Curriculum Vitae Michael McKenna Department of Philosophy University of Arizona

Social Sciences Bldg., Rm 213 work: 520-621-5045 Tucson, AZ 85721-0027 email: [email protected] fax: 520-621-9559

Education

Ph.D., University of Virginia, Philosophy, 1993 B.A., Thiel College, Philosophy, Political Science, 1984

Areas of Specialization

Research Specializations Free Will & Moral Responsibility Primary Teaching Competence Ethics, Metaphysics, Action Theory, Moral Psychology

Employment

Professor University of Arizona, Philosophy, Fall 2010 – present Center for Philosophy of Freedom, Arizona, Fall 2010-Spring 2018 Florida State University, Fall 2008 – Spring 2010 Associate Professor Florida State University, Fall 2006 – Spring 2008 Ithaca College: Fall 2001 – Spring 2006 (Chair 01-04) University of Colorado, Boulder (visiting) Spring 2005 Assistant Professor Ithaca College: Fall 1994 - Spring 2001 Bryn Mawr College (visiting): Fall 1999 – Spring 2000 Lecturer California State U., Long Beach, Fall 1993 – Spring 1994 University of Virginia, Fall 1992 – Spring 1993

Courses Taught:

Graduate Level Moral Responsibility, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Free Will: Compatibilist Style, Metaphysics and Epistemology: Core Course, Identity and Persistence, Moral Psychology Upper Level Dimensions of Freedom, Free Will, Moral Responsibility, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Moral Theory, Metaethics, Persons & Human Condition Mid-level Applied Ethics, Medical Ethics, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Autonomy & Responsibility, Philosophy in Film, War & Terrorism Lower Level Intro to Philosophy, Intro to Ethics, History of Modern Philosophy, Informal Logic, Existentialism Publications

Books Authored

2016 with Derk Pereboom. Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction. New York: Routledge. 2012. Conversation & Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.

Books Edited

2015 eds., with Randolph Clarke and Angela Smith. The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. 2008 eds., with Paul Russell. Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P.F. Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Press. 2003 eds., with David Widerker. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Press.

Articles

2019 (forthcoming). “Reasons-Responsiveness, Frankfurt Examples, and the Free Will Ability.” In D. Nelkin and D. Pereboom, eds., Oxford Handbook on Moral Responsibility. 2018 (forthcoming). “A Critical Assessment of Pereboom’s Frankfurt-Style Example.” Philosophical Studies. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-017-0997-z. 2018. “Power, Social Inequities, and the Conversational Theory of Moral Responsibility.” In K. Hutchison, C. Mackenzie, and M. Oshana, eds., Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press: 38-58. 2018 (forthcoming). “Resisting Todd’s Moral-Standing Zygote Argument.” Philosophical Quarterly. 2018. “Shoemaker’s Responsibility Pluralism: Reflections on Responsibility from the Margins.” Philosophical Studies 175(4): 981-8. 2018 (forthcoming). “The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert.” Journal of Ethics. 2018 (forthcoming). “Watsonian Compatibilism.” In Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Justin Coates and Neal Tognazzini, eds. Vol. 5. 2017 with Brandon Warmke. “Does Situationism Threaten Free Will and Moral Responsibility?” Journal of Moral Philosophy: 1-36. 2017. “Reasons-Responsive Theories of Freedom.” Routledge Handbook on Free Will. Routledge Press: 27-40. 2017. “Theories of Moral Responsibility and the Responsibility Barter Game.” In Z. Goldberg, ed., Of Morals and Merels: Essays Inspired by the Work of Peter A. French. Springer: 71-84. 2016. “A Modest Historical Theory of Moral Responsibility.” Journal of Ethics. 20: 83-105. 2016. “Manipulation Arguments, Basic Desert, and Moral Responsibility: Assessing Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.” Criminal Law and Philosophy. 2016. “Quality of Will, Private Blame and Conversation: Reply to Driver, Shoemaker, and Vargas.” Criminal Law and Philosophy. 2015. “In Defense of a Challenge to Moral Responsibility Skepticism: A Reply to Levy.” In A. Buckareff, C. Moya, and S. Rosell, Agency, Freedom, and Responsibility. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 204-6.

