DOCSLIB.ORG

Simone De Beauvoir's Existentialist Ethics: What the Visible Can Teach Us About The

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Simone De Beauvoir's Existentialist Ethics: What the Visible Can Teach Us About The Simone de Beauvoir's Existentialist Ethics: What the Visible Can Teach Us About the Ethical by Christinia Ryan Landry Honours Bachelor of Arts (Philosophy), The University of Western Ontario, 2002 Masters of Arts (Philosophy), Brock University, 2006 DISSERTATION Submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Wilfrid Laurier University 2011 Christinia Landry © 2011 Library and Archives Bibliotheque et 1*1 Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre r&6rence ISBN: 978-0-494-81491-8 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-81491-8 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le loan, distribute and sell theses monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non­ support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in this et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni thesis. Neither the thesis nor la these ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci substantial extracts from it may be ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement printed or otherwise reproduced reproduits sans son autorisation. without the author's permission. In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la Privacy Act some supporting forms protection de la vie privee, quelques may have been removed from this formulaires secondaires ont ete enleves de thesis. cette these. While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis. •+• Canada Abstract This thesis is an investigation into Simone de Beauvoir's existentialist ethics and the problem that woman's situation presents in realizing that ethics. I argue that Beauvoir does not take her existential-phenomenological commitments far enough given the ontological influence of Sartre on her ethics. By failing to truly push her phenomenological thinking her examination of woman's situation risks closing off a brilliant ethics that accounts for the complexity of the human reality. I show that Beauvoir's ethics can speak to contemporary Western woman's situation if Beauvoir takes seriously the implications of her notion of disclosure and brings it to bear on the patriarchal power-terrain of contemporary Western culture. Disclosure creates a bridge by way of appropriating and recognizing the possibilities for reciprocity. Disclosure demonstrates that we cannot simply close down the ethical relationship by reducing the other to a body-object, thus woman's situation as body-object is not final rather it is creatively co-constituted through her interaction with the other. In thinking through the possibilities for inter subjective relationships this thesis unpacks the ontological, ethical, and existential-phenomenological work of Beauvoir and brings her into dialogue with her predecessors and colleagues. In order to push Beauvoir's phenomenological thinking on intersubjectivity beyond her original formulation, I turn to the work of Maurice Merleau- Ponty, who assists me in achieving a viable existentialist ethics by way of the visible. 1 Acknowledgments This dissertation would not have been possible without the patience, passion, and tireless work of Dr. Christine Daigle and Dr. Helen Fielding. Both professors gave me years of their precious time and cultivated within me a passion for philosophy in their capacities as professors at Brock University and The University of Western Ontario and as dissertation advisors. Dr. Daigle encouraged me to workshop my ideas and was generous with her own. She always had time to review my work even in its very rough beginnings and for this I am thankful. Dr. Fielding directed me toward sources and discussed the ideas presented therein which helped to push my own thinking farther. I am most grateful that both thinkers provided me not only with dissertation advising, but more importantly they served as mentors. I would also like to thank Dr. Allison Weir and Dr. Rebekah Johnston for their helpful suggestions. Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Margaret Toye and Dr. Dorothea Olkowski for reviewing my thesis with fresh eyes and encouraging me to take my work in new and exciting directions. It would have been next to impossible to write this dissertation without the financial support of Wilfrid Laurier University and the Ontario Government. In addition, I would like to acknowledge the travel funding I received from the Wilfrid Laurier University Department of Philosophy, the Dean of Arts, the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies, and the Graduate Students' Association. Without these travel monies I would not have been able to engage in the philosophical community to the extent that I did. Finally, I would like to thank my partner David, my family, and my colleagues in Waterloo and across Canada for all their emotional support. Their friendship and encouragement mitigated the isolation of research and writing. 