APA Eastern Division 2019 Annual Meeting Program
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1 on Reasonable Hope Dana Howard Prepared for the Political Theory
On Reasonable Hope Dana Howard Prepared for the Political Theory Workshop Ohio State University Abstract: John Rawls has argued that one of the aims of a theory of justice is to offer us reasonable hope for a just future. But what makes hope reasonable? And is it misguided to think that reasonable hope is a proper aim of political philosophy? In this paper, I trace the development of Rawls’s conception of reasonable hope by looking more closely at his treatment of Immanuel Kant’s conceptions of Reasonable Faith and of philosophy as Apologia. The idea of reasonable hope goes beyond the weaker kind of “reconciliation” put forward by Rousseau’s account of a conjectural history. It is one thing to believe, with Rousseau, that our deep natures are not incompatible with the possibility of a just society. It is something further to harbor any hope for this in the future. I argue that this temporal aspect, which is built into what Kant and Rawls mean by reasonable hope, is a useful approach to the practice of political philosophy. An approach that takes the need for reasonable hope seriously is one that moves political theorizing from a more passive framework of theoretical imagination toward a more active one that entails political anticipation. 1 John Rawls asserts that political philosophy ought to be realistically utopian; that is, it ought to extend what we ordinarily take to be “the limits of practical political possibility.”1 On his view, a realistic utopia makes us aware of certain available political and social alternatives that we may have previously thought impossible given our non-ideal circumstances. -
Thesis 2.0., Hokkanen
Distorted imaginaries in a world of crisis - A world-ecological analysis of the imaginaries at the root of United Nations’ climate responses Saana Hokkanen University of Helsinki Global Development Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences Master’s thesis November, 2020 Tiedekunta – Fakultet – Faculty Koulutusohjelma – Utbildingsprogram – Degree Programme Faculty of Social Sciences Master’s Programme in Society and Change Tekijä – Författare – Author Saana Maarit Hokkanen Työn nimi – Arbetets titel – Title Distorted imaginaries in a world of crisis – a world-ecological analysis of the imaginaries at the root of United Nations climate responses Oppiaine/Opintosuunta – Läroämne/Studieinriktning – Subject/Study track Global Development Studies Työn laji – Arbetets art – Level Aika – Datum – Month and year Sivumäärä – Sidoantal – Number of pages Master’s thesis November, 2020 67 + references Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract The earth and all of its inhabitants are currently on a trajectory of multiple cascading global crises, which threaten the existence of all beings and the complex relations, which enable the functioning of all societies. In addition to posing a physical threat to human and non-human existence, the climate emergency also poses a conceptual and an ontological challenge. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the institutionalized and globalized ontological assumptions (or imaginaries) at the core of the current world-system (/ecology) characterized by capitalism. One of the main arguments in this thesis is that the perpetuation of the core imaginaries (namely those of Society and Nature’s dualism, mechanistic image of the world and hierarchical existence) at the root of current global structures, as well as the international climate responses, has led to inadequate and misinformed responses to the emergency. -
The Onlife Manifesto Luciano Floridi Editor
The Onlife Manifesto Luciano Floridi Editor The Onlife Manifesto Being Human in a Hyperconnected Era Editor Luciano Floridi Oxford Internet Institute University of Oxford Oxford, Oxfordshire United Kingdom Image made from models used to track debris in Earth orbit. Of the approximately 19,000 man-made objects larger than 10 centimetres in Earth orbit as of July 2009, most orbit close to the Earth. Source: NASA Earth Observatory / Orbital Debris Program Office: http://commons. wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Space_Debris_Low_Earth_Orbit.png original publication date 12 September 2009. ISBN 978-3-319-04092-9 ISBN 978-3-319-04093-6 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-04093-6 Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London Library of Congress Control Number: 2014948552 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and the Author(s) 2015. The book is published with open access at SpringerLink.com Open Access This book is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom- mercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. This work is subject to copyright. All commercial rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publica- tion does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. -
4Th MINDING ANIMALS CONFERENCE CIUDAD DE