McKenna, p.2 2015 with Chad Van Schoelandt. “Crossing a Mesh Theory with a Reasons-Responsive Theory.” In A. Buckareff, C. Moya, and S. Rosell, Agency, Freedom, and Responsibility. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 44-64. 2015 with Benjamin Kozuch, “Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mental Illness.” In D. Moseley and G. Gala, eds., Philosophy and Psychiatry. New York: Routledge Press: 89-113. 2014. “Compatibilist Ultimacy: Resisting the Threat of Kane’s U Condition.” In D. Palmer, ed. Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates. NY: Oxford University Press: 71-87. 2014. “Defending Conversation and Responsibility: Reply to Dana Nelkin and Holly Smith.” Philosophical Studies. 171: 73-84. 2014. “Resisting the Manipulation Argument: A Hard-liner Takes it on the Chin.”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: 89: 467-84. 2014. “The Metaphysical Importance of the Compatibility Question: Comments on Mark Ballaguer’s Free Will as an Open Scientific Question.” Philosophical Studies 169, 1: 39-50. 2013. “Directed Blame and Conversation.” In Blame: Its Nature and Norms, eds. Justin Coates and Neal Tognazinni. New York: Oxford University Press: 119-40. 2013 with Brandon Warmke. “Moral Responsibility, Forgiveness, and Conversation.” Free Will and Moral Responsibility, In Ishtiyaque Haji and Justin Caouette, eds. (New Castle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Series): 189-212. 2013. “Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms” In Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, David Shoemaker, ed., Vol. 1 (NY: OUP): 151-84. 2013. “Seven Questions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility.” Methode. Analytic Perspectives http://www.methodejournal.org. vol. II, no. 3: 98-111. 2013. “Source Compatibilism and that Pesky Ability to Do Otherwise: Comments on Dana Nelkin’s Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility.” Philosophical Studies 162: 105-16. 2012. “Defending Nonhistorical Compatibilism: A Reply to Haji and Cuypers.”Philosophical Issues, vol. 22: 264-80. 2012. “Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism.” Journal of Ethics. 16: 145-74. 2011. “Contemporary Compatibilism: Mesh Theories and Reasons-Responsive Theories.” In R. Kane, ed., 2011, Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press): 175-98. 2011 with Ishtiyaque Haji. “Disenabling Levy’s Frankfurt-style Enabling Cases.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92: 400-14. 2010. “Whose Argumentative Burden, which Incompatibilist Arguments? Getting the Dialectic Right.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88.3: 429-43. 2009. “Understanding Terrorism and the Limits of Just War Theory.” In M. Morgan, ed., The Impact of 9/11 on Religion and Philosophy: The Day that Changed Everything? NY: Palgrave MacMillan: 247-60. 2009. "Compatibilism" (updated from 2004). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/compatibilism. 2009. “Compatibilism and Desert.” Philosophical Studies 144.1: 3-13. 2009. “Moral Monster or Responsible Person? Memento’s Leonard as a Case Study in Defective Agency” in Andrew Kania, ed., Philosophers on Memento. Routledge. 2009. “Naturalism and Free Agency” in J.H. Aguilar & A.A. Buckareff, eds., Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions, Automatic Press/VIP: 165-82. 2008. “A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-case Argument” Philosophy and