2 Table of Contents Abstract 1 Acknowledgments 2 Introduction 4 Section I: Beauvoir's Ontological Beginnings 28 Chapter 1: Hegel's Ontological Influence 31 Chapter 2: Heidegger's Ontological Influence 55 Chapter 3: Sartre's Ontological Influence 69 Conclusion to Beauvoir's Ontology 89 Section II: Beauvoir's Existentialist Ethics 91 Chapter 1: Beauvoir's Existentialism 94 Chapter 2: Beauvoir's Ethical Beginnings 105 Chapter 3: Beauvoir's Explicit Ethics of Ambiguity 121 Chapter 4: Beauvoir's Situated Existentialist Ethics 133 Conclusion to Beauvoir's Existentialist Ethics 146 Section III: Woman's Situation 148 Chapter 1: Exploring the Biological Situation of Woman 153 Chapter 2: Exploring the Psychological Situation of Woman 169 Chapter 3: Exploring the Comportmentality of Woman 187 Chapter 4: Exploring the Historical Situation of Woman 196 Conclusion to Woman's Situation 212 Section IV: Beauvoir's Existentialist Ethics and the Role of the Visible 215 Chapter 1: Becoming Woman—Becoming Visible 218 Chapter 2: Appearance and the Appeal 235 Chapter 3: Visibility and the Ethical 250 Conclusion to Beauvoir's Existentialist Ethics and the Role of the Visible 268 Conclusion 270 Works Cited 278 3 "What circumstances limit woman's liberty and how can they be overcome?"1 Introduction This thesis is an investigation into Simone de Beauvoir's existentialist ethics and the problem that woman's situation presents in realizing Beauvoir's ethics. I argue that Beauvoir's ethics falls short in thinking through intersubjective relationships, such that her examination of woman's situation risks closing off a brilliant ethics that can account for the complexity of the human reality. However, it is possible to push her existential - phenomenological thinking further by considering the human being's corporeal aspect offered up through the visible. The tension between Beauvoir's existentialist ethics and woman's situation hinges specifically on the role of woman's appearance and the way in which woman learns to appeal to the other. Beauvoir argues that woman often works against her ambiguity and reinforces her body-objectivity through her appeal to the other as a body-object. This bodily habituation presents problems for Beauvoir's existentialist ethics and raises the question of necessity. Although the way in which woman appears to the other may not readily be conceived of as a concept worthy of ethical inquiry, the apparent body is the existential-phenomenological pretext against which a woman's choices and a woman's barriers are foregrounded, iterated, and idealized. In order to locate a bridge between Beauvoir's existentialist ethics and her notion of (woman's) situation, I employ Beauvoir's ethical phenomenological inquiries, as found 1 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, ed. and trans. H.M. Parshley (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), XXXV. 2 The question of woman as essence underlies the discussion of woman's situation. Although I deal with the question of to whom 'woman' refers in this Introduction, it is really in Section III, Chapter 1, that I deal with the question of essentialism given that it is best unpacked in the context of Beauvoir's discussion of biology.' 4 primarily in Pyrrhus and Cineas, The Ethics of Ambiguity, and The Second Sex. These works provide a fertile philosophical ground from which to unpack woman as an embodied ethical being and further, to explore woman's possibilities for engaging in reciprocal ethical relationships. As this thesis will demonstrate, it is through the transcending and yet open activity of disclosure that one may appeal to the other as an ambiguous being and not merely as an immanent body-objectivity.6 Beauvoir's notion of disclosure will figure in taking her thinking beyond the weight of woman's situation as explained in The Second Sex. It will do so because it highlights the vulnerability of being- in-the-world. More specifically, disclosure demonstrates that the other cannot simply close down the ethical relationship by reducing the other to a body-object, given this failure woman's situation is not final, but is rather creatively co-constituted through her interaction with the other. Ironically, Beauvoir explains this in thinking through woman's situation, but her commitment to phenomenology comes up short in her adherence to a Sartrean model of intersubjectivity.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Pride and Sexual Friendship: the Battle of the Sexes in Nietzsche's Post-Democratic World
    PRIDE AND SEXUAL FRIENDSHIP: THE BATTLE OF THE SEXES IN NIETZSCHE’S POST-DEMOCRATIC WORLD Lisa Fleck Uhlir Yancy, B.A., M.A. Dissertation Prepared for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS August 2008 APPROVED: Steven Forde, Major Professor Ken Godwin, Committee Member Richard Ruderman, Committee Member Milan Reban, Committee Member James Meernik, Chair of the Department of Political Science Sandra L. Terrell, Dean of the Robert B. Toulouse School of Graduate Studies Yancy, Lisa Fleck Uhlir, Pride and sexual friendship: The battle of the sexes in Nietzsche’s post-democratic world. Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science), August 2008, 191 pp., bibliography of 227 titles. This dissertation addresses an ignored [partly for its controversial nature] aspect of Nietzschean philosophy: that of the role of modern woman in the creation of a future horizon. Details of the effects of the Enlightenment, Christianity and democracy upon society are discussed, as well as effects on the individual, particularly woman. After this forward look at the changes anticipated by Nietzsche, the traditional roles of woman as the eternal feminine, wife and mother are debated. An argument for the necessity of a continuation of the battle of the sexes, and the struggle among men and women in a context of sexual love and friendship is given. This mutual affirmation must occur through the motivation of pride and not vanity. In conclusion, I argue that one possible avenue for change is a Nietzschean call for a modern revaluation of values by noble woman in conjugation with her warrior scholar to bring about the elevation of mankind.
