HEUNI Paper No. 14

Pervasive Illicit Small Arms Availability: A Global Threat

Peter Lock

The European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations Helsinki, 1999 This document is available electronically from: http://www.vn.fi/om/heuni/

HEUNI The European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations P.O.Box 161 FIN-00131 Helsinki Finland Tel: +358-9-18257880 Fax: +358-9-18257890 e-mail: [email protected] http://www.vn.fi/om/heuni/

ISSN 1236-8245 Table of Contents

I. Analysis ...... 4 1. The scope of the problem...... 4 2. Structural determinants of the general security crisis...... 5 3. The dynamics of privatisation of security...... 8 4. The current dynamics of illegal proliferation and intra-societal diffusion of small arms ...... 9 4a) Supply side push: ...... 10 4b) Demand side economics:...... 11 5. Comprehensive measures to reduce illicit small arms availability...... 14 II. Proposals...... 15 1. Gathering information on black markets ...... 15 2. Improving information gathering ...... 15 3.Improving the control of legal transfers...... 16 3 a) The case for a transaction deposit ...... 16 3b) Obligatory certification...... 18 4. Avoiding the misuse of legal small arms ...... 18 4a) Liability of gun ownership...... 19 4b) Marking of weapons is a prerequisite to enact additional safeguards...... 20 5. An ammunition tax: the case for a demeritional tax ...... 21 5. Instituting a recycling deposit for all firearms ...... 23 7. Dual standardisation of calibres for all small arms ...... 24 8. International trust fund for the destruction of surplus stocks of small arms ...... 25 9. Active market intervention in illegal trading...... 26 10. Reversing cultures of violence ...... 27 11. Conclusion ...... 28 Literature:...... 30 because of the enormous magnitude of the volumes circulating already beyond effective I. Analysis controls. The heritage of the lavish American supply to the mujahedin in Afghanistan is but one element of the masses of small arms 1. The scope of the problem floating freely across black market networks (Kartha 1999). In decaying state structures of transition countries corrupt state agents have Illicit small arms availability has become a been opening the floodgates to supply sol- global threat to the sovereignty of states at vent customers on the black market out of the macro- and micro levels. The massive stock backdoors of the arsenals. Therefore, present of small arms accumulated during the Cold levels of disturbances, violence and system- War has turned into a dangerous time bomb atic violations of human rights are but the which the international community so far harbinger of emerging societal fragmentation appears incapable of controlling. State bor- in ever wider parts of the world enabled and ders provide little protection from its effects. reinforced by the pervasive availability of The stocking of small arms during the Cold illicit small arms. War greatly exceeded military requirements. Among the reasons being that military plan- However, illicit small arms availability is ning was shrouded in secrecy and parlia- neither an independent variable in the social mentary supervision generally weak and that matrix nor the root cause of social fragmen- continuous demand irrespective of realistic tation. It is rather a dependent variable requirements tended to enhance the prestige looming wherever certain social conditions of the armed forces. Three observations sup- prevail. It regularly mutates into an active port this contention. When the National Peo- virus in the context of elevated levels of so- ple’s Army of the GDR was taken over by the cial fragmentation which translates into a Federal Armed Forces of the FRG in the pro- widespread weakening of the state. The en- cess unification, it came as a big shock that suing security vacuum, in turn, constitutes a the military stores contained in many catego- dynamic pull factor of further illicit small ries of arms and ammunition several times arms flows. Different social layers which can the volumes western intelligence had esti- not afford the services of the private security mated before the end of the Cold War. Sec- industry seek to protect themselves through ondly, it was estimated that the number of the mostly illegal acquisition of firearms of automatic guns looted in Albania when the all kind (Cilliers&Mason 1999). pyramid schemes collapsed in 1996 amounted to ten or more pieces for every Al- The formal and informal privatisation of se- banian soldier. Finally, even before the end of curity are indicators of a general trend to- the Cold War the American CIA was able to wards violence and the threat thereof be- acquire more or less secretly more than one coming a dominant factor in the regulation of million Russian Kalashnikovs plus ammuni- social relations. Organised crime and local tion to feed the supply logistics of the muja- gangs penetrate economic transactions and hedin in Afghanistan and their Pakistani in- weaken the rule of law (Gamba 1997). As a termediaries. There were many nations at result a dynamic process of internal rearma- hand willing to sell large quantities of Ka- ment takes root in an increasing number of lashnikovs. Apparently they could afford states. Their societies are burdened with in- these sales without endangering their na- tensifying levels of violence and their tional security, as their arsenals were bulging economies with escalating transaction costs. with surplus at the time. A projection of present socio-economic trends in many regions suggests that wide- The full impact of the unbound small arms spread disruptive consequences of the perva- arsenals will only be felt in the years to come sive availability of illicit arms are to be ex-

HEUNI Paper No.14 4 Lock pected (International Federation 1997), if the However, more comprehensive approaches international community fails to find a fast are required to address the disastrous fall-out track to effectively decommission the surplus of the global networks through which small stocks in danger to end up in illegal circula- arms float illegally. Innovative concepts are tion. In addition, it is necessary to create a needed to respond to the largely intra- potent international body tasked with vigor- societal dynamics of the pervasive low-level ous intervention in black markets aiming at destructive violence associated with illicit drying them up. small arms. The fact that the instrumental dimension of this violence is about social in- Presently various entities within the United clusion and exclusion gives it a latent poten- Nations, intergovernmental bodies at re- tial to escalate into civil war, which has be- gional levels and a myriad of non- come the dominant form of current armed governmental organisations have taken steps conflicts whose victims are predominantly to deal with the issue and started to combat civilians. illicit trade and availability of small arms (OSCE 1999; Laurance 1996; IANSA 1998; Rana 1995; International Committee 1999; 2. Structural determinants of the general se- Bulletin 1999; UNIDIR 1999; Boutwell et al. curity crisis 1995; Singh 1995; Stiftung Wissenschaft 1998; Commission of the Churches 1998; United An outline of major features of the current Nations 1998a). Unfortunately the wide- global context allows to identify some mutual spread political attention and the number of roots of the diverse forms of violence related institutions involved does not yet correlate to small arms. The diverse processes summa- with measurable positive changes in the field rised as globalisation are reinforcing ine- of controlling illicit small arms availability. quality. The present course of development is The endurance of this unrelenting situation marked by continued polarisation of income, can be attributed to at least three underlying both between nations (internationally) as factors. Firstly, the knowledge available in well as within nations (intra-societal). As a the public domain of how small arms are il- result social segregation dominates the legally circulated is still rudimentary. It is changes in the social topography of societies therefore difficult to implement customised all over the world. Most visibly formerly countermeasures and act in international co- public spaces are increasingly being con- ordination. Secondly, most initiatives address verted into privatised and socially selective the problem from the supply side only. The malls. But spatial segregation of social classes dynamics of the demand side often involve and other identity formations are pervasive. politically sensitive issues like disputes over In what sociologists have dubbed “global the recognition of controversial governments cities”, i.e. the forerunners of globalisation or economic interests which stifles the and modernisation social segregation mani- chances of co-ordinated countermeasures. fests itself in extremely developed forms Thirdly, small arms are often dealt with in (Wilson 1997). the tradition of the arms control debate dur- ing the Cold War which fails to recognise the Except for some positive deviations in a few different dynamics of the international pro- well-off countries the regular economy is liferation and intra-societal diffusion of illicit marked throughout the world by increasing small arms (Lock 1997). The proposal to add levels of unemployment. As a result informal small arms to the UN register of arms falls economic activities increasingly become the into this category whereas dealing with the backbone of societal reproduction. This evo- problem in the context of the forthcoming lution is not restricted to developing nations UN Convention on Transnational Organised and countries in transition. Particularly af- Crime seems more likely to produce effective fected are the new entrants to the segment of proposals.

HEUNI Paper No.14 5 Lock the economically active population. Unem- changes between the regular economy and ployment rates for the age group 14-24 years the informal economy (Lock 1998a). of 50 % are prevalent in many countries. The main characteristic of the regular econ- Profound crises of the state finances and a omy is the rule of law at its core. Taxes are general disposition to curtail state functions generally paid, though the level of effective following the logic of the neo-liberal para- taxation is generally declining. The unre- digm reinforce each other and deprive the lenting competition to attract inward invest- state of the capacity to effectively deliver se- ment has led to lower tax rates and excessive curity to its citizens. As a result privatisation tax exemptions, above all in special economic of security is a pervasive trend. The private zones like the famous “maquiladora” border security industry has turned into a vibrant industries in Mexico. Most importantly economic sector whose labour force already though, the meagre growth rates of the exceeds the police forces in most countries. A regular economies do not keep pace with the few globally operating companies dominate increase of the economically active popula- this countercyclical sector which seems “cri- tion seeking an entrance to this space. sis-proof”. It is apparently not any longer the “raison d’être” of the state to guarantee the Quantitatively the oceans of informal security of its citizens. Instead security and economies dominate the global economy. particularly protection from violence, being a ILO estimates that almost 60 % of the eco- fundamental human right, are in the process nomically active population in Latin America of becoming a traded commodity. The adage falls into the informal sector (ILO 1999). The “My home is my (proactively protected) cas- rule of law applies often only marginally. Its tle” is only now, in the post-modern age, de- rules reflect asymmetrical power structures. veloping its full meaning. Those who can not Its dominant actors often resort to violence afford protected castles and the proactive for arbitration. Informal economies are glob- commodification of their security are forced ally the fastest growing economic space in to organise their self-defence outside the le- terms of participants. By definition the in- gal parameters. As a result we are observing formal sector hardly pays taxes, value added the evolution of private security into a mutu- taxes being an exception, when individuals ally reinforcing system of multi-polar societal (rarely) interact as consumers with the regu- “rearmament” cascading down the social lar economy. Often welfare levels generated ladder: It fosters an informal militianisation in the informal sector hardly exceed the most of the entire society which starts at the lower basic subsistence, but the sector contributes end of the social pyramid (Lock 1998c). to the welfare in the regular economy mainly through interaction in form of cheap services The underlying structure of these trends is of all kind. Another part of its produce is si- the restlessly globalising economic system, in phoned off into the coffers of criminal actors which the nation-state increasingly takes a who impose their terms wherever the rule of backseat. A closer look at the global economy law is not effectively supported by the state reveals that it is actually composed of at least and people do not have the means to protect three distinct operational spaces, the regular, themselves. the informal and the criminal economies. Asymmetrical interaction between these In the globally organised criminal economy three spheres is a constitutive element of by definition the rule of law does not apply. their respective existence. The criminal sector There is ample evidence that the criminal is by definition a parasitic sphere which economy is the fastest growing space in the prospers through infiltration, extortion and global economy in terms of turnover and violent coercion in the other spheres, while profits. The criminal economy constitutes a unequal exchange characterises the ex- parasitic link between the spaces of the regular and the informal sectors of the econ-

