INDONESIA: COMMUNAL TENSIONS IN

Asia Report N°154 – 16 June 2008

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS...... i I. INTRODUCTION ...... 3 II. ...... 2 A. THE GRAND ...... 2 B. THE DRAFT REGULATION ...... 5 C. MUSLIM REACTION...... 6 III. KAIMANA ...... 7 A. TENSIONS OVER A CONCERT AND TREE...... 8 B. THE NEW RELIGIOUS FORCES ...... 9 IV. UPROAR OVER A MUSLIM CAMPUS IN ...... 10 V. EXPLAINING THE TENSIONS: DEMOGRAPHICS ...... 11 A. GROWTH OF ...... 11 B. “ISLAMISATION” AND MIGRATION ...... 11 VI. IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT...... 14 A. POST-SOEHARTO EUPHORIA ...... 14 B. THE MALUKU CONFLICT COMES TO PAPUA ...... 15 VII. NEW MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS GROUPS ...... 17 A. HIZB UT-TAHRIR...... 17 B. SALAFISM IN PAPUA...... 18 C. JEMAAH TABLIGH ...... 18 D. PENTECOSTALS AND CHARISMATICS...... 19 VIII. A NEW SENSE OF HISTORY ...... 21 IX. MODERATING INFLUENCES? ...... 22 A. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PAPUAN MUSLIM COUNCIL ...... 22 B. OTHER INSTITUTIONS...... 23 X. CONCLUSION ...... 24 APPENDICES A. MAP OF ...... 25 B. MAP OF PAPUA ...... 26 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ...... 27 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ...... 28 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES...... 30

Asia Report N°154 16 June 2008

INDONESIA: COMMUNAL TENSIONS IN PAPUA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Indonesian Papua has seen periodic clashes between democratic system where Christians can exercise pro-independence supporters and goverment forces, “tyranny of the majority”. The communal divide is but conflict between Muslim and Christian communi- overlain by a political one: many Christian Papuans ties could also erupt unless rising tensions are effec- believe autonomy has not gone nearly far enough, tively managed. Violence was narrowly averted in while many Muslim migrants see it as a disaster and Manokwari and Kaimana in province in are fervent supporters of centralised rule from . 2007, but bitterness remains on both sides. The key factors are continuing Muslim migration from else- In some areas latent tensions have been kept under where in Indonesia; the emergence of new, exclusivist control by pairing a Papuan Christian district head groups in both religious communities that have hard- with a non-Papuan Muslim deputy, with political and ened the perception of the other as enemy; the lasting economic spoils divided accordingly. That may work impact of the Maluku conflict; and the impact of de- in areas like , where the migrant population velopments outside Papua. National and local officials has already exceeded 50 per cent, but is not a solution need to ensure that no discriminatory local regulations where the majority feels itself under threat. are enacted, and no activities by exclusivist religious organisations are supported by government funds. Where the risk of conflict is high, indigenous Papuan Muslims, largely concentrated in the Bird’s Head re- The Manokwari drama, played out over more than gion of north western Papua, can play a bridging role, two years, illustrates some of the changes. It started in particularly through a new organisation, Majelis Mus- 2005, when Christians mobilised to prevent an Is- lim Papua. This organisation is both firmly committed lamic centre and mosque from being built on the to universal Islamic values and deeply rooted in Pap- place where German missionaries brought Christian- uan culture and traditions. They have a demonstrated ity to Papua in the mid-nineteenth century. Muslim capacity to cool communal tensions, working with anger went beyond Papua; many Indonesian Muslims, their Christian counterparts. But the indigenous Mus- newly conscious of the history of Muslim traders in lim community is being divided, too, as more and the area, saw Islam as Papua’s original religion and more have opportunties to study Islam outside Papua found the rejection of the mosque intolerable. Local and come home with ideas that are at odds with tradi- church leaders, seeing the reaction, believed they tional practices. It would be in the interests of all con- needed to strengthen Manokwari’s Christian identity cerned to support a network of state Islamic institutes and in 2007 drafted a regulation for the local parlia- in Papua that could produce a corps of indigenous re- ment that would have infused the local goverment ligious scholars and reinforce the moderation long with Christian values and symbols and discriminated characteristic of Papuan Muslims. against Muslims in the process. It was never enacted but generated a furore in Muslim communities across Several mechanisms are available for dialogue among Indonesia and increased the sense of siege on both religious leaders in Papua, including the working sides. It remains to be seen how a new draft that be- group on religion of the Papuan People’s Council gan to be circulated in late May 2008 will be greeted. (Majelis Rakyat Papua, MRP), a body set up to pre- serve Papuan rights and traditions, but they do not It is not just in Manokwari, however, that the com- necessarily have any impact at the grassroots. More munities feel themselves under threat. Many indige- effective might be programs designed to identify nous Christians feel they are being slowly but surely communal hotspots and work out non-religious pro- swamped by Muslim migrants at a time when the cen- grams that could benefit both communities. tral government seems to be supportive of more con- servative Islamic orthodoxy, while some migrants be- lieve they face discrimination if not expulsion in a Indonesia: Communal Tensions in Papua Crisis Group Asia Report N°154, 16 June 2008 Page ii

RECOMMENDATIONS: 5. Avoid funding any groups that preach exclusivity or enmity toward other faiths. To the Central Government: 6. Ensure public debate on the percentage of jobs for 1. Avoid supporting faith-based activities with an Papuans and the impact on further in-migration of overtly political agenda, so as not to exacerbate non-Papuans before agreeing to any further admin- existing problems, and instruct the armed forces istrative division. and police to ensure that Papua-based personnel 7. Reject discriminatory local regulations. are not seen as taking communal sides. 8. Work with donors to identify areas of high tension 2. Identify new approches to addressing communal where conflict might be defused by non-religious tensions at the grassroots level, going beyond the projects involving cooperation for mutual benefit often ineffectual promotion of interfaith dialogue across communities. among elites. 3. Work with the provincial governments to support To Donors: the State Islamic Institute (STAIN) in Jayapura 9. Support conflict-resolution training for Papua-based and facilitate close links with the State Islamic organisations, including the Majelis Muslim Papua University (UIN) in Jakarta to ensure that Papua and the religious working group of the Papua Peo- develops its own indigenous scholars and teachers ple’s Council (Majelis Rakyat Papua, MRP). able to interpret universal Islamic values in ways that are in harmony rather than conflict with cus- Jakarta/Brussels, 16 June 2008 tomary traditions.

To Local Governments:

4. Ensure that government funding of or contribu- tions to religious activities are transparent and in- dependently audited, with amounts and recipients easily available on websites or in public documents.

Asia Report N°154 16 June 2008

INDONESIA: COMMUNAL TENSIONS IN PAPUA

I. INTRODUCTION The tensions are exacerbated by the tendency of Mus- lim migrants to identify overwhelmingly with the cen- tral government and see Christians as separatists, Relations between Muslims and Christians are strained while many indigenous Christians and church leaders in Papua and likely to worsen because of demograph- tend to identify with Papuan nationalism – as do ics, aggressive proselytising by hardline elements on many of their indigenous Muslim neighbours. The in- both sides, political use of religious history and out- tertwining of race and ethnicity with religion in Papua side developments that harden perceptions of the makes conflict management all the more difficult. other as enemy. Twice in 2007, communal tensions almost led to violence in the Bird’s Head region in the Added to this is the arrival in Papua over the last ten north west of the island of , once in years of new militant strands of both religions, which are creating intra- as well as intercommunal strains. Manokwari, once in Kaimana. While physical fight- 2 ing was narrowly averted, other such clashes are likely, On the Muslim side, Hizb ut-Tahrir and salafi Mus- especially where communal tensions become caught lims are giving a harder edge to an Islam that until re- up in local political struggles. A potential mediator cently was more influenced by Indonesia’s two larg- exists, the Papuan Muslim Council (Majelis Muslim est mass-based Muslim organisations, Nahdlatul Papua, MMP), a body of indigenous Muslims that has Ulama and Muhammadiyah, both reasonably moder- good relations with non-Papuan Muslims and indige- ate. On the Christian side, neo-pentecostals and nous Christians. Strengthening it may help prevent charismatics are promoting their own brand of exclu- open conflict, but addressing underlying sources of sivist truth and see the expansion of Muslim daawa friction may be harder. (religious outreach, dakwah in Indonesian spelling) as their greatest challenge. The biggest issue is demographics: the proportion of Muslims is rising, and most are migrants from else- Across Indonesia, moreover, Muslim groups are en- where in Indonesia.1 Official statistics show the trend, thusiastically delving into the history of Islam in but few trust the numbers. Church leaders believe that Papua, calling it Nu Waar, a name given by Arab Muslims are deliberately under-counted, so as not to traders. While Christians have long accepted that cause alarm; some Muslims accuse the government of Christianity came to Papua in 1855, when two Ger- lumping animists together with Protestants to deny man Protestants arrived in Manokwari, Muslims out- Islam its true position as the dominant faith. Both be- side Papua have only become aware relatively re- lieve, for different reasons, that Muslims may in fact cently that Islam arrived several centuries earlier – have overtaken Protestants, whom statistics show and this awareness is being used to heighten a sense of entitlement to land and power, particularly along constitute between 50 and 60 per cent of the popula- 3 tion. To many Christians, this is evidence of a delib- the west coast. erate government policy of “Islamisation” and “de- Finally, both communities are affected by develop- Papuanisation” to make them a minority in their own ments that take place outside Papua. The worst period land; to some Muslims, it suggests a need to focus on of communal relations in the recent past was 1999- securing influence commensurate with their numbers. 2002, when post-Soeharto political euphoria and pro- independence organising in Papua coincided with the outbreak of communal conflict in Maluku, just to the 1 For previous analyses of Papua, see Crisis Group Asia west. The army-backed Muslim militia Laskar Jihad Briefings Nº66, Indonesian Papua: A Local Perspective on committed to fighting Christian separatists in Maluku the Conflict, 19 July 2007; and Nº53, Papua: Answers to arrived in Papua just at the time that local pro-Jakarta Frequently Asked Questions, 5 September 2006; Nº47, Papua: The Dangers of Shutting Down Dialogue, 23 March 2006; Nº24, Dividing Papua: How Not To Do It, 9 April 2003; and Asia Reports Nº39, Indonesia: Resources and 2 This organisation is spelled Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia. Conflict in Papua, 13 September 2002; and Nº23, Ending 3 “Tuan Rumah Menjadi Tamu”, Suara Hidayatullah, July Repression in Irian Jaya, 20 September 2001. 2005, p. 53.

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forces, with many migrant recruits, were trying to II. MANOKWARI stamp out rising independence demonstrations across Papua. More than ever, Muslim migrants were identi- fied with the government and became targets of in- Manokwari, a kabupaten (the administrative division digenous wrath. below a province) in the north eastern corner of the Bird’s Head, is the site of Christianity’s arrival in Today it is the attacks on churches elsewhere in Indo- Papua on 5 February 1855.4 Two German missionar- nesia and the perception that the central government ies, Carl Ottow and Johan Gottleib Geissler, set foot is moving toward an Islamic monoculture that are in- on Mansinam island, just off Manokwari’s coast, and creasing the siege mentality of Papua’s Christians, in- declared it holy land. Manokwari has been known in- creasing their fear of marginalisation and strengthen- formally ever since as “Gospel City”, and a festival is ing their assertion of religious identity. This is the held every year to commemorate the occasion. A dis- context in which tensions in Manokwari and Kaimana pute over a construction of a mosque on Mansinam nearly exploded in 2007, lowering the threshold for and a subsequent effort on the part of Christians in eruption of violence in the future, and other potential early 2007 to draft a local regulation that would in- conflicts are simmering. culcate Christian values in public life led to unprece- dented friction between the two communities. While Violence, if it occurs, is likely to be localised; trouble the regulation seemed to be shelved as a result, a new in Manokwari will not necessarily spread to Merauke. draft suddenly appeared in late May 2008 that threat- Also, while the underlying problems are Papua-wide, ened to reignite tensions. the current hotspots are relatively few, mostly centred in urban areas of West Papua, where the numbers of Muslims and Christians are more balanced than in the A. THE GRAND MOSQUE interior. But growing tensions can have ramifications in other ways. Unhappiness with how local govern- In late 2005, local Muslims decided to establish a ments handle religious issues could reinforce separa- Grand Mosque (Mesjid Raya) and Islamic Centre on tist sentiment in some areas or lead to appeals for help Mansinam island, on four hectares of land. The pro- from radical elements outside Papua in others. posed complex was far bigger than any local church. This report is based on extensive interviews in Mano- Rumours were rife in the Christian community that kwari, , Kaimana and Jayapura in February, the Islamic Centre would be the largest in South , and that Muslims had a hidden agenda to turn March and April 2008. It examines developments in 5 the two near-conflict areas and explores the factors Manokwari into a Muslim city. For church leaders, that have led to increasing tensions. the decision to build the centre was misguided at best and at worst a direct affront to the “Gospel City”. They could not believe that the largest building in the area was to be a mosque. They said it would be as if a church became the most visible landmark in deeply Islamic . And why, they asked, did Muslims need a mega-mosque when they had plenty of places to worship already?6

While Christians suspected that plans for the mosque had been in development secretly for several years, the idea in fact only arose around September 2005, as

4 Administrative nomenclature is confusing in Papua. Else- where in Indonesia, kabupaten is usually translated as “dis- trict”, with the next unit down being kecamatan (“subdis- trict”). But in Papua, that next level is known as a distrik. To avoid confusion, the term kabupaten rather than its English translation is used throughout this report. 5 Crisis Group interview, church activist, Manokwari, Febru- ary 2008. Also see Binsar A. Hutabarat, “Kontroversi Perihal Perda Manokwari Kota Injil”, unpublished paper, 2007. 6 Crisis Group interview, church activist, Manokwari, Febru- ary 2008.