    [Show full text]
  • WSRC3290 ASCP 2018 Conference Program FA.Indd
    AUSTRALASIAN SOCIETY FOR CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY ANNUAL CONFERENCE 2018 AUSTRALASIAN SOCIETY FOR CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY ANNUAL CONFERENCE 2018 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF COUNTRY THANKS TO Western Sydney University would like to acknowledge the ≥ Professor Peter Hutchings, Dean of the School of Humanities Burramattagal people of the Darug tribe, who are the traditional and Communication Arts custodians of the land on which Western Sydney University at Jacinta Sassine and the student volunteers Parramatta stands. We respectfully acknowledge the Burramattagal ≥ people’s Ancestors and Elders, past and present and acknowledge ≥ Hannah Stark, Timothy Laurie and student volunteers their 60,000 year unceded occupation of these lands. who organized the PG event ≥ Panel organisers: Dr Suzi Adams and Dr Jeremy Smith; Professor WELCOME Thomas M. Besch; Professor Francesco Borghesi; Dr Sean Bowden; Associate Professor Diego Bubbio; Dr Millicent Churcher; Dr Richard The Conference Organising Committee for 2018 extends a warm Colledge; Dr Ingo Farin; Associate Professor Chris Fleming; Dr John welcome to all our international and Australian participants, and all Hadley; Professor Vanessa Lemm; Professor Li Zhi; Associate Professor others associated with the conference. The ASCP conference is this year hosted by Western Sydney University, at our new Parramatta David Macarthur; Associate Professor Sally Macarthur; Dr Jennifer City campus. The event has been planned and developed across Mensch; Professor Nick Mansfield; Dr Talia Morag; Associate Professor this year by members of the Philosophy Research Initiative. Eric S. Nelson; Professor Ping He; Dr Rebecca Hill; Associate Professor Janice Richardson and Dr Jon Rubin; Dr Marilyn Stendera; Dr Omid Tofighian; Professor Miguel Vatter and Dr Nicholas Heron; Dr Allison CONFERENCE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE Weir; Dr Magdalena Zolkos.
