The Deliberate Deception of Parliament Summary

The deliberate deception of Parliament

Summary

From late 2001 to March 2003, Tony Blair made three inter-related statements repeatedly to the House of Commons: (1) that no decision had been taken to use military force against Iraq; (2) that military action could be avoided by Iraq’s disarmament of its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; and (3) that regime change was not the goal of government policy.

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, published on 6th July 2016 – the Chilcot report – has demonstrated conclusively and authoritatively that each of these three statements was untrue, and that its falsity was known to Mr Blair. The evidence presented in the Chilcot report shows that Mr Blair was deliberately misleading the House of Commons. According to Erskine May (24th edition, p.254), making a deliberately misleading statement in the House constitutes a grave contempt of Parliament.

Mr Blair backed up his claims about the need for Iraq’s disarmament by asserting (4) that there was conclusive evidence of Iraq’s possession of ‘weapons of mass destruction’, and (5) that these weapons were a threat to the UK’s national security. On both points, these statements contradicted the intelligence assessments that had been put to Mr Blair. He did not address the threats that would arise to the UK in the event of an invasion despite repeated intelligence assessments put to him concerning this matter, and direct questions about these threats. Mr Blair knowingly endangered UK domestic security through his actions, and his statements about threats were in direct contravention of the July 2001 Ministerial Code, which required ministers to “be as open as possible with Parliament”.

Finally, Mr Blair stated in March 2003 that (6) diplomacy had been exhausted in seeking to avoid an invasion of Iraq. This is shown to be untrue by the Chilcot report, and again involved Mr Blair deliberately misleading the House of Commons.

This report summarises the evidence from the Chilcot report and the accompanying documents that statements (1)-(6) made by Mr Blair were either knowingly untrue or involved serious omissions which misled the House of Commons. Statements quoted from Mr Blair are in boxes on the left, while quoted material from and evaluations in the Chilcot report are in boxes on the right.

1. The decision to use military force

In the period from 6th March 2002 to 14 March 2003, Mr Blair faced numerous oral and written questions in the House of Commons about the possibility of the use of force against Iraq. The response given each time was that “no decision has been taken” about action against Iraq. In fact, the Chilcot report reveals that from December 2001, Mr Blair had been proposing an invasion of Iraq to the US administration, had been offering UK military support for that invasion, and – as he became convinced over mid-2002 that the

US would lead an invasion – had given his personal commitment to support US action. It is impossible to view this as anything other than a “decision” to use military force.

Mr Blair began to use this phrase to the Commons from March 2002:

“I totally understand why there is a lot of speculation about action on Iraq, but, as I constantly repeat, no decision has been taken at all in respect of any action. There is a very clear view, which must be right, that Iraq should come back into compliance with UN Security Council resolutions and that it certainly posed a threat on weapons of mass destruction, but no decision-making process has taken place as yet.” - Tony Blair, Prime Minister’s Questions, 18 March 2002

He continued to use it whenever asked a question in the House of Commons about the potential for military action in Iraq:

“I reiterate what I said a moment ago: we have not yet reached the point of decision, and should we do so, of course the House will be properly consulted. People are perfectly entitled to express their views on these issues. But my view remains that weapons of mass destruction are a serious threat, and it is important that we deal with it. How we deal with it is an open question. If decisions are taken, there will be ample opportunity for the House to be consulted.” - Tony Blair, Prime Minister’s Questions, 24 July 2002

In contrast to what Mr Blair was telling the House of Commons, his letter to President Bush in December 2001 proposed both a military strategy against Iraq and a political strategy for winning over international public opinion to it:

“at present international opinion would be reluctant, outside the US/UK, to support immediate military action though, for sure, people want to be rid of Saddam. So we need a strategy for regime change that builds over time. I suggest: (i) Softening up first. We draw attention to Saddam’s breach of UN resolutions; we say regime change is ‘desirable’ […]; (v) We mount covert operations with people and groups with the ability to topple Saddam; (vi) When the rebellion finally occurs we back it militarily.” - Mr Blair’s letter to President Bush, 4 December 2001. Underlining in Blair’s original text

Mr Blair was specifically asked about commitments made to the US, in a question from Elfyn Llwyd: “Has he [the Prime Minister] given the United States any commitment that the United Kingdom would support unilateral action against Iraq?” He responded:

“As I said a moment ago, we are not at the stage of taking decisions about military action. However, it is important to

2 recognise that in the event of the UN's will not being complied with we must be prepared to take that action. We are not at the point of decision yet, but no one should be in any doubt that it is important to express very clearly that should the UN's will not be resolved through weapons inspections and monitoring, it has to be resolved in a different way.” - Tony Blair, to the House of Commons, 24 September 2002

Mr Blair did not answer the question about commitments made to the US, but the record of his communication with the US administration shows him making exactly those commitments to the US Vice-President six months earlier, and again in a note to President Bush two months before facing the question in the Commons. He also gave advice about how to win around public opinion to military action, and proposing a timetable for military action:

