Work in progress, No. 77
Use of the Aluka digital library is subject to Aluka’s Terms and Conditions, available at http://www.aluka.org/page/about/termsConditions.jsp. By using Aluka, you agree that you have read and will abide by the Terms and Conditions. Among other things, the Terms and Conditions provide that the content in the Aluka digital library is only for personal, non-commercial use by authorized users of Aluka in connection with research, scholarship, and education.
The content in the Aluka digital library is subject to copyright, with the exception of certain governmental works and very old materials that may be in the public domain under applicable law. Permission must be sought from Aluka and/or the applicable copyright holder in connection with any duplication or distribution of these materials where required by applicable law.
Aluka is a not-for-profit initiative dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of materials about and from the developing world. For more information about Aluka, please see http://www.aluka.org/.
Page 1 of 55 Alternative title Work In Progress Author/Creator University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg) Contributor Pillay, Devan Publisher University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg) Date 1991-09 Resource type Journals (Periodicals) Language Afrikaans, English Subject Coverage (spatial) South Africa Coverage (temporal) 1991 Source Digital Imaging South Africa (DISA) Rights By kind permission of Hein Marais, Julian May, and the Southern Africa Report. Format extent 52 page(s) (length/size)
Page 2 of 55 WORK 1111WIP 77 September 1991PROGRESSINSIDEThe Downfall of Communism* Sarhwu Organises White WorkersCiskei's Covert Hit-Squad
Page 3 of 55 These and much more ...See order form opposite
Page 4 of 55 Page 5 of 55 Published by theAfrican Re-0 5-iPO Box 32716Braernfonteir *d0-'t'' South AfricaEditorLYEVA PILLAGLENOn DANIEL$'SIMPETHAPAUL ASEKCOfca Man ~
Page 6 of 55 LETTERSCOMMENTThe downfall of communismBRIEFS 4 Durban's Merebank community fightsdangerous polluting industries PWV consumer boycott flops miserably6VIOLENCE Can the Inkatha gate be closed?John Aitchison Assignment to murder: Ggozo's covertmilitary group exposedLoWse FlanaganMK CONFERENCE Sharpening the spear - for peaceDevan PillayLABOUR Cosatu - continuing the classcampaignInterview with Jay Naidoo Cosatu's gender forums:taking gender seriouslyGlenda Daniels Sarhwu and white workers:class solidarity on the tracksGlenda DanielsINTERNATIONALLBrazil - the Janus faceMonty Narsoo30ECONOMY VAT - robbing the poorto give to the richCRI C IMF and World Bank in Africa:Curing the disease by killing the patientSipho Buthelezi Confronting messy economic practicesBernie Fanaroff37DEBATE ANC women's quota:taking the debate furtherPat H-9 Nusas-Sansco merger:will students move with the times?Jonathan Gunthorpe Marxism-Leninism and abstract truthDave Kitson Social democracyor revolutionary socialism?Adam HabibBOOKS _ Learning from Robben Island:the prison writings of Govan MbekiJeremy CroninCONTENTS7Sharpening the spearThe ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, held ahistoric conference in Venda recently, and showed adetermination to overcome the deep problems it hashad to endure since the unbannings, and to carve anew role for itself inside the country- Pages 14 to 19The collapse of communismDoes the imminent collapse of communism in theSoviet Union represent a fatal blow, or is it in fact thebest thing that could have happened to the cause ofsocialism? - Special Comment, Page 3Assignmentto murderGqozo's secret militarygroup, formed to destabilisethe Border region, isexposed by theIndependent Board ofInquiry into InformalRepression - Pages 9 -13
Page 7 of 55 LETTERSWe won't beintimidated intosilenceDear EditorI would like to informreaders about developmentsat the University of theWitwatersrand (Wits) sincethe lecture boycott andoccupation of the adminis-tration's offices in March(WIP 73). It is necessary todispel the impression createdin WIP 73 that eightystudents faced disciplinaryaction, and that chargeswould probably be dropped.The administration hassought to demonstrate itscontrol over the universityby isolating and victimisinga handful of students.Eight students have onlyrecently been charged fortheir part in the occupationof the administration'soffices. Each of thesestudents was sentenced to aLETTERSWrite to: The EditorWork In ProgressPO Box 32716Braamfontein 2017rustication of two years,suspended for two years.Four of these students aremembers of the SocialistStudents' Action Committee(SSAC), which has beenconsistently harassed by theuniversity administration.The institution ofdisciplinary action againstthese students serves theadministration's interests invarious ways. The adminis-tration seeks to avoid thegenuine empowerment ofstudents. It thus acknowl-edges the right of students toprotest and then seeks todefine the form which thisprotest may take.`Acceptable' protest isrestricted to passive actswhich are essentiallysuggestive and may not takethe form of assertive action.Vice-Chancellor Charltonrepeatedly told the press andthe university communitythat the administration hadnot yielded to the demandsof the protesters involved inthe occupation and classboycott in March.The delay in the imple-mentation of disciplinaryaction was a cynical,premeditated manoeuvre.The administration sought toisolate its chosen scapegoatsby implementing discipli-nary proceedings whilestudents were preparing forexams.The twelve students wereable to obtain a postpone-ment of these proceed-ings,but the delay hadsucceeded in diluting theanger of other students.It had also succeeded inremoving the protesters'actions from the democraticdemands which inspiredthem. Students were protest-ing against the high exclu-sion rates, lack of accommo-dation and the introductionof a new policy enforcingthe full payment of fees byMarch, instead of August.The mass of studentshave not forgotten thesedemands. Institutionalisedintimidation will not preventassertive protest overlegitimate demands. Theharsh sentences simply fuelthe desire of students tocontrol their university. Andgenuine empowerment ofstudents can only beachieved through their ownassertive action. - GrantDoble (SSAC member)WIP Is an Independent publication oriented towards stimulating debate and discussion around the political and soclaeconomic future of SouthAfrica. As such the views expressed In Individual articles do not necessarily carespond with those of WIP9 editor and advisory board.Will New Really be Different ?What's different in the New*South Africa?... An innovative Public and Development Management Programme at WitsUniversity. This unique postgraduate Diploma in Public Policy and DevelopmentAdministration starts in January 1992, and is offered full-time (one year) or part-time (two years).This course is based on the need to provide future public and developmentleadership with appropriate organisational and policy skills for effective.management - within the transition and beyond.Pursue a professional career in the public service, in development administration or inpolicy management and ensure that new is both different and better!WitsP&DMFor more information please contact:The Faculty Office, Public & Development Management ProgrammeGraduate School of Business AdminstrationBox 98, Wits, 205() Tel: (011) 643-66412 St David's Place, Parktown, 2193 Fax: (011) 643-2336PUBLIC & DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT PROGRAMMEUniversity of the Witwatersrand, JohannesburgA NEW SCHOOL OF THOUGHTWits meets the need for skilled public service personnel to shape the policies for the future of our countryr~'1 sma
Page 8 of 55 SPECIAL COMMENTThe downfall of `communism'- is it a tragedy for socialism?President Gorbachev, the leading architect of reform inthe Soviet Union, has resigned from the CommunistParty. In the wake of an unsuccessful coup by con-servative forces in the world's first `workers' state', over 70years of communist rule is now rapidly coming to an end.The coup was condemned by all of South Africa'sliberation movements, including the SACP (despite pro-couprumblings by a minority within its ranks), PAC, Azapo,Workers Organisation for Socialist Action (Wom), theInternational Socialists of SA (Issa) and, eventually, theANC, which expressed its full support for Gorbachev on hisreturn to power.While the coup plotters could beseen as representing a section of thebureaucratic caste which has beenhighly threatened by Gorbachev'sreforms, they were not necessarily oldguard Stalinists. Their main concernseemed to be the impending break-up ofthe Soviet Union, and rising pressurefrom working people against the severedecline in their living standards, and intheir sense of security, since theperestroika reforms were implemented.The fact that Yeltsin receivedmassive popular support in Moscowdoes not necessarily mean that similar support exists in otherparts of the Soviet Union, in particular the Asian republics.Yeltsin - the man to watchBut Gorbachev, the advocate of `democratic socialism', nolonger seems in full control. His once friend, then rival, BorisYeltsin, in a dramatic week of defiance, refused to bow to thecoup, and rallied thousands to his call to support the reinstate-ment of Gorbachev.Yeltsin is a highly successful populist politician.Throughout the Gorbachev era, he has directly confronted thebureaucracy, and has even publicly criticised RaimGorbachev, the president's wife, for her extravagant tastes.But Yeltsin is also the darling of the imperialist countries.He has called for the downfall of `socialism', and the reintro-duction of capitalism in the Soviet Union. He seems to appealdirectly to Russian nationalism, and is on the side of thoserepublics which want independence.Yeltsin looks set to eclipse Gorbachev in the near future,and become the most powerful figure in what will remain ofthe Soviet Union. He is set directly against the CommunistParty, and has even hinted that it may be banned.It is still too early to tell where the Soviet Union isheading. That the power and status of the Communist Partywill be drastically diminished, there is litle doubt (unlessthere is another coup). That Gorbachev will continue to losepower and influence to Yeltsin, seems increasingly likely.But where will Yeltsin take the Soviet Union?Does he want Western imperialism to rush in and colonisethe economy, or is he merely determined to sweep away thelayers of bureaucracy, and introduce market mechanisms in amuch more vigorous manner than Gorbachev? Or is Yeltsina highly ambitious narrow nationalist, determined to intro-duce, in its crudest sense, the dictatorship of the bourgeosie?It is still too early to tell.Alternative socialist traditionsBut one thing is clear. What is happening in the Soviet Uniontoday does not necessarily represent a set-back to the causeof socialism in the world. It is a set-back for the world`communist' movement. It may also bea set-back for orthodox Marxism-Leninism. But that does not mean thatMarxism, and the democratic socialistproject, ought to be on the retreat.Socialism, it can be argued, wasnever really practised in the SovietUnion, and less so in its satellite EastEuropean states. The abolition ofprivate property, and the ownership andcontrol of the economy by the state,does not in itself constitute socialism -especially in the complete absence ofany democratic participation of thepeople.Socialism is about democracy, and empowering thepeople. Anything less cannot be socialism. If the Sovietsystem is not (yet) capitalist, in that private productiveproperty is (still) abolished, then a major revision of Marxisttheory is needed to conceptualise a third non-socialist, non-capitalist social order such as the Soviet Union represents (abureaucratic mode of production?).There have always been alternative socialist traditionswhich were highly critical of the deformations of Soviet`socialism'.There was the social democratic school, including Lenin'sformer mentor Karl Kautsky who believed, followingclassical Marxist theory, that capitalism in Russia had not yetripened for socialism to be introduced. To try, in voluntaristfashion, to impose socialism, he said at the time, would ofnecessity have to bring about authoritarian rule.In direct opposition to the social democrats, but alsohighly critical of the new authoritarian Soviet state, was thePolish-German revolutionary Rosa Luxemburg. A passionatechampion of the working class, Luxemburg was also avociferous defender of democratic freedoms. She paid withher life in 1919, at the hands of the German police.Then there was the Soviet leader Leon Trotsky, whosecriticism of Soviet `socialism' began only with the death ofLenin, and the rise of Stalin.The Trotskyist tradition also holds up the banner ofMarxism-Leninism, but contrasts it directly to Stalinism, andthe whole post-Lenin era of Soviet history.For Trotskyists, the Soviet Union is either a deformed or
Page 9 of 55 SPECIAL COMMENT/BRIEFSdegenerate workers' state, or a form of `state capitalism'. Intheir eyes, it has never been socialist or communist, exceptfor the brief period under Lenin (1917-1921).These historical critiques, amongst others (includingSoviet leader Alexandra Kollantai's feminist critique and,much later, Cuban leader Che Guevara's re-emphasis onchanging the individual as well as the structures of society),have informed and inspired a range of alternative brands ofsocialism, which have always distanced themselves from theSoviet version - in much the same way that liberals distancethemselves from fascism (a form of capitalism), or liberationtheologists distance themselves from orthodox christianity.They may read the same classical texts, but they derivedifferent meanings.Hopes and tragediesIn South Africa the Communist Party, until recently anuncritical ally of the Soviet Union, has been thrown intosomething of a crisis. To its great credit, it did not support thecoup, sticking firmly to its path of `democratic socialism' -although the Natal Midlands branch, headed by orthodoxveteran Harry Gwala, issued a statement supporting the coup.But even supporters of `democratic socialism' are dis-mayed by the events following the restoration of Gorbachev.The suspensions and bannings of the Soviet Communist Partyin the different republics are ominous moves which couldpave the way for new dictatorships. But while the banningsshould be condemned, the breaking of the party's monopolyof power is necessary.The Communist Party in the Soviet Union was staffed bysome of the most decrepit, bureaucratic defenders of the oldorder.The tragedy lies in the popular revulsion against the ideasof socialism in the former `socialist' countries. Decades of`socialist' misrule have turned perhaps the majority of Sovietcitizens against what they have experienced as `socialism' -without an understanding of the horrors of capitalism beneaththe glitter. Most of them have absolutely no idea of thealternative socialist visions that have always existed, butwhich have been brutally suppressed since Stalin's rule.There are alternative socialist groups in the Soviet Union,such as the recently-formed Socialist Party (see WIP 76), butthese have not yet reached much beyond their intellectualbases.The task of democratic socialists in the SACP is to make aclean and decisive break with any links to orthodox commu-nism. It is only then that the positive significance of theevents in the Soviet Union can be appreciated.While on the one hand the Soviet state, despite its deform-ity, has always acted as a deterrent against rampant Americanimperialism, Soviet `socialism' on the other hand, by present-ing itself as the only alternative to capitalism, blocked theexamination of alternative paths by the major leftwing forcesin third world countries.Nevertheless, a stark reality to be faced is that the op-pressed people of this world, especially those in Africa, Asiaand Latin America, are now at the mercy of US aggression.Movements of the oppressed, whether orthodox communistor democratic socialist (or even simply radical nationalist)will find it all the more difficult to oppose oppression andinequality in their countries, especially where their econo-mies are tied to the US (via the IMF and World Bank).But all is not necessarily lost. There have been successfulmovements which operated independently from either theSoviet Union or China (an even more deformed `socialist'state). These can be found in Brazil's Workers Party, basedon the union movement, which almost won the 1989 presi-dential elections. The Cuban revolution of 1959 succeededdespite the opposition of the Soviet-aligned Communist Party(although the Soviet Union a few years later provided crucialsupport which sustained the revolution).The SACP and ANC has enjoyed valuable assistancefrom the Soviet Union - but not without a price. That pricewas, until recently, an uncritical stance towards Sovietpolicies, and an unwillingness to examine and debate alterna-tive Marxist perspectives, and alternative socialist visions.The collapse of `communism' now opens up the possibil-ity of a rich, thorough-going search for alternatives -involving the full range of socialist and left opinion - for apath to the future that combines both an attack on the in-equalities of capitalism, as well as an attack on all forms ofauthoritarianism and prejudice - whether it be of men overwomen, the healthy against the infirm, government againstthe people, heterosexual against homosexual, and so forth.Democracy can only flourish within a climate of toleranceand respect for each other's beliefs, and a real empowering ofthe people through the structures of civil society.The arrogance of the capitalist must not be countered bythe arrogance of the `Marxist-Leninist', or any other chosenpath.Only the full interchange of ideas and experiences by allthe people, including the most inarticulate and powerless,will bring about true democracy and equality.If this informs a reconstituted socialist project, thenindeed the demise of `communism' may in the end prove tobe the best thing that happened to socialism. - The Editor.mMerebank ocommunity tightsdangerousindustriesWhen twenty-two year oldSurendren Pillay was killedby a heavy loaded truck onits way to the Mondi paper-mill last July, residents ofDurban's indian township,Merebank, had already beenstruggling against the heavypolluting industries in theirdensely populated area for25 years.In 1964, when a vastconcentration of pollutingindustries started to takeplace in mostly black areasin South Africa, Merebankresidents expressed theirconcern over the planning ofthe Mondi paper-mill inletters to the Durban CityCouncil and the Ministry ofHealth, with no result.Today, the Merebankcommunity (40 000 resi-dents) finds itself surroundedby: a vast industrial area on thewest, of which the smogdaily descends on thetownship; two oil refineries and an oilbuoy (because of which theCity Council once declaredit would not be worthwhiledeveloping the beach) and the main Durban airport,with regular low-flying civil
Page 10 of 55 BRIEFSand military jets at all timesof the day.In the middle of thetownship one can smell theoil refineries, the sewageplant, the Mondi paper milland, until recently, a chromefactory - which has nowbeen closed down because ofunion threats to sue itbecause of the severelydamaged health of itsworkers. However, in theyears of its presence in thecommunity, the chromefactory has managed todeposit its dangerous wasteon the ground.For years the residentsprotested in vain against thehealth and environmentaldangers caused by thisconcentration of pollution,and also against the absenceof thorough control or safetymeasures. Safety measureswere never of much concernto the apartheid authorities,as the people and areasaffected were generallyblack.Polluting companies,when and if found out andprosecuted, have little tofear. An Anglo-Americancompany that negligentlyallowed a stream and a damin the Eastern Transvaal tobecome so polluted that itkilled all forms of fish andaquatic life, was recentlysentenced to a fine of onlyR 10 000, suspended for fiveyears.Residents take actionMerebank residents took uppublic action once again lastJuly. The target of a masscampaign and a march,assembling several hundredmembers of the community,was Mondi's paper-mill.(Mondi's largest shareholderis in fact the South Africanmining giant Anglo-Ameri-can). It took place five daysafter township youthSurendren Pillay was killedby the truck servicingMondi.These trucks passthrough the densely popu-lated area on a narrow roadat a rate of one every fewminutes. On 22 July a paper-loaded trailer had derailedfrom one of them, leavingthe road and Pillay's carburied under its load.The residents, who had- amongst other demands- repeatedly asked for theconstruction of a separateroad for Mondi's traffic,decided to march on thefactory. This was after twomeetings with the manage-ment of Mondi had, accord-ing to the residents, ended ina deadlock. On the 4 August,several hundred residentstook their placards andwalked on the road towardsthe paper-mill. They werestopped by police claimingthat this was an illegaldemonstration. When theyrefused to disperse, teargaswas used and as a result twowomen sustained injuries.Mondi has now stated itwill undertake to build theseparate road for its trucks.However, no date has yetbeen set by management.The organisation ofMerebank's residents, theMerewent RatepayersAssociation, has declaredthat it will pursue its protestsuntil management under-takes to complete the roadby December 1991.The ANC in Merebankhas accused Mondi manage-ment of `benefiting fromapartheid', and called forconcrete steps to be takenurgently to meet its socialresponsibility to the healthof the community.After Mondi, of course,there are still the oil refiner-ies, the sewage plant, theindustrial area and theairport, which together makeMerebank one of the mostdangerously polluted areasin South Africa.And, in the most pollutedcountry in the world (ac-cording to recent scientificreports) that is very polluted.- Africa Information Afrique(AIA)PWV consumerboycott flopsmiserablythe unbanning of the libera-tion movements, the 'care-takers' gave way to the`captains' of the struggle.People started relying on theleadership for direction.But reality struck with thesuspension of armed struggleand violence, and a largesection of the youth foundpolitical accommodationelsewhere.The masses have lost touchwith the leadership. This hasbeen shown in the recentconsumer boycott, whichflopped miserably in thegreater Johannesburg region.In Soweto, a soundrelationship of consultationat a local level can only befound between the leader-ship and executive commit-tees of the organisations.At the bottom of thepyramid there are confusedmasses oscillating betweenactivity and inactivity.The euphoria that markedthe post-February 2 period isdwindling away.The success ofmass actionshould reflectthe effortpeople put intoit. During therecent con-sumer boycottthere was noexertion on the partof activists. It isbelieved that the messageonly reached the executivecommittees, but was neverrelayed to the masses.During the eighties,while the liberation move-ments were still banned,mass actions such asstayaways, consumerboycotts and marches werecarved out with success.ConsultationCivic bodies, church bodies,student bodies as well as theUnited Democratic Front(UDF) had greater confi-dence of the people, withwhom they consulted.People seemed unitedwith one objective - theunbanning of politicalorganisation and the releaseof the leaders, among otherthings.One township residentfeels that immediately afterQuestionsThere are many questionsthat may be asked: Were ouryouth interested only inseeing their organisationsand their leaders operatingfreely? Were the peopleexpecting, with the releaseof the leaders, instantliberation?Cosatu Northern Trans-vaal regional secre-tary, DonsieKhumalo, con-cedes that therewas very littlepreparation forthe boycott. Headmits thatconsumer_ boycotts inracially mixed areas,such as Johannesburg,should be reviewed.Moving around thestreets of Hillbrow, only twoout of ten people had heardabout the boycott, and onlyfour out of ten said that theywould support it if therewere good reasons.Many of those spoken tofelt that a boycott of whiteshops was `racist'.`It would have been farbetter to target specificshops which practisedracism, or which refused tosupport our demands,whether these shops wereowned by blacks or whites',said one activist.The lesson for organisa-tions is clear: before em-barking on mass action,consult the people first.Don't take their support, andmost crucially their consent,for granted. - MositoRaphela