    [Show full text]
  • Why Dreyfus' Frame Problem Argument Cannot Justify Anti
    Why Dreyfus’ Frame Problem Argument Cannot Justify Anti- Representational AI Nancy Salay ([email protected]) Department of Philosophy, Watson Hall 309 Queen‘s University, Kingston, ON K7L 3N6 Abstract disembodied cognitive models will not work, and this Hubert Dreyfus has argued recently that the frame problem, conclusion needs to be heard. By disentangling the ideas of discussion of which has fallen out of favour in the AI embodiment and representation, at least with respect to community, is still a deal breaker for the majority of AI Dreyfus‘ frame problem argument, the real locus of the projects, despite the fact that the logical version of it has been general polemic between traditional computational- solved. (Shanahan 1997, Thielscher 1998). Dreyfus thinks representational cognitive science and the more recent that the frame problem will disappear only once we abandon the Cartesian foundations from which it stems and adopt, embodied approaches is revealed. From this, I hope that instead, a thoroughly Heideggerian model of cognition, in productive debate will ensue. particular one that does not appeal to representations. I argue The paper proceeds in the following way: in section I, I that Dreyfus is too hasty in his condemnation of all describe and distinguish the logical version of the frame representational views; the argument he provides licenses problem and the philosophical one that remains unsolved; in only a rejection of disembodied models of cognition. In casting his net too broadly, Dreyfus circumscribes the section II, I rehearse Dreyfus‘ negative argument, what I‘ll cognitive playing field so closely that one is left wondering be calling his frame problem argument; in section III, I how his Heideggerian alternative could ever provide a highlight some key points from Dreyfus‘ positive account of foundation explanatorily robust enough for a theory of a Heideggerian alternative; in section IV, I make my case cognition.
    [Show full text]
  • Kierkegaard on Selfhood and Our Need for Others
    Kierkegaard on Selfhood and Our Need for Others 1. Kierkegaard in a Secular Age Scholars have devoted much attention lately to Kierkegaard’s views on personal identity and, in particular, to his account of selfhood.1 Central to this account is the idea that a self is not something we automatically are. It is rather something we must become. Thus, selfhood is a goal to realize or a project to undertake.2 To put the point another way, while we may already be selves in some sense, we have to work to become real, true, or “authentic” selves.3 The idea that authentic selfhood is a project is not unique to Kierkegaard. It is common fare in modern philosophy. Yet Kierkegaard distances himself from popular ways of thinking about the matter. He denies the view inherited from Rousseau that we can discover our true selves by consulting our innermost feelings, beliefs, and desires. He also rejects the idea developed by the German Romantics that we can invent our true selves in a burst of artistic or poetic creativity. In fact, according to Kierkegaard, becom- ing an authentic self is not something we can do on our own. If we are to succeed at the project, we must look beyond ourselves for assistance. In particular, Kierkegaard thinks, we must rely on God. For God alone can provide us with the content of our real identi- ties.4 A longstanding concern about Kierkegaard arises at this point. His account of au- thentic selfhood, like his accounts of so many concepts, is religious.
    [Show full text]
  • Man As 'Aggregate of Data'
    AI & SOCIETY https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-018-0852-6 OPEN FORUM Man as ‘aggregate of data’ What computers shouldn’t do Sjoukje van der Meulen1 · Max Bruinsma2 Received: 4 October 2017 / Accepted: 10 June 2018 © The Author(s) 2018 Abstract Since the emergence of the innovative field of artificial intelligence (AI) in the 1960s, the late Hubert Dreyfus insisted on the ontological distinction between man and machine, human and artificial intelligence. In the different editions of his clas- sic and influential book What computers can’t do (1972), he posits that an algorithmic machine can never fully simulate the complex functioning of the human mind—not now, nor in the future. Dreyfus’ categorical distinctions between man and machine are still relevant today, but their relation has become more complex in our increasingly data-driven society. We, humans, are continuously immersed within a technological universe, while at the same time ubiquitous computing, in the words of computer scientist Mark Weiser, “forces computers to live out here in the world with people” (De Souza e Silva in Interfaces of hybrid spaces. In: Kavoori AP, Arceneaux N (eds) The cell phone reader. Peter Lang Publishing, New York, 2006, p 20). Dreyfus’ ideas are therefore challenged by thinkers such as Weiser, Kevin Kelly, Bruno Latour, Philip Agre, and Peter Paul Verbeek, who all argue that humans are much more intrinsically linked to machines than the original dichotomy suggests—they have evolved in concert. Through a discussion of the classical concepts of individuum and ‘authenticity’ within Western civilization, this paper argues that within the ever-expanding data-sphere of the twenty-first century, a new concept of man as ‘aggregate of data’ has emerged, which further erodes and undermines the categorical distinction between man and machine.