HEUNI Paper No.14 6 Lock omy (United Nations 1998b). Conservative But developed countries are affected as well. estimates presented at an IMF- and EBRD- The constant migration of jobs throughout sponsored seminar put the global gross the global market place towards ever cheaper criminal product (GCP) at 1000 billion US $ locations of production tends to reduce job (Reinicke 1998), this compares with a GNP offers for less qualified labour in many ad- for sub-Saharan Africa of 330 billion US $, of vanced countries as well. Certain vulnerable which the RSA alone accounts for more than groups like minorities and above all young one third. people with less than average educational records tend to become excluded from the At the level of nation-states these three regular economy and provide a reserve army spheres of the global economy interact in dif- easily attracted by the jobs the criminal sector ferent proportions reflecting the relative of the economy is offering (Martinez 1998). strength of the state. But in spite of enormous This is by no means restricted to drug traf- differences in the respective configuration of ficking. The heavily biased sociological com- the economies at the level of nation-states, position of the prison population and its one destabilising structural variable has steady growth clearly reflect the specific emerged almost universally during the nine- pattern of exclusion in each country (Stern ties; it is a particularly gloomy feature, 1998). namely unacceptably high rates of youth un- employment. This pervasive feature seems to Radical modernisation in most Third World confirm the existence of interdependent pat- and transition economies in the course of the terns in the global economy, no economy can current globalisation is often embedded in a extricate itself from under the prevailing general economic crisis and hence declining machination of the global economy. The in- employment. These economies have never- capacity of most economies to integrate the theless urgently to find the means and strate- younger generations into the regular labour gies to overcome the tense and expanding market, as they reach the age of normal en- intergenerational economic divide, lest so- try, provides a teeming yeast to the illegal cietal violence will prevail. Illicit small arms and criminal economic circuits and an un- availability empowers the malignant forces limited reserve army for intra-state armed of societal polarisation and confrontation. In conflicts. The exclusion of the current gen- the absence of other chances to develop self- eration aiming to enter the pool of the eco- respect, the ownership of an illegal firearm nomically active population from the tradi- provides idle young males with a surrogate tional intergenerational continuity of eco- for an accepted role in society (Richards nomic roles is particularly acute in many 1996). Thus, the combination of the inde- third world countries. Due to the unrelenting pendent variable (large numbers of idle processes of economic modernisation the young males) and the dependent variable traditional succession of professional roles is (copious availability of illicit small arms) replaced by migration towards the urban converge into a terrifying time bomb, the in- spheres which can not cope with the on- ternational community appears unable to dif- slaught of masses of unqualified labour. Most fuse for the time being, possibly because the embarrassingly in many failing states the dangers have not yet been clearly identified. levels of the average education are falling, in In such contexts amorphous forms of some cases dramatically. This inter- emerging violence are permanently in danger generational decline of educational levels is to take on an ideological guise and eventu- being further acerbated by the age composi- ally escalate into intra-state armed conflicts tion in many developing countries whose along the lines of perceived identities and population under the age of 18 constitutes 50 envisioned exclusion. Often such conflicts % or more of the total, as is the case for sub- turn into protracted wars because in the ab- Saharan Africa. sence of viable economic perspectives war fighting becomes a surrogate mode of pro-

HEUNI Paper No.14 7 Lock duction for many actors. Contrary to con- the rule of law as long as the state is strong ventional interstate wars the civilian popula- and capable of regulating the private security tion is the foremost target which explains the sector. However, in the context of a weak or streams of refugees and internally displaced failing state or pointed social fragmentation, persons as well as the elevated percentage of which is clearly a dominant characteristic of civilian victims in current armed conflicts the present decade in many parts of the (International Committee 1999; UNHCR world, privatisation of security turns into an 1997). unbound process in which ultimately crimi- nal violence arbitrates social conflicts. In this evolution illicit availability of small arms comes into play because it empowers the 3. The dynamics of privatisation of security competing coercive forces outside the rule of law. As a force multiplier illicit small arms The privatisation of security advances from accelerate the confrontational, through two ends. At the one end there is the top- asymmetrical security strategies of different down privatisation of security. Here the state social groups. The massive “target harden- gradually retreats as the sole agency to guar- ing” and “self-ghettoisation” with the help of antee the security of its citizens and delegates extensive private vigilance offer protection the pursuit of the monopoly of legitimate against criminal perpetrators by means of violence to private agencies. At the other end social segregation. But as a result all criminal there is the bottom-up privatisation of secu- energy is then directed towards social groups rity. Here individuals either loose trust in the with little capacity to defend themselves. As state and take up their own precautions or a sad consequence a situation emerges where are effectively abandoned by the existing life at the bottom of the social hierarchy turns state agencies. The process embarks with into a “criminal hell” where protection and measures of passive protection of the habitat coercion can not any longer be meaningfully and leads eventually to privately policed distinguished. The precarious security situa- proactive segregation. Normally it starts at tion in large parts of Colombia, the “favelas” the top of the social pyramid, where people surrounding the megapolis in Brazil (Cano can afford considerable investments and the 1997) as well as apartheid settlements like employment of security personnel. But at the Soweto display such features (Gun Free bottom criminal protection gangs may take South Africa 1999). root in parallel as social fragmentation pro- duces no-go areas for the police. What starts Unfortunately the political and financial as an apparently legitimate reaction to per- status of many states is such that the security ceived insecurity produces a reactive social personnel either serves the economic inter- dynamic. The visible organisation of private ests of the nomenclatura in command or they security is self-promoting because it induces depend on corruption and sell their services feelings of insecurity outside the parameters in the market to the best paying customer. of its service. The commodification of secu- Their official salary is often ridiculous, but rity is contagious. All social layers begin to the position remains an asset which can be organise their respective self-defence because monetised in the informal or the criminal efficient security at one end means concen- spheres of the economy. Corruption, moon- tration of criminal energy at the opposite lighting, mostly as private security agents but end. The cascading of private security down also as criminal actors amount to an informal the social ladder enlarges existing social privatisation of the security function of the cleavages and hardens social fragmentation. state. The pervasive availability of small arms converts the situation in failing states into an But neither the top-down nor the bottom-up internal action-reaction rearmament involv- privatisation of security necessarily infringe ing incumbent rulers who control the state and diffuse social groups which accentuate

HEUNI Paper No.14 8 Lock their identity in the process (Lock 1998c). The state fully commanding the monopoly of le- automatic guns involved are such a terrifying gitimate coercion, which usually serves as a force multiplier that even children can par- benchmark for judging specific situations, ticipate in terrorising and eventually para- existed, if ever, only at the end of the post- lysing the basic functioning of the society. WWII boom in social-democratic states in Europe. And even there major changes of the In the course of this escalating scenario of security order are looming (Trotha 1995). “radically privatised” security the economy This should not come as a surprise as the is burdened with increasing transaction costs three spheres of economic circulation operate related to security which eventually lead to a globally and affect even the most well-to-do downward spiralling economic condition. nations. This coincides with an strong polari- International business consultancies have sation of incomes and the ensuing spatial already developed a scale to gauge the costs; segregation of society. it is called GAD (Gray Area Dynamics) and runs from 0 to 100 percent. At the very upper end of this scale armed violence begins to constitute a mode of (re)production for those 4. The current dynamics of illegal prolifera- who fight their exclusion from the circle of tion and intra-societal diffusion of small arms economic reproduction. The core group of such actors are young males who have little The current snowballing of problems associ- chances to become a productive member of ated with the widespread illicit availability of the society under the prevailing circum- small arms is among others related to the end stances. The attraction for young males to of the Cold War. During the Cold War legal establish themselves by displaying violence and illegal proliferation of small arms were is reinforced by the fact that the culturally both pervasive, but, contrary to the present conveyed gender superiority is not any pattern of proliferation, these transfers were longer corroborated by their roles in the legitimated by one or the other side of the economy and reserved male workplaces. In- ideological confrontation. When non- stead young males are driven to assert their governmental actors were supplied, as was masculinity in participating in the produc- often the case, this meant under-cover opera- tion of violence (Lutz& Nonini 1999). tions, for which extensive networks were put in place to allow for deniability. But at the Finally, in the context of failed states eco- time all of the recipients of either clandestine nomic actors sometimes draft paramilitary or open military support claimed to keep forces or foreign security services offering control of or to take over a given territorial military capacities aiming to isolate their state and deny access to the opposite camp economic interests from the general turmoil (Mathiak 1995). The volumes of weaponry at and to continue their profitable trade. Ille- the disposal of fighting parties bore no rela- gally supplied arms and foreign personnel tion with the economic capacity of the re- with a dubious status are regularly involved. spective territory, Afghanistan, Angola and The existence of vibrant criminal networks in Nicaragua being among the most conspicu- the global economy and militarily qualified ous cases of externally generated civil wars. surplus labour enable this particular form of With the approach of the end of bi-polar complete privatisation of security, even military competition the competing streams against the outspoken will of the interna- of military supplies stopped. Most of these tional community (Cilliers&Mason 1999; supplies had been non-requited transfers, at Musah 1999; Reno 1998). least with hindsight because the military credits had to be forgiven. However, before becoming too despondent over present trends, it should be recognised that the ideal-type security order with the

