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Libya's Turbulent Transition

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Libya's Turbulent Transition Libya’s Turbulent Transition The Pressing Need for Security Sector Reform Barah Mikail December 4, 2013 SUMMARY s The fall of the Gaddafi regime left a security vacuum in Libya that was filled by dozens of militias loosely classified into two opposing camps: the revolutionaries and the “establishment.” s The current government has been unable to implement a clear plan for security sector reform, as militias in both camps have resisted government-led integration initiatives. s Libya’s insecurity has afected the country’s progress on other fronts, particularly on issues of democracy and governance as well as economic growth. s Though the international community has marshalled considerable resources in support of Libya’s security sector, the U.S. should encourage greater coordination between donors and follow-up on pledges. he militia-led abduction of Libyan Prime THE POST-GADDAFI SECURITY Minister Ali Zeidan in October 2013 LANDSCAPE Twas a stark reminder of the urgent need to Te fall of the Gaddafi regime left a security address the deteriorating security situation vacuum in Libya that was quickly filled by in the country. More than two years after dozens of locally affiliated militias. Tese the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, groups frequently engage in criminal activities the central government has not been able for financial, ideological, or politically to extend complete control over Libya’s vast motivated ends. Te Libyan government has territory or reign in the various armed groups been unable to crack down on these activities, that emerged during the revolution. Te lack due in part to the absence of authoritative of security has stalled progress: rampant means to enforce its power, exacerbated by insecurity has hampered economic progress corruption amongst high-ranking officials. and undermined the credibility of the central government, threatening the fragile Te unstable security environment has led democratic transition. As such, security to an increase in violent crime, including sector reform (SSR) must be a top priority the destruction of Sufi shrines, the siege in any plan for rebuilding Libya’s future. of government ministries, and attacks on Although these efforts require trust-building Western embassies. Te most well known of measures to build domestic consensus, the these assaults was the September 2012 attack United States can take constructive steps to on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi that led assist the Libyan government in addressing to the death of Ambassador Chris Stevens this challenge. and three other Americans. Additionally, the POLICY BRIEF POLICY THE PROJECT ON MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY LIBYA’S TURBULENT TRANSITION: THE PRESSING NEED FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM security crisis is frequently underscored by the Tough a national army exists and could assassination of military officers, which has been conceivably act as a counter to the militias, it is occurring roughly once every two weeks. weak and lacks leadership, morale, and cohesion. Under Gaddafi, troops were organized to prevent Although violence often seems indiscriminate a coup. To that end, officers were frequently and incoherent, local skirmishes fit loosely into rotated and positions were allocated based a broader power struggle between two opposing on tribal affiliation rather than merit; loyalty camps: the revolutionaries and the establishment. was rewarded with a leadership position in the Te revolutionary camp seeks to purge the military. A brigade commander noted that the political, economic, and social institutions of new Libyan state inherited “an army of all chiefs individuals associated with the former regime. but no Indians,” referring to the outsized number Te establishment, on the other hand, consists of high-ranking military officials compared to the of fragments of the old military and security number of junior and midlevel officers.1 apparatus that continue to play a role in the country. Tis struggle was aptly demonstrated GOVERNMENT-LED REFORM in the May 2013 siege of government ministries INITIATIVES by various elements of the revolutionary camp demanding the passage of the Political Tough Prime Minister Ali Zeidan has pushed Isolation Law, which would effectively ban any a number of ad hoc security sector reforms, individual connected to Gaddafi’s regime from political infighting and waning political clout holding government office. Tough much of the have obstructed progress. As a result, the current violence is delineated along this division, there is government has been unable to implement a substantial intra-group fighting as well, further clear plan for security sector reform and remains complicating the security landscape. reliant on two semi-official security bodies set up by the National Transitional Council: the Te militias currently operating in Libya Libya Shield Forces (LSF) and Supreme Security vary in size, motivation, affiliation, degree of Committee (SSC). Tese bodies were authorized discipline, and sources of funding. Tere are