knowledge of emergency contact numbers and adequate medical facilities in the area.

several weeks on the grounds of Government House, and there had been several violent and deadly clashes between the PAD and pro-government supporters. This ensured the course took a heavy focus on civil unrest and riots, as well as convoy training (over-watch technique), emergency medical, preventative medicine and landmine / UXOs. I was able to meet and interview several very experienced foreign correspondents and editors working in Asia.

Reuters - September 2008 (Bangkok, Thailand) – 5 Day Managing Hostile Environments

Figure 2. Attendants of the MHE Thailand Course (Left to Right) – Ralph Jennings, Shaun Filer, Chika Osaka, Ben Tai, Rhee So Eui, Simon Rabinovitch, Niki Koswanage, Simon Denyer, Olivia Rondonuwu, Sophie Hardach, David Fox, Alistair Scrutton, Phil Smith, Jason Subler, Manolo Serapio, Steven Ball and Andrew Biraj.

Shortly after the Thailand MHE, in October 2008, I would travel again to Tokyo, Japan, where I had lived for a number of years working in a Military Hospital and Emergency Room. The core focus of the Tokyo course was natural disaster preparation for a new office space, and training for 40 working journalists.

The main elements of this training included: earthquakes, fire, floods, typhoons, medical treatments and patient triage, preventative medicine, assignment planning and equipment for covering natural disasters, evacuations and other considerations in a post-natural disaster Japan. It then culminated in a mass-casualty drill.

Reuters - October 2008 (Tokyo, Japan) – 3 Day Natural Disaster and Emergency Medical

Nelson Graves Aiko Hayashi Chikafumi Hodo Linda Sieg Rodney Joyce Tetsushi Kajimoto Michael Caronna Takefumi Ito Rika Otsuka Hiroyuki Muramoto Mari Terawaki Elaine Lies Toshi Maeda Yuka Obayashi Fumika Inoue Masahiro Koike Hitoshi Ishida Naoyuki Katayama Isabel Reynolds Sakiko Seki Katsuro Kitamatsu Leika Kihara Olivier Fabre Shigeo Kodama Edwina Gibbs Hiroaki Watanabe Akiko Takeda Osamu Tsukimori Michael Caronna Michko Iwasaki Miho Yoshikawa Yuriko Nakao Kazuhiko Tamaki Masayuki Kitano Yoko Kubota Kyoko Kato Noriyuki Hirata Hugh Lawson Yoshihisa Niikura

ABC - October 2008 (Sydney, Australia) – 5 Day Managing Hostile Environments

Figure 3. Attendants of the MHE Sydney Course (Left to Right) – Shaun Filer, Edmond Roy, Terry McDonald, Peter Cave, Matt Carney, Yoav Appel, Tom Iggulden, Laure Treloar, Mark Willacy, Nicki Bagley, Kirrin McKechnie, Thom Cookes and Sally Sara.

In late October, after the Tokyo Natural Disaster course, I returned to Sydney, Australia to teach a full MHE course with many of the ABC’s most experienced correspondents. It was a unique experience, since I had been viewing stories and reading autobiographies of several of the attendees as part of my research. I was able to collect several off-camera interviews during this course, and they provided very important feedback for further development of the courses. One of the notable comments, made by Mark Willacy and Sally Sara, was that the structure and training style of the course was more tailored to what journalists will experience in these environments. “I liked that the course used concepts instead of just passing information – concepts are easier to recall in an emergency.” (Sara, 2008)

In November, 2008, two major incidents occured, The Mumbai Terror Attacks on hotels frequented by foreigners, and the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) protests in Bangkok. The effects of these events were far-reaching, and impacted on both media and business, both requiring various degrees of advice, monitoring and

protection. It was vital to have multiple sources of ‘actionable intelligence’ 15 to respond to particular risks, manage incidents and judge security trends on the ground.

I was in contact with ground assets that fed in hourly Situation Reports (SITREPS), and facilitated an incident management role, communicating between the media and their field support. Obviously, journalists are often required to move towards the risks to obtain the story, while others are moving away. When entering these environments, it is essential that early communication between the journalist and their field support16 be established as a part of assignment planning. This will ensure personnel are in place to assist if required. This occurred with working journalists in Mumbai, and only required a short phone conversation. Assistance with equipment preparation, emergency contacts and evacuation contingencies were then provided.

I was later interviewed by the Mumbai Mirror (see Figure 4) regarding our field support role, in particular, the services provided during the incident there.

15 ‘Actionable Intelligence’ is information that has gone through a filter of professional analysts to ensure information is not sensationalized, and authenticate validity. 16 Field Support can be facilitated by personnel within the media corporation, or outsourced to security firm, but it is essential to have some initial point of call to regularly ‘check-in’ and to request support if necessary.

MUMBAI MIRROR INTERVIEW

BUSINESS

Bullets won’t hit biz: risk assessment

By William Charles D’Souza, Friday, December 26, 2008

Mumbai: Within just 48 hours of the last terrorist being gunned down at the Taj, a top US- based risk management firm put out the following advisory for clients asking if they should travel to India: “In short, yes. The vast majority of trips to India are incident free, and terrorist attacks remain extraordinary situations.”

The assessment was made by iJet Intelligent Risk Systems, which provides real-time intelligence and travel risk management solutions to multinational organisations for $6,000 onwards per annum. The firm’s President Bruce McIndoe pointed out that, increasingly, the greatest opportunities lie in the ‘BRIC’ countries – Brazil, Russia, India and China.

“But there are risks where there are great opportunities. We have rated BRIC countries at 3 and 4 on a scale of 1-5, with 5 indicating a very high threat,” said McIndoe. “While India is rated 3, Mumbai itself went up to 4 on account of the terror attacks. But the city will continue to be a financial destination – its growing importance in global finance won’t change,” said McIndoe. Countries like Pakistan, Iraq and Somalia have been rated 5, while UAE and New Zealand are rated 1. Even advanced economies like the US and Switzerland have managed a rating of only 2.

The terrorist hit the city exactly one month ago.

Dynamiq, a Sydney-based security consultant that employs former special ops personnel, effected several evacuations during the Mumbai terrorist attacks.

“Many clients were unprepared to return to their hotel rooms, and chose instead to remain on streets. Our response was to escort them to safer accommodation, or directly to outbound flights,” said the firm’s Shaun Filer, while withholding the identity of the clients and the cost of the operations. While the company also sees conducting business in India as essential, “the scope of security preparation and planning must undoubtedly increase now,” said Filer.

‘Improved security measures need to be transparent to travellers’

Dynamiq believes that both the government and tourism industry would need to provide transparency in improved security measures being implemented. “This would help restore Mumbai as a financial and tourist destination,” Filer said. “However, businesses and travellers are still likely to require independent assessments.” Indeed, both the risk management firms saw a huge jump in enquiries after the attacks.

The iJet operations centre. Within two weeks of the attack, 65 per cent of all sales enquiries that the risk management firm received were from clients with Indian operations

“In the first two weeks alone, 65 per cent of all our sales-related inquiries came either from Indian-based companies or from companies with employees or operations in India,” said iJet’s McIndoe. “But while India may rank as a number 3 security assessment, by no means is it the most dangerous country in the world,” he said. “We recommend that travellers and organisations to the area be careful and aware, but not that they avoid the country.”

Figure 4. Mumbai Mirror Interview in December 2008.

In January 2009, I embarked on a trip to Kabul and Islamabad to perform several security and emergency management reviews for international media organizations operating in these countries. The first days were relatively uneventful, which I had

expected due to security incidents being far less common in Kabul during the winter. However, on the morning of January 17th, a suicide attack on the United States Military Base, Camp Eggers, in the Wazir Akbar Khan district occurred a mere hundred meters away. The blast, that “killed one American service member and four Afghan civilians” (Rahimi, 2009), was close enough to fracture door frames and windows in the office I was working. This demonstrated the importance of the review being performed, as improvements to security and blast protection were required.

I also observed the immediate responses of media personnel after the attack occurred, as several television and photo staff rushed towards the site of the incident without protective equipment, or knowledge of the situation. I understood the necessity of gaining the images, but the possibility of secondary attacks17. These secondary attacks are not as common in Kabul as Iraq, but they have occurred before. Yousuf Azimi, a local television producer, recalled during our interview an event that occurred near Ghazni, south of Kabul. “We were on the site of the suicide attack very quickly, and I remember the explosion. It happened only twenty or thirty meters from us, and we found ourselves lying in a ditch on the side of the road” (Azami, 2009). It is for these reasons that recommendations included a draft policy for the usage of protective equipment, and sourcing of body armour for all staff that respond to capture these images. They have now purchased several lightweight and concealable vests with Famostone 18 ballistic plates that display the bureau’s emergency contact details, the person’s name and blood type.

The intention of this chapter was to provide a clear understanding of how the combinations of research and fieldwork, developed my comprehension of the travel safety profession, risk mitigation and international journalism. This timeline detailed elements of professional and academic project developments, including events that drove the creative documentary film production and travel that reinforced the importance of the initial core teachings I had discovered within the literature review and while gathering interviews. Although I was able to obtain several hours of rushes during the travel (including the suicide attack and several anti-western demonstrations in Islamabad), I was not able to receive ‘ethical clearance’ for their use within the documentary film.

17 Secondary terrorist attacks regularly occur to target emergency response personnel as a means of increasing the number of victims. 18 Famostone is light-weight ballistic armour made up of Polyethylene fibre, and has shown to be 10 times stronger than steel.

CHAPTER 5 – DOCUMENTARY FILM

The documentary film produced as part of this research is titled JOURNALISTS UNDER FIRE, and is a thirty minute film that utilizes interviews from foreign correspondents, photojournalists, camera operators, media support staff and fixers whom have worked in difficult, remote and hostile environments and archival footage from various archives and libraries. Many of the interview subjects have spent decades of their careers in locations afflicted with human conflict. The film tells of the experiences, the traumas and the emotional burdens faced by those that make a profession of bearing witness to such events, and also speaks as an endorsement of both proactive and responsive support for future journalists in these environments. This film was produced without the support of major production facilities or equipment. It serves as an academic archive, and allows the interview subjects to respond directly to the research questions posed.

To address the initial research question, “What are the risks in difficult, remote and hostile environments, and how have these risks changed for journalists?” I established a lineage of interview subjects with experience in conflict zones spanning from World War II to Iraq. This was to generate a timeline of events to better understand the manner Western journalists obtained stories during these different eras. To separate sections within the timeline, the ‘fly to’ tool from the online navigation resource, Google Earth19, is utilised.

The interviews, originating with the contributions of Walter Cronkite, note that embedded reporting is by no means a recent occurrence. “[In World War II] we moved only by permit, permission of the military. They then provided all the facilities we needed to move, whenever they approved it. We operated out of press camps, organized as such, under the leadership of military officials, and then all of our copy, all of our photographs, all of our film was edited by the military in the sense that it was censored” (Cronkite, 2002). He also expressed the opinion that “young correspondents in Vietnam, and I give them every credit for incredible bravery and incredible dedication to their job, in getting out in the foxholes with the troops. I think they exposed themselves far more than we did as a general think in World War II” (Cronkite, 2002).

19 Lessons within managing hostile environments courses use this free online resource to facilitate navigation between field-support and the team of journalists in the field. The use of a simple GPS and Google Earth has worked to expedite emergency responses and evacuations after serious incidents, and has saved lives. www.earth.google.com

The correspondents which interviewed from the Vietnam War, despite exposing themselves to far more risks than those from previous conflicts, did not suffer a substantial numbers of casualties. “Charlie knew exactly who we were, and where we were going. I mean, you looked like a Christmas tree, with all the cameras and equipment on you. But, Charlie never took us out. We were protected, well protected might be the wrong word… we were countenanced” (Page, 2007). This is because, the North Vietnamese seemed to know that journalists “were making the propaganda they needed, which was telling the truth” (Page, 2007). This situation changed considerably during the conflict in Cambodia, which still holds the record for most journalists killed in a single day (Nine Men Down, 2004).

The war in the former Yugoslavia20 presented further risks to journalists, and “was the advent of the armoured journalist” (Campbell, 2008) due to the nature of risk. To compound on the risks to working journalists in these conflict zones, there was also consistent targeting and assassination of media personnel in the central Balkans. “When I was there, I believe there was a five-hundred deutschmarks payment for snipers targeting journalists” (Page, 2007). There were also large numbers of journalists killed in the Balkans, because of the ease of access from Europe. Many inexperienced, untrained and unprepared media workers rushed to cover the conflict. Peter Cave discussed his witnessing of a group of Austrian’s killed by government fighter planes that “obviously thought that they were not a part of it, that they were immune” (Cave, 2008). Unfortunately, no-one is immune to these risks.

Another concern, illustrated in Thom Cookes report from the Palestinian Occupied Territories, is that the ‘power of image’ is far more understood by factions on all sides of conflict now. This provides incentive to prevent the image from being capture, which unfortunately means weapons are often turned towards journalists as a deterrent. “We tried to get closer to get some better pictures, but I don’t think we are getting anywhere near – they are actually firing at us.” (Cookes, 2006). The presence of media also works as crowd motivators, as seen in this Palestinian context, as children throw stones at the tank in hopes the camera will capture their bravery. Thom Cookes provided this footage to me after attending the October 2008 managing hostile environment course.

20 All interview materials from this point (Balkans War) forward in the documentary have been personally sourced over the duration of these two years of research.

Iraq has served as sobering conflict for media organizations that have been slow to facilitate pre-deployment preparation and field support for their staff. Peter Cave reluctantly conceded, “I don’t think until I went to Iraq, I actually felt that I was a bonafide target of combatants from either side” (Cave, 2008). The number of non- Iraqis killed in 2003-04 (see Table 1) seems to have changed the way foreign correspondents worked in Iraq. Mark Willacy noted that, “just that feeling of being actively sought out and targeted in Iraq, completely changed the way we worked” (Willacy, 2008). They were forced to have local fixers and camera operators retrieve much of the footage and source stories, while they focused on editorial content from the safety of their office compounds. This is why the statistics for non-Iraqi journalist deaths decrease in following years, however, this poses the question, what effect did this have on the quality and diligence of reporting during these years? Was the media, due to the heightened embedded reporting in the early days of the war considered “an extension of government” (Page, 2007), or was “the only place a journalist can work with a degree of safety in Iraq is being embedded with combat troops” (Campbell, 2008)? I believe the timeline method worked to establish the changing nature of risks. Especially regarding how regularly Western journalists are now being targeted, taken as hostages, and murdered. I believe the best summary of the foundation of these changes are provided by Phil Williams, as he recognises now that “people understand the connection between the image – what it might prove, or what it might show – the power of that image. Whether it is used in a very direct way, on the internet cutting the head off a journalist for political advantage, or whether they realize that ‘you just witnessed me shooting that person, therefore I’m going to kill you’ people now understand” (Williams, 2008).

World War I 2 Croatia (Yogoslav) (1991-95) 94

World War II (1939-1945) 68 Colombia (1986-Present) 54

Korea 17 Algeria (1993-96) 58

Vietnam (1955-75) 66 Afghanistan / Pakistan (2001- 39 Cambodia (1970) 25 Present)

Argentina (1976-83) 98 Iraq (2003-Present) 336

Central America (1979-89) 89 Table 1. Tallies of Journalists Killed by Conflict Since WWI (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2009)

Journalist, Reporters 181 Security guards 12 Cameraman 26 Technicians 14 Photographer 6 Non-Iraqi Media Professionals, 24 Administrative 38 killed in Iraq Translator 12 Total Media professionals 336 Driver 17 Who died in the Iraq war Table 2. Breakdown of Journalists and Media Workers Killed in Iraq Since 2003 (Reporters Sans Frontiers, 2009)

Year Iraqi media workers killed Non Iraqi Total 2003 6 20 26 2004 53 6 59 2005 58 1 59 2006 88 2 90 2007 81 1 82 2008 19 0 19 2009 1 0 1

Total: 306 30 336

Table 3. Tallies of Iraqi and Foreign Media Workers Killed in Iraq Since 2003 ( Reporters Sans Frontiers, 2009)

The second structured aspect of the film works to address the second research question, “Do journalists believe the recent advancements in training and support are significant to their profession, and do they believe it works to enable them to make informed decisions about their personal safety, and obtain the story while not becoming a part of the story?” The case study for the analysis of this is the pre- deployment Managing Hostile Environment course provided to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) and Thompson Reuters (Asia). There is a brief introduction to the numerous modules within the training courses, and then gives specific details and provides some further experiences of the interview subjects to reinforce the importance of the training. These areas include: assignment planning, emergency medicine, preventative medicine, weapons effects, protective equipment, driving & navigation, landmines & unexploded ordinances and finally approaches to emotional resilience and support.