McKenna, p.3 Phenomenological Research 77.1: 142-59. 2008. “Frankfurt’s Argument against Alternative Possibilities: Looking Beyond the Examples,” Nous 42: 770-93. 2008. “Putting the Lie on the Control Condition for Moral Responsibility.” Philosophical Studies 139.1: 29-37. 2008. with Neil Levy. “Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility.” Philosophical Compass 3: 96-133. 2008. “Saying Goodbye to the Direct Argument the Right Way.” Philosophical Review 117.3: 349-383. 2008. “The Loss of Innocence and the Things that Remain,” APA Newsletter in Philosophy and Law Vo.7, No.2: 5-9. 2008. “Ultimacy and Sweet Jane,” In D. Cohen and N. Trakakis, eds., Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. (New Castel upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press). 2006 with Ishtiyaque Haji. “Defending Frankfurt’s Argument in Deterministic Contexts: A Reply to Palmer.” Journal of Philosophy 103: 363-72. 2006. “Collective Responsibility and an Agent Meaning Theory.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30: 16-34. 2006. “John Martin Fischer’s Work on Freedom and Responsibility: Introduction.” Guest editor. Special Issue. Journal of Ethics 10: 211-27. 2005. “Reasons Reactivity & Incompatibilist Intuitions.” Philosophical Explorations vol. 8, No.2: 131-43. 2005. “Where Frankfurt and Strawson Meet.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29: 163-80. 2004. "Compatibilism." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/compatibilism. 2004. with Ishtiyaque Haji. “Dialectical Delicacies in the Debate about Freedom and Alternative Possibilities.” Journal of Philosophy 101: 299-314. Reprinted in J.M. Fischer, ed., Critical Concepts in Philosophy: Free Will, UK.: Routledge, forthcoming 2005. 2004. “The Relationship Between Autonomous and Morally Responsible Agency.” In J. S. Taylor, ed., Personal Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 205-34. 2004. “Responsibility and Globally Manipulated Agents.” Philosophical Topics 32: 169-92. 2003. "A Metaphysics for Krausz." In A. Deciu and G.L. Pandit, eds., Interpretation and Ontology: Studies in the Philosophy of Michael Krausz. Amsterdam: Radopi, 129-46. 2003. “Neo’s Freedom…’Whoa!’” Online publication at http://philosophy.thematrix.com. Reprinted in Christopher Grau, ed., Philosophers Explore the Matrix. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005: 218-38. 2003. “Robustness, Control, and the Demand for Morally Significant Alternatives.” In Widerker and McKenna, eds., 2003: 201-17. Reprinted in J.M. Fischer, ed., Critical Concepts in Philosophy: Free Will, UK.: Routledge, forthcoming 2005. 2003. “What is Terrorism?” Ithaca College Quarterly. Vol. 21, No.4. 27-9. An expanded version also can be found on line at http://www.ithaca.edu/icq/2003v4. 2001. “Source Incompatibilism, Ultimacy, and the Transfer of Non-responsibility.” American Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 38, No. 1: 37-52. 2000. “Assessing Reasons-Responsive Compatibilism: Fischer and Ravizza’s Responsibility and Control.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 8, No.1: 89-114. 2000. “Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Three Recent Views.” Guest editor’s introduction to special issue. Journal of Ethics. Vol. 4, No.4: 309-12.

McKenna, p.4 2000. “Toward a Speaker Meaning Theory of Moral Responsibility.” In Ton van den Beld, ed., Responsibility & Ontology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 247-58. 1998. “Does Strong Compatibilism Survive Frankfurt-Style Counter-Examples?” Philosophical Studies Vol. 91, No.3: 259-64. 1998. “Moral Theory and Modified Compatibilism.” Journal of Philosophical Research Vol. 23: 441-58. 1998. “The Limits of Evil and the Role of Moral Address: A Defense of Strawsonian Compatibilism.” Journal of Ethics Vol. 2, No. 2: 123-42. 1997. “A Reply to McDonald: A Defense of the Presumption in Favor of Requirement Conflict.” Journal of Social Philosophy Vol. 28, No. 1, Spring: 51-7. 1997. “Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counter-Example Strategy.” Journal of Social Philosophy Vol. 28, No. 3, Winter: 71-85. 1997. “John Martin Fischer’s The Metaphysics of Free Will.” Review article. Legal Theory 3: 379-97.

Book Reviews and Critical Notices

2009 with Michael Robinson. “Carlos J. Moya’s Moral Responsibility: The Ways of Skepticism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2008 with Aron Vadakin. “George Sher, In Praise of Blame.” Ethics Vol. 18, No.4: 751-7. 2008 with Joshua Gert. “R. Jay Wallace, Normativity and the Will.” Philosophical Quarterly Vol., 58. No. 232: 559-4. 2002. “Alfred Mele, Autonomous Agents.” Philosophical Review Vol. 111, No. 4: 612-15. 2002. “Hilary Bok, Freedom & Responsibility.” Ethics. Vol. 113, No. 1: 144-5. 2001. “Ishtiyaque Haji,, Moral Appraisability.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 63, No. 3: 711-5. 2001. “John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility & Control.” Journal of Philosophy, XCVIII, No. 2: 93-100. 1999. “David Ray Griffin, Unsnarling the World Knot.” Ethics Vol. 110, No. 1: 242. 1996. “R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.” Philosophical Review 105: 415-18.

