Berkeley's Bodies
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Berkeley’s Bodies by Johannes Hugh Hunter A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto © Copyright by Johannes Hugh Hunter 2013 ii Berkeley’s Bodies Johannes Hugh Hunter Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto 2013 Abstract George Berkeley (1685-1753) defends immaterialism, the view that there is no such thing as matter. In place of matter, what exists are only minds and ideas. Berkeley also styles himself a defender of common sense. From early on many of Berkeley’s readers doubted that these two commitments could be reconciled. I consider Berkeley’s joint commitment to immaterialism and common sense in respect of two philosophical theses. (1) Berkeley argues against a version of scepticism that bodies are single collections, constituted by many ideas placed in certain relations, and veridically sensed by finite minds. I identify these collections as Berkeley’s enigmatic archetypes. (2) Berkeley argues that finite minds are able to act causally upon their own bodies by nothing more than an act of will. Both of these theses are defended in the context of immaterialism, and Berkeley persuasively presents them as elements of common sense. I reconstruct Berkeley’s arguments for these theses, and suggest that he succeeds in reconciling immaterialism and common sense in these areas. My account draws on previous research, but I introduce a single mechanism to understand both theses. I call this mechanism overlap. On Berkeley’s view, finite minds represent bodies by constructing representing-collections that are intended to resemble body- iii collections. However, these representing-collections overlap with body-collections, meaning that they share members which are numerically the same. My account of (1) depends on the fact that sensed ideas are in the overlapping area, and therefore represent the body-collection exactly as it is. My account of (2) depends on supposing that the causal powers of finite minds are exercised on ideas in the area of overlap, and thus they act on ideas that are accessible to them but are also constituent parts of bodies. iv Acknowledgments a diis bonos avos, bonos parentes, bonos praeceptores, bonos familiares, necessarios, amicos, omnes fere habui… quod, quum animum ad philosophiam adjecissem, non in sophistam incidi. v Table of Contents Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................ iv Introduction................................................................................................................................... 1 Immaterialism ............................................................................................................................... 3 Works............................................................................................................................................. 7 Chapter One ................................................................................................................................ 10 1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 10 2.1 The Sceptic ...................................................................................................................................... 13 3.1 Berkeley’s Defense of Common Sense .......................................................................................... 19 3.2 Berkeley in the Common Sense Tradition.................................................................................... 23 4.1 Berkeley’s Locke............................................................................................................................. 27 4.2 Berkeley’s Locke and the Primary and Secondary Quality Distinction.................................... 34 4.3 Berkeley’s Critique of Locke......................................................................................................... 39 4.4 The So-Called ‘Master Argument’ ............................................................................................... 42 4.5 Locke Saved..................................................................................................................................... 46 5.1 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 49 Chapter Two................................................................................................................................ 50 1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 50 1.2 Chapter Outline .............................................................................................................................. 51 2.1 How CollectionsF are Formed........................................................................................................ 57 2.2 One Collection Views....................................................................................................................... 60 2.3 Representing the Natural Order ................................................................................................... 63 2.4 A Case for a Second Sort of Collections ....................................................................................... 68 2.5 Textual Evidence for A Second Collection................................................................................... 69 3.1 Berkeley’s use of the word ‘Archetype’........................................................................................ 71 3.2 Archetypes in the Principles........................................................................................................... 75 3.3 Archetypes in the Dialogues........................................................................................................... 77 4.1 Divine Collections in the Principles............................................................................................... 80 4.2 To Blend, to Concrete, to Compose, and to form a Complexion................................................ 84 vi 5.1 How we Make Collections.............................................................................................................. 86 5.2 Epistemic Failure and Success....................................................................................................... 89 5.3 God’s Production of CollectionsD.................................................................................................. 92 5.4 Divine Collections Across Time..................................................................................................... 94 6.1 Some Problems................................................................................................................................ 96 6.2 Two Worries about the Role of God’s Perceptions ..................................................................... 96 6.3 Is my View a Version of Phenomenalism? ................................................................................... 98 6.4 The “Fleetingness” of Ideas ........................................................................................................... 98 6.5 The Heterogeneity Problem........................................................................................................... 99 7.1 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 101 Chapter Three........................................................................................................................... 103 1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 103 2.1 What is Willing? ........................................................................................................................... 107 3.1 The Occasionalist Reading............................................................................................................ 110 4.1 What to Look for in Berkeley’s Account.................................................................................... 116 4.2 Action by an Instrument .............................................................................................................. 118 4.3 Causal Remoteness ....................................................................................................................... 120 4.4 Acting on Bodies: the Textual Evidence..................................................................................... 124 4.5 How Does One Act on a Body?.................................................................................................... 128 4.6 Blind Agency ................................................................................................................................. 131 4.7 The Paralysis Case........................................................................................................................ 132 4.8 Divine Passivity............................................................................................................................. 134 4.9 Locke’s Legacy.............................................................................................................................