The desire with this approach is to allow professionals to propose, something that I have also discovered over the last two years, that “the ABC is unique in the world, as they have taken on a very large program of proactive and support measures” (McMahon, 2008). Luckily, most media organisations have taken up these programs, because there is more awareness about the physical and emotional effects of working in these environments. “The idea of the ‘bulletproof journalist’, if not quite dead and buried, is certainly getting there” (Williams, 2008). However, there is still a requirement to promote this support, because “it is when people are not supported, either in the event or afterwards, that’s when they fall down” (McMahon, 2008).21 Producing ‘Journalists Under Fire’ was a key element in gaining access to interviewees, and it is doubtful that the research goals would have been achieved without the film. I did not have vast production or equipment support to construct a film ready for broadcast, however, the intended audience of the film has received the work with appreciation. The film is shown on the first morning of every Managing Hostile Environment course, and is provided to demonstrate that many of their respected colleagues believe training is vitally important. It also expresses that despite past courses being modelled with minimal consideration of what journalists actually require to do their job, there now exists groups of people that are passionate about this field of research and support. The film exists as an academic

21 The footage for the ‘mind’s eye’ incorporated in the psychological resilience chapter is from a short film produced at the Digital Media Studio, Catholic University of America produced to educate on the effects of Traumatic Brain Injuries on soldiers.

artefact, one which serves to reference our current location within the profession of foreign reporting, as environments become increasingly hostile, as old and often irresponsible approaches of obtaining story are ending, and as we enter a period where mainstream correspondents, freelance journalists, photojournalists, camera operators, media support staff and fixers, across every media organisation, are provided with necessary support, ensuring that more lives are saved.

“Courses like this are great, because you have to be more aware, more careful. It’s not going to protect us all, this year ‘X’ number of journalists are going to die. I know that. We are in the line of fire, very much so, I feel that on the job, and you see, year by year, more journalists are killed” (Williams, 2008).

The following is a comprehensive list of contributors to the documentary film, JOURNALISTS UNDER FIRE, and represents those obtained personally and sourced.

The on-camera interviews personally obtained for use in this academic production, included:

Anthony Moorhouse Jiang Xin Samar Zowak Akram Walizada Joyce Evans Sayed Salahuddin Ben Bohane Lee Duffield Simon Dring Cait McMahon Mark Dodd Steven Dunn David Costello Mark Willacy Tim Page Eric Campbell Peter Cave Tim Palmer Hamid Shalizi Phil Smith Tony Hill Heather Forbes Phil Williams Yousuf Azimi

Previous interviews conducted by Marianne Harris, associate producer, which were reviewed for contribution to this academic production. These contributions were sourced to form a more comprehensive timeline of conflicts, as collecting data from correspondents that had worked during World War II, Vietnam and Cambodia proved difficult.

These contributions included:

Barry Zorthian Gloria Emerson Peter Grose David Greenway Joe Galloway Peter Kann David Halberstam Jon Swain Richard Pyle David Kennerly Kate Webb Stanley Karnow Dick Halstead Mal Browne Tim Page Eddie Adams Michelle Regarrasse Wally Terry Edie Lederer Morley Safer Zalin Grant Horst Faas Neil Sheehan Walter Cronkite Frances Fitzgerald Nick Ut Ward Just George Esper Perry Deane Young William Hammond George McArthur Peter Arnett

CHAPTER 6 –CONCLUSION

Managing Hostile Environment training, protective equipment and field-support are of vital importance to the profession of international journalism, and media organisations have a duty of care to implement proactive programs that have proven to save lives. The aim of this research was to examine the changing nature of risks that face working journalists, and to measure the necessity of Managing Hostile Environment training. There was an examination of how media organizations could provide a framework to prepare, advise, monitor, protect and respond to incidents that may affect their staff working in difficult, remote or hostile environments. The research methodology and approach, which worked so well to ‘open doors’ and grant opportunities that would evolve my position within the field and provide for future professional potential, was illustrated in full.

1) What are the risks faced by journalists and media workers that are assigned or deploy to difficult, remote and hostile environments, and how have these risks changed in recent history?

This initial question was approached in the literature review, and then in the documentary film, with definitive proof that correspondents, freelancers, technicians, producers and even fixers that have worked in these environments, do believe that the risks are increasing. There are a number of reasons for this, but the most disconcerting trend is that “it’s certainly no protection and it’s likely that you’re more of a target if people see you are a journalist” (Campbell, 2008).

2) Do journalists believe the recent advancements in training and support are significant to the profession, and do they believe it works to enable them to make informed decisions about their personal safety, and obtain the story while not becoming a part of the story?

The second question was also approached through the literature review, and further explored in the film. There was a period, after the first implementation of managing hostile environment courses in the 1990s, that journalists were incredulous about their effectiveness, however, this sentiment has slowly subsided. One contributing factor to this original scepticism was the fact that course coordinators lacked the understanding of what journalists required when working in these environments, and

there was a general lack of feedback to improve the courses. The documentary film, which I believe a unique contribution to knowledge in this area, provides a forum to offer feedback, and these have already contributed to improvements in the training.

3) If media organizations have a perceived ‘duty of care’ to their staff deploying into difficult, remote and hostile environments, should there be a minimum standard to facilitate Managing hostile environment training – even for local staff?

The literature pertaining to this particular question was clear, and media organizations that fail to provide resources for the training and protection of journalists should be condemned (IFJ, 1998). There is an ethical ‘duty of care’ to all employees, from correspondent to driver. However, the expense of training course, field support, planning and logistics, security and evacuation plans, often leave medium and small organizations without option to meet the preexisting standard of care set by CNN, BBC, Reuters, the ABC and many other major media organizations. This revealed an area for further development and an immediate need for unique contribution.

4) With organizations now aware of the safety and training requirements for journalists and media workers, what is the next foreseeable stage in developing cost-efficient models to advise, monitor, protect and respond in difficult, remote and hostile environments?

The past two years of research, and consistent analysis of contemporary dilemmas facing media organizations, have presented me with a very exciting concept that would provide these holistic services in a more cost-efficient business model22.

It is foreseeable that media organisations will need to develop a closer relationship with the various training and security organizations that have facilitated their managing hostile environment courses. There are innumerable instances where security providers have supplied close personal protection on assignments, which have traditionally been limited to the world’s high risk environments, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the requirements for support across various environments, not just those afflicted with human conflict, will continue to increase,

22 The following information remains commercially sensitive.

and the current model of charging these media organizations upwards of £800 per day is not sustainable.

The development of a core group of professionals, able to facilitate training, assist with equipment and assignment planning, provide logistics support, offer security reviews and recommendations and finally, plan for possible contingencies and evacuations will become essential. I believe this ‘Editorial Logistics Officer’ or ‘Editorial Safety Officer’ will eventually become a standard addition to media teams deploying on foreign assignment. The value proposed is these personnel would be able to facilitate managing hostile environment training for local staff in-country, be able to provide security advice, monitor security related trends, provide personal protection (at least serve as experienced eyes and ears whose sole purpose is to observe for risks) and be trained responders to medical incidents. I know this model is obtainable, because I have practiced all these elements in just over two years of research. Initially, these personnel will likely be source from third-party security firms (i.e.: Dynamiq, AKE, Centurion, etc.), but I believe these roles will eventually be permanent positions within the International News & Current Affairs offices of media organisations.

This single initiative, of employing full-time professionals to provide comprehensive safety and security frameworks, will ensure the media organisation meets its ethical and legal ‘duty of care’ for all staff deploying to difficult, remote and hostile environments. The use of a core group of personnel, from within the organisation, would also provide assurances that editorial content will not be compromised23. The hybrid nature of this research, and the hybrid nature of my previous life experience, is likely to facilitate working in such a role. I am assured by the numerous people I have met while traveling into some of the world’s hostile environments, that there are other professional security personnel that would also be passionate about providing such a service. It is now a process of communicating with media organisations to explain the innovative service offering, and provide a cost-efficient model. There has already been progress with this initiative, and I believe the ABC will continue to be an innovator in the field of safety and support for journalists working in international news.

23 The actions of these safety officers would be subject to review by the organization’s managers and editors.

In conclusion, these holistic providers of preparedness and support capabilities are an expected development to bring advice, monitoring, protection and response to journalists and media staff working in difficult, remote and hostile environments. This practice may take several years to commence, but in the interim, providing Managing Hostile Environment (MHE) courses should be enforced as the minimum standard. These courses have saved lives in past and they provide journalists with the tools to “cover the story, and not become the story.”

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Addendum 1 – MANAGING HOSTILE ENVIRONMENTS (ADVISE)

My fieldwork in the development of core training competencies included this directory of teaching elements for 2009, reviewed by Steven Dunn, Director of Operations at Dynamiq, and contains commercially sensitive materials.

Assignment Planning Procedures • Assignment Planning – Consider the task, situation, conduct, communications, emergency equipment and procedures needed to complete the assignment safely. • Develop the situation – Understand the environment, threats, locations and key contacts to perform the task/s. Use subscription and open source research techniques • Equipment Selection – What should be carried on-person, in a ‘grab-bag’ and consider available protective / emergency equipment. • Communications – Have multiple forms of both task specific and emergency communications that have been tested and are supported in the region. • Emergency Procedures – Develop emergency management planes for security and medical situations. • Contingencies – Eliminate single-point failures in planning.

Personnel Security • Dress & Specialist Equipment – Maintain a low profile, and have cultural awareness regarding religions, traditions and customs. If possible, minimize the carriage of high visibility, high value items. • Consider Your Appearance – Weapon or Camera? • Crime Prevention / Action Plan – Robbery, assault, car-jacking and sexual assaults • Creating Accountability – Establishing consequences for the actions of others

Transport Security • Route Planning – Primary, alternate and rendezvous • Vehicle and driver selection – Vehicle selection, condition and increasing vehicle safety

• Convoy driving– ‘Over-Watch’ Vehicle • Check Point management technique • Carjacking

Accommodation Security • Hotel Selection – Assess the street and hotel access control, physical barriers and security measures. • Room Selection – Assess the most appropriate room for the environment. • Safety Standards – Select accommodation that has a low profile, but adequate fire and security standards. • Evacuation Considerations – Know your routes out in a fire or security related incident. • Securing Your Room – Increase “defence in depth” of personal space. • Blast Protection Considerations

Natural Disasters • Earthquake, Cyclone, Flood and Fire – Precautions, survival techniques and post-incident safety considerations. • Natural Disaster Action Plan • Pandemic – Body Substance Isolation • Post-Incident – Assess hazards, use safe water and monitor emergency broadcasts. • Disease Prevention

Civil Unrest & Riots • Categories of Unrest and Riots – Political, Religious, Industrial and Special Interest. Understand trigger points. • Security / Police and Protesters’ Equipment – Assess the risks • Preparation – Know the location, expected police / security response, have adequate communications (including direct with transportation), evacuation contingencies and appropriate protective equipment. • Understanding of Crowd Control Techniques (Security / Police Containment, Arrests and Dispersal). • Vantage Points and Positioning – If media are seen, is this a crowd or police motivator for further violence? Will the media be targeted? • Civil Unrest Action Plan

Kidnap & Ransom • Overview: target selection process, abduction, captivity, negotiation and release / escape / rescue. • Kidnap Mitigation strategies • Kidnap and detention Action Plan • Emotional and Physical Resilience • Post-Release – Debriefing, media attention and physiological responses.

Fixers, Stringers and Domestic Staff • Integrating local staff and contacts into security planning. • Disclosure of sensitive information to security personnel and local staff. • Types of private security and what to expect.

Military Relations • Types of Military Embedding • Types of Military Units, and the various levels of ‘duty of care’ towards journalists • Planning for and Embed – mission, timeframe, equipment, training and briefings. • Information needed from the unit – Actions-on: contact, tactics, separation, lost, water / food, casualties, etc.

Latitude and Longitude Coordinates - GPS Navigation • Locate position via a map and Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates • Understand Latitude & Longitude: Values: Degrees, Minutes, Seconds • Communicate position clearly to support staff • GPS equipment and global map resource utilization

Weapons Effect Lesson • Weapon Types – Ammunition, ranges and penetration • Cover & Concealment – types of cover • Personnel Protective Equipment – Body armour, ballistic plates and helmets care and ballistic ratings (what do they protect you from) • Ricochet and bullet dynamics

• Rocket propelled grenades and indirect fire – fragmentation and cover selection • Firefighting Action Plan

Mines, Explosive Ordinance and Unexploded Ordinance (UXOs) • Ordinance Types – Size, appearance, affect (designed to maim) • Precautions – Use local advise and avoid lowlands • Landmine – Actions-on: On foot and in vehicle • Minefield action plan

CPR / Lifting and Moving • Emergency Action Plan and Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation • Safe methods to lift and move patients • Managing spinal stabilization, and keeping in-line stabilization of head, neck and spine (c-spine) • Motor Vehicle Accidents - Extrication of patient from vehicle, lifting and moving managing c-spine stabilization.

First Aid, Treatment of Injuries • Trauma treatments – Deformities, sprains, strains, fractures, contusion, abrasions, lacerations, punctures, bleeding, burns, head & spine injuries • Medical treatments – Breathing disorders, cardiac disorders, exposure (heat, cold & altitude) poisons, bites and stings • Wound Dressing and Bandaging

Preventative Medicine • Communicable Diseases – Common types and modes of transmission • Transmission Protection – Body substance isolation • Protective Measures – Heat, cold, altitude, contaminated food / water, parasites. • Mosquito-Borne Diseases – Malaria / dengue fever / yellow fever protective & preventative measures • Blood-Borne Disease - Protective & preventative measures

Psychological Resilience

• Consider the three main sources of stress, (professional, personal and assignment) of working in hostile environments • Consider key personal strategies of dealing with work related stress • Identifying Stress Responses – Physiological, behavioural, emotional and existential • How to coup with stress

MANAGING HOSTILE ENVIRONMENTS COURSE SCHEDULE (5 DAY COURSE) Monday 09.00 – 09.30 Introduction 09.45 – 12.00 Planning & Equipment –Procedures (Breakaway Groups) 12.00 – 13.00 Lunch 13:00 – 15:00 CPR / Lifting and Moving (Activity) 15:15 – 16:30 Personnel Security 16:45 – 18:30 VCP – Convoy Training – MVA Lifting and Moving (Activity)

Tuesday 09.00 – 09.30 CPR Revision (Activity) 09.30 – 10.45 First Aid, Treatment of Injuries (Activity) 11:00 - 12:00 Guest Speaker 12.00 – 13.00 Lunch 13:00 – 14:45 Latitude and Longitude - GPS Navigation (Outdoor Activity) 14:45 – 17:00 Mini Scenario – Multi-Casualty MVA (Outdoor Activity – Linked with GPS) 17:15 – 18:00 Disaster Natural

Wednesday 09:00 – 09:30 CPR Revision (Activity) 09:30 – 10:30 Civil Unrest & Riots 10:45 – 12:00 Kidnap & Ransom 12.00 – 13.00 Lunch 13:00 – 14:45 Accommodation Security (Activity) 15:00 – 16:00 Fixers, Stringers and Domestic Staff 16:15 – 17:30 Guest Speaker 17:30 – 18:00 Mines awareness exercise (Outside Activity)

Thursday 09.00 – 10.00 Mine awareness exercise – cont. (Outside Activity) 10.15 – 10.45 Military Relations 11:00 - 12:00 Preventative Medicine 12.00 – 13.00 Lunch 13:15 – 17:00 Guest Speaker (Psych - DART) 17:00 - 18:00 Dinner 19:00 - 22:40 Scenario (local) All involved (Activity)

Friday 09.00 – 10:45 Weapons Effect Lesson (Armourer) 11.30 – 12.00 Mines and Explosive Ordinance and UXOs (Armourer) 12.00 – 13.00 Lunch 13:00 – 14:30 Course Testing 14:30 – 16:30 End of course review

VUEE TUEE HANDBOOK

This vuee tuee pocket handbook is designed for use as a reference tool for journalists and media workers that have attended the Managing Hostile Environments courses. The handbook is developed as the initial location to record assignment specific and emergency contact details, and can be used as a teaching tool – as the MHE course is fashioned to be a trainers’ course. The intention is for past course attendees to promote assignment planning and safety concepts to their local staff or other journalists they work with. The information is modular, and provides easily accessible detailed sequences for initial incident responses.

The following will present the entire vuee tuee handbook developed for course attendees throughout 2009. This material is commercially sensitive, and should not be reproduced or distributed.

ADDENDUM 2 – SECURITY AND EMERGENCY REVIEW (MONITOR & PROTECT)

‘MEDIA ORGANIZATION’ Kabul Bureau Security and Emergency Management Review

Date Produced: January 2009

Prepared By Shaun Filer Senior Consultant

SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION

1.1 SCOPE OF WORK

This report includes findings and recommendations compiled from site observation, and consideration of current emergency management policies, for (Media Organization) News Ltd operations in Kabul, Afghanistan. Recommendations to regional managers, including Phil Smith (Fmr. Editor, South Asia), Simon Denyer (Bureau Chief India), Simon Cameron-Moore (Bureau Chief, Pakistan & Afghanistan) and Jonathan Hemming (Chief Correspondent, Afghanistan), for future security-related budgeting considerations in Afghanistan and Pakistan are also included.