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local politicians were gearing up for the first-ever di- churches; material losses faced by churches and rect election for governor of West Irian Jaya, sched- schools; the trauma suffered by Christians in conflict uled in March 2006. A candidate for deputy governor, areas such as Ambon and Poso; and legal discrimina- Rahimin Kacong, was looking for support from Mus- tion via the “Two Ministry Decree”. The coming of lim voters and suggested the construction of the Is- the Gospel on 5 February 1855 on Mansinam island, lamic centre. The idea was warmly welcomed, and the statement said, was “the vanguard of a new civili- Kacong became head of the mosque development sation in Papua”, opening a “dark curtain” and instill- committee, which then began looking for private do- ing faith “through the sacrifice and martyrdom” of nors.7 To facilitate contributions, the committee pro- missionaries.10 posed a system of “wakf-per-metre”: individuals could purchase one or two square metres of land, then Progress, development and the integration of West donate it as religious endowment (wakf) for the Irian into Indonesia could not be separated from the mosque. Local Muslims responded enthusiastically church’s role, it continued, and only the church, and within two weeks, the committee had raised through its principles of peace, had been able to re- Rp.500 million (about $50,000) – more than Rp.100 solve political conflicts in Papua. Manokwari was a million from one mosque alone after Friday prayers.8 historic city where Christianity had first arrived in Papua, and its status needed to be preserved and re- But plans for the centre ran aground. On 4 October spected by all religious and ethnic communities. 2005, the committee submitted a formal request to the Therefore, it concluded, church leaders and the Chris- bupati (kabupaten head) requesting permission to tian community in Manokwari rejected plans for the build the mosque. This procedure was in accordance construction of a Grand Mosque.11 Ironically, they with a 1969 “Two Ministry Decree” from the religion cited as the legal basis for their rejection the same and home affairs ministries requiring approval of lo- ministerial decree they deplored in the statement. cal authorities for constructing places of worship.9 Before a response was forthcoming – but convinced On the same day, Manokwari’s district head, that it would be positive – the committee scheduled a , wrote to the mosque commit- groundbreaking ceremony on 21 October. As the day tee, refusing a building permit, citing objections from approached, Manokwari’s Christians began to protest, church leaders and recommending that the committee and banners rejecting the mosque appeared all over hold further talks with them.12 The letter was not the city. enough for Manokwari’s Christians, however. A month later, on 17 November, thousands of people, On 19 October, church leaders, through the Manok- representing 30 denominations, took to the streets to wari District Interchurch Cooperation Board (Badan protest the construction of the Grand Mosque. Rev. Kerjasama Antar Gereja Kabupaten Manokwari, Herman Awom, a member of the pro-independence BKAG), issued a statement of “deep concern” over Papua Presidium Council who was also deputy head the “discriminatory and unjust” government stance of the Papuan Protestant Synod, took part. They de- toward the development of Christianity in Indonesia. manded that the provincial parliament immediately They cited 991 attacks on churches across the country issue a regulation formally declaring Manokwari from independence in 1949 to the present; a pattern of “Gospel City”.13 intimidation of Christians and attacks on pastors and A parallel demonstration took place in Jayapura, where about 100 people, mostly students, calling 7 Crisis Group interview, Tim Sukses Yoris, confirmed by themselves “Student and Christian Solidarity in the committee for the Mesjid Raya development, February- Papua” (Solidaritas Mahasiswa dan Masyarakat Kris- March 2008. ten di Tanah Papua) marched in support of those re- 8 Crisis Group interview, mosque development committee, jecting the Grand Mosque. The demonstration almost Manokwari, February 2008. 9 turned violent, when participants became angry at the At the time, a fierce debate was underway across the coun- attempt by police in the Kotaraja area of the city to try over proposed revisions to this decree, SKB Menteri Agama dan Menteri Dalam Negeri 01/BER/MDN/MAG/ 1969. Most Christian leaders wanted it revoked, not revised, because it had been used as the basis for attacks on churches, 10 “Pernyataan Bersama Pemimpin dan Tokoh Serta Umat particularly in West , by local Muslim groups which Kristen di Kabupaten Manokwari”, 19 October 2005. claimed the necessary community approval had never been 11 Ibid. granted. In 2006 it was revised in a way that made no one 12 Letter 450/1040 on Bupati Manokwari letterhead, 19 Oc- happy, with local approval still required, but through an in- tober 2005. ter-faith committee with representation proportional to each 13 “Ribuan Massa Demo Damai di DPRD IJB”, Cender- religion’s adherents in the community. awasih Pos, 18 November 2005.

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stop them from proceeding and threatened to burn a religion of Papuans, Christians are only guests; by mosque, until allowed to continue.14 The students is- what right do guests ban their host?”17 sued a statement opposing the Grand Mosque; urging local government to protect Christian assets and sup- Many hadith (traditions of the Prophet) state that to port Christian schools; and demanding that it provide build a mosque – the house of Allah – is the most protection from all threats “deliberately or not delib- meritorious act possible. Allah deemed it an amal erately created by a certain group” and pass a regula- jariah, an act that continues to benefit the actor even tion protecting the Papuan people from immigrants.15 after death, because as long as Muslims worship at a mosque, the builder will be rewarded. Mosque con- Most Muslims were angered by the Christian stance; struction is also linked to social status, connoting a few talked ominously about jihad. Members of the wealth and piety. The “wakf-per-metre” concept sud- provincial Indonesian Islamic Scholars Council (Ma- denly made it possible for anyone to have that status jelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) tried to find a compro- and was an immense source of pride, especially since mise. In a 30 November letter to the Papuan People’s the result was to be not just an ordinary place of wor- Council (Majelis Rakyat Papua, MRP) a body estab- ship but a Grand Mosque. lished to safeguard indigenous Papuan rights and cul- ture, they stated that Manokwari had been recognised Almost every Muslim migrant in Manokwari contrib- as the capital of the new province of West Irian Jaya, uted. Then, suddenly, the project was halted by Chris- as West Papua was then called. It followed that the tians, robbing the donors of cherished status. After the construction of a Grand Mosque was in keeping with banners appeared rejecting the mosque, some Mus- a 2004 decision of the religion ministry stipulating lims were ready to use force to defend their plans for there should be a Grand Mosque in every provincial the mosque, even to die in the process, especially as capital. Normally it would be designated by the gov- according to Islamic teachings, protecting the house ernor and the provincial religious affairs office. But of Allah from enemy attacks was a legitimate form of since there was not yet such an office in Manokwari, jihad. “I never prayed regularly, I committed all sorts it was appropriate for the bupati to refuse a permit. of sins, when else would I have the chance to go to heaven without worrying about my past?” said a local Nevertheless, since provincial capitals should be able Muslim.18 to accommodate interests of various social groups, and MUI-Papua recognised the city’s status as the The anger was only tempered after security forces, birthplace of Christianity in Papua, the solution was worried about violence, lobbied Muslim community to move the provincial capital to Sorong.16 This was leaders. The government promised that after the local not realistic, and emotions remained high. elections, plans would resume; in fact, resumption be- came a campaign promise of Rahimin Kacong. In the The Muslim position that there was nothing wrong meantime, the controversy attracted the interest of ji- with establishing a large Islamic Centre in the cradle hadi groups outside Papua. Three Javanese, whom a of Papuan Christianity was linked to a new awareness source in Manokwari described as “followers of Abu that Islam had taken root in Papua long before the Bakar Ba’asyir”,19 arrived in December 2005, offering missionaries arrived. Popularised in a book, Is Islam help to the Muslim community through a local con- or Christianity the Religion of Papua? by Ali Athwa, tact in the event that conflict erupted. They drew up a a journalist for the magazine Suara Hidayatullah, the list of 38 names and addresses of pastors leading the facts were not new, but for the first time, the idea that campaign against the Grand Mosque, apparently as Islam was Papua’s first major religion reached a mass contingency targets. Their local contact refused any audience across Indonesia. Reacting to the ban on assistance, however, and they soon returned to Java.20 construction of the Grand Mosque, one Muslim leader About three weeks later, a jihadi delegation from in Manokwari said angrily, “Islam was the original Maluku contacted the same individual, also offering

17 Crisis Group interview, Muslim leader, Manokwari, Feb- ruary 2008. 14 Crisis Group interview, two journalists who covered the 18 Crisis Group interview, trader in Pasar Sanggeng, Mano- demonstration, Jayapura, February 2008. kwari, February 2008. 15 “Di Jayapura Pendemo Mendatangi MRP”, Cenderawasih 19 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir headed the region’s largest terrorist Pos, 18 November 2005. organisation, Jemaah Islamiyah, until his arrest in 2002. 16 Surat Majelis Ulama Indonesia Provinsi Papua No. 62/ 20 Crisis Group interview, Muslim leader, Manokwari, Feb- MUI-PAPUA/XI/2005, 30 November 2005. ruary 2008.

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help in case of conflict and also receiving a polite re- Gospel City” – at the Elim Kuali church in Manok- fusal.21 wari. Several participants expressed concerns at the spread of Islam in Papua. Rev. Phil Erari, a nationally known figure, warned that Manokwari, a holy city for B. THE DRAFT REGULATION Papuan Christians, was facing the same fate as Naz- areth, Bethlehem and Capernaum. Bethlehem, Jesus’s In February 2006, the Evangelical Christian Church birthplace, was now controlled by Muslims, he said. (GKI) Synod, meeting in , in Papua’s central The government needed to take a proactive stance to highlands, discussed the situation in Manokwari and preserve Manokwari as a Christian city.24 agreed that a local regulation should be adopted to preserve the town’s status as “Gospel City”. In the On 7 March, the church leaders outlined the city they meantime, however, the local elections in West Irian had in mind in a draft “Regulation on Implementing Jaya went ahead. The ticket of Abraham Atururi and Mental Spiritual Guidance”, which was better known Rahimin Kacong won with 61.3 per cent of the vote as the “Gospel Regulation”. The basic idea was to in- and was inaugurated in July. Muslims expected that culcate Christian values in Manokwari society, and Kacong would deliver on his promise to authorise several provisions were bound to generate concern in construction of the mosque. But the local government the Muslim community. It defined the gospel as realised that to go ahead in the face of implacable op- “good news that says the coming of Jesus Christ was position from the city’s Christians would court more the beginning of God’s government on earth, giving serious conflict, so plans for the mosque remained in new life to the values of compassion, peace, brother- abeyance. hood, prosperity, justice, partnership and openness”. The program of spiritual guidance would be devoted Toward the end of the year, rumours began circulat- to promoting those values. Article 25 of the draft read: ing in the Christian community that Laskar Jihad, the salafi militia that wreaked havoc in Maluku from Mental spiritual guidance will be conducted in ac- 2000 to 2002, was conducting military training in a cordance with historical, cultural and customary trans-migrant area known as Satuan Pemukiman (SP) values and local wisdom that can be found in local 7 in Masmi, outside Manokwari, with the aim of society, especially the majority of indigenous in- fighting Christians who had opposed the mosque. The habitants of Papua who profess the Christian faith. fears were calmed after it turned out that the young men involved, almost all of them migrants, were not Article 26 said the government could hang Christian Laskar Jihad at all but members of a non-political, symbols in public places and offices, because Christi- non-religious martial arts organisation.22 anity was the religion of most indigenous Papuans. Article 28 designated Sunday as a day of worship, on But on the Christian side, the successful halt to the which all business activities would be prohibited, at Grand Mosque gave a sense of power to local leaders, least for half a day. This caused particular consterna- who began campaigning for the banning of other tion because the port of Manokwari was usually and Muslim organisations in the Manokwari booming on Sundays. The city was to be vice-free: all area. On 11 December 2006, more than a year later, gambling, prostitution and production and distribution the BKAG sent a letter to the head of the al-Hidayah of alcoholic beverages would be banned. Islamic Foundation, rejecting the foundation’s pres- ence in Ransiki district and the construction of a The draft also contained provisions that seemed a di- mosque in nearby Abreso. If Muslims wanted to wor- rect response to fears of Islamisation. Article 37 in ship, it said, they should join the mosque in Ransiki effect banned women from wearing the headscarf in town rather than build a new one. “Thank you”, it public places, schools and government offices, by concluded, “and may this letter be seen as a sign of “outlawing dress which displays religious symbol- interfaith tolerance in Ransiki district”. 23 ism” in these areas; the headscarf was apparently seen as a means of propagating religion.25 Article 30 re- Then, on 1-2 February 2007, church leaders held a quired places of worship to have the consent of 150 seminar – “Making Mansinam and Manokwari a tribal elders and individuals in the neighbourhood concerned and in effect prevented mosques from be-

21 Ibid. 22 Crisis Group telephone interview, Muslim activist, Mano- 24 Rev. Karel Phil Erari, “Mansinam dan Manokwari Kota kwari, May 2008. Injil”, copy of presentation to “Seminar on Designating Man- 23 Pernyataan Sikap BKAJ distrik Oransbari, Ransiki, Womi sinam and Manokwari ‘Gospel City’”, 1-2 February 2007. Waren Tahota Izim dan Pulau Rumberpn, 11 December 2006. 25 Binsar Hutabarat, op. cit.

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ing built in areas where the indigenous population and the legislative team would consider the negative was served by churches. social impact if the designation of Manokwari as “Gospel City” went forward.31 The draft was immediately denounced by Muslim and Christian leaders alike. Local Muslim leaders sent a protest to the bupati, but unlike the Grand Mosque C. MUSLIM REACTION dispute, which had remained a local problem, the draft regulation became a national issue. The major However, the damage was done. In August 2007, Muslim media portrayed it as discriminatory toward three members of the Manokwari district ulama coun- Islam – which of course it was.26 On 15 March 2007, cil presented a statement to a Region V MUI meeting Indonesia’s main Islamic organisations, including the covering Papua, and Maluku that was note- Indonesian Ulama Council, Muhammadiyah, and worthy for its bitterness. It noted that “one group, in Nahdlatul Ulama issued a statement rejecting the the name of a certain religion, is trying to ... challenge draft. Hidayat Nur Wahid, speaker of the People’s the existence of Muslims in Tanah Papua and espe- Consultative Assembly and a leader of the Prosperous cially Manokwari”, trying to undermine the unity of Welfare Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), said the Indonesian state and turning religion into a politi- it could divide the nation. Not even Rome had de- cal commodity. Muslims, it said, were being denied clared itself a “Gospel City”, even though it was the equal access to resources, while Christians were centre of Catholicism, he said.27 The hardline Forum claiming that “their” land did not belong to Muslims, Umat Islam said the regulation showed the true nature even though Islamic civilisation preceded Christianity of Christians, which was that if they were weak, they in Papua by more than 200 years. The 2001 Special made demands, and if they were strong, they op- Autonomy Law for Papua was described as a “horrific pressed. The draft regulation was the first step toward disaster” that would lead to disintegration of the na- expelling Muslims from Papua, it claimed.28 tion.32

The head of the Indonesian Council of Churches and If our community is always shackled, marginalised Indonesian Catholic Bishops Council also opposed and manipulated to destroy the solidarity of the the draft. Both said they rejected any local regulation ummat [Muslim community], then it is time for the based on religion, a not-so-veiled allusion to dozens Islamic community to wake up, unite and wage ji- of local regulations inspired by Islamic law adopted in had to implement Allah’s teachings.33 strongly Muslim areas of the country.29 In the interests of ensuring peace and avoiding com- The Manokwari government was taken aback by the munal conflict as happened in Ambon and Poso, it protests. The provincial secretary told reporters that urged the regional meeting to set up a special commit- the draft was only a set of suggestions from church tee to study the problem of the ummat in eastern In- leaders and did not have the force of law. Everything donesia and that the recommendation be conveyed to would have to be discussed with a legislative team, the central government, through the national MUI.34 and he was sure the discriminatory provisions would disappear.30 In May, the bupati, Dominggus Man- Some jihadi groups also were ready to defend the dacan, said that while the draft represented the aspira- faith in Manokwari, sending reconnaissance teams to tions of the majority, it needed some fixing before it check out conditions. Groups like ’s could be submitted formally to the district council, Laskar Jundullah discussed starting a new jihad there. In these circles, conspiracy theories were popular, such as that the draft regulation was a foreign plot to 26 The problem was that the same media had shown no such “Christianise” eastern Indonesia, or was part of a interest in the discriminatory provisions of local regulations Christian agenda to establish the “Arafuru Raya designed to inculcate Islamic principles in Muslim majority Christian State” that would include both Maluku and areas. Indeed, some sources suggested that the so-called Papua. This in turn became linked to rumours circu- Sharia regulations were an inspiration for the Manokwari draft. 27 “Hidayat: Raperda Kota Injil Memcah Bangsa”, Republi- ka, 30 March 2007. 31 “Raperda Manokwari Kota Injil Masih Perlu Penyempur- 28 “Kristen, Kecil Meuntut, Besar Menindas, Suara Umat naan”, Cenderawasih Pos, 29 May 2007. Islam, 13 April 2007. 32 “Regarding the History and Presence of Muslims in Tanah 29 “KWI dan PGI Tolak Raperda Berdasarkan Injil”, UCAN, Papua, Especially Manokwari”, 30 August 2007, photocopy 3 April 2007, at http://faithfreedom.myforumportal.com/ of statement made available to Crisis Group. forum/viewtopic.php?p=15709. 33 Ibid. 30 Binsar Hutabarat, op. cit. 34 Ibid.

