Burkina Faso Niger

COUNTRY REPORT

Burkina Faso Niger

3rd quarter 1998

The Economist Intelligence Unit 15 Regent Street, London SW1Y 4LR United Kingdom The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For over 50 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, government regulations and corporate practice worldwide. The EIU delivers its information in four ways: through subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through specific research reports, whether for general release or for particular clients; through electronic publishing; and by organising conferences and roundtables. The firm is a member of The Economist Group.

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Contents

3 Summary

Burkina Faso 4 Political structure 5 Economic structure 6 Outlook for 1998-99 8 Review 8 The political scene 14 The economy 15 Agriculture and livestock 17 Mining and energy 18 Foreign trade, aid and payments

Niger 19 Political structure 20 Economic structure 21 Outlook for 1998-99 22 Review 22 The political scene 27 Economic policy 28 The economy 28 Agriculture 29 Energy 30 Aid news

32 Quarterly indicators and trade data

List of tables 7 Burkina Faso: forecast summary 18 Burkina Faso: French aid to Burkina Faso 32 Burkina Faso: quarterly indicators of economic activity 32 Niger: quarterly indicators of economic activity 33 Burkina Faso and Niger: main commodities traded 34 Burkina Faso and Niger: direction of trade 35 Burkina Faso and Niger: French trade

List of figures 8 Burkina Faso: gross domestic product 8 Burkina Faso: real exchange rates 22 Niger: gross domestic product 22 Niger: real exchange rates

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998

July 27th 1998 Summary

3rd quarter 1998

Burkina Faso Outlook for 1998-99: President Compaoré will favour a conciliatory approach to try to ensure that the opposition takes part in forthcoming elections. Meanwhile, civil servants will maintain their opposition to public-sector reforms. Cotton is likely to continue to record strong growth, while gold also has the potential to boost GDP growth in 1998.

The political scene: Defying popular discontent, the government has imple- mented key pay reforms in the public sector. The main opposition alliance has rejected what was dubbed an independent electoral commission by parliament, and has threatened to boycott the presidential election. Mr Yaméogo has been sworn in as president of the opposition ADF-RDA. President Compaoré hosted the OAU summit in Ouagadougou.

The economy: Real GDP growth reached 5.5% in 1997. The Bretton Woods institutions have praised the government’s management of the economy. Poor harvests have pushed up food prices, while cotton output has continued to break all records, thanks to significant investment and attractive incentives for farmers. Gold production has been disappointing. While formal development assistance from France has declined, bilateral trade has increased.

Niger Outlook for 1998-99: An already shaky political environment could deterio- rate still further in the short term. Fresh local elections will be held in Novem- ber under the scrutiny of international observers and the opposition. The government’s programme of economic reforms will benefit from new structural funds from the IMF, World Bank and EU. Famine will remain a constant preoccupation for the government. Real GDP growth in 1998 is expected to be around 4%.

The political scene: New strikes and violent demonstrations punctuated the months of April and May, despite fresh calls for calm from the unions and the EU. Two important parties, the PUND and the PNA, have left the ruling coalition. The announcement that local elections will be held in November has somewhat assuaged the opposition’s anger. Official harassment of journalists has continued. The 1995 peace agreement with Tuaregs in north Niger has been completed.

The economy: The IMF has resumed payments under the 1996-98 ESAF, following recent efforts by the government to control spending and reform the public sector. The IMF has projected real GDP growth of 4% for 1998, compared with a low 3% in 1997. Year-on-year inflation rose by almost 8% in June. Emergency food stocks remain dangerously low and the threat of famine is increasing. The liberalisation of the oil sector is under way. Germany has resumed aid suspended more than two years ago.

Editor: Charlotte Vaillant All queries: Tel: (44.171) 830 1007 Fax: (44.171) 830 1023

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 4 Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso

Political structure

Official name République démocratique du Burkina Faso

Form of state Unitary republic

Legal system Based on constitution adopted by referendum in June 1991

National legislature Bicameral: the Assemblée nationale of 111 deputies, elected for a five-year term by universal suffrage in a single round; and the Chambre des représentants, of 178 nominated members

National elections December 1991 (presidential) and May 1997 (legislative); next elections due in 1998 (presidential) and 2002 (legislative)

Head of state President, elected for a seven-year term by universal suffrage

National government Council of Ministers, appointed by the prime minister, who is appointed by the president; last reshuffled June 1997

Main political parties Congrès pour la démocratie et le progrès (CDP, 101 seats); Parti pour la démocratie et le progrès (PDP, six seats); Rassemblement démocratique africain-Alliance pour la démocratie et la fédération (RDA-ADF; the RDA and ADF merged in May 1998 and have four seats). The CDP forms the government