Work in Progress

Reasons-Responsiveness and the Sources of Agency: A Compatibilist Theory of Free Will (under contract, OUP) “Deserved Blame and its Value” “Punishment and the Value of Deserved Suffering” “Facing the Luck Problem for Compatibilists”

Editorial Board

Journal of Ethics Philosophical Studies Philosophical Explorations

McKenna, p.5

Editorial Journal Work

2001 to 2008. Journal of Ethics. Book review editor. 2007. Guest editor (with Neil Levy). Special issue devoted to Alfred Mele’s Free Will & Luck, in Philosophical Explorations. 2006. “John Martin Fischer’s Work on Freedom and Responsibility.” Guest editor. Special Issue. Journal of Ethics. Vol. 10 2000. “Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Three Recent Views.” Guest Editor. Special issue. Proceedings of conference sponsored by the Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium. Journal of Ethics. Vol. 4, No.4.

Referee

American Philosophical Quarterly; Australasian Journal of Philosophy; Canadian Journal of Philosophy; Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review; Erkenntnis; Ethics; International Journal of Philosophical Studies; Inquiry; Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly; Journal of Ethics; Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy; Journal of Philosophical Research; Journal of Philosophy; Journal of Social Philosophy; Mind; Nous; Oxford University Press; Pacific Philosophical Quarterly; Philosophical Explorations; Philosophical Review; Philosophical Studies; Philosophical Quarterly; Philosophy of Science

Professional Presentations

“Free Will by Way of Responsiveness to Reasons,” Department of Philosophy, Rice University, Houston, TX, April 20, 2018. “Punishment and the Value of Deserved Suffering,” Keynote for Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Agency Graduate Student Conference, Philosophy Department, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, October 6, 2017. “Punishment and the Value of Deserved Suffering,” Workshop on Responsibility, Conversation, and Communication, Gothenburg University, Philosophy Dept., Gothenburg, Sweden, May 30, 2017. “Punishment and the Value of Deserved Suffering,” Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, April 7, 2017. “Accountability and Pluralism,” Author-Meets-Critics session on David Shoemaker’s Responsibility from the Margins, APA Central Meetings, Kansas City, KS, March 2, 2017. “Punishment and the Value of Deserved Suffering,” Department of Philosophy, University of Portland, Portland, Oregon, 26 January, 2017. “Watsonian Compatibilism,” Gary Watson Conference, Murphy Institute, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA November 4, 2016. “Basic Desert, Blame, and Free Will,” Keynote. Gothenburg Responsibility Conference 2016, Gothenburg University, Philosophy Department, Gothenburg, Sweden, August, 26, 2016. “Resisting Todd’s Defense of Manipulation Arguments,” Manipulation and Moral Responsibility in Ethics and Philosophy of Religion, University of Edinburgh, Philosophy Department, Edinburgh, Scotland, July 16, 2016. “Punishment and the Value of Deserved Suffering,” Justice without Retribution Conference, Cornell University, Philosophy Department, Ithaca, NY, June 4, 2016. “How Free Are We? A Compatibilist View,” Keynote speaker Mid-Hudson Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, Marist College, Poughkeepsie, NY, October, 23, 2015. “Crossing a Mesh and a Reasons-Responsive Theory,” New Orleans Invitational Seminar in Ethics,