Primary attention within this report is placed on methods to improve the current security conditions for the office at Wazir Akbar Khan Area, House No-125 Street-15 (N 34o 32’ 06.2” E 69o 10’ 51.1”), and the proposed expansion of the facility to house further staff. Also included is a recommendation for armoured vehicle selection, a policy review for medical and security related incidents, evacuation procedures and a comprehensive directory of (Media Organization) specific sites, staff accommodation and preferred medical facilities.

1.2 WORK UNDERTAKEN

The objectives undertaken during the Kabul site visit included:

To study existing Emergency Management Planning specific to the Kabul bureau, and provide recommendations to prevent areas of single-point failures.

To review records of previous medical and security related incidents, and records of any previous evacuations.

To conduct security environment assessments and survey physical security measures for the Kabul Bureau.

To obtain latitude & longitude for all (Media Organization) specific sites, including: offices, accommodation (including guest house and private residences) and medical facilities.

These mapped locations are to be kept with the Kabul Bureau Chief, the Regional Bureau Chief (Pakistan / Afghanistan), the South Asian Editor and Dynamiq to aid in emergency / incident responses and monitoring.

To observe on-site medical supplies available and determine if there are sufficient stores to stabilize in a multi-casualty event.

To interview Kabul bureau on-site security personnel to identify current Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and levels of professionalism.

1.3 INFORMATION SECURITY

This report, including the attached map resource, discloses sensitive information regarding (Media Organization) facilities, operations, security systems, policies and procedures, locations of private residences and states “weak points” in security. The record of these locations is a vital tool if external responses, or security, are ever required. Distribution of these records should be restricted and access carefully controlled.

SECTION 2 –KABUL BUREAU

2.1 HOUSE 125-STREET 15, WAZIR AKBAR KHAN

2.1.1 Current Security The central focus of the Kabul bureau office and guesthouse review is to provide recommendations for increased security measures and compound blast protection. This section will describe the current security standard, and explore areas of necessary improvements.

Street access is currently controlled by a combination of local security and British Ghurkhas guarding routes to the British embassy compound. This vehicle check point (VCP) is approximately 30 meters from the bureau office, manned 24/7 and composed of both concrete and Hesco barriers. Street 15 continues past the bureau to the southeast, with subsequent VCPs at intervals of 50-100 meters between. Adjacent buildings include a British security compound to the west, Canadian government compound to the east and a Turkish business office to the north. This street access control, and the scrutiny of vehicle and pedestrian traffic through the initial checkpoint, greatly decreases exposure to opportunistic crime, kidnap & ransom and other security related incidents.

Bureau – Access Control and Adjacent Buildings.

Compound access is controlled by security staff, consisting of two unarmed guards during the day and a single unarmed guard during the evening. The guards, and on- duty driver/s, are positioned in a 3 x 3 meter stone “guardhouse” next to the access gates in the southern-most aspect of the compound. The guards on duty have only cellular phones as their primary form of communicating with personnel inside the office.

2.1.2 Security: Recommendations The location of the bureau in Kabul provides significant defence in depth, through both street and compound access control, and although the British embassy compound is a relatively high-profile target for suicide attacks, the adjacent buildings are not. This is however, the security concern requiring primary attention, and will be further explored in sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4.

Risk – Suicide Attack at British Embassy Compound Entrance: This risk is defined as a suicide attack via vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED)

on the adjacent British compound or vehicle check point (VCP): Consequence Likelihood Possibility of multiple Very fatalities or serious Not likely to occur during the life of Very Low High injuries requiring operations in Kabul. emergency medical care. Risk Rating Requirements Manage by increasing compound blast protection and have support staff routinely Medium police up objects that could become foreign object debris (FOD).

The lack of communication between the guardhouse and offices / guest rooms is a concern. A possible contingency for this “single-point failure” is to provide UHF two- way radios that can be left on and placed on chargers inside the guardhouse, offices and upstairs living areas. These are relatively inexpensive and units can be purchased with secure channels to prevent “chatter”. This may also expedite the process of mustering staff drivers and vehicles, as requests can be made via this mode of communication.

2.1.3 Current Blast Protection There is currently minimal blast protection in place at the office compound. The southern two meter high compound wall, adjacent to the initial vehicle checkpoint for the British Embassy compound, is only thirty centimetres in width. This is also a cavity wall, constructed with an air space between the stone surfaces, which easily break into debris in the event of an explosion.

Southern Compound Cavity Wall Upstairs Small Glass Panes – fractures present from previous blasts. .

All forward facing door and window glass panes have been coated with a single laminate of shatterproof film. However, a number of sections require re-coating. The

wooden framing and rebates holding the glass have also become fractured in several locations due to previous nearby suicide attacks. The current state of the framing suggests that with a sufficient blast, it is possible that full panes of glass could enter the working and dining spaces at high velocity. There are also various foreign objects, such as bricks, present on window seals and stacked atop the southern compound wall. In the event of a nearby explosion, this foreign object debris (FOD) would likely cause damage.

2.1.4 Blast Protection: Recommendations There are several options to increase the blast protection for the compound. The primary course of action should be to line the interior of the southern compound cavity wall with Hesco barriers. A quote has been sourced, and implementation of this recommendation is estimated at USD $3,628.00 (see Addendum 2).

The placement of these Hesco barriers will also require an alteration to the 3 x 3 meter guardhouse, as the door entrance will be obscured by this measure. On the eastern aspect of the guardhouse the window may be converted into a doorway – this will also provide ease of access to the gate. In conjunction with this required alteration, it may be an opportunity for expansion of the guardhouse to provide a working space for the 3-4 personnel regularly stationed inside.

There are several options to improve the resilience of the office building itself, including:

1) The replacement of forward facing wooden door and window frames with deeply rebated metal frames, to negate wooden frames fracturing in the event of a blast. Removal of small windowpanes and replacement with a single shatterproof pane for each window (to avoid fracture of the frame around these small pieces), and deeply anchored wires into the frames to prevent laminated panes from entering the space.

2) The repair of wooden window and door frames damaged in previous blasts. Removal of small panes of glass and replacement with a single shatterproof pane for each window (with deep rebates into the wooden frame) and anchored wires.

3) The re-laminating the forward facing door and windows glass panes, as required, and installation of the anchored wires.

N.B. Quotes are currently being sourced for the various options.

Upstairs Wooden Doorframe with Blast Damage

The current standard for window blast protection is the use of single laminate shatterproof film - 300 microns thick, with adequately reinforced frames and deep rebates emplace.

Most notably, the laminate should meet a level of two on the GSA rating.

General Services Administration (GSA) protection levels for glazing response to glass:

Performance Protection Hazard Description of window glazing response condition level level

Glass does not break. No visible damage to 1 Safe None glazing or frame.

Glass cracks but is retained by the frame. 2 Very high None Dusting or very small fragments near sill or on floor acceptable.

Glass cracks. Fragments enter space and land on 3a High Very low floor no further than 3.3 feet from the window.

3b High Low Glass cracks. Fragments enter space and land on

Performance Protection Hazard Description of window glazing response condition level level

floor no further than 10 feet from the window.

Glass cracks. Fragments enter space and land on floor and impact a vertical witness panel at a 4 Medium Medium distance of no more than 10 feet from the window at a height no greater than 2 feet above the floor.

Glass cracks and window system fails catastrophically. Fragments enter space impacting 5 Low High a vertical witness panel at a distance of no more than 10 feet from the window at a height greater than 2 feet above the floor.

Blast curtains are also essential in most cases with single glazed and small paned windows in framing with questionable resilience.

2.2 TRANSPORTATION

2.2.1 Current Transportation Current transportation available to News staff working in Kabul includes three unarmoured off-road vehicles, a single unregistered armoured Land-Rover Defender and several privately owned vehicles (POVs). One of the POVs is a Toyota Corolla, owned by Ghiasuddin Barez (Bureau Office Manager), which is regularly utilized for expatriate staff transport to and from Kabul International Airport. There are two staff drivers during the day and one driver during the evening.

Exterior compound wall with further Unregistered Armoured Vehicle asset car parking. Entered Country via Pakistan: 2001 . The primary vehicles used by local and expatriate staff for work-related tasking are the unarmoured off-road vehicles, due to their relatively low profile in Kabul. The armoured Land-Rover Defender is not currently used, even for high-risk tasking, due to the obvious armoured exterior – which greatly increases its profile. It is feared that the use of this vehicle will mistakenly expose staff to targeting as a military transport.

In Kabul, armoured vehicles have also been subject to increased scrutiny by the Afghan National Police (ANP), who often check the validity of registration and terms of use approved by the Ministry of Interior. Many vehicles found in breach have been confiscated and impounded, with no recourse of reclamation.

Currently, the Land-Rover Defender is maintained and kept in working order inside the office compound as an essential asset for potential evacuation. Country and regional management have proposed the inclusion of another armoured vehicle for the bureau. While this is an imperative enhancement in the security of both expat and domestic staff, the Defender should be maintained to serve this evacuation role, as it will remain onsite and available for this sole purpose.

2.2.2 Armoured Vehicle: Recommendations Armour level B6 (CEN) Toyota HardTop, 76-series, Land Cruiser, station wagon, off- road-vehicle, LHD, semi-LWB, 5 doors (EURO €102.000.00 approx.) (See Addendum 2 & 3 for feedback to ASC quote)

Profile: Considering the environment, road conditions, vehicle commonality, profile and the ease of maintenance in Kabul and the surrounding areas, the make of vehicle currently being considered for purchase are the Toyota Hilux (Pick-Up / Surf) and Toyota Land Cruiser (LC). Undoubtedly, both vehicle options are relatively high profile, as they are outside the purchasing means of the average Afghan. However, considering the specific utilization of vehicles, the armoured Land Cruiser or Hilux Surf appears the best option.

The vehicle will mainly be used for transportation inside Kabul, routinely transporting local staff to-and-from the sites of suicide attacks or other security related incidents. The use of LCs in Kabul is common, as small pick-ups such as the Ford Ranger are used mainly by ANA and ANP forces. Another consideration for the profile of the pick-up is that outside Kabul – on the open highway and at speed – it would be difficult to differentiate from an ANA / ANP model (Ford Ranger).

If (Media Organization) obtained the pick-up to decrease vehicle profile, they run the risk of being misidentified as military. As regular washing is not likely to occur, the vehicle will appear brown at high speed, thus aligning with the colour and configuration of most ANA military transports. The LC on the other hand is less likely to be mistaken for a military target. It is preferable to be misidentified as a foreign NGO, development organization, media or affluent Afghan in an off-road vehicle than the military.

Logistics: The office in Kabul has been utilizing other unarmoured off-road vehicles for years without incident, including another Land Cruiser and Hilux Surf. The LC is also a well-rounded option for storage, because equipment carried regularly includes Type III–ballistic vests, helmets, medical kits, cameras and other technology – all of which must be kept out of the elements and secured.

In the event of personnel movement or evacuation, the LC can also carry more people inside the “armoured skin”. Whereas, the Hilux pick-up has an unarmoured canopy, and will only carry 4-5 people safely. Furthermore, from a maintenance, repair and operation perspective it is better to utilize multiples of the same vehicle type, rather than a mixture, consequently the LC is the favoured option.

2.3 SAFETY

2.3.1 Current Safety Measures Armoured vehicles serve a vital role in travel safety for personnel, but must be complimented with the use of personal protective equipment, such as ballistic vests. TV and photography staff that respond to security related incidents, including suicide attacks, have not historically worn or carried ballistic vests in their vehicles. As Yousuf Azimi (TV Producer) stated, “This is an issue, because we must get out of the vehicle to get the images, and we have been as close as a few meters from secondary explosions.” Despite the obvious risk, their weight and increased profile prevents the use of the vests and helmets available at the office. Several ballistic vests are stored for ISAF and other military embedding stints, but are rarely used otherwise.

It was also observed that one ballistic vest, one helmet and one small medical kit were maintained in the back of most vehicles. However, in the event of an incident, or the requirement for staff to respond quickly to cover a high-risk story – this is clearly inadequate equipment for other personnel in the vehicle.

Other considerations regarding vehicle safety is the constant threat of serious motor vehicle accidents (MVA) and assault during travel. Staff drivers are professional and observe the core vehicle safety measures. These include; observing “safe” speed limitations, the use of seatbelts, windows that remain up during transit and the locking of all vehicle doors. Statistically, motor vehicle Storage of Ballistic Vests accidents pose the greatest risk of injury or death to personnel, so increased compliance in these areas should be formally required in standing policies.

2.3.2 Safety: Recommendations There are several options for Type III Ballistic Vests that meet the requirements of News personnel that regularly respond to high-risk incident sites. The development of plastic plates (instead of the traditional ceramic or metal) has greatly reduced overall vest weight and assists in concealment. Ideally, TV and photography staff responding to high-risk sites should have personalized and fitted vests worn under their clothing. They should also have visible personal information for medical responders, including: name, organization, blood type and an emergency contact phone number. This can easily be placed on a patch and attached to the front of all vests.

Compliance with placing ballistic vests, for each person travelling inside the vehicle, should also become the standard. This simple tasking will dramatically increase proactive approach to personnel safety, and is further reason to have personalized and fitted vests for each staff member.

Light-weight Ballistic Vest Recommendation: Level NIJ IIIA Protective Vests with Level NIJ III+ FAMOSTONE PLATES Light-weight all-round ARAMID protective vest with front and rear FAMOSTONE plates including delivery to Kabul, Afghanistan: $1,100 USD.

This standard should also apply to afterhours socializing for expatriate staff, as current trending for the targeting of foreigners is likely to include bars and restaurants catering to expats. Once the armoured vehicle purchase is finalized, this vehicle type should also be the primary selection for transit to these locations, as the majority of locations visited showed limited street access control. This means that an assailant could follow staff leaving a bar or restaurant, and influence them with weapons in a “soft skin” vehicle. The likelihood of this occurring is very low, but the Kidnap & Ransom of foreign personnel by opportunistic criminals has continued to increase.

2.4 EMERGENCY RESPONSE

2.4.1 Emergency Planning Due to the proximity of the bureau to the US Army base, Camp Eggers, the British and Canadian embassy compounds, it is likely that a suicide attack affecting the office would bring an expedited response from local ambulances, foreign military

and government emergency responders. Minimal emergency transport planning is required for events occurring at or near the office, but adequate medical supplies should be maintained for the office and in each vehicle for incidents occurring elsewhere.

2.4.2 Emergency Medical Stores The first aid and medical stores maintained at the office are currently inadequate for a single critically injured patient, or multi-casualty scenario. Depending on the professionalism of initial responders to the scene of multi-casualty or mass-casualty scenarios, such a VBIED explosion, reliance on local emergency medical response may take several minutes to arrive. At this point, a period of triage (patient sorting) will eventuate, and in theory, all critically and seriously injured personnel will be initially treated and evacuated. However, this process may take several hours depending on the equipment and personnel available to transport. Therefore, it is essential to be self sufficient in the initial care and treatment of Reuters personnel, have adequate first aid and medical supplies and regularly perform patient treatment refreshers and practice utilizing exercises. Medical supplies for all kits should at least include much of the following:

1. Gloves 2. Pocket Mask 3. Trauma Shears 4. Cervical Spine-Collar 5. Abdominal Dressings 6. Burn Dressings 7. Cravats 8. Elastic Wraps

9. Emergency Bandages Sample Emergency Medical Bag for Vehicles To decrease scrutiny at police check points, a red 10. Sterile Gauze crescent can be placed on the first aid kits. 11. Eye Bandages

SECTION 3 – KIDNAP & RANSOM (K&R)

3.1 K&R TRENDS

In Kabul, kidnappings for ransom began as part of the Taliban’s political and religious movement, but are now primarily motivated by opportunistic criminals’ push for financial gain. Criminally motivated kidnappings are mainly focused in and around Kabul, while other regions such as Kandahar, continue to be conducted for political and religious reasons.

Foreigners lacking security are often most vulnerable, which include aid workers, missionaries and journalists. Others considered “soft-targets” and attractive targets include local nationals tied to non-governmental organizations and media organizations. Foreign travellers, business people, military personnel and contractors normally merit the largest ransoms of foreign targets, increasing their profile for assailants. Security planning and protective services are highly recommended for all foreigners.

3.2 RISK COMPARISONS

3.2.1 Bureau Guest House verses Private Accommodation This is a comparison of accommodation options for expatriate staff working in Kabul. The Bureau Guest House has 24/7 street and compound access control, security planning in place and actions-on in the event of an incident. Expatriate staff that live in private accommodation are rarely provided comprehensive protective services, and therefore may be perceived as “soft-targets”.

This is an initial comparison between areas of possible K&R risk:

Risk – Kidnap & Ransom of Expatriate Staff at the Bureau Office & Guest House, Kabul This risk is defined as a K&R of single or multiple expatriate personnel.

Consequence Likelihood Possible single or multiple injuries or Very Not likely to occur during the life of fatalities, damaging Very Low High operations in Kabul. media coverage, post- incident lawsuits.

Risk Rating Requirements

Low Manage by facility access control and security measures.

Risk – Kidnap & Ransom of Expatriate Staff at Private Accommodation: The risk is defined as a K&R of single or multiple expatriate personnel living in the community in private accommodation with a minimum access control or security standard.