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lating since early 2004 that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, III. KAIMANA president of the Philippines, had written U.S. Presi- dent Bush, asking his help in founding a Christian empire in South East Asia. As tempers cooled in Manokwari, they rose in Kai- mana, a district on the south west coast of Papua In the Region V MUI meeting, in , North Su- carved out of Fakfak in 2002. For years it was known lawesi, Haji Adnan Arsal, the radical Muslim leader for its harmonious relations between Christians and from Poso whose school became the centre of JI ac- Muslims; in 2006, a local priest wrote the standard tivities there, reportedly offered assistance from his reference on the topic, stressing the commitment both mujahidin in the event conflict erupted in Manokwari. communities had to pluralism and co-existence.38 The But local leaders continued to decline any help from tensions in late 2007 thus came as a shock, but they 35 outside. had been building for some time, especially since the Ambon conflict. Some Christians in Manokwari felt there should be no backing down from the draft, which they considered In 2005, Kaimana kabupaten had a population of an absolute necessity, a protection against galloping 37,469. Most were indigenous Papuans from several Islamisation. For them, the provisions that Muslims ethnic groups including the Koyway, Irarutu, Mairasi considered discriminatory were not prohibitions but and Madewana. Migrants, mostly working in the petty restrictions. With respect to the headscarf, “we’re not trade and transport sectors, came from Java, Maluku banning it, but it should just be used in appropriate and North, South and South East Sulawesi; there are places”, one said, “and especially for civil servants no figures on their total numbers. required to wear uniforms, why should some be al- lowed to be different?” They were not banning the call Protestants are more than half the population; Mus- to prayer; they were banning the use of loudspeakers lims are second, with 40 per cent, most of them in- 36 because they disturbed people of other religions. digenous Papuans, and Catholics are 9.5 per cent.39 The religious harmony Kaimana enjoyed was the re- In late May 2008, a second draft of the regulation ap- sult of strong (customary) norms that stressed peared. It was much better than the first and the most clan and family solidarity across communal lines.40 controversial provisions had been removed, but the Many clans, such as the Werfete, Tanggarofa, Ka- title was “Draft Regulation on Designating Villages makaula, Amerbay, Jaisono, Feneteruma and Waita, for Mental Spiritual Guidance/Inculcation of Chris- included followers of both religions. Christians often 37 tian Values” (penginjilan). To most Muslims, the sat on mosque development committees and joined in word penginjilan means proselytisation aimed at con- construction of new buildings; Muslims helped build verting Muslims and as such generates anger. The churches. During Ramadan, Christians often prepared draft also retained the provision requiring the permis- the pre-dawn meal for Muslim neighbours and woke sion of the community to build a house of worship – them to eat it.41 Christian educational foundations built one that worries the Catholics as much as the Mus- schools in Muslim neighbourhoods and hired Muslim lims, since both are minorities in the area. Religious teachers for Koran recitation and religious subjects. polarisation seems set to continue. Most Muslims followed practices similar to Indone- sia’s largest Muslim organisation, the Nahdlatul Ulama. Protestants were divided between what was known as the Moluccan Protestant Church (Gereja Protestan Maluku), now GPI (Gereja Protestan Indo- nesia) di Papua, and the Evangelical Christian Church (Gerja Kristen Injili, GKI), the largest denomination

38 J.F. Onim, Islam dan Kristen di Tanah Papua (, 2006). 39 “Propinsi Papua Barat dalam Angka” [“Papua Province in 35 Crisis Group interview, Muslim leader, Manokwari, Feb- Figures”], Badan Pusat Statistik, 2006 . The remainder are ruary 2008. Hindus and Buddhists. 36 Binsar Hutabarat, op. cit. 40 Crisis Group interview, Fadel Al Hamid, secretary of the 37 “Raperda Tentang Penetapan Kampung-Kampung Sebagai Dewan Adat Papua, Kaimana, March 2008. Perkampungan Penginjilan/Pembinaan Mental Spiritual”, 41 Crisis Group interview, Andi Karan, GKI Kaimana, undated photocopy, received by Crisis Group, 9 June 2008. March 2008.

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in Papua. The near conflict arose in part because of the began mobilising after hearing rumours that the tree coming of new, less tolerant strains of both religions. would be destroyed and their neighbourhoods at- tacked. In Kampung Baru, Muslims began organising trucks to bring crowds into Kaimana town. A sense of A. TENSIONS OVER A CONCERT AND TREE panic took hold, with some people preparing to flee if conflict broke out. In Arguni, a Christian neighbour- The tensions began in October 2007, sparked by the hood, some did go into the jungle. The bupati inter- GPI deciding to have a concert to raise funds for the vened on 14 December 2007, urging Muslims not to construction of a church. Such events were common blame the Christians for the tensions but rather his in Kaimana, but this concert, with singers from deputy, who had given the permit. The statement low- Maluku, was to take place during Ramadan and to ered the temperature, and the next day he called a start at 6pm, around the same time that Muslims meeting of religious leaders from both sides. It was started shalat tarawih, the special nightly prayers dur- agreed the tree could stand until 21 January 2008 and ing the fasting month. In addition, it was to be held in then would be dismantled.43 a Christian elementary school sandwiched between two mosques (Sabilillah and Cenderawasih) in the Nothing more happened until 28 December. Then, town’s Cenderawasih neighbourhood. When they suddenly, GPI members invited leaders of other de- learned of the plans, many Muslims were angry and nominations to a meeting and announced they had accused the Christians of being heedless of their feel- heard that Muslims intended to attack Christians the ings. Muslim leaders calmed them, saying the Chris- next day; to forestall this, they decided to dismantle tians probably did not understand that there were the tree immediately. Oddly, however, GPI an- prayers after dusk. But one group was incredulous: nounced that before it was torn down, it would hold a how could Christians not understand the importance joint prayer session and a service in which pastors of Ramadan or not know about tarawih prayers? were asked to wear their vestments. GKI rejected the Eventually the organisers gave in and rescheduled the idea, believing it would only fuel the conflict: it concert for 9pm. would appear to be an invitation to all Christians to attend as if it were a formal church service, but when A clash was thus avoided, but in mid-December, ten- they saw the tower being brought down, it could gen- sions rose again. This time they were sparked by the erate an emotional response, since in the eyes of many raising of an iron tower in the form of a Christmas Christians, the tower was a sacred symbol. GKI tree, crowned not with the cross, as would have been members became even more worried after GPI lead- more common in Papua, but with the Star of David, a ers said Christians from Tual, in south eastern Malu- sensitive symbol in Indonesia frequently used by ku, directly south of Kaimana, were prepared to help charismatics. It was erected as a permanent structure if conflict broke out.44 But the tower-dismantling ser- in a public entertainment park (Taman Hiburan vice never happened – police broke up the meeting Rakyat, THR) not far from the town centre. Again, and summoned the head of the GPI classis (similar to GPI, many of whose members were from Maluku and a diocese) to explain why it was taking place. Sorong but also from the Kaimana neighbourhood of Ayamaru, planned a ceremony, without coordinating On 1 January 2008 a ship from Tual arrived at the either with members of other Christian denominations harbour, sparking rumours that the Christians from or with its Muslim neighbours. GKI claimed to have Tual had arrived, but Kaimana stayed calm. Tensions no knowledge of the tree, but GPI was determined to rose on 21 January, however, the deadline for destroy- erect it, saying it had a permit from the deputy bupati ing the tower. Muslims began mobilising, demanding of Kaimana, Mathias Mayruma, who came to watch it be brought down. Christians again feared attacks. its installation. Hasan Achmad, the bupati, reportedly GPI leaders refused to do the dismantling themselves, had no idea that the tower was to be permanent, com- saying it was the bupati’s job. Hasan Achmad was not plete with cement foundation.42 prepared to take it on, knowing it would make Chris- tians angry. Eventually a compromise was worked out Local Muslims were furious. In neighbourhoods such that GPI would take down the structure and move it to Kampung Seram, Anda Air, Bungsur and Kaki Air, one of its churches. crowds began to gather, waiting for a command to bring down the tree. In Christian strongholds such as Cenderawasih, Jalan Sisir and Kebon Kelapa, groups 43 Crisis Group interview, Muhammad Katsir, a participant in the meeting, Jayapura, March 2008. 42 Crisis Group interview, Anggota DPRD, Kaimana, March 44 Crisis Group interview, participant of 28 December 2008 2008. meeting, Kaimana, March 2008.

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In the end, no conflict broke out, but many in the priests, one of whom became head of the classis. community were shocked that it had been such a close Muslims date the deterioration of Christian-Muslim call. After all, religious differences in Kaimana were relations to his arrival. not mixed with ethnic and economic issues as they were elsewhere. Even though ethnic groups from South A similar phenomenon of religious renewal was tak- Sulawesi (Bugis, Buton and Makassarese) dominated ing place on the Muslim side. But unlike the new the markets there as elsewhere in Papua, there were strands of Christianity, brought by outsiders, the no serious indigenous-migrant differences. In the “new” Islam was brought by indigenous Papuans who mosques, Muslims of all backgrounds, Papuan and had studied elsewhere. One example is Ahmad Naus- non-Papuan, had always mingled easily; the predomi- rau, now deputy head of the Papuan branch of Partai nant style of worship following the Syafi’i school of Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), who went abroad for Is- law, familiar to many of the Javanese migrants, also lamic studies. When he returned to Kaimana, he helped. Likewise, friendly interaction characterised joined Al Fatih Kafah (AFKN), led by migrant-indigenous relations on the Christian side. Papuan Hizb ut-Tahrir leader Fadzlan Garamatan. AFKN quickly attracted local followers, because it provided not only sermons but also social services, B. THE NEW RELIGIOUS FORCES such as mass circumcisions, and offered scholarships to Muslim children to study in religious boarding What changed in Kaimana was the entry of new, more schools (pesantren) and institutes outside Papua. fundamentalist strains in both religions around 2000. Evangelical churches appeared, including Jemaah Improvements in technology, especially the ubiqui- Jalan Suci (Congregation of the Holy Way), a charis- tous use of hand-phones, also played a role in chang- matic group, together with the Bethel and Bethany ing relations between the two communities. Hand- churches. These Pentecostal churches frequently con- phones with state of the art “3G” technology were ducted what they call KKR (Kebaktian Kebangunan used to download films and videos that spread hatred Rohani, Spiritual Awakening Services), often taking on the part of one community toward the other. One the form of mass religious rallies in public places, but set of videos circulated showed atrocities against also featuring testimonies from recent converts from Muslims in Ambon and Poso.46 To many Muslims, Islam. Many Muslims saw these KKRs as an affront they gave the impression that Christians were evil. to their religion and decided to mount their own chal- Videos also circulated of the beheadings of hostages lenge, publicly questioning basic tenets of the Chris- in , leaving many Christians with the impression tian faith, such as the divinity of Jesus.45 that Islam was a religion of violence.

As Christmas 2006 approached, another problem ap- As in Manokwari, outside jihadi groups learned of the peared. Suddenly, and without permission of local tensions and waited on the sidelines, ready to inter- residents or adat leaders, the Jalan Suci charismatics vene if violence erupted. In the end it was averted, but set up a large cross on a hill in Bungsur, a Muslim the foundation for conflict is in place. majority area. Muslims pulled it down.

It was not just the new churches causing problems; a radical stream also began to emerge within the GPI around the same time. Under the name Gereja Protes- tan Maluku, the congregation had long been in Kai- mana, brought by Moluccans working as bureaucrats or teachers after integration of West Irian in 1969. Re- lations with local Muslims were generally smooth, until conflict erupted in Ambon in 1999 and shortly thereafter in Tual. Many Christians fleeing the con- flict came to Kaimana, bringing with them stories of atrocities committed by Muslim forces there. Many of their accounts were confirmed by the mass media, es- pecially television. Even after the conflict waned, some Moluccans continued to come, including several 46 Some of the videos were produced by Seyam Reda, the Egyptian-German with alleged al-Qaeda ties arrested in Jakarta for immigration violations in 2002 and eventually 45 Crisis Group interviews, Muslims , Kaimana, March 2008. deported to Germany.

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IV. UPROAR OVER A MUSLIM In the end, the construction went ahead and the school CAMPUS IN JAYAPURA now sits on a one-hectare site in Waena, but the epi- sode left sour feelings on all sides.

In early 2007 a new problem emerged in Jayapura. The local state Islamic institute, Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (STAIN), wanted to build a campus in Bumi Perkemahan, in the Waena area of the capital. Throughout Indonesia, with few exceptions, these in- stitutes have become forces for moderation and home to some of the most progressive Islamic scholars in the country.47 In Papua, its proponents believed, such an institute would produce Papuan Islamic scholars (ulama), reducing dependence on non-Papuan teach- ers and ensuring that Islam’s universal values were conveyed in a way that was in harmony with Papuan cultural traditions.

But believing this was another sign of increasing “Islamisation”, the Association of Indonesian Pastors (Asosiasi Pendeta Indonesia, API) issued a letter op- posing the project, even though it had been approved by the synod of GKI, the largest Protestant denomina- tion in Papua. Indigenous Muslims were particularly angry. “Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama never tried to control us”, said a local Muslim leader, refer- ring to the two largest Islamic organisations in Indo- nesia, “then all of a sudden it’s API that rejects us”.48 The fact API was dominated by non-Papuans only in- creased their resentment.49

The API letter was copied to the governor, the pro- vincial legislature and the MRP, whose working group on religion discussed it and endorsed the API position. On 1 March 2007, the MRP issued its own statement, rejecting the proposed campus. Arobi Achmad Airtuarauw, a Muslim MRP member, was not present during the discussion. In mid-April 2007, the founding congress of an indigenous Muslim asso- ciation he headed, the Majelis Muslim Papua, said the statement had “deeply hurt the feelings of Muslims in general and indigenous Muslims in particular” and called on the MRP to apologise.50

47 There are three levels of institute, the STAIN, a two-year college; the Institute Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN), a four- year institute; and the Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN), a uni- versity with a postgraduate program. 48 Crisis Group telephone interview, to Jayapura, 24 May 2008. 49 Many API members in Papua are from Menado (), Toraja (South Sulawesi) and North . 50 Rekomendasi Majelis Muslim Papua, Bidang Otonomi Khusus dan Pemerintah Daerah, nos. 4 and 5, and Bidang Sosial Budaya (Pendidikan) in Hasil-Hasil Pelaksanaan Muktamar I Majelis Muslim Papua, Jayapura, 10-13 April 2007, pp. 38-39.