President Blaise Compaoré Prime minister Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo

Ministers of state At the Presidency Arsène Bongnessan Yé Environment & water Salif Diallo

Key ministers Agriculture Michel Koutaba Civil service & institutional development Paramanga Ernest Yonli Culture & communications Mahamoudou Ouédraogo Defence Albert D Millogo Economy & finance Tertius Zongo Employment, labour & social security Elie Sarré Energy & mines Elie Ouédraogo Foreign affairs Ablassé Ouédraogo Health Alain Ludovic Tou Industry, commerce & artisanry Idrissa Zampaligré Infrastructure, housing & town planning Joseph Kaboré Primary education & mass literacy Baworo Seydou Sanou Territorial administration Yéro Boly Transport & tourism Bédouma Alain Yoda Women’s promotion Alice Tiendrébégeo

Central bank governor Charles Konan Banny

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Economic structure

Latest available figures

Economic indicators 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997a GDP at market prices (CFAfr bn) 796.0 1,030.2 1,102.5 1,231.5b 1,344.6 Real GDP growth (%) 0.5 1.0 4.8 6.1 5.5b Consumer price inflation (av; %) 0.5 25.2 7.4 6.2 2.8b Population (m) 9.7 9.9 10.1 10.3 10.5 Exports fob ($ m) 226.1 215.6 275.6 304.5b n/a Imports fob ($ m) 469.1 344.3 485.4 583.5b n/a Current-account balance ($ m) –71.1 14.9 8.6 –103.0b n/a Reserves excl gold ($ m) 382.3 237.2 347.4 338.6 332.8c Total external debt ($ m) 1,117 1,129 1,267 1,294 n/a External debt-service ratio, paid (%) 8.3 12.1 11.8 10.8 n/a Raw cotton productiond (’000 tonnes) 116.9 143.1 151.2 206.0 290.0 Exchange rate (av; CFAfr:$) 283.2 555.2 499.2 511.6 583.7e

July 24th 1998 CFAfr596.5:$1

Origins of gross domestic product 1995 % of total Components of gross domestic product 1995 % of total Agriculture 32.9 Private consumption 78.5 Industry 26.4 Government consumption 14.5 Manufacturing 20.1 Gross domestic investment 22.8 Services 40.6 Exports of goods & services 14.5 GDP at factor cost 100.0 Imports of goods & services –30.3 GDP at market prices 100.0

Principal exports 1996b $ m Principal imports 1995 $ m Cotton 110 Capital goods 151 Gold 18 Food 70 Petroleum products 51

Main destinations of exports 1996f % of total Main origins of imports 1996f % of total France 9.3 France 21.7 Taiwan 8.8 Côte d’Ivoire 14.2 Italy 7.7 Togo 3.9 Brazil 4.6 Nigeria 2.9 a EIU estimates. b Official estimates. c November actual. d Crop years beginning in calendar years. e Actual. f Based on trading partners’ returns; subject to a wide margin of error.

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Outlook for 1998-99

Mr Compaoré wants the Confident of his re-election to a second seven-year term in the November 15th opposition to contest the presidential poll, the president, Blaise Compaoré, is more worried that the presidential election— major opposition parties may once again boycott the election, as they did during the last election in December 1991. Such a boycott would continue to deprive him of the political legitimacy that only a contested election can bring, not only domestically, but also in the eyes of Burkina Faso’s international partners. Having become the new chairman of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), following the OAU’s early June summit meeting in Ouagadougou the international spotlight will be on the country more than ever before and the shortcomings in its political system will be thrown into starker relief. The fact that Mr Compaoré’s ruling Congrès pour la démocratie et le progrès (CDP) secured 101 out of 111 seats in the Assemblée nationale during the last legislative election in May 1997, amid opposition accusations of widespread electoral fraud and manipulation, is already difficult enough to explain away. Moreover, the memory of how Mr Compaoré originally came to power—in a 1987 military coup, over the body of the popular president, Thomas Sankara— has still not faded, as he discovered with dismay when reporters asked about his role in the coup during a visit to Uganda in early May to prepare for the OAU summit. Given such sensitivities, even a symbolic participation by the opposition in the forthcoming presidential election will be important for the political image Mr Compaoré is trying to project.