as auxiliary forces that operated parallel to no reliable records tracking the militias that the military and police under the authority of have proliferated during and after the civil war, the army Chief of Staff and Interior Minister, as their sheer number and often informal or ad respectively. Te LSF and SSC were intended to hoc nature make them difficult to identify and be the first step toward giving the government a classify. Armed groups that could be classified degree of control over the various militias. Te in the revolutionary camp include Islamists, government hoped that by identifying these federalists, and some tribal groups using the groups and placing them under the authority of language of the revolution to justify their actions. ministers that it could gradually facilitate their Similarly, the establishment is a diverse collection integration into the formal security apparatus. of counter-revolutionaries, ex-military members, former officials from Gaddafi’s government, and Te SSC was set up to be a temporary body conservatives. to absorb revolutionary brigades under the command of the Interior Ministry. However, the Both camps have strongly resisted the central militias were integrated wholesale into the SSC, government’s integration campaign. Te retaining their existing structures of command revolutionaries accuse the government of being and autonomy. Because the militias were more illegitimate. Te establishment views many of the loyal to their unit commanders than the Interior revolutionaries as undisciplined and chaotic, and Minister, the SSC as a whole lacked a coherent it strives to maintain the influence it wields within agenda and was only nominally under the control the government’s formal security institutions. It of the government. Tese weaknesses prompted has therefore been resistant to efforts to allow several attempts to dissolve the SSC. some of these new forces to integrate into its existing structures and chains of command. At the end of 2011, Interim Prime Minister Abdel Rahim al-Keeb set up the Warrior Affairs 2 pomed.org LIBYA’S TURBULENT TRANSITION: THE PRESSING NEED FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM Commission that sought to gauge the aspirations In response, Prime Minister Zeidan announced of SSC and brigade fighters. Tis information was Resolution 362 to create a National Guard, which used either to provide incentives for the fighters aimed to bring the Libya Shield under closer to join the state’s armed forces and police, or to control of the government. Te National Guard find them alternative employment. However, was conceived as a two-year project during because of the commission’s limited resources which members would perform internal policing and a lack of political cooperation, its impact functions. At the end of the proposed timeframe, was minimal. Te armed forces were reluctant members would either be moved into the regular to absorb too many militiamen, and the militias armed forces or offered alternative employment. rejected integration with remnants of the former Te remaining National Guard would then regime. become a national reserve force. However, the GNC opposed the idea, forcing Zeidan’s In December 2012, the government again government to abandon the initiative. attempted to dissolve the SSC by discontinuing pay for non-integrated forces. However, Zeidan In the aftermath of this proposal, little progress later reversed this decision, declaring that the has been made. While the GNC has approved a security situation still required the SSC, and that decision transferring 424 million Libyan Dinars such dissolution would require agreement from from the reserve of the general budget to cover both the GNC and his government to proceed. some of the expenses related to the salaries of the In response to these failed integration efforts, army, and Zeidan has raised the salaries of the a number of revolutionary brigades formed regular police and army, countering the militias’ regional coalitions. Tese coalitions received a reluctance to join the national army and give up unified name and formal recognition as security their independence remains a challenge. forces under the Chief of Staff, becoming the Libyan Shield Forces (LSF). Like the SSC, the Recently, Zeidan has backed a plan to establish a LSF was undermined by divided loyalties and “General Purpose Force (GPF),” a joint effort to excessive power wielded by unit commanders. train and equip a new Libyan army by the United States, AFRICOM, Italy, Turkey, and the United Despite the LSF’s autonomy, the government Kingdom. Te force reportedly consists of up remains heavily reliant on it for security. In to 20,000 troops, who will receive six-to-twelve August 2013, the GNC ordered more than a weeks of training.3 Critics have questioned, thousand armed vehicles carrying Libya Shield however, whether the force’s mandate to exclude troops into Tripoli to improve the security militia members is divorced from Libya’s security situation. Te GNC has also deployed the Libya realities, skeptical of the GPF’s ability to respond Shield to military zones in the south to conduct to emerging threats absent militia support. border security operations.
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