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V. EXPLAINING THE TENSIONS: Many church leaders believe migrants are under- DEMOGRAPHICS reported, and Papuans have become a minority in their own land. One report noted:

The current composition of the West Papuan popu- The tensions in Manokwari and Kaimana are evident lation is 30 per cent native West Papuans and 70 elsewhere in Papua, and some of the same elements per cent migrants. The native West Papuans have are responsible: demographic changes, the impact of been marginalised in all aspects of life.53 the Maluku conflict, new understandings of history, developments outside Papua and new technologies. Likewise, an article in a widely read conservative Muslim magazine stated that 2003 data (not clear A. GROWTH OF ISLAM from where) showed 40 per cent of the population as Muslim, making Islam the dominant faith, since ani- mists were grouped with Christians, resulting in Official statistics show the steady growth of Islam in 54 51 skewed figures. But, it stated, Muslims occupied Papua (see table below). The Muslim population is less than 10 per cent of Papuan political positions – overwhelmingly non-Papuan. According to the Na- holding the bupati job only in Manokwari and Kai- tional Bureau of Statistics, migrants in 2000 were mana – and the imbalance should be redressed.55 90.82 per cent of the Muslim population; indigenous Papuans, largely concentrated in the Bird’s Head re- gion, were 9.18 per cent. By contrast, indigenous B. “ISLAMISATION” AND MIGRATION Papuans accounted for 81.24 per cent and 81 per cent of the Catholic and Protestant populations respec- Many Papuans see the steady rise of Islam in Papua as tively. The impact of migrants was even more striking the result of deliberate government policy. It is one in Papuan cities. Indigenous residents were only 33.9 point made in a book banned by the Yudhoyono gov- per cent of the urban population in 2000, ranging ernment in December 2007 – and therefore wildly from 6 per cent in Sorong to 54 per cent in Manok- popular – about the “drowning” of Melanesian iden- wari, while across Papua, taking rural areas into ac- 56 52 tity in Papua. The author, Sendius Wonda, a young count, they were over 60 per cent. Papuan activist, wrote:

Year Total Protestants Per Catholics Per Muslims Per Other Per population cent cent cent cent 1964 808,336 400,360 49.5 209,875 26.0 51,700 6.5 146,000 18.0 1975 991,537 619,067 62.4 289,614 29.2 65,435 6.6 17,421 1.8 1985 1,452,919 763,547 52.5 306,076 21.0 215,198 14.8 2,951 0.2 1991 1,744,946 998,406 57.2 401,405 23.0 340,632 19.5 4,458 0.3 1998 2,111,500 1,171,297 55.5 478,609 22.7 452,214 21.4 9,380 0.4 2002 2,288,410 1,235,670 54.0 543,030 23.7 498,329 21.4 11,672 0.5 2004* 2,516,284 1,503,124 59.7 422,126 16.7 583,628 23.1 7,406 0.3 * The 2004 data is the last available before Papua province was divided into two. It is not clear why the percentage of Catholics dropped so precipitously, but it likely has more to do with faulty counting than with a real decline.

51 Crisis Group compiled this table from several documents 2000”, Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua, Katalog BPS obtained at the provincial statistics office in Jayapura and the 2116.91 (Jayapura, 2001). National Statistics Bureau in Jakarta. Statistics in Papua are 53 “West Papuan Churches Deepest Concern and Appeal to not always reliable, partly because of the difficulty of data the International Community”, July 2007. collection, partly because of errors in tabulation. Even in a 54 “Cemburat Cahaya Papua” and “Tuan Rumah yang Men- single document, percentages often do not add up to 100, or jadi Tamu”, Suara Hidayatullah, July 2005, pp. 52-53. In are calculated incorrectly. The pattern over time, however, is Java, followers of traditional Javanese spirit beliefs are usu- consistent. ally considered Muslims in official statistics. 52 Table 3, “Persentase Pendukuk Asli Papua Menurut 55 “Tuan Rumah yang Menjadi Tamu”, op. cit., p. 54 Wilayah Kabupaten/Kota (Perkotaan)”, in “Pendukuk Asli 56 Sendius Wonda, Tenggelamnya Rumpun Papua Menurut Suku Bangsa dan Papua Dalam Persentase (, 2007), p. 71.

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It was a systematic and planned effort to annihilate the Soeharto government in 1986 to change tack. It (through ) indigenous Papuans by sending issued Presidential Decree no.4/1986, designating the transmigrants or illegal migrants to Papua, on the islands of Flores, Alor, Sumba and Timor in East grounds that there were too few Papuans in areas Nusa Tenggara, all areas with strong Christian popu- where new administrative divisions were planned lations, as sending areas for transmigration.62 From – a means of long-term Islamising and Javanising that point until the program ceased altogether in 2000, Papua to control the Pacific region and .57 the religious make-up of transmigrants changed.

The book was tendentious, but the author was only At the same time, however, there was an increase in saying in print what many Papuans have been saying spontaneous migration – voluntary movement by in- for years. When GKI held a discussion on the banning dividuals at their own expense in search of better eco- of the book in Jayapura, nearly all participants said nomic opportunities, most of them from Muslim they believed the Papuan people would eventually be South and South East Sulawesi. Migrants had been wiped out by mass migration.58 coming to the coastal areas of Papua for centuries. In 1959 there were some 14,000, but their numbers rose Population statistics show a particularly dramatic sharply after the Indonesian government in 1970 jump in the percentage of Muslims between 1975 and eased restrictions on travel there.63 Most spontaneous 1985, when a government-sponsored “transmigration” migrants settled in urban areas, quickly filling niches program was in full swing. While its rationale was to in the trade and transportation sectors. They not only ease overcrowding on Java and develop Indonesia’s worked in the urban markets but also became itinerant outer islands, there was also a strong security dimen- peddlers to far-flung corners of the province. With sion in border areas like and Papua, and Indonesian civil servants and soldiers coming to the perception was powerful among Christian leaders Papua in greater numbers as well, the number of non- that Jakarta was encouraging Muslim migration, Papuans grew significantly.64 daawa and construction of mosques to dilute Papua and undermine the independence movement.59 Despite the enormous controversy that transmigra- tion provoked in Papua, the market trumped the The number of transmigrants sent to Papua rose stead- state as the main generation of population move- ily through the first three five-year plans of Soe- ment into Papua. In fact the total number of harto’s (1969-1973, 1974-78, 1979-83). unsponsored migrants settling in Papua had ex- The government moved some 10,000 families (41,701 ceeded 560,000 by 2000.65 individuals), mostly Javanese, to Papua, settling them in five areas: Jayapura, Merauke, Manokwari, Paniai The sense of economic displacement strengthened lo- and Sorong.60 Between 1981 and 1985, all 9,772 cal hostility toward the migrants. When violent social transmigrants settled were from Java, most of them unrest has erupted in Papua, the migrant-controlled Muslims.61 As available land in other receiving areas markets frequently have become the targets, as hap- declined, Papua by 1985 had become the top destina- pened in Abepura, outside Jayapura in 1996, Entrop, tion for all government-sponsored transmigration. Jayapura in 1999 and 2000 and Sentani, on the north

International criticism of transmigration in Papua, in- cluding that it was linked to Islamisation, prompted 62 Catholicism is the majority religion in these islands, ex- cept for Alor, which is mostly Muslim, but there are impor- tant Muslim minorities in Flores and Sumba. 57 Ibid. 63 Rodd McGibbon, “Plural Society in Peril: Migration, Eco- 58 A Crisis Group consultant attended the meeting. nomic Change and the ”, East-West Center, 59 Richard Chauvel, “Constructing Papuan Nationalism: His- Washington DC, p. 20. tory, Ethnicity and Adaptation”, East-West Center, Washing- 64 Today Muslim Bugis and Makassarese migrants from ton DC, 2005. Some leaders of the pro-independence Free South Sulawesi dominate the markets in all major Papuan Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM) openly cities and towns. The fishing sector once controlled by in- advocated a Christian state. See John RG Djopari, Pembe- digenous Papuans has been taken over by migrants from roktakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Jakarta, 1993), p. 141. South and South East Sulawesi; so have the foodstalls and 60 Djopari, op. cit., pp. 115-127. all-purpose kiosks. Almost all security guards, construction 61 “Banyaknya penempatan Transmigrasi Menurut Kabu- workers, sidewalk vendors and taxi drivers are non-Papuan. paten Tahun 1981/2 – 1984/5”, BPS Propinsi Irian Jaya, in See Aryo Wisanggeni Genthong, “Orang Asli Papua Yang Irian Jaya Dalam Angka 1985 (Jayapura, 1985), pp. 69-70. Terasing di Tanah Sendiri”, Laporan Jurnalistik KOMPAS, Banyuwangi and Grobogan in were the two largest Jakarta, 2007, pp. 122-125; and Akhmad, Amber dan Komin: sending areas, both strongholds of the largest Islamic organi- Studi Perubahan Ekonomi di Papua (Yogyakarta, 2005). sation in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). 65 McGibbon, op. cit., p. 23.

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coast, in 2000.66 A migrant shopkeeper in Abepura bupaten. In 2008, it had two provinces and 36 kabu- said that after the 1996 destruction of the market paten or equivalent municipalities.71 Several of the there, he was keeping a third of his profits in Papua new units originally lacked qualified personnel to run and sending two thirds back to Sulawesi, because he them, so in Boven Digoel, Yahukimo, and Tolikara, was convinced that if Papua ever became independ- all created in 2002, non-Papuans are between 84 and ent, he and other migrants would be expelled.67 85 per cent of the civil servants.72 Despite concern over migration, the interests of local elites in creating A Papuan Muslim said part of the problem was that new top jobs and access to resources for themselves migrants brought with them the confidence of the ma- or in getting greater opportunities for their social net- jority and felt no need to accommodate themselves to works, often clan-based, ensures that the division will the local population.68 They also found it easy to get continue. permits for mosque construction from non-Papuan of- ficials. Many Papuan Christians believed dispropor- It is worth noting that in Merauke, Papua’s south tionate goverment assistance was going to mosques easternmost city, near the border with Papua New and Muslim activities through the religion department Guinea, where migrants already exceed locals and at the expense of Christian projects, to the point that Muslims are 58 per cent of the population, a political in 2003, a treatise by autonomy advocates on how to accommodation of sorts has been reached. The bupati better implement Papua’s special autonomy legisla- is an indigenous Papuan; his deputy is Javanese. They tion demanded that government support for religious are considered one of the effective executive teams in activities be proportional to the recipient group’s size.69 Papua, giving more attention to health and education than many others. They are also working hard to se- If Christians fear Islamisation, some Muslims in tradi- cure a new province of South Papua, which would in- tional Islamic strongholds fear they are losing ground crease patronage spoils. This does not mean that to Christians. In the Babo subdistrict around Bintuni Merauke is free of communal tensions, but with the Bay, an area best known for a giant natural gas pro- demographic threshold long since passed, they are be- ject run by the multinational oil company BP, a com- ing worked out in a different way.73 mentator wrote that the Muslim population had shrunk drastically, with one village going from 80 Muslim families in the 1970s to five in 2003. He attri- buted this to the lure of worldly temptations, the aging of influential ulama and aggressive Christian mission- ary activity and failure of Muslims to defend them- selves against it. The contractors brought in by BP in- cluded many Muslims willing to donate construction materials for mosques and schools, he noted, and the 71 In Papua province, the kabupaten are Jayapura city; Jaya- hope for Islam’s revival might lie with the company. pura; Sarmi; Keerom; Jayawijaya; Lani Jaya; Memberamo Tengah; Nduga Tengah; Yalimo; Pegunungan Bintang; Ya- This was in late 2003, before some of the more con- hukimo; Tolikara; ; Puncak; Merauke; Boven servative Muslim advocacy groups began to adopt an Digoel; Asmat; Mappi; Yapen; Waropen; Mamberamo Raya; anti-globalisation agenda.70 But it is a reminder that Numfor; Supiori; Nabire; Digiyai; Paniai and Mimika. one vector for the growth of Muslim migration has been In West Papua (formerly West Irian Jaya), they are Sorong corporate investment, and while seen by some as neces- city; Sorong; Sorong Selatan; Raja Ampat; Manokwari; Bin- sary for the province’s development, the social and tuni; Teluk Wondama; Fakfak and Kaimana. Several other divisions are planned. political consequences need to be taken into account. 72 “Bagaimana Kesejahteraan Masyarakat di Daerah Peme- karan?”, Suara Perempuan Papua, no. 35, 12-18 May 2008. Another factor driving migration has been the admin- 73 In 2001, at the height of the “Papuan Spring”, indigenous istrative division (pemekaran) of Papua into ever Papuans attacked the Hidayatullah Pesantren (Islamic board- more units. In 1999, it had one province and nine ka- ing school) in Merauke. Several students were wounded and a few buildings vandalised. The pesantren has a close rela- tionship with the local military, with teachers from the 66 Akhmad, Amber dan Komin, op. cit. school leading a weekly religious discussion session at the 67 Ibid, p. 57. district military command (KODIM 707). It was founded in 68 Crisis Group interview, Thaha al Hamid, Jayapura, April 1989 by a graduate of the original Hidayatullah Pesantren in 2008. Gunung Tembak, Balikpapan, , in Kombe 69 Agus Sumule (ed.), Mencari Jalan Tengah: Otomi Khusus village, subdistrict Kurik Merauke, about 20km outside the Provinsi Papua (Jakarta, 2003), p. 147. city. Around 1994, a Muslim donor endowed land within the 70 “Mencari Jejak Muslim Babo”, Suara Hidayatullah, Oc- city limits, and the school moved to a new campus. It is now tober 2003, p. 84. one of several Hidayatullah schools in Papua.