—and has made some This helps to explain the CDP’s decision to concede one of the opposition’s key important concessions to demands—the establishment of an independent electoral commission—and to bring them in make further concessions when the amended legislation was finally adopted by parliament on May 7th. At least on paper, the new Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI) marks an improvement over the old electoral body, whose chairman and other key officers were government nominees. No direct government representatives will sit on the new commission, which will comprise 6 figures from the ruling party, 6 from the opposition and 15 from civil society organisations. While some opposition groups and pro-democracy lobbies acknowledged the CENI as a step forward, however imperfect, the main opposition alliance, known as the Group of February 14th, has continued to reject the commission on the grounds that it is not truly independent. Their main—and most credible—complaint concerns the CENI’s limited supervisory role in the drawing up of the electoral rolls and issuing of voter cards, areas that in the past have involved the greatest number of allegations of fraud. Although the Group has threatened to boycott the election if the CENI’s independence and mandate are not strengthened and expanded, leaders of some of its con- stituent parties are nevertheless jockeying for political position in anticipation of a possible contest against Mr Compaoré.

The government moves Under pressure from external donors, the government is moving more force- into confrontation with fully to modernise public administration, in part by introducing more flexi- its civil servants bility to civil service employment practices. This, however, is running up against stiff opposition from the powerful public-sector trade unions, which have held a series of protest marches and brief warning strikes against a law

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altering the civil service promotion system. Beyond the problems that the unions themselves may cause the government, they have succeeded to some extent in politicising the issue, by claiming that the new, more discretionary, promotion procedures would strengthen the CDP’s ability to reward civil servants who are politically loyal and punish those who are not. Accordingly, the Group of February 14th has incorporated opposition to the public administration reform programme into its list of demands.

Cotton will play an With Burkina Faso highly dependent on agriculture for its overall economic increasing role in performance, the 5.5% growth in the country’s GDP in 1997, despite poor rains economic growth— and significantly reduced cereal production, may be attributed to the direct and indirect effects of the cotton sector’s exceptionally strong showing. In recent years cotton has accounted for about 55% of foreign-exchange earnings and 35% of GDP, so its fortunes will continue to have a significant impact on the economy as a whole. Total production of seed cotton had already reached a record 206,000 tonnes in 1996/97, the first year of a five-year recovery campaign by the Société des fibres et textiles (Sofitex), the cotton parastatal. In 1997/98 output climbed further, to 334,000 tonnes, very close to Sofitex’s initial five-year goal of 345,000 tonnes. Encouraged by farmers’ enthusiastic response to the campaign, it has raised the goal even higher for 1998/99, setting an initial target of 400,000 tonnes.

—as will gold, once the In terms of foreign earning power, cotton’s biggest potential rival is gold, Poura mine reopens which has been attracting considerable foreign investment over the past two years. Actual production has been disappointing, however, given that most of the external investments so far have remained at the prospecting stage and that the officially collected output of the artisanal and semi-industrial mines generally has not reached much more than 1 tonne annually. The biggest single mine, at Poura, has not been producing for several years because of extensive rehabilitation work, but with rehabilitation now expected to be completed by October 1998, gold production may soon begin to climb.

Burkina Faso: forecast summary

1996a 1997b 1998c 1999c Real GDP growth (% change) 6.1 5.5d 5.0 5.3 Consumer prices (% change; average) 6.2 2.8b 3.0 3.0 Overall fiscal balance (% of GDP) –8.9 –8.2 –8.4 –8.3 Current-account balance (% of GDP; excl official transfers) –14.0 –11.6 –10.5 –10.2 Gross official international reserves (months of import cover) 9.2 9.2 9.6 9.5

a Actual. b EIU estimates. c EIU forecasts. d Official estimate.

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Burkina Faso: gross domestic product Burkina Faso: real exchange rates (c) % change, year on year 1990=100 140 7 Naira:$ Burkina Faso 6 Africa 120 5

4 100 3 Cedi:$ 2 80

n/a 60 0 1995 96 97(a) 98(b) 99(b) CFAfr:$

(a) Official estimates. (b) EIU forecasts. (c) Nominal exchange rates adjusted for changes in relative consumer prices. Sources: EIU; IMF, World Economic Outlook. 1990 91 92 93 94 95 96 9798(b) 98 99(b) 99

Review

The political scene

A civil service reform bill Following months of heated public debate and dire warnings from the public- is pushed through sector trade unions, the Assemblée nationale on April 28th adopted a new law parliament— on the employment and promotion of civil servants, a key component of a package of reforms designed to modernise the country’s public administration. With its overwhelming majority, the ruling Congrès pour la démocratie et le progrès (CDP) easily pushed through the measure, with 98 votes for, 8 opposition party votes against, and abstentions by 2 CDP deputies. Among other changes, the legislation scraps the old system of regular promotions based on years of service, providing instead for advancement on the basis of performance evaluations by employees’ immediate superiors. Although presented as a merit-based system, the unions charge that it will be open to arbitrariness, favouritism and political interference from the CDP. The unions also fear that this law, just one of three on civil service personnel issues, is part of a broader bid to weaken public-sector job security. Indeed, the government has openly spoken of “contractualisation”, the hiring of public employees according to contracts of limited duration, thus suggesting a move away from the old con- cept of lifelong career civil service. By challenging the established procedures and positions that Burkina Faso’s more than 40,000 civil servants have become accustomed to over the decades since independence, the government has taken on a formidable political and social force.