“it was highly desirable to get rid of Saddam … the UK would help [the US] as long as there was a clever strategy, and one that worked. This meant building up the case against Saddam carefully and intelligently. … As far as military strategy was concerned, we must ensure that our forces were equipped to finish the job quickly and successfully.” - Mr Blair to US Vice-President Cheney, on 11 March 2002

“I will be with you, whatever. […] Here is what could bring [public] opinion round. (1) The UN. We don’t want to be mucked around by Saddam over this, and the danger is he drags us into negotiation. But we need, as with Afghanistan and the ultimatum to the Taliban, to encapsulate our casus belli in some defining way. This is certainly the simplest. We could, in October as the build-up starts, state that he must let the inspectors back in unconditionally and do so now, ie set a 7-day deadline. [..] he [Saddam] probably would screw it up and not meet the deadline, and if he came forward after the deadline, we would just refuse to deal. (2) The Evidence. [..] If we recapitulate all the WMD evidence; add his attempts to secure nuclear capability; and, as seems possible, add on Al Qaida link, it will be hugely persuasive over here. […] We would support in any way we can. On timing, we could start building up after the break. A strike date could be Jan/Feb next year. But the crucial issue is not when, but how. - Mr Blair’s note to President Bush, 28 July 2002. Underlining in Blair’s original text.

The same approach of denying any decision had been taken was maintained all the way through to March 2003:

“No decision to launch military action against Iraq has been taken.” - Tony Blair, written answer to a Parliamentary question, 11 March 2003

By this point, Mr Blair had already planned out a timetable for the invasion of Iraq with President Bush. The decision to deploy ground troops was taken on 17 January 2003, without discussion in Cabinet or notification to Parliament (The Chilcot Report, Volume 5, section 6.2, pp.413-427). On 24 January 2003, he sent President Bush a note and suggested in the subsequent conversation commencing the invasion in late March:

“Mr Blair argued that ‘we needed to look reasonable’ and that the deadline for the start of military action should be delayed to the end of March.” - The Chilcot Report, Volume 3 (section 3.6), p.118, on the conversation between Bush and Blair on 24 January 2003

When Mr Blair met President Bush on 31 January, the joint commitment for military action was already clear, and the issue for the UK was merely whether they would be able to organise another Security Council Resolution to legitimise a decision that had already been taken:

“When Mr Blair met President Bush on 31 January it was clear that the window of opportunity before the US took military action would be very short. The military campaign could begin ‘around 10 March’. President Bush agreed to support a second resolution to help Mr Blair. Mr Blair confirmed that he was ‘solidly with the President and ready to do whatever it took to disarm Saddam’ Hussein.” - The Chilcot Report, Volume 3 (section 3.6), p.163

While Mr Blair was telling the House of Commons that no decision had been taken to launch military action, he had already committed UK troops to support the US, leaving only discussions of strategy and the timetable to be arranged.

2. Iraq’s disarmament and the need for force

Mr Blair repeatedly told the House of Commons that the reason why military action was a possibility was because of Iraq’s possession of chemical and biological weapons, and its development of nuclear weapons. He assured the Commons that if Iraq were to renounce these weapons, there would be no need for military action. By contrast, the Chilcot report reveals that weapons inspections for Iraq’s disarmament were no more than a public relations strategy, chosen because it was believed the Iraqi leader would trip up in verifying compliance, and thus providing the pretext for military action.

“If at all possible, we should have a peaceful resolution of this issue, but the way to get that is for Saddam Hussein to co-operate fully with the inspectors, who are back in Iraq under UN mandate. … If he co-operates fully with the inspection team, mandated by the UN, there will be a peaceful resolution of this dispute, but, in the end, that decision is for him.” - Tony Blair, to the House of Commons, 20 November 2002

“When there is a clear view among the international community that a country—namely Iraq—must be disarmed of weapons of mass destruction, it is essential for the fight against those weapons and international terrorism that the will of the UN is obeyed. That is why, although we have given Saddam the chance to disarm peacefully, we shall—reluctantly—have to disarm him by force if he refuses to do so.” - Tony Blair, to the House of Commons, 8 January 2003

Well before making these statements to the Commons, Mr Blair had already told the US Vice-President Dick Cheney in March 2002 that the reason for weapons inspections was not disarmament but to win over public opinion to an invasion:

“If action was taken suddenly against Saddam now, the international community would ask what had changed. It was important to take enough time to put Saddam in the wrong place over inspections and compliance with UNSCRs. This would play an important part in convincing international opinion to rally to the idea of regime change.” - Mr Blair to US Vice-President Cheney, on 11 March 2002

That was followed up by the message to President Bush from 28 July 2002, quoted above, which proposed inspections as a way to prompt Saddam Hussein to “screw it up”. The strategy of using inspections as a way to pretext for the use of force was laid out explicitly in Mr Blair’s two conversations with his foreign policy adviser on 10th and 11th September 2002, which were minuted and reported back to him:

“You [Mr Blair] emphasised the need to play Iraq cleverly. We must look reluctant to use force, making it clear that we saw the current situation as a challenge to the credibility of the UN, and to the international community. You were increasingly convinced that, in the end, people would come round to accepting the need to deal with Saddam.” (10 September 2002)

“The inspectors were an indispensable part of the strategy. Saddam would either refuse to let the inspectors back, or he would let them in but almost certainly obstruct their operations. We should then be in a very strong position to insist on action.” (11 September 2002) - Sir David Manning, Tony Blair’s foreign policy adviser, reporting back to Blair on the content of their conversations

Perhaps the most direct statement to this effect was in response to a question from Joyce Quin, asking “will my right hon. Friend reassure me that the timing of the renewed push against Saddam Hussein arises from evidence and knowledge of his activities, and not from a political agenda on the part of President Bush?”:

“In his speech [of September 2002] to the UN—which was, I think, very well received—President Bush corrected a lot of the

5 problems that had existed between the US and the UN. At the time, I had conversations with President Bush in which I said— and he accepted entirely—that, if the UN ended up being able to disarm Saddam voluntarily, that would be an end to the matter, detestable though the regime is. …. I assure my right hon. Friend that when we went back through the UN, we did so in the full knowledge that if Saddam Hussein complied, that had to be an end to the matter.” - Tony Blair, to the House of Commons, 25 February 2003

The Chilcot report (Volume 2, pp.162-68) goes over in considerable detail the content of the conversations with President Bush in September 2002 that Mr Blair was addressing in this parliamentary answer. Bush and Blair discussed military strategy against Iraq, how to secure an international coalition, and how to make a public case against Saddam Hussein. In direct contrast to what Mr Blair said in the Commons, there was no indication that Mr Blair stated or President Bush agreed that voluntary disarmament by Iraq would be “an end to the matter”. In fact, the report quotes the notes by Sir David Manning, who supported Blair in the meetings, which were about how best to remove Saddam Hussein “quickly and cleanly”, without reference to disarmament:

“Mr Blair said that he was in no doubt about the need to deal with Saddam Hussein; and that the likelihood was that this would mean military action at some point. The immediate issue was ‘how to maximise the chance of resolving the Saddam dilemma quickly and cleanly’. It was possible that sustained pressure would lead to his quick collapse, but ‘we could certainly not count on it’. That might ‘in part’ depend on ‘winning the propaganda battle’ and securing wide international support.” - The Chilcot report, Volume 2, p.163, quoting Sir David Manning’s minute to Blair, 8th September 2002

Six days before Mr Blair’s response to this question in the Commons, he had written to President Bush to explain that inspections were the “trick” needed to win public support for the invasion:

“… the trick we need to take is this: we have to find a way of re- focusing the issue on the absence of full co-operation … and do so in a way that pulls public opinion and the UNSC waverers back to us by showing that we have indeed made every effort to avoid war.” - Tony Blair, written comment to Bush, 19 February 2003

He had developed this point in a conversation with Sir Jeremy Greenstock, his the UK ambassador to the UN, the previous month, in which a tactic of provoking the Iraqi government in order to give a pretext for the use of force was explained:

“The Prime Minister set out the following approach: … The extra time should be used to maximise the chance of the inspectors … being seriously obstructed (the inspectors should be encouraged

to inspect sites which we knew the Iraqis would want to block).” - ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s meeting with Jeremy Greenstock’, 23 January 2003

3. Regime change in Iraq

A number of MPs pressed Mr Blair on whether his policy towards Iraq was driven by the desire to see regime change in Iraq. The consistent response of Mr Blair in the Commons was that, while the end of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq would be in his opinion a good thing, the policy was about weapons, and was never about regime change. In direct contrast to these statements, the Chilcot report shows that Mr Blair from December 2001 was setting out a policy of regime change in his communications with the US administration, and even told the leader of another country in June 2002 that the US and UK would be changing the Iraqi regime.

Paul Marsden: “may I ask the Prime Minister a simple question to which yes or no will suffice? Does he support regime change without UN authorisation—yes or no?”

The Prime Minister: “I have made it clear that the purpose of any action should be the disarmament of Iraq. Whether that involves regime change is in a sense a question for Saddam as to whether he is prepared to comply with the UN resolution. …. Regime change in Iraq would be a wonderful thing. That is not the purpose of our action; our purpose is to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction …”

- Tony Blair, to the House of Commons, 24 September 2002

In contrast to this answer, Mr Blair had been advocating “regime change” in Iraq for over 9 months, beginning in his letter to President Bush from December 2001 (quoted more extensively above), which also brought in the importance of using Afghanistan as a precedent:

“How we finish in Afghanistan is important to Phase 2 … In particular we shall have given regime change a good name, which will help us in the argument over Iraq.” - Mr Blair’s letter to President Bush, 4 December 2001

The language of regime change was repeated by Mr Blair in his conversation with Vice- President Cheney:

“inspections … would play an important part in convincing international opinion to rally to the idea of regime change.” - Mr Blair to US Vice-President Cheney, on 11 March 2002

Consistent with this stance, Jonathan Powell, Mr Blair’s chief-of-staff, wrote him a note of advice on 19 July 2002, about what to tell President Bush.

