How Ought We Live?

How Ought We Live? The Ongoing Deconstruction of Our Values Mark Nielsen This thesis is submitted to the School of History and Philosophy at the University of New South Wales in fulfilment of the requirements of the PhD in Philosophy 2010 ii iii Dedication For Theresa and Charlotte. iv Acknowledgements Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Paul Patton, for his generous support in assisting me in the creation of this thesis. I am particularly grateful for his patience and understanding in relation to the research method I have used. I would also like to thank my co-supervisor, Rosalyn Diprose, for her generous support. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Theresa, for her unwavering support over the years and for reminding me of what is important in life. v Table of Contents Title Page i Thesis/Dissertation Sheet ii Originality Statement, Copyright Statement and Authenticity Statement iii Dedication iv Acknowledgements v Table of Contents vi Introduction: Horizontal Philosophy and the Construction of an Ethical Rhizome 1 Macro-Sociological Plateaus 1. The Salesman as Values Educator: A Lesson From a Primary School Teacher 25 2. Feeling Unhappy and Overweight: Overconsumption and the Escalation of Desire 38 3. The Politics of Greed: Trivial Domestic Democracy 52 Philosophical Plateaus 4. The Democratic Rise of the Problem of ―How Ought We Live?‖ 67 5. Living in the Land of Moriah: The Problem of ―How Ought We Sacrifice?‖ 80 6. Welcome to the Mobile Emergency Room: A Convergence Between Ethics and Triage 101 7. Diagnostic Trans-Evaluation and the Creation of New Priorities 111 8. Re-Learning How We Ought to Live 127 9. Freedom in the Middle of an Emergency 137 Deconstructive Plateaus 10. An Ethical Life To-Come 153 11. The Ongoing Deconstruction of Our Values 166 vi Tragic Plateaus 12. Nothing to be Done: Chronic Suffering and Certain Death in the Emergency Room 186 12. Ethix: From the Hospital to the Hospice 199 References 202 vii Introduction: Horizontal Philosophy and the Construction of an Ethical Rhizome In an interview the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), who is well known for his work on difference, comments that ―we don‘t suffer these days from any lack of communication, but rather from all the forces making us say things when we‘ve nothing much to say‖ (Deleuze, 1995, p. 137). Too many unnecessary words are spoken and written all the time. In writing this essay I have tried to write only what I think is necessary and urgent. Life, I believe, is far too short to afford the wasting of time and effort (in some sense, this simple imperative to minimise waste, to make the most of the short time we have, to make valuable differences in our own and others‘ lives, summarises my entire ethical position). Unfortunately, an excess of words has become a normal characteristic of an academic career where the more publications the better, which is why I have always been deeply troubled by the idea of it. What if it is better to say and write nothing, as little as possible, only as much as must be said and written or only that which is truly important? It seems odd, even preposterous, that philosophers and others in the academy should be driven away from the minimisation of waste and have their careers and reputations built upon the amount of units mass produced, as if in a factory. But there is the risk that this work will have suffered the same fate. This work is a meditation on the positive task of improving ―historical‖ outcomes in ethically richer directions through investigating and using philosophical thought and concepts. This does not mean the aim is to teach people how they ought to live in concrete historical terms. In fact, no historical prescription is offered at all, rather, what is offered is a ―concept of ethics.‖ I attempt to solve the central philosophical problem of ethics: the abstract or philosophical form of the problem of ―how ought we live?‖ Our project, then, is entirely problem-centred. It is not built 1 around a proper name or tradition of thought. The problem of ―how ought we live?