—prompting protest The first active opposition to the civil service reform effort had come on marches and strikes— December 9th, when the Confédération générale du travail du Burkina (CGTB) called its public-sector workers out on a brief protest strike. Then on April 27th, the day before the Assemblée nationale was scheduled to take up the bill, a CGTB-organised march brought some 3,000 workers and students to the parliament building. Linking the government’s public administrative reform measures to the structural adjustment programme supported by the World Bank and

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IMF, the CGTB general secretary, Tolé Sagnon, claimed that “this reform is part of the anti-social and anti-national demands of international donor institutions”. A similar CGTB march on May Day was blocked by the mayor of Ouagadougou, Simon Compaoré, but the Collective of 13, comprising several other federations and independent unions, held a march and rally denouncing civil service reform, rising unemployment and high-level corruption. A statement by the Collective charged that the law adopted by parliament would transform civil servants into “lackeys” subject to the whims of the country’s governing “princes”. The Collective of 13 then called a 48-hour general strike on May 19th and 20th. Although the government-owned press reported a mixed turnout in Ouagadougou, the unions claimed that 70% of primary school teachers went on strike in Kadiogo, the province that includes the national capital, and that the strike call was widely followed in Bobo-Dioulasso, Koudougou, Kaya, Ouahigouya, Banfora and several other provincial capitals.

—and a petition campaign The CGTB did not call out its members for this protest strike—demonstrating to overturn the measure— yet again the divisions among the union federations, even concerning issues upon which they generally agree. But the CGTB did launch a petition drive, aimed at collecting the 15,000 signatures needed legally to challenge the law. Government officials conceded that the constitution permits a law to be over- turned through public petition, but stressed that it would have to meet all legal requirements before the petition could be considered.

—but the government Overall, the government has taken a firm stance towards the unions, although remains firm on often in conciliatory language. On May 19th, the start of the two-day protest implementation strike, Paramanga Ernest Yonli and Elie Sarré, the civil service and labour ministers respectively, argued that opposition to the reform measures was mainly a result of misinformation and that no public employees would suffer a “negative” economic impact (meaning salary cuts). However, Mr Sarré added that, as the legislation had now been enacted into law, there was no longer any point in dialogue over its specific provisions: all that remained was to carry it out.

A law on state In December 1997 the prime minister, Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo, had explained intervention still leaves it that the overall aim of the government’s package of administrative reforms was with broad powers— to move away from the earlier, post-independence model of an interventionist state. The goal, he said, is a state that is more streamlined and efficient, less costly and better attuned to the realities of globalisation and economic liberalisation. However, a law passed by the Assemblée nationale on April 21st “clarifying” the specific scope of state action still left a broad field for govern- mental intervention, not only in such obvious areas as justice, social services, infrastructure and protection of the environment, but also in the “domain of production”, specifically citing agriculture, livestock, fishing, mining, industry and artisanal trades. The actual policies currently followed by the government, at the urging of the World Bank and IMF, indicate a clear move away from excessive economic intervention, but it appears that at the level of broad principle at least, the government is still keeping its options open.

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—but decentralisation Another part of the government’s overall administrative reform package—a set bills are postponed amid of four laws on decentralisation—did not win parliamentary approval, how- parliamentary discord ever, with deputies from both the CDP and the opposition expressing serious reservations. The most controversial aspect was a suggestion that the country’s 45 provinces be regrouped into a number of larger regions. During debates on the draft laws on May 11th, some deputies asked whether regionalisation would not mark a return to the pre-1983 system, when the country was sub- divided into 11 regions; then seen as cumbersome and bureaucratic, the regions were subsequently redivided into 25, then 30, then 45 provinces, partly in order to bring government and its services closer to the rural population. A number of deputies also raised fears that the creation of larger regions could threaten social harmony, as they might favour the larger ethnic groups, leaving the smaller ones frustrated. Others focused on ambiguities in the government drafts, querying whether the new regions would simply be administrative structures, headed by appointed officials, or whether they would have a political character, as they would presumably be headed by elected governors. At the conclusion, Mélégué Traoré, the president of the Assemblée nationale, announced that the four bills were being withdrawn for further reflection.