“We need to give GWB [Bush] a context for Iraq before he gets his military plan on 4 August. I recommend a phonecall and one of your notes after our meeting next week and before you go on holiday. I think we need a road map to getting rid of Saddam, drawing parallels as far as possible with his success in Afghanistan, including the following elements: We will be there when the US takes the decision to act … If we are not ready in January 2003 then we may need to wait for autumn 2003. Of course Saddam may give us a break before then that we can exploit” - Jonathan Powell, memo to Mr Blair, 19 July 2002

It is noticeable that at this stage, Powell was already referring to “when” (not “if”) the US takes the decision to act, and how the reference to how Saddam “may give us a break … that we can exploit” shows how public claims about reluctance to use military force are implausible. Mr Blair read the note and wrote (by hand) across the top of it: “I agree with this entirely”.

The language of Powell’s advice was taken up into Blair’s note to Bush of 28 July. The policy of regime change was sufficiently well established by mid-2002 that it was also being touted to other world leaders (but not Parliament), as Blair reported to Bush. He also mentioned how Afghanistan could be an ‘advertisement’ for Iraq:

“Getting rid of Saddam is the right thing to do. He is a potential threat. He could be contained. But containment … is always risky. His departure would free up the region. … When I met [name redacted]1 and said we would do Iraq, he said “fine – just do it with total force.

“Afghanistan: We need this to be going right, not wrong. It is our one act of regime change so far, so it had better be a good advertisement.” - Mr Blair’s note to President Bush, 28 July 2002

4. Evidence of ‘weapons of mass destruction’

1 This is unmistakeably Ariel Sharon, then prime minister of Israel, with whom Mr Blair had a meeting in Downing Street the previous month. The quote is in the context of an account of the possibility of resuming Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

The examination of how Mr Blair presented the information to assert evidence of Iraq’s chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes has been extensive, both in the Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Butler report, July 2004) and in the Chilcot report. The reports demonstrate three major ways in which Mr Blair misled Parliament: he exaggerated the extent of intelligence; he did not convey the limitations to warnings he received personally about mischaracterising United Nations findings; and he misquoted United Nations reports to convey a characterisation of Iraq that they did not actually present.

From early 2002, Mr Blair told the Commons that the evidence for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was unambiguous:

“Saddam Hussein's regime is despicable, he is developing weapons of mass destruction, and we cannot leave him doing so unchecked. … there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein is still trying to acquire nuclear capability and ballistic missile capability. Furthermore, although we do not know what has happened, we suspect that the piles of chemical and biological weapons remain.” - Tony Blair, to the House of Commons, 10 April 2002

At the time he made this statement, the latest assessment from the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was that of 15 March 2002, which was presented to Mr Blair. It was reprinted in the Butler report and cited in the Chilcot report. It stated:

“Intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programmes is sporadic and patchy. … We continue to judge that Iraq has an offensive chemical warfare (CW) programme, although there is very little intelligence relating to it. From the evidence available to us, we believe Iraq retains some production equipment, and some small stocks of CW agent precursors, and may have hidden small quantities of agents and weapons. …There is no intelligence on any BW agent production facilities, but one source indicates that Iraq may have developed mobile production facilities ... Although there is very little intelligence we continue to judge that Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons programme… ” - Joint Intelligence Committee, ‘The Status of Iraqi WMD Programmes’ (15 March 2002)

By not acknowledging the statements about “sporadic and patchy” intelligence in the JIC report in his statements to the Commons, and instead substituting those qualifications by saying that “there is no doubt”, he was giving a misleading account to Parliament. He also transformed an assessment that Iraq “may have hidden small quantities” into a statement that “piles of chemical and biological weapons remain”, though in this case he did only say that this was suspected, not proven.

Nevertheless, even this qualification was dropped by September, when the government published a dossier on Iraq’s weapons. At that stage, Mr Blair presented the evidence as

9 coming from the intelligence services, and without any acknowledgement of its limitations:

“I am aware, of course, that people will have to take elements of this on the good faith of our intelligence services, but this is what they are telling me, the British Prime Minister, and my senior colleagues. The intelligence picture that they paint is one accumulated over the last four years. It is extensive, detailed and authoritative.” - Tony Blair, to the House of Commons, 24 September 2002

The evaluation made by the Chilcot report of this claim is unambiguous:

“Mr Blair’s categorical statement that the intelligence picture painted by the JIC over the last four years was ‘extensive, detailed and authoritative’, was not an accurate description of the intelligence underpinning the JIC’s assessments.“ - The Chilcot report, volume 4 (section 4.2), p.275

The Chilcot report makes a similar assessment of the Prime Minister’s foreword in the dossier, which made the claim that “the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons”:

“Mr Blair’s statement that he believed that the ‘assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt’ that ‘Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons’ and that ‘he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons’, went further than the assessments of the JIC.” - The Chilcot report, volume 4 (section 4.2), p.259

As well as exaggerating claims from British intelligence sources, Mr Blair made frequent reference to the reports of United Nations weapons inspectors. He did so in two significant ways that were deliberately misleading.