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VI. IMPACT OF THE MALUKU were calling for expulsion; others approached mi- CONFLICT grants and demanded the return of occupied houses or land. One man said:

We couldn’t reject their demands; most of us said, The impact of the Maluku conflict in Papua in “yes, yes”. But it didn’t mean we just accepted it. strengthening religious identities was profound, espe- We Bugis and Makassarese agreed that before we cially as it coincided with an opening of political left Papua, we would burn our houses. Easy for space for expression of pro-independence views. them to demand the land and homes we bought Muslim migrants became identified with pro-Jakarta, with our own sweat. If we were forced out, Papua anti-independence forces, indigenous Christians with could burn.76 Papuan nationalism. The fact that many Papuan Mus- lims also sympathised with independence and chafed The same sentiment was shared by migrants in the under Indonesian rule was often overlooked but rein- larger cities like Jayapura, Timika, Sorong and Mano- forced their potential importance as mediators. kwari.77

The rising political temperature worried the migrants. A. POST-SOEHARTO EUPHORIA Some joined anti-independence groups backed by the army, making relations with indigenous Papuans The collapse of the Soeharto goverment in May 1998 more strained. On 8 July 1998 in Sorong, for exam- led immediately to demonstrations in Papua demand- ple, after several attacks across Papua on migrants by ing accountability for past human rights violations a pro-independence militia, the Satgas Papua (Papua and resource exploitation and withdrawal of the Indo- Task Force), migrants calling themselves the South nesian military. It was the beginning of what became Sulawesi Group for Integrity and Unity of the Nation known as the “Papuan Spring”. Calls for independ- (Kelompok Pro Persatuan dan Kesatuan Bangsa ence increased, and within six months, half the dis- Kerukunan Keluarga Sulawesi Selatan) held a pro- tricts were flying the Morning Star flag, the official vocative anti-independence demonstration, with pro- emblem of the (Organisasi tection provided by the army’s Infantry Battalion 733. Papua Merdeka, OPM). They carried machetes, sickles, iron pipes and other implements, shouting, “Curse the troublemakers!”, In 2000 pro-independence leaders formed the Presid- “The OPM are thieves and robbers!” and slogans of a ium Dewan Papua (PDP), with adat leader Theys much ruder, racist nature against the Papuans.78 Eluay as the head and Thaha Muhammad al Hamid, a Muslim of Yemeni descent, as the secretary general. The alliance of migrants with anti-independence forces They convened what they called the Second Papua in some areas only made the situation worse. Indige- Congress from 29 May to 4 June, attended by thou- nous Papuans’ hostility increased, as they accused 74 sands who called for independence. migrants not only of stealing their land and control- ling their economy but also of obstructing independ- PDP leaders proposed including a “pillar” for mi- ence. The tension erupted in Wamena in October grants within the movement’s governing structure to 2000. A scuffle between police and pro-independence show its commitment to diversity in the future state, forces ended with an attack by thousands of indige- but this was never filled, perhaps because renewed nous Papuans against migrants that left 37 dead, 24 of demands for independence were accompanied by a 75 them migrants; 89 wounded; and some 13,500 people strengthening of anti-migrant sentiment. It was as detained in twenty different locations. Thousands of though long pent-up resentment over loss of land and migrants lost their homes and belongings and left economic control suddenly found an outlet. Some Wamena, but the incident had repercussions beyond 79 the central highlands. While some families else-

74 The first Papuan Congress was in 1961, prior to the terri- tory’s incorporation into Indonesia. See Richard Chauvel, 76 Crisis Group interview, taxi driver, Sorong, February 2008. “Where Nationalisms Collide”, Inside Indonesia, July- 77 Crisis Group communication with migrant worker in September 2001. Jayapura, February 2008. 75 The PDP was to be the executive branch of the independ- 78 Muridan S.S. Wijoyo, “Diantara Kebutuhan Demokrasi ence movement, while “pillars” representing different parts dan Kemenangan Politik Kekerasan”, unpublished paper for of Papuan society were to constitute the legislature. See Oc- conference on Demokrasi: Konflik Papua Pasca Order Baru, tovianus Mote and Danilyn Rutherford, “From Irian Jaya to Jakarta, 2001. Papua: The Limits of Primordialism in Indonesia’s Troubled 79 “Indonesia: Violence and Political Impasse in Papua”, East”, Indonesia, vol.72, October 2001, p. 130. , July 2001.

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where packed their belongings and quietly left, others B. THE MALUKU CONFLICT COMES decided to stay and defend themselves with sharp TO PAPUA weapons or homemade guns and some to join anti- independence forces.80 In July 2000, ELSHAM, a Jayapura-based human Religion influenced the choice made by this last rights organisation, reported that 100 displaced youths group. Many Muslim migrants viewed independence from Ceram, Maluku, who had fled the communal as the aspiration of Christian Papuans, all the more so fighting there were being given military training in Sorong, with about a dozen guns and Molotov cock- because Christian attributes such as crosses, Biblical 83 references and hymns often accompanied pro- tails. There were questions about the credibility of independence demonstrations. Muslims were increas- the information, but no question that many Papuans ingly convinced that if Papua achieved independence, believed the Maluku conflict was spreading to Papua. they would suffer.81 Independence leaders, however, understood well that the eruption of communal conflict could wreck their The perception that the independence movement was own struggle, and they ordered the pro-indepedence essentially a Christian one was strong not just among Satgas Papua to turn away any migrants from 84 migrants but among indigenous Muslims as well. In Maluku. Kaimana and Fakfak where Papuan Muslims were the majority, most rejected independence and saw Chris- The first victims of this policy were 3,000 displaced Christians from Maluku, brought by a passenger ship, tians as the promoters of . Indeed, Fakfak 85 became the headquarters of a pro-government militia, the Dobonsolo, to Papua on 27 July 2000. At first the Red and White Task Force (Satgas Merah Putih), the Satgas Papua and the local government prevented led by Ismail Bauw, a local government official. them from disembarking. For several days their fate was uncertain; eventually, after complex negotiations, Most but not all its members were Muslim. One was they were allowed to stay two or three months under 86 Ismail Yeni, a clan head from Yapen Waropen. In the the protection of the church. 1970s, the took him on as a “civil volunteer” in a program called ABRI Masuk Desa The Dobonsolo case did not end the rumours that (the military enters the village). It was supposed to be Papua was on the verge of religious eruption, particu- a hearts-and-minds program to assist the local econ- larly after rumours of the arrival in Papua of Laskar omy but became a euphemism for the military’s ex- Jihad, a mostly Javanese army-backed militia led by tension into rural areas. Ismail became a loyal servant Yogyakarta-based salafi leader Ja’far Umar Thalib in the local public works office, and then, while still a that had led attacks on Christian communities in Christian, a leading figure in Satgas Merah Putih. But Maluku. In September 2000 Amnesty International, he had four wives and 35 children, and the Protestant citing local human rights organisations, reported that church would only acknowledge the children of his some 300 armed Laskar Jihad members had arrived in 87 first wife. He decided to convert, but local Muslims Sorong. Some reports placed its fighters in Manok- refused to help him, fearing religious disturbances. He wari, Biak, Nabire, Jayapura and Arso, in addition to 88 flew to Jakarta, where his conversion in 2002 at a Sorong, with total numbers in the thousands. Some large Jakarta mosque was witnessed by former army of the wilder figures appear to have been based on chief of staff, General Hartono.82 sightings of men with turbans and long white robes, the characteristic dress not only of Laskar Jihad but Clashes between Satgas Merah Putih members and also of Jemaah Tabligh, a missionary group long ac- local Christian pro-independence supporters in Wayati, tive in Papua, particularly on the west coast. Fakfak, in March 2000 deepened the religious- political cleavage, but it was the Maluku conflict that had a lasting impact. 83 “Pengungsi Maluku Latihan Perang di Sorong”, Kompas, 27 July 2000. 84 Crisis Group interview, Thaha al Hamid, Jayapura, Febru- ary 2008. 85 “3.000 Pengungsi Ambon Ditolak Masuk Irja”, Kompas, 80 Crisis Group communication with migrant in Jayapura, 31 July 2000. February 2008. 86 Ibid; Crisis Group interview with Fadel al Hamid, Kai- 81 Crisis Group interview with Muslim leader in Manokwari, mana, March 2008. Also see “3.000 Pengungsi Ambon Di- March 2008. tolak Masuk Irja”, Kompas, July 2000. 82 “Ismail Yenu, Kepala Suku dan Penginjil yang Bersyahadat”, 87 “Indonesia: Impunity Persist in Papua as Militias Take Suara Hidaytaullah, 11/XV/Dzulhijjah-Muharram 1423, March Root”, Amnesty International, September 2000. 2003, p. 76. 88 Crisis Group Report, Resources and Conflict in Papua, op. cit.

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Ja’far Umar Thalib acknowledged that some of his major events of both communities as an example of men did arrive in late 2000 – he did not say how what must not be allowed to happen in Papua. many – as a reconnaissance team to investigate the needs of Muslims, and only after they completed their survey, in October 2001, did he send about 200 men. He believed there was a conspiracy of Christians in eastern Indonesia, including Maluku and Papua, to secede and form a Christian state. Laskar Jihad, he said, saw its mission as crushing the Papuan inde- pendence movement:

The Papuan independence movement in Irian Jaya sounds the gong of Holy War by terrorising Mus- lims there. This must be answered by sending Ahlussunnah wal Jama’ah mujahidin there to crush the potential for a revolt of Christian Papua. The mujahidin are forced to function as the guard- ian of the Indonesian unitary state, because the de- fence institutions are shackled by issues of human rights violations and the belief that they are the en- emy of democracy.89

The Laskar Jihad forces were welcomed by some in the Muslim migrant communities, but not by Papuan Muslims; H. Zubeir Hussain, head of the provincial ulama council, very clearly rejected the presence of any Islamic militia, fearing they would spark religious conflict.90 For the most part, Laskar Jihad members focused on daawa rather than military training, and most, but not all, left Papua after the organisation was disbanded in October 2002.

But concerns about its activities did not go away. In February 2003, a salafi businessman, Haji Muhamad Koya, head of a courier company called PT Bina Tirta, was arrested in Sorong, after police found a small arsenal in his office warehouse of homemade bombs, explosives and arrows with tips designed to be dipped in petrol. Church leaders, believing he was storing these for Laskar Jihad, sent a letter of concern to the police. Although close to Ja’far Umar Thalib, he said he was storing the weapons for his own pro- tection. He was convicted of weapons possession, but his ties to Laskar Jihad were never proven.91

As the conflicts in Maluku and Poso waned, and other developments took precedence in Papua, communal tensions also subsided, but suspicions remained. The Maluku conflict to this day continues to be invoked at

89 Ja’far Umar Thalib, “Jihad fi Sabilillah Solusi Problem- atika Bangsa dan Negara Indonesia”, Majalah Salafy, no. 34, 1421 H, 2000 M, pp. 2-5; and “Laskar Jihad di Papua Cuma 200 Anggota, Bukan 3,000”, Sinar Harapan, 25 March 2002. 90 “Laskar Jihad”, op. cit. 91 Crisis Group interview, salafi activist, Sorong, March 2008.

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VII. NEW MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN for human rights defenders, were seen as part of the 94 RELIGIOUS GROUPS U.S. strategy to wrest Papua from Indonesia.

Another cause of Papuan separatism, according to New religious forces in Papua have brought with HTI, was inequitable distribution of economic re- them a doctrinal intolerance that complicates commu- sources, so that while Papua had undreamed of nal relations. On the Muslim side, there has been an wealth, its people remained poor. The giant Freeport influx of Islamist groups, including Hizb ut-Tahrir copper mine was an example of how capitalism ex- ploited local resources to the hilt; Islamic economic and salafist groups, some, like the -based 95 Wahdah Islamiyah, with ties to militant groups. On practices, by contrast, would bring justice for all. In the Christian side, pentecostals and charismatics have late May 2008, the Papuan branch of HTI led demon- gathered strength. Each is convinced of its own un- strations in Jayapura against fuel price rises, saying shakable truths and tends to see the other faith as the natural resources like oil and gas belonged to the peo- enemy. ple but by the price increases, the government was making the people suffer.96

A. HIZB UT-TAHRIR HTI teachings took hold not only among migrants but also among indigenous Papuans, thanks to the re- Hizb ut-Tahrir is a case in point.92 An international cruitment of Mohamed Zaaf Fadzlan Garamatan. A organisation founded in Jerusalem in 1953, it began to native Papuan born in Patipi, Fakfak, in 1969, he be- operate clandestinely in Indonesia in the early 1980s; came the spearhead of HTI in indigenous Muslim only after Soeharto fell did it come out in the open us- communities. After finishing school in Fakfak, he ing its name.93 The Indonesian branch (HTI) was went to Hasanuddin University in Makassar to study brought to Papua at the beginning of the 2000s by ac- economics and was active in various Muslim student tivists from Java and Sulawesi who came to work in organisations. After graduation, he established an Is- Papua and grew rapidly. One indication was the lamic charity in Pondok Hijau, Bekasi, outside Ja- strength of the Papuan contingent – some 300 people karta, which he called Al Fatih Kaafah Nusantara – at HTI’s International Caliphate Conference in Au- (AFKN), to support daawa in Papua and provide free education for hundreds of Papuan students, mostly in gust 2007 at the main sports stadium in Jakarta. In 97 Jayapura, HTI members formed a student wing, the pesantrens in Java, Sumatra and Makassar. AFKN Student Liberation Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa has also provided university scholarships to Papuan Muslims; it claims that 29 of them have gone on to Pembebasan). 98 receive masters’ degrees. It also helps Papuans make the hajj: Fadzlan says that in 2007, he also sent seven HTI members took an active part in discussions on 99 Papua, although they tended toward conspiracy theo- clan leaders to Mecca. ries. In their view, for example, separatism was caused by two factors. First, America and its allies, like Australia, Singapore and the Philippines, wanted 94 “Strategi Imperialisme Amerika Memcahbelah Indonesia: to weaken and divide Indonesia; one way to do this Waspadalah, Wahai Kaum Muslim!”, statement of Hizbut was by encouraging Papuan separatism. According to Tahrir Indonesia, 5 July 2007, at www.hizbut-tahrir.or.id/ this theory, the U.S. feared that Indonesia and Malay- 2007/07/13/strategi-imperialisme-amerika-memecahbelah- sia together would become a new, anti-American, Is- indonesia-waspadalah-wahai-kaum-muslim/. 95 lamic force in the region, so preventive steps had to “Mewaspadai Gerakan Separatisme”, Pernyataan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 12 July 2007. be taken. The visits to Papua in 2007 of Eni Faleo- 96 mavaega, the U.S. Congressman from American Sa- “Kecewa Harga BBM Maik, Gema Datangi DPRD”, Cenderawasih Pos, 26 May 2008. moa, and Hina Jilani, the UN’s special representative 97 Three pesantrens in the Jakarta area with AFKN students are Pesantren Assafi’iyah, Jatiwaringin and Maslakul Irafan and Tasfiyah pesantrens in Jatibening, Pondok Gede. Fadz- lan himself claims to have supported the schooling of more 92 For earlier analysis of this organisation, see Crisis Group than 1,400 Papuan children, but others say the figure is much Asia Report Nº58, Radical Islam in : Respond- lower. ing to Hizb ut-Tahrir, 30 June 2003. 98 Irian, Bumi Allah yang semakin terang oleh cahaya tauhid, 93 Greg Fealy, “Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia: Seeking a ‘Total’ www.wakaf-alquran.org, 12 November 2007. Islamic Identity”, in Shahram Akbarzadeh and Fethi Man- 99 Six of the seven were Ust. Abdul Kahar (Jeri Pele) from souri (eds.), Islam and Political Violence: Muslim Diaspora the Araboda clan, Wamena; Abdul Karim Ogar; Abdul Qadir and Radicalism in the West, (London and New York, 2007), Qurita, head of the Irarutu clan, Kaimana; Husein Sayyor; pp. 151-64. Mansur Garamatan; and Abdul Salam Peawei. AFKN gets