HEUNI Paper No.14 9 Lock In a parallel process international creditors relatively safe storage towards sometimes began to put pressure on highly indebted less protected, politically fragile environ- countries to consolidate their financial bal- ments. There is no evidence that WTO coun- ance sheets. As a result legal military trans- tries other than the former GDR acted simi- fers plummeted for lack of purchasing power larly fast at the governmental level. Instead and soft credits and did not recover even in those countries attempted to foster the export regions plagued by wars, Turkey and re- of weapons which continued to be produced cently Eritrea and Ethiopia being an excep- by the oversized arms industry which had tion. lost their domestic markets due to financial constraints. Only a small number of custom- In the field of small arms, however, a dy- ers were attracted by weaponry of Soviet de- namic illegal market emerged during the sign, even at the offered dumping prices. It present decade accompanied by soft gov- took Russia almost eight years to establish a ernment-to-government transactions of sur- separate agency for export marketing of sur- plus weapons and ammunition. The follow- plus weapons (Pierre&Trenin 1997). ing sections highlight firstly what can be de- scribed as a supply side push due to the post- The dramatic downsizing of military budgets Cold-War military downsizing and the fal- in all former WTO-countries had immediate tering institutional cohesion of armed forces destabilising effects on the entire military or- particularly in transition countries and sec- ganisation. The headlines were full of reports ondly the economics of the demand side. on shady deals. The central European states overcame this destabilisation relatively fast, but throughout the former Soviet Union the 4a) Supply side push: military institution has continued to fall The Cold War allowed for the stocking of apart, corruption is rife and central control is arms beyond realistic requirements, even in virtually lost. In Russia the once unified Red the maximalist context of scenarios of the Army had to compete for funds with several time. The political paranoia produced among other powerful armed bodies and addition- others secret arms caches throughout Europe. ally lost qualified personnel to the expand- Some of them were so secret that their bu- ing private security industry, booming reaucratic records were lost. So, Europe lives within as well as outside the rule of law. In not only with hidden uxos (unexploded am- the established Soviet tradition that stealing munition) from WW II, but it has to contend from the state involves no moral wrongdo- with unexpected finds of small arms caches ing, military property transmuted into a hidden during the height of the Cold War. commodity which was appropriated and il- While these caches are only an exotic exam- legally marketed if a solvent customer could ple of the heritage of the Cold War, bulging be identified. stores of ammunition and automatic weap- ons that were scattered for strategic reasons It started with the retreat of the Red Army over the entire state territory marked the from Germany and continues unmitigatedly situation in most NATO and WTO (Warsaw to date, the plundering of state arsenals and Treaty Organisation) countries. the illegal sale both within the former Soviet Union as well as to international black mar- Most western countries immediately engaged kets. Large quantities of ammunition and in word-wide surplus sales as well as dona- small arms in possession of the Western tions initiating in this way a process which Group stationed in Germany never returned has been labelled “cascading” towards the to Russia, instead they found their way to the lower end of the international hierarchy. battlefields of the Bosnian war. In the case of With respect to leakages into black market small arms many reports on black market circulation this process meant a transfer from sources refer to the Ukraine and Bulgaria (Human Rights Watch 1999), but this may

HEUNI Paper No.14 10 Lock only reflect the logistical sophistication black originated in the United States and were ille- marketers from these countries have devel- gally imported (Tokatlian&Ramirez 1995). oped. The continued atrophy of the former The numbers involved have five digits which Soviet military complex guarantees for the indicates the interrelatedness of distant time being that the arsenals can be tapped regulatory spheres when it comes to the upon demand provided sufficient cash is at sources of the international black market of hand. And most importantly the immense small arms. The regulatory order of the in- stores of weaponry hoarded in Soviet times ternal American market has unacceptable are not exhausted and will fuel black markets global ramifications as does the disorder in unless the armed forces are radically the former Soviet Union. Of course the list of downsized and reformed (Thurbiville 1996). countries whose regulatory deficiencies in the field of small arms radiate internationally Since for the time being the respective gov- is long. But it can not be explored in full de- ernments neither have the inclination nor the tail in the context of this overview which resources to destroy the vast surplus stocks, merely attempts to highlight the need of si- black marketers will continue to benefit from multaneous co-ordinated international action this lucrative playing field where the wares and unilateral steps to curb the sometimes globally in demand can easily be secured. rampant illicit availability of small arms. Small arms have a low visibility which fa- cilitates concealed logistics. Therefore they are more difficult to police than major weap- 4b) Demand side economics: ons. As mass produced commodities their Societal violence, crime, organised crime, source is often difficult to trace. armed conflicts, intra-state wars, and even some international wars are no longer dis- However, it is often overlooked that illicit crete events. A profound paradigmatic small arms are flowing both directions, in change of the concept of war has taken root. and out of the former Soviet Union. The If conflict resolution is to succeed, the new weapons of choice of the organised crime in paradigm of armed conflicts must be taken Russia and elsewhere are sophisticated mod- into account. With the transformation of the els mostly procured on the largely uncon- character of wars their causes and the logic trolled private market in the United States. for their continuation are also changing. The logic of committing crimes with such “luxury” weapons lies with the reduced After the Cold War armed conflicts are more traceability of these imported weapons which directly constrained by the economic re- diminishes the risks of the perpetrator to be sources the fighting parties can mobilise lo- detected. This example draws attention to the cally. Therefore a proper understanding of fact that regulatory deficits are not restricted the underlying economics of on-going wars to countries in transformation or otherwise is a precondition to design efficient sanctions particularly weak states (Gonchar&Lock and other interventions intended to end the 1994). fighting and the often ensuing low-intensity violence. In the context of current civil wars Permeable arsenals which are targeted by the roles of politician, war commander, mo- arms traffickers exist in many more countries nopoly trader and organised crime leader where the state fails to properly pay its per- blend gradually. Radical ideologies manipu- sonnel or functions as a corrupt corporation lating often spurious identities serve as a only. Furthermore Latin American countries, cynical cover of shrewd personal, mostly above all Mexico, are permanently inquiring economic interests of such leaders and their with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Alcohol, To- entourages. Yet the ideological grip they hold bacco and Firearms about small arms identi- over the population in war zones as well as fied in armed conflict, individual murder among refugees on the basis of constructed cases and other crimes, because they have

HEUNI Paper No.14 11 Lock identities endows them with effective negoti- warring parties and create a class of war ating power vis-à-vis the international com- profiteers, both inside and outside the con- munity. As a result war criminals become a flict zone. Given this array of interested par- party of peace deals and can carve out a safe ties “war economies” tend to become stable position for themselves in the post-conflict patterns which is reflected in a continuously setting. Understanding these often complex longer duration of civil wars (Keen 1998). power equations is indispensable for peace They tend to become a “mode of production” negotiators. for the dominant actors. But this weird mode of production regularly implies destruction With the end of the Cold War non-requited for large segments of the economy as looting transfers in support of fighting parties in in- and blackmailing are among the preferred ternal wars are rarely available, diaspora strategies of surplus generation. Chechnya contributions fuelling conflicts “at home” comes to mind in this context. Internally dis- being an exception (Angoustures&Pascal placed persons and refugees are almost a 1996). The required resources to sustain in- natural product of this “destructive mode of ternal wars must now be collected and accu- production”. Individual survival strategies in mulated locally, often by force and blackmail. such deteriorating circumstances often face It follows that almost by definition fighting the alternative either to join the looting “war parties turn into complex economic conglom- fighting” actors or to face starvation and ex- erates, often commanded by wealthy traders pulsion. turned warlords. Above all the non-state parties in conflict must generate foreign cur- Empirical studies have so far identified sev- rency to pay in cash for their military resup- eral major sources which sustain warring ply on the black market. Every automatic parties in on-going armed conflicts and gun, every round of ammunition fired into therefore fuel the demand for small arms on the air by a child soldier embodies an eco- the black market (Jean&Rufin 1996; de Waal nomic circulation involving commodity ex- 1997; Duffield 1998). Firstly, illegal export of changes with international markets, at least minerals and raw materials by means of a in all countries where the arms are not manu- reckless exploitation of the local biosphere. factured domestically. It also presupposes the Tropical wood, gems, diamonds, ivory and generation of a corresponding economic sur- minerals lead the list of products which enter plus and the directed use of the surplus to the global market through questionable illegally import arms. Since the eventual channels in support of “war economies”. placement of the surplus in mostly oversup- Secondly, drug production and trafficking plied global markets of raw materials re- are regularly an important element in “war quires in many cases illegal transactions, the economies”. Afghanistan is a scarcely veiled marketed surplus fetches only heavily dis- case of a “drug economy” and Colombia an- counted prices. In other words the illegal re- other. The world atlas of drugs shows that supply of arms is costly, even if the actual international trafficking routes take advan- c.i.f. prices for the weaponry are low due to tage of the control vacuum in weak states the present oversupply. and countries involved in low-level violence and armed conflict, Thirdly, the appropria- Illegal transactions are a common denomi- tion and misuse of humanitarian aid seems to nator of “war economies”. Global networks be pervasive in the environment of many of criminal traders facilitate access to illegal armed conflicts (Anderson 1999). Though markets. On a global scale illegal economic there is no easy solution to overcome this di- activities appear to witness higher growth lemma for international aid agencies, it is ob- rates than the regular economy. These “mar- vious that the competition among private kets”, however, are characterised by high risk agencies whose vested interest is to provide premiums and violence. They serve as re- humanitarian aid play into the hands of supply stores and as force multipliers for warlords who manage to appropriate hu-

