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Strasbourg, 3 July 2013 CDL-EL(2013)006 Or. Bil. EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION) ELECTORAL LAW French version: Le droit électoral ISBN 978-92-871-6423-0 The opinions expressed in this work are the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the Council of Europe. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be translated, reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic (CD-Rom, Internet, etc.) or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the Public Information and Publications Division, Directorate of Communication (F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex or [email protected]). Cover design: Graphic Design Workshop, Council of Europe Council of Europe Publishing F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex http://book.coe.int ISBN 978-92-871-6424-7 © Council of Europe, May 2008 Printed at the Council of Europe 2 Contents General introduction ............................................................................................. Part 1 – Elections Code of good practice in electoral matters – Guidelines and explanatory report ................ Introduction ................................................................................................................................ Guidelines on elections .............................................................................................................. I. Principles of Europe’s electoral heritage ................................................................... 1. Universal suffrage ................................................................................................. 2. Equal suffrage ....................................................................................................... 3. Free suffrage .......................................................................................................... 4. Secret suffrage ....................................................................................................... 5. Direct suffrage ....................................................................................................... 6. Frequency of elections .......................................................................................... II. Conditions for implementing these principles ........................................................... 1. Respect for fundamental rights ............................................................................. 2. Regulatory levels and stability of electoral law .................................................... 3. Procedural guarantees ........................................................................................... 4. Electoral system .................................................................................................... Explanatory report ..................................................................................................................... I. The underlying principles of Europe’s electoral heritage .......................................... 1. Universal suffrage ................................................................................................. 2. Equal suffrage ....................................................................................................... 3. Free suffrage ......................................................................................................... 4. Secret suffrage ...................................................................................................... 5. Direct suffrage ...................................................................................................... 6. Frequency of elections .......................................................................................... II. Conditions for implementing these principles ........................................................... 1. Respect for fundamental rights ............................................................................. 2. Regulatory levels and stability of electoral law .................................................... 3. Procedural guarantees ........................................................................................... Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... Interpretative Declaration on the Stability of the Electoral Law ........................................... Declaration on Women’s Participation in Elections ................................................................ Study on electoral law and national minorities ........................................................................ Introduction ......................................................................................................................... I. Rules specifically providing for representation of minorities .................................... A. Representation of minorities as such ..................................................................... 3 B. Rules facilitating the representation of minorities ................................................ C. The system ............................................................................................................. II. The influence of electoral systems on the representation of political groups – what kind of general rules? ...................................................................................... III. The effects of electoral systems on the representation of minorities ......................... A. Political parties of national minorities – a factor in the representation of such minorities ...................................................................................................... B. The situation when there are no parties of minorities ........................................... IV. Constituencies and the representation of minorities .................................................. V. Debate on the electoral system and national minorities ............................................. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... Questionnaire on participation of members of minorities in public life ............................. Synopsis of replies to the questionnaire on participation of members of minorities in public life ........................................................................................................ Report on electoral rules and affirmative action for national minorities’ participation in decision-making process in European countries .......................................... Introduction ......................................................................................................................... I. Affirmative action ...................................................................................................... II. Affirmative action and electoral rules ........................................................................ Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... Appendix: Electoral law and national minorities ................................................................. Report on electoral law and electoral administration in Europe – Synthesis study on recurrent challenges and problematic issues ...................................................................... I. Introduction ................................................................................................................ II. General remarks ......................................................................................................... III. The electoral administration structure ........................................................................ IV. The right to vote, and voter registration ..................................................................... V. The right to stand for election, and the registration of election subjects ................... VI. Election campaign ...................................................................................................... VII. The role of the media in election campaigns ............................................................. VIII. Election observation ................................................................................................... IX. Election day – the polling stations ............................................................................. X. Voter identification, and voting procedures ............................................................... XI. Vote count and the announcement of provisional results .......................................... XII. Election appeals and accountability for electoral violations ...................................... XIII. Final results, and the electoral system ....................................................................... XIV. Conclusions ................................................................................................................ Appendix I: Opinions and recommendations of the Venice Commission ........................... Appendix II: Reports and other documents of the Venice Commission ............................. Appendix III: Reports of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe ...............................................................................................................
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