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He likewise has strong links with Islamic organisa- Papua joined a rival salafi faction, led by a - tions in Jakarta. In addition to HTI, he is close to Fo- based scholar, Umar Sewed.102 rum Umat Islam (FUI) headed by Mashadi, a former PKS politician who is at the forefront of the campaign The salafi community grew, but not as quickly as to establish Islamic law and ban “deviant sects”. In HTI. Its preachers had little success among indige- terms of his political contacts, he is close to Mochtar nous Muslims; most members were migrants. It set up Ngabalin, a Papuan member of the Crescent Star Islamic foundations (yayasan) in cities to support Party (Partai Bulang Bintang); he himself has aspira- daawa activities. In Sorong, the base for ex-Laskar tions to become a member of parliament in 2009.100 Jihad was a school started by Yayasan Ta’dhimus Sunnah; several mosques there hosted salafi religious In an interview in a Hizb ut-Tahrir tabloid newspaper discussions (pengajian).103 In Jayapura, the commu- in 2007, Fadzlan maintained that Papuan Muslims nity has not yet managed to establish a foundation or had led the fight against colonialism in Papua and that school but has one regular public forum and smaller the anti-Dutch bases in Kaimana and Fakfak worked religious discussion groups both at the home of Abu together with the Indonesian government to return Zahwaa, the leading salafi preacher there, and in one West Irian to the republic. He said Christians were of the capital’s main mosques.104 The number of salafi trying to work with the OPM to create a Christian preachers is so limited that the Jayapura salafis often state, while Muslims were working together to deepen bring in Java-based scholars by telephone for discus- their faith and their Indonesian nationalism, “to show sions, including Umar Sewed from Cirebon, Abu that Papuan Muslims think like Indonesians”.101 He Hamzal Yusuf al-Atsary from Bandung and Usama also claimed that Muslims now constituted 65 per bin Faishol Mahri from Malang. cent of Papua, both migrants (muhajirin) and indige- nous (whom he termed anshar), and that Christians Unlike HTI, the salafis almost never raise Papua as a claimed a majority only by including animists in their political issue in their discussions. The focus is on re- statistics. ligious principles and on combating idolatry and de- viance. Nevertheless, one source said, most believe that Papuan Christians want to separate from Indone- B. SALAFISM IN PAPUA sia to form the Arafuru Christian state. His friends, however, are no longer interested in jihad. “There is Papuans first became aware of salafism, or neo- no more jihad”, he said flatly, “or at least our jihad is Wahhabism, through Ja’far Umar Thalib and his no longer through war but through spreading knowl- Laskar Jihad. The ultra-puritan method (manhaj) of edge”. They remain strongly committed to the princi- practicing Islam grew rapidly in Indonesia in the ple of al-wala wal bara (loyalty and disloyalty), or in 1990s, thanks to returning graduates from universities his terms, loving Islam and hating kafirs (infidels). in and Yemen. Concerns about the role and prominence of Laskar Jihad in 2002 led to divi- C. JEMAAH TABLIGH sions in the movement, and eventually to Laskar Ji- had’s dissolution. Most of its members returned to Java as a result; almost all of those who stayed in The Muslim missionary organisation Jemaah Tabligh deserves mention here, not as a hardline group, which it is not, but because many Papuans confuse tablighis, as its members are called, with Laskar Jihad due to their dress: women are often veiled to the eyes, and

funding for its daawa activities from many Islamic organisa- 102 For an analysis of why Laskar Jihad disbanded and the tions in Jakarta. The biggest grant thus far was from Baitul rift in the Indonesian salafi movement, see Crisis Group Re- Maal Muamalat (BMM), the charitable arm of Indonesia’s port Nº83, Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Ter- largest Islamic bank. Together with BMM, Fadzlan started a rorism MostlyDon’t Mix, 13 September 2004. business selling Papuan products, such as salted fish and 103 The school is Ma’had Darul Atsar in Kampung Bugis, sweets, to supermarkets in Jakarta like Carrefour, with the Matalamagi, Sorong, led by Ustadz Syafruddin. The mosques label AFKN-BBM. He believes that mosques should func- with salafi pengajians include Mesjid al Akbar, Jl. Mesjid tion as business centres for the ummat. Raya; Mesjid ar-Raudhoh, on Jl. Pendidikan, Km 8, and one 100 Crisis Group interview with Muslim leaders in Manok- in Kampung Pisang, Remu Utara, Sorong. wari and Kaimana, February and April 2008. 104 The forum is Majelis Ta’lim Ittaba’us Sunnah Jayapura 101 “Pemerintah Harus Perhatikan Muslim Papua: Ust M Fadz- dan Umahat Salafiyah. The pengajians are held at Abu Zah- lan al Garamatan (Mubaligh Papua)”, Suara Islam, Minggu waa’s house in Entrop and at Mesjid Raya Baiturrahim on Jl. I-II, May 2007. Gurabesi.

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the men often have full beards and wear white robes established a base at a mosque in the Hamadi area of and turbans. A non-political, non-violent international the capital and gave it the name “Serambi Madinah” movement that was founded in the 1920s in Lucknow, (Veranda of Medina). This has been their headquarters , and came to Indonesia in 1952, Jemaah Tabligh in Papua ever since. Two other bases are in Sorong aims to improve the moral character of Muslims and and the Kampung Makassar neighbourhood of Mano- make them better practitioners of their faith.105 It is kwari. A tablighi estimated membership at about tolerant of other religions, aims its activities only at 1,000 each in Jayapura and Sorong and about 500 in Muslims and has no interest in converting people of Manokwari. There are smaller numbers of tablighis in other faiths. Kaimana, Fakfak, Nabire, Merauke and Wamena.109

Like Mormons, it requires its members to undertake Most tablighis in Papua are migrants, but a significant missionary work; tablighis are required to spend 40 number of indigenous Muslims have also joined, es- days per year in the field, usually in groups of five to pecially around Kaimana and Fakfak. There is no dis- fifteen members.106 Many Indonesians go to Malaysia, cussion of Papuan politics in tablighi meetings; mem- Bangladesh or India, and many South Asians come to bers believe it would undermine their mission. Indonesia, especially the eastern region. In January Jemaah Tabligh meets openly and anyone can join, 2002, the Indonesian press reported the arrest in So- but it remains widely misunderstood and confused rong of six men from possibly linked to with more militant Islamic groups. al-Qaeda; they turned out to be Pakistani tablighis quietly doing their mission work.107 D. PENTECOSTALS AND CHARISMATICS Tablighis, like salafis, believe that the Prophet pro- vided the model for Muslims to follow, and they try Papua has also seen the arrival in recent years of pen- to emulate him in everything, without adjusting to tecostal churches and charismatic groups, also called time or place. For example, they brush their teeth not neo-pentecostals. These churches and groups are con- with plastic toothbrushes but with a wooden stick troversial, not only because they boast of converting called siwak, similar to what the Prophet is said to Muslims, putting them at odds with the Muslim have used. Because there is a tradition (hadith) that community, but also because they sometimes have says the Prophet ate using only three fingers, tablighis government or military backing, setting them against do the same, even though it is more difficult in rice- many local church groups.110 Active in several Papuan based cultures than it would have been with bread in cities, charismatics and pentecostals are almost iden- seventh-century Arabia. They refuse to be drawn into tical in terms of religious doctrine and practice “an debates over interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence, expressive quality of worship style that is dynamic which only divide the ummat, and they reject any dis- and physically demonstrative”.111 cussions on subjects they deem controversial, such as politics or jihad. They differ in organisational form. The churches have fixed locations and congregations, while the charis- Jemaah Tabligh arrived in Papua in 1988, after a matics tend to meet in prayer groups or cells that move group of tablighis meeting in Jakarta decided to send from place to place; examples are Yayasan Filadelfia ten members to Jayapura for three months.108 They and the California-based Full Gospel Businessman’s Fellowship. The cells are used for recruitment, much

as radical Muslim groups rely on small prayer groups

105 For a discussion of Jemaah Tabligh’s teachings, see Ghu- to identify potential members. When a critical mass is lam Musthapa Hasan, Menyingkap Tabir Kesalafahaman reached, they can form a church. Most charismatic Terhadap Jamaah Tabligh (Yogyakarta, 1997). Jemaah groups see themselves as inter-denominational, so do Tabligh took off in Indonesia in the 1970s through the efforts want a more formal organisation. of an Indonesian preacher and former army officer, Mu- hammad Zulfakar. It now has two main centres, one in the Kebun Jeruk neighbourhood of Jakarta, the second at 109 Crisis Group interviews, Jemaah Tabligh member, Jaya- Pesantren al-Fatah in Temboro, Magetan, East Java. pura, March-April 2008. 106 Solahudin, “Menelusur Kelompok Islam Sempalan”, 10 110 Some Papuans, however, have turned to the new groups January 2001, at www.detik.com/perisitwa/2001/01/10/ as an escape from authority, an opportunity to have an un- 2001110-0191452.shtml. mediated relationship with God. Charles E. Farhadian, Chris- 107 “Keresahan Warga Kristen di Papua – Papua Ambon III?”, tianity, Islam and Nationalism in Indonesia (New York, 2 April 2002, at www.geocities.com/kariu67/jk050402.htm. 2005), p. 119. 108 The meeting was led by a tablighi named Dr A.A. Noor 111 Ibid. Farhadian notes that while all pentecostals are char- at the Lung Hospital (Rumah Sakit Paru-Paru), near Tanjung ismatic, not all charismatics are pentecostal; they may be Priok, Jakarta. parts of other congregations.

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Charismatics stress the Holy Spirit and faith healing. storm, particularly after an investigation by the news They believe the Holy Spirit enters individuals after magazine Gatra showed they were false.117 they are baptised and bestows the blessing of glosso- lalia (speaking in tongues), in which someone sud- Since the late 1980s – much later in places like Kai- denly utters words of an unknown or never-studied mana – these groups have been organising KKRs language.112 The blessing of the Holy Spirit is also be- (Spiritual Awakening Services) in Papua. Gereja Be- lieved to cause miracles, for example allowing the thel Indonesia (GBI) and Gereja Bethani are the two blind to see, the lame to walk and the deaf to hear. most active organisers. In April 2008, GBI ROCK (an acronym for Representatives of Christ Kingdom) or- They also teach the “theology of success”, in which ganised a KKR in Sorong, bringing in Rev. Timotius faith is linked to wealth and comfort. To be devout is Arifin, a “success theologian” from . to be rich; poverty, sickness or suffering is a sign of inadequate faith.113 As one pastor put it, “if a sinner Another Gereja Bethel figure active in organising has a Toyota, then the pious will surely get KKR in Jayapura, Timika and, most recently in Feb- BMWs”.114 One explanation of the doctrine’s popular- ruary 2008 in Sorong, is Rev. Kirenius Bole from the ity in Papua is that it meshes well with indigenous Jakarta-based Yayasan Filadelfia Indonesia (YFI). Melanesian religion.115 Bole is a pastor from Jayapura who is also secretary of the foundation.118 In February 2007, working with The aggressive evangelising of both groups has Pondok Daud, a group that a Protestant scholar de- caused resentment in the mainstream Protestant de- scribed as “extreme charismatic”, he organised a Ser- nominations, which have lost members to them. There vice of Praise and Faith-Healing in the Papua Trade are also accusations that the evangelical groups are Centre in Entrop, Jayapura.119 Thousands packed in to driven by economic motivations. They preach that hear the husband-wife team of Rev. Jacob B. Sumba- every member should tithe (donate one-tenth of in- yak and Rev. Susan Sumbayak, Pondok Daud’s foun- come to the group), so the more members, the more ders.120 The group was the subject of a cover story in a income at the disposal of the preachers.116 leading newsweekly in 2005 that discussed what it called cult-like practices.121 The groups also aim their proselytising at non- Christians, causing anger among adherents of other Another charismatic group with growing influence in faiths, especially when there is a sense that conver- Papua is the Full Gospel Business Men’s Fellowship sion by any means is permissible. In a widely re- International. Based in Irvine, California, it claims to ported case in 2003, two charismatic pastors, Mu- have 5,000 branches in 160 countries and over a mil- hammad Filemon, a Muslim convert, and Fachli lion members. The Indonesian national president is Bachriudin, distributed video CDs of their lectures. the retired army general and former ambassador to Filemon claimed he had baptised one of Indonesia’s Singapore H.B.L. Mantiri; the Papuan chapter is led most popular Muslim preachers, Zainuddin MZ, by Julius T. Subay. In May 2007, the group brought while Fachli boasted in Sukabumi, that he an American evangelist, John Hartman, and a team had baptised 68 (Muslim leaders) and 400 mem- from Television Crusade with Gospel Overseas Tele- bers of Laskar Jihad. The claims generated a fire- vision Network to Papua to hold a KKR in Jayapura. As with the Pondok Daud event three months earlier, an estimated 20,000 packed the stands of the Papua 122 112 Trade Centre to hear them. Probably the best- An example often cited is that of Agnes N. Oznan, who known foreign evangelist in Papua is a Canadian, after her baptism in the U.S. was said to suddenly speak flu- Rev. Peter Youngren, who has traveled back and forth ent Chinese, while a light, seen as evidence of the Holy Spirit’s presence, appeared around her face and head. See Dr. Rijnardus A. Van Kooij and Yam’ah Tsalatsa A, Ber- main Dengan Api (Jakarta, 2007). 117 “Heboh VCD Zainuddin MZ Pendeta Bersaksi Umat Be- 113 See Ir. Herlianto, Teologi Sukses Antara Allah dan Ma- reaksi”, Gatra newsweekly, 19 May 2008. mon (Jakarta, 2006). 118 “1.643 Orang Sakit Ikut KKR”, Radar Sorong, 19 Janua- 114 Crisis Group interview, senior scholar, Sekolah Tinggi ry 2008. Teologi, Jakarta, 9 June 2008. 119 Crisis Group interview, senior scholar, Sekolah Tinggi 115 Agus A. Alua, Karakteristik Agama-Agama Melanesia Teologi Jakarta, 9 June 2008. (Jayapura 2006); Charles Farhadian, Christianity, Islam and 120 “Terbakar oleh Api Injil”, Majalah Gema Kesembuhan, Nationalism in Indonesia, op. cit, pp. 7, 23. Indigenous be- edition 7, 2007. liefs were sometimes characterised as “cargo cults”, linking 121 “Menanti Sinterklas di Malam Natal”, Gatra, 1 January the arrival of foreigners to expectation of access to goods as 2005. well as spiritual salvation. 122 “Buta 15 Tahun Jadi Melihat”, Cenderawasih Pos, 28 116 Ibid. May 2007.