HEUNI Paper No.14 12 Lock manitarian aid to foster their ends. The best requires safe entry points into the legal eco- documented case is Sudan, where bandits nomic circulation (Reno 1998). This indispen- and fighting factions create hunger in order sable exchange between illegal black market to attract humanitarian aid which is appro- activities and the regular commodity and priated or taxed when it arrives (de Waal monetary circulation makes “war economies” 1997). Fourthly, international embargoes vulnerable to well-targeted interventions by sometimes strengthen the position of the lo- the international community. In other words cal warlord by creating a profitable black the lack of efficient controls of criminal eco- market controlled by him and his cronies nomic activities and the frequent collusion of while it impoverishes the majority of the sovereign states (not only of tax havens) are population. They then have the choice of ei- the fertile ground where “war economies” ther filling their Swiss bank accounts or step- are grafted into the global market. ping up the war fighting. Fifthly, in some cases the different diaspora communities A recent change of policy by DeBeers points volunteer to finance the war back home. But the way to go. After twenty years of collusion often they face extortion by clandestine with Savimbi’s UNITA by tacitly marketing criminal gangs which collect “war taxes”. its diamonds, DeBeers which controls the The Tamil Tigers from Sri Lanka are reported diamond markets through a cartel agreed in to have perfected this source of income by fall 1999 not to purchase any longer dia- drafting asylum seekers who are being monds originating from UNITA (Mallet milked once they have arrived in Canada or 1999). It was public pressure by non- Norway for example. Flourishing industries governmental organisations which finally of kidnapping and protection rackets in turn forced DeBeers to take this step and to com- may herald an escalation towards armed con- ply with a mandatory UN-regulation. flict over the control of different turfs. This has always a potential of developing antago- Without real resolve to combat the criminal nistic identities which if ruthlessly exploited economic circulation little progress is to be may lead to low-intensity warfare, as a mili- expected in constraining parties involved in tianisation (Marchal 1997) of the entire soci- armed conflicts and in luring them to con- ety sets in as a reaction. sider a non-violent conflict resolution. In particular, it should at last be taken into ac- This description of resources tapped and count that most traditional international em- mobilised by “war economies” is far from bargoes have reinforced the income concen- complete, but it allows the prediction that, tration and the criminal control of the em- without shoring up the regular economy bargoed economies in the hands of the in- from permanent criminal infiltration with cumbent rulers who were the target of the illegally traded commodities, the sheer vol- embargo. An ill-conceived embargo has the ume of effective demand for small arms on potential to initiate a self-reproducing pat- the black market will continue to render ex- tern where the power of a criminalised elite isting controls ineffective. The reason being profits from the continuation of the fighting that the present level of demand offers suffi- as well as the embargo (Keen 1998). cient rewards to mobilise criminal actors who Milosevic and the nomenklatura of his re- are disposed and capable of outsmarting ex- gime apparently became addicted to this isting control regimes. This pattern is rein- condition. forced by the existence of many weak states whose control regimes are not properly ad- While the killings and human suffering in ministered. on-going wars appear to be absolutely irra- tional from an outside perspective, it may be However, it is important to recognise that the hypothesised that apart from the material underlying logic of every illegal economic rewards from looting etc. joining the fighting activity aims at legalising the proceeds which can be at a certain stage an advantageous

HEUNI Paper No.14 13 Lock survival strategy as nine out of ten victims in of the issue and the different settings current internal wars are civilians. This throughout the world do not prepare for a would explain the military dynamics in ob- fast consensus on measures to take at the in- viously desperate situations and that forced ternational level nor is it likely that such a recruitment is less pervasive than is reported consensus allows for dynamic actions to curb in the media. This pattern also foreshadows illicit flows of small arms. National “gun” serious problems in post-conflict times. It is cultures and the presently prevailing political important to anticipate that conceivable post- conditions among nation-states are simply conflict scenarios are likely to have many los- too diverse for the creation of the well- ers, to whom an end of the fighting appeared targeted regime. Therefore measures taken undesirable. Once ended without compre- without further delay at local, national and hensive proactive outside support fighting is regional levels must serve as precursors for likely to be resumed as an income generating an eventual set of international conventions. activity or alternatively criminal elements Any delay of instituting national measures maintain a tight grip on the economy and while waiting for international harmonisa- stifle any dynamic market-oriented devel- tion will cause additional harm impossible to opment (World Bank 1999). The present post- repair at later stages. Unilateral initiatives conflict situation in El Salvador highlights also serve as important role models, which this danger. Many economic transactions are will help to draw hesitant governments into a not controlled by the market, instead they are world-wide coalition focusing on the elimi- regulated by violence or the threat thereof. nation of illicit small arms availability. It is As a result today in El Salvador more people important that presently safe countries do are being killed annually with firearms than not mistakenly take their status for granted, during the civil war. because in times of globalisation no economy is immune against producing social frag- This short synopsis of the economics pre- mentation, “inner cities”, “bidonvilles”, “no vailing in most current armed conflicts sug- go areas for the police” and other pull fac- gests that the term civil war is not any longer tors. The three economic spheres are spread- appropriate (Kaldor 1999). Firstly, the fight- ing like fog around the globe and the crimi- ing parties do not any longer necessarily as- nal economy has inevitably penetrated or- pire to take over state and reconstruct it; sec- derly, developed societies as well. Drug traf- ondly, their organisation and ethics resemble ficking is often offering an initial leverage for criminal gangs more than anything else. The the criminal sector to expand into otherwise combination of these features explains as to well regulated economies. why in more and more cases the vast major- ity of the population opposes the internal No single measure will provide an encom- armed confrontation, but has no leverage on passing solution, but an array of improved the fighting groups. controls and proactive measures will eventu- ally curb the proliferation and diffusion of small arms. If the industrialised countries fail to understand the dynamics of this problem, 5. Comprehensive measures to reduce illicit they will be confronted with pervasive small arms availability armed violence in many states which puts the very existence of these states in danger In the light of the ease of illegal supply and and successively the global economy as well. the economic forces creating effective de- Against this background selective, often dis- mand for small arms at different levels, it is parate measures designed to reduce the illicit urgent to take internationally co-ordinated, availability of small arms and their malig- energetic measures to curb the illicit flows of nant role in fostering societal fragmentation small arms. But unfortunately the complexity will be discussed in the second section. It does not enumerate the various proposals

HEUNI Paper No.14 14 Lock presently discussed in the on-going small sion of small arms. SIPRI in the field of major arms debate, mostly related to tightening ex- arms transfers and OGD in the case of drug port controls, this presentation seeks instead trade have proven that a modest, but tar- to complement this discussion with partially geted research effort unfettered by political innovative measures to curb illicit small arms intervention can highlight sensitive transac- availability. tions, the actors themselves are not disclos- ing, simply by systematically screening open sources. After 20 years the United Nations finally assimilated the investigative work of II. Proposals SIPRI and instituted its own register of trans- fers of major weapons. A similar initiative within the United Nations in the field of drugs will probably take a few more years. In the case of small arms this process has not 1. Gathering information on black markets even been started.

Black market networks appear to be able to It is to be hoped that a smaller country like deliver small arms, if necessary in large the Netherlands, Belgium or Switzerland will quantity, whenever and where ever effective fill this obvious gap in the landscape of re- demand articulates itself. Proactive interven- search in the near future and support an in- tion to halt illegal flows across borders by dependent research facility serving as a custom services and police forces is presently global small arms observatory. At present not feasible because too little is known about preparatory steps are being taken in Swit- these networks, their warehouses, the opera- zerland to publish a yearbook on small arms tion of their financial settlements and, not issues and in Belgium to set up a small least, their collaborators within governmental documentation centre on black market flows. agencies around the world. While the intelli- But given the dimension of the problem these gence agencies of certain states ought to have initiatives need to be strengthened and sup- a fair understanding of the black market, be- plemented by complementary work in the cause some of these actors were used as field. proxies during the Cold War to perform de- niable supplies, this information is not shared internationally with control agencies nor is it available in the public domain. Thus, 2. Improving information gathering improving the control of small arms trade requires reliable information on the basis of An important element to enlighten our world-wide field observation and data col- knowledge about the illegal flows of small lection. arms is comprehensive and reliable informa- tion from the places where they are being Surprisingly up to now no institution collects used in armed conflict and crime. From jour- continuously data on the illicit proliferation nalists to humanitarian aid workers there are of small arms. There is urgent need to create many yet untapped, potential sources of an independent source of information in this much improved information, provided these field. Stockholm International Peace Research observers are qualified to report in correct Institute (abbr. SIPRI) (SIPRI 1999) and Ob- detail what weapons they observe during servatoire géopolitique des drogues, Paris conflicts. One way of qualifying them would (abbr. OGD) (Observatoire 1995; idem 1996) be the widespread availability of a concise are excellent role models for an efficient in- small arms and ammunition identification stitutional form to collect reliable information booklet. It would allow them among others on the illicit proliferation and societal diffu- to tell the difference between an Uzi, Galil,