th 4 MINDING ANIMALS CONFERENCE CIUDAD DE MÉXICO, 17 TO 24 JANUARY, 2018 SOCIAL PROGRAMME: ROYAL PEDREGAL HOTEL ACADEMIC PROGRAMME: NATIONAL AUTONOMOUS UNIVERSITY OF MEXICO Auditorio Alfonso Caso and Anexos de la Facultad de Derecho FINAL PROGRAMME (Online version linked to abstracts. Download PDF here) 1/47 All delegates please note: 1. Presentation slots may have needed to be moved by the organisers, and may appear in a different place from that of the final printed programme. Please consult the schedule located in the Conference Programme upon arrival at the Conference for your presentation time. 2. Please note that presenters have to ensure the following times for presentation to allow for adequate time for questions from the floor and smooth transition of sessions. Delegates must not stray from their allocated 20 minutes. Further, delegates are welcome to move within sessions, therefore presenters MUST limit their talk to the allocated time. Therefore, Q&A will be AFTER each talk, and NOT at the end of the three presentations. Plenary and Invited Talks – 45 min. presentation and 15 min. discussion (Q&A). 3. For panels, each panellist must stick strictly to a 10 minute time frame, before discussion with the floor commences. 4. Note that co-authors may be presenting at the conference in place of, or with the main author. For all co-authors, delegates are advised to consult the Conference Abstracts link on the Minding Animals website. Use of the term et al is provided where there is more than two authors of an abstract. 5. Moderator notes will be available at all front desks in tutorial rooms, along with Time Sheets (5, 3 and 1 minute Left). -
Response to Daniel Dennett on Free Will Skepticism Derk Pereboom(Α)
RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA ISSN 2039-4667; E-ISSN 2239-2629 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2017.0021 Vol. 8 (2017), n. 3, pp. 259-265 STUDI Response to Daniel Dennett on Free Will Skepticism Derk Pereboom(α) Ricevuto: 17 febbraio 2017; accettato: 24 agosto 2017 █ Abstract What is at stake in the debate between those, such as Sam Harris and me, who contend that we would lack free will on the supposition that we are causally determined agents, and those that defend the claim that we might then retain free will, such as Daniel Dennett? I agree with Dennett that on the suppo- sition of causal determination there would be robust ways in which we could shape, control, and cause our actions. But I deny that on this supposition we would have the control in action required for us to basical- ly deserve to be blamed, praised, punished or rewarded. In this response, I argue that this is the core issue that divides compatibilists and incompatiblists about free will and causal determination, and that the in- compatibilist position is the right one to accept. KEYWORDS: Sam Harris; Daniel Dennett; Free Will Skepticism; Compatibilism; Incompatibilism █ Riassunto Risposta a Daniel Dennett sullo scetticismo circa il libero arbitrio – Qual è la posta in gioco nel dibattito che vede contrapporsi chi – come Sam Harris e me – sostiene che non avremmo libertà di volere sulla scorta dell’ipotesi per cui siamo agenti causalmente determinati e chi, al contrario – come Daniel Den- nett – difende l’idea che possa darsi un libero volere? Concordo con Dennett circa il fatto che, anche nell’ipotesi della determinazione causale, resterebbe lo spazio per sostenere che per vari e importanti aspetti saremmo comunque noi a modellare, controllare e causare le nostre azioni. -
Ecological Reconstruction: Pragmatism and the More-Than-Human Community
A Thesis entitled Ecological Reconstruction: Pragmatism and the More-Than-Human Community by Matthew S. Bower Submitted to the Graduate Faculty as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree in Philosophy ________________________________________ Dr. James Campbell, Committee Chair ________________________________________ Dr. Ashley Pryor, Committee Member ________________________________________ Dr. Ammon Allred, Committee Member ________________________________________ Dr. Patricia Komuniecki, Dean College of Graduate Studies The University of Toledo May 2010 An Abstract of Ecological Reconstruction: Pragmatism and the More-Than-Human Community by Matthew S. Bower As partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree in Philosophy The University of Toledo May 2010 Ecological reconstruction challenges the historical chasm between culture and nature by using the normative implications of ecology to assert a primacy of relations in experience. Drawing upon the framework of John Dewey and classical American Pragmatism, I sketch out an experimental method for thinking about environmental philosophy that follows this reconstruction, moving beyond both applied ethics and dogmatic values. Central to this move is the possibility of opening up ecotonal spaces, literal and theoretical cites of intensified interaction between cultural and natural systems. These spaces furnish reconstruction with the experiences necessary to generate new concepts that set human communities on the course towards greater ecological attentiveness. iii Acknowledgements I would like to thank my committee for their wisdom and guidance, my family for all of their support, and everyone who has ever joined me for a walk in the woods. I am grateful to have been introduced at such a young age to the necessity of the wild. -