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to Papua for seven years, holding KKRs in Jayapura, VIII. A NEW SENSE OF HISTORY Manokwari and Merauke.

The growth of these charismatic groups cannot be The rediscovery by Muslim commentators of Islam’s separated from the strong support they have from long presence in Papua is a positive development if it some local officials and the security forces. One char- leads to academic research on early Papuan history. acteristic of the charismatics is that they gravitate to But history is easily politicised, and some Muslim centres of political and economic power. For that rea- commentators are using the fact that Muslim traders son, unlike the Catholic or mainstream Protestant preceded Christian missionaries to suggest that Islam groups, they are either silent on Papuan political is- was Papua’s original religion, much like the “Balik sues or actively support the government, which they Islam” movement in the Philippines.126 preach is God’s representative on earth; to criticise the government is to criticise God. Whether Islam was brought to “Nu Waar” by a Gu- jerati trader on 17 July 1214, as one Papuan Muslim In 2001, virtually all the costs of a huge KKR called preacher asserts; by a Hadrami trader, according to Festival Papua 2001, with Rev. Youngren in atten- another; or through the Bacan sultanate in North dance, was borne by the provincial government, in- Maluku in 1569 is immaterial for these commenta- cluding the travel costs of participants, according to tors.127 Wihtout probing how far Islam penetrated be- Dr Benny Giay, a well-known mainstream Protestant tween the thirteenth and nineteenth century, the sub- pastor.123 He said security forces arranged 40 trucks to text to the new popular history is that foreign bring participants from all over Papua. The festival missionaries were responsible for Christianisation of took place only days after the military killed an im- a Muslim land; that Christian colonialism proceeded portant customary and pro-independence leader, to obliterate all traces of Islam; and that not just , then head of the Papua Presidium Papua Muslims but Indonesian Muslims more gener- Council. Giay said Youngren tried to cool the anger ally must redouble efforts to regain lost ground and of the Papuans over the murder by claiming that exert the control that is rightfully theirs. 128 Theys’ death was God’s plan, not a human rights vio- lation by the Indonesian state. If Youngren could History seminars are now a popular adjunct to Mus- really demonstrate miracles from God, Giay said, he lim events in Papua. The latest took place on 23 April should have summoned the voice of Theys Eluay 2008 in Fakfak in conjunction with a West Papua- from the grave to explain to the participants how he wide Koran-reading competition (Musabaqah Tilawa- was killed and by whom.124 til Qur’an, MTQ) at the local sports stadium.129 The The tendency of KKR meetings to showcase new seminar, “Geliat Muslim Irian: Antara Sejarah, Kiprah converts is also causing friction with Muslims. The dan Tantangannya” (Awakening of Irian Muslims: converts testify to their new faith in front of large Between History, Progress and the Challenges Faced), crowds, in public places, often over loudspeakers, in a was one of a series of activities jointly funded by the Hizb ut-Tahrir-led AFKN and the kabupaten govern- way that causes deep offence to adherents of the faith 130 they left. For example in February 2008 in Sorong, a ment. The bupati told the press that one reason for woman from Madura, Siti Muslika, appeared at a KKR and testified how she had been a Muslim and now was joyful because she had found Christ. 126 “Changing religions should be a private matter, not The Balik Islam (Return to Islam) movement suggests that Philippine Christians who convert to Islam, many after something you do in public to denigrate Islam. It 125 working as migrants in the Middle East, are actually revert- makes us angry”, said a Muslim in Sorong. ing to their original religion. See Crisis Group Asia Report Nº110, Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts, 19 December 2005. For reference to Islam as Papua’s original religion, see “Kiprah Misionaris di Papua, Hidayatullah, 6 January 2006. 127 Even those who accept the later date argue that Papua was included in the Hindu empire, ruled from Java, and therefore was always part of Indonesia rather than being a colonial construct later tacked on to the Indonesian republic. 123 Dr Benny Giay, Pembunuhan Theys, Kematian HAM di 128 See “Ditusuk dari Belakang”, Hidayatullah, July 2005, p. 54. Papua (Yogyakarta, 2006), pp. 40-41. 129 “Sejarah Islam di Papua”, Republika, 18 April 2008. 124 Ibid. 130 “Geliat Umat Islam di Bumi Papua”, Hidayatullah, 11 125 Crisis Group interview, Muslim, Sorong, April 2008. April 2008.

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the program was to “open the eyes of the world to the IX. MODERATING INFLUENCES? fact that Irian is not synonymous with non-Muslims”.131

At the same time, the bupati stressed that 25 per cent In the midst of these tensions, a new body emerged of the committee for the event were local Christians, that may be able to play a mediating role in the future. and banners raised across the district read “One Fam- On 13 April 2007, the Papuan Muslim Council (Ma- ily, Three Religions” (Islam, Catholicisim and Protes- jelis Muslim Papua, MMP) was established in Jaya- tantism). The inter-faith participation is at one level a pura as a body of indigenous Muslims committed to hallmark of Fakfak’s traditional tolerance, but the fact upholding Papuan cultural identity and Islamic univer- that it had to be so publicly proclaimed suggests a sal values. It was an outgrowth of Solidaritas Muslim new level of contestation. Papua, a group set up in 1999 which included several pro-independence Muslims among its founders. Meanwhile, on 26 April 2008, on Biak and Supirori islands just west of Manokwari, Christians celebrated The MMP announced at its founding congress that it the 100th anniversary of local Christianity with a was composed of Muslims “from the seven cultural proclamation of Supiori as “Gospel Island” – an act regions of Papua” who were committed to the princi- sure to feature in subsequent discussions of religious ples of moderation, tolerance, balance and dialogue history in Papua.132 and to democracy, the rule of law and human rights.133 It stated specifically that its goal was “not to be exclu- sive, not to promote Islamisation, let alone fundamen- talism that could lead to the emergence of radical groups, but to extend a hand to the local government to work for justice and prosperity”.134

A. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PAPUAN MUSLIM COUNCIL

The recommendations that emerged from the congress included telling commentary on the social and politi- cal situation in Papua. It said the reform movement was being “threatened by political groups with a ten- dency to use physical intimidation, anarchism and po- litical thuggery” to achieve their aims in a way that undermined basic freedoms of expression and asso- ciation – a reference to some of the hardline Islamic groups causing consternation among Christians in Papua. It expressed concern over signs of communal politics that threatened to lead to “horizontal disinte- gration” at both the local and national level. “The de- velopment of Papua”, it noted, “cannot be undertaken by just one ethnic group, one race, one religion or one group”.135

Unlike some of the migrant-dominated Muslim groups, it called the 2001 Special Autonomy Law for Papua a “monumental and historic event”, although it had not been implemented effectively. It urged the

133 “Deklarasi Berdirinya Majelis Muslim Papua”, Kotaraja- Jayapura, in Hasil-Hasil, op. cit., pp. 38-39. 134 “Pesan Wagub Kepada Peserta Muktamar I Majelis Mus- 131 Ibid. lim Papua, 11 April 2007, at 132 “Seratus Tahun Perkabaran Injil diperingati di Papua”, www.papua.go.id/berita_det.php/id/1260. Liputan 6, 26 April 2008, at www.liputan6.com/actual/ 135 Rekomendasi Majelis Muslim Papua, Bidang Demokrasi ?id=11294. dan Politik, no.2, in Hasil-Hasil, op. cit., p. 44.

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central government, local government, provincial par- has excellent contacts at the Catholic grassroots, its liaments and the Majelis Rakyat Papua – as noted ability to reach beyond the elite of other religious above, the body set up to safeguard Papuan culture – groups is limited. Moreover, its focus has been on to do their utmost to turn special autonomy into a what most Papuans see as the more important con- blessing and not a curse.136 It sharply criticised the flict, not on inter-religious tensions. MRP for having become too politicised and tenden- tious – despite the fact that its own general chairman, The MRP’s working group on religion (pokja agama) Arobi Achmad Airtuarauw, is an MRP member. And consists of eight Protestant leaders, four Catholics and it closed by urging the government to uphold the rule two Muslims, one from Kaimana and one from Wa- of law and protect human rights, including by setting mena in the central highlands, but it played no role up a human rights court in Papua and forming a truth when the Manokwari and Kaimana tensions reached a and reconciliation commission in Papua.137 crisis stage.

The MMP proceeded to set up branches in almost The Papuan Peace Commission, established in 2002 every kabupaten in Papua. Ironically, it failed in Fak- as an outgrowth of the “peace zone” movement, is not fak, the place where indigenous Muslims are most an option either. Aimed at ending violence in Papua numerous, apparently because of the bupati’s support by advocating, among other things, the withdrawal of for Hizb ut-Tahrir and AFKN – both of which see it Indonesian troops, it also recognised the importance as separatist. But while the MMP may not claim of preventing conflict between migrants and indige- Fadzlan Garamatan among its members, it does in- nous Papuans. In 2004, however, the Commission clude several figures who are seen as pro-Indonesia. head, Benny Giay, described its efforts as “an attempt When tensions arose in Kaimana, some of its mem- to boil a stone that will never cook”, because of lack bers played a critical role in cooling emotions in both of support from the Indonesian military, and the communities. commission has since virtually disappeared.139

If other options do not yet exist, perhaps they should B. OTHER INSTITUTIONS be created. One possible model, though formed under very different circumstances, is the Maluku Media Few other institutions, whether NGOs, religious bod- Centre, created in Ambon as a forum for journalists ies or government agencies, seem likely moderating writing for Christian and Muslim papers to share in- influences. Several long-term observers of Papua formation and ensure that more balanced accounts suggested that one possibility might be the Zone of were disseminated to readers. Communities in Papua are Peace movement, begun in 2002 by the Jayapura-based not segregated the way Maluku was during its con- Justice and Peace Secretariat (Sekretariat Keadilan flict, but the idea of a media-based approach to defus- dan Perdamaian, SKP) of the Catholic Church. While ing conflict, engaging journalists from both communi- it was aimed primarily at ensuring a non-military so- ties and reaching a mass audience through radio, lution to the political conflict between the Indonesian television and the print media deserves attention. state and pro-independence Papuans, a working paper prepared for a 2003 meeting underscored the impor- tance of tolerance and the need to prevent discrimina- tion, eliminate “primordial” sentiments based on race, religion or ethnicity and initiate dialogues among re- ligious leaders.138 The problem is that while the SKP

136 Rekomendasi Majelis Muslim Papua, Bidang Otonomi Khusus dan Pemerintah Daerah, no.1, in Hasil-Hasil, op. cit., p. 45. 137 Rekomendasi Majelis Muslim Papua, Bidang Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia, no.1, in Hasil-Hasil, op. cit. p. 50. The last provision in the human rights section of the recommen- dations was an exhortation to President Yudhoyono to “end support for the U.S. in its intervention in the intellectual rights of Iran in developing its nuclear program”. 138 “Membangun Budaya Damai dan Rekonsiliasi: Dasar Menangani Konflik di Papua”, Sekretariat Keadilan dan Per- 139 David Little (ed.), Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Re- damaian (SKP), November 2003, pp. 18-19. ligion in Conflict Resolution (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 416-417.

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X. CONCLUSION continue because of other developments. Papua’s Christians are only too well aware of attacks on churches elsewhere in Indonesia and see the country The potential for communal conflict is high in Papua as a whole moving toward more support for Islamic because both sides consider themselves aggrieved. orthodoxy. Muslims from outside Papua are easily Indigenous Christians feel threatened by ongoing mobilised to defend what they see as slights to a be- Muslim migration; Muslim migrants feel democracy leaguered community and to bolster the latter’s num- may be leading to a tyranny of the majority, where in bers through daawa and other forms of outreach. the long term they will face discrimination or even With ever more new kabupatens and districts being expulsion. Even though there are significant rifts and created as a byproduct of Indonesia’s decentralisation factions in both communities, especially over compet- process, the chances for communal sentiments being ing nationalisms (Indonesian vs. Papuan), the devel- mobilised in service of local politics is high. Leaders opments in Manokwari and Kaimana may be a sign of at all levels of government must be alert to existing more clashes to come. tensions and do everything in their power to ensure at the very least that they are not exacerbated. Changes in demographics are part of the problem, but even if migration from outside Papua were to stop Jakarta/Brussels, 16 June 2008 tomorrow, communal polarisation would probably

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APPENDIX A

MAP OF INDONESIA

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APPENDIX B

MAP OF PAPUA

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APPENDIX B

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an inde- Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Demo- pendent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with cratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, some 135 staff members on five continents, working Kenya, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, , through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, prevent and resolve deadly conflict. Indonesia, , Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, / Burma, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Phillipines, , Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Teams of political analysts are located within or close by Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Serbia and violent conflict. Based on information and assessments Turkey; in the Middle East, the whole region from North from the field, it produces analytical reports containing Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia, the rest practical recommendations targeted at key international of the Andean region and Haiti. decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct reg- Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable ular update on the state of play in all the most significant foundations, companies and individual donors. The fol- situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world. lowing governmental departments and agencies currently provide funding: Australian Agency for International De- Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed velopment, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign min- Trade, Austrian Development Agency, Belgian Ministry istries and international organisations and made available of Foreign Affairs, Canadian International Development simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Agency, Canadian International Development and Re- Group works closely with governments and those who in- search Centre, Foreign Affairs and International Trade fluence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis Canada, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Dan- analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions. ish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of For- eign Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Federal Foreign figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business Office, Irish Aid, Principality of Liechtenstein, Luxem- and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring bourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Agency the reports and recommendations to the attention of for International Development, Royal Norwegian Minis- senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is try of Foreign Affairs, Qatar, Swedish Ministry for For- co-chaired by the former European Commissioner for eign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Af- External Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S. fairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United King- Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief dom Department for International Development, United Executive since January 2000 has been former Austral- Kingdom Economic and Social Research Council, U.S. ian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. Agency for International Development.