Consequence Likelihood Possible single or multiple injuries (physical Very and emotional) or Could occur under certain conditions Low High fatalities, damaging during the life of operations in Kabul. media coverage, post- incident lawsuits. Risk Rating Requirements Manage by increasing private accommodation access control and security Medium measures.

3.2.2 Expansion of Capacity – Office Compound Kabul Phil Smith, Simon Denyer and Simon Cameron-Moore have requested options to increase the living capacity of the office for expatriate staff, expecting a build-up of news operation in Afghanistan. Due to the House 125, Street 15 compound being a rental property, the recommended option for this expansion is a temporary accommodation container. International Construction Management (ICM) currently have several one and two bedroom containers with kitchenettes and bathrooms included that are being moved from the Canadian Embassy compound on the same street as the office. This used container should be a relatively inexpensive option, and could be placed to the east of the building.

N.B. A quote (with pictures) of the accommodation containers are pending.

SECTION 4 – RECOMMENDATIONS

Armoured Vehicle Purchase: level B6 (CEN) Toyota HardTop, 76-series, station wagon, off-road-vehicle, LHD, semi-LWB, 5 doors. (Quote – EURO €102.000.00 approx.)

Provide fitted ballistic vests with personalized information, such as name, organization, blood type and emergency contact number visible. Consider the use of lightweight Type III vests with plastic plates for comfort and concealment.

Increasing compound blast protection by placing Hesco barrier along the southern compound wall. (Quote - USD $3,628.00)

Repair or replacement of damaged window & door framing, re-lamination of forward facing glass panes as required and removal of small panes for single panes. (Quote – Pending)

Routinely police up object that could become foreign object debris (FOD).

Provide ample first-aid and medical stores for all vehicles, and an emergency “breakout” kit for the office.

Consider placing deeply anchored wires inside window frames. (Quote – Pending)

Consider providing UHF two-way radios for communication between the guardhouse, offices and upstairs living areas.

Consider expanding the guardhouse to make it an adequate working space for the guards.

Consider the purchase of one or two bedroom container accommodation for the build-up of operations in Kabul. (Quote – Pending)

Consider the risk comparison between expatriate staff living in private accommodation, or in the Bureau office / guesthouse.

HESCO BARRIER QUOTE

International Construction Management House 1003 Lane 6 Street 15 Sher Pur Kabul AFGHANISTAN 19 January 2009

Reference: Supply and installation of Hesco Basions.

Attn, Mr. Shaun Filer Dear Sir, as discussed during our site visit to your villa International Construction management would like to submit the following pricing proposal for your consideration. a. Provide and install 11 x 1.5 meter square x 2meter high Hesco Bastian Baskets b. Cutting and re‐configuring some Hesco’s to fit around optical such as trees and tanks etc c. Repositioning water lines and faucets outside of the new Hesco wall position d. Fill with 50 cubic meters of compactable soil (Free of large stones and other foreign objects) e. Completely covering the Hesco wall with plastic sheeting (temporary weather retardant)

Total Cost for the project $3,628.00 The above includes supply, transportation costs of all equipment, local government transportation approval fees and salaries of all personnel on site. ICM places a guarantee of 1 year on all Hesco construction. Again thank you for the opportunity to provide you with this quotation and I look forward to speaking again to you soon.

Regards, Barry Stevens Project Manager International Construction Management

LAND CRUISER QUOTE

Quotation: for one Toyota HardTop 76-series armoured to CEN level B6 according to BRV 1999

Vehicle Specifications Base vehicle: Toyota HardTop, 76-series, station wagon, off-road-vehicle, new, LHD, semi LWB, 5 doors Model: HZJ 76L-RKMRS, for use under extreme climatic and physical conditions Engine: 4.2 litre diesel (4.5 litre petrol also available) Engine layout: 4.164cc, 6 cylinders in line, OHC Output: 95 kW @ 3.800 rpm Torque: 285 Nm @ 2.200 rpm Transmission: manual, five gear, dual range Colour: white or any other colour at extra cost (recommend blue) Interior: grey vinyl seats Seats: 2 front + 3 rear Titled: no Mileage: 200 km (rough-road factory testing) Included Options: as per attached option list

Method of Design The armouring system is integrated after the production process of the base vehicle without changing its exterior appearance. The safety cell is designed in such a way that all gaps between the main body of the car and the doors are overlapped and fitted with spall-returns to prevent projectiles or splinters from entering the passenger compartment. This method of installation also offers highest possible protection to the vehicle occupants against the effects of a bomb blast from either side of the vehicle.

Figure 5. Security and Emergency Management Review (Sample)

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ADDENDUM 3 – EVACUATION AND EMERGENCY PLAN (RESPOND)

“MEDIA ORGANIZATION” Central Guinea West Africa Evacuation Plan

Date Produced: September 2008

Prepared By Shaun Filer Senior Consultant

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EVACUATION PLAN – CENTRAL GUINEA, WEST AFRICA

The following is a list of airstrips throughout central Guinea, and are the closest options for emergency air evacuation for media personnel. The selection of airstrip will be determined based on the incident location, charter company selection and political / security considerations. This list contains relevant information for each option, including distances from accommodation and story locations, max runway distances for airframe selection and the latitude / longitude for each.

There will be three emergency response and security personnel on stand-by in the event of an incident requiring security of medical evacuation.

Guinea Airstrip Location for Emergency Evacuation a. FARANAH Airstrip: BADALA (GUFH FAA)

Max. Runway: 7500ft / 2286m

10° 2'7.73"N, 10°45'35.02"W

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Note: For some charter companies, permission is required from the Ministry of Transport through the Guinea Civil Aviation Authority to operate at Faranah Airstrip for political reasons.

b. KISSDOUGOU Airstrip: KISSI (GUKU KSI)

Max Runway: 6500ft / 1981m

9° 9'37.67"N, 10° 7'20.92"W

c. GBENKO Airstrip: (GUGO)

Max Runway: 5100ft / 1554m

9°14'25.21"N, 9°17'35.08"W

d. KANKAN Airstrip: (GUXD KNN)

Max Runway: 8800ft / 2682m

10°23'35.89"N, 9°18'5.81"W

e. LABE Airstrip: TATA (GULB)

Max Runway: 6500ft / 1981m

11°20'5.19"N, 12°17'26.91"W

f. Conakry International Airport: GBESSIA (GUCY CKY)

Max Runway: 10800ft / 3292m

9°34'24.91"N, 13°37'13.50"W

AIR CHARTER SERVICES

Charter Services: Local and regional charter services, most notably Elysian Airlines (Cokakry), Sahel Aviation (Bamako) and Sénégal Air (Dakar), regularly operate in central Guinea, and are familiar with the airstrips listed above. There are also limited charter companies servicing West Africa, and no rotary-

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winged civilian charter airframes. These compound the difficulties with providing urgent evacuation for media personnel, so the following will list services providers in order of priority.

1) Elysian Airlines International

Contact: Sylvester Akinjagunla - Country Manager

Airframes Located: Conakry, Guinea

Tel: (+224) 6428 7537

Email: [email protected]

Website: www.elysianairlines.com

Note: Elysian Airlines takes 1hr 30mins to remove seats and have the aircraft prepared for medical evacuation services. Due to airstrips near assignment locations not included in Elysian’s scheduled flights, it is recommended that a test flight be scheduled as part of their safety policy.

2) Sahel Aviation Service

Contact: Jerry Krause – Country Manager

Airframes Located: Bamako, Mali

Tel: (+223) 2022 9826

Fax: (+223) 2022 3345

Med Evac: (+223) 7640 4600

Email: [email protected]

Website: http://www.sasmali.com

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Note: Sahel Aviation takes 1hr to remove seats and have the aircraft prepared for medical evacuation; however they do not have litters in their airframes. They regularly operate in Guinea, and are familiar with Gbenko (GUGO) and Kissdougou (GUKU) airstrips. The approximate flight time between Bamako and Kissdougou (GUKU) is 1hr and 15min.

3) Sénégal Air

Contact: Gerard Diop – CEO

Airframes Located: Dakar, Sénégal Tel: (+221) 77638 8512

Fax: (+221) 33825 3256

Med Evac: (+221) 825 8011

Email: [email protected]

Website: http://www.senegalair.sn

Note: Sénégal Air takes 1hr to remove seats and can be fitted with up to four stretchers and support equipment. They can arrange on-flight medical supervision, often French trained military physicians. The response and flight times are increased due to the initial deployment, but there will be a high standard of professionalism and reliability.

PRIMARY EVACUATION PLAN – INTENSIVE CARE REQUIRED

This will detail the primary plan for evacuation of patients requiring intensive care from Central Guinea -> Conakry, Guinea -> Paris, France:

1) EMT and on-site medical personnel will manage patient/s condition until air ambulance and airstrip is verified.

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2) EMT will transport patient/s (at least two vehicle convoy) to the indicated airstrip in vehicle with medical supervision and adequate medical equipment (airway management, IV fluids, medications, etc) for the entire transportation time.

a. Pri: FARANAH (GUFH)

b. Alt 1: KISSDOUGOU (GUKU)

c. Alt 2: GBENKO (GUGO)

3) The air charter company will remove seats and setup airframe for medical evacuation.

a. Pri: Elysian Airlines (+224) 6428 7537

b. Alt 1: Sahel Aviation (+223) 7640 4600

c. Alt 2: Sénégal Air (+221) 825 8011

4) The EMT will ensure on-flight medical support and equipment are adequate.

a. Pri: Flight physician has been deployed with the airframe

b. Alt 1: Dynamiq Assist medical provider will travel on airframe

5) The patient/s will be transferred to Learjet Air Ambulance service.

a. Pri: Learjet deployed from Paris, France with on-board emergency medical and trauma management team.

b. Alt 1: Learjet deployed from Johannesburg, South Africa with on- board emergency medical and trauma management team.

c. Alt 2: Air charter service will refuel for travel to Dakar, Sénégal for treatment at Hopital Principal de Dakar

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ALTERNATE EVACUATION PLAN – INTENSIVE CARE REQUIRED

This will detail the primary plan for evacuation of patients requiring intensive care from Central Guinea -> Conakry, Guinea -> Dakar, Sénégal:

1) EMT and Dynamiq Assist medical personnel will transport patient/s (at least two vehicle convoy) to Conakry International Airport, and ensure adequate medical equipment (airway management, IV fluids, medications, etc) are present for the entire transportation time.

2) The patient/s will be transferred to Learjet Air Ambulance service.

a. Pri: Learjet deployed from Paris, France with on-board emergency medical and trauma management team.

b. Alt 1: Learjet deployed from Johannesburg, South Africa with on- board emergency medical and trauma management team.

c. Alt 2: Air charter service (Elysian Airlines) will transport patient/s to Dakar, Sénégal for treatment at Hopital Principal de Dakar

3) The EMT will ensure on-flight medical support and equipment are adequate.

a. Pri: Flight physician or emergency medical team has been deployed with the airframe

b. Alt 1: Dynamiq Assist medical provider will travel on airframe

PRIMARY EVACUATION PLAN – NO INTENSIVE CARE REQUIRED

This will detail the primary plan for evacuation of patients requiring intensive care from Central Guinea -> Conakry, Guinea -> Dakar, Sénégal:

Note: There are no central contact numbers for hospitals in Guinea. Only private clinics can be contacted. In Conakry, Clinique Pasteur can be reached on (+224) 30430074, but extended care or treatment at this facility is not recommended. So, the evacuation plans for non-intensive care patient/s will also include transport to Dakar, Sénégal or non-urgent commercial flights to Paris or South Africa.

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2) The patient/s will be transferred to charter or commercial flight service, to Dakar, Sénégal

a. Pri: Elysian Airlines (+224) 6428 7537

b. Alt 1: Sénégal Air (+221) 825 8011

3) The EMT will ensure on-flight medical support and equipment are adequate.

a. Pri: Flight physician or emergency medical team has been deployed with the airframe

b. Alt 1: Dynamiq Assist medical provider will travel on airframe

4) The patient/s will be treated at medical clinics in Dakar, Sénégal

a. Pri: Clinique Du Cap (+221) 33821 3627

b. Alt 1: Clinique De La Madeleine (+221) 889 84 70

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Clinics Comments

Dakar, Sénégal Intensive Care Required:

Hopital Principal de Dakar

Tel: (+221) 33839 5002

Alt: (+221) 33839 5003

Email: [email protected]

Website: http://www.hopitalprincipal.sn

Dakar, Sénégal Non-Intensive Care Required:

Clinique Du Cap

AVENUE PASTEUR

B.P. 583, Dakar, Sénégal

Tel: (+221) 33821 3627

Alt: (+221) 33889 0202

Fax: (+221) 33821 6146

Website: http://www.cliniqueducap.com

Dakar, Sénégal Non-Intensive Care Required:

Clinique De La Madeleine

18, Avenue des Jambaars

B.P. 3500, Dakar, Sénégal

Tel: (+221) 889 84 70

Fax: (+221) 821 94 71

Email: [email protected]

Website: http://cliniquedelamadeleine.com

CLINIQUE PASTEUR Not Recommended:

Conakry, Guinea Tel: (+224) 30430074

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ADDENDUM 4 – INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS: SHAUN FILER

INTERVIEW WITH TIM PALMER

Shaun Filer: OK, tape recognition, Tim Palmer, interview with ABC Sydney, 6th of July, 2007. Alright, again I’m not a professional journalist-

Tim Palmer: That’s OK, you can probably come in and not be in shot, ‘cause I was looking over there assuming you would point, so yeah that’s good.

SF: I just want to have a conversation about your experiences overseas, maybe just start by talking about how you got into journalism, and what were your first assignments overseas?

TP: OK. Um, I was a late starter as a journalist, I didn’t, ah, follow the typical mould of a lot of journalists who, you know, either had family in journalism or else they were inspired in school, were on the school magazine and then edited uni magazines, I didn’t do any of that, I, I ah, I was a serial university drop-out, and then in my late twenties decided I would go back to uni and ah, and try journalism, and I had found what I was good at. So I didn’t actually get a cadetship until I was nearly thirty, as a journalist, um, reported domestically for the next…six or seven years on television on a whole range of things from major sports events to, ah, national politics and ah, a lot of police and courts, and broke stories along the way, which was the big secret, and then so as a result of breaking a lot of stories, I started getting chances to go overseas, and was lucky enough that people were unlucky around me, in that, when I got chances to go overseas, there were stories- big things tended to happen (loud background noise). Um, so you know I did trips to New Guinea to cover sort of, a tsunami there, to Malaysia to do the commonwealth games and ended up with the sacked vice-premier (name) arrested in front of me with only me there (laughs) um, and, ah, after you sort of get a few, ah, stints away, they sort of give you a chance to go away for good. I’d always planned to be an Indonesia correspondent, um, and I’d been for that job a couple of times and failed to get it, and then ah, when I was in the middle of a hot run of stories, the middle east job came up and I went for it, sort of not really ever thinking that I would ever be a middle east correspondent, but that’s were I ended up.

SF: So I know most foreign correspondents that are stationed overseas or assigned overseas, have the hostile environment training? If you kind of fell into it, did you have all the training tiers before you went over?

TP: No. And at that point the ABC wasn’t as rigorous say, seven or eight- ten years ago, as they are now. Now, you won’t get to go do a short assignment without a hostile environment course- basically they won’t send you to Fiji during the middle of a coup, or they won’t send you to Papua New Guinea during a tsunami, all the things I got to do- I mean the reasons I got some of the chances I got was that I had a lot of experience in some third world countries just from travel and study there and that sort of thing so I guess they thought they could chance me in a country like

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Indonesia, and that my local knowledge would help anyway- but certainly the sort of specialist combat medicine and things like that I hadn’t done and, oddly enough, when we went to the middle east it was during a period of “prolonged boring peace” as a lot of the correspondents said, I mean Rogers from CNN was bailing out of the place, saying it was, that the peace process was the dullest story he had ever had to cover, and I think there was a sense that, yeah they were sort of getting away with it at that stage, um, and it was only after my cameraman and I had already been in the resurgent IF, which broke out 18 months after we got there, for about a year, that we got sent on a hostile environment course, which we did in Britain, so ah, you know at which point we sort of felt that we’d learnt everything (laughs) on the ground anyway!

