The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Executive Summary Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors HC 264 Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons dated 6 July 2016 for The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Executive Summary Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 6 July 2016 HC 264 © Crown copyright 2016 This publication is licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 except where otherwise stated. To view this licence, visit nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ version/3 or write to the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London TW9 4DU, or email: [email protected]. Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. This publication is available at www.gov.uk/government/publications Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at [email protected] Print ISBN 9781474133319 Web ISBN 9781474133326 ID 23051602 46561 07/16 Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum Printed in the UK by the Williams Lea Group on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Contents Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 4 Pre‑conflict strategy and planning .................................................................................... 5 The UK decision to support US military action ................................................................. 6 UK policy before 9/11 ................................................................................................. 6 The impact of 9/11 ................................................................................................... 10 Decision to take the UN route .................................................................................. 16 Negotiation of resolution 1441 ................................................................................. 19 The prospect of military action ................................................................................. 21 The gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council widens ........... 24 The end of the UN route .......................................................................................... 30 Why Iraq? Why now? ..................................................................................................... 40 Was Iraq a serious or imminent threat? ................................................................... 40 The predicted increase in the threat to the UK as a result of military action in Iraq . 47 The UK’s relationship with the US .................................................................................. 51 Decision‑making ............................................................................................................ 54 Collective responsibility ........................................................................................... 55 Advice on the legal basis for military action ................................................................... 62 The timing of Lord Goldsmith’s advice on the interpretation of resolution 1441 ...... 63 Lord Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March 2003 ............................................................... 65 Lord Goldsmith’s arrival at a “better view” ............................................................... 66 The exchange of letters on 14 and 15 March 2003 ................................................. 66 Lord Goldsmith’s Written Answer of 17 March 2003 ................................................ 67 Cabinet, 17 March 2003 .......................................................................................... 68 Weapons of mass destruction ........................................................................................ 69 Iraq WMD assessments, pre‑July 2002 ................................................................... 69 Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002 ................................................... 72 Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003 ........................................... 75 The search for WMD ................................................................................................ 77 1 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Planning for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq ..................................................................... 78 The failure to plan or prepare for known risks ......................................................... 78 The planning process and decision‑making ............................................................ 81 The post‑conflict period .................................................................................................. 86 Occupation ............................................................................................................... 86 Looting in Basra ................................................................................................ 86 Looting in Baghdad .......................................................................................... 88 UK influence on post‑invasion strategy: resolution 1483 .................................. 89 UK influence on the Coalition Provisional Authority .......................................... 90 A decline in security ........................................................................................... 93 The turning point ............................................................................................... 96 Transition ................................................................................................................. 97 UK influence on US strategy post‑CPA ............................................................. 97 Planning for withdrawal ..................................................................................... 97 The impact of Afghanistan ................................................................................. 99 Iraqiisation ....................................................................................................... 101 Preparation for withdrawal ..................................................................................... 103 A major divergence in strategy ........................................................................ 103 A possible civil war .......................................................................................... 104 Force Level Review ......................................................................................... 107 The beginning of the end ................................................................................. 108 Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq? .................................................................... 109 Key findings ..................................................................................................................111 Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002 ...................111 Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 – “axis of evil” to Crawford .................................................................................................................111 Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002 ................................. 112 Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September 2002 .......... 112 Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002 – the negotiation of resolution 1441 ................................................................................ 113 Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003 ........ 113 Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003 ................ 114 Iraq WMD assessments, pre‑July 2002 ................................................................. 115 Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002 ................................................. 116 Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003 ......................................... 117 The search for WMD .............................................................................................. 117 2 Executive Summary Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003 ....... 119 Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq ................................... 120 Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003 ..................................... 121 Military equipment (pre‑conflict) ............................................................................. 122 Planning for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq ............................................................. 122 The invasion .......................................................................................................... 123 The post‑conflict period ......................................................................................... 123 Reconstruction ....................................................................................................... 124 De‑Ba’athification ................................................................................................... 125 Security Sector Reform .......................................................................................... 125 Resources .............................................................................................................. 126 Military