Crisis Group’s international headquarters are in Brussels, Foundation and private sector donors include Carnegie with advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based Corporation of New York, Fundación DARA Internacio- as a legal entity), New York, London and Moscow. The nal, Iara Lee and George Gund III Foundation, William organisation currently operates eleven regional offices & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Hunt Alternatives Fund, (in Bishkek, Bogotá, Cairo, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, Kimsey Foundation, Korea Foundation, John D. & Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi) and has local Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Charles Stewart field representation in sixteen additional locations (Abuja, Mott Foundation, Open Society Institute, Pierre and Baku, Bangkok, Beirut, Belgrade, Colombo, Damascus, Pamela Omidyar Fund, Victor Pinchuk Foundation, Dili, Dushanbe, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, Ploughshares Fund, Provictimis Foundation, Radcliffe Port-au-Prince, Pretoria and Tehran). Crisis Group current- Foundation, Sigrid Rausing Trust and VIVA Trust. ly covers some 60 areas of actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes Burundi, June 2008

Further information about Crisis Group can be obtained from our website: www.crisisgroup.org

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APPENDIX C

CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2005

CENTRAL ASIA South Korea’s Election: What to Expect from President Lee, Asia Briefing N°73, 21 December 2007 The Curse of Cotton: Central Asia’s Destructive Monoculture, China’s Thirst for Oil, Asia Report N°153, 9 June 2008 Asia Report N°93, 28 February 2005 (also available in Russian) Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution, Asia Report N°97, 4 May 2005 (also available in Russian) Nepal’s Royal Coup: Making a Bad Situation Worse, Asia Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising, Asia Briefing N°38, 25 May Report N°91, 9 February 2005 2005 (also available in Russian) Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track, Asia Briefing Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State, Asia Report N°109, 16 December N°35, 23 February 2005 2005 (also available in Russian) Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup, Asia Briefing N°35, Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul, Asia Briefing N°45, 16 24 February 2005 February 2006 (also available in Russian) Nepal: Dealing with a Human Rights Crisis, Asia Report N°94, Central Asia: What Role for the European Union?, Asia Report 24 March 2005 N°113, 10 April 2006 The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan, Asia Report N°95, 18 Kyrgyzstan’s Prison System Nightmare, Asia Report N°118, April 2005 16 August 2006 (also available in Russian) Political Parties in Afghanistan, Asia Briefing N°39, 2 June 2005 Uzbekistan: Europe’s Sanctions Matter, Asia Briefing N°54, 6 November 2006 Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues, Asia Report N°99, 15 June 2005 Kyrgyzstan on the Edge, Asia Briefing N°55, 9 November 2006 (also available in Russian) Afghanistan Elections: Endgame or New Beginning?, Asia Report N°101, 21 July 2005 Turkmenistan after Niyazov, Asia Briefing N°60, 12 February 2007 Nepal: Beyond Royal Rule, Asia Briefing N°41, 15 September 2005 Central Asia’s Energy Risks, Asia Report N°133, 24 May 2007 (also available in Russian) Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan¸ Asia Report N°102, 28 September 2005 Uzbekistan: Stagnation and Uncertainty, Asia Briefing N°67, 22 August 2007 Nepal’s Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy, Asia Report N°104, 27 October 2005 (also available in Nepali) Political Murder in Central Asia: No Time to End Uzbekistan’s Isolation, Asia Briefing N°76, 13 February 2008 Pakistan’s Local Polls: Shoring Up Military Rule, Asia Briefing N°43, 22 November 2005 Kyrgyzstan: The Challenge of Judicial Reform, Asia Report N°150, 10 April 2008 Nepal’s New Alliance: The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists, Asia Report N°106, 28 November 2005 NORTH EAST ASIA Rebuilding the Afghan State: The European Union’s Role, Asia Report N°107, 30 November 2005 North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand?, Asia Report N°96, 25 April 2005 (also available in Korean and Russian) Nepal: Electing Chaos, Asia Report N°111, 31 January 2006 Japan and North Korea: Bones of Contention, Asia Report Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake, Asia Briefing Nº100, 27 June 2005 (also available in Korean) N°46, 15 March 2006 China and Taiwan: Uneasy Détente, Asia Briefing N°42, 21 Nepal’s Crisis: Mobilising International Influence, Asia Briefing September 2005 N°49, 19 April 2006 North East Asia’s Undercurrents of Conflict, Asia Report N°108, Nepal: From People Power to Peace?, Asia Report N°115, 10 15 December 2005 (also available in Korean and Russian) May 2006 (also available in Nepali) China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?, Asia Report Afghanistan’s New Legislature: Making Democracy Work, Asia N°112, 1 February 2006 (also available in Korean) Report N°116, 15 May 2006 After North Korea’s Missile Launch: Are the Nuclear Talks India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Stabilising a Cold Peace, Asia Dead?, Asia Briefing N°52, 9 August 2006 (also available in Briefing N°51, 15 June 2006 Korean and Russian) Pakistan: the Worsening Conflict in Balochistan, Asia Report Perilous Journeys: The Plight of North Koreans in China and N°119, 14 September 2006 Beyond, Asia Report N°122, 26 October 2006 (also available Bangladesh Today, Asia Report N°121, 23 October 2006 in Korean and Russian) Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes, Asia North Korea’s Nuclear Test: The Fallout, Asia Briefing N°56, Report N°123, 2 November 2006 13 November 2006 (also available in Korean and Russian) Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process, Asia Report After the North Korean Nuclear Breakthrough: Compliance N°124, 28 November 2006 or Confrontation?, Asia Briefing N°62, 30 April 2007 (also Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, Asia Report available in Korean and Russian) N°125, 11 December 2006 North Korea-Russia Relations: A Strained Friendship, Asia Nepal’s Peace Agreement: Making it Work, Asia Report Nº126, Briefing N°71, 4 December 2007 (also available in Russian) 15 December 2006

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Afghanistan’s Endangered Compact, Asia Briefing Nº59, 29 Papua: The Dangers of Shutting Down Dialogue, Asia Briefing January 2007 N°47, 23 March 2006 (also available in Indonesian) Nepal’s Constitutional Process, Asia Report N°128, 26 February Aceh: Now for the Hard Part, Asia Briefing N°48, 29 March 2006 2007 (also available in Nepali) Managing Tensions on the Timor-Leste/Indonesia Border, Pakistan: Karachi’s Madrasas and Violent Extremism, Asia Asia Briefing N°50, 4 May 2006 Report N°130, 29 March 2007 Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks, Asia Report N°114, Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, Asia Report N°131, 2 5 May 2006 (also available in Indonesian) April 2007 Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh, Asia Report N°117, Nepal’s Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists?, Asia Report N°132, 31 July 2006 (also available in Indonesian) 18 May 2007 (also available in Nepali) Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, Asia Briefing Sri Lanka’s Muslims: Caught in the Crossfire, Asia Report N°53, 5 September 2006 N°134, 29 May 2007 Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis, Asia Report N°120, 10 October Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Crisis, Asia Report N°135, 14 June 2006 (also available in Indonesian) 2007 Aceh’s Local Elections: The Role of the Free Aceh Movement Nepal’s Troubled Tarai Region, Asia Report N°136, 9 July 2007 (GAM), Asia Briefing N°57, 29 November 2006 (also available in Nepali) Myanmar: New Threats to Humanitarian Aid, Asia Briefing Elections, Democracy and Stability in Pakistan, Asia Report N°58, 8 December 2006 N°137, 31 July 2007 Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge, Asia Report N°127, Reforming Afghanistan’s Police, Asia Report N°138, 30 August 24 January 2007 2007 Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup, Asia Report Nepal’s Fragile Peace Process, Asia Briefing N°68, 28 September N°129, 15 March 2007 (also available in Thai) 2007 (also available in Nepali) Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh , Asia Briefing N°61, 22 Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan, Asia Briefing March 2007 N°69, 22 October 2007 Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Current Status, Asia Briefing Sri Lanka: Sinhala Nationalism and the Elusive Southern N°63, 3 May 2007 Consensus, Asia Report N°141, 7 November 2007 Indonesia: Decentralisation and Local Power Struggles in Winding Back Martial Law in Pakistan, Asia Briefing N°70, Maluku, Asia Briefing N°64, 22 May 2007 12 November 2007 Timor-Leste’s Parliamentary Elections, Asia Briefing N°65, Nepal: Peace Postponed, Asia Briefing N°72, 18 December 2007 12 June 2007 (also available in Nepali) Indonesian Papua: A Local Perspective on the Conflict, Asia After Bhutto’s Murder: A Way Forward for Pakistan, Asia Briefing N°66, 19 July 2007 (also available in Indonesian) Briefing N°74, 2 January 2008 Aceh: Post-Conflict Complications, Asia Report N°139, 4 Afghanistan: The Need for International Resolve, Asia Report October 2007 (also available in Indonesian) N°145, 6 February 2008 Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, Asia Sri Lanka’s Return to War: Limiting the Damage, Asia Report Report N°140, 23 October 2007 (also available in Thai) N°146, 20 February 2008 “Deradicalisation” and Indonesian Prisons, Asia Report N°142, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, Asia Report N°149, 2 April 2008 19 November 2007 (also available in Nepali) Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform, Asia Report N°143, 17 Restoring Democracy in Bangladesh, Asia Report N°151 28 January 2008 (also available in Tetum) April 2008 Indonesia: Tackling Radicalism in Poso, Asia Briefing N°75, 22 January 2008 SOUTH EAST ASIA Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown, Asia Report N°144, Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian 31 January 2008 Embassy Bombing, Asia Report N°92, 22 February 2005 (also Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing Industry, Asia available in Indonesian) Report N°147, 28 February 2008 Decentralisation and Conflict in Indonesia: The Mamasa Timor-Leste’s Displacement Crisis, Asia Report N°148, 31 Case, Asia Briefing N°37, 3 May 2005 March 2008 Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad, Asia Report N°98, The Philippines: Counter-insurgency vs. Counter-terrorism in 18 May 2005 (also available in Thai) Mindanao, Asia Report N°152, 14 May 2008 Aceh: A New Chance for Peace, Asia Briefing N°40, 15 August 2005 Weakening Indonesia’s Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from OTHER REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS Maluku and Poso, Asia Report N°103, 13 October 2005 (also For Crisis Group reports and briefing papers on: available in Indonesian) • Africa Thailand’s Emergency Decree: No Solution, Asia Report N°105, • Asia 18 November 2005 (also available in Thai) • Europe Aceh: So Far, So Good, Asia Briefing N°44, 13 December 2005 • Latin America and Caribbean (also available in Indonesian) • Middle East and North Africa Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts, • Thematic Issues Asia Report Nº110, 19 December 2005 • CrisisWatch please visit our website www.crisisgroup.org

Indonesia: Communal Tensions in Papua Crisis Group Asia Report N°154, 16 June 2008 Page 30

APPENDIX D

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Co-Chairs Kim Campbell Christopher Patten Former Prime Minister of Canada Former European Commissioner for External Relations, Gover- Naresh Chandra nor of Hong Kong and UK Cabinet Minister; Chancellor Former Indian Cabinet Secretary and Ambassador of India to the U.S. of Oxford University Joaquim Alberto Chissano Thomas Pickering Former President of Mozambique Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Russia, India, Israel, Jordan, and Nigeria Victor Chu Chairman, First Eastern Investment Group, Hong Kong

President & CEO Wesley Clark Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Gareth Evans Former Foreign Minister of Australia Pat Cox Former President of European Parliament Uffe Ellemann-Jensen Executive Committee Former Foreign Minister of Denmark Morton Abramowitz Mark Eyskens Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey Former Prime Minister of Belgium Cheryl Carolus Former South African High Commissioner to the UK and Secre- Joschka Fischer tary General of the ANC Former Foreign Minister of Germany Maria Livanos Cattaui* Leslie H. Gelb Former Secretary-General, International Chamber of Commerce President Emeritus of Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Yoichi Funabashi Carla Hills Editor-in-Chief & Columnist, The Asahi Shimbun, Japan Former Secretary of Housing and U.S. Trade Representative Frank Giustra Lena Hjelm-Wallén Chairman, Endeavour Financial, Canada Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister, Sweden Stephen Solarz Swanee Hunt Former U.S. Congressman Chair, The Initiative for Inclusive Security; President, Hunt George Soros Alternatives Fund; former Ambassador U.S. to Austria Chairman, Open Society Institute Anwar Ibrahim Pär Stenbäck Former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia Former Foreign Minister of Finland Asma Jahangir *Vice-Chair UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief; Chairperson, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan Adnan Abu-Odeh Nancy Kassebaum Baker Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah II and to King Hussein Former U.S. Senator and Jordan Permanent Representative to the UN James V. Kimsey Kenneth Adelman Founder and Chairman Emeritus of America Online, Inc. (AOL) Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and Wim Kok Disarmament Agency Former Prime Minister of Ersin Arioglu Ricardo Lagos Member of Parliament, Turkey; Chairman Emeritus, Yapi Merkezi Former President of Chile; President, Club of Madrid Group Joanne Leedom-Ackerman Shlomo Ben-Ami Novelist and journalist, U.S. Former Foreign Minister of Israel Ayo Obe Lakhdar Brahimi Chair of Steering Committee of World Movement for Democracy, Former Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General and Algerian Nigeria Foreign Minister Christine Ockrent Journalist and author, France Former U.S. National Security Advisor to the President

Indonesia: Communal Tensions in Papua Crisis Group Asia Report N°154, 16 June 2008 Page 31

Victor Pinchuk Douglas Schoen Founder of Interpipe Scientific and Industrial Production Group Founding Partner of Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, U.S. Samantha Power Thorvald Stoltenberg Author and Professor, Kennedy School of Government, Former Foreign Minister of Norway Harvard University Ernesto Zedillo Fidel V. Ramos Former President of Mexico; Director, Yale Center for the Former President of Philippines Study of Globalization Ghassan Salamé Former Minister, Lebanon; Professor of International Relations, Paris

PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL Crisis Group’s President’s Council is a distinguished group of major individual and corporate donors providing essen- tial support, time and expertise to Crisis Group in delivering its core mission. Khalid Alireza Frank Holmes Ian Telfer BHP Billiton George Landegger Guy Ullens de Schooten Canaccord Adams Limited Iara Lee & George Gund III Neil Woodyer Bob Cross Foundation Don Xia Equinox Partners Ford Nicholson

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL Crisis Group’s International Advisory Council comprises significant individual and corporate donors who contribute their advice and experience to Crisis Group on a regular basis. Rita E. Hauser Harry Bookey and Charlotte & Fred Michael Riordan (Co-Chair) Pamela Bass-Bookey Hubbell StatoilHydro ASA Elliott Kulick John Chapman Chester Khaled Juffali Tilleke & Gibbins (Co-Chair) Chevron George Kellner Vale Marc Abramowitz Citigroup Amed Khan VIVATrust Hamza al Kholi Richard Cooper Shiv Vikram Khemka Yasuyo Yamazaki Anglo American PLC Credit Suisse Scott Lawlor Yapı Merkezi APCO Worldwide Inc. Construction and Neil & Sandy DeFeo Jean Manas Ed Bachrach Industry Inc. John Ehara McKinsey & Company Patrick Benzie Shinji Yazaki Frontier Strategy Group Najib Mikati Stanley Bergman & Sunny Yoon Edward Bergman Seth Ginns Harriet Mouchly-Weiss Alan Griffiths Donald Pels

SENIOR ADVISERS Crisis Group’s Senior Advisers are former Board Members (not presently holding national government executive office) who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on from time to time. Martti Ahtisaari Stanley Fischer George J. Mitchell William Taylor (Chairman Emeritus) Malcolm Fraser (Chairman Emeritus) Leo Tindemans Diego Arria Bronislaw Geremek Surin Pitsuwan Ed van Thijn Paddy Ashdown I.K. Gujral Cyril Ramaphosa Shirley Williams Zainab Bangura Max Jakobson George Robertson Grigory Yavlinski Christoph Bertram Todung Mulya Lubis Michel Rocard Uta Zapf Jorge Castañeda Allan J. MacEachen Volker Ruehe Alain Destexhe Barbara McDougall Mohamed Sahnoun Marika Fahlén Matthew McHugh Salim A. Salim