SF: A lot of experiences that you had, I mean, you were already kind of attuned, you were already accustomed to being in those situations. Did you find the hostile environment training did much? Other than, maybe the field medicine stuff is important, did you feel it really-

TP: It did- look there were some good things about it. Um. There’s a strange anomaly about it, which is that, I was mainly a radio correspondent in that posting, before I went to Indonesia, I was sort of both, so that typically I’d be either working on my own completely, or with a Palestinian fixer, who I’d pick up say in Ramallah or Hebron you know so I’d drive on my own to where they were entirely on my own anyway and then I’d pick them up, so learning combat medicine, learning how to save someone who’s got a gunshot and severed a femoral artery was great for him (laughs) great for the half hour or two hours I might spend with him, but if I’d got hit, when I was on my own or with him, I’d have either died on my own in the car or had him drag me around looking for a doctor until I bled out, you know? So it was sort of, its an odd exercise, that its all meant to be about protection for me, but it was really giving me medical expertise I’d probably use on someone else in the end (laughs). So I sort of tried to reinforce that to the ABC, you know that they really need to train everyone, they need to ah- obviously its different with TV, cause the chances that our ABC cameraman and our ABC TV reporter both being hit is unlikely, so you know one is likely to treat the other, but for radio people- I don’t know. You know, to me distinctly the most valuable part of the hostile environment courses is the emergency medical training, without a shadow of a doubt, I mean some of the rest of the stuff is good, its partly commonsense, and um, you know there was some good expertise stuff, but I guess we’d been in a really combat situation, day in and day out for a year, and a lot of it we’d sort of just…picked up (laughs) I guess.

SF: Can you talk about the ah, the day to day combat, the kind of experiences that you would go through, I mean, you’d go into work and, the day would be essentially trying to get as close to capture images but, trying to keep yourselves obviously safe…

TP: What's, its, I mean it’s a fantastic opportunity, that part of the middle east, so Lebanon, Israel and palest- Palestinian territories, because its tiny- geographically it’s a tiny area, you forget how tiny it is, relative to the number of stories that come

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out of it. I covered a civil war in Aceh, Indonesia, and found it difficult, despite the fact that there were violent clashes everywhere, to ever get anywhere where things were happening, because there are few roads, they’re degraded, the weathers poor, they're pretty big distances, scattered 3000 um, guerrillas that could disappear anywhere it was sort of like chasing shadows. Whereas in, around, especially in Israel and the Palestinian territories, things are just, if you got out and about, in such a small area and such a limited number of flash points, that things would just happen in front of you, so you know within the third day of the IF we got pinned down for 45 minutes behind a rock, myself and a Palestinian fixer by a Palestinian gunman who was trying to, who thought we were Israeli settlers who were trying to head back, on a road that had always been safe, you see so that was the first thing we learnt, was that a lot of the roads we’d always taken were now death traps. Um, and then a couple of hours later, having then, you know, been shaking all the way driving back to Ramallah to drop my fixer off, we were wearing like, flak jackets, then we came into Ramallah and then were taken by Palestinian security, sort of like radicals who took us into the police station who suspect that I’m an agent, that I’ve turned up in sort of military gear, cause they're not used to the new hostility, or the new situation either. And we were, things would just happen like, I was interviewing a guy in Bethlehem one afternoon and we were parked, he was parked facing up the hill and I was parked facing down the hill and when we finished, he drove off round the block one way and me the other way and the first assassination happened about 150 metres from me but he was right there, and when we got there like, forty seconds later, it’d killed four people, not just the guy intended but you know there were people still dying in front of us- and his shoulder had been blown off, you know (small laugh) like things just happen right in front of you there, so you don’t, it was very, you know you, you really got used to it pretty quickly. I spent days when I’d been pinned down in a hotel room where a sniper position had been set up, set up on top of me, and I didn’t stand, I didn’t stand up for you know, two days, I’d just get down at floor level, I’d sleep with three flak jackets, like as a tent over me, cause I couldn’t get a room that was ah- not exposed (laughs) you sort of, it was a weird place to work. I still don’t think it was as dangerous as say, Baghdad because we weren’t, on the whole, we weren’t targeted by people who wanted to get us for who we were, occasionally the army was targeting journalists, but more to frighten them, occasionally to do more than that- but you develop a sense that you’ve got to be pretty unlucky to be randomly killed in that sort of combat. So you start to get used to it.

SF: Yeah that’s something interesting that ah, I dunno Tim Page was mentioning before, about those journalists that have covered the war since Vietnam, and the changing face of journalism now, I mean, journalists are considered soft targets, so, the training that they, that they send you to, just six days, out bush (TP laughs), I mean, you may have some rounds fired over your head, I mean, you may learn some things but, what, what can adequately prepare people for actually being targeted in combat other than more rigorous training, I mean, its kind of a-

TP: I don’t, I mean I don’t think- they're isn’t that much training you can do about it, in the end you are going to make common sense decisions, and the kind of people who make smart, logistic decisions about, who, who are the kind of people who get

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into being successful foreign correspondents anyway, who get into the right places where there’s trouble, because they're logistically good enough to get to where there’s trouble, I mean that’s what our job is, are generally best able to make those , have got a fair grounding in making the right decision say under fire again themselves, um, and others…I, I mean I had no experience of being under missile fire, when the Israelis conducted the first air raid in the Palestinian territories which was in response to, we were in Ramallah when it started, and it was in response to the, the, ah two Israeli reservists had accidentally taken the wrong road and wandered into Ramallah and gotten lynched- basically beaten to death in a police station as a result the Israeli’s called out (?) helicopters and started rocketing targets, and at one point, I was standing in a road, and the helicopters- we weren’t sure what it was going to target but I thought it was the TV masts, for the Palestinian authority behind me, about 150 metres behind me. They're not huge missiles, they're fly by wire missiles, and, um, there are about 100 journalists and other people all sort of milling around, you know journalists, sort of various local people from Ramallah, and the odd Palestinian sort of gunman and security guard all milling around in the street, when these helicopters wheeled in and started lining up and you could see what was about to happen, and everyone including my, like, the ABC TV crew, the journalist, ran down and got behind this building, and started running down behind, and I stood in the middle of the street, ah, I, just all of a sudden I was completely on my own, with like the microphone in the air, and recorded the missile going directly over my head, probably only about 40 feet over my head, which is an awesome bit of audio and sort of, and in the town, my feeling was these guys, to me, to run and get behind a building, I, I didn’t actually know which, what they were targeting, but I knew it wasn’t me, and I knew that they were good, the pilots (laughs), and they were flying by wire, so my gut feeling was if I go and get behind a building, and in fact they’re trying to hit that building, I'm going to be showered with glass, why- I may as well stay out in the middle of the street and like, watch it and record it and cover it. So you make…I had no experience in that but I made the right decision on the fly, and I think you cant- how’re you going to train that? Cause you know in other circumstances, I might have made a completely different (loud background noise), you know if I’d been in Iran, in a riot and seen a helicopter coming I reckon I’d have got into a trench (laughs), so you know you sort of apply, just, your reading of the situation, which you can’t be trained in- you think of the number of soldiers that have fired shots, or been shot- it’s, it’s tiny (laughs), like, out of most soldiers who go to war, it’s a tiny proportion of them who actually do any shooting or get shot at, a tiny proportion of them in most wars nowadays. So, what you teach, the most important things to teach in these hostile environment courses is not about combat actually its about all of the peripheral things that you can have some control about, which if you don’t plan, really will endanger you, so for example, I felt more in danger in some ways, not immediately, but certainly not, the adrenalin building sort of danger, of being stuck in Nablis when your hotel room’s being hit by 50 mm fire, but in, Aceh, surrounded by 80,000 bodies, with a totally uncertain, we’re the only Westerners there, not, not knowing anything more than two blocks of the town cause the rest of the time I’d been there it’d been under marshal law in civil war, the place totally dark and covered in mud, everywhere we’d tread there’s bodies, and we haven’t got a reliable fuel, food, electricity or water supply (laughs), that’s, that’s what you can teach, you know that’s what you can teach, you know its

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like, I made the dumbest decision in not stopping to get fuel cause I wanted to save a bit of time on that day cause I knew we were ahead of everyone else on the assignment, so I just didn’t want to stop where I saw a queue of twenty cars, then there was no fuel for the next 400 kilometres and we were like, begging- and you know, it could have endangered us, so you can teach that sort of thing. But in the real sort of spur of the moment crisis of combat and stuff like that, people just make decisions based on, what you think and what you know- I think. You know?

SF: Was there ever an oral tradition that’s passed down from the guys that left the area you went into, I mean, I'm just trying to, kind of, understand the training echelon, I mean there must be information that gets (loud background noise) passed on, cause you don’t want people going in fresh-

TP: No, no but there isn’t a lot, I mean you know I probably had more of a tradition of stuff passed down from watching documentaries then I did from my, because in the end we’re journalists and, and a lot of what I would have had described to me by other correspondents about combat was like Peter Cave said to me, oh, you know, I did this thing where I was standing in, in an area being shelled by Serbian artillery, and I’d worked out the intervals between the flash of the gun and the explosion of the gun and then the landing of the shell and the next explosion, and he’d constructed what he was going to say for the TV piece so that the flash of the gun he’d, he’d cue, say a few words, have enough of a pause to know that he was going to have the explosion of the gun, the muzzle, say a few more words and know that he’d get there before the next bang (claps hands), so that his whole piece was sort of punctured, now I was sort of much more interested in learning how to do that in combat then actually, you know (laughs) trying to get anything else off him, cause in the end, you’re sort of focused on, the story. Ah, you know? We, the, self preservation is just (stutters) natural. But I spent, we spent a few nights driving back where we were just absolutely petrified on the road, the whole way home, where we’d sort of left it a bit late, or whatever and you know.

SF: I know you, you mentioned that you didn’t feel like a target when you were in the middle east but um, what about different conflicts where, you don’t have standing militaries per se, its more, as other people would say ‘ferals’, its just… 14 year olds behind the-

TP: Well, I haven’t been quite in that but, Aceh was pretty loose. Um, and also, its more, like I think, sort of civil insurrection, hysteria, those sorts of situations in crowds. I was in Nobus once when a big gun fight broke out, and the Israeli army was taking out guys at the back who were, who were shooting at their sort of troop line, using these Barrett rifles, that were like 550, you know 50 mm, like any bunker- busting, like bullets, anti-aircraft bullets, as sniper bullets. And they were shooting, and they just head-shot someone from a kilometre, they used video cameras you know, and um, we’re so, this stuff’s happening, (pause) and this kid gets, who I’d just looked up and glanced at, was like about 40-50 metres away, I was just looking, and I would have thought he was only 13 or something, and his head just explodes, just like bang, just while I'm sort of looking up, and (pause) so there’s all this hysteria going on anyway, the whole fight had started after these funerals and

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everyone had been whipped into a frenzy, and this stuff had people at absolute mad-, you know, complete level of madness, and so his friends were scooping up bits of his skull and brain and running up and asking us ‘film this’ you know ‘film this’-like right in our faces, and we’re like, a) hys-hys-hysterical ourselves, like I was, myself and my female fixer, we were like, completely in shock, ah, and, but also knowing that we can’t show that, I mean, you know, Palestinian TV, and al jazeera, we wouldn’t shoot it, let alone run it, and, um, so we said ‘no no we cant’, and immediately, the group becomes antagonistic towards us; ‘they’re spies’, and from their ‘spies’ murmuring, and as this is happening, and my fixer, who’s this Palestinian f-, he’s this fatar guy I know, is convincing the people around us, going ‘no no they’re not spies’, and then you start hearing them say ‘no they’re Jews, they’re spies’, and you can hear it radiating back through circles of people around you, and we needed to call in fatar guys, gunmen to come and separate this crowd who were just going to pull us apart. F-, now, you can’t plan something like that, it’s these sort of unplanned, as you say, the feral, uncontrolled, unregulated situation, and all you can do to, all you can do to sort of combat that is to get a very good sort of early warning system (laughs), you know the hairs on the back of your neck type thing? I mean I (pause), you know I've been to towns where I've heard people say things about us just as we drive through a group of people with my fixer, or you can tell from the way people are looking at you, and you just go ‘we took three hours to get here but we’re not stopping’. You get out, you know, you just leave. So, it’s partially intuitive, you know. Those are the most dangerous situations I'm sure, you know, where people are hysterical, drug-affected, alcohol-affected, mob violence- affected, I mean Indonesian people would just be so hospitable and so quiet and introspective and introverted, until (click) they reach a tipping point where just mob violence is just phenomenal, you know, and anyone in the way is just a target, you know.

SF: I'm just interested about ah, what media organisations, international news organisations can do for the next generation of ah, of correspondents, because if conflicts are so different, and you’re going to have to learn by doing, its an on the job learning, and it’s a stiff learning tier, I mean people are injured and killed, um, would, do you believe that providing some sort of a research based, have a group of people or a lobby that researches exactly what risks come about or what risks exist in that particular conflict just to help inform- because information is key.

TP: You’re right, but the worst thing that you can have is information that’s old, or inappropriate, and that’s what tends to happen once you centralise that sort of thing. There’s nothing better, like when I was driving around the West Bank, then being able to ring someone who is 300 yards from the next place I'm going to drive to, and who can look out the window, and say ‘yeah that checkpoint closed’, or ‘there’s only two guys their now and they no longer have the armoured cars there, they’re not sort of shooting at anything that arrives’- that’s what you want, and y-you can’t centralise that- it’s up to a journalist to get that on the ground. Now, the real danger is, I think, the lack of opportunity, for journalists, to-to do that under what we currently have, which is, a system that depends on transmitting (in broadcast journalism terms, lets talk about television), in television terms, where you’re tethered to either a feed-point in a city or your ba- your home base, or an SMG; a

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portable satellite set-up that’s been set up somewhere near this happening story, its disastrous for journalism because the 24 hour, all the 24 hour news services, as soon as you have one of those there, stop reporting news in terms of going out, finding out what's happening and doing packages and start reporting live crosses, and won’t learn anything more while they’re doing it because they can’t leave the satt- or, they’ll be pushed and pulled so that they’ll like beg for five hours to go and do a story and get new information, let us off doing you know this cross or that cross, and they rush, and they rush into it, and try and rush out of it? And, don’t take the time to get the story, but also don’t take the time to get the proper logistics, to work out how am I going to get in safely, and what pressure is reasonable in terms of getting out safely at the right time, you know. You’ve got to make those calls yourself. We drove into west Afghanistan as the war was finishing, into Harat from Iran, and it was a really dangerous trip, we knew the most dangerous thing about the story was the trip in, a really long trip across eastern Iran and western Afghanistan, and as soon as we got there, within about twelve hours we’d discovered that an A- Australian cameraman had been killed coming in to Afghanistan the other way, and this edict just went out- ‘everyone in Afghanistan has to get out’- and we’re like ‘well fuck hang on, we’ve just done the most dangerous part of the trip, we’re exhausted, we’re, we’re in no situation to travel at night, we’re not, you know we don’t even know reliable people, and like we could rely on Iranians to get us in, now we have to rely on Afghanistan contacts, in this post-Taliban anarchy- and um, so we just had to make the decision ‘well bugger that’, I mean, you know, that’s, that’s the problem with having a central resource for, for intelligence about what's the best thing to do, is that they’re reactive, and prescriptive, and they think they’ll know, or they’ll rely on their intelligence, and the only intelligence you have is, the guy that went through 30 minutes before, down that road, is the best intelligence you have (laughs). Not A.K.E, or Centurion, or some company like that, who can help in terms of your general planning, for what do you need when you’re going to Sudan, you know, but they can’t tell you which road, or what time to travel, or what kind of car, or which driver to pick; you’ve got to do all that stuff still, so.

SF: Alright, um, so the training that was most helpful, I’ll just, we’ll just cover it quickly, I just want to- (TP: yep), some of the medical training-

TP: Some of the medical training, some of the sort of psychological approach to, um (pause). See kidnapping’s the most tricky one, it’s the thing I dreaded the most, and the training is that, you know do you sort of go along with them, do you try and resist, do you sort of suggest you gotta- and, and the answer in nearly every case was ‘yeah, maybe’ (laughs) ‘depends on the circumstances’. And, I found that quite sort of interesting that ambiguity, I mean, there was, I’m trying to think what other training was really useful (pause). There was sort of some of the role playing stuff about things not to say, things not to wear, how to clearly identify yourself- but all of it changes wherever you are, you know I used to, when I was in um, in the first year and a half of the IF, we got Australian style road signs made up, you know the big diamond yellow signs, with kangaroos on them, we got them blown up into these huge adhesive stickers which we put on our car, and labelled the car TV, and all that sort of stuff, and that was great, um, worked really well- but there’s no way I’d have

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them on now, because now they’re, the targeting of Western and especially the coalition of people that went into Iraq, across the middle east, is spreading- I mean I wouldn’t want to identify myself as an Australian, then it was a , it was a definitely a, an advantage to identify yourself as Australian, or you know, so now I’d try and make out I was Irish or something like completely non-partisan. So, all of these things are fluid, you can sort of give advice one day that a couple of weeks later is, is pointless, some of the commonalities, you, you know the combat medicine is gr- as I say, it’s great. It should be absolutely essential, no-one- but you know people should be doing that here, you know you go and drive out to floods in, I nearly bloody rolled a car going to a flood once, in western New South Wales with a whole crew in there and I mean, we would have been in just as much need out in that situation for that sort of trauma medicine, as I ever was in Indonesia.

SF: Alright, yeah I think that’s pretty much covered everything, and thanks so much for your time. END OF INTERVIEW

INTERVIEW WITH ERIC CAMPBELL

Shaun Filer: Alright so um, again I'm not a professional journalist or anything, this is just-

Eric Campbell: There’s not much to learn.