Page 11 of 55 Can the Inkathagate be closed?JOHN AITCHISON assessesthe state of play in Natal afterthe Inkathagate scandal, andargues that peace accords,including the recent NationalPeace Initiative, are unlikely tosucceed if people on the groundare not consultedpage 6 wip 77For the past few weeks eventhe glummest of Natal con-flict watchers have looked abit more cheerful. It was theenjoyment of the vindicated.What they had privatelyknown to be true for years - that thesecurity police had an intimate relation-ship with Inkatha and Uwum-was nowpublic knowledge. Double and hiddenState and Inkatha agendas were nowhanging out to dry and looking considera-bly bleached.But the vindicated were not exces-sively cheerful as they watched sinkingships, a spot of white on white violence inVentersdorp, and a hit squad attempt onagent Cooper successfully distracting thetelephone owning community who getsurveyed by the HSRC. They begancontemplating the awful possibility ofInkathagate being closed and forgottenand the business of death continuing asusual.The press banners about Ventersdorpscreamed `bloodbath' but, with on aver-age four political deaths a day in Natal,bloodbaths can become normality. In thegarden province, the death toll sinceSeptember 1987 had risen to above fivethousand.What indeed has happened in Natal?Apart from getting increasingly angrywhen they hear Johannesburgers sayingthat `the' violence started in South Africain August 1990, and when high-up lead-ers in political movements, state andchurch debate solutions to the Natal con-flict without apparently consulting any-body on the ground in Natal, involvedpeople in this province are busy observ-ing the dynamic that is continuing to tearthe rural areas apart.The ruralisation of the NatalviolenceThe process of the Natal violence becom-ing embedded in ruralcommunities, whichfirst became clearly apparent in 1989, iscontinuing, with major conflicts occur-ring in midlands rural towns likeRichmond, Mooi River, Greytown, Est-court, and at Port Shepstone on the southcoast. By contrast, relative peace hasdescended on Pietermaritzburg's town-ships, Hammarsdale and large parts of theDurban area where the ANC seems to bedominant. This rural violence is under-reported and some of its specific charac-teristics poorly understood.Superficially, it appears that modern-ising comrades are brushing up directlyagainst KwaZulu's traditionalist tribalstructures, and in the process a number ofexisting factional disputes explode (par-ticularly in the Table Mountain andRichmond areas).As was experienced in the semi-ruralareas near Pietermaritzburg since 1987, afairly standard sequence of events seemsto have taken place in these newer areasof violence. A youth-driven politicalmobilisation sets the temperature soaringand after an initial disempowering of amoribund Inkatha/tribal structure, a fierceInkatha/traditionalist reaction, stiffenedby police, `warlord' and KwaZuIu fire-power (much of it imported from otherareas), drives the youth out to refuge inANC dominated areas. In the Port Shep-stone area this process has been exceed-ingly savage. In places like Richmond theyouth returned with a vengeance and thebattles continue.It is probable that under peacefulconditions Inkatha would be routed po-litically in most of these areas. But condi-tions are not peaceful. Inkatha often out-guns its opponents. Generally, KwaZuluand police support and tolerance haveenabled Inkatha to retain a place in thisring of towns round Pietermaritzburg.But, all otherthingsbeingequal,Inkatha'sprospects in the long term look grim.The academic shootoutFloating above the fight on the ground isthe academic struggle as to who under-stands the violence best. The best one cansay of this battle is that considerably.-papers have been written than thereare dead.The political or power struggle school(among which I suppose I am numbered)has been somewhat vindicated by theInkathagate revelations and David Ever-ett's analysis of the Transvaal conflict forCASE, as well as by departing Minister
Page 12 of 55 Gatsha Buthelezi: Perhaps more disturbing for Inkatha is not so much itslack of support as the active dislike the vast majority of blacks expresstowards it in a number of pollsVlok's very recent admission that 90% ofthe Natal violence was political and only10% criminal.The Inkatha Institute has not furtherrefined Gavin Woods rather abstractsocio-economic explanation, and therecent covey of retired National StudentFederation agents, who have winged theirway into Inkatha and KwaZulu, tend ratherto incline to the more fanciful of conspir-acy theories than to material economism.However, a recent Cosatu supportingsource, a finely nuanced paper by DougHindson and Mike Morris for the Eco-nomic Trends group, explains just abouteverything except the messy and irreduc-ible importance of human agency.Inkatha and the major playersyndromeAll the opinion polls of the last two yearsshow a systematic erosion of Inkatha andChief Buthelezi's popular support na-tionally. In the most recent HSRC tele-phone poll, Chief Buthelezi didn't evenget onto the list of major figures, andInkatha's support was I%. Perhaps moredisturbing for Inkatha was not so much itslack of support as the active dislike thevast majority of blacks express towards itin a number of polls (in some cases it isdisliked even more than the AWB).Indeed, one could be forgiven forthinking, on the basis of what has hap-pened over the last year, that Inkatha'sinsistence on being considered a majorplayer relies now mainly on its ability tocause pain and spoil rather than demo-cratic representativeness even of aminor-ity.Has Inkathagate now evisceratedInkatha's majorplayerchances? Is it likelyto be dumped by its black members andwhite supporters?Inkathagate provided clear evidenceof what the informed had known for years,that there was a de facto alliance betweenthe security arm of the state and Inkatha.It also raised some interesting thoughtsabout why there was a major escalation ofviolence in the region after both theNovember 1989 and March 1990 state-funded Inkatha rallies. The statistics areunequivocal in reporting a considerableescalation of conflict (as seen in the fa-talities) after these rallies.So one of the purported state ration-ales for the funding (to help peace) wasnot realised. At least a partial explanationis provided about who financed the `7 daywar' in the Pietermariuburg region thatstarted on the Tuesday after the March 25rally. It seems that this rally may havebeen paid for three times - by the state,by businessmen, and by Inkatha support-ers (people who had to pay for transport tothe rally). Even if, as the state claims,their money was used to pay for T-shirts,banners, broomsticks and hotdogs for theless than ten thousand people who at-INKATHAtended the rally, it is entirely plausible tosay that at a local level the now surplusrevenue could have been utilised to payfor the petrol (for transport and petrolbombs) and the inordinate amount ofammunition that was fired off by theInkatha forces during the war.But do the disclosures actually makeadifference? Certainly,ChiefButhelezi'score of loyal followers seem totally un-fazed by the revelations (and anywaythey indicate, if accurate, that most of theInkatha hierarchy was deeply implicatedin it all).One can only guess what has hap-pened to the rumours and indications of aNational Party/Inkatha alliance. Such adeal seems to me unlikely to garner DeKlerk many black votes and might in-stead plausibly lose him many. Indeed analliance with Inkatha might increase stra-tegic and tactical ANC rubbishing thatthe National Party should want to keep itshands clean of this mess. What one makesof the other rumours that suggest thatInkathagate was the result of a deliberategovernment leak designed to get rid ofwhat was now an albatross around itsneck, I don't know.Probably a more serious blow toInkatha is the guarded rapprochementbetween big business and Cosatu and thewhole social contract rhetoric that is in-creasingly being used by them. Uwusa isdead (not that it was ever very lively) andcapital's infatuation with Inkathabecauseof its union-bashing potential seems likelyto be stone cold within the very nearfuture. This is witnessed in the slightlymore robust criticism that is coming forthfrom capital's newspaper editorial writ-ers.The crucial test of all this speculationis what happens to give the commonperson security in the townships, squattercamps, rural areas and hostels.Peace and policingDown in theprovinces, the squatter campsand rurai slums, live those with a deepscepticism about what business, state,church and political leaders say whenthey announce grandiose peace settle-ments, like the current one which is sup-posed to bring shalom in mid-September.The people who are living there have seentoo many abortive peace settlementsskewered in the past. They are also unen-tranced by big hotel signings that are notaccompanied by genuine and adequatelyinfrastructured efforts on the ground.My own assessment is that given thedynamics of the grassroots violence, itwould require a massively final politicalsettlement, together with enormous so-cio-economic resources, to halt the proc-
Page 13 of 55 esses already deeply embedded in Natalsociety.The draft National Peace Initiativedocument published in the Sunday Timesof 18 August could have been written bya human rights lawyer (maybe it was) andif signed by the parties would be anenormous step forward. But it still needsto touch the ground. The collapse of theInkatha/ANC accord of 29 January wasaided by the almost complete absence ofon the ground structures to carry the accordforward or to monitor its progress.In the various crises that followed,monitoring groups found it extremelydifficult to get in touch with liaisoncommittee members who were both avail-able and had some authority. Either onemust utilize existing structures that workor budget the necessary time to set up newones. It is almost irresponsible to signhigh level agreements without having inplace the appropriate peace process infra-structure. Each failure on the groundfurther devalues top level peace negotia-tions.Another worry relating to the Na-tional Peace Initiative is the compositionof the Inkatha Freedom Party team - forwhat real clout do Mdlalose, Felgate andVos really have? Where are the Myents,Khozas and Khawulas who call the realshots on the ground? Will they reallyabide any agreement?BUILT ENVIRONMENT SUPPORT GROUPBESG is a development NGO working in-% the fields of housing, community buildingsand local govemment in Natal and fullerafield. BE' G provides a range, of servicesto community ba==-i ons,induding techncal , researchand pollq formulation, and support in theirstruggles. Following an expansion ofactivities, new positions have been created.DIRECTOR/CO-ORDINATORSomeone with special qualities to head the organisation, manage administration and co-ordinate various programmes. The applicant should have appropriate qualifications andextensive exPerience with develoPmerit issues, and an ability to work creatively and effectivelywith people. The applicant should also be committed to a iust and equitable society.SENIOR ADMINISTRATORThe applicant shall be an experienced administrator to handle all financial, staffing and fundingaffairs, as well as administrative functions. An appropriate qualification will be important.ARCHITECT/ARCHITECTURAL TECHNICIANAn experienced architectural technician or junior architect to work on housing and communitybuilding projects, township layouts, site surveys and possibly site supervision.Application forms and further particulars can be obtained from:The Chairperson, BESG, University of Natal, King George V Aye, Durban 4000.Fax: (031) 815006 Telephone: (031) 816-2267For queries: ask for ColleenClosing date: 7? September 1991A crucial factor in any peace drive isthe ability and the will of the police to takeeffective action against murderers, ar-sonists and intimidators. So far their at-tempts (in so far as there were attemptsgiven the collusion between the securitypolice and Inkatha) have been dismal. Mycurrent estimate is that less than 5% of5000 political murders in Natal since 1987have led to trials. This legal lethargy doesnot only apply to Inkatha supporters butalso to UDF/ANC ones. The few signs ofhope have been the arrests and convictionof KwaZulu Minister Jamile and KwaZ-ulu MP Ndlovu, and the recent appear-ance in court of the police allegedly re-sponsible for the Trust Feeds massacre ofDecember 1988. Two KwaZulu chiefshave also been arrested on charges ofmurder. Inmost of these cases the identityof the alleged killers was publicly knownfor years and the arrests may signify apolicy shift that may be reinforced byVlok's departure.Cultural weaponsHowever, it is fair to say that, in spite ofsome improvements, the state has notadequately addressed the need to halt theviolence through effective professionalpolicing, and has also refused to stopInkatha and vigilante groups bearing dan-gerous weapons at rallies and marches.The `cultural weapons' debate is in-deed symptomatic of what is wrong withthe current situation. In one sense thedebate serves as an enormous distraction,for what right-minded state would allowthe provocative carrying of lethal weap-ons in public at a time of unrest. The realproblem is that the police have been to-tally ineffective in halting the slaughterof thousands of people by men armedwith assault rifles, shotguns and a varietyof hand weapons. Murderers are appar-ently immune.The real significance of the legalisa-tion (as De Klerk did late last year aftermore than a century of prohibition) of theright of `Zulus' to carry cultural weaponsshows that there are still powerful forceswithin the state whose actions are intenton dividing and disaggregating the blackpopulation of South Africa in the inter-ests of the National Party. The artificialencouragement of a destructive ethni-cism at this stage in our history is appall-ing. Yet we are faced with the reality thatmuch damage has already been done andwill continue to be done.Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi's stresson a Zulu ethnic identity, and claims thatany criticism of Inkatha or the KwaZulu`self-governing state' is a racial attack on`Zulus' (though in reality Inkatha speaksfor a minority of Zulu-speaking people),led to an ever destructive reaction whichlinks them psychologically with the Afri-kaner right.I recently conferred with an Inkathaleader who agreed with my assessmentthat the African National Congress wouldgain control of all the urban areas inNatal. Indeed he averred that they alreadyhad. But that, he said, was irrelevant:`That is the fault of English. The town-ships are their creation. Inkatha rejectsthe townships'.Lying behind this perception is a radi-cal denial of historical processes and ofmodernity. Politically defeated in themodem arena, Inkatha is psychologicallyretreating to apre-colonial nostalgia. Thatit is impossible to go back is not grasped,nor that the very attempt to do so isreactionary and corrupting. There is noZulu Eden in which an untarnished King-dom can be reanimated.The long-term consequences of thislethal period in South African history willbe painful, particularly for the littlepeopleon the ground, the street-level combat-ants on both sides. For them the war hasbrought nothing but suffering and loss.Victories are Pyhirric and the damage,both material and psychic, deeply em-bedded in communities. John Aitchison is based at the Univer-sity of Natal-Pietermaritzburg.
Page 14 of 55 LOUISE FLANAGAN of theIndependent Board of Inquiryinto Informal Repression exposesa covert SADF-linked militarygroup in the Ciskei, which hasbeen destabilising the region,including the -1 .,Lt Ntantiso Kleinbooi, ex-Ciskel Military Intelligence - the first to expose --"Gqozo's secret unit Holomisa's Transkei governmentHitoath Africa appears to be,behind the claimed disband-ing of a covert militarygroup setup by Ciskei mili-tary ruler Brigadier ()upsGqozo, which has beentraining an expanded aimed force and hasbeen accused of destabilising the region.The group, initially called Interna-tional Research (IR) and now known asCiskei Intelligence Services (CIS), hasn accused of telling Gqozo he wasrider threat from both the ANC and fromwithin Transkei, apparently as an excuseto attack regional ANC members and theTranskei military government. Last monthsenior South African Foreign Affairs andDefence Force staff met with the Ciskeigovernment in what was believed to bethe first moves towards closing the groupdown.South Africa denies linkTo date, the Department of Foreign Af-
Page 15 of 55 fairs has declined to comment on IR/CIS.Last month an SADF spokesman saidthose implicated (see profiles on page 13)were not members of the SADF and thatthe SADF was `in no way involved in thisorganisation.'Over the past year, the group has beenaccused of: involvement in the abortive November,990 coup attempt in Transkei, in whichleader Colonel Craig Duli was killed; luring Ciskei rebels Charles Sebe andOnward Guzana back to Ciskei and kill-ing them in an ambush; stockpiling arms; threatening a former member who ex-posed them; trying to recruit a journalist on a localnewspaper to spy for them; fabricating threats against Gqozo fromthe ANC and within Transkei as an ex-cuse for turning the military governmentagainst these groups.On August-6 South African deputy-director of Foreign Affairs Rusty Evansand chief of the South African DefenceForce (SADF) General Kat Liebenbergmet with the Ciskei Council of State for`confidential discussions on matters ofmutual interest'. The Ciskei governmentconfirmed the meeting but would give nodetails.It is believed the group met over thefuture of IR/CIS. Both Ciskei and SouthAfrica have come under a lot of pressurerecently to account for the group's activi-ties, but so far Ciskei has tried to cover upthe unit and South Africa has deniedknowledge of its activities.Ciskei Military Intelligence (MI) chiefColonel Gert Hugo, who fled Ciskei inlate July, told a press con ference in Um tatathat former South African Defence Force(SADF) colonel Jan Breytenbach wastraining a new paratrooper regiment inCiskei. This follows independent reportsthat Breytenbach had been seen in Ciskeiin military uniform, driving a Ciskeimilitary vehicle, and that SADF troopsfrom Bloemfontein, where the SADFparabats are based, were deployed inCiskei.Hugo directly linked Breytenbach'swork to IR/CIS, saying that he had beenbrought in by the unit. Hugo claimed thatBreytenbach was being assisted by for-mer `recces' from the SADF. In responseto questions on Breytenbach's presencein Ciskei, the SADF would say only thatBreytenbach had retired from the SADFyears ago.Hugo questioned the need for Ciskeito expand its forces in this way. `He'sallowing people to develop a force toprotect only himself. How the hell doesthat make sense? What threat?' said Hugo.Oupa Gqozo: easily influencedGqozo sets up groupIR/CIS has been operating in the regionfor the past year. It was set up aroundAugust 1990 by Gqozo himself.Ciskei has never denied setting upsuch a unit or that Gqozo heads it. Theyhave denied its activities.`Any government in the world has theright (and responsibility) to establish acovert and secret intelligence service toensure the security of the state and itscitizens. To imply that such a service issinister and abnormal would be totallyirresponsible,' said a Ciskei governmentstatement in February, after the unit'sexistence was initially exposedby CiskeiMilitary Intelligence (MI) officer Lieu-tenant Ntantiso Kleinbooi.IR/CIS is headed by three white SouthAfrican men, all former officers in theSADF. They are Jan Anton Nieuwoudt,Ted Brassell and Clive Brink (see pro-files). Nieuwoudt is the head.Nieuwoudt, Brink and Brassell havebeen named by numerous sources, in-cluding Kleinbooi, Hugo and Melane.`Gqozo personally recruited AntonNieuwoudt,' stated Hugo. When Klein-booi was asked who headed the unit, hesaid: `I said, it's an Anton Nieuwoudt.'The group expanded and those namedat one time or other as being part of itinclude more former SADF men, Ciskeisoldiers, security policemen, men alleg-edly linked to the CCB and men linked tohit squad-style killings in the region (seesidebar).According to Hugo, the unit forcedout South African Brian Campbell, theman hired by Ciskei to set up a NationalIntelligence unit and took over this func-tion themselves.The group was structured with thethree former SADF officers in the con-trolling positions, the security policemenand former security policemen immedi-ately below them, and the soldiers at thebottom of the hierarchy.Nieuwoudt controlling forceThe implications are that the white offi-cers set up a structure which 'piggy-backed' on an already existing networkbetween the South African, Ciskei andTranskei police, probably set up someyears ago. While both soldiers and policewere involved, neither the Ciskei armynor police appears to have had any con-trol over it, and there are indications thatfor a long time senior army officers didnot even know of the existence of the unit.'In the Ciskei Defence Force I thinkfew people know of the existence of them,'stated Kleinbooi in February. He added,`They (the CDF) don't know about whatis happening in Ciskei, only those threepeople (Nieuwoudt, Brink and Brassell)know what is happening'.Gqozo is the ultimate head of thegroup but Nieuwoudt appears to be thecontrolling force and possibly even givesGqozo instructions.`He (Ggozo) is easily influenced,' saidKleinbooi after fleeing Ciskei in Febru-ary this year. `His change of attitudetowards the people and organisationsstarted after the establishment of thisInternational Research.'This is supported by a look at the pressstatements put out by Ciskei: there is anoticeable change in attitude in the lastquarter of the year.`The three guys (Nieuwoudt, Brinkand Brassell) are the people who are tell-ing Gqozo what to do, and they are doingthat in the interest of South Africa throughits Foreign Department,' said Kleinbooi.Keeping alive an ANC/Transkei`threat'Hugo claimed that Nieuwoudt has totalcontrol over Gqozo. He said that as theunit's existence depends on the existenceof threats against Gqozo, the unit activelyfabricates evidence of threats. `The plot isalways there because it motivates theirexistence,' said Hugo. `The threat isalways kept alive.'It appears that the `threat' was paintedby IR/CIS as coming from both the ANCand from within Transkei.An indication of the unit's powerfulposition is the resources they have accessto. It is believed that Nieuwoudt, Brinkand Brassell were paid between R 130 andR 140 000 each a year with full benefits,housing allowances and special funds.
Page 16 of 55 Infrastructure, regional fragmentation and uncertaintyabout reincorporation. According to Godfrey Howes,who represented White Local Authorities from KingWilliam's Town, only 36 factories out of some 120 atDimbaza were still operational.The news from the rural areas was also bleak: BorderCivic Congress (Bocco) president, Otto Tokwe, blamedBrigadier Oupa Gqozo's dismissal of civics andreintroduction of unrepresentative tribal authorities forexacerbating tenslonsin the villages.Political organisations and the business community In Another Issue that was debated was the role of thethe Border have forged a working relationshiptocounter ANC. Andre de Wet, DP MP, said the source of the twothe threat of violence in the region, following a Border major tensions In the region - between the Ciskel endPeace Conference hosted jointly last month. the ANC, and between the Transkei and the NP-was theit is the first time organisatlons in the region have same: the NP still saw the ANC as the 'enemy that mustcanvassed business to rally behind such an initiative, be conquered at all costs'.according to Steve Tshwete, the ANC's national De Wet said such an approach would be In line withorganiser. the NP programme In Natal and the Transvaal and couldSpeaking from the local ANC office, he said: `P come spell disaster for the Border.from this area and I know business has been reserved. Most participants, including the ANC, SACP, Cosatu,But an awareness emerged fro m' this conference that Bocco and BCC, called for the removal of Gqozo and hisyou cannot separate business and politics.' security forces and the reincorporation of the Ciskel.The background to the conference lay in the June The chairperson of the Zwelltsha SACP branch, Godfreyconsumer boycott, called by the ANC and supported by ' Goba, stressed the necessityof removing Gqozo himself,the SACP, Cosatu and Border Civic Congress (Bocco), not simply trying to repair the damage he has done.in an attempt to focus attention on the increasing The conference decided to make representations torepression in the region. For several months before the the State President, FW de Klerk about the potentialaction, various groupings had warned that elements' violence and elected a steering committ..totak.fomardwithin the Border were creating conditions which could the resolutions.lead to an explosion of violence, similar to Natal' or the While the committee has since formed two sub-Reef.The boycott was called off at the end of the month, asit was felt the business community had taken steps toaddress the boycott demands. The peace conferencewas subsequently organised for 27 July.It was attended by a broad spectrum of delegates, blamed for much of the clampdown - remains Inrepresenting the National Party' (NP), white local existence (see main story), pensioners have been told toauthorities, the Democratic Party (DP) the ANC, join Ggozo's African Democratic Movement, or facechurches, business, the Transkei government and losing their pensions, and an open war of words hasobservers from SA Foreign Affairs. The Ciskei broken out between the Transkei and Ciskei overgovernment withdrew the day before' the' conference, allegations of Ggozo's involvement in attempting tocondemning it as a `kangaroo court'. topple Ho lomisa's military government.Delegates described how political instability, It Is clear that Gqozo is determined to stay In powerimpoverished living conditions and the bleak economic whatever the cost and will not hesitate to lash out atclimate were aggravated by the Ciskei government and organisations which 'challenge his monopoly. He hasthe many borders in the region. attacked the ANC, civics, trade unions and the churchesErrolSpring,arepresentative fortheBorder Business and warned communists that he will `clean up' theAction Committee representing most major employers Ciskel.in Border, told the conference that business had been That the peace conference in itself was a success is'caught in the crossfire between conflicting'' parties'. not disputed. But the real measure of its success will beSpring said businesswasadversely affected bylabour the extent to which its committee can implement theunrest complicated by three different labour laws, resolutions passed, and whether peace and stability canabsenteeism,underdevelopment,abadcommunications be restored to the region. - Claire Keeton/elnewsBorder - businessand politicians actagainst violencecommittees, one on constitutional Issues Includingreincorporation, and one on development, Instabilityand repression remain the order of the day in the region.People have been harassed and detained, the covertCCB-type operation called International Researchers-Hugo supported this, stating that the theywere paid about R140 000 pa each anddrove BMW cars.As the Professional Research Foun-dation, the three paid an East Londondealer R119 899.90 in cash for a BMWeach in September last year. When theybought the cars, the men allegedly askedfor them to be issued with registrationnumbers that would not be easy to re-member.Col Hugo said they told him they hadspent RI-million in their first year ofoperation.Members were instructed to gatherinformation about opposition to Gqozo,both among the general population andwithin the army. The unit appears to havebeen working to protect Gqozo himselfrather than the whole military council orthe general population of Ciskei.