‖ is as old as philosophy itself and because it is an ancient problem it immediately cuts across the various philosophical traditions that have developed since the Greeks. It is not a problem that is reducible to one tradition or another and it lends itself to the kind of ―horizontal‖ (or ―rhizomatic‖) philosophical style I have employed. The aim is ultimately practical, both in an individual and collective political sense. This work is based on the view that life is highly variable (or mobile). Life is pure movement and difference. The same goes for the decision to live ethically. One can live either ethically or unethically. Ultimately, an ethical life begins with this fundamental decision and act of freedom. But if one wishes to be ethical, or to be more ethical (or less unethical), then one must have some philosophical sense (or concept) of what ethics is, of what it means to live an ethical life, which should then orient, by way of ―historical negotiation" (or ―effectuation‖), how we ought to live across extremely diverse historical (or ―sociological‖) states of affairs. ―Ethical sense‖ here does not refer to any fixed and identifiable norms or imperatives that would identify the ethical in history, rather the sense we are referring to is purely a ―mobile philosophical concept,‖ which goes beyond the here and now and is never reducible to one state of affairs or another. To this extent, it has a universal quality about it and can only be effective practically by way of negotiation, which is always a singular and unique rendezvous between the concept and actual states of affairs. Philosophical concepts are also variables. There are plausibly a number of philosophical concepts of what it means to live ethically, such as those that belong either to utilitarianism, liberalism or other moral traditions. Moreover, the same concept can be expressed (or described) in different ways, for our example, our concept is expressed from the angle of freedom, from the angle of sacrifice, etc. My interest is not to provide a comprehensive survey of the 2 various concepts suggested by others of what it means to live an ethical life (not that I do not draw upon and use the work of others), rather, this essay is an attempt to outline one concept of the ethical. It is by freshly raising the philosophical question (or problem) of ―how ought we live?‖ that the possibility of new (or renovated) ethical sense might arise for us in the form of an answer (or solution). Very few contemporary philosophers raise the question of ―how ought we live?‖ (or a similar question) in the pure, raw and animating sense that it is raised in this essay. Even fewer philosophers provide a sustained and detailed philosophical answer, which amounts to a concept of ethics. The British philosopher Simon Critchley (1960-) is a notable exception. In his (2007) book, Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance, Critchley raises what he understands as ―the fundamental question of ethics.‖ This question is to some extent similar to our question and, as with this project, Critchley attempts to construct a ―conception of ethics.‖1 1 According to Critchley, What is lacking at the present time of massive political disappointment is a motivating, empowering conception of ethics that can face and face down the drift of the present, an ethics that is able to respond to and resist the political situation in which we find ourselves. (Critchley, 2007, p. 8) For Critchley, like myself, it is clear that the current concepts of ethics are in some sense insufficient. This gives rise to the need for the creation of a new (or renovated) concept of ethics, which would serve to guide political action. He appears to connect the task of raising questions (or problems) with the creation of new concepts, which I understand to be the Deleuzian approach to doing philosophy. Critchley claims that ―if we are going to stand a chance of constructing an ethics that empowers subjects to political action, a motivating ethics, we require some sort of answer to what I see as 3 I describe this work as a rhizome because it branches out in so many diverse directions, analogous to the Internet, which is also a rhizome.2 The movements across the rhizome do not follow any pre-determined pattern or algorithm and often take ethics down non-traditional avenues. One is always fleeing in a rhizome, forging new paths. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that ―the line of flight is part of the rhizome‖ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 9). To take flight is to engage with ―the other‖ and make a new connection. The difference, the engagement with the other, taking flight, is precisely the process of thinking and learning. Arguably, one is not yet thinking and learning until they take flight from what they already know. Thinking, then, as ―thinking with the other.‖ What is learning if it is not to flight from what one already knows? One takes flight not in order to forget what one knows, or forget what one has learnt, but in order to add to it. One learns when they begin to encounter the other, the unknown. The problem of ―how ought we live?‖ can perhaps never be finally or fully solved, but one can chip away. Our solution centres around the task of ―evaluation,‖ but not just any evaluation. Our solution, or concept of ethics, is ―diagnostic trans- evaluation‖ (or the ―creation of new values‖) and the ―creation of new priorities.‖ I also the basic question of morality‖ (Critchley, 2007, p.

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