HEUNI Paper No.14 15 Lock Kalashnikov, G-3 or FN without looking for a label and thus better the quality of press as All attempts to improve controls must depart well as institutional reporting. If collected from the hypothesis that virtually all small such data will help to simulate the black arms enter circulation as a legal commodity, market dynamics. but it is during their often several decades long life cycle that a significant percentage Since humanitarian organisations are se- transmutes into the illegal sphere. Targeted verely obstructed in their work as a result of controls presuppose sound hypotheses con- the almost effortless availability of small cerning the most likely points of leakage into arms in many conflict zones, it should be in illicit circulation. their interest to improve the information on black market networks which supply regions of conflict with arms and ammunition. An- 3a) The case for a transaction deposit ticipating the creation of a global small arms An important source of illegal flows is the observatory humanitarian organisations falsification of export licenses or export con- should sponsor the production and global signments never reaching their documented distribution of a simple small arms identifi- destination. Some traditional exporters of cation booklet. The necessary knowledge can small arms like the Czech Republic simply do easily be transferred from the military into not have the diplomatic network which is the civilian domain. Jane’s Infantry Weapons indispensable to corroborate suspicious ex- or Ezell: Small Arms Today could serve as a port applications. In order to facilitate an source. It would certainly improve the qual- adequate control of licensed exports without ity of reporting on armed conflicts and so- burdening the tax payer with the costs which cietal violence and cumulatively provide in- might outweigh the economic value of the formation which will eventually allow the transaction, the introduction of a transaction reconstruction of illicit flows of small arms as deposit might considerably improve the ef- a precondition to targeted intervention as fectiveness of governmental controls. In or- opposed to the impossibility of perfecting der to avoid the creation of competitive dis- existing trade controls. advantages for smaller producing countries less capable of certifying the correct execu- tion of export transactions, all arms exporting 3.Improving the control of legal transfers countries should agree to charge an export deposit for licensed small arms exports. An Improved policing of illicit transactions is the efficient first step could be the introduction most obvious step to take, in order to curb of this instrument by the European Union. the black market. All present international, This would provide the EU with the leverage mostly regional initiatives pledge to improve to oblige all entry candidates to follow suit. the standards of controls. But this may not Given the fact that particularly in the field of prove to be sufficient to curb the illicit trans- small arms some of the applying nations are fers. In some cases governments do not have among the big suppliers throughout the the infrastructure necessary to effectively world, such a step is likely to significantly control the transactions originating on their reduce the present level of “leakage”. territory. An efficient and internationally co- ordinated plan of action must include a Export control bureaucracies and custom broad range of measures. Some important services are regularly confronted with measures, however, which are geared to- fraudulent documentation which are not easy wards structural improvements produce sub- to detect. It is not known how often licensed stantial results only in medium and long arms exports are converted into an illicit term. Other steps could be taken instantly to commodity during the transaction and end discourage fraudulent exports. up in wrong hands. The increasing number

HEUNI Paper No.14 16 Lock of cases of attempted fraud may reflect im- means to thoroughly check the applications proved scrutiny of the controlling institu- for export licenses and to supervise the cor- tions, but it is also possible that fraud is gen- rect execution of the respective shipments. erally on the increase. The smaller transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe have typically consider- Major weapon systems have a certain visibil- able manufacturing capacities in the field of ity which makes an eventual detection of a small arms, which makes them an attractive fraudulent transaction likely. This condition target for black market actors (Human Rights does not pertain to small arms, ammunition Watch 1999; Saferworld 1999). and spare parts, the case of smaller arms is different. For a variety of reasons SIPRI (SI- The known cases of fraud using a third PRI 1999; Lock 1993) never attempted to country as an entrepôt suggest that a certain cover small arms in its transfer registers. class of countries is emerging where the Firstly data were difficult to come by, sec- agreed rules of international relations do not ondly, in the context of the military confron- apply any longer. Several fraudulent trans- tation between West and East the issue was actions were reported in the literature in not given high priority, and thirdly, it was which Paraguay has been implicated. This argued that small arms would constitute a must have serious implications for the proce- certain proportion of the trade in major arms dures of surveying arms transfers at the in- and could thus be assessed ceteris paribus. ternational level. These countries must be While the latter has certainly not been the identified by consultative procedures among case given the fact that most internal wars are exporting countries. At the same time all predominantly fought with small arms and suppliers have to institute measures which generate demand for a specific range of in- make sure that the controlling body in the fantry weapons, it remains a sad reality that exporting country maintains an efficient lev- even today very little is known about the erage of intervention throughout the entire trade in small arms in general (Naylor 1995). transaction. Presently hardly any sanctions are at hand to effectively sanction the Additionally since the mid-eighties the en- fraudulent re-routing of an export consign- during economic and financial crisis ment if the mishandling occurs beyond the throughout large parts of the Third World territorial borders of the exporting country has weakened governmental bureaucracies in and the exporting company can not be di- a significant number of smaller countries to rectly implicated. Virtually no leverage exists such an extent that it has apparently become to undo the illegal delivery. easy to corrupt them and obtain forged documents which facilitate consignments of Given the continued pressure from the de- small arms to illegal destinations. Black mar- mand side and the plentiful existence of ket traders are thus able to generate perfectly traders who dispose of the criminal energy to looking documents even without exploiting enact fraudulent transfers, governmental the sophistication of modern computers and controls must be considerably intensified lest copy machines. In short, false destinations illicit transactions will spread further. How- seem to be internationally on sale, moreover ever, some supplier countries do not have the the number of ports where customs offices resources required to effectively tighten con- are inexpensive to bribe are apparently nu- trols. More generally, it is difficult to justify merous facilitating convenient re-routing of that the taxpayer should shoulder the con- shipments to an illegal destination. siderable costs which accrue from the indis- But a similar observation points to some of pensable control procedures. The trade of the smaller transition countries where the this commodity reflects above all the legiti- capacities of the export control administra- mate entrepreneurial interest of the arms tion are limited. The administration does manufacturer or trading company to make a neither have the personnel nor the logistical profit. The transaction costs should be fully

HEUNI Paper No.14 17 Lock part of the entrepreneurial cost calculation 3b) Obligatory certification* and be reimbursed to the government. How- Another strategy to make sure that licensed ever, the black sheep among the exporters are exports are being carried out according to the responsible for the escalation of the costs of application would be to prescribe the execu- the control system. Charging exporters with a tion of the transaction in detail. While dubi- standard fee would punish the law-abiding ous customers have a tendency to pay in exporters. Making a transaction deposit cash, which is, of course, most welcome to compulsory for every licensed transaction the exporting company, it is conceivable to instead would allow for an automatic pun- outline obligatory steps, each licensed trans- ishment if the transaction is not carried out as action has to comply with. A letter of credit stipulated in the license. In addition, the in- with a bank in the recipient country should terest earned during the deposit period be made obligatory, additionally the certifi- would help to cover the costs of controlling cation of the declared destination should be arms exports. included in the conditions of the letter of credit, ensuring that the payment is only re- Making a substantive transaction deposit leased after the consignment is confirmed to compulsory for every licensed transaction have arrived at the stated destination. would give the government a financial lever- age to enforce a correct execution. A transac- Such a stipulation would bring into play the tion deposit of 25 or 50 % of the value of the existing private certification sector. The certi- respective contract would serve as a power- fication would be possible in most relevant ful economic disincentive to all contracting countries, because the industry is represented parties to engage in fraudulent transactions. in more than 140 countries. The estimated Because the deposit will only be returned af- costs of certification per consignment would ter an independent source certifies the full amount to roughly 500 to 700 US $. If made and correct execution of the licensed export, a obligatory in the context of the EU for exam- careful scrutiny of potential customers lies in ple the prescribed procedure would not dis- the self-interest of the exporting company. criminate against any supplier. Given that Even under the worst-case assumption that a Europe is a large supplier in this field and ruthless exporter counts on losing the deposit that many legitimate customers have strong in his calculation, the weapons would arrive interests not to change the calibre and other at the black market at least 50 % more expen- standards, it is realistic to assume that the sive than the going market rate, leaving the customers will carry the burden of the addi- government with additional resources to tional costs, particularly since this measure further improve controls. would be taken in the best mutual interest of states combating the scourge of illicit small The introduction of a transaction deposit al- arms availability. lows governments to act unilaterally and shift the burden of proof to the exporting party. It is conceivable to consider deposit 4. Avoiding the misuse of legal small arms rates which decrease with the visibility of the respective weaponry, dispensing major weapon systems from any deposit. The lower As mentioned already, virtually all mass- the visibility the more important substantial produced small arms are manufactured and deposits would be, because it is this end of traded in abidance by existing laws. How- the illicit arms trade which relates to on- ever, at some point of their respective, long going wars, societal violence and fragmenta- life-cycles large quantities of small arms pass tion of states. * I am indebted to Ouliana Kolbina who investigated the certification industry and to Mr. Müller from the Association of Exporters in Hamburg for an exten- sive interview on the feasibility of export controls.

HEUNI Paper No.14 18 Lock into the sphere of illegal circulation and mis- original owners under present laws are not use. Present levels of illicit small arms avail- liable. ability is the cumulative result of a large va- riety of schemes which permanently re- Therefore the liability of legitimate owners of supply the illegal circulation of small arms small arms, in case their weapons enter for and ammunition. The various critical points whatever reasons into illicit circulation and during the life-cycle of a weapon must be are eventually identified to be implicated in addressed with specific control mechanisms damages of various kind urgently requires and measures of general prevention. A gen- greater attention. As a first step it is proposed erally underestimated source of illegal circu- to introduce a compulsory third party liabil- lation is the legal private ownership of fire- ity insurance for every small arms item pro- arms in countries with little restrictions at- duced or traded irrespective of the status of tached to private gun ownership. Regulative the ultimate legitimate owner. The logic of schemes used in other fields provide an ori- this proposal draws among others upon the entation how firearms and ammunition can regulation of car ownership in many coun- be safeguarded from entering illicit circula- tries as well as on already existing interna- tion and misuse and how liability can be tional conventions regulating and securing regulated. the liability in the case of international risks like transport of oil and fissile materials at sea. In the latter cases the international com- 4a) Liability of gun ownership munity perceived the need to react to In the following the case for an obligatory emerging large-scale dangers and established third party liability insurance will be estab- an obligatory third party liability coverage. lished. The transformation of legally pos- sessed firearms (manufacturers, traders, Given the recognition that the indiscriminate armed forces, law enforcement bodies, and diffusion of small arms puts the existence of private licensees) into instruments of crime, entire states into danger, causes human suf- violence and internal warfare takes many fering and enormous economic damages al- routes. It is an obvious truth that the criminal most everywhere, the situation is ripe for the energy in this process is not restricted to the international community to agree on joint demand side. Greed, extra profit and passive measures to reverse present trends. This corruption, covert support and interference would lend support to countries presently (mainly by governments), fraud and negli- most affected by the scourge of illicit arms gence are among the facilitating factors at the availability. A convention on the liability of supply end, while criminal energy and cor- owners of small arms for engendered dam- ruption are the main tools at the demand ages would be one such measure. side. By no means all facilitating factors are punishable, nor are the sentences always Cars and a guns are both commodities which commensurate with respect to the often ap- are at risk to cause major damages to third palling consequences of the ensuing criminal parties, particularly when misused. The offences and violations of human rights. damaging act itself may be perpetrated by a Generally the original owners are never held third person following a theft or just by acci- liable on the basis of their negligence or ac- dent. A car owner is obligated to take out a tive participation for the damages the re- third party liability insurance, because the spective firearms provoke during the illicit state rightly wants to protect the victimised phase of their life cycle. With respect to the third parties. Damages are covered irrespec- actual perpetrators claims of victims are often tive of the financial capability of either the of no avail because only in rare occasions suf- owner or the actual perpetrator. The regula- ficient assets can be forfeited, while the tion gives priority to the victim. It also pro- tects the tax payer from being shouldered with the bill as a debtor of last resort.