Page 17 of 55 They used bugging devices and taperecorders, and kept track of members ofthe ANC's armed wing UmkhontoweSizwe. Atone point, Nieuwoudt men-tioned to unit members the possibility ofa joint Ciskei and South African opera-tion against ANC guerillas. This is be-lieved to be `Operation Cable' referred toearlier this year and the subject of tele-phone calls from ANC deputy-presidentNelson Mandela to Gqozo at the time.Assignments to killIR/CIS did not simply gather informationbut also carried out several operations,resulting in the deaths of several people.Some of the actions they have been linkedto are: Last year's abortive coup attempt inTranskei, in which coup leader ColonelCraig Duli and others were killed. Tran-skei has forwarded a diplomatic note toSouth Africa asking for assistance in in-terviewing 24 people in connection withthis action. They include Foreign Affairsminister Pik Botha, embassy officialsRusty Evans and Dries Venter, Gqozo,Nieuwoudt, Brink, Brassell and ConstableWana who has also been linked to theunit.The January deaths of Ciskei rebelsColonel Onward Guzana and CharlesSebe. There has been evidence fromseveral different sources, including courtrecords, that IR/CIS planned and carriedout the luring back to Ciskei and fatalambushing of Sebe and Guzana. Anotherof the unit's activities was stock-pilingarms. On February 6 a secret deliv-ery of arms was made to the unit's base inthe ministerial compound. It was deliv-ered by two white men.It was this arms cache that led to theinitial exposure of the unit in Februarythis year. Melane, chief of Ggozo's body-guards Lieutenant Kadefunwa Qamataand then MI chief Lieutenant-ColonelPeter Zantsi arranged during a night-timeoperation on February 8 for the weaponsto be removed from the house and takento 1 Ciskei Battalion base on the otherside of Bisho.,Then the following day Lt-Col Zantsisummoned all the senior officers of theCDF to go to 1 Ciskei Battalion to see theweapons and decide what was to be done.I was one of the officers,' said Kleinbooionly days -after this happened. Instead,troops opened fire on the officers andthey were all arrested, including Zantsi,Melane and the then head of the CDFBrigadier A. Jamangile.Kleinbooi escaped to tell the story,and Qamata's body was found floating ina dam with a bullet-wound in the head afew days later. The inquest into his deathThe luxurious house of IR/CIS head Jan Niewoudt: It is believed thatNieuwoudt, Brink and Brassell were paid between 8130 and R140 000each a year with full benefits, housing allowances and special funds.is currently being heard.Ciskei claimed this was a coup at-tempt. `It was not a coup,' stated Klein-booi atthetime. `Most of the people werejust arrested because they saw the weap-ons.' Hugo supported this, stating thatthis removal of all the top army officerswas engineered by IR/CIS and gave theunit increased control over the army:`It is significant that during these coupallegations there appears to have been aclose liaison between the RSA ForeignAffairs Department, Ciskei and SABC,where inflammatory statements againstindividuals and governments were made,'said Holomisa in reponse to Kleinbooi'sallegations. `Against this background it isimperative that the truth comes out aswhat in reality happened in this region'.It has never been made clear just whatthese weapons were supposed to havebeen used for, or what happened to themafter they were taken to the CDF base. Atthe time there were a lot of rumours in theregion that Ciskei was planning a jointoperation with South Africa against ANCguerrillas in Mdantsane township.`Rumours persist that an operationwas going to be launched against MKcadres and others in Ciskei which ofcourse, Gqozo denies,' said Holomisa.`Such rumours whether fact or fiction area serious threat to the organisations whichhave been unbanned, some of who. areexploring ways of resolving the SouthAfrican political impasse peacefully onthe negotiating table. They further threatenthe very process of peaceful negotiation'.On March 8, the day Melane was re-leased from detention resulting from theabove incident, his relative BonginkoseKondilati was stopped by Nieuwoudt andBrink near the Blacklands farm.Nieuwoudt, holding a gun, ordered Kon-dilati out of his car, searched him andquestioned him about weapons Melanehad taken from the unit's offices.In a subsequent court application toprevent the unit from harassing Melane,Kondilati claimed Nieuwoudt had threat-ened to kill Melane. Nieuwoudt con-firmed the rest of the incident but deniedthe threat. He did say that `It is correct thatI spoke in a serious way, and that I wasangry.'The May 27 armed attack on the Dim-baza home of ANC official Smuts Ngo-nyama, linked to the unit. Hugo alsohinted that the unit had been responsible,saying that `Anton Nieuwoudt borrowed mybalaclava and said they've got anotherjob to do' late the night of the attack;Between May 24 and June 24, Brink andanother unit member, Paul Oeschger, triedto recruit Daily Dispatch journalist An-drew Trench, offering him `information'in return for `help'.They said they were concerned aboutthe newspaper's coverage of Ciskei andhoped he could assist them. When herefused to promise anything, Brink threat-
Page 18 of 55 ened that he could have Trench called upto the SADF. The spate of anonymous pamphlets dis-tributed in Transkei over the past fewweeks, calling on people to revolt againstthe military rule of Major-General BantuHolomisa, which Holomisa has linked toIR/CIS. On July 15 Melane was detained byCiskei. Although it was announced thathe had been detained by police, Hugosubsequently stated that he had beenpicked up by MI staff acting on the ordersof the Council of State. This meant thatthe action appears to be in contempt of aninterim court ruling preventing Melanefrom being harassed. Hugo stated thatMelane had grounds to sue Ciskei forwrongful arrest.South African involvementIt's very clear that South Africa musthave had some knowledge of the group, ifnot actively supported it.`There is a connection between thatgroup and the police in East London andI can say even in King William's Townbecause I sometimes went to the securitycouncil where Anton Nieuwoudt is also amember and that is where he used tomention his connections,' said Kleinbooiin February.Hugo referred to it as `an undercoveroperation by the SADF'. The most likelysenario is that a conservative section ofthe SADF unofficially sanctions and co-operates with the unit. Hugo also statedthat Nieuwoudt had `open and free' liai-son with SADF military intelligence.Hugo also said that Nieuwoudt hadonce told him that even Ggozo himselfwas on the South African MI payroll.Earlier this year the SADF flatly deniedany knowledge of Nieuwoudt, Brink orBrassell, despite the fact that all threewere senior officers.`None of these men are members ofthe SA Defence Force,' said an SADFspokesman on February 21.`The Defence Force has no knowl-edge of this organisation (InternationalResearch) because it is not part of theDefence Force. Therefore the DefenceForce also has no knowledge of these so-called operations.'The SADF reiterated this last month,stating that the men were not membersand that details of any service with theSADF should be got from either the menthemselves or the organisations whichthey were working with.The South African ambassador toCiskei, Pieter Goosen, has confirmed thathis government had been aware of theexistence of IR/CIS, but denied anyknowledge of their activities.The men involvedOver 20 people have been linked to International Research/Ciskei IntelligenceServices:* Jan Anton Nieuwoudt has been described as the head of the unit by those whohave come into contact with it.He is believed to live in a luxurious house on the Gonubie River. The houseis situated in a cul-de-sac, which appears to be a tactic adopted by severalmembers of the group for security reasons. He drives a silver BMW.Although the SADF previously denied any knowledge of Nieuwoudt, Brink andBrassell, former Ciskei Military Intelligence (MI) officer Lieutenant NtantisoKleinbooi said Nieuwoudt had been a colonel in the SADF, and an anonymous faxsent from the CDF stated that he had served with the Far North Command and wasa former CCB member.Nieuwoudt is believed to have been part of a secret SADF camp called Hippoin northern Namibia which trained Inkatha fighters in guerilla warfare, exposed bythe Weekly Mail in September last year.Nieuwoudt's deputies in International Researchers are Clive Brink and TedBrassell.* Clive Brink is a former member of SADF MI, where Hugo said he was involvedin counter-intelligence. While trying to recruit Daily Dispatch journalist AndrewTrench, Brink said that he had been a colonel in the SADF.Kleinbooi referred to him as the unit's 'technical man'.*Ted Brassell is along standing East Londoner. He served for four years as a citycouncillor and spent a period as deputy-mayor in 1978. A description attached toan article which Brassell wrote in the Daily Dispatch in 1984 stated that: 'MajorBrassell is a staff officer at Group 8 headquarters in the city.' This has beenconfirmed by others locally who remembered him from this period.As an NRP candidate, he contested the provincial seat for Griqualand East in1977 but failed to be elected. In 1980 he joined the National Party.*Paul Oeschger. Hugo said that Oeschger was a former member of the SADFSpecial Forces and worked for SADF MI, where he was involved in counterintel-ligence.* 'Cassie' whose background is unknown.* 'Piet', according to Hugo, served with the SWA Special Forces.*Lieutenant-Colonel Chris Nel, seconded to MI under Hugo. Hugo said that Nelwas the main interrogator of captured Swapo guerrillas in Oshakati and in 1985/6 was an intelligence officer in the Special Forces. He is believed to have beenactive in the CCB.* Colonel Ockert Swanepoel, also seconded to MI under Hugo. Hugo describedhim as having been part of 32 Battalion and Special Forces. He is thought to havebeen linked to the CCB.* Shane Brassell, named by Hugo, who said Brass 11 was a former sergeant in theEastern Province command and Ted Brassell's son.* Colonel Dirk van der Bank, named by Hugo as the deputy-commander of theCDF although Hugo referred to him as effectively the commander. Hugo said thatVan der Bank is Nieuwoudt's cousin. The implication of this is that through Vander Bank, IR/CIS could control the CDF.* Basie Oosthysen, believed to be apolitical advisor' to Gqozo. Hugo named himas the chief organiser for Gqozo's new African Democratic Movement.* General JJ Viktor, Ciskei's new commissioner of police. Viktor was at one stagethe regional commander at Northern Transvaal security.* Jan Breytenbach, a former colonel in the SADF and the founder leader of 32Battalion. According to Hugo, he was recruited by Nieuwoudt and his cousin Vander Bank to train paratroopers. Hugo said he believed that Breytenbach was being'led by the nose' by Nieuwoudt.None of the above men are among the six named by South Africa in July aspersonnel seconded to the Ciskei by the SADF. - Louise Flanagan (IndependentBoard of Inquiry into Informal Repression)
Page 19 of 55 Sharpening the spearfor peaceDEVAN PILLAY spoke todelegates at the recent historicconference of Umkhonto weSizwe (MK), and discovered thatwhile great strides have beenmade in clarifying the role of thearmy, it remains to be seenwhether severe problems ofneglect and welfare will beovercomeWhen prominent MKleader and ANC NECmember RonnieKasrils said on SABC-TV's Agenda pro-gramme recently thatUmkhonto we Si, we's current role wasthat of an army for peace, the mainlywhite television audience jeered.While they listened politely to theANC's Pallo Jordan and Cyril Rama-phosa, to them Kasrils was just mouthinganother far-fetched communist lie. Afterall, MK represented the `violent', `terror-ist' face of the ANC. It is seen as theblemish the movement must remove tobecome fully respectable and part of thenormal arrangements of political life.This, of course, is in stark contrast towhat many black people believe. Theyouth, in particular, have an image ofglorious gladiators poised to strike thefatal blows at an oppressive system, andestablish lasting freedom and justice. Themere mention of MK elicits wild, enthu-siastic responses at marches and rallies.Although the inability of MK thus farto defend townships under attack fromrightwing forces may have dented thatimage in some quarters, the magic aura isstill there.But the view of MK as a `blemish' isnot necessarily confined to white SouthAfricans and others who have succumbedto years of state propaganda. The allegedneglect of MK by the ANC leadershipsince the ANC's unbanning, and themanner in which armed struggle wassuspended, gave rise to fears in MK thatthe armed wing of the movement was
Page 20 of 55 being consciously marginalised. Thegovernment persistently portrayed MKas an obstacle to negotiations and, in theirdesire to be seen as reasonable, the ANCleadership gave the impression that it hadsuccumbed to this pressure.But MK is neither an undisciplinedforce posing a threat to negotiations, noris it an all-mighty saviour of the people.The recent MK conference in Vendaexposed a guerrilla movement that was instark contrast to common white percep-tions. While not the cohesive, shiny forcemany youth picture, MK soldiers wereimpressive with their high level of de-bate, their disciplined and responsibleapproach to the tasks which lie ahead,their determination to assist in establish-ing peace in this country, and to build anew army which defends the new consti-tution, and not any political party.The conference was also an opportu-nity for MK cadres, returnees and those incamps outside, to voice their deep dissat-isfaction about the way MK has been ne-glected since February 2.In an attempt to directly address allthe challenges facing the ANC's armedwing, the conference focused on fourmain areas: the welfare of returningcombatants, as well as those still in campsoutside the country; the creation of self-defence units (SDUs) ; the building of anew, democratic army out of existingarmies; and the restructuring of MK as alegal presence within the country. Beforelooking more closely at these issues, letus briefly trace the background leading toconference.Suspension of armed struggleAccording to Kasrils, MK went throughthree distinct phases before the currentphase of transition. The first, from 1961to 1965, saw the break with non-violence,and the launch of MK through sabotagecampaigns, and the recruitment of cadresfor training.The second period, from about 1963 to1973/6, was the period of exile, the post-Rivonia period when the ANC was cut offfrom home. The third phase, from 1976until the unbannings, saw operationsincreasing dramatically. The emphasiswas placed on armed propaganda, and themerging, during 1983 to 1986, of armedactivity with the mass movement. Thepossibility of popular insurrection camedramatically to the fore.This, says Kasrils, `frightened theregime, as there was the serious potentialand threat that if we achieved that merger,we would be on the road to a revolution-ary situation'. Thus, he says, `the regimeand imperialist countries took note', andmajor reforms were implemented, inparticular the lifting of the bans on theANC, SACP, MK and PAC, and the re-turn of exiles.The role of MK after the unbanningshas now changed significantly. With thesuspension of armed struggle, the empha-sis is on the regrouping and stabilisationof MK. This has been especially urgentafter the demoralisation and confusionthat set in when the suspension was an-nounced.Although some ANC leaders insistthat there was adequate consultation whenthe ANC suspended the armed strugglelast year, MK Chief of Staff and ANCNEC member Chris Hani, in an interviewwith Esther Waugh (Pretoria News 9/8/91) admits that the suspension causeddeep resentment among MK soldiers:`The soldiers are angry about all sortsof things. Their anger is based on the factthat they don't think we should havetaken that decision last year. Theyfeel... there should have been broaderconsultation'.This was confirmed by senior MKcommander Che Ogara, at a press confer-ence after the MK conference.Last December's consultative confer-ence endorsed the decision in the end,confirming that there was no principledobjection to the suspension from MKsoldiers. It was the way it was done thatwas the problem. According to RefiloeManana, a Zimbabwe-based commander,the `suspension was rushed. It was notproperly canvassed inside the countryand outside. The leadership was supposedto consult the army, the population andthe mass democratic movement'.Call for MK conferenceNelson Mandela visited MK camps soonafter his release last year, and MK held amajor seminar in April 1990, where,according to Manana, `the mutinies andappalling conditions of MK soldiers, in-cluding poor housing, in Zambia, Angolaand Tanzania' was discussed, amongother concerns of the army.But after the entire national leader-ship left Lusaka to return to South Africa,MK cadres left outside felt abandoned,especially since agreement had not yetbeen reached with the government abouttheir indemnity and return.At the December conference it wasnoted that an MK conference was neces-sary, where, says Manana, `issues wouldbe sharply raised and discussed', in par-ticular the violence and the well-being ofthe army. That, it was felt, would meet theaspirations of the army.Calvin Khan, MK projects officer anda member of the MK conference prepara-tory committee, adds that at the Decem-ber conference there was still no clarityabout the way forward, and there was noserious analysis about the role o MK inthe new situation. MK had to come toterms with the move from `seizure ofpower' to `transfer of power', and how torelate armed struggle to this new context.By the time of the July conference,says Khan, `the political image of MKbecame clearer'. Sufficient time hadelapsed between the unbannings and theconference for the movement to under-stand the realities it faced, and the politi-cal importance of engaging the state innegotiations, without ignoring the contra-dictions involved, as the Groote Schuur,Pretoria and DF Malan agreements high-light.MK makes impact on ANCconferenceThe MK conference was originally goingto be held before the July conference but,says Khan, this was `not practicallypossible'. This meant that theMKconfer-ence could only make recommendationsto the ANC leadership.Did this not seriously undermine thesignificance of the conference?No, says Khan, because MK was ableto insert important demands into the ANCconference, as reflected in the far-reach-ing resolution on MK, which was unani-mously adopted.Among other things the resolutioncommitted the ANC to `maintain anddevelop MK' until a new democraticconstitution was adopted. Until such time,the equipment of the movement `shallNOT be surrended to the regime'. MKshould `remain in constant combat readi-ness', and the ANC shall accept `fullresponsibility' for any cadres who arearrested or detained by the police, whilecarrying out their duties `in the defence ofthe people'. The NEC was also bound toensure that adequate funds were madeavailable for the welfare of cadres insideand outside the country, as well as provid-ing offices and `resources' for MK activi-ties, including the defence of communi-ties under attack.Disciplined cadresSome delegates were highly scepticalabout the value of the conference whenthey first arrived. One cadre, formerUganda ANC representative ThenjiweMtintso, says that she would have pre-ferred the MK conference to have beenheld before the ANC conference, as shefeels that the MK delegates to the latterwere guided `only by our own opinions',and not by a more forceful MK mandate.It was also felt that not everyone was in-formed in time about the MK conference,
Page 21 of 55 Forging a democratic armyThe MK conference resolved to 'set up a commission toexplore and research the form and content of a futureregular army'.The regrouping and consolidation through SDUs andmarshalls, as well as setting up a re-gional command sytem inside thecountry, are essential aspects of whatMK sees as its ultimate objective-be-coming part of a transformed nationaldefence force.A major development in the think-ing of MK leaders is the recognitionthat the present SADF cannot be wishedaway, and there needs to be some ac-commodation of Its vast experienceand expertise. The trick, however, Is tomerge the various armies, includingthose of the PAC, Azapo and the ban-tustans, without succumbing to thedomination of the SAD F.Hani (Pretoria News 9/8/91) felt confident that a newnon-racial army can be created to defend the new consti-tution, and not any political party. Such an army, heargued, need not be very strong numerically, as it wouldserve primarily to protect the country's skies and seas.As long as the SADF accepted that It would in future beaccountable to a different kind of parliament to thepresent one, HanI saw no problem in using the skills,expertise and professionalism ofthe SADF.Onthe SADF'sinsistence on maintaining standards, Hani said:'But there will be standards. Certain tests will becarried out - intelligence tests, physical tests - be-cause the army has to draw into It the best mentally andphysically.'MK, however, is no match for the well-equipped andpowerful SADF. To ensure that the merger does notmerely mean a few MK leaders occupying high-profilepositions In and SADF-dominated future army, MK has asone of Its priorities the training of advanced cadres inacademies outside. Countries such as India, Uganda,Libya, Cuba, Nigeria, France and even Britain have beenmentioned.According to Kasrils, there will be a 2-3 year transitionperiod, during which training will be provided for officersIn the airforce, navy and ground forces. MK has a smallnucleus of such people already, 'but we have to Increasethat number', he says.Dual power?But can MK really avoid being dominated by the SADFResearcher Laurie Nathan of the Centre for IntergroupStudies In Cape Town has his doubts.Nathan fears that there will be a 'dual power' situationafter apartheid, where a democratic government will nothave complete control over its own defence force. Keyelements In the transition from colonial rule to democ-racy in Zimbabwe and Namibia are missing, he says.These are the absence of an international authority tooversee the process, and a mutually-binding ceasefire.The creation of an Interim government may not over-come the dangers inherent here, says Nathan, because'It Is unlikely to enjoy the moral au-thority of an international body, norwill it have an impartial peacekeepingagency and sufficient monitoringforces at Its disposal'.The SADF, as the strongest army inAfrica, Is sufficuentlywell-endowed toswamp the III-equipped and differentlytrained MK. It has 'extensive conven-tional battle experience, a highly de-veloped infrastructure and technicallyadvanced weaponry and equipment',says Nathan. The SADF's current sizeis 75 000 permanent force members, astanding operational force of 125 000,and a total reserve of 455 000. In addition, the SAP Is firmly in the control of white officers, andthis may not change for some time to come.MK at most has 10 000 soldiers, many of whom do notnecessarily see themselves as being part of a new armyor poll. force.For Nathan the spectre of military Intervention Islikely to haunt a new government for some time, thus sti-fling any moves towards fundamentally transformingsociety. The SADF's record of destabilisation Internallyand externally strengthens this fear. The present rulingestablishment, while willing to concede major politicalspace, is unlikely to give up Its 'security fall-back'.The extent to which a future army will Intervene in thepolitical process depends on a number of factors: thesuccess Wand the ANC has in instilling a sense of con-fidence in a non-racial government; the stability of thenew order; and, crucially, the extent to which MK andother armies are fully Integrated Into the new army, onthe firm basis of professionalism and loyalty to theconstitution.Nathan points to considerable dangers that lie ahead.The ANC-led alliance may win major battles In Its fight fora thoroughly democratic constitution, but come libera-tion Itmay find itself unable to do much more than tinkerwith change. This is assuming that the security forceswill allow an ANC/SACP government to take power in thefirst place.But Nathan is perhaps too pessimistic. The ANC andMK are working hard to win over a wide range of support,Including the support of the bantustan leaders and theirarmies.Despite their relative weakness, these armies couldprove to bolster the MK presence in a new army. In addi-tion, there is a sizeable number of black soldiers In theSADF, and many of them, as well as some white soldiersand officers, may very well find themselves resistingattempts to subvert the democratic process.
Page 22 of 55 and `comrades who are knowledgeable'were not there.But once the MK conference got going,`a higher note was struck', says Mtintso.The presence of the ANC's top leader-ship, including Nelson Mandela, OliverTambo, Ronnie Kasrils, Chris Hani, JacobZuma and Thomas Nkobi, among others,gave the conference the status it desired.In her opinion, delegates felt more confi-dent about their deliberations being takenseriously, and saw their value in terms ofstrengthening the resolution adopted atthe ANC conference.There was a high level of debate andparticipation - much higher than at theANC's July conference. The richness ofMK came to the fore, says Mtintso, interms of the range of people present, andthe committed and disciplined way inwhich delegates went about their busi-ness.Khan concurs, stressing that 'contri-butions to the commissions were conciseand to the point. It showed the calibre ofthe soldiers, despite the very real anddeep problems within MK'.Kasrils supports the view that the ANCleadership indicated a seriousness aboutconsidering the proposals put forward bythe conference. They expressed concern,he says, about the need to prevent thedispersal of MK, and ensure its orderlyregrouping and stabilisation.He feels that despite the sober moodof the conference, the `spirits and morale'of the cadres was very high. It was,something of a reunion, which is impor-tant in terms of regrouping', and this wasreflected in the songs that were sung.Tremendous regard was shown for for-mer ANC presidentOliverTambo, Kasrilspoints out, because he was a key person inkeeping MK together. He made combat-ants feel needed, and shared their prob-lems and sufferings.Criticism of leadershipBut did delegates feel the same way aboutthe entire leadership?According to one delegate, there wassevere criticism of the leadership by cadresin the various closed sessions. There wasgeneral unhappiness about the way theMK leadership has performed.The whole of Military Headquarters(MHQ) came under fire. MK commanderand ANC NEC member Joe Modise wasslated by region after region for the inade-quate report he presented, and there wasunanimous rejection of MHQ command-ers Rashid Patel and Lamber Moloi as ex-officio NEC members. The ANC con-sitution states that ex-officio membersmust be in MHQ, and delegates werequite prepared to suggest huge changes toConference delegates felt stronglythat Hani (above) remains as MKchief of staffMHQ rather than have Patel or Moloi.Although MK chief of staff Chris Haniwas also criticised for his report, confer-ence felt strongly that he remain chief ofstaff, thus expressing overall confidencein him.Another ANC NEC member, securityhead Joe Nhlanhla, was also specificallymentioned as being `bad news'. Dele-gates apparently groaned during hisspeech, such that he stopped halfway andsat down.A reflection of the lack of respect forthe soldiers, said a delegate, was the factthat the leadership sat separately fromthem for every meal. This delegate feltthat insufficient tribute was paid to MKby the leadership at the conference, be-sides references to `our glorious army',and Mandela reading out the names ofsome soldiers who had died since theformation of MK.Indeed, it is significant that the Tran-skei leader, Bantu Holomisa, received abetter response for his speech than any ofthe ANC leaders. He warned the dele-gates not to allow the ANC to make toomany compromises with the regime.A delegate said that many cadres werestill `disgruntled' after the conference,with `not a lot of confidence that matterswould improve', despite the leaders' com-mitment to deal with the problems.But this mood did not translate intoself'-pity. The delegate continued:`I was filled with admiration for thecourage and commitment of the cadres,considering the enormous hardships theyhave had to endure.... despite the growingbitterness and disillusionment about theway they have been treated, no-one hasANC national chairperson OliverTambo: a key person in keeping MKtogethermoaned about the decision to suspend thearmed struggle.'Reorganisation and welfareOne way to fight the threat of simpledispersal into civilian life, says Kasrils, isby regrouping and strengthening MK andits structures inside the country. ne con-ference was primarily oriented towardsthis. MK is legal, but it cannot recruit andtrain members inside the country. ButMK can develop strong internal struc-tures, and (if agreement is reached withthe government) provide security train-ing, which could include the use of li-censed fire-arms. MK aims to create astructure for the internal discipline ofcadres, with a central register of mem-bers, and a strong social welfare depart-ment to ensure a viable and stable force.Besides its role in assisting with SDUsand forming marshalls (see box on page19), MK also has a political role, saysKasrils. Cadres are expected to help buildthe ANC, civics, women's groups, andyouth structures. Many have advancedpolitical understandings, which they learntfrom the political courses they underwentin camps and other countries. Cadres havea vital para-military role to play, saysKasrils, `in the service of the community,rural and urban, industrial and residen-tial'.An MK social welfare departmentwill be formed `to look into the specificneeds of the entire membership ofUmkhonto both inside and outside thecountry'.According to Khan, particular prob-lems, such as inadequate resources andthe general conditions of living, the fact
Page 23 of 55 The traumas ofcoming homeMbulelo Mdledle, a returned exile, describes the traumaexperienced by many cadres who have come homeComing home Is the most heavenly experience that all exiles wish for.But beyond the pomp and fanfare of being repatriated, a soberingexperience awaits them.Tens of thousands of indemnified exiled cadres face the bliss ofthe Pretoria Minute with the prospect of being home'legally', but thetranquil of the night offers something different, which contrasts withtheir 'legality.'The much publicised Pretoria Minute, signed on August 6 last year,seems to be valid on paper only, during daylight and In official circles.At night It loses' its validity. Hundreds of returned cadres are allegedto be harassed by police either on entering Jan Smuts Airport or in thecomfort of their homes.Some are harassed for 'crimes' alleged to have been committedbefore they left South Africa. For others, It Is either 'routine checks',which involve rude knocks In the dead of the night by members of thesecurity forces scanning homes with metal detectors.This is' a very traumatic experience as, If the door Is not opened intime, there is a ten to one possibility that they'll break the door down,and force their way In.The attitude and attire of the Intruders who are carrying out'offlclalduties' In the name of the 'law,' contrasts sharply with officialagreements and the propaganda of negotiations. The general trend isa number of vehicles carrying personnel in full combat gear withbullet-proof protection, sub-machine guns and metal detectors,converging on a house.It is common for these officials to recruit returnees to work for themfor lucrative 'secret' salaries to spy on MK cadres. With the presenteconomic recession, high unemployment rate and Inconsistency inthe payment of grants to returnees by the National Co-ordInatingCommittee for Returnees (NCCR), the loyalty of the cadres hangsbetween the struggle and want. From an economic perspective, thequestion of human want cannot be ruled out. Political rhetoric cannotsatisfy human wants, especially In a predominantly capitalist economylike South Africa's:Returnees also have to endure a host of problems. There Is theviolence of an administration that Is not negotiating in good faith; ofrightwing elements who still adhere to the neo-fascist policies ofapartheid; and of sponsored violence through ancillary organs of thegovernment. This deepens the trauma of the returnee, who ends upnot knowing who is who In this society.The returned cadres are exposed to additional dangers like thelarge numbers of askaris (turned cadres) hovering everywhere. Thereis also the returned ANC ex-detainees, some of whom are threateningto 'fix up' the organisation. These people owe their allegiance to thestate, not to their communities.These are the serious problems that the ANC has to address Itselfto, as the government of the day pulls the carpet from under themovement's feet, while pretending to'negotlate in 'good faith.'that most returning combatants are unem-ployable, the psychological traumas of awar situation which they bear-all theseneed to be specifically attended to. Stepswill have to be taken to assist in upgrad-ing the academic education of cadres, sothat they will be able to secure jobs.Kasrils points out that the main thrustof social welfare is towards helping cad-res to resettle inside the country.The upgrading of their educationalqualifications can be achieved by provid-ing grants for study, not so that cadresmay take a permanent leave of absencefrom MK, but in order to assist `comradesbecoming more highly trained andskilled', he says.A vital roleKhan stresses that the ANC is still con-ducting a liberation struggle, which meansemploying different forms of struggle.Negotiations is but one form of struggle,which at this time is the dominant form.But this should not be seen in isolationfrom other forms, including armedstruggle (which has been suspended, notabandoned).Kasrils feels that the regrouping ofMK, and its maintenance as a viable forceinside and outside the country, is 'veryimportant to the transition process. Itprovides us with the possibility of revert-ing to other forms of struggle if there is areturn to repression by the present re-gime'.MK is also a vital factor in negotia-tions, he argues, because 'our concept ofnegotiations must include pressures andlevers'. The ANC has stressed the needfor mass struggle, and MK is 'one of ourkey vehicles for advancing that struggle',he asserts.The forces for democracy have themajority of people on its side. That is amajor factor against anti-democraticforces within the police and army. If MKsucceeds in developing a truly popularpeople's militia, and ensures that creativemass struggles involve the people in ac-tive participation, then much can be doneto offset the military disadvantage it suf-fers.But while the conference has madeenormous strides in clarifying the role ofMK, and committing the ANC leadershipto look after the army, the conferenceomitted to specify a mechanism to ensurethat decisions are implemented - inparticular setting another conference toreview the situation.But despite these uncertainties, theMK conference revealed an army thatseems equipped with the necessary ex-pertise to ensure it plays a key role inshaping a democratic future.