First, United Nations weapons inspectors listed material from before 1991 that was ‘unaccounted for’, as the evidence that this material had been used or was destroyed in full (as Iraq claimed it was) was incomplete. For example, the UN inspectors had evidence that Iraq had burned growth media anthrax at a specific site in 1991, but did not have the evidence of how much of the growth media had been destroyed in that way – and therefore they recorded the entire quantity of growth media as still ‘unaccounted for’. Mr Blair portrayed claims about material that was unaccounted for as if that meant the material existed still, was hidden and was weaponised, even though he had been repeatedly warned this was not the term meant.

In the 24 September 2002 statement to the Commons that accompanied the publication of the weapons dossier, Mr Blair used the phrase “missing and unaccounted for”:

“… we estimate on the basis of the UN's work that there were up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agents, including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent; up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals; growth media sufficient to produce 26,000 litres of anthrax spores; and over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents. All of this was missing and unaccounted for.” - Tony Blair, to the House of Commons, 24 September 2002

The Chilcot report notes that the word “missing” was a late addition to the previous day’s draft of the statement (volume 4, section 4.2, p.277) and that Mr Blair wrote the final version himself (volume 4, section 4.2, p.263). Therefore it seems that Mr Blair himself inserted this word. The Chilcot report also notes the implication that this word has through its inclusion:

“A reference to material being ‘missing’ as well as ‘unaccounted for’ was new and implied the material had existed. The word was added to the draft version of 23 September.” - The Chilcot report, volume 4 (section 4.2), p.277

Mr Blair stretched the point further in the month leading up to the invasion, claiming that material that was unaccounted constituted proof of weapons:

“Is it not reasonable that Saddam provides evidence of destruction of the biological and chemical agents and weapons that the UN proved he had in 1999? So far he has provided none. Is it not reasonable that he provides evidence that he has destroyed 8,500 litres of anthrax that he admitted possessing, and the 2,000 kilos of biological growth material, enough to produce over 26,000 litres of anthrax?” - Tony Blair, to the House of Commons, 25 February 2003

“When the inspectors left in 1998, they left unaccounted for 10,000 litres of anthrax; a far-reaching VX nerve agent programme; up to 6,500 chemical munitions; at least 80 tonnes of mustard gas, and possibly more than 10 times that amount; unquantifiable amounts of sarin, botulinum toxin and a host of other biological poisons; and an entire Scud missile programme. We are asked now seriously to accept that in the last few years— contrary to all history, contrary to all intelligence—Saddam decided unilaterally to destroy those weapons. I say that such a claim is palpably absurd.” - Tony Blair, to the House of Commons, 18 March 2003

Mr Blair made these statements even though he had been warned by Dr Hans Blix, the head of the inspections regime, that it would be misleading to portray material unaccounted for as if it still existed, as evidence for existing weapons.

“Dr Blix reminded Mr Blair that the material described as ‘unaccounted for’ in UNSCOM’s report of 1999 was not necessarily present in Iraq; and that it would be ‘paradoxical to go to war for something that might turn out to be very little’.”

“…Dr Blix was reported to have informed Mr Blair that his report to the Security Council on 14 February would probably contain a ‘balance sheet’. His last assessment had been ‘honest but harsh’; the next might have to say that the inspectors ‘had not found any WMD’.” - Hans Blix meeting with Tony Blair, 6 February 2003, as recorded in The Chilcot Report, Volume 3, section 3.7, pp.199-200.

Mr Blair had a further 45-minute conversation with Dr Bilx on 20 February 2003, in which Dr Blix restated his belief that there was no evidence that Iraq still had any chemical or biological weapons:

“Dr Blix commented that ‘perhaps there was not much WMD in Iraq after all … It would be paradoxical and absurd if 250,000 men were to invade Iraq and find very little.’” - Hans Blix telephone conversation with Tony Blair, 20 February 2003, as recorded in The Chilcot Report, Volume 3, section 3.7, p.295- 96.

Mr Blair did not reveal the content of these conversations with Hans Blix to the Commons, even though he was explicitly asked in a parliamentary question about the meeting with Blix (in a written answer on 24 February 2003) and it was directly relevant to the discussion. Indeed, on 18 March 2003, he categorised as ‘palpably absurd’ the very position twice put to him by Dr Blix, in the debate that led to a vote to support the invasion of Iraq.