HEUNI Paper No.14 19 Lock 4b) Marking of weapons is a prerequisite to enact It is striking that in the case of firearms third additional safeguards parties are not protected in a similar manner Every firearm carries the potential of creating against accidentally or intentionally caused havoc, when misused. This risk must be damages when misused. Absolutely no li- translated into costs which are to be born by ability protecting third parties takes effect, in the legitimate holder. In order to implement case a firearm is stolen. This is a serious la- this logic, every firearm is to be produced cuna which should be corrected, particularly with an unique undeletable mark (number) since the general taxpayer is usually charged to allow for tracing of the original legitimate with the costs provoked by the misuse of owner. The most feasible moments in a life- firearms, alternatively victims are left with- cycle of a firearm for collecting an insurance out compensation. The changes required can fee to cover potential and statistically pre- be initiated unilaterally at the national level. dictable damages are the first legitimate sale They should, however, rapidly expand into after the production itself and every legiti- an international convention, because illicit mate trade transaction thereafter. circulation of firearms operates across bor- ders. But the introduction of an obligatory It seems evident that the private insurance insurance will effect the situation only in the industry would collect a considerable fee long term. Additionally the international against a policy covering all possible liabili- community has urgently to find ways of ties, taking into account the long life-cycles coping with the heritage of millions of small and the enormous damage any firearm can arms already circulating illicitly and not cov- cause. The principle to charge the owner of ered by any insurance. small arms with the costs of potential liabili- ties would considerably increase the costs of When discussing third party liability it is im- gun ownership. It would make the true so- portant to take into account that no institu- cietal costs of gun possession finally trans- tion or person entitled to possess firearms is parent. It might also reduce the effective de- aloof from the risk of theft and eventual mis- mand for firearms as life-cycle costs increase use of its inventory. This applies to the armed because this commodity is likely to be price forces as well as to the police, where the sensitive. Finally, a healthy pressure to im- custody of firearms is not always as tight as prove the safekeeping of firearms would one would expect. The need to introduce the come from the insurance industry trying to concept of liability is best illustrated by the protect its stakes. Technological innovation, enormous damages caused by the huge stock like efficient personalised trigger locks, of small arms recklessly left behind by the would rapidly enter the market because such US-forces at the end of the Vietnam war. firearms would in the end allow legitimate These weapons were marketed off-shore by gun owners to economise the insurance pre- the exhausted Vietnamese government, en- mium. The market mechanism would foster tered the web of global illicit circulation and innovation in the field of safeguarding and surfaced in the hands of insurgents and neutralise the passionate resistance of gun criminals all over the world engendering lobbies against tightening controls. untold suffering and enormous destruction. It would offer an interesting exercise for in- As a first step it would be important to es- surance mathematicians to calculate the rate tablish the principle of compulsory third that they would had to have charged the US- party liability insurance to be levied on the army for each American gun left behind in ownership of guns. It must apply to the Vietnam to cover the (economic) risk of their military and the police alike, because arms illegitimate use off the former Vietnamese stolen from their stock are as likely to become battlefield. the means of destructive acts as any other firearm. From innovations like personalised

HEUNI Paper No.14 20 Lock trigger locks the security of police officers the costs of “gun cultures” transparent. The would significantly benefit as they would be increase in effective prices would discourage not any longer in danger of being threatened overstocking at all levels and possibly reduce or killed with their own weapons. Different the demand for new production as excessive insurance rates according to risk classifica- stocks will be marketed first. It also ends the tion are conceivable, but this is a technicality effective subsidisation of gun ownership. which the insurance industry will easily Presently the taxpayer shoulders the dam- solve once this obligatory insurance is being ages ensuing in case of theft and misuse. introduced and the different risks evaluated With an obligatory insurance the gun owner by the industry. Such a regulation can be in- would finally pay for the eventual damages, troduced unilaterally, but the nature of illicit his individual choice to carry a firearm pur- circulation and international diffusion of porting to enhance his personal security en- small arms strongly suggests to pursue in tails. parallel the implementation of an interna- tional convention. For example, a sniper gun Of course, this short exposition can only pro- stolen from the stores of the FBI might end vide a stimulus for a debate of how compul- up in some remote country and be used in sory third party liability insurance for small terrorist activities. Thus, such a risk insur- arms can contribute to improving the safety ance would have eventually to be operated as standards, and reduce illegal circulation. an international trust fund charged to regu- Small arms are a dangerous commodity, but late cross-border liabilities. Enormous sums lack the normal treatment of dangerous can be involved when small arms not legiti- commodities. Otherwise long since some mately possessed see action in violent con- obligatory insurance regime would have flict and civil wars. But it is time to make been introduced as in the case of car owner- transparent the true costs of small arms ship. But as the problems are becoming more which slip into black market circulation and pressing and costly every day, it should fi- to induce in this way better controls. nally be possible to tackle them more vigor- ously, in this case from the economic end and The proposal to enact a compulsory insur- call for an end of the effective subsidisation ance clearly embraces market mechanisms to of privately owned small arms. However, achieve its ends and considers this an appro- innovative approaches to old problems al- priate complement to tighter government ways need a long breath and must work to- regulation of firearm ownership and trade. It wards winning wide political support. is likely to provoke an outcry from the gun lobby and also from the armed forces and the police. However, the latter must understand 5. An ammunition tax: the case for a demeri- that risk coverage is a reasonable principle. tional tax For the government it would basically be a zero sum game, it does not cause additional Many observers would agree that the supply expenditures, because uninsured damages of ammunition is a key factor in most on- are in most cases paid for by the taxpayer in going armed conflicts. In many conflicts the any case. Once the problem is handled as warring parties are absolutely dependent on normal insurance business it will look less the efficiency of the logistics black marketers threatening to legitimate owners of firearms, are able to offer. This reliance on the black because the increased costs will correspond market to supply the fighting forces intro- to their specific risk classification which they duces an economic dimension into the politi- can influence by adopting safeguards. cal equation which determines the level of fighting and possibly the eventual disposi- But the important aspect of the proposed tion to seek a political solution of the conflict. move is the translation of the risk small arms Moreover, as discussed in the first section, in embody into monetary terms, thus making

HEUNI Paper No.14 21 Lock some protracted conflicts fighting has virtu- and the behaviour of the consumers. Small ally developed into a “mode of production”, arms have become an increasingly important there the calculation of the “fighters” should public health issue, therefore they require a be particularly sensitive to the prices of their health-oriented steering of consumption “inputs”, not least because illicit trade net- patterns. In changing the relative price of this works operate on a cash basis in convertible commodity the government explicitly in- currencies. tends to discriminate against the potential (mis)use of this commodity. To make an im- In general, however, prices are low, quite of- pact a rate between 100% and 200% should ten below the cost of manufacture as huge be considered, in order to truly discriminate stocks of surplus are being cascaded interna- against the unnecessary use and overstocking tionally in a chain reaction which increased of ammunition. Being a mass produced the likelihood of leaks filtering into black commodity with only a limited number of markets. In contrast to the creation of new producers an ammunition tax should be col- jobs in the regular economy being virtually lected at the source. unaffordable in the context of war-torn economies, the economic threshold of turn- The tariff must be levied for all ammunition ing armed violence into a profitable business produced. This is perfectly acceptable be- is rather low due to the pervasive availability cause the tax is financially neutral for the of cheap small arms. government as a legitimate customer. The higher prices its agencies have to pay are The long shelf-life of most small arms sug- fully balanced by tax income. All private us- gests to additionally explore the control of ers of small arms would have to pay a pre- ammunition supplies as a means to effec- mium for their hobby or for the privilege of tively reduce the availability of operational presumed self-defence with a firearm. This is small arms at least in medium term. The de- perfectly justified given the risks of inevitable finitive consumption when used promises an health-hazards due to the danger of illegiti- impact on the availability through improved mate use of privately owned firearms in case controls and significant increases in prices. of theft and other ensuing negative external effects. Against this background it is proposed to lobby governments to levy a significant (con- With respect to international trade in cases of sumer) tax on all ammunition fitting small certified deliveries to legitimate governmen- arms used in armed conflicts. Such a tax tal recipients the consumer tax would have to would be absolutely consistent with the his- be relinquished. In all other cases of export torical evolution of taxes and their legiti- the tax would be levied at the source. The macy. An important element in the evolution additional tax income would help to cover of taxes are levies on demeritorial goods, like the social costs of the misuse of firearms alcohol and tobacco. A tax on ammunition which are presently shouldered by the gen- would follow in this tradition where the state eral tax payer. Given the fact that a tax levied acts on the basis of a consensus that a certain indiscriminately at the source would be col- commodity has negative external effects and lected from foreign customers as well, a large affects the common welfare. The current in- part of the tax income should be dedicated to ternational discussion indicates that this con- an international trust fund charged with sensus is rapidly maturing with respect to coping with the disastrous consequences of small arms. The conversion of this consensus reckless proliferation of small arms in the into a consumer tax of ammunition is how- past. ever unfortunately not yet on the political agenda. There are, of course, also arguments against A tax on ammunition would be a non-fiscal such a consumer tax. At the principle level tax aiming at changing consumption patterns neo-liberal economists argue that any con-