    [Show full text]
  • Creativity in Nietzsche and Heidegger: the Relation of Art and Artist
    Creativity in Nietzsche and Heidegger: The Relation of Art and Artist Justin Hauver Philosophy and German Mentor: Hans Sluga, Philosophy August 22, 2011 I began my research this summer with a simple goal in mind: I wanted to out- line the ways in which the thoughts of Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger complement one another with respect to art. I had taken a few courses on each philosopher beforehand, so I had some inclination as to how their works might be brought into agreement. However, I almost immediately ran into difficulty. It turns out that Heidegger, who lived and thought two or three generations after Nietzsche, had actually lectured on the topic of Nietzsche's philosophy of art and had placed Nietzsche firmly in a long tradition characterized by its mis- understanding of art and of the work of art. This means that Heidegger himself did not agree with me|he did not see his thoughts on art as complementary with Nietzsche's. Rather, Heidegger saw his work as an improvement over the misguided aesthetic tradition. Fortunately for me, Heidegger was simply mistaken. At least, that's my thesis. Heidegger did not see his affinity with Nietzsche because he was misled by his own misinterpretation. Nevertheless, his thoughts on art balance nicely with those of Nietzsche. To support this claim, I will make three moves today. First, I will set up Heidegger's critique, which is really a challenge to the entire tradition that begins with Plato and runs its course up to Nietzsche. Next, I will turn to Heidegger's views on art to see how he overcomes the tradition and answers his own criticism of aesthetics.
    [Show full text]
  • How Ought We Live?
    How Ought We Live? The Ongoing Deconstruction of Our Values Mark Nielsen This thesis is submitted to the School of History and Philosophy at the University of New South Wales in fulfilment of the requirements of the PhD in Philosophy 2010 ii iii Dedication For Theresa and Charlotte. iv Acknowledgements Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Paul Patton, for his generous support in assisting me in the creation of this thesis. I am particularly grateful for his patience and understanding in relation to the research method I have used. I would also like to thank my co-supervisor, Rosalyn Diprose, for her generous support. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Theresa, for her unwavering support over the years and for reminding me of what is important in life. v Table of Contents Title Page i Thesis/Dissertation Sheet ii Originality Statement, Copyright Statement and Authenticity Statement iii Dedication iv Acknowledgements v Table of Contents vi Introduction: Horizontal Philosophy and the Construction of an Ethical Rhizome 1 Macro-Sociological Plateaus 1. The Salesman as Values Educator: A Lesson From a Primary School Teacher 25 2. Feeling Unhappy and Overweight: Overconsumption and the Escalation of Desire 38 3. The Politics of Greed: Trivial Domestic Democracy 52 Philosophical Plateaus 4. The Democratic Rise of the Problem of ―How Ought We Live?‖ 67 5. Living in the Land of Moriah: The Problem of ―How Ought We Sacrifice?‖ 80 6. Welcome to the Mobile Emergency Room: A Convergence Between Ethics and Triage 101 7. Diagnostic Trans-Evaluation and the Creation of New Priorities 111 8.
    [Show full text]
  • Response to Daniel Dennett on Free Will Skepticism Derk Pereboom(Α)
    RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA ISSN 2039-4667; E-ISSN 2239-2629 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2017.0021 Vol. 8 (2017), n. 3, pp. 259-265 STUDI Response to Daniel Dennett on Free Will Skepticism Derk Pereboom(α) Ricevuto: 17 febbraio 2017; accettato: 24 agosto 2017 █ Abstract What is at stake in the debate between those, such as Sam Harris and me, who contend that we would lack free will on the supposition that we are causally determined agents, and those that defend the claim that we might then retain free will, such as Daniel Dennett? I agree with Dennett that on the suppo- sition of causal determination there would be robust ways in which we could shape, control, and cause our actions. But I deny that on this supposition we would have the control in action required for us to basical- ly deserve to be blamed, praised, punished or rewarded. In this response, I argue that this is the core issue that divides compatibilists and incompatiblists about free will and causal determination, and that the in- compatibilist position is the right one to accept. KEYWORDS: Sam Harris; Daniel Dennett; Free Will Skepticism; Compatibilism; Incompatibilism █ Riassunto Risposta a Daniel Dennett sullo scetticismo circa il libero arbitrio – Qual è la posta in gioco nel dibattito che vede contrapporsi chi – come Sam Harris e me – sostiene che non avremmo libertà di volere sulla scorta dell’ipotesi per cui siamo agenti causalmente determinati e chi, al contrario – come Daniel Den- nett – difende l’idea che possa darsi un libero volere? Concordo con Dennett circa il fatto che, anche nell’ipotesi della determinazione causale, resterebbe lo spazio per sostenere che per vari e importanti aspetti saremmo comunque noi a modellare, controllare e causare le nostre azioni.