Page 24 of 55 The case for self-defence unitsFormer ANC chief of military Intelligence andNEC member Ronnie Kasrils talks to DevanPillay about self-defence units (SDUs)0: After the recent Ventersdorp violence, there was astrong call for'private armles'to disband. Inkatha usedthis as an opportunity to call for the disbanding of MK.How do you respond?it is wrong to see MK as a private army of the ANC. It is awingof the liberation movement. MK does not stage marches, itdoes not bear arms, it does not intimidate anyone, as theAWB does.We must put pressure on the regime to control itsrenegade forces. If an organisation is perpetually creatingviolence, then the people involved must be brought to book.I don't believe that the AWB should be banned, but it has tobe emasculated. Too much has been allowed. No civilisedsociety can tolerate armed bands who intimidate people.It is incorrect to draw a parallel between the AWB andMK. SDUs will remain where they are, and MK is happy toaccept the role of merely assisting in their for- rmation, with no offensive actions.Self-defence must be community-based,non-sectarian, and not under the control ofMK. We must involve Azapo, PAC etc, whichwill be discussed at the forthcoming patrioticfront meeting. Comrades are ready to play arole in the community. But not simply as indi-viduals. MK must assist, and give direction.SDUs should be responsible to the leader-ship of that community -notthe ANC branch,but the civics and others.I can perceive an increase of grassroots-based security forces, producing recruits forafuturedemocratic army. They willcome from theSDUsanda marshalls system for ANC. We can produce a highlydisciplined core of cadres, who will provide security at publicmeetings.0 : How can the abuse of SDUs by undisciplined indi-viduals be avoided?The discipline is not of a small group, but of a large body ofcadres, underthe control of community organisations. Thereneeds to be strict discipline from a very strong and clearpolitical leadership. There must be a system in which indi-viduals do not decide their own tasks, although of coursethere must be room for initiatives. But this must be in thecontext of extremely clear-cut tasks.0: So you have no fears that things could go badlywrong?Well, nothing is automatic. We will have to work very hard toestablish discipline, and prevent abuses. That is why theSDUs starting-off point is vital. Up to now a township com-munity under threat has been defended by groups that arenot very accountable. To create viable SDUs, we must go tothe leadership of the community, and the community itself.We need to go to the recognised representatives of thepeople, eg civics etc, and other groups like the PAC andAzapo, and bring them all together. We can then discuss theprotection of the community with that leadership. But theinitiative can be taken by anybody, including Azapo and thePAC.MK can play a 'seven samurai' role, where cadres go into help defend a community, but more importantly they givethem the confidence to defend themselves, by imparting theirskills to the people. If there is any abuse, individuals will facea tribunal of the community.SDUs can bring about the emergence of a popular militiaof the people, and become the embryo of a future securityforce of the country (police and armed forces). In this way wecan embed the security forces within the people.0: These ideas have been around since at least last De-cember. Why have they not been Implemented yet?They still need to be fully popularised. These ideas arecontained in the discussion document For The Sake Of OurLives, which is strong on the principle of howSDUs must be created. The document hasbeen distributed and discussed in squattercamps and townships. At the moment self-defence is spontaneously developing, forsheer self-preservation. The document hasbeen accepted within the ANC, but it needs tobe popularised more. Both the December andJuly ANC conferences expressed a commit-ment to develop SDUs. But we need to findpeople to go out and do the job.The recent Peace conference acceptedthe people's right to self-protection. We needto explore that space. We see SDUs operat-ing like neighbourhood watches in white areas, in that theyprovide protection from external forces, and control crime.0: Is there a role for existing security forces?There needs to be increased fraternisation with existingpolice and military personnel. We must educate them. Thewhole alliance needs to place far more emphasis on this, in-cluding bantustan security forces. MK combatants are verywell-placed as trained and professional soldiers to link upwith security forces. We must engage them in discussion anddebate at every level, officially and unofficially.There are some very honest individuals serving in thearmed forces and police, the SADF and SAP. We must linkup with them, and end the undeclared war on anyone inuniform. We must take the message of peace to those in theuniform of the state, and do so in a creative manner. Forexample, we can hold days of peaceful celebration.Our campaigns have been very narrow in approach. Toolittle attention has been paid to winning over the police, evenamong whites. A trend is developing now, and we need to bevery flexible about this. MK combatants are trained with theseideas in mind.
Page 25 of 55 Cosatu: Continuing theclass campaignJAY NAIDOO, recently re-elected general secretary of Cosatu, talks to Glenda Danielsabout the road ahead, in particular Cosatu's role within the political arena, and in shapinga new economic orderQ: What implications does the ANC conference have forCosatu?The ANC conference was important for Cosatu for a number ofreasons. It was the first legal conference inside the country inover 30 years, and the representatives came from structureswhich, although embryonic, enabled a spectrum of people whosupported the ANC to be involved in the processes. The demo-cratic process became a very visible process. The fact that therewere documents circulated in advance, and people could partici-pate and change those documents before they were adopted asresolutions, was very important.Secondly, the fact that we could hold such a conference wasimportant for political morale, in the context of the wave ofviolence aimed at destabilising the ANC, and attracting interna-tional attention.Thirdly, Cosatu has always been committed to building thestructures of the ANC. That is important because, as a tradeunion federation, we recognise that we are not a political partyalthough we carry many political responsibilities. It is thereforenecessary for us to build alliances and to influence politicalparties in the interests of the working class. And the ANC andSACP ideologically are our closest allies across the politicalspectrum. Therefore to build a strong ANC would direct it to-wards a working class position.The election of unionists onto the ANC NEC have givensubstantial impetus to this at different levels, like negotiations,campaigns, and administration.While the election of Cyril Ramaphosa and Sydney Mafumadiis a loss to Cosatu, it has been a gain for the liberation movementand the country as a whole.So now there are people within the ANC that have an under-standing in detail of the processes of democracy, of the flavourof politics, within the trade union movement. This lays the basisfor a much stronger relationship between ourselves and theANC, which can be seen in eg the National Peace Accord, whichstarted recently.Q: What role does Cosatu expect to play in the politicalarena, particularly in talks and negotiations in the immedi-ate future?Cosatu will continue to play a political role, it's how we definethat role that's the issue. Congress deferred the debate to thecentral executive committee (CEC). Broadly speaking we havea political role, we need rights to be entrenched in the constitu-tion, eg the right to strike. We also have further rights that arecontained in the workers charter. We intend to reach an agree-ment on apolitical platform within the alliance, on the basis ofthese positions. We also intend going broader than this, andapproach the Patriotic Front and Nactu etc to adopt a platformof worker demands.We are centrally involved in the mechanisms of the NationalPeace Accord at this stage, and arising from the Peace Accordwill be a range of mechanisms that basically begin to introducethe transitional arrangements that will help. In this context webelieve that Cosatu will continue to play a very key role, such aslooking at the role of the security forces, peace committees atvarious levels, the way the judiciary will have to be restructuredto meet needs, political violence and so on.We also hope to tighten up the process of consultationbetween ourselves and the ANC, particularly in relation toconstitutional negotiations. There is a commitment already andthere are guidelines for the process. Cosatu is. consideringmaking more people with negotiating experience available toassist with the negotiating process.Q: Cosatu has complained about a quick resort to massaction during a period of economic downturn, eg the con-sumer boycott. Does Cosatu have any alternative forms ofmass action to offer?Our view has always been that mass action has to be carefullyorganised and planned, and there has to be mass involvement inthat process or it becomes action imposed. We have seen that themasses of our people don't accept imposition. Secondly, veryimportant is that when we are building a democratic societywhere we want an accountable government, we have to developprinciples of consultation, which is absolutely necessary for theprocess.Mass action is never spontaneous, it cannot be turned on andoff like a tap, so recognising that within Cosatu we are beginningto talk of the need for a comprehensive programme whichclearly identifies our strategies and tactics. We need concreteguidelines at national, regional and local level on how massaction is taken. It is better to have fewer mass action campaignswhich are well organised than many which are badly organised.A balance has to be maintained, we don't want to stifle massaction in a particular local area where there is an issue thataffects them. It is a programmatic approach that is necessary, forexample there have been severe criticisms about the recentconsumer boycott.One can't separate mass action from a programme, massaction is a component of an overall programme, it is part of astrategy, like negotiations is a site of struggle, like the workerscharter campaign, and the nexus of the campaigns constitute theprogramme.Q: Where is the workers charter campaign at this point?A detailed report was given at congress. The congress instructedthe CEC to draft a concise, accessible workers charter and tobegin to popularise this in a campaign as the basis for a futureworkers summit with Nactu and all other trade unions. At the
Page 26 of 55 JAY NAIDOOpresent moment there are discussions in Cosatu around this. Itmust form part of an overall programme. So we see a process tothe workers summit and a process coming out of the workerssummit, where a workers charter is built into a future constitu-tion.Q: To what extent is the union movement forced to considersocial contracts with management?We have a particular conception of social contracts. We recog-nise as trade unions the reality of the South African economicsituation. We can't wishaway employers and like-wise they can't wish awaytrade unions. Thereforethere needs to be bindingagreements between our-selves and employers. Thisrelates to what we see asour goals and how theyrelate to our vested inter-ests. In that context we seeour way to enter into nego-tiations on a national basiswith Saccola and the stateon a macro-economic levelas part of a constructiveprogramme. Its focus shallbe the need to create jobsand the need to create eco-nomic growth through re-distribution, by focusing onareas such as housing,human resource develop-ment, which as an offspinwill improve the opportu-nities for our workers. It isalso the dynamo that willpropel the economy to-wards growth and make itmore competitive in theinternational arena.So we see bindingagreements, rights andobligations for us as tradeunions, for governmentsand employers as not just apaper thing but backed upby mass organisations.Q: How does this relateto the long-term strugglefor socialism?We are committed to so-cialism,ademocratic formof socialism, there is no blueprint for what this means, but thereare certain democratic principles, mandates and report-backs.While there is a necessity for planning, it shouldn't be bureau-cratic or Stalinistic. The trade union movement and other insti-tutions, now called civil society, must be given real power tointervene in decision-making. We need to create an economythat reflects the aspirations of the needs of people. How weconstruct this into a democratic society is very much part of anon-going debate.Q: And nationalisation?It still remains an essential instrument to ensure that the soci-ety's inequalities are addressed. It is essential that a democraticstate play a key role in the economy. But not the only role, whichis how a lot of free-marketeers try to portray us.We have seen what has happened in Eastern Europe, wherenationalisation led to a new elite, which controlled the means ofproduction. We have learnt important lessons from EasternEurope.Q: What implications does the economic downturn have onwage demands?We've argued that whatemployers must accept isa cut-back on profits. Owresearch shows thatamongmajor conglomerates,enormous profits are re-cycled intheJohannesburgstock exchange rather thanbeing put in the produc-tive sector.So we think the eco-nomic downturn has a lotto do with policies of thegovernment and employ-ers in this country. Thismeans that workers haveto suffer for their disas-trous policies. However,we've got to accept thatthere is going to be a majorstruggle around the needto keep wage increasesabove the cost of living.And given the disasters inthe mining industry, thereality is that we have hadto settle for less.However, this has beenon the basis that there is acommitment from em-ployers to discussing re-structuring in that indus-try. Similarly in the autoindustry, we have ex-tracted a commitmentfrom them to discuss jobcreation, relating to train-ing which is a significantbreakthrough, like themoratorium on the restruc-turing of the mining in-dustry. The other strategyis to enter into negotia-tions on a macro-economicreconstruction programme, which has as its focus job creation.Q: Does Cosatu have any ideas on how to direct investmentaway from speculative investments into production?This falls into the context of negotiations on a macro-economicreconstruction programme. We have a few propositions inrelation to redirecting resources thatexist in the stock exchange,in pension and provident funds, in state resources, towards moreproductive sectors of the economy. The issue of job creation,like I've said before, must be central to any economic plan forthe country. We are not interested in multi-billion rand invest-ment projects which create very few jobs. -
Page 27 of 55 Taking gender seriouslyWomen won a major vic-tory with the decisionatlast month's Cosatucongress to set upgender forums. Thecongress also decidedto appoint a full-time national co-ordina-tor to ensure the decision is implemented.The forums, which will include menand women and operate alongside thealready-existing women's forums, willaim to deepen union members' under-standing of gender oppression.Hotly debatedThe issue was hotly debated at the con-gress, with some affiliates voicing strongopposition to the forums.The National Union of Mineworkers(NUM) and South African Clothing andTextile Workers' Union (Sactwu) feltthatwomen's forums were unnecessary anddescribed the appointment of a genderco-ordinatoras mere tokenism. However,they were outnumbered by other affili-ates, most notably the National Union ofMetalworkers of SA (Numsa), ChemicalWorkers Industrial Union (Cwiu), Foodand Allied Workers Union (Fawu), Pa-per, Pulp, Wood and Allied WorkersUnion (Ppwawu), South African Munici-pal Workers Union (Samwu) and theTransport and General Workers Union(TGWU). They felt that the move wasnecessary to ensure a gender con-sciousness within the unionmovement.Sactwu's argument is thatwomen's structures set up by someaffiliates to build women's lead-ership had failed to do this. Thetextile union has more women innational leadership positions thanany other Cosatu affiliate, with 60percent of its national positionsheld by women. Its membershipis also 60 percent women.A Sactwu member said at thecongress: `Our attitude towardswomen needs to be addressed inthe society at large. A nationaloffice bearer would be tokenism,but we are not opposed to womenmeeting from time to time.'The NUM went a step further,with an official from the union'scollective bargaining department,Manoko Nchwe, stating that theunion was not bound by the 'on-g,gressdecision as itdisagreed withGLENDA DANIELS reports onCosatu's decision, after a hotdebate, to set up gender forumsas a vehicle for fighting sexism`tokenism'.While the women's forum is to bediscussed by the union's national execu-tive committee, hopes for its implemen-tation are low.`We support Sactwu and believe thatwomen can occupy the same positions asmen. Trade unions should remain tradeunions and there should be no separateconstitutional structures for women,' saidNchwe after the congress.Building women's confidenceThe majority of affiliates were forceful inlobbying for women's structures and agender co-ordinator. They cited the needto address women's oppression by ensur-ing affirmative action and buildingwomen's confidence to take up workerleadership positions. The unions whichmost vociferously supported Cosatu'semploymentof a genderco-ordinator wereCwiu, TGWU, Sarhwu, Fawu, Ppwawu,Numsa, and Samwu.Cwiu national education officer ChrisBonnerexpressed disappointment that thecongress failed to implement a resolutionthat women delegates should be repre-sented in proportion to the number ofwomen union members.`This did not happen. It wasn't even inthe documentation, nor was it debated.The proposal that one national officebearer should be a woman was also thrownout,' she said. Support for the women'sforums was important, because other-wise `you have nothing'.TGWU's women's co-ordinator andeducation officer, Desiree Daniels,countering Sactwu and NUM arguments,said the large percentage of women onSactwu's executive was no solution asmen still held the key positions.`In Cosatu we talk of a bottom-updemocracy but it doesn't always worklike this, which means that national officebearers have enormous influence. Hav-ing a 60 percent women executive as-sumes that gender inequalities are ad-dressed, but obviously this is not the case.Afterall, making clothes is women's workand this stereotype has not been chal-lenged!'On the Num argument, Danielssays, `They see the developmentof womenas an organic process, it will happen auto-matically. If they have risen in the ranksand are confident, then why can't otherwomen be the same? This is like sayingthat all shopfloor workers, byvirtue of the fact that they areworking class, have a certain con-sciousness, which is not the case.'VictoryOne of the co-ordinators ofC0satu's women's forum,Sibongile Bongwe, says the deci-sion to have a full-time gender co-ordinator is a victory, as this willhelp ensure that gender forumsare set up.The congress decided that thegender forums would have a 50-50 men-women representationand their objective is to under-stand gender oppression anddebate the issue.The employment of a full-time, national, gender co-ordina-tor would help strengthen the fed-eration's programme of action andbuild a national gender forumrepresentative of al l unions, said acongress resolution on the forums.
Page 28 of 55 GENDER FORUMSThe gender co-ordinator will be awoman and will sit on the federation'snational executive committee. This, alongwith initiatives by individual affiliates,will help ensure that women's demandsare taken seriously within Cosatu.The congress also adopted proposals,put forward by Samwu, Numsa and Fawu,that:- women's skills be recognised and paidfor-`equal wages for skills of equal value';- women be trained for skilled jobs nor-mally performed by men;- career paths be developed for areas oftraditional women's work;- it be made easier for women to receivetraining - by providing childcare for alltrainees, equal facilities for men andwomen, and non-sexist documentation.The gender co-ordinator will have toresearch local and international experi-ences of different approaches to dealingwith gender inequalities. In addition, hertasks will include monitoring affirmativeaction programmes within affiliates andCosatu, and assisting with informationabout job grading, childcare and equalwages.Brighter futureThe future certainly looks a little brighterforwomen in the unions. However, Cosatuinformation officer Neil Coleman saysthat, while the debate at the congress wastaken `more seriously than ever before, itwon't be resolved by a simple congressresolution.'`People were grappling with the is-sue, with the variety of ways in which itcould be handled. Those with simplesolutions like a quota system will be seri-ously disappointed. We need an all-roundapproach. There is a problem with havingthe icing at the top with nothing under-neath', he said.Bongwe agrees that much still needsto be done within affiliates to encouragewomen's participation. `If certain issuesare not so easily dropped by unions whenthey are negotiating, like maternity bene-fits and leave, then more women wouldbe interested in joining. The men need topull up their socks,' she says.Bongwe feels the women's forumsare invaluable: `As a woman, I know I amvery shy and in these forums we candiscuss things like pap smears with otherwomen more easily.' She says the forumsalso enable women to develop leadershipskills, learn how to write agendas, chairmeetings, take minutes and organisespeakers on issues such as Aids.TGWU set up local women's forumsabout a year ago in Johannesburg, Preto-ria and Secunda. These meet once everytwo weeks. Regions meet once a monthWomen leaders in Cosatu late 1990no ofUnion national no of women positionoffice of officebearersCosatu 6 None NoneCawu 7 None NoneCwiu 4 None NoneFawu 5 None NoneNehawu 7 One National treasurerNumsa 4 None NoneNum 5 None NonePotwa 6 None NonePpwawa 5 None NoneSadwu 4 All President,Vice-President,treasurer,general secretarySamwu 4 None NoneSaccawu 6 None NoneSactwu 8 Two First vice-president, treasurerSarhwu 6 None NoneTGWU 6 One National treasurerTaken from Jeremy Baskin (1991) Striking Back, Johannesburg: Ravan,p372and there are two national meetings.Women's forum projects have includedleadership and skills training and discus-sions on issues such as women, the con-stitution and the law; childcare; maternityand violence against women.Women's forums a jokeNumsa women's convenor MaggieMagubane says the union has extremelysuccessful women's forums. There are 50locals which meet a few times a month.However, a lack of understanding amongmale union members has often made theprocess of organising women's forumsmore difficult.According to Magubane, male com-rades initially treated the forums as ajoke. This was countered by includingmale union members as delegates to na-tional and regional women's forums, inorder to ensure report-backs to other menon what was being discussed in the fo-rums.Numsa women have concentrated onbuilding confidence among women anddeveloping skills. They have also inviteddoctors to address women on issues suchas cervical cancer. `Women are now beingeducated and last year we got employersto agree in principle to free pap smears,'said Magubane.Cosatu's decision in 1989 to establish`worker controlled sub-committees ofwomen' was also implemented by Cwiu,Fawu, Ppwawu and Saccawu. The Wits,Southern Natal and Northern Transvaalregions of Cosatu have already estab-lished regional women's forums.According to Cosatu's 1991 secretar-ial report: `We need to strengthen andconsolidate these sub-structures. The co-ordinating functions of the women's com-mittee have been constrained by the lackof resources given it.'Coleman concedes that, at the con-gress itself, women were not adequatelyrepresented compared to their member-ship of the federation.Women comprise 36 percent of .Cosatu's total membership of 1.2 millionand the federation is concerned that it hashad little success in implementing its pastresolution on women's leadership. Onlyone Cosatu regional office bearer out of36 is a women. Among affiliates, only ahandful of national office bearers arewomen. However, this has improvedslightly following recent affiliate con-gresses. -
Page 29 of 55 Sarhwu and white workersClass solidarity onthe tracks?nity in the transport sectorcomes as no big surprise,with the merger of Sarhwuand TGWU set for the endof this year. What is star-tling is a growing unityamong black and white transport workersin the face of looming retrenchments anda rising cost of living. -Sarhwu confronts management...In July, Sarhwu workers went on strike atTransnet and Spoornet in the Transvmlover wages and dismissals. They are alsoat loggerheads with the transport compa-nies over retrenchments, privatisation andthe employment of casual labour.Transnet has denied that it is retrench-ing workers, but unions claim that thecompany says it is overstaffed by about60 000 workers. This means that 60 000jobs are on the line - a threat to bothblack and white workers - and the par-astatal will probably introduce phasedreductions to cut costs.According to Sarhwu, retrenchmentsso far have taken the form of disciplinaryaction against workers and casualisationof labour. A related concern for the unionis the transfer of workers around thecountry, from depot to depot. Sarhwuviews this as a strategy to get rid of the`surplus' workforce in a shrewd anddevious way.With a rising cost of living, wagedemands arc an increasingly pressing issuefor both black and white workers. AtSpoornet, Sarhwu workers were not sat-isfied with the wage offer and demandeda minimum wage of R1 500....and white workers follow suitAt the beginning of August, thousands ofwhite workers, members of the conserva-tive Artisan Staff Association (ASA),followed suit and went on strike for a day.The action was in support of wage de-mands and in protest against proposedrationalisation and action taken againstsome workers.According to Sarhwu, white workersat Transnet and Spoornet arc dissatisfiedwith the wage settlements negotiated byBread and butter issues areoverriding ideologicaldifferences as white railwayworkers, fearful of losing theirjobs, move towards Cosatu'sSarhwu in the hope of being ableto fight retrenchments.GLENDA DANIELS reports onthe growing prospects for unityj within the transport sectortheir unions. In addition, they are worriedabout their future in companies that arcplanning retrenchments.Transnet assistant general managerand labour relations manager, Vic vanVuuren, denies having retrenched my-body in recent months. `But whether wedo so in the future is another story,' hesaid.`What we do have from the unions areaccusations about how we use our disci-plinary code.'Asked about Transnet's reported 60000 surplus workforce, Van Vuuen said:`The number is not 60 000. We are still inthe process of working out the figure.There arc redundant workers in variouscategories. We are busy retraining andrelocating in different positions of em-ployment in the company.'According to Van Vuumn, reports ofwhite workers joining Sarhwu have beenexaggerated. `Yes, about a 100 whiteshave joined Sarhwu recently. We havereceived their paid-up stop orders. Wehave no problem with this. It is part of amarketing strategy in Sarhwu, likewisewith Potwa and all Cosatu unions. But itis certainly not happening on the scalethat it is being published in the media.'He adds: `There are white unions withblack members but no-one is mentioningthat.'Common problemsBut Jan Bredenkamp, general manager ofI Spoomet's Fluman Resources, concededin last month's issue of the company'smonthly publication, Platform, that la-bour relations involving white workershad changed recently. Job security, hesaid, had become as important as themajor issue, wages.`The unions seem to have dropped alot of their ideological differences theymight have had, now that they are con-fronted with this common problem calledretrenchment. In fact, they have alreadydrawn up a draft outlining procedures tobe followed in the event of retrenchmentbecoming necessary,' he said.Traditionally one of the most conser-vative sectors, but increasingly threat-ened by looming retrenchments, whiteworkers are now looking curiously andexpectantly at their black fellow workersin Sarhwu. They arecomparing Sarhwu'sgains with those made by unions like theASA, the Transnet Employees Union, theTransnet Union of South Africa, Salstaffand Spoorbond.In areas like Bloemfontein, Pi-etersburg, Messina and the PWV, whitetransport and railway workers have startedjoining Sarhwu. This has been more thana sporadic occurence, it has become atrend.The trend can be traced back to Au-gust last year when, for the first time inhistory, white railway workers joined awork stoppage in solidarity with blackworkers at Braamfontein station (seeWeekly Mail, 10/11/90). The strike, initi-ated by Sarhwu members, was over dis-missals and disciplinary procedures.The militancy displayed by whiteworkers last year appears to be increasingand, now, some are actually joiningSarhwu. Recently, workers at the Kas-eme depot elected white Sarhwu mem-bers as shopstewards.In August, thousands of white work-ers went on strike in protest over a 11,5percent increase negotiated by the ASA.Recruiting white workersIn a significant show of solidarity be-tween black and white workers, between3 000 and 4 000 Sarhwu members in theNorthern Transvaal protested against the