The second way in which Mr Blair misled parliament in relation to the UN weapons inspections was through misleading quotation of their reports. On 18 March 2003, in the debate that led to the vote to support an invasion, he quoted at length from the UN report, ‘Unresolved Disarmament Issues’ (7 March 2003), reprinted here in full:

“On VX, for example, it says: ‘Documentation available to UNMOVIC suggests that Iraq at least had had far reaching plans to weaponise VX’. On mustard gas, it says: ‘Mustard constituted an important part … of Iraq's CW arsenal … 550 mustard filled shells and up to 450 mustard filled aerial bombs unaccounted for … additional uncertainty’ with respect to over 6,500 aerial bombs, ‘corresponding to approximately 1,000 tonnes of agent, predominantly mustard.’ On biological weapons, the inspectors’ report states: ‘Based on unaccounted for growth media, Iraq's potential production of anthrax could have been in the range of about 15,000 to 25,000 litres … Based on all the available evidence, the strong presumption is that about 10,000 litres of anthrax was not destroyed and may still exist.’ On that basis, I

12 simply say to the House that, had we meant what we said in resolution 1441, the Security Council should have convened and condemned Iraq as in material breach.” - Tony Blair, to the House of Commons, 18 March 2003

Out of the five separate quotations above, four are directly misleading. The quote about VX is from the ‘Background’ section of the UN document (p.82), about Iraqi policy before 1990. Blair does not mention that, leaving the House with the misleading impression that this was the UN’s understanding of Iraq’s current policy. By quoting UN inspectors’ statements about the history of Iraq’s weapons programmes before 1990 as if they were their assessment of the status of those programmes in 2003, Mr Blair was directly misleading Parliament.

The quote about mustard omits the intervening sentences, which directly contradict the tenor of Blair’s statements. The reference to Iraq’s CW arsenal is about Iraqi policy in 1991 and in the very next sentence, the UN report states: “There is much evidence, including documents provided by Iraq and information collected by UNSCOM, to suggest that most quantities of Mustard remaining in 1991, as declared by Iraq, were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision” (p.76). By not including this sentence, Mr Blair was giving the impression that these quantities remained in Iraq, when actually the report were relating what had been verifiably destroyed in Iraq.

The next two statements relate to uncertainties, but again miss the sentences that qualify those uncertainties: “According to an investigation made by the Iraqi ‘Depot Inspection Commission’, the results of which were reported to UNMOVIC in March 2003, the discrepancy in the accounting for the mustard filled shells could be explained by the fact that Iraq had based its accounting on approximations” (p.76) and that “According to Iraq, data on consumption of CW filled munitions positioned at three airbases was not included as the airbases had been occupied in 1991 and the records destroyed. This explanation is being reviewed by UNMOVIC” (p.77). It was at the time entirely reasonable to be sceptical of Iraq’s declarations on both matters, but in both cases, the UN inspectors set out in the document how they were able to investigate the validity of Iraq’s declarations. By omitting the intervening sentences from his quotation (and not indicating that he was omitting sentences), Mr Blair gave a misleading impression that the UN inspectors were setting out a programme of Iraqi concealment when actually they were setting out what they were still in the process of verifying.

On anthrax, the first part of the quote about Iraq’s potential production was again from the ‘Background’ section of the document (p.95), about what Iraq could have done in 1989-90. Again, this is not mentioned by Mr Blair, thus giving a directly misleading impression. The final quote, on “the strong presumption is that about 10,000 litres of anthrax was not destroyed and may still exist”, is a valid quotation, even if it turned out to be wrong. Mr Blair did not mention that later on the same page, the UN recorded how Iraq was proposing methods for better assessing that the full quantity of anthrax that had already been destroyed.

Mr Blair’s statement that directly preceded the long quotation above was that:

“On 7 March, the inspectors published a remarkable document. It is 173 pages long, and details all the unanswered questions about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. It lists 29 different areas in which the inspectors have been unable to obtain information.” - Tony Blair, to the House of Commons, 18 March 2003

This was clearly false, and the three issues Blair cites (VX, mustard and anthrax) all involved the provision of information by Iraq to the inspectors, even if that information still needed verifying and in some cases further development. The Chilcot report makes it clear that this was known fully to Blair, whose discussion of the report with his advisors on 7 March 2003 is recounted in Alastair Campbell’s diary:

“We were all outraged at the Blix report. TB [Tony Blair] said it was political and dishonest … [chair of JIC John] Scarlett said he was wrong in saying the Iraqis were trying to co-operate more … TB was very philosophic about it all. As I sat listening to him on the phone, I lost count of how many times he said: 1. we are right on the issue; 2. we have to see it through …” - Alastair Campbell’s diary, quoted in The Chilcot Report, Volume 3 (section 3.7), p.395.

The quote reveals that Blair knew that the UN report was giving a different picture of Iraq from the one he wanted, and that he was aware that the report portrayed Iraqi cooperation as increasing, even if the chair of JIC disagreed with that assessment. Nevertheless, he still told Parliament eleven days later that the report showed that the report was about issue areas on which “the inspectors have been unable to obtain information”. This is clearly therefore a deliberate false portrayal of the UN report.