McKenna, p.6 Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, March, 6, 2015. “Facing the Luck Problem for Compatibilists.” Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, October 13, 2014. “How Free Are We? A Compatibilist View.” Midwest Philosophy Colloquium, Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, Morris, Morris, MN, September 26, 2014. Commentator, “Is the Problem of Luck the Compatibilists’ Problem Too?” by Seth Shabo, APA Pacific Meetings, San Diego, CA, April 17, 2014. Commentator, “Ecumenical Responsibility,” by David Shoemaker, New Orleans Invitation Seminar in Ethics, Murphy Institute at Tulane University, March 14, 2014. Commentator, “Less than Fully Responsible,” by Manuel Vargas, Society for the Philosophy of Agency, APA Central Group Meeting, February 27, 2014. “Reasons-Responsiveness and the Sources of Agency,” Keynote for Tennessee Value and Agency 2013 Conference, Philosophy Department, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, November 15, 2013. “The Conversational Theory of Moral Responsibility and the Conditions of Agency,” Philosophy Department, University of Texas, El Paso, September 19, 2013. “Defending Conversation and Responsibility: Reply to Nelkin, Sher, and Smith,” Author-Meets-Critics Symposium on Conversation and Responsibility, APA, Pacific Division Meetings, 29 March, 2013. “Basic Desert, Blame, and Free Will,” Conference on Moral Responsibility and Free Will,” Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, Calgary, March 23, 2013. “Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms,” Conference on Alternatives, Belief, and Action, University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain, November 15, 2012. “Resisting the Manipulation Argument: A Hardliner Takes it on the Chin,” Philosophy Department, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA, September 26, 2012. “Defending Conversation & Responsibility,” The Murphy Institute, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, April 27, 2012. “Resisting Nelkin’s Asymmetrical Compatibilist Proposal,” Author-Meets-Critics session at APA Pacific Meetings, Seattle, WA, April 2012. “A Hardliner Takes it on the Chin: Resisting Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument,” Bowling Green Workshop in Applied Ethics, Bowling Green University, Bowling Green, OH, March 2012. “Intuitions Near and Far: The Dubious Status of Manipulation Cases in Arguments for Incompatibilism,” Brown Bag, Freedom Center, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, November 29, 2011. “Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms,” New Orleans Conference on Agency & Responsibility, The Murphy Institute, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, 4 November, 2011. “A Hardliner Takes it on the Chin: Resisting Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument,” California State University, LA, Philosophy Department, Los Angeles, CA, September 22, 2011. “Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms,” University of Texas at Austin, Department of Philosophy, Austin, TX, September 1, 2011. “The Metaphysical Importance of the Compatibility Question,” Author-Meets-Critics session at APA Pacific Division Meetings, San Diego, CA, April 22, 2011 “A Compatibilist Account of Freedom and Responsibility,” Salisbury University, Philosophy Department sponsored public debate with Derk Pereboom, April 15, 2011 “A Hardliner Takes it on the Chin: Resisting Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument,” University of Tennessee, Philosophy Department, March 4, 2011 “Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History” University of Tennessee, Philosophy Department, March 3, 2011 “Freedom, Responsibility, History,” University of Arizona, Philosophy Dept., September 1, 2010 “Holding Morally Responsible & the Moral Emotions,” University of Arizona, Philosophy Dept., April 26, 2010 “Conversation & Responsibility,” University of Florida, Philosophy Dept., December 4, 2009. “Conversation & Responsibility,” University of Arizona, Philosophy Dept., May 1, 2009. “Conversation & Responsibility,” Symposium, APA Pacific Meetings, Vancouver, BC, April 8, 2009.