Page 30 of 55 SARHWUDismissed worker Karel Niewoudt with his wife and child: Sarhwu hastaken up his case, and has provided him with emotional and financialsupportdismissal of a white colleague (NewNation, 16-22/8/'91).According to Sarhwu's OFS regionalsecretary, Paulos Mabaso, up to 30 whiteworkers in Bloemfontein have joinedSarhwu recently.`Sarhwu seems to be more powerfulthan the white unions because they arenegotiating a living wage. White workersare beginning to see this,' said Mabaso.He said white railway workers in theOFS were also unhappy with the 11,5percent increase their unions negotiated,especially when Sarhwu showed it wasable to win greater increases.`I am definitely optimistic that morewhites will be joining. There are strongindications in this direction.'However, there are still some prob-lems, said Mabaso: `Some are fearful ofbeing victimised and harassed if they joinabove board. A serious problem is that wecan't express ourselves in Afrikaans. Thismakes it difficult to recruit. But we canget translators. We also have to arrangeaccess for them into our offices so thatthey can feel free...'Presently the union is planning mate-rial targetted at recruiting white workers.This includes a magazine in Afrikaanswhich explains Sarhwu's aims and objec-tives.Scratching below the surface willreveal political differences, says Mabaso.But right now, `the white workers areinterested in wages and not politics'. Headds jokingly: `If Sarhwu achieves inte-gration, there will be no more apartheid inthe railways!'According to Sarhwu organiser JohanBeaurain, white workers are rapidly join-ing Sarhwu, mainly because their unionsare mere extensions of management andso are caught between workers' demandsfor better wages and management itself.`Stop orders are flowing in. We arestill in the process of computerising, sowe don't have numbers yet. Colour isfalling away under the circumstances.It's a case of economics here, they havecommon interests as workers. Whiteworkers are as affected by retrenchmentsas black workers. Members of the ASAare not satisfied with the 11,5 percentsettlement that was negotiated on theworkers behalf.'Reassuring whitesMany problems white workers have injoining Sarhwu, according to Beaurain,are linked to `politics'. Coming fromconservative backgrounds, they some-times think that, if they join the union,they are obliged to be members of theSACP and the ANC. This is not the case,he says. `They are free to belong to any
Page 31 of 55 party they choose.'Another problem is that white work-ers fear intimidation and assault by con-servative whites if they join a union likeSarhwu. Beaurain, a former railwayworker and ASA member, was himself avictim of this when he questionedTransnet's racist attitudes and left ASAto join Sarhwu a few years ago.The length of strikes and media re-ports of intimidation of non-strikingworkers has also scared off some whiteworkers.`What is important is for our (Sarhwu)workers to reassure white workers thatthey will be protected. There is an insecu-rity onboth sides. Our members don'trealise that there is white insecurityabout the political changes that aretaking place,' says Beaurain.`It is difficult to reassure whiteworkers that there will be no intimi-dation because, unfortunately, thesethings do happen. But it is not ourpolicy to intimidate people into strik-ing. That must be made clear. As tothe length of a strike, if we are morepowerful - and we will be if morejoin - then our strikes will be moreeffective and shorter, because man-agementwill have no option once theplants stop operating', he says.For example, Beaurain says, the1987 strike would not have contin-ued for so long if all workers in thetransport sector had been'united.He emphasises the point thatwhites are insecure about joining Sarhwuand need to feel that the union will pro-vide them with security and protection.This has begun happening in several de-pots around the country, where blackworkers have threatened strike actionwhen white workers have been victim-ised.A good example of this protection isthe case of Pietersburg railway workerKarel Niewoudt, who joined Sarhwu af-ter S poornet fired him (Sunday Star 14/7/91 ). Not only is the union taking up hiscase with the company, they have alsorallied around him and his family to pro-vide emotional support and food.The local branch has also started apetition calling for Niewoudt's reinstate-ment, along with a pamphlet carrying apicture of his destitute family and a head-ing: `If you feel something for your fel-low worker sign this petition'.Niewould, who worked as a passen-ger wagon and truck examiner, has a rarecase of epilepsy and was dismissed forhealth reasons. He was reported to havesaid: `My white union did nothing for mewhen I was retrenched.' Asked how fel-low white workers were reacting, he said:`They have told me if Sarhwu manages toget my job back, they are going to join. Iwould say as many as 80 percent wouldjoin.' (Sunday Star).Artisan Staff AssociationMeanwhile, a disgruntled ASA generalsecretary, Kenny Cuthbertson, vehe-mently denies that the body is losingmembers to Sarhwu. `I haven't heardabout any resignations, except when I'veseen it in the newspapers. They are notour guys. I don't want to be connectedwith Sarhwu in any way. Write your storyabout them but don't connect it with us inany way. We have settled our strike at11,5 percent and yes, retrenchments areaffecting white workers,' he told WIP.Nevertheless, all indications are thatSarhwu's membership is set to grow andbig mergers are on the cards in the nearfuture.However, the possibility of a mergerbetween ASA, the largest white unionwith about 15 000 members, and Sarhwuseems remote. Beaurain says:`At this stage they are economicallypowerful and are unwilling to come to us.Their office has ideological biases. Theygive the direction about which way to go.The workers want to support Sarhwu, butthey are being led in a different direction.For those unionists, this is their salaries,they are worried because they are losingmembers... Now with workers, colour isfalling away under the circumstances,stop orders are coming in fast to Sarhwu.'One transport unionA merger between TGWU and Sarhwu isset for the end of this year. But, accordingto Beaurain, the `facilitation process isslow and there are other complications'.In his book, Striking Back, Cosatuofficial Jeremy Baskin said the labourfederation has been pushing for the mergerfor a long time and cites a few of theproblems.It is Cosatu's policy that there shouldbe one transport union encompassing boththe private and public sector. Part of theproblem lay with the fact that Sarhwu, arelatively young union, grew rapidly fol-lowing its 1987 strike, but found it diffi-cult to consolidate its membership. Thisweakness was made worse by inexperi-enced leadership. `Sarhwu had only justemerged from its bruising conflict withSats, and argued that it had not had thetime to think of mergers,' said Baskin(p200).Another unionist explains thedelay in the merger: `It's the old storyof people feeling reluctant to relin-quish their positions. It's very com-mon. Both the unions need a push andnow the time has come.'The two unions will have to movefast as they only have until the end ofthe year to merge. The new union willbe much bigger, with 69 567 mem-bers made up of Sarhwu's 36 243members and TGWU's 33 324.Another possible merger is withthe Black Trade Union (Blatu), aNactu affiliate with about 18 000members. Previously a managementstaff association, it affiliated to Nactuon advice from management.According to Beurain, this mergerwould not be as difficult as withTGWU because Blatu organises infewer sectors.The possibility of unity betweenCosatu's transport unions and Blatu isstronger following the enthusiastic re-ception Nactu's general secretary, Cun-ningham Ngcukana, received at Cosatu'scongress, when he spoke about the`common interests of all workers' and`one industry, one union'.Blatu president Dan Phiri says hewants it pronounced `loudly and clearly'that his union wants `peace and harmony'.`At a level of principles we have no prob-lems with merging, but there is too muchviolence and too much rivalry betweenunions.'He says it is Blatu's wish to sit downat a `round table and iron out the difficul-ties, especially to do away with radicalelements, we abhor violence...I would begrateful when the intimidation and thepolitical intolerance stops. We shouldn'tbe having so many splinter groupings.'The trend among transport unionsseems to be that political affiliations andideological tendencies are taking a backseat in the interests of unity and solidarityaround the bread and butter issues affect-ing workers.
Page 32 of 55 South Africa's fascinationwith Brazil has been anongoing affair. The sambarhythms have been heard fora long time in South Africandance halls. The Braziliannational soccer teams have evoked fa-natical support over the years - indeedone of the leading South African soccerclubs, Sundowns, have the same coloursand are nicknamed the Brazilians. Thebeauty of the place and its people havehad an obvious attraction.In more recent times, South Africansacross the spectrum have become inter-ested in Brazilian matters. For the securo-crats it was the way the Brazilian militaryjunta had repressed opposition in Brazil.They were interested to the extent thatthey implemented the Brazilian methodof repression in the townships in the 1980s.Anglo-American, the South African con-glomerate, has had financial interests inBrazil for a long time, particularly inmining. Academics saw many parallelsbetween South Africa and Brazil, in thestudy of the transition from a military dic-tatorship to a democracy.For the left in South Africa, the emer-gence of the Partido Trabalhadores(PT),the Workers Party, out of the trade unionmovement, the progressive elementswithin the churches, and smaller leftistparties, held a special fascination. Thefact that the PT came within a few per-centage points of winning the first demo-cratic presidential elections in 25 yearsaroused even greater interest (see WIP67).The black movementLess well known, and what may providesalutary lessons for us, is the black move-ment in Brazil. It is not a cohesive na-tional organisation, but has a wide varietyof adherents in different parts of Brazil,particularly in the north-eastern state ofBahia. This area of Brazil is largely blackand was the scene of the two famousblack revolts at the turn of the century, theCanudos in the 1890s and by Padre Cic-ero's followers in 1914.What is the black movement and outof what conditions does it arise?To answer the second question first.Brazil is the fourth largest country in theworld, with a population of about 150million people. It is claimed that Brazilhas the largest number of people of Afri-can descent outside Nigeria. More than70% of Brazilian people are black.Brazil was a Portuguese colony sincethe 15th century. It became a republicnearly a century ago, in 1889. Within thefirst hundred years of its colonisationPortugal began to import large numbersBrazil: theJanus faceA recent visitor to Brazil, MONTY NARSOO looks at the blackmovement there, and their fight against `soft' apartheidof African slaves to work on plantations.Slavery was abolished in 1888 during thetime of the Brazilian Empire. The Portu-guese colonial policy was that of assimi-lation. It was, as one black movementactivist put it, `integration into the whitehegemonic cultural, economic and ideo-logical system. A form of cultural geno-cide'. The latter day Brazilian authoritiescalled this system a `racial democracy'- a land of racial harmony. Yet its poli-tics, economics, state apparatuses, andmedia are dominated by white or fair-skinned people - even, it is alleged, inprogressive organisations. A black fieldworker in a research institute in Rio deJaneiro, which services popular move-ments, complained that there were veryfew black people in the higher ranks ofthat organisation. A journalist reportedthat it was unusual for one to see blackwaiters at high-class restaurants. Thepeople in the sprawling shantytowns -favelas - that surround most of Brazil'scities are overwhelmingly black.It is out of this background that theblack movements emerged. They tooktheir inspiration from the civil rights andblack panther movements in the USA,from the anti-colonial struggles in the Lu-sophone colonies in Africa, and the blackconsciousness tradition in South Africa.They became one of the key movementsin the anti-apartheid struggle and havesupported the ANC staunchly even in thedays of the military dictatorship in Brazil.They, nevertheless, remain a scattered,unevenly developed, and ideologicallydiverse movement. Brazil is a massivecountry, and black Brazilians refer tothemselves in over a hundred ways de-pending on the shade of their skins in thelast census. There are also personalityclashes at leadership level. They do notbehave as a unitary movement but as acoalition of social movements. In the lastyear preparations have been in progressto provide national co-ordination. In factmany black activists saw the visit ofNelson Mandela (see box) at the begin-ning of August as providing the impetusfor the emergence of a national move-ment.`Soft apartheid'What does bind them together is that theywant to fight racial and cultural discrimi-nation and to rehabilitate their variouslanguages. Theirs is not a racially exclu-sive doctrine but a non-racial one, be-cause they do not want ghettoise theirstruggle. They believe that despite thefact that they have the vote, they have inother ways been stripped of their citizen-ship - a process they call `soft apartheid'.This is despite the fact that Brazil hasstringent anti-racist laws.Many of the black movements havehad differences with the left in generaland with some of the unions in particular.They argue that in the case of the former,
Page 33 of 55 class was almost the sole criterion used invarious struggles, and they did not ade-quately come to terms with the issue ofrace. Some also believed that the tradeunions did not pay sufficient attention toissues of racial and cultural discrimina-tion. But there has been some movementforward, with many of the political par-ties, churches, and unions beginning tosetup black sections to deal with issues ofblack people.There are a number of strategies beingpursued: an electoral one, in which blackcandidates are to be promoted; legal tac-tics to enforce the anti-racist laws; aneducation campaign to change the cur-riculum away from a Eurocentric bias; acampaign for constitutional guaranteesfor the indigenous people in the Brazilianhinterland; and a campaign for economicjustice and some form of wealth redistri-bution.At the ANC's consultative confer--e in Durban, the representative of theBrazilian anti-apartheid movementwarned South Africans that, although theywere close to eliminating had apartheid,South Africans must beware of replacingitwith'wft'apartheid,whereblackpeoplemight have the vote, but they may stillremain poor and disadvantaged. This isan experience that black Brazilians havehad for many decades. -Tour upsets anti-apartheid groupsANC president Nelson Mandela be-gan his recent visit to Brazil by prais-ing the `non-racial' character of thecountry. He ended with a strongers- that all was not what it seemed.In Brazil, `black' is largely synony-mous with `poor', and many blackpeople, who regard Mandela as a leg-endary hero, were hoping that the visitwould promote their cause.Mandela was, it seems' poorlybriefed. According to the Braziliananti-apartheid movement, this wouldnot have been the case had originalarrangements for the visit been ad-hered to.The Brazilian National ReceptionCommittee claimed before the visitthat relations between the ANC andprogressive forces in Brazil wereendangered. In a message sent to seniorANC officials, it said that an advanceparty of the ANC's Department ofInternational Affairs had arrived inBrazil to prepare for the ANC delega-tion led by Mandela. On its arrival, theadvance party proceeded to leave theNational Reception Committee out ofthe arrangements, denying them in-formation about the trip and dealingonly with state institutions.The committee stated that in 1981the anti-apartheid organisation wasformed following a request by thethen ANC representative to theUnitedNations, the late Johnny Makathini.Asaresult progressive organisations,including the black movement, cam-paigned strongly for the ANC. At theend of May this year, at the request ofthe Department of International Af-fairs of the ANC, the anti-apartheidmovement set up a reception commit-tee. This committee included govern-,- Nelson Mandelamental agencies (local and state) andnon-governmental organisations, fromRio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Brasilia,and Bahia.The committee expressed concernthat the alienation of the broad basednon-governmental organisationswould have severe repercussions forthe support the ANC enjoys.In response, YusufSaloojec of theANC's Department of InternationalAffairs told WIP:`Essentially, the invitation ex-tended to comrade Mandela was offi-cially extended by the Brazilian gov-ernment. If I invite you to my house,you can't tell me what to do. Therewas no way of avoiding working withthe state. There was an advance dele-gation comprised of two people. Thepurpose of the delegation was to workwith everybody, toarrive atacompre-hensive programme. What we foundwhen we arrived in Brazil, was theanti-apartheid movement wanting todictate the programme. There was noway we could accept this because wewe. invited by the state. We had towork with the..'Saloojee maintained that it was`untrue to say the anti-apartheidmovement was left out. We had sixmeetings with them and three meet-ings with the federal government.They are upset because they feel thatinsufficient time had been given tothem.'During the course of the visit thematter was to some extent resolved,and relations between the ANC dele-gation and the reception committeewere patched up. Nevertheless, ac-cording to reports, the visit experi-enced some `organisational prob-lems'.This issue throws up acrucial prob-lem facing the ANC and its supportersthroughout the world. As the ANCbecomes increasingly acceptable toforeign governments, its missions willbe moving in official circles more fre-quently. How do they then late tothe anti-apartheid movements, manyof which are composed of groups inopposition to their governments?This is a dilemma the ANC mustcarefully resolve. In the case of Bra-zil, the immediate desire to elicit fi-nancial and diplomatic support for theANC meant cosying up to the Brazil-ian government, and almost shunninggroups which have been at the fore-front of ti-apartheid solidarity. It issurely short-sighted to alienate suchsupport, and not realise that govern-ments respond to pressures fromwithin, as well as diplomatic pres-sures, when assessing the extent towhich it aligns itself against the apart-heid regime? -Special Correspon-dent in Brazil -
Page 34 of 55 BRAZILThe Workers'Party and tradeunion movementCosatu's Jay Naldoo accompanied other unionists on a trip to Brazil last April, and came awaywith the following Impressions.Q: What did you learn from your recent trip toBrazil?There are a whole range of lessons we learnt fromBrazil. It was a trip that brought together Cosatu, theBrazilian trade union federation CUT, and CGIL fromItaly. We share a lot in common with CUT. We bothcome from an economy that is dominated byimperialism, in which there is a developed economy onthe one hand and a large sectorthat is underdevelopedon the other. So it's like two economies living side byside.There is massive poverty which is very obvious andthe extreme wealth of the bourgeoisie which is alsovery obvious. Both countries have a very militanthistory of working class struggle that has led to thegrowth of militant trade unions, which has givensubstance to the political movement.However, one has to take into account that CUT,although they are moving towards national industrialunions, don't have, in the strict sense, the nationalindustrial unions we have in Cosatu. They are made upmore of a range of regional unions that constitute alooser federation than Cosatu.The Workers Party in Brazil is an offspring of thestruggle of workers at factory level. Its leader, LuisInacio da Silva, or `Lula' (pictured here), was an autoworker. So there area numberof interesting similarities.In the context of the globalisationof the world economy,which could only affect workers adversely, the need forthe strengthening of relations between workers'organisations in the southern hemisphere becomesincreasingly more critical, In the context of central andSouth America, Brazil is the dominant economy,Similarly here, South Africa is the dominant economyin southern Africa.We learnt a lot from each other and there is acommitment to increase cooperation. Recently, therewas another delegation from Cosatu to a meeting ofnon-aligned trade union centres held in Brazil. Sothere is a very concrete commitment by us to try andbuild links with militant trade union movements, inparticular south to south links. We think that it's anatural progression in the context of having to face theWorkers' Party leader Lulaeffects of the globalisation.Q: Does the Workers Party in Brazil have anythingto offer us?The Workers Party is very similar to our situation here,with ANC and SACP, and a strong emphasis onindependence. But I think that in Brazil they have gonefurther. There is a stronger separation of leadership,but there is a very close working relationship.Q: How are they taking up the struggle forsocialism?Similar to here, with an emphasis on building verystrong powerful mass organisations that would propelthe government towards a democratic form of socialism.They have a commitment towards buildingthe WorkersParty as the representative of the working class. Lulacame very close to winning the last presidentialelections.Q What about the relationship between the WorkersParty and the union movement?They have a close relationship. I am not sure about thetwo hats debate. 1 think they have taken a decision toseparate the leadership.0: What do you think of the way the Workers PartyIs organised, with open, organised tendencies orfactions?The Workers Party is organised with open tendenciesthat compete for political hegemony. But there is acommitment within that context that the integrity of theorganisations is critically important, so that none of thetendencies undermine the democratic principles of theorganisation. They have debates around this, and inthis context there has to be a clear code of conduct,
Page 35 of 55 Robbing the poor togive to the richThe Community Resource and Information Centre (CRIC) looks at VAT, andargues that it forms part of an attack on the working classThe government intends to re-place General Sales Tax (GST)with Value Added Tax (VAT)on 30 September this year. Itis spending R10 million on an`information' campaign inwhich it is trying to convince consumersand owners of small businesses that VATis a better tax than GST. It argues thatVAT is a `fair' and `neutral' tax, that it ismore difficult to evade than GST and thatit will lead to lower prices, more invest-ment and more jobs.By and large, big business, the com-mercial press, audit firms, tax consultantsand academic economists also support achange to VAT, and openly argue its sup-posed merits.From poor to richThe change from GST to VAT will,however, lead to a massive redistributionof wealth from the poor to the rich. Nei-ther business nor government have beenable to successfully hide this reality intheir attempts to promote VAT. Forexample, Andre Meyburgh, of KPMG,Aiken & Peat Tax Practice, argued in theStar that `VAT is a fairer tax than GST'.In the same article, he said that `Its"sting', will be felt far more widely and bymany more people.'The Business Day was even moreblunt. `Vat must be comprehensive,spreading the tax burden widely with noconcessions to special interests, or it couldbecome political dynamite ... The man inthe street will realise all too soon whatVat means-higher prices all round anda further twist to inflation's spiral.'The introduction of VAT is, more-over, part of a systematic attack againstthe working class. The South Africaneconomy has been in crisis ever since the1970s and the government, with the sup-port of big business, has attempted torespond to this crisis by implementingeconomic policies that have severelyaffected workers and the unemployed.These include, for example, harsh mone-tary policy, privatisation, deregulation andchanges to the tax structure.Since the late 1970s, there have beentwo important trends in the types of taxeswhich the government has collected. First,individuals now have to pay a larger shareof all the taxes collected by the govern-ment. Companies, on the other hand, paya smaller share than they did in the 1970s.Secondly, there has been a shift in thetypes of taxes collected from individuals.Before 1978, the government did notcharge GST. In 1978, it introduced a GSTat 4%. For every R1 spent, consumerswere forced to pay an extra 4c to thegovernment. This was increased regu-larly until it reached 13% in 1989.GST now represents a large share ofall the individual taxes collected by thegovernment and income tax accounts fora smaller share than it did in the 1970s. Acrucial difference between GST and in-come tax is that everyone pays the samepercentage on goods and services boughtas GST, whereas income tax is calculatedin such a way that poor people pay a lowerpercentage of their income than thewealthy. In other words, the governmentis forcing workers and the unemployed topay a larger part of individual taxes andallowing rich individuals to pay a smallerpart. In summary, the tax burden is thusbeing shifted from companies and wealthyindividuals to the working class. Theextent of this shift has been dramatic. Inthe late 1970s, individual taxes amountedto about 30% of total government reve-nue and this had increased by the middleof the 1980s to about 60%. GST, whichdidn't yield any revenue before 1978,accounted for almost 30% by the middleof the 1980s.Increasing the poor's burdenThe shift from GST to VAT will increasethe tax burden on workers and the unem-ployed. The state collects GST on mostitems bought by consumers. There are,however, a number of items for whichone does not pay GST. These include awide range of foodstuffs such as bread,meat, milk, eggs and vegetables. Thegovernment now intends to charge VATon almost all items and initially decidedon a rate of 12%. It will be charged on allfoodstuffs except for mielie meal andbrown bread.The government also intends to chargeVAT on a number of services for whichpeople do not pay GST at the moment. Itplans to charge VAT on electricity andwater bills from local authorities and ontelephone accounts from the Departmentof Post and Telecommunications. VATwill be charged on professional servicessuch as those provided by doctors, den-tists, lawyers, architects and accountants.It will also be levied on goods such asmedicines and stamps.