5. The threat to national security

Mr Blair argued repeatedly to Parliament that Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction would be a threat to the region, and ultimately to British national security. This was in direct contrast to the judgement of the intelligence reports that Mr Blair was receiving, which did not consider such weapons – if the Iraqi regime had them – would be used for external aggression. Furthermore, they explained repeatedly that the graver threat to British national security would come from terrorism, and that the risks of terrorism would increase in the event of an invasion. Mr Blair not reveal this to Parliament, even when faced with repeated questions directly about the matter.

“the threat is that within his own region, or outside it given the missile capability that he is trying to develop, he launches an attack that threatens the stability of that region and then the wider world. All the evidence that we have is that if there is such - a conflict in that region, we will not be able to stand apart from it.” - Tony Blair, to the House of Commons, 24 September 2002

“The reasons for being prepared to take action in respect of Saddam are, first, that Saddam has weapons of mass destruction

14 that threaten his region. As I said a few months ago, they not only threaten his region; frankly, if a conflict took place there involving weapons of mass destruction, it is unthinkable that we would not be involved in it in some way” - Tony Blair, to the House of Commons, 18 December 2002

“The intelligence is clear: he continues to believe that his weapons of mass destruction programme is essential both for internal repression and for external aggression.” - Tony Blair, to the House of Commons, 25 February 2003

These statements were made even though the intelligence assessments had repeatedly stated that it was unlikely that Iraq would use chemical or biological weapons, except in the context of an external invasion. The intelligence assessment which Mr Blair received and read two weeks before making the first statement above to the Commons was that:

“The use of chemical and biological weapons prior to any military attack would boost support for US-led action and is unlikely.” – JIC report: ‘Iraqi use of chemical and biological weapons: Possible scenarios’ (9 September 2002)

This evaluation was retained in subsequent analysis of Iraq. The Chilcot report makes the overall evaluation of the statement in Mr Blair’s foreword to the September 2002 dossier, which stated that Iraq was a “current and serious threat to the UK national interest”:

“The statement that Mr Blair believed Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction was ‘a current and serious threat to the UK national interest’ reflected his view. But it did not reflect the view of the JIC, which had addressed the threat posed by Iraq and assessed that Iraq’s capabilities and intentions were limited and related to the balance of power in the region and internal challenges.” - The Chilcot Report, Volume 4 (section 4.2), p.247.

There was however a threat to UK national security that was affirmed through multiple intelligence briefings given to the Prime Minister, and that was the threat of heightened international terrorism in the event of an attack on Iraq. The Chilcot Report records multiple such briefings:

JIC Assessment, 5 August 2002: “A US-led attack on Iraq would spark large-scale protests across the Arab world. […] Anti-Western sentiment in the region would not dissipate quickly and could boost popular sympathy for extremist causes, including Al Qaida.” (Volume 2, p.104).

“A JIC Assessment issued on 13 December [2002] warned that any US-led action against Iraq and a subsequent occupation was one of many issues that could draw large numbers to Islamist extremist ideology over the next five years.” (Volume 3, p.49).

JIC Assessment, 10 February 2003: “The threat from Al Qaida will increase at the onset of any military action against Iraq. They will target Coalition forces and other Western interests in the Middle East. Attacks against Western interests elsewhere are also likely, especially in the US and UK, for maximum impact. The worldwide threat from other Islamist terrorist groups and individuals will increase significantly.” (Volume 3, p.212).

JIC Assessment, 10 February 2003: “Al Qaida and associated groups will continue to represent by far the greatest terrorist threat to Western interests, and that threat will be heightened by military action against Iraq. The broader threat from Islamist terrorists will also increase in the event of war, reflecting intensified anti-US/anti-Western sentiment in the Muslim world, including among Muslim communities in the West. And there is a risk that the transfer of CB material or expertise, during or in the aftermath of conflict, will enhance Al Qaida’s capabilities.” (Volume 3, pp.214-15).

JIC Assessment, 12 March 2003: “The threat from Al Qaida will increase at the onset of military action against Iraq. […] Despite serious setbacks for Al Qaida, and some disruption of terrorist activity, especially in the Middle East, the threat from Islamist terrorism in the event of war with Iraq remains high, with continuing evidence of attack planning.” (Volume 3, pp.468-9).

Mr Blair was asked in the Commons about the likelihood of increased terrorism in the event of an invasion of Iraq. He pointedly did not answer the questions, even though the answer must have been well-known to him. He received four such questions on 15 October 2002 alone, after a terrorist attack on Bali, Indonesia:

Charles Kennedy: “is it the Prime Minister's assessment that, if there were a war against Iraq, it would increase or decrease the likelihood of further international terrorist incidents of the type that we have just seen?”

Alice Mahon: “In the light of this latest outrage, however, should we not be targeting all our resources and energies on fighting terrorism, rather than starting another war in the Middle East? Surely the Prime Minister will agree that to start such a war would fan the flames of fundamentalism across the whole area and make matters much worse. Our priorities must be to get the weapons inspectors back and to concentrate on getting rid of al- Qaeda. That is the way in which to protect all our citizens.”