SF: Yeah, well, just want you to know that this is going to be really conversational, you know, just kind of here, hanging out. Um, I guess to start off, maybe we just talk about, why you chose journalism, I mean how you got into the field, and uh, your course of study before you actually started working as a foreign correspondent for the ABC?

EC: OK, well when I started journalism, excuse my bleeding chin, when I started journalism there w- there were journalism courses but they were looked down on by the sort of grizzled old hacks who chose cadets in those days, so they just wanted people who had a degree, um, in anything, um, people that had some experience freelancing, people they thought they could, you know get along with, um, their philosophy was ‘we’ll teach you what you need to know when you start’, um but they want people with some academic idea of journalism, um, they want people with a clean sheet that they can just teach to, you know, spell and write simple English and ah, report. So I started at the, at the old Sydney Sun newspaper, which is now defunct, um, which was used to wrap many a fish over the years, um it was a very tabloid newspaper, um, it folded a few years later, um, from there I went to the Sydney Morning Herald, then got a job at the ABC on a terrible program called ‘The Investigators’, um, where I used to come into the Gold Coast and chase cars every week and yell out ‘when are you going to give the refund?’ Um, from there I went to a number of different programs, wound up in current affairs at the ABC, and kept applying for foreign postings, so I got Moscow in 1996.

SF: Alright, and the course that you went through for preparing for that different overseas, ah, posting, I know that you did a lot of study when you were applying for the Chinese correspondent-

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EC: Yeeeah, I mean the ABC has a large number of bureaus but a very small budget, so it tends to be on a wing and a prayer, um, like I was given a book; ‘Teach Yourself Russian’- that was my language preparation, um, when I went to Moscow, in the first couple of weeks I had to go to a hostile environments course, um, which had just been starting off at that stage, at a British army base, um, where they, basically gave us battlefield first aid, um, ah, suggestions how to identify different sniper fire, incoming sniper fire from outgoing, and all the sort of stuff which is fine in theory but totally useless, um, when it comes to actually remembering anything in the field. But it does make, um, managers feel more assured that they’re preparing us, um, none of us really took it seriously I don’t think, um, because I think the more experience journalists who were there were saying that ‘this is all crap because, once you get out there, you’re on your own and you’ll just have to make your own decisions and it’s all instinct’.

SF: So what year was that course that you-

EC: That was ’96.

SF: 96. Have you been through any other courses since then, like refreshers or-

EC: No I haven’t, I'm due to do another one actually, for insurance purposes, but I went, before I went to Iraq in 2003, um, I went to an A-B-C course, Atomic- Ballistic- Chemical, um where they were looking at the um, at survival techniques, for um, what was anticipated to be the use of chemical weapons in Iraq, um, and we were taught things like, um, how to survive a gas attack, and we had a, you know, a pack, with a gas mask we’d put on, and we’d have to practice putting it on in the gas chamber, then putting our suit on and um identifying the wind direction by lifting up the back of your, you know, collar, and feeling the wind direction, and all that sort of stuff um, being assured that we’d have, you know, about nine seconds to do this before we’d be dead, so, again, none of us really took it seriously, because, you know we assumed that if something like that happened, we’d- we’d be dead. Um, so (laughs).

SF: Exactly. So, it’s safe to say that, a lot of the training courses, don’t adequately prepare you for the job you’re going to be doing?

EC: Well, it’s very hard to know how, excuse me, how you could adequately prepare people for that kind of environment, I mean in the army, you go through months of training, um, but more importantly you’re there with a bunch of other soldiers and officers and logistics and that sort of stuff, um, so if something happens, you’ll be part of a pack reacting in a certain way, or um, being advised in a certain way, but as a journalist on the road, you’re on your own, you know its you and the cameraman, um, maybe another couple of journalists your tagging along with, but there’s not that same sense of being part of a well trained unit that’s actually equipped to react in certain situations, um, you’re there doing a reporting job, its entirely different from what the military are doing in that situation, um, and you cannot possibly have, like, the kind of infrastructure that they have, the kind of equipment they have, the kind of training they have, um, even though your likely to face far worse dangers then they do, I mean, the most dangerous profession in a war these days is a journalist, much more dangerous than being a soldier. So, look it-it’s very reassuring to managers to give us these courses, its essential for insurance purposes that we do these courses, but I don’t know if anyone really takes them seriously, or if they’re of much use when it comes to the crunch.

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SF: True. A lot of people say that, journalists are actually, you said before that, they’re, they’re the ones that are in the line of fire more than soldiers, I mean most of the soldiers that are over in Iraq won’t see any action-

EC: No, well I mean there have been no Australian soldiers killed in action, whereas um, you know, um, Paul Moran my cameraman was killed on the third day of the war, um, there was the Australian sound recordist Jeremy Little, who was killed I think a few weeks into the war, um, a number of journalists have had, um, have been injured or have had very close calls, from Australia, um, and- and, you know, I, I, it’s, it’s kind of insanely dangerous now, I mean, um, especially with the advent of suicide bombing, where it can come at any time. Um, the only place that a journalist can work with a degree of safety in Iraq, is to be embedded with combat troops, um, which says it all I think, that you’re much safer working with combat troops, than you are working on your own as a journalist.

SF: Yeah, there’s a lot of discourse about embedding, and, people think it’s some sort of new-

EC: It’s some terribly new, spooky thing that journalists, you know, get Stockholm Syndrome and can’t possibly exercise any objective judgement if they’re working with soldiers, which is nonsense of course, I mean, as a journalist, you, um, you know- you work on your own, or you um, you work very closely with a group of people because you’re doing a story on them, um, if you’re doing- covering an environmental protest, you might be with a group of environmentalists, who are out- you know, out in the bush, you know, up in their tripods, um, but all these things have been happening all the time, for, you know, decades, and you don’t lose your objectivity simply by being with a group of people you’re reporting on, um, you know that’s 101 of journalism, um, so this whole conspiracy theory that, um, journalists are being compromised by working, by being embedded is nonsense. The, the problem is, of course, that you, that its too dangerous too actually work independently at the moment, I mean its too dangerous to try and report on the other side, you can’t sort of tag along with some insurgents.

SF: Right. Tim Page, um, when we were talking about, you know those decades ago, when, he actually felt like he was being protected, or, maybe not protected but not targeted, I mean (EC: Yeah), you’re out there with the equipment, to work as a journalist, um, and you, you know that people are going down around you, you know the officers in charge, the uh, the radio operators, the medics, but you’re not being targeted. Do you think that, the targeting of journalists has actually become more prolific?

EC: Well its certainly, it’s no protection being a journalist anymore, um, when I was in Iraq in the first days of the war, we all had ‘TV’ on the sides of our cars, we had, um, ‘PRESS’ stuck across our flak jackets, um after Paul was killed, I remember everyone was going out and taking off the press sticker, taking off TV signs from their cars because, um, its certainly no protection and it’s likely that you’re more of a target if people see you are a journalist, um, so, um, and, you know, when you look at the evolution of that back from the, um, the war in Croatia, when um, you had the advent of the, of the armoured journalist, you know, when journalists had to start wearing flak jackets and travelling around in cars, and, and that got worse and worse during the Bosnian war, um, ah, if you look at, um, when I was in Kosovo, we went in with NATO, um, the first day, two German journalists were executed, um, apparently by Serb paramilitaries, I mean there has been consistent targeting of journalists, um, over the last, um, ten or twelve years.

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SF: So you think if it was Croatia and Kosovo that actually started the advent of –

EC: The armoured journalist yeah well I, I, I, mean, in um, in the Vietnam War, journalists didn’t wear flak jackets, um, um, it was obviously very dangerous to be in any kind of war, but you didn’t actually have to um, work on the assumption that you were going to be shot at, there was going to be some sort of bounty for journalists, ah we weren’t- am I still bleeding? (laughs) oh god this is (SF: It’s not going to be really noticeable) yeah, yeah, yeah, I suppose it goes with the topic. Mmm. So um, I, when I started doing it (SF: its really funny) (laughs) When I started doing international reporting, it was already at the stage where, um, it was, you know, being a journalist was on, on as dangerous, or probably more dangerous then being a, a soldier in a war, um, so um, you know I've never felt any kind of, um, protection as a journalist.

SF: Considering the risk, and this isn’t really directed at the ABC, it’s pretty much ah, taking a broad look at all international media organisations, but considering the risks, do you think that enough attention is really being placed on adequately preparing or giving the professionals in the field the, the instruction, the research, the, the intel to know what not to do and when not to go-

EC: Well it’s, it’s a very nebulous area, I mean, you know, you can’t really pretare, prepare and protect journalists. I mean, you can pay a lot of money to, you know, intel companies and security experts who aren’t going to know what’s happening on the ground because nobody knows, I mean everything is entirely unpredictable these days- you can have people with you that may advice, you know, it’s a bit dangerous to go to, you know, some place, acting on their own instincts, but often, journalists that have been covering wars for a long time have better instincts then the intel people, um, you can have very expensive, um, as the ABC does very expensive SOS, um, emergency procedures, where you have a company that will, you know, fly in and fly you out, but the problem is that in most of these places that you’re working, such is Iraq- it’s useless, because they can’t actually fly in and pick you up, I mean, after I was injured in Iraq, I could make phone calls to this organisation who were very, you know, willing to assist, but there was nothing they could do- they could ask me how am I feeling, um, you know, um, what are your injuries, you know, um, how have you been treated (when I went to the hospital), um, how are you getting out, will I have to try and get over the boarder somehow, ah but, you know, it was moral support but there was no actual, nothing tangible they could actually do to help you, so you know, while it’s reassuring in a sense to managers to, to have this kind of, you know, infrastructure umbrella and training courses and all the rest of it, I don’t know if it actually makes any difference whatsoever.

SF: That’s interesting, you see the same riffs, a lot of people have been saying the exact same thing, it’s just, you know, as journalists have this, ah, have this really low public opinion, you know you see these ratings of journalists, ah, rated right above, used car salesmen, like they take extraordinary risks, and ah, the majority of the population don’t appreciate it, don’t know about it, and ah, and honestly don’t really-

EC: Mmm, well its always delightful to see John Howard go down to, you know, um, farewell our brave boys and girls going off to, um, you know, on the (11:46) to stay on the ship, in perfect safety (laughs), you know, in the Gulf, um, whereas, its not that dangerous actually for, you know, most of the military people going off to these theatres of, of war, um, but nobody comes down to farewell journalists at the airport, and you know, have a brass band playing- nor should they, but I'm just saying that,

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um, the risk to soldiers is somewhat exaggerated, um, the risk to journalists is, I don’t think, really appreciated.

SF: Do you think that this topic- I mean, there have been a few films that came out, and I know Compass just did a report with Tim Page and Sally Sarah, and a few others, about the risks and bearing that burden of ah, of viewing those very terrible traumas, but, I mean do you think that this is something that should be brought forward or-

EC: Well it’s very hard to know what to do, I mean it did, as I said, I did my first day course in 1996, and I'm due to do another one fairly soon, but when I was actually injured in Iraq, I was in enormous shock, um, you know, I was absolutely terrified, I was on my own, um, sure I’d done a first aid course, but it wasn’t going to come into my mind as to what to do, I mean I wasn’t about to go and start doing circular bandages and, you know, pressure point, you know, um, applications and that sort of thing because, in that sort of situation, you know, it’s like, like you’ve just been in a car accident, um, you know if a car accident victim has a first aid course behind them, is that going to help them when they’ve been in the car accident? No, I mean, they’re lying there bleeding and, um, and in shock and um, you know desperate for help, which, in a war zone, doesn’t come.

SF: Yep, Tim said the same thing, I mean, he worked independently, and when he was working for radio, normally he’d be the only person who had had that type of training (interruption-someone at door). I didn’t have very specific, prepared questions, but most of them you’ve just blown out of the water, so, I'm kind of going, from the hip a little bit-

EC: Oh, look, I'm a terrible person to interview; I’m all over the shop-

SF: You’re completely destroying my thesis (laughs).But that’s good, getting to the truth of the matter. OK, so what I was saying was, Tim Palmer, when he was in the Middle East, and even before that, he was working independently, um, in a lot of cases they would employ, stringers? You know the independents, to just augment and do, do – whereas people from the actual company that they were working with then, none of those people had hostile environment training (EC: No, no), none of those people had, ah, first aid or field medical training, so how far do you think the duty of care, should, should encompass, I mean, those ah, those individuals that are actually working with the ABC correspondents, or do you don’t, you don’t think that –

EC: Well that does, I mean, stringers, you know, you rely on stringers, um, to basically save your life, um, and generally in a very crowded um, journalistic conflict zone, where you have, you know, hundreds of journalists arriving, everybody who speaks English has been snapped up, and you’re relying on finding some sort of, you know, high school student or someone, who speaks a bit of English, to be your eyes and ears, and to, you know, make sure you survive, um, we put enormous faith in stringers, who we pay very little money, um, who have to take great risks with us, and um, you know, we have no real duty of care to them if they get injured, um. So, um, you, you know again, it’s the, it’s the reality of what it’s like out there compared to the nice sort of, um, you know, board room discussion as to what we should do to protect our people, I mean either you, I think, accept that it’s an extremely dangerous situation for which your people are unprepared, and lets think about how we can deal with some of the realities on the ground for them, or, you have to go to them, the greater extreme of thinking they will do, extremely intensive first aid course, they will have strong back-up of, of people with, with knowledge of intel, they will have armoured cars, they will have, you know a, a whole menagerie of people

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behind them, which I know the ABC couldn’t afford, um, when I've, you know, spoken to managers about this, what I've stressed is that it’s not really a question of having first aid courses, it’s more of a question of being aware that journalists are working under extreme pressure, and trying to keep off their backs, and let them make their own decisions. I think the greatest danger to ABC journalists, um, from my own experiences, is that you’re working in a state of exhaustion, because you have so many outlets, demanding so much, um, material from you, that you’re not getting enough sleep, you’re not having enough time to go and um, check out the safety of, of various areas, you’re having to just work in a sort of, fug of exhaustion, and rush out and do things just to get material, um, or you are, you know, taking the option of staying in the hotel room and just doing two-ways, and, and fudging it and actually making up what’s going on, because you have no way of finding out, or, you know, having the um, the office in Sydney read the wires to you over the phone and then you parrot them back, so I, I think that the, the major reality check which groups like the ABC need to do is, is to recognise that just because someone is in an area, doesn’t mean you can treat them like a robot, and a story machine, um, and push them, um, to do things that just aren’t safe, and that’s what has happened over and over again, um, and I think that’s really the major safety issue, its about, um, not working the journalist to a state of exhaustion, keeping other programs off their backs that are demanding material, and just letting them, make their own decisions in a calm and rational manner, um, which um, of course is a very difficult argument to put because, um, broadcasters put you there to get output, and if you’re not giving output, they’re saying, you know; (puts on voice)‘what the fuck’s he doing there?’, you know?

SF: That’s a complete counter to the corporate line you hear (EC: yep), there’s quite a few people that I've interviewed, not just from the ABC, but everybody’s saying, we no longer, you know, push our journalists to, you know, extremes, or put them in-

EC: Well, you know, I, I’d like to think that was true, but um, you know, everybody in these situations, has, you know, has the news room on their back, and different programs on their back, and it’s worse for the ABC because we have so many outlets, and, you know, a lot of programs are run by dickheads who’ve never been in this situation, um, you know, carpet strollers sitting there in their air conditioned comfort in Ultimo, ah, (puts on voice) demanding this lazy cunt, you know, fuckin’ file for us. And, you know, when you’re on the satellite phone shouting at some prick that ‘I cannot do this, I’ve actually gotta check out something, I-I don’t know if it’s safe to go down there, I need to get some sleep’, um, you get a very hostile reaction every time. And, you know, I, I’ve often appealed to managers to just keep these pricks off our backs- if you want to keep your journalists alive; don’t work them to a state of exhaustion.

SF: So were those the area managers that are usually the pricks, the fucking-

EC: Ah, the, the program producers, I mean, you know, its, you know, you can be, you can go for, you know, two days without sleep and you, you know, just trying to get to an area to get some information or something, the satellite phone rings and it’s drive-time Adelaide, and they wanna have a chat about, you know, (puts on voice) ‘what’s it like in Iraq at the moment?’ And its just beyond comprehension that they, you know, people in- in Australia have no concept of what the journalists are actually going through, and the pressures they’re under, um, and, the amount of effort you have to go to and time you have to go to, to get information, to actually be able to report with some authority, as opposed to just fudging it, um, and I think that’s the world-wide trend, um with the improvement in technology, ah, the desire

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for immediacy of news, that it, it’s all become about the theatre, of having someone in an area, talking about something they don’t know about, um, to other peoples pictures, to agency pictures, rather than the idea of a journalist being there, so they can actually go out and, with their own eyes and ears, see what's happening, and report that back, and that’s a great shame, which is why I'm not really interested in, in doing this sort of work anymore, um, because it’s just so frustrating that um, to try and do the job properly, um, you not only have to push yourself to such dangerous extremes, but you have to deal with all these unreasonable demands that keep flying at you.