Page 36 of 55 VATThe Labour Research Service (LRS),using the Unisa Bureau of Market Re-search and official statistics from theCentral Statistical Service as sources, hascalculated that low income householdswill have to pay an additional R26 to R38for the same basket of goods and servicesat a VAT rate of 12%. This represents anincrease in cost of living of 5%.The governmenthas argued that VAT,unlike GST, is levied on all goods andservices and, as such, it is a `neutral' and`fair' tax. It is, however, clear from theabove that the consequences of this `fair'tax for the working class are very severe.Workers and the unemployed will, fur-thermore, need to find the extra money topay VAT in a year in which they arealready going to be suffering from a highrate of inflation. The price of food inparticular is escalating at an alarmingrate. Although VAT will not be chargedon bread, there have been large increasesin the price of bread because, earlier thisyear, the government stopped subsidis-ing bread and removed controls on thebread price.Professor Brian Kantor, director ofUCT Graduate School of Business, notedthat consumers will be R6 billion a yearworse off. The government has, however,indicated that it does not intend to collectmore money from VAT than it did fromGST. The massive amount that it willcollect from consumers will merelycompensate for the vastly decreased sumthat it will get from the capitalist class.Companies will no longer pay tax oncapital and intermediary goods and thiswill result in a tax concession of about R7billion a year.The government argues that thismoney will be passed on to consumers inthe form of lower prices. It also suggeststhat this concession will encourage moreinvestment and create job opportunities.This is, however, mere speculation on thepart of the government. Kantor points outthat `How quickly these tax savings canbe passed on to domestic consumers ...will depend above all on competitionbetweenmanufacturers. The governmenthas taken a bold gamble in presentingwhat is a pro-business budget against abackground of widespread scepticismabout the forces of competition.'The capitalist class has, furthermore,refused to make substantial investmentsinto productive activities for more than adecade and there is no guarantee whatso-ever that the introduction of VAT willlead to a significant change in investmentand employment.The change from GST to VAT is thusan important part of a long term tax strat-egy which, in essence, aims to redistrib-ute wealth from the working class to thecapitalist class. The bitter irony is that thisis taking place within the context of anideological offensive in which the gov-ernment is gaining credibility for suppos-edly distributing wealth in the oppositedirection by means of, for example, its so-called social upliftment initiatives.Opposition growsUntil recently, most opposition to VATcame from pro-capitalist forces which,although they are essentially in agree-ment with the change to VAT, disagreewith VAT in so far as it affects theirparticular interests. The construction andprivate health sectors, for example, ar-gued against the imposition of VAT intheir sectors, but not against the tax as awhole. Since July, however, there hasbeen growing resistance from progres-sive forces, led by Cosatu.Cosatu has called for the postpone-ment of the implementation of VAT andfor negotiations between progressivestructures and the government, with aview to reaching agreement as to how thenew tax should be implemented. It hasthreatened widespread protest action ifthe government does not respond posi-tively. Big business and the commercialpress have suddenly become increasinglycritical of the government, not becausethey have had a change of heart aboutVAT, but rather because they fear that thelack of consultation by and concessionsfrom the government could threaten theimplementation of the tax. The govern-ment, in turn, has dug in its heels. It hasrefused to retain GST, postpone the im-plementation date of VAT or make sig-nificantconcessions on the way itplannedto implement VAT.It reduced the VAT rate from 12% to10%, but, at the new rate, low incomehouseholds will still have to find an extraR17 to R26 a month. This is an increasein the cost of living of between 3 and 4%.At the same time, the government an-nounced a rise in the price of petrol,which will lead to an increase in the rateof inflation of at least one percent over thenext few months. The Southern AfricanBlack Taxi Association has already indi-cated that it will put up taxi fares inresponse to the fuel price rise. The neteffect of the government announcementis that the expected increase in the cost ofliving for the working class remains almostunchanged at 5%.For the working class, the struggleagainst VAT is clearly very importantand the months ahead will prove to becrucial. There is, however, also a need tochallenge the current tax system in itsentirety and to ensure that a future taxsystem shifts the burden of tax back to thecapitalist class.THE GENDER RESEARCH FUNDThe Gender Research Fund invites applications for smallgrants to finance research projects focusing on genderissues, Preference will be given to projects in Natal.Applications to be addressed to:The ChairpersonGender Research FundDepartment of PoliticsUniversity of NatalDURBAN4001The next consideration of applications will be at the end ofOctober 1991,
Page 37 of 55 IMF and World Bank in AfricaIF ~ft VOW WXT+0N5 WANT W3VE GRth1FQ lAINJU Of TRhM Ef~utlIBRlV1A,LUlJts, NERE's wN^T m WWT To SEE- ~M:oPQth1E ov~w`/ ktkmol"NTS_SIPHO B UTHELEZItakes a critical look atthe policies endorsedby the IMF and WorldBank in third worldcountries - anduncovers a deep-rootedbias against women.Curing the disease bykilling the patientThe economic policy adoptedby the newly-created nation-states of Sub-Saharan Africa(SSA), under the supervisoryeye of the International Mone-tary Fund (IMF) and WorldBank, aimed to ensure internal price sta-bility and bring about a balance in theirpayments. This policy, it has been ob-served, became the neo-colonial versionof the former colonial policies of defla-tion - low wages and low prices for thepeasants (of which the vast majority, 80%in some cases, are women), resulting inlow prices of raw materials. In SSA, theseraw materials are mainly agriculturalcommodities produced by women underconditions of harsh exploitation. Thepolicy arose out of the attempts of inter-national finance to maintain its profitabi I-ity on the basis of monopoly prices formanufactured products.The last decade has been marked by acontrast between an increasing aware-ness of the importance of women's eco-nomic struggles and the deterioration ofthe world economy. In SSA, the 1980shave seen not just low growth rates, butabsolute declines in many of the keyindicators of economic well-being. Realper capita incomes have continued todecline in SSA. SSA governments haveresponded by adopting Structural Adjust-ment Programmes (SAPS) sponsored bythe IMF and the World Bank.This article critically examines SAPSin relation to third world economies ingeneral, and to SSA economies in par-ticular. Before this can be done, however,we must first look at the historical back-ground of the IMF and the World Bank.Historical perspectiveThe IMF and the World Bank (Interna-tional Bank of Reconstruction and Devel-opment, or IBRD) were both founded atthe 1944 Bretton Woods conference, heldin New Hampshire in the United States.Membership of the IMF is a prerequisitefor membership of the World Bank andeligibility for its loans. The headquartersof the two institutions sit side-by-side inWashington, joined Siamese twin-styleby corridors at several levels. Executiveboard meetings of the two institutions areheld on alternate days of the week toallow individuals to serve on both boards.Since both institutions depend on thesupport of the major Western capitaliststates (they must maintain the confidenceof Western capital markets in order tocontinue lending), they share a pro-capi-talist ideology.While the IMF was ostensibly createdto monitor the international foreign ex-change system and enhance the return tomulti-lateral exchange and payment rela-tions between member countries, its pur-pose included the following objective:`To facilitate the expansion and balancegrowth of international trade, and tocontribute thereby to the promotion and
Page 38 of 55 IMFmaintenance of high levels of employ-ment and real income and to the develop-ment of the productive resources of allmembers as the primary objective ofeconomic policy.'In theory, there is a clear division oflabour between the IMF and the WorldBank. The IMF makes short-term loansfor balance-of-payments support, whilethe Bank serves as a loan broker and guar-antor for specific development projects.In practice, both institutions have gradu-ally acquired functions not foreseen attheir founding, and their roles have over-lapped to some extent.The Bank has recently decided that ittoo can legitimately provide balance-of-payments support and enforce economicliberalisation and financial discipline inborrowing countries. Similarly, althoughit is usually the Bank which organises aidconsortia, the IMF is invariably a keymember and occasionally takes on therole of organiser.Structural adjustment via austerityThe recent economic crisis in SSA coun-tries has persuaded the World Bank toexamine ways in which the globalisationof financial capital can proceed further inconformity with prevailing trends on themajor exchanges. This is what structuraladjustment and stabilisation policies areaimed at.One of the IMF tools for discipliningSSA countries in order to re-assert mar-ket discipline is the exchange rate policy.This compels the SSA countries - onpain of starvation - to realign the valueof their currencies with those of majorcurrencies. This is what currency devalu-ation is supposed to achieve. In the mean-time, SSA countries have become moredeeply embedded in economic crises.The current crisis is, however, morethan one of severe balance-of-paymentsdisequilibria aggravated by an acuteshortage of external financing. It is also acrisis of growth and development. Since1981, the majority of the countries on theAfrican continent have experienced nega-tive per capita income growth, and eco-nomic and social development has beenat a virtual standstill since the mid-1970s.In reality, it is increasingly becominga crisis of survival - of people and ofstates. More than half of the Africancountries are now threatened by faminedue to severe shortages of imported food-stuffs, in a context where massive urbani-sation together with lagging domestic foodproduction has led to food-dependency.The victims of these crises are mainlywomen and children.Meanwhile, in more and more SSACountries, the viability of state systemsestablished in the aftermath of decoloni-sation is being undermined, as govern-ments encounter difficulties in meetingmonthly payrolls, paying for criticallyneeded oil supplies and maintaining es-sential social and public services.During the 1980s, SSA economicmiseries were tackled by the IMF andWorld Bank by means of what have cometo be called Structural Adjustment Pro-grammes (SAPs). IMF stabilisation loans,issued only against evidence of stringentbudgetary austerity, are followed byWorld Bank Structural AdjustmentLoans(SALs) and Sector Adjustment Loans(SECALs), which are extended againstguaranteed policy changes or `condition-ality': producer price increases, divest-ment of parastatals, import liberalisation,interest rate rises, and devaluations. Allthese policies are aimed at boosting for-eign exchange earnings and spreadinggrowth.However, the austerity programmesare, if anything, worsening the growthdevelopment crises in SSA through theirheavy reliance on deflationary adjust-ment, which is a disincentive to invest-ment.Deflationary monetary policiesDeflationary monetary and fiscal policiesare aimed at limiting demand for foreignexchange indirectly. Since governmentscreate new money via budget deficits -that is, by spending more than they cantake in taxation and printing money tomake up the balance - a deflationaryfiscal policy means the reduction of thedeficit through an increase in taxes, adecrease in government spending and sub-sidies, or both. Since government is con-sidered an important instrument of botheconomic development and social justiceor income redistribution in third worldcountries, a restraint on these functionscan only have adverse consequences forthese countries.In the same context, governments inSSA are required to follow a deflationarymonetary policy, by which they limitcredit creation by raising bank interestrates or the amount held against deposits.Since business depends on credit to fi-nance current operations, a deflationarymonetary policy is always bad for domes-tic businesses that depend on local sourcesof credit.There is compelling evidence that, inthe context of current economic condi-tions, the standard prescriptions of mas-sive public sector retrenchment and de-valuation have made little, if any, contri-bution to dealing with the balance of pay-ments deficits of SSA countries. It wouldbe surprising if they were to do so, con-sidering the major causes of deficits arelow commodity prices, stagnating inter-national trade due to the world recession,and the problem of debt.The absurdity of the standard packageof measures has been illustrated by thefollowing question: How far would acountry like Tanzania have to depress itseconomic activity in order to reduce itsconsumption of imports to the point whereit can be financed by current earningsfrom export and capital flows? Given thatmost of these imports, such as oil, rawmaterials and food, are non-substitutablewith domestic goods, a large part of in-dustry and transport would have to closedown, and much of the population wouldstarve. Adjustment via austerity has beenlikened - literally - to an attempt tocure the disease by killing the patient!Moreover, the present programme foradjustmentmakesvery little sense ininter-national terms, since no effective provi-sion is made for adjustment in relation tothose countries where payment surplusesare the counterpart of the deficits of oth-ers - although, as has been cogentlyargued, unilateral adjustment is by defi-nition impossible. The paradox is that thecountry with the largest balance of pay-ments deficit in the world, the UnitedStates, is able to escape the strictures ofIMF-type austerity programmes. This isthe result of the privileged position of itsnational currency, which serves as theprincipal internationalreserve asset, quiteapart from the fact that it is the dominantforce in the IMF itself.`Adjustment', therefore, is a remedyreserved for the weak and vulnerable:deficit third world countries, and espe-cially those of SSA.Structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan AfricaAs a result of the sustained economiccrisis, the vast majority of SSA nationshave turned to the IMF for balance-of-payments assistance and, as a result, hadtheir economic policies shaped by IMF`conditionality'.Between 1980 and 1986,no fewer than 30 SSA governments en-tered into Standby or Extended Arrange-ments with the IMF, representing three-quarters of the nations of this part of thecontinent.The policy instruments and measuresundertaken by SSA governments havehad severe consequences for regionaleconomies: Drastic budgetary reductions, especiallywith respect to expenditures and subsi-dies on social services andessential goods,have undermined the
Page 39 of 55 human condition(particularly of women and children, themost vulnerable in these societies) and
Page 40 of 55 necessitated massive retrenchment in thepublic sector. The indiscriminate promotion of tradi-tional exports through price incentivesoffered only to the `tradeables' has led tothe undermining of food production andself-sufficiency, environmental degrada-tion and sometimes oversupply and a fallin prices. There has been an across-the-board creditsqueeze which has led to an overall con-traction of the economy, declines in ca-pacity utilisation and closure of enter-prises, and an increasing shortage of criti-cal goods and services. Generalised devaluation policies involv-ing open exchange markets, currencyauctions and large and frequent currencydepreciations have serious social, politi-cal and economic consequences. Theselead to socially insupportable increases inprices of critical goods and services; raisethe domestic cost of imported impots andundermine capacity utilisation; triggergeneral inflation; divert scarce foreignexchange to speculative activities andexacerbate capital flight; worsen incomedistribution patterns; undermine growthand can result in structural entrenchmentof traditional exports through price in-centives for such commodities or, tradeables' . Unsustainable high real interest rates(inflation-adjusted nominal rates of inter-est) lead to shifts in the economy towardsspeculative and trading activities by be-coming a disincentive to productive in-vestment, and fuels inflation. Total import liberalisation leads togreater and more entrenched external de-pendence; intensifies foreign exchangeconstraints; jeopardises national priori-ties such as food self-sufficiency; erodesthe capacity of `infant' industries andthereby slows industrialisation. Excessive dependence on market forcesfor `getting the prices right' in structur-ally distorted and imperfect market situ-ations results in the worsening of infla-tion through sharp increases in produc-tion costs and mark-ups; causes devia-tions from desirable production and con-sumption patterns and priorities, and mayderail the entire process of transforma-tion. Lastly, SSA countries have followeddoctrinaire privatisation which under-mines growth and transformation, andjeopardises social welfare and the humancondition.`Conditionality' is central to any pro-gramme of expanded IMF and WorldBank lending. There is compelling evi-dence that the Standby and Extendedfacilities of the IMF and Structural Ad-justment lending of the Bank are built onThe work of caring for children, gathering fuel and water, processing food,preparing meals, housekeeping, nursing the sick and the reproduction ofhuman resources in general is excluded from macro-economic adjustmentpolicies.IMF conditionality. This is designed interms of monetary methods which areused for deflationary adjustment, and thatboth institutions apply pressure in favourof market-oriented, export-led growth.There is overwhelming evidence thatthe `one road' to external balance hasproved intractable. Finally, whereas theneed for improvements in economic man-agement may be readily conceded, themethods prescribed by the IMF and WorldBank should be considered on their ownmerits and not in terms of their consis-tency with a predetermined adjustmentmodel.Gender biasTo date, this adjustment model has fo-cused on the Gross National Product(GNP) or Gross Domestic Product (GDP);on imports, exports and the balance ofpayments; and on efficiency and produc-tivity. As Elson concluded in a recentstudy, this apparent gender neutrality inmacro-economic policy masks a deepgender bias. There is a hidden agenda inthe procedures of analysis and policyformulation which covers the reprodue-tion and maintenance of human resources.This process is not explicitly includedin the macro-economic thinking of theIMF and World Bank `advisors'. Theeconomy is defined principally in termsof marketed goods and services, withsome allowance made for subsistence cropproduction in developing countries. Thework of caring for children, gatheringfuel and water, processing food, prepar-ing meals, housekeeping, nursing the sickand the reproduction of human resourcesin general is excluded from macro-eco-nomic adjustment policies. This workfalls largely on the shoulders of women.Therefore, by excluding explicit con-sideration of women's contributions toeconomic developmentin SSA countries,macro-economic structural adjustmentanalysis and policy has a built-in concep-tual bias against women. Sipho Buthelezi is an economist based inHarare.
Page 41 of 55 REPLY TO NATTRASConfronting messyeconomic practicesn WIP 76 Nicoli Nattrass makesseveral criticisms of my piece inWIP 74. She criticises in particularthe `profusion of baldly stated,incorrect, observations'.The piece in WIP was tran-scribed from a set of overhead slides,which I wrote to assist members ofNumsa's national bargaining commit-tees and organisers to report back toshopstewards in our locals on nationalnegotiations in the engineering and steel,auto manufacturing, tyre and motor in-dustries. The slides were based on, butnot identical to, Numsa's opening speechat the National Industrial Council for theIron, Steel, Engineering and MetallurgyIndustry (Nicisemi) negotiations.By their nature, overhead slides for apresentation of this nature are abbrevi-ated and in brief point form, and do notcontain references. It was not intendedthat the slides should contain a fully rea-soned and referenced argument. Numsadoes try to ensure that all facts and state-ments presented in this way are accurateand not paternalistic. I am cer-tainly prepared to accept that itwas a mistake to publish theseslides without references, editingor proofing in a journal as repu-table as WIP.Debates about dataThe data I used in preparing thespeech were derived primarilyfrom three sources: an apparentlyunpublished paper on economicstrategy by Wim De Villiers,which was provided to me by aservice organisation (hence thereference in my speech to `gov-ernment figures'); the Old Mu-tual (OM)/Nedbank scenario pres-entation on the economy; andpublished figures and histogramsfrom the Labour Research Serv-ice (LRS). Neither I no, Numsaare in a position to carry out inde-pendent research to verify figurespresented in such studies. The linegraphs to which Nattrass and MFBWchford (Letters, WIP 76) ob-ject were traced from graphs usedin the OM/Nedbank presentation,and were as precise as I could make themusing a felt pen. The data and histogramson returns and profitability were tracedfrom LRS publications in the same way.The figure of -4% growth in GDP percapita was calculated by me as follows:The OM/Nedbank presentation gavethe growth rate of GDP in 1990 as -I%and the population growth rate as 3 % perannum. I put the two figures together toget -4% for the rate of change of GDP percapita. I am happy to be corrected by aneconomist, but would welcome an expla-nation of why the -4% should be -I%.I was not then aware of debate on theLRS figures. The metal industry employ-ers' association, Seifsa, disagree withthese figures, but provide insufficient de-tail for us to assess their objections. Ibelieve that the labour movement wouldwelcome any improvement and agree-ment on statistics to be used in discus-sions on economic policy. I would per-sonally prefer not to use figures which areambiguous or of doubtful accuracy.Cosatu is attempting to supplement dis-cussion of `frameworks' with discussionsof `content', and we would clearly preferthe content to be objective and accurate.It is a great pity that the OM/Nedbankscenario analysis has not been published.The report given to Cosatu and othergroups by the team which did the study,confirmed most of the criticisms of theeconomic role and policies of the stateand capital which Cosatu has been put-ting forward for many years, and whichhave been universally scorned by busi-ness and their apologists. Their argu-ments are more adequately referencedand closely argued than mine. While wedo not agree with many of their proposedremedies, their marshalling of the facts isextremely valuable for further debate onthe economy and should be made public.Numsa's BERNIE FANAROFF replies toNicoli Nattrass's criticism of his article`Business Has Made a Mess!'Training not taken seriouslyNattrass also takes issue with some of thepoints I made concerning the failure ofbusiness and the state to look further thantheir noses. I said that they haveconsidered only short-term re-turns, and had not had investmentor business strategies which bene-fit the economy or the people inthe medium- or long-term.She points to my criticism ofthe lack of training as an exampleof inaccuracy. I believe that it iscorrect to say that business andgovernment have failed to taketraining seriously in any long- oreven medium-term way, and thatthey have failed to make any sig-nificant investment. In the metalindustry sectors, for instance, theonly training which has takenplace systematically has beenartisan training. Operator train-ing has been almost universallyjob-specific, done on the job, in-formal, inadequate and uncertifi-cated. Regarding artisan training,Iscor alone trained more than halfof all the apprentices in the indus-try (when it was still a para-statalcorporation).Attempts to invest in training,such as the Mossgas trainingproject, were abandoned half-way
Page 42 of 55 1991 Cosatu congress:The unions arecommitted todeveloping a soundeconomic policy whichdirectly involves theirmembersin favour of importing thousands of Pol-ish, Phillipino and Taiwanese workers.The record is available and is singularlyunimpressive. The government has re-cently abdicated responsibility for train-ing - except the training of the unem-ployed, but even here its expenditure hasbeen significantly cutin this year'sbudget.There is now thinking and negotiationabout new training strategies and facili-ties in the industry-but almostall of thishas resulted from Numsa proposals andinitiatives (witness the results of negotia-tions recently concluded in the Nicisemiand auto sectors).Numsa members are well aware of thedearth of training, and the proposals havebeen widely discussed in Numsa, andnow in Cosatu.I was using the issue to illustrate thefailure of capital and government to in-vest in training, and believe that ourmembers were aware of the background.I plead guilty to a loose use of words.Luxury economyAs regards `production... for luxuries', noless an authority than Alec Erwin hascharacterised the SA economy as a 'lux-ury economy'. This I take to mean thatmost production is geared towards that(small) part of the population which canafford to pay for relatively high qualitygoods and services. The majority of thepopulation continue to be unable to bene-fit from much of this-hence the concen-tration of the Cosatu and ANC economicprogrammes on the provision of afford-able basic goods and services to the ma-jority of the population, and our con-demnation of the Thatcherite economicswhich would further emphasise inequal-ity. Again, I plead guilty to a loose use ofwords (most Numm organisers and bar-gaining committee members have heardthis argument before and understand thebackground).The core of Nattrass' argument,however, while purporting to be based onher response to my facts, is actually heropinion on the necessary conditions forinvestment. She believes that businesscannot be bullied into investing and thatnationalisation cannot work as a way ofdirecting investment. This glosses overthe entire argument concerning the fail-ure of the capital market to invest in jobcreation, wealth creation (other thanspeculation) or in basic goods and serv-ices. The debate on how to give directionto the capital market is an active one inCosatu, and is being pursued in as scien-tific a manner as possible. We are notsimply relying on metaphysics or theol-ogy.However, we do not accept the sim-plistic arguments of the IMF or of busi-ness that government should withdrawcompletely and allow business to have afree hand (except, of course, that govern-ment and the trade unions must ensurethat the environment is favourable forindividual businesses to succeed). Thefate of the steel and electronics industriesin the USA is ample warning of the con-sequences of a failure to have seriousnational industrial and economic strate-gies. The SA economy (for instance thetax system) is already riddled with spe-cial concessions and assistance for bigbusiness- and they will fight to retainthese even in a `free' economy.On the question of profitability, it isfairly clear from our experience thatcompanies in the metal industry whichhave maintained profitability have, in gen-eral, done so by reducing employmentand the productive base. At least until1990, most of the big companies ap-peared to be able to maintain profitabilityin this way.Economic policy conferenceA detailed discussion of all these issueswas, however, beyond my capabilitiesand was not relevant to the circumstances(of the negotiations). The debate oneconomic policy is a complex one, and itshould be: public; based on statistics which are clearly de-fined and as accurate and reliable aspossible; not present political opinion as fact; involve the masses.Cosatu is trying to develop economicand industrial policy in this way, and hasundertaken several major research proj-ects which directly involve unions andtheir members. The 1991 Cosatu con-gress passed a resolution to continuedeveloping these policies with a view toholding a large Economic Policy Confer-ence.