McKenna, p.7 “Conversation & Responsibility,” Bowling Green State University, Philosophy Dept., February 27, 2009. “Conversation & Responsibility,” Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, Philosophy, Dept., University of Colorado, Boulder, August 10, 2008. “Compatibilism,” Session on Four Views on Free Will APA Pacific Meetings, Pasadena, CA, March 20, 2008. “Agent Meaning and an Expressive Theory of Moral Responsibility,” Philosophy Dept, University of Colorado, Boulder, March 7, 2008. “Ultimacy and Sweet Jane,” Philosophy Dept., Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, PA, October 24, 2007. “Ultimacy and Sweet Jane,” Keynote Address for West Virginia University Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, Morgantown, WV, April 14, 2007. Commentator, “Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and Impossibilism,” by Kadri Vivhelin, APA Pacific Division Meetings, San Francisco, CA April 7, 2007. Commentator, “Control, Responsibility and Moral Assessment,” by Angela Smith, New Perspectives on Free Will and Moral Responsibility, San Francisco Univ., San Francisco, CA, November 20, 2006. Commentator, “Responsibility and Practical Reason,” by George Sher, Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference, Pullman, WA, March 31, 2006. Commentator, “Source Incompatibilism and its Alternatives,” by Kevin Tempe, APA Pacific Division Meetings, Portland, OR, March 23, 2006. “Saying Goodbye to the Direct Argument the Right Way,” Philosophy Department, Florida State University, February 27, 2006. “Collective Responsibility and an Agent Meaning Theory,” Queen’s University, Department of Philosophy, Kingston, Ontario, October 13, 2006. “Frankfurt’s Argument Against Alternative Possibilities: Looking Beyond the Examples,” University of Colorado, Boulder, Department of Philosophy work-in-progress colloquium, Spring 2005. “Understanding Terrorism and the Limits of Just War Theory,” Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, APA Eastern Division Meetings, Boston, MA, December 27, 2004. “Where Strawson and Frankfurt Meet” Free will workshop, Philosophy Departments of University of British Columbia and Simon Frasier University, Vancouver, BC, Canada, November 20, 2004. “Expressive Theories of Responsibility & an Agent Meaning Theory,” Department of Philosophy Colloquium Series, Columbia University, New York, NY, September 30, 2004. Commentator, “The Fairness of Blaming,” by Pamela Heironymi, APA Pacific Division Meetings, Pasadena, CA, March 26, 2004. Commentator, “Free Choice and Moral Character: A Difficulty for Libertarians,” Thomas B. Talbott, APA Central Division Meetings, Cleveland, OH, April 26, 2003. Commentator, “Robust Local Alternatives and Responsibility,” by Robert Allen, APA Pacific Division Meetings (comments presented in absentia), San Francisco, CA, March 28, 2003. “The Relationship Between Autonomous and Morally Responsible Agency,” The Binghamton/ Cornell/ Syracuse Philosophy Triangle Conference on Autonomy, Respect and the Will in Kant and Contemporary Philosophy, Ithaca, NY, February 22, 2003. Commentator, “Frankfurt Style Examples,” by James Cain, APA Eastern Division Meetings, Philadelphia, PA, December 28, 2002. “Defining Terrorism,” 2002-2003 Ithaca College Faculty Colloquium Series, Ithaca, NY, October 24, 2002. “Free Will, Agent Meaning, and the Conditions of Morally Responsible Agency,” Invited Speaker, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, 27th Annual Midwest Philosophy Colloquium at the University of Minnesota, Morris, October 21, 2002. “A Metaphysics for Michael,” Critic, author meets critic session on Michael Krausz’s Limits of Rightness, APA Pacific Meetings, April 2002. Commentator, “Free Will, Chancy and Mysterious,” by Laura Ekstrom, The 2002 Werkmeister Conference on Causation and Free Will, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, January 19, 2002. “A Metaphysics for Michael,” Critic, author meets critic session on Michael Krausz’s Limits of Rightness,