The Religious Naturalism of William James: a New Interpretation Through the Lens of Liberal Naturalism
Kent Academic Repository Full text document (pdf) Citation for published version Bunzl, Jacob Herbert (2019) The Religious Naturalism of William James: A New Interpretation Through the Lens of Liberal Naturalism. Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) thesis, University of Kent,. DOI Link to record in KAR https://kar.kent.ac.uk/81750/ Document Version UNSPECIFIED Copyright & reuse Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. Versions of research The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the published version of record. Enquiries For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: [email protected] If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html 1 The Religious Naturalism of William James A New Interpretation Through the Lens of ‘Liberal Naturalism’ Jacob Herbert Bunzl Abstract: This thesis argues that recent developments in philosophical naturalism mandate a new naturalistic reading of James. To that end, it presents the first comprehensive reading of James through the lens of liberal rather than scientific naturalism. Chapter 1 offers an extensive survey of the varieties of philosophical naturalism that provides the conceptual tools required for the rest the thesis, and allows us to provisionally locate James within the field. -
Tiina Rosenberg
Don ’t be Quiet TIINA ROSENBERG , Don’ ,t be Quiet ESSAYS ON FEMINISM AND PERFORMANCE Don’t Be Quiet, Start a Riot! Essays on Feminism and Performance Tiina Rosenberg Published by Stockholm University Press Stockholm University SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden www.stockholmuniversitypress.se Text © Tiina Rosenberg 2016 License CC-BY ORCID: Tiina Rosenberg: 0000-0002-7012-2543 Supporting Agency (funding): The Swedish Research Council First published 2016 Cover Illustration: Le nozze di Figaro (W.A. Mozart). Johanna Rudström (Cherubino) and Susanna Stern (Countess Almaviva), Royal Opera, Stockholm, 2015. Photographer: Mats Bäcker. Cover designed by Karl Edqvist, SUP Stockholm Studies in Culture and Aesthetics (Online) ISSN: 2002-3227 ISBN (Paperback): 978-91-7635-023-2 ISBN (PDF): 978-91-7635-020-1 ISBN (EPUB): 978-91-7635-021-8 ISBN (Kindle): 978-91-7635-022-5 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.16993/baf This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 444 Castro Street, Suite 900, Mountain View, California, 94041, USA. This license allows for copying any part of the work for personal and commercial use, providing author attribution is clearly stated. Suggested citation: Rosenberg, Tiina 2016 Don’t Be Quiet, Start a Riot! Essays on Feminism and Performance. Stockholm: Stockholm University Press. DOI: http://dx.doi. org/10.16993/baf. License CC-BY 4.0 To read the free, open access version of this book online, visit http://dx.doi.org/10.16993/baf or scan this QR code with your mobile device. -
Ethics and Animals Fall 2020
Ethics and Animals Fall 2020 Description This course examines the morality of our treatment of nonhuman animals. We start with a survey of moral theory. Do animals have moral status? Do we have a right to harm or kill some animals in order to benefit or save others? We consider these questions from a variety of moral perspectives, including consequentialism, Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, and feminist ethics. We then apply these ideas to different kinds of animal use. For example, what is the morality of our treatment of animals in food, research, captivity, and the wild? Finally, we will explore ethical questions that arise for animal activists, including about what ends they should pursue, what means they should take towards those ends, and how they should relate to other social movements. General Information Time: T 5:00{7:30 ET Place: online Instructor: Name: Jeff Sebo Email: jeff[email protected] Office: online Office Hours: M 3-5pm ET 1 Readings The required books for this class are: Julia Driver, Ethics: The Fundamentals; Lori Gruen, Ethics and Animals; and Gary Francione & Robert Garner, The Animal Rights Debate. These books are available online, and the Gruen and Francione & Garner books are also available for free at the NYU library website. All readings not from the required books will be posted on the course website. Grading Your grades will be determined as follows: • Papers (75%): You will write three papers explaining and evaluating the ideas and arguments discussed in class. You will email this paper to [email protected]. For each paper, you can either create your own prompt (provided that you clear it with us in advance) or select from prompts that we create. -
Compassion and Sympathy As Moral Motivation Moral Philosophy Has Long Taken an Interest in the Emotions