HEUNI Paper No.14 22 Lock sumer tax infringes the liberty of the con- subject to taxation. Higher prices for ammu- sumer, but this tax intervention must be nition lower the chances of unlawful appro- weighed against the negative externalities of priation of ammunition, because all actors the diffusion of small arms. “If we don’t, oth- will be less inclined to overstock ammunition ers will do”(sell and export cheap, duty-free and the final demand is likely to display ammunition), this standard argument against some elasticity to prices as well. Finally, if the national initiatives, will be advanced by the major international suppliers (G-8 and different lobbies associated with the ammu- NATO member states among others) could nition business. This argument is not valid as agree on a concerted tax on ammunition, can easily be understood, when applied to they would easily be able to muster sufficient the cultivation of marijuana and other drugs, pressure to bring most other suppliers to con- in order to create additional jobs for farmers. form to such an international tax regime as It will certainly be argued as well that the happened with other demeritional taxes in stocks already in black market circulation history. will earn windfall profits as a result of the institution of such a tax. This will inevitably be so, before black market stocks will begin 5. Instituting a recycling deposit for all fire- to be crowded out. It should also be taken arms into consideration that the introduction of an ammunition tax will provide an environment Increasingly states intervene in markets and for black market activities if neighbouring put up regulations to make sure that envi- states do not co-ordinate their tax policies. ronmentally hazardous commodities are be- The mutual history of the United States and ing properly recycled to avoid lasting nega- Canada provides a number of negative ex- tive effects if left as waste. Thus, car manu- amples when different tax policies created facturers will eventually be forced to recycle black markets and huge profits for cross- their cars at the end of their useful life. The 1 border smuggling . costs of recycling will already be charged with the sales price. To minimise the risk of But these hurdles are not insurmountable. illicit firearm possession and black market The history of demeritional taxing (Tipke activities small arms should also come under 1993) shows a surprising convergence be- an obligatory recycling regime aiming at tween different cultures and continents. eliminating a potential source of illicit trans- Ammunition seems to fulfil the properties actions (For a study on the destruction of needed to justify an internationally co- small arms see: De Clerq 1999). ordinated promotion of a tax. The most im- portant factor bringing the international All small arms items are particularly sensi- community in line to a process of strictly ap- tive commodities which constitute a potential plying a hefty consumer tax on ammunition danger if the decommissioning does not lead is the emerging consensus on the dangers of to the destruction and recycling of the com- small arms diffusion and the commonly felt ponents. To insure a proper recycling of fire- need to counteract this tendency. arms and decommissioned ammunition, a recycling deposit should be charged with the From a security perspective the control of sale of firearms and ammunition. The deposit ammunition and its taxing is by far more ef- must be a consequential sum, in order to ficient at the source than at the level of the make it attractive for everybody to return any ultimate consumer. It also allows for a rigor- weapon found or not any longer needed and ous accountability of those legitimate inter- receive the deposit in cash. The deposit national transactions which would not be should be calculated out of two components, the costs of decommissioning and recycling 1 I am indebted to David De Clerq who drew my and the reward to make it attractive to return attention to this aspect.

HEUNI Paper No.14 23 Lock weapons. If further investigations of ammu- and 8 mm, as the exclusive standard for all nition supplies confirm that illicit refilling of non-state actors who legitimately own a fire- empty cases constitutes a problem, a deposit arm, while 5.56 mm, 7,62 mm and 9 mm should be levied on ammunition as well, in would be reserved for the military and the order to secure the safe return of the cases to police. Countries with restrictive ownership the legal sphere. Aluminium soft drink tins, laws could serve as precursors of what also a mass produced item, carry such a de- should be developed into an international posit in Denmark. regime. In a period of less than ten years compulsory changes of the calibres of weap- Such a compulsory deposit would have a ons in private possession could be imple- double effect. It would elevate the economic mented. threshold to acquire firearms, but it would also contribute to reduce the average life cy- Such a set of norms would facilitate in the cle of the existing stock of weapons and long run much improved controls. It should hence the availability to enter illicit circula- be acceptable to all nations because it does tion in general. The incentive to decommis- not directly interfere with national regula- sion weapons and be rewarded by a refund is tions of private ownership of guns. At the likely to forestall the accidental appropriation same time it would be an important step to- and entry of many firearms into illicit circu- wards the marking of ammunition proposed lation. If old stocks of ammunition can be by the UN-expert group on ammunition (Re- converted into cash, they are also less likely port 1999) as ammunition for official use and to end up in the cross-border black markets. private consumption would be unequivocally identifiable. The private and the official A recycling deposit operates not unlike a weapon markets would be absolutely sepa- buy-back program, but its costs are borne by rated making it virtually impossible to sub- the legitimate or tolerated owners of firearms stitute illegal supplies from one sphere with and it is made a permanent feature. Given wares from the other sphere. The diffusion of the large existing stock which was acquired arms and ammunition from official use to without the payment of a deposit, the start illegal non-state ownership and illicit circu- capital would have to be advanced by the lation would become instantly transparent. government during the initial phase, while the program would become self-financing Liberal sales regulations with respect to pri- after a certain period. Compared to the po- vate acquisition of firearms and ammunition tential security gains the initial investment would not any longer lead to illegal exports required is modest. of ammunition to feed international black market networks which will be flooded with automatic weapons of the presently prevail- ing calibres for many years to come. It would 7. Dual standardisation of calibres for all become inherently more difficult to procure small arms ammunition for illegally possessed automatic weapons as their possession is globally re- stricted to the military and the police. In a An important measure to improve the control transition period of ten years it should be of the illegal proliferation and diffusion of feasible to achieve a complete separation of small arms would be internationally agreed the two markets through a strict regime of standards for calibres of small arms which dual standardisation. strictly distinguish between weapons de- Once such a set of manufacturing norms is in signed to serve the military and in law en- place, it will become easier to exert interna- forcement and weapons designed for sport, tional pressure against ammunition manu- hunting and legal private ownership. One facturers supplying international black mar- could define new calibres, for example 4 mm kets with non-private calibres. It may even be

HEUNI Paper No.14 24 Lock possible to win the consent of arms manu- struction of surplus stocks of small arms, facturers for such a regime because the intro- possibly under the auspices of the United duction of such dual-standardisation would Nations, should receive priority on the mean additional business as many privately agenda of the General Assembly. owned arms would have to be refurbished to comply with the new regime or replaced. Since many individuals and non- Measured against the damages caused by the governmental organisations would be sym- illicit availability of small arms an eventual pathetic to the creation of such a trust fund, compensation for affected private gun own- one might conceive this fund as a foundation ers would not be costly. open to governmental as well as individual contributions. It would be perfectly plausible for concerned citizens around the world to contribute to the destruction of small arms by 8. International trust fund for the destruction purchasing “disarmament shares or certifi- of surplus stocks of small arms cates”, if a credible foundation can be created for this purpose. Such an initiative would raise the visibility of this issue. Provided suf- Large surplus stocks of small arms originat- ficient funds can be assembled the trust fund ing from uncontrolled accumulation of re- would actively pursue a strategy of identify- serves during the Cold War remain a source ing critical surplus stock and offer its services of illegal circulation which requires co- which in certain cases might involve in addi- ordinated international action. The cascading tion to destruction and recycling a compen- of surplus weapons from the arsenals of in- sation for the lost (black) market value of the dustrial countries to the inventory of the weapons, in order to make it attractive to armed forces of less wealthy nations was governments to contract the trust fund for started in the early nineties. Unfortunately surplus reduction. the weaponry and the volumes involved were often not commensurate with legitimate With the Kosovo experience in mind where needs of the recipient armed forces. Some- the looted arsenals of Albania surfaced, times the suppliers were merely interested in NATO should resolutely act and clear the economising on recycling costs. As a result arsenals of all states aspiring membership or these weapons ended up in the arms depots other forms of association. NATO’s leverage with diminished safety against leakage into to enact a reduction of existing arsenals to illicit global circulation. More importantly, reasonable levels in former Warsaw Pact however, the profound economic crisis in member states must be used resolutely and most transition countries and in a significant fast as it is well established that presently number of developing countries has weak- black markets are supplied from within this ened the public services, including the mili- region. On the basis of NATO’s expanded tary to such an extent that the safety of the agenda such a program could be offered arms depots is no longer guaranteed. In such globally as it is likely to reduce the probabil- precarious circumstances an orderly recy- ity of future humanitarian missions in the cling of surplus arms is not feasible. context of internal armed conflicts. NATO would act in its best self-interest, but appar- Measured against the enormous economic ently political pressure on the organisation is damages and human suffering caused by the still lacking. global illicit small arms availability investing in an international trust fund for the destruc- tion of surplus stocks of small arms will pro- duce high rates of return in form of foregone damages. It is for this reason that the forma- tion of an international trust fund for the de-