Violent protests rock Fada Perhaps reinforcing the parliamentary deputies’ concerns about threats to law N’Gourma and order in the countryside, Fada N’Gourma, the capital of one of Burkina Faso’s more impoverished provinces, was rocked for several days in early March by often violent protests. Prompted by allegations that the mayor, Idrissa Tandamba, and other officials were involved in the corrupt appropriation of municipal land titles, protesters demanded the mayor’s resignation. Several were wounded when he ordered police to fire into the crowds. CDP leaders, traditional chiefs and other dignitaries then organised a series of meetings to try to calm the situation. The government-owned daily Sidwaya suggested that factional divisions among the locally dominant ethnic group, the Gourman- tché, may have played a factor in the conflict.

Parliament approves an Replacing the previous electoral commission, which was directly under the independent electoral government’s control, the CDP majority in parliament on May 7th pushed commission— through a law creating the new Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI), an ostensibly autonomous body. An independent commission had long been a key demand of the opposition, but the Group of February 14th, a coalition of ten parties (including all three opposition parties with parliamentary representation), rejected the measure on the grounds that its authority and independence were both too limited (2nd quarter 1998, pages 10-11). The legislation as finally adopted did incorporate some of the opposition’s proposed amendments: commission members would enjoy immunity for any actions related to their commission functions (though not the full immunity the opposition had sought) and the CENI will be a standing body, not a temporary institution set up solely for the forthcoming November 15th presidential election, as the government had initially envisaged. It will have 27 members: 6 from the ruling party, 6 from the opposition, and 15 civil society representatives (3 religious, 3 traditional, 3 human rights and 6 trade union). In addition, a six-member technical committee, appointed by the government, will ensure co-ordination with the relevant government ministries.

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—but the opposition Some opposition parties, human rights groups, and even Mr Sagnon of the alliance still rejects it— CGTB, while critical of certain features of the CENI, nevertheless welcomed it as an improvement over the old Commission nationale d’organisation des élections (CNOE). However, the Mouvement burkinabè des droits de l’homme et des peuples, the most prominent rights group in the country, considered the new commission to be little more than a revised CNOE. The opposition’s Group of February 14th (named after the date on which it was formed this year) took a similar stance. The six deputies belonging to the Parti pour la démocratie et le progrès (PDP) and the two of the Rassemblement démocratique africaine (RDA) voted in parliament against the measure, while the alliance as a whole stated in a declaration following the passage of the amended CENI legislation that the commission still did not meet the “basic minimal conditions” demanded by the opposition for a “truly independent” CENI. Among various criticisms, it said that the commission would not be sufficiently autonomous of the CDP-dominated administration, would not have authority to ensure equi- table coverage in the media, and would lack sufficient resources and financial autonomy. Most strongly, the alliance complained that the CENI would not be in charge of drawing up the voters’ lists or of the distribution of voter regis- tration cards, the phases of the electoral process that have generated the most allegations of fraud during previous ballots.

—and leaves a cloud over The opposition alliance’s declaration belligerently concluded with the slogan: its participation in the “Without a truly independent CENI, no elections!” While it is unlikely that the presidential poll group would be in any position physically to block the November poll, a boycott would nevertheless seriously undercut the perceived legitimacy of any second-term mandate for President Compaoré. His first electoral mandate, ob- tained in December 1991, was won in an uncontested vote boycotted by all the opposition parties, a factor that left a stain on the democratic image he has been trying to cultivate internationally. The CDP’s heavily lopsided win in the May 1997 legislative election, giving it 101 out of 111 seats in the Assemblée nationale, only compounded the problem. Mr Compaoré acknowledged as much in an interview in early March, when he told Sidwaya that he hoped for a bigger opposition representation in the future, to “further strengthen our democracy”. By holding out the implied threat of another boycott, the Group of February 14th is playing on this concern, perhaps in the hope of securing a few more concessions.

Speculation over To keep the boycott threat credible, representatives of the Group of February opposition candidates 14th have repeatedly stated that no discussions have been held on fielding a mounts— possible candidate or candidates against Mr Compaoré; indeed, the question is not even on the agenda, they assert. Nevertheless, as November draws closer, speculation has been rife in the Burkinabè press and among the party ranks themselves over likely contenders. The declared candidacy of Ram Ouédraogo of the environmentalist Verts du Burkina (which is not part of the opposition alliance) has put further pressure on the other parties to begin considering whom they might put forward.