Page 43 of 55 ANC CONFERENCEMary Turok's article in thelast issue of WIP, `Thewomen's quota debate:Building non-sexism' isa welcome piece. It is instark contrast to thejumbled accounts of the debate whichgraced the pages of the commercial pressafter the ANC's July consultative confer-ence in Durban. The debate was over anattempt to ensure that women are electedto at least 30% of all positions in ANCstructures.Turok's account, however, misses outsome important details of the strategicprocess which operated in the course oftrying to resolve the issue.Resolution by defaultThe real difficulty emerged when thedebate was exhausted, and the issue hadto be resolved. Only 17% of the confer-ence delegates were women. So the stan-dard method of the majority vote was indanger of perpetuating, rather than re-solving, this problem. After voting com-menced, an ANC Women's League(ANCWL) delegate announced that theANCWL would be abstaining from thevote.Instead of proceeding with the vote(which many who were monitoring thevotes against, predicted was going to be avery close result) the chairperson aban-doned the chair to consult with ANC andANCWL leadership. While this washappening women, supported by manymen (including many who had votedagainst the quota), sang and demonstratedin favour of the quota.After a break of many hours (duringwhich a large women's caucus, and manyother desperate discussions, was held)the conference reconvened. The then vice-president (Nelson Mandela) appealed toconference to adjourn and allow a meet-ing between the national executive com-mittees (NECs) of the ANC, ANCWLand ANC Youth League (ANCWL) tohammer out a compromise. This wasresisted by a few delegates, who pointedout that national conference was a morerepresentative and higher decision-mak-ing structure than any of the NECs.However, due to time constraints, theconference agreed to adjourn anyway.The following day, the president of theANCWL apologised to the conferencefor the ANCWL's disruption of the voteand creating a delay the previous day.Then a statement by the ANCWL wasread out on the quota issue, which pro-posed that the matter be finalised one wayor the other.Some delegates took this as an apol-ogy for having raised the quota issue at allANC women's quota:The debatecontinuesPAT HORN draws further lessons for feminists from the way thewomen's quota issue was defeated at the ANC's July consultativeconference- one male delegate patronisingly rappedthe women over the knuckles for theindignity of introducing the issue into theconference! The 30% quota fell by thewayside. It was, to say the least, an em-barrassing resolution to a highly chal-lenging and eye-opening debate.The very next constitutional proposalwas that MK commanders have auto-matic seats on the NEC. A vote was takenon the principle. This time nobody ob-jected on the basis of merit or democracy.A quick vote showed overwhelmingsupport for this principle, which then hadto be incorporated into the constitution.This was a very low point for women.The ease with which the conference agreedto create automatic posts for militarycommanders from the very male-domi-nated MK, contrasted starkly with thedesperate resistance of delegates againsta quota for women.Lessons for womenThe most obvious lesson to draw fromthis experience is that women still have alot of work to do to popularise affirmativeaction programmes, and in creating anawareness among men and women activ-ists of gender oppression and the need tofight against it. The meagre 18% ofwomen elected to the NEC later on in theconference suggests that the progressivegender policy of the ANC has so far leftmost of its membership behind.But there are other lessons: Not one member of the ANC NEC,which had accepted the proposal for a30% quota, intervened in the debate toindicate the NEC's support for the issue.At best, even if the NEC all agreed on theprinciple, a strong commitmentcould notnecessarily be expected of such a male-I dominated body. The entire old NECshowed that it was prepared to blow in thedirection of the wind on this issue. Nexttime this needs to be anticipated. It was also a strategic error to rely on thepower of the NEC, or powerful individu-als within it, rather than the more demo-cratic (albeit more conservative) confer-ence structure. This meant relying on thegoodwill of influential males to swing theissue. Certainly women should try to winsupport from men for gender struggles,but should not rely or depend on it.-The vice-president's appeal, on women'sbehalf, to delegates to allow the NEC tosettle an issue that could not be settled byconference, a more representative body,lost some of the moral high ground (whichuntil then was on the side of those pushingfor the 30% quota). The women's eman-cipation struggle cannot afford to be per-ceived to be in opposition to the strugglefor democratisation of South Africansociety. Although all women participants in thedebate pushed for the quota, some womenvoted against it. This should, however,not confuse us. What is more important isto try to understand the reasons whichimpel many women to participate in theirown oppression, to anticipate that thiswill continue as the struggle continues,and to develop ways of convincing thosewomen of the importance of fightinggender oppression with other women. The mere act of debating this issue cre-ated space for exposing gender oppres-sion as a reality. It also gave space tomany women to be heard.This was anadvance in our struggle, however small. There were 17% women at the confer-ence. The proportion of women elected tothe NEC was 18%. So we can expect 50%of women to be sitting on the structures ofthe ANC only when women have theclout to elect 50% of women as confer-ence delegates. Do we have to sit on ourhands and wait to see if that time comesspontaneously, or do we hasten it bymeans of affirmative action programmessuch as the quota system? Pat Horn works for the CWI i1 and rep-resented the Durban central branch ofthe ANC at the conference
Page 44 of 55 Wits students in protest: Students need to break with traditional dogma and raise new debates if they want tocarry the struggle forwardThe Nusas-Sansco merger:Will students movewith the times?In a historic move, the predominantly white Nusas and thepredominantly black Sansco, merge into one non-racial organisationthis month. JONATHAN GUNTHORPE assesses some of the issueswhich arise out of this mergerhe popular uprisings which en-gulfed the country in the mid-'80s enveloped South Africanactivists in a euphoric frenzy,and a confidence that a trans-fer of power was around thecorner.There was a belief that popular insur-rection would lead to the collapse of theapartheid state. This would be replacedby the very organs of `people's power',which had led to its destruction. Thisconception sees `the people' as a ho-mogenous political bloc, characterisedby a single objective will. Thus, the po-litical structures of democracy, the struc-tures of people's power, become instru-mentalist organs, shaped and wielded bythis unitary will.The crisis of socialism in EasternEurope, together with the complexity ofstruggle in the post-February 1990 era,has compelled activists to re-examine thistheory. Among the new notions are theneed for a separation of political andrepresentative formations, and assertionsthat the popular democratic will cannot
Page 45 of 55 NUSAS/SANSCObe adequately articulated within the struc-tures of a state controlled by a single po-litical party.These issues have also affected thedebates which are moulding the futureprogramme of the progressive studentmovement, on the eve of the integrationof the National Union of South AfricanStudents (Nusas) and the South AfricanNational Students Congress (Sansco), intoa single political body.Students have been characterised as amilitant sector of society aligning them-selves with struggles often in contradic-tion with their material interests. Theirlocation in society and access to knowl-edge and ideas enables them to become acritical social force.Organising separatelyIn South Africa, ever since the dramaticwalkout of black students (led by SteveBiko) from Nusas in 1969, black andwhite students have been organised sepa-rately. Nusas existed alongside, andlargely in isolation from, the black con-sciousness South African Students Or-ganisation (Saso), until the latter wasbanned in 1977. However, during theearly 1980s the organisation which cameto replace Saso, the Azanian StudentsOrganisation (Azaso), aligned itself ex-plicitly with the ANC tradition, andworked together with Nusas in the UnitedDemocratic Front (UDF). By the mid-80sAzaso changed its name to Sansco.Both organisations, however, acceptedthat, due to the vastly differing experi-ences and conditions of black and whitestudents, they should continue to organ-ise separately. Nusas has had to developstrategies and tactics to involve privi-leged white students into democraticprogrammes. Sansco, on the other hand,was able to rely on a largely organicsupport for a national liberation pro-gramme. After the February 1990 unban-nings, it is now felt that conditions havechanged sufficiently for there to be onenon-racial student body.The debate on the student movement'sprogramme now centres around interpre-tations of the political terrain since theunbanning of the liberation movement.Two broad positions have emerged withinthe student movement, which cut acrossthe membership of Sansco and Nusas.`There has been no fundamentalchange'The first position acknowledges that theemergence of negotiations as a site ofstruggle partially reshapes the studentmovement's relationship to national poli-tics, in that negotiations must be con-tested and won by popular mass interven-tion.This position also asserts that thematerial conditions of the majority ofSouth Africans have not fundamentallychanged. The state's strategic interven-tion remains the repression of nationaldemocratic expression, in order to recon-stitute white minority rule in a new form.Arising from this, it is asserted that thestrategic programme of the liberationmovement, including the student move-ment, remains unchanged. The struggleremains one of a colonised people unitingto destroy white minority rule. The role ofthe liberation movement remains to con-stitute itself. the true and sole represen-tative of the oppressed, to agitate andmobilise South Africans into a ho-mogenous anti-apartheid force. Thisimplies that ANC-aligned studentorgani-sations remain constituted as THE stu-dent movement, THE sole representativeof South African students.New times, new strategiesThe other position holds that the priorityremains the development of strategies toensure the demise of colonial rule, and itsreplacement with a deeply democratic,non-racial political society. It, however,questions whether the strategies of themid-'80s are still appropriate.What defines the present nationalpolitical terrain is that the democraticforces have been invited to participate inthe national political system. This is notto say that we have been invited to partici-pate in the wielding of state power on ourown terms.The present terrain is substantivelydifferent from the '80s. The struggle is nolonger one to ensure that democratic forcesare represented in the state, but to ensurethat the future state is a non-racial andpopularly-controlled one.This has two crucial implications. Thefirst is that the divide between the strugglefor state power and the struggle overreconstruction becomes more and moreblurred. Reconstruction will take place,with or without us. Our role is to ensurethat the process is a democratic one whicheradicates apartheid's legacy.Secondly, non-racial democracy anda post-apartheid future is no longer viewedas the sole property of the liberationmovement. A whole myriad of forces arejostling for a position in a multi-racial ornon-racial state.The powerful anti-apartheid unitydeveloped in the'80s, the overwhelmingpresence of a common enemy, allowedagitational and mobilisatory politics tosweep substantive differences amongstthe oppressed under the carpet. The proc-ess of building a new political movementrequires that these differences are nowvoiced, and that we develop the necessaryformations for them to be voiced.Our programmes must aim to ensurethat we are the hegemonic and popularforce which leads South Africa to na-tional democracy. However, we cannotsimply assert this hegemonic role. Weneed to win it in the midst of a plurality offorces.Significant changesWithin the tertiary educational sector, theimplications of the new era are beingdramatically witnessed. The 1990's haveseen the poor conditions at many tertiaryinstitutions remain unchanged. Repres-sion by administrations, the state andBantustan forces has continued. Therehave, however, been significant changes.The governing bodies of the tertiaryinstitutions have not remained unaffectedby the climate. These institutions can bedivided into two categories - the (moreliberal) universities and some technikons,which are looking at reform while retain-ing control over change. Many realisethat they are likely to be substantiallyaltered in a post-apartheid educationsystem. However, none have been forcedto take direction from students or thecommunity.The new climate poses importantchallenges to the student movement. Weare being required to develop a programmeto transform tertiary education that goesbeyond rhetorical demands for change.This requires structures of participationto create a powerful social movementwhich can act to bring about significantchange. This programme and structuremust accommodate the diverse nature oftertiary institutions in South Africa aswell as the differing class and politicalinterests of students. We also need toensure that we unite students in action forthe final onslaught on apartheid, whilepreparing ourselves for a post-liberationrole.These challenges have thrown updifferent strategic responses within thestudent movement. I now turn to debatesaround these.Structure of the student movementSince the late 1980s, the student move-ment has recognised the dynamic natureof the relationship between political andrepresentative structures. Nusas andSansco agree that building democraticstudent representative councils (SRCs)should be part of a political student or-ganisation's programme. However, thereare differences in emphasis. This is re-flected in the debate around the need tobuild a representative national union of
Page 46 of 55 students.One approach argues that the priorityis to build and consolidate political stu-dent organisation at local and nationallevel. Maintaining a strong position onlocal SRCs is seen as useful. However,developing a national union is a low pri-ority or even a threat to political studentorganisation.An associated argument is that thenew student organisation, as an inde-pendent formation, should function as abroadly representative organisation. Thisposition refers to Sansco's historical abil-ity to speak on behalf of oppressed stu-dents and its status as part of the liberationmovement. At the root of this position isthe conception that the struggle remainsone of a potentially homogenous colo-nised people. It also argues that the ANC-aligned movement can and should remainthe sole representative of the oppressed.Others argue that a clearly alignedunitary organisation which at the sametime claims to be broadly representative,falls between two stools. This positionholds that a national union based on electedSRCs could more easily claim an ongo-ing student-mandate and ensure broaderstudent participation. A national unionwould be able to back political clout withconsiderable resources.gathered throughSRC affiliation.Those who favour a representativenational union do see the need for a politi-cal student organisation. They argue thatstudents organised around a clear politi-cal programme should build grassrootsdemocracy and engage in open contestwith other groupings attempting to shapethe programme of SRCs and the envis-aged national union, or student parlia-ment.Critical alignmentDuring the 1980s, both Nusas and Sanscoevolved into organisations of the Con-gress tradition. Some therefore expectedthey would transform themselves into thestudent wing of the ANC. Instead, thenew student organisation will constituteitself as `independent' at its launch inSeptember.A number of factors motivated thisdecision. Oneconcern is that programmesfocussing on students and the tertiaryinstitutions would be subsumed within anANC or ANC Youth League programme.The objective is to maintain a certaindistance from the ANC, while retainingthe mantle of Congress. The relationshipis seen as one of critical alignment. Therewill be no ANC structures on campuses,but the new organisation will recruit forthe ANC.Debates concerning alignment areA clearly aligned unitaryorganisation which at the sametime claims to be broadlyrepresentative, falls between twostools.clearly linked to positions on an SRCfederation. Some argue that a nationalunion, contested by ANC-aligned stu-dent structures, would be the most appro-priate `independent' student formation.Notably, the `Congress aligned' stu-dent movement was unable to persuadethe ANC that it had a rightful place inshaping ANC policy, through representa-tion at the recent ANC congress. Thisunderlines key questions surrounding thenew organisation's relationship to theANC: Can students expect the ANC to holditself accountable to an `independent'organisation when it comes to issues af-fecting. students and tertiary education?On the other hand, if a relationship of dual ~'accountability is defined, how is this rec-onciled with the claim to represent stu-dents broadly? Will the new organisation be able todefine a relationship with the ANC whichkeeps students in touch with national po-litical developments? Will the organisation's relationship withthe ANC satisfy the ANC's desire to haveaccess to the student constituency?Programme of the studentmovementMany of the issues which need to be ad-dressed by progressive student organisa-tions have already been raised in thispaper. These include the building of abroad student movement able to act as apowerful organ of civil society, contestedby a strong political student organisation.Also needed is an effective programme tomobilise students for the transfer of power,linked to a sophisticated programme forthe transformation of tertiary education.Other areas that need to be addressedinclude the development of programmesthat accommodate the diverse nature ofthe student constituency and tertiary in-stitutions.This is an area subject to debate withinthe student movement. One position ar-gues that the immediate interests of themost oppressed students at the most re-pressive and poor institutions should begiven primacy in the student movement'sprogramme. These students are seen to bepotentially the most consistent element ofthe student movement because they havethe most to gain and the least to lose frommilitant struggle.This view seems limited in its ap-proach to the development of the studentmovement. Firstly, multi-faceted pro-grammes must be developed to accom-modate different groups of students. It isonly with united student support that theprogressive student movement will beeffective. The concentration of resourcesat some institutions should not imply thatprogrammes for these institutions are de-emphasised. On the contrary, the impor-tance of these institutions as centres ofhighereducation and research makes theircontestation all the more important.Lastly, any strategic approach to theformulation of programmes which ac-commodate the mass of students needs torecognise subjective changes in the stu-dent constituency referred to earlier.New approaches to cadre develop-ment, campaign work, and other strategicand tactical issues must be developed ifstudents are to be taken into the 1990s.Creativity and the preparedness to breakwith past traditions are necessary to makethis possible.Breaking with dogmaThe student movement is potentially animportant force for change and the deep-ening of democracy in our society. Stu-dents need to ensure that they contributeto the transformation of both their institu-tions and of society as a whole.Students have often been the first tobreak with traditional dogma and raisenew debates that carry struggle forward.It is my hope that, at this critical momentin our struggle, students are able to live upto this reputation and advance signifi-cantly. The alternative is to be left behindby history, to begin disintegrating whileclutching desperately atholy bibles whichthe rest of the world has forgotten about. Jonathan Gunthorpe was a member ofNusas before the merger.
Page 47 of 55 Marxism-Leninism andabstract truthDAVID KITSON replies to two critiques of his article `Is the SACP StillCommunist?', and argues that a Marxist-Leninist position has to closely, butnot rigidly, follow the writings of the Marx, Engels and Leninn his diatribe against me (`Is TheSACP Moving in the Right Direc-tion?' in WIP 74) Jeremy Cronincalls me incoherent, a skim reader,excitable, given to the silliest andthe purest dogmatism, describingmy concept of Marxism as dogmatic,metaphysical, unscientific and anti-Marx-ist. We all know that such personal attackindicates that the attacker finds the con-tent of my article unassailable and incon-trovertible, and therefore belittles anddenigrates me in the hope that my argu-ments will not be considered seriously.Note that Cronin is careful not toactually discuss the content of my quota-tions from Marx, Engels and Lenin, andbypasses my introductory remark thatMarxist-Leninists `should not woodenlyapply the principles used by their prede-cessors, Marx, Engels, Lenin and others,indifferent ages and in different struggles'(WIP 73). Let the reader judge.The concreteness of TruthLet us consider `the right direction', `right'being the operative word. Cronin says:`B ut the truth, Lenin (following Plekha-nov following Hegel) was fond of saying,"is alway concrete".'The works of Lenin are contained in45 volumes covering a period rangingfrom 1893-1923. In the course of thesethirty years, Lenin is recorded as sayingonly eight times that the truth is alwaysconcrete. It is illuminating to examinesome of these.In his article `One Step Forward, TwoSteps Back', Lenin says:`Comrade Luxemburg's... article...consists of nothing but manufacturedformulas and runs counter to the ABC ofdialectics. This ABC tells us that there isno such thing as abstract truth, truth isalways concrete. Comrade Rosa Luxem-burg loftily ignores the concrete facts ofour Party struggle and engages in gran-diloquent declamation about matterswhich it is impossible to discuss seri-ously'. (Lenin Collected Works Vol 7)(LCW 7, p475-6).Contrary to what Cronin claims, I donot think it is a sin or heretical to quoteLuxemburg. However, she was oftenmistaken, and her viewpoints should notbe taken for granted. Of course, Leninshould not be `woodenly' taken for grantedeither. But he was less liable to error than~- Luxemburg. Lenin's revolution in Russiasucceeded, whilst Luxemburg's Germanrevolution failed. One must be careful,however, to ascertain whether Lenin'stheories are still pertinent to the presentday.Instead of relying on Lenin's opinion,I actually attempted to show why in aclass society, ie South Africa in the 1990s,Luxemburg's definition of freedom iswrong, especially, as she says, and Croninrepeats in WIP 74: `Freedom is alwaysand exclusively freedom for the one whothinks differently'.My emphasis shows that no otherdefinition of freedom is permissible forher and her followers - including thedefinition that freedom is the apprecia-tion of necessity (following Engels fol-lowing Hegel), which can be regarded asa basic Marxist-Leninist principle. Thereare other principles. I decline to be chainedto Cronin's Procrustean bed of only five.I was discussing in WIP 73 Luxemburg'sfailure to demonstrate a class attitude tofreedom.(Actually, everybody has a class ap-proach, no matter how veiled. It is noaccident that, with 75% of its member-ship in exile being petite bourgeois (seeWIP 60) the SACP's approach is largelypetite bourgeois.)In his `A Painful But Necessary Les-son' (LCW 27, p65), Lenin inferred that,although European capitalism was incrisis, he was not over-confident about itscollapse. He said this in February 1918,in the middle of the period Cronin consid-ers to be `crucial'. With hindsight weknow that capitalism didn't collapse.Lenin's attitude follows from his tenetthat `uneven economic and political de-
Page 48 of 55 Left to wither on the vineDave Kitson talks about how he was excluded fromthe SACPI joined the Communist Party in 1940 as a student. After continuousactivity, 1 became the SACP representative on the National HighCommand of Umkhonto We Sizwe in 1963. When I arrived in LondonIn 1984 after my release from 20 years in jail, Brian Bunting, a leadingSACP official, told me that I was Indeed an SACP member, but thatI could only be Integrated Into the party structures after somemonths when the fuss consequent on my release was over. Thisnever happened. Instead, l was set up to be suspended from the ANCand excluded from the SACP In short order.Norma Kitson, an SACP member since 1960, and active in theCongress movement since she was 18, had been excluded from theparty as soon as I landed in jail.Our suspension from the ANC was perpetrated without theslightest regard for the procedures contained in the section ondiscipline in the constitution of the ANC. However, after a five-year-long battle, Norma and i were reinstated by the NEC in accordancewith procedure. The ANC is full of comrades who want justice to bedone.Our exclusion from the SACP was in contempt of Paragraph XIVof the Constitution of the South African Communist Party (at theback of the party's programme, The Path to Power). We have neverbeen 'expelled, suspended from membership for a fixed period,reprimanded or disciplined' (The Path to Power, p69), nor confrontedwith the charges against us in writing or given an opportunity of fullystating a defence (p70).We were just left to wither on the vine, except it looks like It is thevine that has withered ideologically. I never quite knew whether,nominally, I was in or out. Now an official spokesperson of theSACP, Jeremy Cronin, has revealed that I am 'a former partymember'.Thanks, now I know where I stand - alongside the multitude ofcomrades who stood by the principles of Marxism-Leninism, ratherthan go supinely along with the decadence that Is afflicting so manyso-called communist parties in the world. Maybe there is a justcommunist who could put a resolution to the forthcoming SACPconference, calling for respect for the rights of members so callouslytreated?velopment is an absolute law of Capital-ism' (anotherbasic Marxist-Leninist prin-ciple, and an absolute one). As I said, heformulated it in 1915 and repeated it in1921. Surely Cronin does not expectLenin himself to vacillate from an 'abso-lute law' in between these dates like anypetite bourgeois intellectual?Abstract truthContinuing in the vein quoted above,Lenin said in 'The Political Report of theCentral Committee to the ExtraordinarySeventh Congress of the R.C.P. (B)', inMarch 1918:'I repeat, our salvation from all thesedifficulties is an all-Europe revolution.Taking this truth, this absolutely abstracttruth, as our starting point, and beingguided by it, we must see to it that is doesnot in time become a mere phrase, be-cause every abstact truth: if it is acceptedwithout analysis, becomes a mere phrase'(LCW 27, p95).So here Lenin is speaking of abstracttruth, when he is on record that the truthis always concrete. Marx said in theintroduction to Capital:'In the analysis of economic forms,moreover, neither microscopes norchemi-cal reagents are of use. The force ofabstraction must replace both' (my em-phasis) (Karl Marx (1977) Capital, Vol 1,Lawrence and WishartLtd: London,pl9).Then Marx went on to develop suchconcepts as abstract labour which en-abled him to produce his penetrating andcomprehensive analysis of the capitalismof his day, showing that it was doomed tocrisis. So what then is the nature ofTruth? According to Maurice Conforth:'Itisthecorrespondence between ideasand objective reality. Such correspon-dence between ideas and reality is onlygradually established, and then the corre-spondence is often no more than partialand incomplete' (Maurice Comforth(1987) Dialectical Materialism, Vol 3(Theory of Knowledge), Lawrence andWishart: London, p135).As we live in a material world whereobjectively real phenomena and proc-esses are always changing, so a specifictruth can be subject to change and, what iscertainly true at some juncture, may notbe so at another. However, if some spe-cific idea or concept, ie a mental con-struct, accurately reflects objective real-ity, we can say its truth is concrete, in thesense of specific. Yet, as truth is ex-pressed as an idea, it has its abstract side.No doubt Cronin will expand on this withhis characteristically patronising anddidactic gloss.But he is right, I am abstract in thesense that I am dealing in abstractionsextracted from the works of the Marxistmasters, and I try to be thorough in pre-senting ones that are pertinent to the top-ics I am discussing. If my quotations arenot relevant to present-day South Africa,or miss the mark, or if Marxism-Lenin-ism is no longer a guide to action, let it beclearly explained why.I have, to some extent, 'consideredthe actual practice of and specific pro-gramme of the SACP'. I inferred that itstinks. But nowhere in my article do I'attempt even a basic analysis of thisconcrete South African situation'. Croninis right again. But that is not relevant tomy purpose. I was examining a discus-sion document written by Slovo, and re-lated documents, specifically (ie, con-cretely), to see if the SACP is Marxist-Leninist in its approach to the situation(see WIP 73).Marxist-Leninists adhere to the theo-
Page 49 of 55 ries of Marx and Lenin, applying themanew to each newly arising political situ-ation, because the test of a theory is prac-tice, not the eminence or notoriety of itsadvocates. If one decides that the doc-trines of these theorists are no longerapplicable, then one should describeoneself by some other name, as the for-merItalian andBritish communist partieshave done.Dictatorship of the bourgeoisieOn to a consideration of Steinberg'scharming essay, `Leninist Fantasies andSACP Illusions' (WIP 74). Of course, weare discussing socialism, which is un-likely to be attained in South Africa forsome time yet. If the SACP's attitude isthat socialism is not on the agenda, this islikely to be a self- fulfilling prediction.Lenin presented and applied his the-ory of continuous revolution from 1905onward. He thought that a revolutionarysituation calling for bourgeois democraticrights could be continued by workingclass struggle, led by embattled commu-nists, into a socialist revolution. Obvi-ously it is not thought by the SACP thatsuch an approach is applicable to thepresent situation in South Africa, eventhough the working class is militant,politically conscious and by far the mostnumerous class in South Africa.Then it follows that some form of thedictatorship of the bourgeoisie - onehopes the bougeois democracy embracedwith relief by Steinberg - will ensue.Even parliamentary democracy based onone person, one vote would be better thanthe current dispensation. For the vastmajority of South Africans, there is notradition of bourgeois democracy. Therewas, and is, rule by naked force through abureaucracy and an army in authoritarianbourgeois manner.One can only hope that, some day, amulti-party democracy will be the out-come of the negotiations which are cur-rently suspended because of the level ofviolence in the society. However, the bestchance for real involvement of the massesin determining the path of society -where the people shall govern - is bymeans of proletarian democracy.Steinberg may boggle at the prospectof the dictatorship of the proletariat.Indeed, the events in Eastern Europe showthat there is no easy road to full-blownsocialism and communism. However, itis a fact that every form of bourgeois ruleis in content a dictatorship of the bour-geoisie. It is the rule of a tiny minorityover a big, oppressed majority.If this rule is threatened, it becomescompletely ruthless, no matter how demo-cratic the political institutions of the coun-try concerned are. This remark is notrooted in a `fundamentally flawed theoryof capitalism', as Steinberg argues, but isderived from an observation of objectivereality.Proletarian democracyIf I may join the ranks of the heretics andsinners, here is a quotation from RosaLuxemburg's `What Does the SpartacusLeague Want?':`The violence of the bourgeoiscounter-revolution must be confrontedwith the revolutionary violence of theproletariat..., the arming of the peopleand disarming of the ruling classes... Sucharmingofthesolidmassoflaboringpeoplewith all political power for the tasks of therevolution - that is the dictatorship ofthe proletariat and therefore true democ-racy.' (Luxemburg (1971) Selected Po-litical Writings Monthly Review Press:New York, pp370-2)The invasion of Grenada, CIA in-trigues in Chile, The Iraq War, the defeatof the 1984-5 miners' strike in Britain bystate violence, to say nothing of otherincidents, confirm that Luxemburg'sview, which here is at one with that ofMarx, Engels, Lenin and Castro amongothers, is still valid.Perhaps it would have been nicer ifMarxistsdescribedworkem'rulingpoweras `true democracy', or proletarian de-mocracy, or socialist democracy - allperfectly correct appellations describinga form of rule much more democratic andquite different than any form of bour-geois democracy, because it should beexercised by the day-to-day participationoftheoverwhelmingmajority. But,under-lying every form - which can be mostvaried - of socialist democracy, is thedictatorship of the proletariat.Lenin, and before him, Marx, thoughtof bourgeois parliamentarism as a merefacade for a form of the dictatorship of thebourgeoisie.The content of proletarian democracyis based on participatory democracy,involving the masses in every way inrunning the proletarian state and rulingover the defeated bourgeoisie. Yet theexperience of the former socialist coun-tries must make every aspirant to social-ism pause. Here we have to find a wayforward that makes proletarian democ-racy real while avoiding the shortcom-ings of authoritarian bureaucracy.It is not good enough for Marxists(although it is for Steinberg) just to aban-don the socialist ideal in favour of bour-geois democracy, even though capitalismhas proved to be much more vigorousthan the classical Marxists might havethought.After all the USA, once the foremostcreditor nation, is now the world's great-est debtor. Sixty million Americans arepoverty-stricken, with 14 million home-less. Capitalism cannot deal with theneeds of the workers; will-nilly they willstill be its grave-diggers.I think that the classics of Marxism-Leninism can be mined to find the wayforward for true proletarian democracyafter a socialist revolution in South Af-rica. Steinberg thinks the classics shouldbe laid to rest. Nevertheless, at least weare at one in regarding the SACP as notbeing based on the principles of Marx-ism-Leninism. David Kitson is a former political pris-oner and SACP member, now based inZimbabweLenin, and beforehim, Marx,thought ofbourgeoisparliamentarismas a mere facadefor a form of thedictatorship ofthe bourgeoisie.