McKenna, p.8 International Development Ethics Association Group Meeting, APA Eastern Meetings, Atlanta, GA, December 29, 2001. Commentator, “Wronging Future Generations,” by Rahul Kumar and David Silver, Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World Group Meeting, APA Eastern Meetings, Atlanta, GA, December 28, 2001. “Robustness, Control & Morally Significant Alternatives: Frankfurt Examples with Oodles and Oodles of Alternatives,” invited paper, Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference, Pullman, WA, April 27, 2001. Commentator, “Defending the Flicker of Freedom Response to Frankfurt-Style Examples,” by Gordon Petit, APA Central Meetings, Minneapolis, MN, March 9, 2001. Commentator, “Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives,” by David Hunt, APA Eastern Meetings, NY, NY, December 29, 2000. “Robustness, Control, and the Demand for Morally Significant Alternatives: Another Defense of Frankfurt’s Argument,” Phil. Dept., San Diego State University, December 8, 2000. “Libertarian Freedom and the Demand for Morally Significant Alternatives,” Phil. Dept., U of Delaware, November 30, 2000. “Recent Work on Compatibilism,” Philosophy Study Group, Ursinus College, April 16, 2000. Commentator, “Fanning the Flickers of Freedom: Defending Alternative Possibilities Once Again,” by Daniel Speak, APA Pacific Meetings, Albuquerque, NM, April 7, 2000. “Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Three Recent Views,” Opening remarks, Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium Conference, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, PA, October 2, 1999. “Self-Expression Theories of Moral Responsibility & an Agent Meaning Theory,” Phil. Dept., U of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, February 4, 1999. “Toward a Speaker Meaning Theory of Moral Responsibility,” Phil. Dept., Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, PA, September 28, 1998. “A Speaker Meaning Theory of Moral Responsibility,” The Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, MA, August 12, 1998. “Toward a Speaker Meaning Theory of Moral Responsibility,” Institute for Research in Phil. of the Universities of Utrecht and Leiden, Responsibility and Ontology Conference, June 6, 1998. “Self-Expression and a Speaker Meaning Theory of Moral Responsibility,” Phil. Dept., U of Virginia, Speaker Series, Charlottesville, VA, April 29, 1998. “A Speaker-Meaning Theory of Moral Responsibility,” Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Estes Park, CO, August 11, 1997. Commentator, “P.F. Strawson’s Other Argument for Compatibilism,” by Russell Daw, APA Central Meetings, Pittsburgh, PA, April 26, 1997. Commentator, “The Humean Is/Ought Problem Resolved,” The Creighton Club, Skaneatles, NY, March 15, 1997. “Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counter-Example Strategy,” APA Eastern Meetings, Atlanta, GA, December 29, 1996. “The Limits of Evil and the Role of Moral Address: A Defense of Strawsonian Compatibilism,” Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Estes Park, CO, August 16, 1996. “The Limits of Evil and the Role of Moral Address: A Defense of Strawsonian Compatibilism,” APA Central Meetings, Chicago, IL, April 27, 1996. “The Limits of Evil and the Role of Moral Address: A Defense of Strawsonian Compatibilism,” The Creighton Club, Skaneatles, NY, March 16, 1996. Commentator, “A Compatibilist Theory of Alternate Possibilities,” by Joseph Campbell, APA Eastern Meetings, Washington, DC, December 28, 1995. “Revising Our Understanding of Responsibility,” Phil. Dept., SUNY, Plattsburgh, Plattsburgh, NY, October 12, 1995. “A Defense of Strawsonian Compatibilism: A Reply to Watson,” Phil Dept., U of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, April 7, 1995.

McKenna, p.9 “Revising Our Understanding of Responsibility,” Phil. Dept., SUNY, Potsdam, Potsdam, NY, March 6, 1995. “Revising Our Understanding of Responsibility,” Phil. Dept., SUNY, Geneseo, Geneseo, NY, October 27, 1994. “Notes on Frankfurt-style Counter-examples,” Phil. Dept., U of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, July 27, 1994. “Moral Theory and Modified Compatibilism,” APA Central Meetings, Kansas City, MO, May 5, 1994. Commentator, “The Presumption in Favor of Requirement Conflicts,” by Julie McDonald, APA Pacific Meetings, Los Angeles, CA, April 1, 1994. “Moral Theory and Modified Compatibilism,” Moral and Political Society of Orange County, Santa Ana, CA, November 20, 1993. “Is Frankfurt Committed to Free Will as a Condition of Moral Responsibility?” Phil. Dept., California State U, Long Beach, Long Beach, CA, November 3, 1993. “Recent Developments in Theories of Moral Responsibility,” The Long Beach Circle, Phil. Dept., California State U, Long Beach, CA, September 19, 1993. “Free Will and Moral Intuition,” Phil. Dept., U of Virginia, Summer Colloquium Series, June 17, 1992. “Compatibilism without Free Will?” Phil. Dept., U of Virginia, Blandy Farm Retreat, 1992. “Rationality and Resentment,” Phil. Dept., U of Virginia, Summer Colloquium Series, 1991. “The Bite in Quine’s Two Dogmas,” Phil. Dept., U of Virginia, Blandy Farms Retreat, 1990. Commentator, “Notes on the Status of Dualism,” by James Cargile, Phil. Dept., U of Virginia, Blandy Farms Retreat, 1989.

McKenna, p.10