Compassion and Sympathy as Moral Motivation Moral philosophy has long taken an interest in the emotions. Ever since Plato’s defense of the primacy of reason as a source of motiva- tion, moral philosophers have debated the proper role of emotion in the character of a good person and in the choice of individual actions. There are striking contrasts that can be drawn among the main tradi- tions in moral philosophy as to the role they assign to the emotions, and to the particular emotions that they evaluate positively and nega- tively. Here are some examples. Utilitarianism is often presented as a the- ory which simply articulates an ideal of sympathy, where the morally right action is the one that would be favored by someone who is equally sympathetic to the pleasure and pains of all sentient beings. And, on another level, utilitarianism tends to evaluate highly actions motivated by sympathy and compassion, and to evaluate negatively actions motivated by malice and spite. Kantianism (or deontology, as it is often called) has a completely different structure and, conse- quently, a different attitude towards the emotions. It conceives of morality as the self-imposed laws of rational agents, and no emotion is thought to be involved in the generation of these laws. It is true that Kant himself does find a special role for the emotion—if that is the right word—of respect for rational agents and for the laws they impose on themselves. But Kant seems to regard respect as a sort of effect within us of our own inscrutable moral freedom, and not as the source of moral legislation. -
For What Can the Kantian Feminist Hope? Constructive Complicity in Appropriations of the Canon Dilek Huseyinzadegan Emory University, [email protected]
Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Volume 4 | Issue 1 Article 3 2018 For What Can the Kantian Feminist Hope? Constructive Complicity in Appropriations of the Canon Dilek Huseyinzadegan Emory University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, European History Commons, Feminist Philosophy Commons, History of Philosophy Commons, Other Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Commons, Race, Ethnicity and Post-Colonial Studies Commons, and the Women's Studies Commons Recommended Citation Huseyinzadegan, Dilek. 2018. "For What Can the Kantian Feminist Hope? Constructive Complicity in Appropriations of the Canon." Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 4, (1). Article 3. https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Feminist Philosophy Quarterly by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Huseyinzadegan: For What Can the Kantian Feminist Hope? For What Can the Kantian Feminist Hope? Constructive Complicity in Appropriations of the Canon Dilek Huseyinzadegan Abstract As feminist scholars, we hope that our own work is exempt from structural problems such as racism, sexism, and Eurocentrism, that is, the kind of problems that are exemplified and enacted by Kant’s works. In other words, we hope that we do not re-enact, implicitly or explicitly, Kant’s problematic claims, which range from the unnaturalness of a female philosopher, “who might as well have a beard,” the stupid things that a black carpenter said “because he was black from head to foot,” the poor women “living in the greatest slavery in the Orient,” to the “sheep-like existence of the inhabitants of Tahiti.” In this piece, I argue that we cannot simply hope to avoid these problems unless we are vigilant about incorporating the full picture of Kant’s and Kantian philosophy into our feminist appropriations. -
Eric W. Hagedorn Curriculum Vitae
Eric W. Hagedorn Curriculum Vitae Areas of Specialization: Medieval Philosophy Areas of Competence: Metaphysics; Early Modern Philosophy; Philosophy of Religion; Philosophy of Mind; Logic Employment St. Norbert College Associate Professor Philosophy (August 2018-Present) Assistant Professor of Philosophy (January 2014 – August 2018) Teaching Fellow of Philosophy (August 2012 – December 2013) Education University of Notre Dame Ph.D. in Philosophy (January 2013) M.A. in Philosophy (January 2008) Iowa State University B.S. with Honors in Computer Science and Philosophy (May 2004) Journal Articles and Book Chapters “Thomas Aquinas through the 1350s,” in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Ethics, ed. Thomas Williams (forthcoming). “Ockham’s Scientia Argument for Mental Language,” Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 3 (2015): 145-168. "Is Anyone Else Thinking My Thoughts?: Aquinas's Response to the Too-Many Thinkers Problem," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 84 (2010): 275-86. Book Reviews Review of John Duns Scotus, On Being and Cognition: Ordinatio I.3, John van den Bercken (tr.) in International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion (forthcoming). Review of Claude Panaccio, Mental Language: From Plato to William of Ockham in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (August 2017). Review of Jari Kaukua and Tomas Ekenberg (eds.), Subjectivity and Selfhood in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (September 2016). Review of Sander W. de Boer, The Science of the Soul: The Commentary