Alex Salmond: “I wonder how it could be sensible to fight a war on two fronts if any preoccupation with a military campaign in Iraq were to detract, disrupt, deflect or in any way undermine the solidarity of the international coalition against terrorism.”

Robert Wareing: “If we were to take military action in the light of recent events involving Iraq, does my right hon. Friend agree that we would be acting as a recruiting sergeant for the international terrorists whom we must defeat?”

- Questions to the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, 15 October 2002

6. The exhaustion of diplomacy

The debate in the House of Commons on 18 March 2003, which led to the vote to support military action against Iraq, revolved centrally on the question of using military force without a Security Council Resolution specifically authorising it. Mr Blair argued that diplomatic efforts to secure a resolution had been exhausted, as the French President was unreasonably threatening to veto any resolution.

“… on Monday night [10 March], France said that it would veto a second resolution, whatever the circumstances. Then France denounced the six tests. Later that day, Iraq rejected them. Still, we continued to negotiate, even at that point. Last Friday [14 March], France said that it could not accept any resolution with an ultimatum in it. On Monday [17 March], we made final efforts to secure agreement. However, the fact is that France remains utterly opposed to anything that lays down an ultimatum authorising action in the event of non-compliance by Saddam.” - Tony Blair, to the House of Commons, 18 March 2003

The Chilcot Report demonstrates conclusively how inaccurate this account is. Firstly, the account of the French position was inaccurate: President Chirac had said that if the UN inspectors reported that they were unable to guarantee Iraq’s disarmament, then “regrettably, the war would become inevitable. It isn’t today” (The Chilcot Report, volume 3, p.423).

Mr Blair spoke to US President Bush on the telephone the following day, and told him that Chirac’s remark “gave some cover” for ending the UN route (The Chilcot Report, volume 3, p.439). The phrase is ambiguous, but the most likely meaning in the context is that Mr Blair meant that it enabled a plausible argument to be made for a preconceived purpose, that of terminating the UN inspections route.

On 12 March, the French Ambassador to the UK, acting on the instruction of the French Presidency, delivered a message to Downing Street, notifying them that “it is not the case that [President Chirac] said that he would vote no against any resolution” (The Chilcot Report, volume 3, p.449). The message was passed to Mr Blair’s chief of staff and

17 foreign policy advisor, as well as other No. 10 officials. The ambassador later on the same day visited the political director of the Foreign Office to remonstrate at how British ministers has misconstrued President Chirac’s comments (The Chilcot Report, volume 3, p.467). The report of the meeting was also sent to Mr Blair’s foreign policy advisor.

On 13 March, the French foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, telephoned the British foreign secretary, Jack Straw, to make clear that President Chirac “‘had not meant that France would not try to find common ground’; nor ‘that, whatever happened, France would vote no’. His comments had been ‘only in the context of text [of the draft resolution] on the table’ on 10 March” (The Chilcot Report, volume 3, p.480).

On 14 March, President Chirac spoke by telephone to Mr Blair, and suggested a series of compromises. The Chilcot Report records that President Chirac “‘wondered whether it would be worth’ Mr Straw and Mr de Villepin ‘discussing the situation to see if we could find some flexibility’; or was it ‘too late’? Mr Blair said ‘every avenue must be explored’” (The Chilcot Report, volume 3, p.491).

The reason why these discussions did not success is explained in the Chilcot Report:

Mr Blair and President Chirac had agreed Mr Straw and Mr de Villepin should talk, but Mr Blair ‘issued instructions’ to Mr Straw ‘to concede nothing. There was intelligence suggesting the French were seeking to get the undecided six to go for tests plus more time.’ Mr Blair suspected President Chirac ‘would move to a position of automaticity but inspectors are the sole judges of compliance’. - The Chilcot Report, Volume 3 (section 3.8), p. 492, quoting Alastair Campbell’s account.

On 17 March, the British ambassador to France reported to Jack Straw that he would agree to the British proposal for ‘six tests’ by which Iraqi compliance with the weapons inspectors would be judged (The Chilcot Report, volume 3, p.557). However, by this point, Mr Blair had already agreed in a conversation with US President Bush to bring the UN process to an end, and that the invasion would happen according to the US timetable (The Chilcot Report, volume 3, pp.507-08).

The Chilcot report shows how the French position had deliberately mischaracterized. According to Alastair Campbell, Mr Blair was clear on 15 March that the French position was flexible: he wrote that Blair “was ‘clear now what the French would try – yes to the tests, even to the possibility of military action, but they would push for a later date’” (quoted in The Chilcot Report, volume 3, p.505). Blair however deliberately sought to undermine negotiations, by instructing the Foreign Secretary to be inflexible. He knew that it was inaccurate to say that France was rejecting the British-proposed ‘six tests’, and that there were no ‘final efforts to secure agreement’ on 17 March, because a final decision had already been taken by that point. On this key aspect of the debate of 18 March, which resulted in a vote to support military action, Mr Blair was directly and unambiguously misleading the House of Commons.