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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons dated 6 July 2016 for The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors Volume III Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 6 July 2016 HC 265-III 46561_10b Viking_Volume III Title Page.indd 1 21/06/2016 12:56 © Crown copyright 2016 This publication is licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 except where otherwise stated. To view this licence, visit nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ version/3 or write to the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London TW9 4DU, or email: [email protected]. Where we have identifi ed any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. This publication is available at www.gov.uk/government/publications Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at [email protected] Print ISBN 9781474110136 Web ISBN 9781474110143 ID 23051601 46561 07/16 Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fi bre content minimum Printed in the UK by the Williams Lea Group on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Offi ce 46561_10b Viking_Volume III Title Page.indd 2 21/06/2016 12:56 Volume III CONTENTS 3.6 Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003 1 3.7 Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003 177 3.8 Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March 2003 399 46561_10b Viking_Volume III Title Page.indd 3 21/06/2016 12:56 46561_10b Viking_Volume III Title Page.indd 4 21/06/2016 12:56 SECTION 3.6 DEVELOPMENT OF UK STRATEGY AND OPTIONS, NOVEMBER 2002 TO JANUARY 2003 Contents Introduction and key findings ........................................................................................... 4 The response to resolution 1441 ..................................................................................... 5 Iraq’s response .......................................................................................................... 5 Cabinet, 14 November 2002 ...................................................................................... 7 UK assumptions about Iraq’s position ....................................................................... 8 JIC Assessment, 14 November 2002: ‘Iraq: Regime Cohesion Under Pressure’ .................................................................................................. 8 Psychological profile of Saddam Hussein ......................................................... 10 Concerns about the US view on the threshold for a material breach ...................... 12 The Prague Summit, 21 November 2002 ................................................................ 19 Intelligence update, 21 November 2002 .................................................................. 25 Mr Blair’s meeting with Dr Blix, 22 November 2002 ................................................ 26 Security Council, 25 November 2002 ...................................................................... 29 Debate on resolution 1441, 25 November 2002 ...................................................... 30 Cabinet, 28 November 2002 ............................................................................. 34 Iraq’s declaration of 7 December and the response ...................................................... 35 JIC Assessment, 6 December 2002: ‘Iraq: Military Options’ .................................... 42 Iraq’s declaration, 7 December 2002 ....................................................................... 43 The UK’s initial response ......................................................................................... 43 JIC Assessment, 13 December 2002 ................................................................ 49 Mr Blair’s conversation with President Bush, 16 December 2002 .................... 51 Sir Richard Dearlove’s visit to Washington, December 2002 ............................ 53 Mr Straw’s statement, 18 December 2002 ........................................................ 54 Prime Minister’s Questions, 18 December 2002 ............................................... 55 Mr Hoon’s statement, 18 December 2002 ......................................................... 56 JIC Assessment, 18 December 2002 ...................................................................... 56 Cabinet, 19 December 2002 .................................................................................... 61 Security Council, 19 December 2002 ...................................................................... 62 The need for a communications strategy ................................................................. 67 1 46561_10c Viking_Section 3.6.indd 1 21/06/2016 12:57 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry The absence of a “smoking gun” ................................................................................... 69 Advice for Mr Blair in early January 2003 ................................................................ 71 Public statements, 7 and 8 January 2003 ................................................................ 78 Publication of the UK’s policy objectives ........................................................... 78 Mr Hoon’s statement, 7 January 2003 .............................................................. 80 Mr Blair’s speech to the Foreign Office Conference, 7 January 2003 ............... 81 Prime Minister’s Questions, 8 January 2003 ..................................................... 83 Cabinet, 9 January 2003 .......................................................................................... 84 Security Council, 9 January 2003 ............................................................................ 86 Growing pressure to find evidence of Saddam Hussein’s non‑compliance ............. 88 Mr Blair’s press conference, 13 January 2003 .................................................. 91 Lord Goldsmith’s draft advice, 14 January 2003 ............................................... 93 Prime Minister’s Questions, 15 January 2003 ................................................... 93 Concern that the US might act at the end of January .............................................. 95 Cabinet, 16 January 2003 ........................................................................................ 98 The decision to deploy ground forces ............................................................. 101 Mr Blair’s meeting with Dr Blix, 17 January 2003 .................................................. 103 Security Council, 20 January 2003 ........................................................................ 105 The positions of other members of the Security Council ....................................... 107 Mr Blair’s conversation with President Bush, 24 January 2003 ............................. 113 Cabinet, 23 January 2003 ............................................................................... 114 Mr Blair’s Note to President Bush, 24 January 2003 ...................................... 115 Mr Blair’s interview on BBC’s Breakfast with Frost, 26 January 2003 ................... 121 Security Council, 27 January 2003 ........................................................................ 124 President Bush’s State of the Union address, 28 January 2003 ........................... 131 Security Council, 29 January 2003 ........................................................................ 134 Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush, 31 January 2003 ........................................... 135 The US position ..................................................................................................... 135 Other views ............................................................................................................ 138 JIC Assessment, 29 January 2003 ........................................................................ 144 Cabinet, 30 January 2003 ...................................................................................... 150 Mr Blair’s conversations with President Bush, 29 and 30 January 2003 ............... 151 Mr Blair’s meeting with Mr Aznar, 30 January 2003 ............................................... 153 Papers produced for Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush ............................... 154 MOD letter, 29 January 2003 .......................................................................... 154 FCO advice, 30 January 2003 ......................................................................... 155 Lord Goldsmith’s minute, 30 January 2003 ..................................................... 158 2 46561_10c Viking_Section 3.6.indd 2 21/06/2016 12:57 3.6 | Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003 Mr Blair’s Note, 30 January 2003 .................................................................... 158 Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s advice, 31 January 2003 ......................................... 160 Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush, 31 January 2003 .................................... 163 The views of Mr Blair and Sir Jeremy Greenstock ................................................. 172 Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 174 3 46561_10c Viking_Section 3.6.indd 3 21/06/2016 12:57 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Introduction and key findings 1. This Section addresses the development of UK strategy on Iraq between the adoption of resolution 1441 on 8 November
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