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—as Mr Yaméogo is Aside from the veteran politician Joseph Ki-Zerbo, the head of the PDP, proclaimed head of a Hermann Yaméogo has emerged as an increasingly strong potential contender. merged ADF and RDA— The son of the country’s first president, Maurice Yaméogo, he has for several years headed the Alliance pour la démocratie et la fédération (ADF), which won two seats in the last legislative election. Although this marked a decline from the party’s previous strength (five seats), Mr Yaméogo has rebuilt his political base by successfully managing a merger with the RDA, the party his father headed in the 1960s. At the two parties’ merger congress, held in Bobo-Dioulasso on May 27th-29th, Mr Yaméogo was chosen as president of the new party, which is to be known as the ADF-RDA. Gérard Kango Ouédraogo, the ageing head of the RDA, had gracefully stepped aside and accepted the post of “honourary life president”. By ushering through the merger, Mr Yaméogo has not only mod- estly increased his political weight in parliament, but can also tap into Mr Ouédraogo’s traditional political base in Yatenga province. In addition, he can now expect more forthright support from the Parti démocratique du Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), the ruling party in neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire, which is another offshoot of the old regional RDA of pre-independence days and which sent a high-level delegation to the ADF-RDA congress in Bobo-Dioulasso. However, Mr Yaméogo’s participation until June 1997 as a minister in the Compaoré government means that some of his colleagues in the Group of February 14th remain suspicious of his political allegiances, and may be uncomfortable supporting him as a common candidate against Mr Compaoré.

—while the PAI overhauls Virtually simultaneously with the ADF-RDA congress, the Parti africain de its leadership l’indépendance (PAI), another member of the Group of February 14th and one of Burkina Faso’s oldest left-wing parties, decided to retire many of its long- time leaders. At a May 28th-29th congress in Bobo-Dioulasso, Philippe Ouédraogo, the party secretary-general for some three decades, and ten other leaders were proclaimed “honorary members” of the party’s Executive Bureau, while a comparable number of somewhat younger figures stepped into their posts. Best known among them is Soumane Touré, the new secretary-general, a fiery former trade union leader who in the late 1970s and 1980s confronted a succession of military governments, sometimes suffering imprisonment as a result. Subsequently, the PAI, and Mr Touré in particular, played a pivotal role in building a pro-government alliance in 1991-92, at a time when the opposition was leading large demonstrations. The PAI has since become disillusioned with Mr Compaoré, and in 1997 again moved into opposition.

Mr Compaoré receives a As he did with the Africa Cup of Nations football tournament in February in political boost from the Ouagadougou (2nd quarter 1998, page 11), Mr Compaoré used his govern- OAU summit— ment’s position as host of the early June summit meeting of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to domestic political effect, demonstrating to potential voters his growing stature as a continental statesman. In the weeks leading up to the summit he undertook a number of trips, to Addis Ababa (the OAU head- quarters) and other African capitals, and there was extensive national media coverage of his preparatory meetings and predictions that the Ouagadougou summit would mark a turning point in the OAU’s history. His opening and closing speeches to the summit received similar treatment, while the government’s information officers trumpeted the Ouagadougou summit as the largest

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in the organisation’s history—although the independent daily Observateur Paalga later pointed out that the 1981 summit in Nairobi was in fact larger.

—and again comes to The OAU summit’s condemnation of the international sanctions against Libya, Libya’s defence— for the second year in a row, was given particular emphasis by Mr Compaoré and the government media. Even more pleasing for Mr Compaoré was the OAU’s decision that henceforth member states would no longer need to respect the embargo, a position that his government had already been following in practice. Over the past year, the Burkinabè president has made several official visits to Libya, the most recent in April. Libya was the largest single donor ($2m) to contribute to Burkina Faso’s preparations for the OAU summit, and a few days after the summit’s conclusion provided two further grants to the country, CFAfr600m ($1m) for grain purchases and CFAfr250m for wells and boreholes in the arid northern provinces.

—but the OAU deflects his Somewhat embarrassingly for Mr Compaoré, however, the OAU did not follow proposal to end Saharan through on the Burkinabè government’s very energetic campaign to withdraw recognition membership of the OAU from the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and thus pave the way for Morocco, which controls and claims Western Sahara, to rejoin the continental organisation. In the lead-up to the summit, the foreign minister, Ablassé Ouédraogo, argued that the OAU’s admission of the SADR in 1984 had been a “mistake”, as the SADR does not actually “exist”, at least by most international criteria for statehood. Moreover, he noted, some ten African countries, including Burkina Faso, have in recent years withdrawn diplomatic recognition from the SADR, reducing to a minority the number of OAU member states that recognise it. However, the subject of the withdrawal of the SADR’s OAU membership did not actually arise, in part because of strong resistance from southern African heads of state, especially South Africa’s president, Nelson Mandela. Some of the independent press considered the Burkinabè government’s decision to press the Saharan issue as “amateurish”, suggesting that Mr Ouédraogo had not adequately gauged African views on the matter before the summit opened. At a post-summit news conference, Mr Compaoré announced that the issue would be referred to the OAU foreign ministers and that he hoped that it would soon be resolved. With the Burkinabè president now chairing the OAU, there is little doubt that he will try to press for the withdrawal of the SADR’s membership, not least because of the growing aid that Morocco has given to Burkina Faso (see The economy).