SF: Yeah, when I watched that ah, Compass broadcast; ‘Bearing the Burden’, ah, I don’t know if you saw that, but it was interesting that the ABC actually, ah, allowed it to be made, because it brought up a lot of interesting points about where the industry isn’t, you know, providing that duty of care, not really, um, you know, offering enough debriefing and counselling, um, post, but, it just didn’t go far enough, you know, the audience, I think need to, to realise and understand these risks. But, just kind of jumping to, ah, post traumatic stress, um, and debriefing, they say that they’ve started setting up some sort of a counselling service-

EC: Yeah they do which is very good, I mean, I, I wouldn’t fault the ABC on what it does for people after the event, um I have reservations about what can lead to the event, but after the event, it’s great, um, they do have, um, a very understanding system that if you need time off you can take time off, um, that, you know, you have a counselling program now, which is not a magic bullet, I think that’s the major reservation I have about it, that, that people think that, someone’s traumatised, they can go to counselling and that will fix it, um, you’re dealing with an extremely um, ah, hard to fathom area, with a very nebulous science, um, where, you know, you can’t just deal with the human mind through, you know, a few blocks of counselling, um, counselling may or may not be affective, but, if it’s used properly, over enough time, it can be quite helpful. Um, so as long as it’s recognised, which it isn’t always recognised- that it may not do the trick, um, you know it- it’s a good program, um, but, w- in my case it took me several months of very painful counselling because I, you know, hated talking about it, I found it all quite re-traumatising at first to actually go over what had happened but eventually it, I was able, you know, through my own efforts and with the help of counselling to, you know, get over the problems I was having, and um, you know, get a framework for dealing with such problems such as that may arise in the future. Um, but, you know, again, what- the point that I keep stressing to the ABC is that, um, the major thing they should do for safety is not put the journalists under, um, undue pressure when they’re in the field, um, and that’s far more important than first aid courses, or you know, any other sort of infrastructure that they may wish to ring in.

SF: I’ll be honest, when I, when I took on board this ah, this project, this thesis, because of my, my training, I was a, in the military for quite a few years and ah, I was a hospital corpsman, like a medic with the marines, and I thought that there must be some sort of training to provide people with the muscle memory to, to jar, to come in play, just to try to increase some survivability, give them knowledge and enough information to understand, you know, lines of fire, I mean, thinking like a real military jerk-off, that really doesn’t understand the situation, but I was involved with training some foreign correspondents, and they seemed a bit naïve, I thought there was something you could give these people, but ah-

EC: Well it takes more than a two day course, I mean it-it takes several months of training for any of that to actually have any effect, that, you know, it kicks in automatically when you’re in a, you know, state of extreme stress, fear and shock,

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um, unless you’re going to put journalists through several months of military training, um, I don’t know if any of it is really going to be worth while, um, I think that, the best thing I’ve found, when I've been working in war zones is to hook up with other journalists who, you know has as much or more experience and for us to sort of, you know, take things as they come and, you know, take it slowly and not take any risks and not push things, and at our own speed and pace, work our way through the area, and you know, get the material as we’re able to, um, but I-I really am sceptical about, um, you know the military courses, um, or the, you know sort of, security advisers they can give you, um, in the end it, you know, looks good on paper but I don’t think it has any effect in the field.

SF: Ok, um, I think we’re pretty much about to wrap up, but just, in closing, you’ve had a, a bit of time now to reflect on, on those experiences that you’ve has, was there one gem of knowledge or, or some lesson that you’ve learnt, to give to the new generation of journalists?

EC: Don’t push to cover a war. Um, you know, don’t leap into, you know, the big story, um, before you’re, you’ve had enough experience to really know what you’re doing, and um, enough maturity not to, you know, push yourself, um, beyond what you feel is, is cautious and safe.

END OF INTERVIEW

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ADDENDUM 5 – INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS: MARIANNE HARRIS

Interview with Walter Cronkite

Interviewer: Walter, thank you very much for sitting with us this morning at your beautiful home. I want to start by asking you about the difference in covering the war in Vietnam and World War II, which you also covered. I want to put our film in context. You have said that Vietnam was a far different sort of war than what you correspondents had known in World War II. Could you talk about a little?

Walter Cronkite: Well, the war itself was different. The coverage was, of course, different because of the nature of the war, and the nature of the military, the attitude toward the press. World War II was a very well structured war, both as a war and as an information enterprise. As a war, it was a war of movement, of (vast) armies moving ahead as they always have, in modern times at least, as large groups. There was no hint of the individual unit type movement (with the) guerrilla war in Vietnam. Also, the war, World War II, was a war in which the correspondents were very well tended to by the military in the sense of being restricted on their assignments and entirely constricted on their copy they wrote. We moved only by permit, permission of the military. They then provided all the facilities we needed to move, whenever they approved it. We operated out of press camps, organized as such, under the leadership of military officials, and then all of our copy, all of our photographs, all of our film was edited by the military in the sense that it was censored. They either permitted it out or they did not permit it out, or they suggested cuts we would have to make if they were going to submit that copy to the public generally. The Vietnam War was vastly different. It was a guerrilla war. It was one of the reasons that our military had trouble. They had not trained for guerilla war. They were not, or did not understand guerrilla wars. Despite the fact the British had been fighting them in the Malaysia, and tried to teach us something, we didn't learn very quickly. And, also, there was no censorship whatsoever. The military was absolutely on its own. We literally hitchhiked from one battle scene to another without any military supervision whatsoever, nor was there any censorship of the copy that we moved. There were the essential differences in the two wars.

INT: You mentioned that there was a substantial difference in attitude of the military toward the press. Could you talk about that the antagonism ??

WC: Well, the military of course, in World War II, operated with complete control. That is, they accredited correspondents. They permitted the correspondents to go where they decided it was proper for them to be. The correspondents considerably, in considerable numbers, fought for the right to be where they wanted to be, and the military understood these arguments. The military censorship and much of the military control of the press was under civilian heads; that is, people who had been recruited into the army for their special talents, and who understood the civilian need for information. There was not, didn't seem a

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very -- any serious high level debate within the military about how we should be treated. It ran smoothly and well. In Vietnam, that wasn't the case. They just, it was chaotic. There was no rule, no rhyme nor rule, or reason to how they handled it.

INT: Some people have said that there was -- the media, the press during World War II existed, or saw its role as something of an extension of American policy, and that was quite different in Vietnam.

WC: I don't think it was quite that the press saw its role in that fashion. It was the nature of the war that created this. We understood the evil we were fighting. We understood the need to defend against that perceived evil. It seemed perfectly obvious to civilized persons, who were not within the axis, that we had to resist Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo, those people. There was no question about it. So we conceived ourselves to be on the right side. It wasn't a phony injection of patriotism. It was an honestly come by decision that this was where we should be.

INT: And in Vietnam?

WC: In Vietnam, there was no such concept at all. There was at the beginning. In the early days of American commitment, when we believed we were there to help train the South Vietnamese forces to protect the possibilities of democracy, understanding that the government we were helping to defend by instruction was not a democracy; but that, if we were to keep any part of Southeast Asia free for the possibility of nurturing democracy, we needed to be there and defend South Vietnam. This was the only concept we had, and that was in the early stages. As we poured more and more forces in, and it became our war, there was considerable doubt as to whether we were doing the right thing and our tactics in doing it.

INT: Walter, you had a famous interview with President Kennedy, I believe inaugurating the first half hour nightly news broadcast, and the subject of Vietnam came up. I wonder if you could recall when that took place, where, and what the President said to you.

WC: Well, it took place in Hyannis in his summer home in September of what, 1963, was it? The -- in the -- it's a very interesting story, a rather lengthy one, I'm afraid, but I arrived up there to do this interview with some preconceived notions of what I wanted to ask him about, which did not necessarily include Vietnam. Vietnam was one of the subjects, but Vietnam was not the top subject. There were other things in the presidential events of that year that needed covering, and I intended to get to Vietnam eventually. I arrived at the Hyannis press headquarters the evening before the interview to be confronted by Bob (Pierpoint), our White House correspondent who said, well, if you know what the President is going to say, and all that, why can't you let me in on it? I'm your correspondent at the White House. You ought to tip me off about these things. I said, what in the world are you talking about? He said, the AP has got a story that he is going to give you a statement tomorrow about Vietnam. I said, I know nothing about

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that, never heard of it. And he said, well, the AP got it from somewhere. They must have gotten it from Pierre Salinger, who was the press secretary to the President. Well, I immediately dashed in to the bar where I found Salinger, as I expected to, with the rest of the press, and what is this about? He said, well, the President has got something he would like to say about Vietnam tomorrow and I don't know, somehow or other AP got hold of it. I said, somehow or other? You planted it with them. Just because of that, because I don't want anybody to think I ever give questions in advance of an interview, I am not asking a single question about Vietnam tomorrow. He said, but you have got to. He has got -- I said, I don't care what he has got. I am not asking the question. Well, he pursued me all night long; picked me up the first thing in the morning to go out to the Kennedy compound. Again, he was pressing me, you have got to ask this question. I said I wasn't going to. What of course I didn't realize was that the subject controls an interview and not the interviewer, and we were barely into the interview that Kennedy didn't bring it around to Vietnam. That's not quite true. I brought it around to Vietnam because it was leading that way and I couldn't duck it; and, also, I wasn't about to. I was threatening Salinger, but quite clearly, if he had something he was going to say, I was going to ask it, and I did. And it turned out that what Kennedy was doing, was trying to, in advance, excuse the United States from participating in any way in what turned out to be a coup against the present leadership, at that moment, of Vietnam, a coup which eventually ended in the assassination of the -- of (Diem), and it is generally believed that the United States participated rather deeply in that coup, although not probably anticipating his assassination.

INT: I want to go back to a subject you raised a moment ago in terms the widespread support among both the American public and the media early in the war. As I understand it, you took two trips to Vietnam and you had one trip in 1965, maybe it was in March of 1965, where you came back and concluded that we were making some progress. Could you recall that trip for us, and why you came to that conclusion?

WC: Well, this was fairly early on, in the early stages, and this was very early on. I went out with the first calvary, I think it was, of all the calvaries I remember, and into the field, which was right outside Saigon, and which the Vietcong had infiltrated; and, indeed, we landed there by helicopter and came upon the campsite where the Vietcong had been. The fire was still there where they had been preparing their breakfast. They were still in the woods around us. And, in this case, we had obviously chased them out of their encampment, prevented whatever their intended movement was that day. And, in other episodes around there over the short period of time I was there, there was similar feeling that, well, the American army was finally there in some force. The period of our instruction was passing at that moment to the fact that we were picking up the job itself, of trying to defeat the Vietcong; and in that, what I saw, we were doing it. The three or four episodes that I covered actively like that, we were pursuing the Vietcong, breaking up their intended movements. Of course, that ended pretty quickly; but, by that time, I was back in the States, as the mood, the whole atmosphere of the war changed.

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INT: And I know that you have written that, after you came back, there was a growing disillusionment on your part and on the part of the country before your return, and you went back in the spring, in early 1968 for -- during the Tet offensive. I wonder if you could describe for us what you saw Saigon, Hue, and how what you saw then was different from what you had seen on your (other) trip.

WC: The Tet offensive, of course, was the deciding moment, really, in the Vietnam War. Already, we had been suffering serious losses, very serious losses over a period of years. Although our military leadership kept telling us that we were winning, that we were -- excuse me -- I'll take that again. The military had been telling us that we were winning, that we were pacifying the villages, and giving us numerous --

XX: Because you don't have a cohesive (piece). (State) the question again and take the full answer.

WC: From the beginning?

XX: Keep it ??

INT: That's fine. Thank you, (Randall). Let's, again, start with what you had seen on your second trip. You have gone back to Tet. This was a big change from what you had seen before. So tell me what you saw in Saigon and what was different.

WC: Well, the Tet offensive was a deciding moment in the war. There is no question about that, and we already had been having great difficulties in achieving a final victory over the Vietcong, and the North Vietnamese. We had been losing untold numbers of Americans in the fight; although, the military kept telling us we were winning this war. We were liberating all these villages, liberating in quotes. They had come along on our side. They were so pleased to be out from under the Vietcong and North Vietnam, we were told. And, yet, here with the Tet offensive, by the time I got there, the North Vietnamese, Vietcong, were already in the outskirts of Saigon. The Chinese part of Saigon, northern part, had already been infiltrated, considerable damage done. The -- here was an army that claimed they were winning the war, that could not even defend their base, their major headquarters, the capital city of Saigon completely. And, when I got there, the Battle of Hue, this famous old city in the north, and I went up there to see with my own eyes how that battle was going, and there were a couple of other spots I covered. There was just no question that this was a very sizeable military victory, whether it was a lasting victory or not, nobody knew at that time, of course, but it certainly had made a difference in the whole nature of the war, and it was making a serious difference back home in people's attitude toward the war. They were (barely) suffering a war that we were being told we were winning, that we were told we could see the light at the end of the tunnel. It was the Vietnam equivalent of World War I's “we will be out of the trenches by Christmas”. At this point, it didn't look like there was any light at the end of the tunnel whatsoever. If anything, the tunnel had been bombed and closed, and the American people were vastly confused. Those who had clung to the propaganda from the Pentagon, the

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White House and, of course, originating with the command in Vietnam that we were winning were not quite discouraged, and it did seem that the American people were finally biting the bullet that maybe this wasn't a war we could win, and that meant the offensive was important.

INT: And when you were in Vietnam on that second trip during Tet, do you recall meeting with General Abrahms, who gave you a more positive briefing than the story you have just described to us? Do you remember what he said?

WC: Well, all the military leadership was giving a fairly positive summary of what they felt was happening and expected to happen. General Abrahms I had known very well in World War II and he was one of our great tank heroes, and we had a meeting at his headquarters and a very interesting evening with his, part of his staff in which they were talking of the kill ratio, which was a very revealing conversation to me. We know that that's the military job. That's what they have got to do. If they are going to win, they have got to kill, but to hear this cold blooded suggestion, not suggestion, this philosophical contemplation of how you can kill more people, how you win a war by killing more people, was kind of a rough one to take for a civilian. I think a military mind can accept that. It's very difficult for the civilian mind to do so.

INT: When you returned to the United States after that trip and presented your report to the American people, what you had seen, you closed that report with an extraordinary comment, an editorial. I wonder if you could talk about how you decided to say what you said, and how you came to that conclusion.

WC: Well, my trip to Vietnam during the Tet offensive was, in a sense I suppose, egotistically dictated by both CBS and by myself. The Tet offensive had begun. The great surge of the North Vietnamese to get down into the villages, capturing of the villages, who supposedly we had liberated, and into the outskirts of Saigon had occurred before I got there, before I went there, and the American people were deeply confused, after having been told that we were winning the war, that here the North Vietnamese and Vietcong could put on such an offensive. And we felt, at CBS, that we had quite a reputation of being down the middle of the road. We knew that was so because we got an equal number of letters condemning us from both the anti-Vietnam forces and the loyalists, if you please, patriotic forces, as they would call themselves, those who supported the war effort. Since we got an equal number, so many that we (weighed) them instead of reading them, we felt we were in the middle of the road. If you get shot at from both sides, you must be in the middle of the road, and since people seemed to trust us to that degree, or distrust us to an equal degree, it might be possible for us to give some kind of interpretative report with the anchor person who had been doing this job from New York on the scene. So I went out to decide what we might tell the American people, and I did not know. I did not know when I went out there what side I would be on when I came out. It was only after seeing the scene and talking to the military and hearing them say, despite what they had just been through, that if they could get a hundred or a hundred and fifty thousand more men, they could finish the job. We had been listening to that for far too

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long. Give us a hundred thousand more and we can finish the job. That was what decided me. As a consequence I said in my report, after making sure the people understood it was a personal opinion and not a factual report, I said that I felt we should now say that we had done the best we could. We had surrendered as much material and blood as we could, and we had done the best we could with our best intentions and we should (sue for an honest peace).

INT: What was the reaction to your personal comment?

WC: Well, it was very interesting. Naturally, the anti-war people applauded and thought this was a great breakthrough for them. The -- and, interestingly enough, from the supportive level of the government, the people that is, there was not a great reaction, anti-reaction. There seemed to be an almost sad acceptance of the fact that we were moving in that direction. It was shortly after that, that President Johnson decided not to run again, which seemed to have had -- perhaps we had some effect. He had said at the time of the broadcast, watching it, if I have lost Cronkite, I have lost middle America, and I guess it had some effect.

INT: It seems that you were uniquely qualified in this country to go out, without an opinion on one side or the other, and come back and draw that conclusion, and people would accept it on both sides.

WC: Well, that's what CBS management thought. We had a great president of CBS, Dick (Salant), at the time, who was -- he was opposed to editorializing in any way. But, in the extraordinary circumstances, he weighed that and came to the conclusion, you just -- I guess we don't know that you (just announced it), but the -- let me say that again. Well, what happened was that the CBS management did consider the fact that we were perhaps uniquely qualified to give the public some leadership in what the situation truly was in Vietnam. Our distinguished, our President of CBS, Dick (Salant), who was very much opposed to any kind of editorializing, signed off on that as something, perhaps, that we should do to serve the American public.

