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Response to Critics Adorno and Existence Abstract Peter Gordon’s response to Espen Hammer, Gordon Finlayson, and Iain Macdonald. Volume 2, Issue 1, September 2018 Keywords Response to Critics Theodor W. Adorno; Peter E. Gordon, existentialism, Adorno and Existence; philosophy Adorno and Existence Peter E. Gordon Harvard University [email protected] 71 | Gordon Response FOR any author it is a true gift to receive genuinely Adorno’s criticisms of Husserl and then Heidegger, with special discerning and critical remarks that open up one’s work in attention Adorno’s controversial claim that both philosophers unexpected ways to reveal themes and problems the author remained in some fashion, either overtly or covertly, confined may have never anticipated. I am deeply grateful to Espen to a kind of philosophical idealism. 3) In the third and final Hammer, Iain Macdonald, and Gordon Finlayson for their portion of this paper, I respond to concerns raised chiefly by commentaries on my book, Adorno and Existence. They have Macdonald, though also by Hammer, regarding the status of stated their views with remarkable generosity, though the religion in my interpretation, namely, the question as to challenges they have presented are considerable. My only whether I am “theologizing” Adorno, and whether we should regret is that I could not benefit from this criticism before instead adopt a more materialist perspective on Adorno’s publishing the book (though I should note that Espen Hammer readings, especially though not exclusively his readings of did offer a great many discerning comments on the Kierkegaard and Kafka’s “Odradek.” manuscript, and the book is far better than it might have been thanks to his insights along with those of the other readers Immanent Critique or Meta-Critique? whose names appear in the acknowledgements). But the general truism holds true that no work is ever truly complete. Before I address these concerns, however, it seems Much in the spirit of Adorno, I have never felt that anything I appropriate to note a general theme that has emerged not only write is definitive or without blemish. In my own critical from these three commentaries, but also from several of the encounters with Adorno, I never consider myself more than an recently published reviews.2 In at least some of these reviews, eternal student, so I would prefer to think of this book as critics have observed (in more or less muted tones of merely a stopover on my own endless Erziehungsweg. 1 dissatisfaction) that the book confines itself to mere exposition and that it shies away from the philosophically It seems most fruitful and most interesting for readers more compelling question as to whether Adorno’s criticisms to eschew the method of responding to each and every point were at all justified. Let me respond to this with a general that was raised during the book panel. I will instead offer my own commentary under three broad themes: 1) In the first section below, I respond to methodological concerns (raised 2 Recent reviews of the book include the one by Christian Skirke, in the Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (on-line; posted 23 March, 2017) at chiefly by Finlayson and Hammer) as to whether Adorno’s http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/adorno-and-existence/; Andrew Bowie in The Journal of the readings should count as genuine works of immanent History of Philosophy. Volume 55, Number 3 (July, 2017): 550-551; Richard criticism, or whether they remain too mired in socio-cultural Westerman on the website of the Canadian Society for Continental Philosophy (on- polemic. 2) I will then take up these questions by focusing on line; posted 29 August, 2017) at https://www.c-scp.org/2017/08/29/peter-gordon- adorno-and-existence; and Samuel Freeman in The New York Review of Books in the print edition (23 March, 2017) but also available on-line. I also want to thank the 1 I am grateful to Professor Edward Baring (Drew University) for his panel on my book at New York University that also convened in the spring of 2017 discerning comments on this response. Needless to say all errors here are entirely my with comments by Tamsin Shaw (NYU) and Hent de Vries (Johns Hopkins Center own. for the Humanities). Adorno Studies | 2018 | 2:1 72 | Gordon Response remark on method. In the history of philosophy, there reconstruction that has not already committed itself implicitly remains a considerable difference between merely historical or explicitly to an interpretative stand as to how a reconstruction and critical engagement.3 This is a distinction philosophical text should be construed. Historicists who that has always remained of great interest to me, perhaps believe they can bracket out their own interpretations for the because I trained both in intellectual history and philosophy, sake of a purely “historical” reconstruction typically appeal to and I often find myself crossing the well-policed boundary the notion of a past context or horizon of meaning that between the two disciplines. remains somehow distinct from our own present-day horizon. This begs the question as to how a past context remains Critical theory itself, of course, insists on the dialectical accessible at all, if we could not reach it by means of an relation between social conditions and philosophical appeals to interpretative breach through ostensibly distinctive horizons truth. Properly understood, such a dialectical relation forbids of meaning. Historicism that disavows the independent us to consider either social conditions or philosophical moment of context-transcending critical engagement with all meaning in their full independence. But this non-reductive meaning, both past and present, is merely interpretation in and dialectical understanding often comes into conflict with bad faith. It is entirely understandable if the broadly historical the disciplinary and institutional distinctions that have and narrative strategy that was adopted in Adorno and Existence solidified methodological norms in the modern research may have left some critics feeling dissatisfied. university. Historical narratives as constructed by intellectual historians all too often remain indifferent to questions of All the same, the book is a preliminary overture. If I validity, while philosophical work all too often remains blind to had taken care to address the deeper questions of the historical conditions that subtend philosophical meaning. philosophical validity with all the attention they truly demand, the fruits of my labor would have been remarkably different on More frequently than I would like, I find myself at several counts. Most importantly, it would have belabored loggerheads with intellectual historians who believe that extraordinarily technical matters far exceeding a rather historicist explanatory methods can displace or serve as rudimentary problem that in my view confronts us in the satisfactory substitutes for philosophical criticism. Needless to current literature. If I assigned myself the task of spinning out say, this kind of reductive historicism holds little appeal for me a largely synthetic or reconstructive narrative of Adorno’s in part because it often seems driven by a kind of anti- encounter with existentialism and phenomenology, this is philosophical ressentiment, and, more importantly, (to state chiefly because even the basic contours of this encounter the matter as plainly as possible), it strikes me as conceptually remain neglected and poorly understood. At nearly every step incoherent. There is no such thing as a purely historicist I recognized moments that might have been developed, and specific weaknesses in Adorno’s assessment that might have 3 See, e.g., Philosophy in History: Essays in the Historiography of Philosophy been challenged. But I placed most of these concerns aside, edited by Richard Rorty, Jerome B. Schneewind, Quentin Skinner (Cambridge, not for lack of philosophical interest but chiefly because my 1984). Adorno Studies | 2018 | 2:1 73 | Gordon Response aims were far more modest in scope. I trust that the evaluative exercises in immanent critique this is indeed misleading. Yet I labor will receive further and far more attention in the future. worry that the notion of a Metakritik (which he used for his Still, it seems to me that this facet of Adorno’s legacy has been Husserl book) has the unfortunate effect of confirming the too frequently dismissed without pausing to exercise a received view that these writings belong to the genre of measure of interpretative charity. It could be that my own cultural or sociological polemic. The “meta” disburdens us of charity goes too far, though it should be said that throughout the “immanent” and encourages us to forget Adorno’s typical the book I do take care to acknowledge those moments when I habit of reading the social thematics in and through an feel Adorno has lapsed from philosophical criticism into mere internalist engagement with formal argumentation. The polemic. When it comes to Adorno’s Jargon der Eigentlichkeit, famous methodological statement in Aesthetic Theory tells us for example, I suggest that it indulges far too often in a kind of that in the interpretation of works of art, problems of society “culturalist” reductionism. When Adorno is not charitable, I return as immanent problems of form. What Adorno said of am not charitable back. Although these preliminary comments aesthetic interpretation goes for philosophy as well; in a proper can hardly do justice to the ongoing debate between historicist understanding of his interpretative method, the apparent and critical-rational
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