HEUNI Paper No.14 25 Lock the end of civil wars is expected to tackle the problem of illicit small arms availability by 9. Active market intervention in illegal trad- pricing small arms and ammunition out of ing reach to potential black market customers. The implementation of such a scheme has to The case for massive intervention in the ille- take many hurdles. It is often argued that it is gal circulation of small arms is highlighted not possible for an accountable agency to act by the situation in certain border regions on the black market. It must be stressed, where arms trafficking is concentrated. however, that throughout the Cold War the Armed violence, organised criminality and intelligence networks of major powers pur- protracted civil wars are often a reflection of chased particularly small arms on the black economic activities which are not based on a market, in order to avail themselves with set of rules of law. In the context of intra-state stocks of “deniability” to support their prox- armed conflicts armed predatory acts and ies. The design of the agency is also a sensi- extortion often turn into an independent tive issue, but given the damages caused by mode of production. It is therefore reasonable the illegal diffusion of small arms the organ- to assume that the different violent actors in isational hurdles should not be insurmount- their capacity as “homines oeconomici” are able. Among others one can certainly borrow sensitive to the costs of their tools of produc- from the experience in international co- tion. Thus, prices charged in black market operation to combat the illicit trade of drugs. transactions influence the actual demand and hence the societal diffusion of small arms. If While international programs for mine the argument that the illegal circulation of clearing are widely accepted and receive con- small arms is marked by price elasticity siderable support, the idea of a follow-up holds, then massive market intervention initiative focusing on clearing illicit small aiming at elevating prices would signifi- arms has not yet taken root. Like mine clear- cantly contribute to the reduction of illegal ing small arms “clearing” has important hu- circulation and societal diffusion of small manitarian and economic dimensions. For arms. regions where protracted intra-state conflicts have produced elaborate networks of black Black market intervention requires financial market supplies specialising in small arms resources and a trustworthy institution under and the complementary illegal channels for the authority of regional organisations like the export of marketable products, like gems, the OAS or OAU and possibly national agen- diamonds, tropical wood and diverted hu- cies, in India2 for example. The ECOWAS manitarian aid commodities are well en- initiative is probably the politically most ad- trenched, the availability of a Rapid Inter- vanced agreement at the regional level to vention Fund (RIF) administered by the control small arms. With strong financial and United Nations would be helpful. Govern- institutional backing from the EU in the con- ments would be eligible to receive funds in text of the Lomé III agreement the feasibility support of active intervention in the black of aggressive black market intervention could market and to take measures controlling the be tested in this region which is still infested illegal economy. The same would apply to with large quantities of free-floating small countries where an early warning of an arms. Such a programme which is not re- emerging conflict has been given. stricted to traditional buy-back schemes at But the supply of organised crime might also 2 Tara Kartha’s ‘Tools of Terror; Light Weapons be directly targeted in some cases. In south- and India’s Security’ (New Delhi 1999) de- ern Africa the border towns in Angola are scribes in detail a scenario on the sub-continent believed to operate huge black markets which clearly endorses an active market inter- vention. where the organised crime in South Africa is

HEUNI Paper No.14 26 Lock believed to procure its weapons from stocks tions like the US-based National Rifle Asso- spilling over from the protracted civil war. A ciation strategically sponsor the gun culture. few million dollars invested in mopping up This “virus” does not recognise national bor- the arms bazaars in the border region would ders and often operates as a precursor of the make a considerable contribution to con- global network of illicit arms trade. It has taining the sprawling violence in South Af- been reported that the hero of the Rambo rica (Chachiua 1999; Nkiwane et al. 1999). A movie is perceived as a role model among similar situation is reported from the border young Africans in war-torn societies (Ri- region in Paraguay where the Brazilian and chards 1996). Argentinian crime scenes procure their weaponry (Gasparini Alves&Cipollone 1998). The case for restrictions on advertisement for small arms is one small element in a cam- The financial volumes required for such a paign to neutralise gun cultures. The aggres- rapid intervention fund are modest if com- sive visibility of advertisements for military pared with the costs of conflict and post- weapons in all kind of print media is but one conflict reconstruction. However, the rate of example of many accepted practices which return measured in added global economic contradict the declared intention of many development should be high and therefore it governments to fight the diffusion of small might be adequate to involve the Word Bank arms, including weaponry of military design. in the provision of the required funds. Advertisements for military weapons3 in print media are particularly suspect, since the readers in most countries are legally not en- titled to purchase the products advertised. 10. Reversing cultures of violence Since procurement officers are certainly not appropriately addressed by scenic adver- tisements praising the performance of auto- Reducing the attractiveness of illegally pos- matic guns and military ammunition in a sessing small arms is foremost a process of wide range of journals, it is pertinent to reconstructing mutual confidence at the local question the purpose of such advertisements. level. It calls for a consensus of putting the state back into the driving seat along the road To secure contracts in the legitimate pro- towards improved security. The different curement market sending extensive docu- measures proposed to improve the control of mentation, offering at competitive prices or firearms and to reinforce the supply side bribing the right person would seem much controls are only the start of an extensive po- more efficient and indeed practised strategies litical discourse over the mutual acceptance to win contracts. So, what is the logic behind of different identities needed before any legal the advertisements for sniper guns, auto- action can bear fruit. The ensuing discussions matic weapons etc.? Is it merely to entice the about appropriate legal measures will al- appetite of prospective customers, fanatics ready be part of the cultural and political who are addicted to weapons, so that they changes required to convert declaratory poli- would place their orders on the black market cies of governments into effective measures which eventually translates indirectly into of improved control and restraint among the higher demand in the legal market where the population. Bringing the diffusion of fire- advertising manufacturer has its stakes? Or is arms under control is not merely a legal act, it about cultivating a political climate where it requires to overcome the latent gun culture the focus is on military solutions of political whose “virus” is more firmly established in some societies than in others. Unfortunately 3 For a detailed analysis of advertisements for the propagation of the gun culture is pres- military weapons see: Peter Lock, Rüstung- ently well entrenched in the global electronic swerbung; Der Boom gegen die Krise der Rüs- media. Some non-governmental organisa- tungsindustrie. Militärpolitik Dokumentation No.41/42, Frankfurt 1985.

HEUNI Paper No.14 27 Lock conflicts which guarantees business as usual kind. The minimum regulation required for the arms industry? would be a code of conduct aiming at re- ducing the open propagation of armed vio- The fact that in general media aggressive lence and a prohibition of product placing publicity for weapons which nobody is enti- related to small arms. This form of publicity tled to possess, except for the armed forces is particularly hideous, because the profit and law enforcement agencies, is tolerated motive of the movie producers requires as world-wide, is no longer acceptable. It ap- many scenes as possible where posh guns pears to reflect a prevalence of a permissive can be displayed, so that the respective political climate with respect to the diffusion manufacturers pay a considerable fee. of small arms. Just as advertisement for medicine, smoking, and drinking came under regulation in many countries, advertisement for weaponry individuals are under no cir- 11. Conclusion cumstances authorised to possess legally should be restricted to the absolute minimum required for rational procurement proce- The illegal proliferation and diffusion of dures. small arms are a case for sharing the respon- sibility between industrialised and develop- Displaying ammunition as if it were lipsticks ing countries. They are structurally embed- in the window of an up-market perfumery ded in the present stage of the global order. attempts to impart ammunition with an es- The huge disposable quantities are a heritage thetical aura and to obfuscate the inherently of the previous Cold War period, but the pull dangerous character of the commodity. factors are mainly of the making of the crude Given the legal antecedents of restricting ad- imperfections of present economic order vertisements for certain other products, the (Lock 1999b). Most small arms and ammuni- chances to challenge the public relations tion illegally circulating around the globe practice of the international small arms in- were legally produced in industrialised dustry look promising. The aim must be to countries. At some stage these weapons were curb the indiscriminate propagation of fire- separated from the chain of legal custody. arms at minimum of those legally restricted Straight theft is only a negligible source of to military use only. Earlier parliamentary illicit availability. The transfer into illegal initiatives in the FRG4 to prohibit advertise- ownership is either associated with a barter ments for military weapons in general print deal or a cash transaction. In either case an media should be reactivated and provide a economic exchange between the regular model for an initiative within the European economy and criminal spheres is a precondi- Union. tion of effective flows. Thus, the recipient party of the illegal trade must control some Children and minors around the world are economic activity linked to international exposed to the products of the dominant (global) markets which generates the indis- American entertainment industry. Armed pensable cash in a convertible currency or violence is a pivotal feature in these products allows for barter deals with low visibility. In where product placing is a major element of every case, therefore, the economics of the the business. Thus, firearm manufacturers black market for arms can be targeted from compete for placing their violent gadgets as the demand side through tightening the con- long and as often as possible in movies of all trols of illegal economic transactions and tar- geted economic embargoes. Only if the cur-

4 In 1985 the Social Democratic Party proposed to rent initiatives to curb the illicit trade of insert a paragraph into the Law to Control small arms supplement their supply-side Military Weaponry (Kriegswaffenkontrollge- strategies with regulatory measures barring setz) banning the advertisement for military illegal commodities from entering the regular weapons in general print media.

HEUNI Paper No.14 28 Lock commodity market will these initiative Approaching illicit small arms availability achieve the desired effect. from as many angles as possible contributes to the creation of political awareness of this This is because on-going armed conflicts, complex situation which is required to mobi- even in remote impoverished regions, are lise unilateral and multilateral measures de- never isolated events. To the contrary, their signed to reverse the fatal course of societal dynamics and logistics depend on their con- militianisation. It is at the fringes of the pres- tinued participation in the global economy, ent order where the implosion of statehood though often through the backdoor of crimi- vis-à-vis a self-arming society is most visible, nal sectors. Without the oxygen of economic but elements of this process are pervasive. interaction with the global economy armed conflicts would suffocate or at least trans- form into rather low levels of violence. This message has not yet arrived at the centre stage of the debate on small arms.

Tackling the small arms availability in on- going wars requires an understanding of the underlying economics (Keen 1998) which would allow targeted and internationally co- ordinated action to close the revenue gener- ating backdoors of the global economy through which criminal brokers organise lo- gistical life lines for the fighting parties. More generally, illicit small arms availability and the growth of the global GCP (gross criminal product) seem to be closely linked, not only in cases of armed conflict as increasing levels of armed violence in fragmented societies in Latin America (Lock 1998a) and Africa (Lock 1999a) testify.

It must be repeated that the awareness of far- reaching consequences of tolerating criminal economic activities for the diffusion of armed violence is still underdeveloped. From an economic perspective all armed conflicts are woven into the global economic web. In some cases it might be necessary to sharpen the legal instruments5, in order to stem the arms supply of on-going wars. But there is no denying that all armed conflicts are economi- cally at our doorsteps and the spoils form part of our consumption pattern which makes them our common responsibility.

5 While some would argue that closing loopholes is impossible, the crippling record of the Ameri- can embargo against Cuba suggests that a lot can be achieved provided the necessary political will exists.

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