    [Show full text]
  • On the Internet, Second Edition
    Copyrighted Material-Taylor & Francis Copyrighted Material-Taylor & Francis On the Internet Second edition Copyrighted Material-Taylor & Francis Thinking In Action Series editors: Simon Critchley, New School University, New York, and Richard Kearney, Uni- versity Gollege Dublin and Boston College Thinking in Action is a major new series that takes philosophy to its public. Each book in the series is written by a major international philosopher or thinker, engages with an important contemporary topic, and is clearly and accessibly written. The series informs and sharpens debate on issues as wide ranging as the Internet, religion, the problem of immigration and refugees, and the way we think about science. Punchy, short and stimulating, Thinking in Action is an indispensable starting point for anyone who wants to think seriously about major issues confront- ing us today. Praise for the series ‘. allows a space for distinguished thinkers to write about their passions.’ The Philosophers’ Magazine ‘. deserve high praise.’ Boyd Tonkin, The Independent (UK) ‘This is clearly an important series. I look forward to reading future volumes.’ Frank Kermode, author of Shakespeare’s Language ‘. both rigorous and accessible.’ Humanist News ‘. the series looks superb.’ Quentin Skinner ‘. an excellent and beautiful series.’ Ben Rogers, author of A.J. Ayer: A Life ‘Routledge’s Thinking in Action series is the theory junkie’s answer to the eminently pocketable Penguin 60s series.’ Mute Magazine (UK) ‘Routledge’s new series, Thinking in Action, brings philosophers to our aid...’ The Evening Standard (UK) ‘...a welcome new series by Routledge.’ Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society (Can) ‘Routledge’s innovative new Thinking in Action series takes the concept of philosophy a step further’ The Bookwatch Copyrighted Material-Taylor & Francis HUBERT L.
    [Show full text]
  • Mood-Consciousness and Architecture
    Mood-Consciousness and Architecture Mood-Consciousness and Architecture: A Phenomenological Investigation of Therme Vals by way of Martin Heidegger’s Interpretation of Mood A Thesis submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Cincinnati In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER of SCIENCE in ARCHITECTURE In the School of Architecture and Interior Design of the College of Design, Architecture, Art, and Planning 2011 by Afsaneh Ardehali Master of Architecture, California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo, CA 1987 Committee Members: John E. Hancock (Chair) Nnamdi Elleh, Ph.D. Mood-Consciousness and Architecture abstract This thesis is an effort to unfold the disclosing power of mood as the basic character of all experiencing as well as theorizing in architecture. Having been confronted with the limiting ways of the scientific approach to understanding used in the traditional theoretical investigations, (according to which architecture is understood as a mere static object of shelter or aesthetic beauty) we turn to Martin Heidegger’s existential analysis of the meaning of Being and his new interpretation of human emotions. Translations of philosophers Eugene Gendlin, Richard Polt, and Hubert Dreyfus elucidate the deep meaning of Heidegger’s investigations and his approach to understanding mood. In contrast to our customary beliefs, which are largely informed by scientific understanding of being and emotions, this new understanding of mood clarifies our experience of architecture by shedding light on the contextualizing character of mood. In this expanded horizon of experiencing architecture, the full potentiality of mood in our experience of architecture becomes apparent in resoluteness of our new Mood-Consciousness of architecture.