INT: At some point, Walter -- excuse me.

XX: Do you want a glass of water, or anything, Walter? Are you okay?

WC: Yes. Maybe we could do that. Could you do that?

INT: -- is to, to put the reputation of the network on the line to do this?

WC: Well, I don't think there is any question about that. They certainly did. I -- of course, we didn't know. I mean, I really didn't know when I went out what my attitude would be. I had no idea, and it really wasn't until (Westmoreland) said, give me a hundred thousand more and we can do -- finish the job, that I flipped. I wouldn't say I

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flipped. I was confirmed in what I thought I had seen out in action, talking to the military. INT: Was there a sort of a cast system, a class system, where individuals such as yourself, anchors, the most important news gatherers, opinion makers would be given access to a certain level, and then others who come in as a stringer, or as a --

WC: Well, that's something called Bigfooting, as you may know in the coverage of any story, when the anchors, the more prominent correspondents move in on a story and really, in effect, almost take it over from the local man, who has been covering it all along. And that was certainly true in Vietnam, no question about it, and I felt very guilty about it. I think other anchors who went out there did, for the same reason. Those are the guys who are in the foxholes all the time, from one foxhole to another, and here we swing in and get the bylines and the headline. I would have resented it. I resented it in World War II when the top UP guys would come in and take over my story.

INT: Walter, at some point during the Vietnam War, it became what is now known as the Living Room War. Television became the primary source of most people's information about the war. When did you realize this and how did that effect your coverage?

WC: Well, the -- sure, television became the principle source of people's information on the war, even as it did on everything.

XX: Alright. We are good to go.

INT: Okay. Let's go back and talk about what we were discussing a moment ago, about the young reporters and their behavior at the Five O'clock Follies. You were talking, I think almost embarrassment of the skeptical and cynical questions (of the young reporters).

WC: The young correspondents in Vietnam, and I give them every credit for incredible bravery and incredible dedication to their job, in getting out in the foxholes with the troops. I think they exposed themselves far more than we did as a general think in World War II; frequently on occasion in World War II, but in their case, every time they were out with the troops, it was -- there was a front line situation, practically. But, at the same time, it was their first war. They were all competing with each other; and, at the Five O'clock Follies, it seemed they were competing with the U.S. Army much of the time. There was almost a -- what I would call almost a feigned arrogance, if there can be such a thing. They were trying to prove to each other how cynical they could be instead of really digging for information, it seemed it was constantly a challenge match with the military. Frequently, they had things to challenge the military with. They had the facts, having been there at the scene, where the military was reporting through second, third hand sources, and having doctored the information themselves, but it was an uncomfortable thing, I found, as an old hand, at the Five O'clock Follies with all of this deep display of cynicism, whether it was true or not. It was embarrassing.

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INT: What -- was there some reason, some foundation for this cynicism? Did the military lie?

WC: Oh, yes; sometimes deliberately and sometimes unintentionally. It had its own version of what was happening out in the field, and it tried to describe it to its best advantage, quite clearly, to give a positive story instead of frequently what has appeared to the press, which was present, a negative story. And, frequently, the problem was that the military didn't even know that these correspondents had been there at the time. They had no way to know that the correspondents went out on their own, hitchhiking, getting rides on helicopters, rides in Jeeps, whatever, to get them up where the action was, or where it was about to be, or they thought it might be. They would live with the troops for a while, and they would get into that action. When they back to Viet -- to Saigon, and the military suddenly is telling about this action, and it is their own version that they have written in the Public Relations Office. So, the correspondents really had a lot of reason to question the reports they were getting.

INT: Walter --

XX: Do you want to get -- we may need that question again ?? thunder and, all of a sudden, we got a big downpour.

WC: I could kind of retch like it was a burp.

INT: I think we are all right. The Living Room War; at some point, most people began to get their information about the war from television. This was a (seed) change in journalism. When did that happen and how did you, as someone in charge of reporting television news deal with this?

WC: Well, it happened with the development of television. It wasn't the Vietnam War, necessarily, that did it. Television was developing very rapidly, of course, from the time when it was first, really became a national phenomenon in 1952. And, from that time on, more and more people were getting more and more of their news from television until, by the time the Vietnam War came ten, fifteen years later, most of the people were getting most of their news from television, a rather serious matter because, in the little fifteen minutes news we had at the beginning of the Vietnam War, half hour later, we could possibly deliver all the news that people needed; but, still, they were getting most of their news from television. So they were getting truncated versions and pictorial versions of the news. Now, in the case of a war situation, here for the first time a war was being covered on a daily basis on film and delivered directly into the home, into an environment in which people were far more receptive to it than they would have been in a theater as news reels were presented in World War II and before. So, the news had an impact, undoubtedly, in the home that it had never had before.

INT: What was that impact, do you think?

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WC: The impact in the case of war was the horror of the combat that they saw, the difficulties of the soldier and the lifestyle of a guerrilla war. All of this was quite impressive to people at home and quite disturbing to them, obviously.

INT: Did this Living Room War force any kind of editorial changes, any editorial decisions? In particular, were you faced with decisions about, well, we can't show those pictures?

WC: We were faced with that decision, yes. There was bloodletting that we decided was excessive. We didn't -- we tried not to censor the war by that means. We tried to show it in its brutality, as it came to us in our editing rooms in New York. We did not, I don't -- I am sure we didn't distort the nature of the war by not covering some of the more horrible examples of the brutality of war, the bloodletting of war, but we showed enough that the public got a good sense for what the war was about. I think it was helpful to do so. I think it is very necessary to do so. If a public is willing to send their young people to combat, to the loss of limbs and life, we should, at the least, be willing to look at it, and understand what we have sent them to do.

INT: As the war progressed, it became more and more dangerous to journalists, and later in the war quite a few journalists went missing. You were involved in a group of people, a committee to help locate missing journalists. Could you tell us about what that committee was, why you agreed to participate in it?

WC: Well, it seemed necessary. There wasn't any organized system to look for journalists, of course. They went missing in strange and difficult areas, areas in which we had no presence at all, particularly in Cambodia, and the only -- we founded this organization out of a necessity to try to pursue, in an organized way, the inquiry as to what might have happened to them. This involved spending some money, which we had to raise to do, and the organizations who lost these men, of course, put up funds for it, but we did the organizing and sent people out into the area as best we could, to try to determine if these correspondents had been seen; if so, in what circumstances; captured or free, or what? It was simply a necessary effort.

INT: Did you have any success?

WC: We had some success; but, unfortunately, certainly not total success.

INT: As I understand it, at one point, you sought to enlist the support of then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Did -- was Secretary Kissinger receptive? Was he helpful to you?

WC: You are going to have to remind me. I don't recall what our problems. I remember that we had a problem with Kissinger, but I can't remember what it was.

INT: Okay. I had read that you went to Secretary Kissinger, particularly with regard to some journalists missing in Cambodia. I don't recall their names. And he wasn't

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particularly receptive to assisting you or your colleagues in trying to locate any missing journalists.

WC: Well, yes, that's -- I still don't remember the precise circumstances, but I do know that he was -- he just didn't feel there was anything he could do. They had no relations with the Khmer Rouge, these communists, terrorists really, that had taken over Cambodia. They had no contact with them, and nothing they could do for us. I think, at the time as I remember, we were quite upset because we hoped for a more sympathetic reception. We just didn't get it at that time. I am not sure there was anything he could have done at that time, either, thinking back on it.

INT: There was a brochure printed, and we have not been able to find a copy of that brochure, with the photographs of the missing journalists. I talked to Maureen Adler and she couldn't find one. There is a -- the only evidence I have seen of that brochure was a photograph in a book call Requiem. I don't know if you have seen it. It is a book of photographs by journalists killed in the wars in Indochina, and the story that I had heard of your involvement came from that book, but we haven't been able to track down a copy of this brochure. But we are going to keep tracking it down. I hope Amy might be able to help us find it.

WC: I don't think I have got one. I may have buried in my papers somewhere, but I don't know.

INT: I want to talk a moment about media bias. There remains controversy, to this day, that the media was biased, that the media was participating in helping to lose the war in Vietnam. What is your comment on that?

WC: Well, I certainly don't think we were participating in any effort to lose the war in Vietnam. If advising the public of what they have sent their young people to do, and expose to them the horrors of a war in which they have committed their young people persuades them that the war is not worth the (candle), then I think we did a journalistic job. But it was not an intention on anybody's part, that I know of, to do that. There was no organized campaign, certainly, on the part of television news, or the press generally, to persuade people one way or the other in the war. We were doing what we have always done, and I am sure that I speak for everybody in journalism, maybe with one or two exceptions, but with everybody of any authority in journalism, that we were trying to do a straightforward job of reporting the war as we saw the war and as we could report it, and there was no bias intended.

INT: It has been alleged by some that, by bringing the war into our living rooms through television, we helped destroy the will of the American people.

WC: I think that is probably true. I think that's probably true and it's the -- that is the contention of most of the military, of the military authorities at the time at any rate, and it likely to be true in any war. It is likely to be true in any circumstance. If the public can see what the war is like, it is very hard to retain an interest in staying there unless you have a motive in that war that is so overpowering that it rules out any further, other

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considerations. That would be the case in World War II. It was not the case in Vietnam.

INT: Could you talk for a moment about the impact of Vietnam on war journalism? For example, how did coverage of the war in Vietnam affect coverage of wars that came thereafter?

WC: Very seriously. The military decided it would never let that happen again, that it would control the press in any future encounter, and it certainly did. The war in Iraq was a serious -- excuse me. Do you want to come in? Let him come in. He may learn something.

INT: Sure. Come on in, Walter.

WC: Come on in, Walter.

INT: ?? answer your question in a minute. Think of a question to ask your grandfather.

WC: Do you want to ask me that question again?

INT: Yes. The impact of the Vietnam War on journalism; how did coverage of the Vietnam War affect coverage of wars that came thereafter?

WC: It seriously affected it for the worse. The military decided it would never again permit that to happen, to let the press run free in a battle situation, and report as it saw it without the censorship of the military itself. And, in pursuing that policy, it committed one of the great crimes against democracy, as far as I am concerned, in the Iraq War, The Persian, The Gulf War. At that time, the military clamped down so completely that, to this day, and never will we have a true, honest, objective picture of our troops in action in world -- in that war. They prevented us from covering it. They did not let our correspondents go with the troops. They did not let our photographers, cameramen go with the troops. The film we were provided was provided by the Army Pictorial Service, for the most part. Very little of it was covered by our people, except behind the lines or after action, not during action. They made the excuse they were protecting the lives of correspondents, ridiculous. Correspondents lives can be forfeited in a war as the troops lives can be forfeited. That's part of our job, and nobody ever refused an assignment. I mean, there is always somebody to accept every assignment, is what I should say, but they -- as a consequence, as I say, we do not have an impartial record of our troops' valiance, our troops' heroism, as well as whatever other (problems) -- any (problems) that might have arisen in the Iraq War.

INT: You have had the honor of meeting some great, working with some great correspondents in the course of your life, one of which we were talking a moment ago, was Homer (Biggert). Could you tell us who Homer (Biggert) was, and give us a sketch of his character?

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WC: Homer (Biggert) was one of the great reporters and great writers of our time, and showed that brilliance in wartime situations beginning with World War II, then Korea, then Vietnam. Homer was, I am happy to say, a very dear friend of mine. We covered a lot of stories together in World War II, particularly the (Air War) together. He was a charming fellow, who had a very terrible stutter, stammer at first. He was a reporter from Philadelphia originally, and then in New York with the New York Herald Tribune, later with the New York Times after the Tribune folded. He -- this stutter of his was just terrible when he first came to New York; but, with his successes, as he went on and won two Pulitzer Prizes, with each one his stutter, his confidence, I guess, overtook him and the stutter, much of it disappeared. In the early days, it was quite terrible because he was a brilliant reporter, and when he had to be in a pool situation where we were all, the press was gathered around a subject and trying to get through the questions, and throwing questions out, Homer would keep trying to get a question, and well, well, well, well; and, by that time, somebody else (asked a) question until finally he would throw his arms up and push people away and say, da-da-da-damn it. J-j-j-just a damn minute, and he would finally get his question in. But he was delightful, but he was now -- Homer was a man who had deep cynicism under control. It was always under control. He went to the source of things and was the source to the bottom of things with very direct questioning until he got the answer he thought was the right answer, not the answer he anticipated perhaps, but what he had developed into believing would be the proper answer; and, with that, then he wrote exceedingly well. We had one occasion, he and I flew from the same base when (8th) Air Force permitted correspondents for the first time to fly over Germany, and it was the second mission over Germany by the (8th) Air Force, and we took quite a beating. We flew from -- in different aircraft but from the same base. And, when we came back, we had to go back into headquarters to write our stories. We weren't permitted to use the telephone lines, which might be intercepted. So we had to go back to base, and on riding back to the base, he said to me, he said, wh-wh-wh- what's your lead? And I said, I think I've got it. I am going to say something like, I think I have just returned from an assignment to hell, a hell at seventeen thousand feet, a hell of bursting (flack) and screaming fighter planes dropping bombs, and Homer said, y-y-y-you wouldn't because he would never write anything as purple as that. His reporting was far -- his writing was far better than that.

INT: Another correspondent, who made his name during the Vietnam War, worked for you at CBS, Morley Safer.

WC: Oh, yes.

INT: And he reported a very controversial story at a hamlet outside of Da Nang called (Cam Nee). Do you recall that story and how you --

WC: Oh, yes, very well, very well. He was with a bunch of Marines who burned a village, burned a very small village, and he -- they lighted the thatched roofed houses with their Zippo lighters, and his cameraman was there with him, and they recorded

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this event, and it looked to be unnecessary destruction, really, very hard to explain, and he found difficulty getting the Marines to explain it well, and he showed the story on the air; and, of course, the military took great offense, felt it was necessary, that this village -- fire had come from the village against the Marines and they were retaliating, but it looked just like simple retaliation rather than elimination of a continuing danger.

INT: What kind of criticism or pressure was brought on you in New York by the military or the government? Did they criticize you?

WC: Oh, sure. They did whenever they had a -- we had a piece that they felt did not show them in the best light. Everybody wants to be shown in the best light on air, of course, and the military isn't any different from anybody else in that, and with a lot more reason for wanting it because they depended upon, of course, the popular support if they were going to get their job done. So, they would pile on us. The Pentagon was on the phone to us frequently.

INT: As I understand it, at first, the military said that this was a training exercise, or that Morley Safer gave the Zippo lighter to the troops.

WC: Oh, I don't remember specifically, but that's not unusual. That's the sort of thing that gets exaggerated as it gets down the line to the final Public Relations officer, who has to make the call to the office in New York, and they don't know the facts themselves. They built upon what -- the little bit they do learn. It's kind of a natural human error to exaggerate their offense (and why).

INT: Another young reporter who made his reputation initially in Vietnam working for you, for CBS, was Jack Lawrence. Could you give us a sketch of Jack Lawrence? What did you know?

WC: Jack Lawrence was either the bravest or the foolhardiest of our reporters; bravest, you have to certainly give him that, and a very, very good reporter. He was brave in the sense that he sought out the units that were in the worst trouble and stayed with them, and he did a series on Charlie Company, which were really at the base, undoubtedly the most graphic reporting we had of any unit. His cameramen followed the wounded soldier right on back, and the battles that took place. They were quite a team. In fact, Lawrence has just got a new book out, coming out, that is quite splendid.

INT: He gave me a copy (in the middle of the ??). Walter, is there any --

WC: (Just let it pick up.)

INT: I don't have any further questions and before I turn it over to young Walter here for a question, is there any area or question which you think is important that I have not touched on?

WC: No. I think you have done quite a good job with it. No, I wouldn't.

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INT: Well, Walter, any questions for your grandfather?

WC: Well, have you enjoyed this exposition?

INT: Any regrets, Walter, in terms of how the war was covered by the news?

WC: Any regrets? No. I don't have any regrets at all. If I have any regrets, I wish it could have been every more thorough than it was. I think it was thorough enough to understand, but you always wish for more. There were many actions that took place that we weren't there for. I would liked to have thought we could have had a camera at every one of those actions. Also, some of it was very difficult to show, the sieges that lasted a long time, when we undertook a lot of pressure and lost a lot of people, including correspondents who were wounded at least, if not killed. There is no way -- there is no way to show the horror or constancy of action over a period of days, or weeks. It's -- as graphic as photography is, war is such a hell that it is almost indescribable and unphotographable.

INT: What about how news was changed as a result of Vietnam ??

WC: I don't think that Vietnam had any major influence on change in the way news is covered in the sense that, if it hadn't been for Vietnam, we still would have developed along the way we have; that is, taking advantage of miniaturization of equipment, particularly, to go to the scene, taking advantage of satellites to go to the scene, staying there and getting reports back live from the areas of action. That would have happened whether Vietnam had influenced it at all. The Vietnam influence maybe speeded up the development by a slight margin, but a very slight margin.

INT: Thank you very much.

WC: Okay. END OF INTERVIEW

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