Support for the ousted In late May Mr Ouédraogo vehemently denied charges by refugees from the Sierra Leone junta is continuing fighting in Sierra Leone that Burkina Faso is supplying arms to denied by Mr Ouédraogo supporters of the military junta ousted there in February by a West African force. Burkina Faso, he maintained, has too many immediate concerns of its own to become involved in a far-off country. But he also described it as “intol- erable to seek legality through force” in Sierra Leone, an implicit criticism of the Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (Ecomog) intervention forces, which reinstalled the democratically elected president, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. Whatever Burkina Faso’s current in- volvement in Sierra Leone, a former Sierra Leonean air force major captured by Ecomog troops declared in early June that both Burkina Faso and Liberia had

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 14 Burkina Faso

airlifted significant quantities of arms and ammunition to the junta while it was still in power, in violation of the UN arms embargo then in effect against the country.

A US general looks Visiting Burkina Faso in March, General James Jamerson, the US Force Com- forward to renewed mander in Europe, said that the US would like to “renew” military contacts military ties between the two countries, which had been broken in 1983 with the seizure of power by Thomas Sankara. In a meeting with President Compaoré, General Jamerson also sought to dispel any possible “misunderstanding” about the US government’s Africa Crisis Response Initiative, aimed at supporting African countries’ efforts to establish and train regional peacekeeping units. He noted Burkina Faso’s growing role in such peacekeeping ventures in recent years, including its hosting of the “Cohesion Kompienga ’98" military exercises in late April, involving 4,000 troops from eight African countries.

The economy

Growth in 1997 was In his annual state of the nation speech to parliament on March 27th, the spurred by a credit prime minister reported that average real GDP growth in 1997 had reached a expansion relatively strong 5.5% in part because of an increase in credit, which brought a 13% expansion of money in circulation. Much of this was in the form of producer loans to Burkina Faso’s cotton farmers. The outstanding performance of cotton (see Agriculture and livestock), despite the second year in a row of poor rains and reduced cereal output, was another factor reinforcing the overall growth rate, the prime minister observed. Industrial output was also strong, with the industrial production index rising from 86.1 in 1996 to 105.9 in 1997: here too, the large cotton harvest had made its impact felt, as the rise in cotton ginning activity contributed to the overall industrial performance.

The prime minister The prime minister led a delegation with a strong focus on economic issues to receives US praise for his Washington from May 31st to June 2nd, accompanied by the minister of eco- economic policies— nomy, Tertius Zongo, and the minister of trade, Idrissa Zampaligré. The delegation held extensive discussions with officials of the World Bank and the IMF, with the IMF deputy managing director, Alassane Ouattara, expressing his institution’s satisfaction with Burkina Faso’s management of the economy. The prime minister also met with numerous US diplomatic and aid officials, and on the last day of the visit addressed the Corporate Council on Africa, a private-sector group devoted to expanding ties with the continent: the Council has announced plans to send a group of American businessmen to Burkina Faso this September.

—but is also questioned by Before departing for Washington, Mr Ouédraogo and his entourage spent sev- French businessmen about eral days in France. During a breakfast meeting at the Paris Chamber of US competition Commerce, he was bombarded with questions from French businessmen, some of whom are worried that Africa might be falling into the “American orbit”, in the wake of President Bill Clinton’s recent high-profile African tour. Mr Ouédraogo praised the US president’s trip as a timely recognition of Africa’s economic potential and then pointedly declared that he hoped it would “stimulate our European partners to turn their eyes back to this continent, which has been abandoned for several years”.

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 Burkina Faso 15

Hotel owners complain Reinforcing the general disappointment over the economic balance sheet of about disappointing the Africa Cup of Nations football tournament held in Burkina Faso in February Africa Cup earnings (2nd quarter 1998, page 14), the Association des hôteliers et restaurateurs du Burkina announced at a press conference in late March that many hotels had lower than anticipated occupancy rates during the games. Citing several exam- ples in Ouagadougou, they also complained about the conduct of the Cup’s national organisation commission, which had reserved groups of rooms at some hotels, but then failed to fill them or even diverted guests to other hotels or private accommodation at the last minute.