    [Show full text]
  • Curriculum Vitae Michael Mckenna Department of Philosophy University of Arizona
    Curriculum Vitae Michael McKenna Department of Philosophy University of Arizona Social Sciences Bldg., Rm 213 work: 520-621-5045 Tucson, AZ 85721-0027 email: [email protected] fax: 520-621-9559 Education Ph.D., University of Virginia, Philosophy, 1993 B.A., Thiel College, Philosophy, Political Science, 1984 Areas of Specialization Research Specializations Free Will & Moral Responsibility Primary Teaching Competence Ethics, Metaphysics, Action Theory, Moral Psychology Employment Professor University of Arizona, Philosophy, Fall 2010 – present Center for Philosophy of Freedom, Arizona, Fall 2010-Spring 2018 Florida State University, Fall 2008 – Spring 2010 Associate Professor Florida State University, Fall 2006 – Spring 2008 Ithaca College: Fall 2001 – Spring 2006 (Chair 01-04) University of Colorado, Boulder (visiting) Spring 2005 Assistant Professor Ithaca College: Fall 1994 - Spring 2001 Bryn Mawr College (visiting): Fall 1999 – Spring 2000 Lecturer California State U., Long Beach, Fall 1993 – Spring 1994 University of Virginia, Fall 1992 – Spring 1993 Courses Taught: Graduate Level Moral Responsibility, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Free Will: Compatibilist Style, Metaphysics and Epistemology: Core Course, Identity and Persistence, Moral Psychology Upper Level Dimensions of Freedom, Free Will, Moral Responsibility, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Moral Theory, Metaethics, Persons & Human Condition Mid-level Applied Ethics, Medical Ethics, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Autonomy & Responsibility, Philosophy in Film, War & Terrorism Lower Level Intro to Philosophy, Intro to Ethics, History of Modern Philosophy, Informal Logic, Existentialism Publications Books Authored 2016 with Derk Pereboom. Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction. New York: Routledge. 2012. Conversation & Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. Books Edited 2015 eds., with Randolph Clarke and Angela Smith. The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays.
    [Show full text]
  • APA Eastern Division 2019 Annual Meeting Program
    The American Philosophical Association EASTERN DIVISION ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM SHERATON NEW YORK TIMES SQUARE NEW YORK, NEW YORK JANUARY 7 – 10, 2019 Visit our table at APA Eastern OFFERING A 20% (PB) / 40% (HC) DISCOUNT WITH FREE SHIPPING TO THE CONTIGUOUS U.S. FOR ORDERS PLACED AT THE CONFERENCE. THE POETRY OF APPROACHING HEGEL’S LOGIC, GEORGES BATAILLE OBLIQUELY Georges Bataille Melville, Molière, Beckett Translated and with an Introduction by Angelica Nuzzo Stuart Kendall THE POLITICS OF PARADIGMS ZHUANGZI AND THE Thomas S. Kuhn, James B. Conant, BECOMING OF NOTHINGNESS and the Cold War “Struggle for David Chai Men’s Minds” George A. Reisch ANOTHER AVAILABLE APRIL 2019 WHITE MAN’S BURDEN Josiah Royce’s Quest for a Philosophy THE REAL METAPHYSICAL CLUB of white Racial Empire The Philosophers, Their Debates, and Tommy J. Curry Selected Writings from 1870 to 1885 Frank X. Ryan, Brian E. Butler, and BOUNDARY LINES James A. Good, editors Philosophy and Postcolonialism Introduction by John R. Shook Emanuela Fornari AVAILABLE MARCH 2019 Translated by Iain Halliday Foreword by Étienne Balibar PRAGMATISM APPLIED William James and the Challenges THE CUDGEL AND THE CARESS of Contemporary Life Reflections on Cruelty and Tenderness Clifford S. Stagoll and David Farrell Krell Michael P. Levine, editors AVAILABLE MARCH 2019 AVAILABLE APRIL 2019 LOVE AND VIOLENCE BUDDHIST FEMINISMS The Vexatious Factors of Civilization AND FEMININITIES Lea Melandri Karma Lekshe Tsomo, editor Translated by Antonio Calcagno www.sunypress.edu II IMPORTANT NOTICES FOR MEETING ATTENDEES SESSION LOCATIONS Please note: this online version of the program does not include session locations.
    [Show full text]