Page 50 of 55 A reply to Jeremy CroninSocial democracy orrevolutionary socialism?n 1990 and 1991 political and aca-demic journals within the countryhosted a raging debate on the futureof socialism, the SACP's restruc-turing of its theory and practice,and the tasks currently confrontingsocialist militants. This debate has re-cently been enhanced by the useful con-tribution of Cde Jeremy Cronin in WIP74.The purpose of Cronin's interventionwas to reply to two previous contribu-tions, one by Dave Kitson (see WIP 73),and the other by myself (see Transforma-tion 14). Cronin's intervention raises someimportant questions. This article attemptsto tackle some of these questions throughfocusing on Cronin's critique of my ini-tial contribution. His critique of Kitson,whichI agree with on manypoints, shouldbe responded to by Kitson himself (seeprevious article).Cronin's criticisms seemingly disarmmy initial critique. However, a closerlook at the issues in question indicate thathe is guilty of simplifying issues and ofmanipulating revolutionary theory andhistorical examples to suit his own con-clusions.The national democratic projectCronin's use of the Cuban revolution todefend the `national democratic' projectis dubious to say the least. The fact thatFidel Castro was committed to a nationaldemocratic project proves nothing. Theessential question is: what was the dy-namic of the Cuban revolution?Despite Castro's commitment to avoidthe overthrow of capitalism, this solutionwas forced upon the 26 July movement(which Castro headed) because of thepressure to deliver on the democratic de-mands of the Cuban masses. This is es-sentially what happened.Soon after the revolution, the 26 Julymovement merged with the officialcommunist party (the PSP) to form theCuban Communist Party. Cuba's rela-Wosa's ADAM HABIB, in replyto Jeremy Cronin (WIP 74),argues that the SACP's `nationaldemocratic' path can at bestlead to social democracy, andnot revolutionary socialismtions with the imperialist powers souredfrom very early on in the life of therevolution, and all foreign investmentswere expropriated and nationalised. By1960, a mere one year after the revolu-tion, the Cuban regime had nationalisedall banks, hotels, cinemas and most of thefactories and shops. (see P Binns & MGonzales (1987) Cuba, Castro and So-cialism, London: SWP).There was no national democratic`stage' in Cuba. The revolution proceededfrom its anti-colonial and patriotic char-acter into an anti-capitalist order.Cronin's second defence of the na-tional democratic project, namely that itis the foundation for determining theconcrete tasks of socialist militants, isalso questionable. To avoid the nationaldemocratic path does not imply that so-cialist militants have to be passive. Allthat it does is release us from being tiedinextricably to a nationalist programmeof action. It enables us to determine con-crete tasks for socialist militants, whichwould contribute to creating conditionsfor the overthrow of the capitalist order.The parliamentary road to socialismCronin's critical comments in relation tomy critique of the parliamentary road tosocialism are more useful. He correctlycriticises me for the total negation of par-liamentary participation implied in myoriginal critique. Parliamentary partici-pation is indeed feasible for socialistparties under certain specific historicalconditions (1). However, this is wheremy agreement with Cronin ends.Parliamentary participation, for me,would be solely for the purpose of creat-ing conditions that would facilitate popu-lar mass struggles. Cronin, on the otherhand, suggests parliamentary participa-tion with the utopian hope that it willfacilitate the realisation of a socialistsociety.Cronin's assertion that the socialistorder can!,, realised through parliamen-tary participation is justified on thegrounds that such participation will beaccompanied by popular mass strugglesfor hegemony in civil society. This notionof the struggle for hegemony is Brawnfrom Antonio Gramsci.However, Cronin's interpretation ofGramsci is a reformist one. It is true thatGramsci asserted the need for socialistmilitants to engage in a struggle for he-gemony in civil society - a strugglewhich he described as a'war of position'.This commitment to the `war of position',however, never eroded Gramsci's recog-nition of the need to engage in a frontalassault on state power through armed in-surrection. The war of position, that is,the struggle for hegemony in civil soci-ety, was adopted in periods of lull, tocreate the capacity and conditions forsocialist militants to engage in a `war ofmanoeuvre', that is, a frontal assault onstate power.Cronin's essential problem is that hecounterposes Gramsci to Lenin - in-stead of locating both within the traditionof revolutionary Marxism. The notion ofhegemony, and the theory of the war ofposition and manoeuvre, need to supple-ment the theory of the dictatorship of theproletariat, not replace it (see C Harmen(1986) Gramsci versus Reformism, Lon-don: S WP).Strategic tasksWhat are the strategic tasks facing social-ist militants? Any answer to this questionmust be based on two realisations: So-cialism is a product of the self-activity of
Page 51 of 55 REPLY TO CRONINthe working class, and can only be real-ised with the destruction of the existingstate and its repressive apparatus. Wepresently lack the objective and subjec-tive conditions for an armed insurrection.Currently the state holds the initiative,and has thrown the liberation movementlargely on the defensive.Our strategic perspective must there-fore be to engage in whatGramsci termed the warof position in order to cre-ate conditions for the warof manoeuvre. This per-spective enables us to de-termine three major tasksfor socialist militants.The first is an unflinch-ing commitment to buildall mass organisation ofthe working class (tradeunions, civics, studentsand youth movements).This is to ensure that theworking masses are ableto engage in defensiveactions against attacks ontheirliving standards. Thisability to engage in collec-tive defensive actions willgreatly enhance the self-confidence and the self-activity of the workingclass, thereby creating thetwo conditions that arenecessary for any futureoffensive action againstboth capital and the state.Secondly, there mustbe a realisation of the needto engage in united frontaction. Non-sectarianismand independence of theorganisations of the work-ing class must become thenon-negotiable principlesof all political tendencieswithin the liberation move-ments. Mass organisations must becomethe united front forums where the diver-gent political ideas within the workingclass do legitimate battle. Of course, oncedecisions are madeby the respective struc-tures within the mass organisations, allactivists within such organisations arebound by such decisions.The third and final strategic task is tobuild the constituent assembly campaign.The demand for a constituent assemblyhas the potential of greatly radicalisingthe mass movement. It can open up muchneeded political space for the masses ofour country to struggle, and participatecollectively, in promoting their own vi-sion of an alternative society. This canonly rebound to the benefit of the social-ist cause. Thus the task of socialist mili-tants must be to build the campaign for aconstituent assembly within the frame-work of mass action and mass participa-tion.Social democracy or revolutionarysocialismThere is a high degree of consensus in theshort term between the SACP and social-ist organisations such as the Workers'Organisation for Socialist Action (Wosa)on these strategic tasks. However, the re-spective organisations' political perspec-tives underlying these tasks differ sub-stantially. For Wosa, these strategic tasksare designed to create conditions that willmake insurrection feasible. The demandfor a constituent assembly is seen as atransitional one that bridges the massconsciousness of the present with a visionof the future. A socialist perspective thusunderlines Wosa's strategic demands andtasks.This, however, is not true of the SACP.Since the party is tied to the concept of the`national democratic stage', its politicalperspective is predicated on this min,mum goal. Evidence of this is the fact thatthe party has abrogated its leadership roleto the ANC. It has acquiesced to theANC's programmes of action and sup-ported its compromises on nationalisa-tion.In a similar vein, the party's proposalsfor a post-apartheid state represent noth-ing more than a basic representative democracy, which is com-pletely compatible withcapitalist relations of pro-duction. This is furtherreinforced by the party'slatest suggestions that it ispossible to achieve social-ism through parliamentaryparticipation. All thesefactors indicate that theparty's political perspec-tive is one of social de-mocracy, rather than thatofrevolutionarysocialism.These political differ-ences between the SACPand Wosa ensure that, inthe medium- to long-term,these organisations arebound to follow differingpaths in their strategies andtactics.Some final remarks:Cronin correctly argues inhis critique that `neither adogmatic fundamental-ism, nor a passive wait-ing-for-the-revolutionary-moment, helps us to an-swer the real questions ofthe day'. But neither doesblind allegiance to a na-tionalist programme. Thestrategic tasks of socialistmilitants need to be deter-mined by the constraintsof present realities, and bya vision of our ultimategoal. Without this vision,socialist militants can only blindly marchinto the cul-de-sacs of reformism.FOOTNOTE1. There should be no principle objectionto participating in parliamentary struc-tures. There have indeed been examplesin history where revolutionary workerparties found it necessary, for one reasonor another, to temporarily participate inparliamentary structures. However, ourentrance into such structures must betempered with the realisation that social-ism cannot be won through parliamentaryparticipation. Adam Habib is based at the Universityof Durban-Westville
Page 52 of 55 The oldest living member of the ANC, and almost cer-tainlythe oldest communist on the continent, recentlypaid a visit to Johannesburg. Edwin Mofutsanyanawas born in Witsieshoek district in 1899. He came toJ. 'burg as a young man, and joined the ANC in 1921and the communist party six years later.In his honour, two weeks ago, a small gathering was held inthe National Union of Mineworkers' boardroom. The 91-yearold Mofutsanyana is generally in excellent physical shape, buthis sight and hearing are failing. In response to printed questionswe handed to him on slips of paper, he struggled with the demonsof memory.Marx and MoshweshweThere were moments of extreme lucidity. At other moments thedemons seemed to be winning: `There were two chairs. Twoempty chairs. I waited and I waited. I waited to hear what theywould say. But they never came. Am I dreaming? Or am I goingmad? Those two chairs were for Karl Marx and Moshweshwe.'Marx and Moshweshwe. We too easily forget that their livesoverlapped by several decades. Had they sat down on thosechairs, what would they have said to each other? Perhaps, out ofhis sometimes disconnected, old man's memory, Mofutsanyanawas disclosing the conversation that has been his own life. Marxand Moshweshwe.As a young herdboy in the foothills of the Drakensberg,Mofutsanyana would have heard from elders who had lived andperhaps worked with that outstanding 19th century southernAfrican politician. Moshweshwe had built a people and amountain kingdom out of the diaspora of the terrible years of thedifaqane. Barely 60 years after Moshweshwe's death, in theearly 1930s, half a world away, Mofutsanyana was studyingMarxism at the Party School in Moscow.I recount this anecdote, because a year or two after his returnfrom Moscow, Edwin Thabo Mofutsanyana met a young school-teacher and had a major and lifelong impact upon him. Theschoolteacher's name was Govan Mbeki, who later, inciden-tally, named his first-born in honour of his mentor.Post-Rivonia DifaqaneThe organisational and intellectual history of the left in SouthAfrica is full of disruptions, and yet often profound continuitieslike this.The major disruption that struck in recent times was, ofcourse, what Govan Mbeki describes in his always fresh andwitty prose as the `post-Rivonia difagane' of the mid-1960s. Awhole left intellectual tradition was scattered by this difagane,books and documents, activists and intellectuals.When a significant Marxist theoretical tradition re-emergedin the mid- to late-1970s on the liberal campuses, it did so moreor less in discontinuity with (and often in profound ignorance of)an earlier left intellectual tradition in our country. Of course, itstudied the Mofutsanyanas as historical actors, but it hardlyrelated to them as intellectuals.But the older lineage, the Mofutsanyana-Eddie Roux-GovanMbeki et al lineage didn't peter out. Some of the exiles con-nected up with and influenced the new academically basedMarxism (prominent among them was Ruth First, for whomthere is a moving tribute in this collection).But the lineage had its most dogged and, in organisationalterms, its most impactful locus of survival on Robben Island.The Island became, ironically, a 20th century Thabo Bosiu, thatsheltered, fostered and developed this major current of leftthinking.The first evidence of its dogged survival, for many of us, wasan endless stream of Robben Island graduates. Militant blackThe chairsare talkingLEARNING FROM ROBBEN ISLAND: The PrisonWritings of Govan MbekiDavid Philip, Cape Town (1991)R29,95Reviewed by JEREMY CRONINconsciousness activists would go to jail repeating Steve Biko'sassertion that Marxism was irrelevant to South Africa. In SouthAfrica it was Afrikaner nationalism versus black nationalism. Aclass struggle and not a race struggle? - Biko had asked wryly -try and tell that to a white railway worker!And yet, with almost monotonous regularity five, six, sevenyears on, the majority of those who went to the Island as BCadherents didn't come out quite the same. Govan Mbeki'sprison writings begin to give us a substantial insight into theintellectual world of the University of the Atlantic.Before being sentenced to life imprisonment Govan Mbekihad been a school teacher, a journalist, a researcher and apolitical organiser with a particular interest in the rural areas. Allhis many skills are at work in these essays.In an insightful introduction, Colin Bundy locates Mbeki'scollection within the wider genre of South African prisonwritings - poems, memoirs, novels, journalistic exposes. Bundycorrectly notes that the present writings differ `from all the
Page 53 of 55 others: they were written, circulated and preserved in prison.They were never intended for publication but to be read by otherprisoners; their aim is not to share an experience but to educatepolitically.' (pxxiv)Mbeki and Gramsciit is this pedagogical and collective function that also distin-guishes them from another body of prison writings that springsto mind, the Notebooks of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci.For Gramsci prison was a terribly lonely affair. Early on in hisimprisonment he had become alienated from his fellow prison-ers. Gramsci wrestled prodigiously but alone, and the dense,often difficult, and always coded (to get past censors) notebooksbear all the evidence of this.Mbeki, by contrast, writes lucidly. He is writing for animmediate (or almost immediate) audience. The difference incharacter of these writings is a tribute not just to Mbeki but to theentire collective that the ANC prisoners on the Island were ableto build and sustain. Mbeki's writings are a conversation thattravels on slips of paper between different sections of the prison.,You complain that my Note was full of "provocativeassertions, hints and undeveloped points" which have set yourmind a thinking. Blame my training as a teacher, which wasentrenched in my mind by having to teach others to be teachers.One of the most important lessons in Psychology of Educationand in School Method was the injunction to draw the answersfrom the pupils. They should work out answers from hintsthrown out. When I write I so often forget that my position is nolonger that of a teacher.' (A Note on the Comment, p175).But Gramsci's experience of prison as isolation, squabblesand factionalising between comrades is, as anyone who has beenin prison knows, an ever-threatening reality. In his openingparagraph to one intervention, Mbeki feels compelled to ob-serve: `In the situation that has arisen the most important thingand, therefore, priority number one is to ensure that two viewsdo not become rallying points around which two groups mayform. It should be stressed that this is nothing more than apolitical discussion in which there may be differences of viewswhich should not be allowed to become a dividing line.' (A Dis-cussion Document -3/B> p178).Organisational purposeAs always for Mbeki, a theoretical intervention is encapsulatedwithin an organisational purpose and concern. The particulardebate that he is intervening into here is between those who werearguing that the Freedom Charter's perspective was for a`bourgeois democracy', against those who argued that it stoodfor a `people's democracy'. The debate, which evidently lastedsome three years on the Island, resulted in a whole series ofposition papers that travelled back and forth in heated exchangesbetween the different sections. Mbeki argues very robustly forthe `people's democracy' perspective.Apart from several interventions into this debate, the collec-tion also contains moving obituaries for Ruth First and MosesMabida, a major three-part series on `The Rise and Growth ofAfrikaner Capital' - a scholarly but accessible class analysis ofAfrikaner nationalism (and in part, therefore, a reply to the BCposition?), several lectures on economic topics, and three lec-tures on organising.The lectures on organising were written in a very specificconjuncture. According to one ex-Islander who was there at thetime: `It was the early 1980s and a wave of comrades was dueto be released. Oom Gov's notes on organising became the biblefor these comrades as they prepared themselves for their re-lease.'Many of these Islanders were to play a strategic role ofimmense significance in the reconstruction of the mass demo-cratic and trade union movement in the 1980s. Mbeki's lectureson organisational work despatched this wave of releasees withan injunction borrowed typically from the poet Mqhayi:`Godukani ningalali/ Nizothengiswa Ngooyihlo.'[Go home but don't fall asleep/ For your fathers are going tosell you down the river.] (p77)Throughout the book Mbeki's ability as a teacher comesshining through. He has a knack of illustrating a profound pointwith a homely example. Take, for instance, his debunking of theanti-scientific, history-is-a-series-of-accidents approach:`It is amazing how bourgeois historians often lose sight ofhistorical perspective and thus behave like a child whose milktooth falls out while he is chewing some food and in despair anddisappointment moans, "If I had not eaten this meal I would nothave lost my tooth".' (p162).Or consider Mbeki's remarkable prediction of some tenyears ago of what an All Party Conference might eventually looklike: `If the Nationalist government found itself compelled toyield to a combination of pressures, and thus rather than fight tothe end, decides to convene a national convention to discuss thefuture of the country, it is not difficult to visualise what wouldhappen. A number of organisations would come forward claim-ing representation. And presto!, like the Holy Ghost descendingon Pentecost Day, what a babel of tongues would be there! (Suchas I witnessed many years back in Rev Chiliza's Full GospelChurch along Mngeni Road in Durban, when suddenly thewhole congregation was up dancing, shouting in a medley oftongues.)' (p173)Fascism the highest stage of capitalism?I don't, of course, agree with everything in these pages. Oneissue in particular, is the conceptualisation of the National Partyregime as `fascist'. Conceptually, theoretically, it is not precise.Was it true, for instance, to write in 1983 that: `The era of thefascist dictatorship, with all the paraphernalia to assert itsauthority, is dawning; the jackboot is going to be used on a scalehitherto unknown to crush all open opposition.' (p60)?Or is true to describe fascism as that `which is by commonconsent regarded as the highest stage of capitalism' (p166)?Fascism is not the highest stage of capitalism, that label belongsto imperialism, to state monopoly capitalism and the post-Fordist transnational corporation.Fascism is, though, often the ultimate resort of a beleagueredcapitalist system, when the ruling class hands over the reigns ofthe state to the most depraved criminal elements, to carrythrough a reign of terror against working class and democraticformations. Eugene Terreblanche's khaki hordes and MumMyeni's rooi doeke are lurking in the wings, but the bourgeoi-sie has not gone for the option (at least for the moment) ofinstalling them in central, state power.The current strategy to rescue a crisis-ridden capitalistsystem. But they owe more to French and Pentagon neo-colonialtheories of low intensity conflict and to Huntingdon's theoriesof `managing transition', than to Hitler's Mein Kampf.Well, so much for disagreement. What is hugely excitingabout the publication of these writings is that it enables us todiscover intellectual riches, to enter into discussion, and, yes,even to disagree. It is starting to be possible to recover a senseof our intellectual roots, of lineages, of continuities and discon-tinuities, across generations and out of the terrible post-Rivoniadifagane.Listen, comrade Edwin Mofutsanyana, the chairs are talk-ing. Jeremy Cronin is a member of the SACP Central Committee.
Page 54 of 55 TOTAL CODE ITEMCODE ITEM UNIT OTTY LP TOTALoo1 Tambo T-shirt PRICE R CIE12.00 1 Irn I096 Big ANC tr/st/b 72.13oo2 ANC T-shirt 12.00 097 Small ANC tr/st/b 7213oo3 Andy cap 13.65 098 Big Spearman sw/tp/b 40.00004 Magnum cap 9.38 099 Small Spearman sw/tp/b 40.00005 Super golf cap 12.73 100 Big logo sw/tp/b 40.00006 Lumber jacket 165.60 101 Small logo sw/tp/b 40.00007 Football umbrella 41.40 102 Big ANC sw/tp/b 40.00008 ANC wristwatch 115.00 103 Small ANC sw/tp/b 40.00009 Road to Peace 4.50 104 Big Sixarman sw/tp/w 40.00010 Joining the ANC 4.50 105 Small Spear- sw/tp/w 40.00011 Africa earrings 5.52 106 Big logo sw/tp/w 40.00012 Pendant 9.11 107 Small logo sw/tp/w 40 .o0013 Tie On 12.79 108 Big ANC sw/tp'w 40.00014 ANC 1991 calender 1.26 109 Small ANC sw/tp/w 40.00015 ANC poster 2.58 110 Labour Bulletin 6.00016 A4 notepad 4.42 111 Work in Progress 250017 A5 note pad 3.84 112 Const Assembly T-shirt 6.96018 A5 letter pad 3.15 113 ANC metal badge 2.40019 A6 pocket book 1.77 114 Logo metal badge 2.40020 Large travel bag 33.46 115 Spearman metal badge 2.40021 Small travel bag 23.87 118 Youth Lgue metal badge 2.40022 ANC 1991 diary 1.00 117 People Shall Gvn badge 2.40023 Gold ANC keyring 7.14 119 Se-lking stick 22.40024 Logo lapel badge 2.80 120 Men's pad. takkies 62.38025 Greetings cards 0.43 121 Men's pin takkies 53.18026 Pack greetings cards 1.70 122 Lumber jacket kids 135.60027 Tambo poster 0.85 123 Ladies takkies 35.26028 Peace poster 1.60 124 Kiddies takkies 26.94029 Logo earrings 12.79 140 Video Mandela's Release 50.00030 Flag earrings 12.79 141 Video Fruits of Defiance 50 0o031 Africa cufflink 15.18 142 Video The comrade king 50.00032 Flag lapel badge 4.80 143 Video Isitwalandwe 50 .o0033 Logo cufflink 15.18 144 Video No Mdle Rd to Fredm 50.00034 Conference poster 2.61 145 Video Sophiatown 50.00035 Leather key ring/red 4.05 146 Video A Savge War of Peace 50.00036 Leather keyringibrn 4.05037 Leader card 0.46 Total of the above purchases038 Chequerboard card 0.41 Plus postage (if order less than R50.00)039 ANC woolen belt 2.02 Contribution to the work of the ANC040 Grey stripe tie 22.08 Total enclosed041 Blue shield tie 22.08 Mayibuye042 Blue flash tie 22.08043 Shield white scarf 25.58 NOTE044 Grey stripe scarf 25.58045 Flash white tie 25.58046 ANC table flag 8.28 1. If you are ordering a single item than add R3.00 for postage.047 Paper flag 1.04051 Liberation cloth badge 1.56 2. If you are ordeing items for up to R50.00 then add R6.00 for postage.052 ANC logo cloth badge 1.56 3. For orders above R50.Oo postage is free.4. For orders outside the republic please add R5.00 for clearance of foreign053 Spearman cloth badge 1.56 cheques and an additional R15.00 for postage.054 SACP cloth badge 1.56055 Umsebenzi 1.00 5. Unfortunately, we cannot accept COD orders.056 African Communist 5.00 6. All prices include GST.057 The Red Flag 5.00 7. Please allow 4 (four) to 6 (six) weeks delivery.058 Mayibuye 3.00 8. Cheques must be crossed and made payable to Movement Enterprises059 Bill of Rights 5.00 (Pry) Ltd.060 The New Constitution 7.20 9. For more information please phone (011) 29 3032/5.061 Women's Rights 7.20 10. Please indicate which size t.shin you require.062 Path to Power 5.00 11. A full colour catalogue will be sent to you.063 ANC logo T-shirt 6.96064 Govern T-shirt 12.00 Please065 Mass Action T-shrt 13.57 Movement066 Equal Rights T-shrt 6.96 send Enterprisesyour PO Box 1092067 Spearman T-hirt 6.96 orders to:068 Peace/Freedom T-shrt 12.00 Joubert Park, 2044069 Nylon tracksuit 81.36 Johannesburg083 ANC flag belt 38.88 South Africa084 ANC logo belt 38.88085 ANC belt 38.88086 Big Spearman tr/st/w 72.13 ------087 Small Spearman tosty 72.13I enclose crossed cheque/postal order for088 Big logo tr/st/w 72.13 R...... made payable to the ANC089 Small Logo tost/w 72.13 Name:...... 090 Big ANC tr/st/w 72.13091 Small ANC tr/st/w 72.13 Address: ...... 092 Big Spearman tr/st/b 72.13093 Small Spearman tr/s. 72.13094 Big logo tr/st/b 72.13095 Small logo tr/st/b 72.13
Page 55 of 55