A teachers’ union reaches On June 5th, a day before a 48-hour warning strike was set to begin, one of the an accord with the two main secondary and higher education teachers’ unions, the Syndicat nat- government ional des enseignants du secondaire et du supérieur (SNESS), reached an accord with the government. Among various issues dealing with teachers’ advancement, placement and remuneration, the agreement addressed their longstand- ing demand for higher housing allowances, with the government agreeing to a compromise offer of CFAfr5,000 ($8.5) more per month, a 33.3% increase for secondary teachers and a 16.6% one for those at higher institutions. However, a rival teachers’ union, the Syndicat national des travailleurs de l’éducation et de la recherche (SYNTER), which is allied with the CGTB, criticised the SNESS for breaking ranks and negotiating a separate deal with the government. It also denounced the accord as an attempt to divert teachers from the struggle against the government’s public administration reform package.

Morocco helps to seed the With Ouagadougou and much of central and northern Burkina Faso suffering clouds from severe water shortages, the government has been under considerable pressure to do something about the problem. In addition to commissioning several new dams to feed the reservoirs and power plants (2nd quarter 1998, pages 15 and 17), it has also appealed to Morocco to provide assistance in seeding clouds (cloud seeding involves introducing salt crystals or other parti- cles into cloud formations, so that atmospheric water vapour and cloud drop- lets may condense with enough density to precipitate actual rainfall). Morocco has considerable experience in the technology (cloud seeding in the country is claimed to have increased average annual rainfall by 17%), and it agreed in April to send 87 technicians and several aircraft to Burkina Faso. Working with about 130 Burkinabè personnel, they began seeding clouds in the vicinity of Ouagadougou. When the first few millimetres of rain fell in May over Ouagadougou’s reservoirs, there was some jubilation, although the success of the programme remains to be demonstrated fully. The plan is to continue the cloud seeding throughout the rainy season, from May through October, and to extend the operations to the central and northern provinces.

Agriculture and livestock

Grain prices are pushed According to the government’s final figures for the 1997/98 agricultural season, up by the poor harvest— included in the prime minister’s report to parliament, total gross cereal production reached 2m tonnes, 19% below the output for the 1996/97 season. This left a 160,000-tonne cereal deficit, after stock drawdowns and imports had been accounted for. As a result the US government’s Famine Early Warning

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 16 Burkina Faso

System (FEWS) reported in late May that average prices for millet, one of the country’s grain staples, had by April climbed 30% higher than they had been in the same month of the previous year, and were expected to remain high throughout the “hungry season” which lasts from May to August. Such high prices are beyond the purchasing power of the urban poor and residents of food-deficit provinces. Among other donor contributions to help to fill the gap, Japan in April granted the country CFAfr1.9bn ($3.2m) for the purchase of Japanese rice.

—but cotton output Generally grown in provinces with higher average rainfall, and with its deep continues to break all roots that take advantage of soil moisture, cotton performed exceptionally records— well, despite the year’s disappointing rains, in the 1997/98 season. According to Célestin Tiendrébéogo, the director-general of the Société des fibres et textiles (Sofitex), the cotton parastatal, total production of seed cotton reached 334,000 tonnes in 1997/98, well above the previous season’s record-setting 206,000 tonnes. In reaching this level, he noted that it had taken Sofitex only two years to approach its five-year goal of 345,000 tonnes. The initial target set for the next campaign will be 400,000 tonnes.

—thanks to significant Mr Tiendrébéogo attributed this success in part to Sofitex’s heavy investments investments and farmer over the past two years in increased ginning capacity and the construction of incentives 1,830 km of rural roads, to enable farmers to bring their crops to collection points. Perhaps even more significantly, low-interest credits have been provided to cotton farmers, to help them purchase more fertiliser, insecticide and other inputs, at subsidised prices. While in the past cotton farmers had to use an average of 55% of their income to repay input costs, he noted, the average has now come down to around 40%. Greater use of inputs, in turn, has continued to push up cotton yields, from 1,095 kg/ha in 1996/97 to 1,136 kg/ha this past season. Most of the increase in total cotton output, however, is a result of more land area being devoted to the crop. The improved incentives for cotton, especially by comparison with those for food crops, have induced more farmers to switch over, including in areas not traditionally known for cotton cultivation.

Problems emerge in the Another factor in cotton’s revival, according to Sofitex officials, has been the cotton producer groups— formation, beginning two years ago, of new local cotton farmers’ associations, the Groupes des producteurs de coton (GPCs). An estimated 5,900 are now believed to exist around the country, and in mid-April a Union nationale des GPCs du Burkina was set up to help them better formulate their concerns and co-ordinate their activities. Sofitex, which initiated their formation, saw the GPCs as a more efficient way to channel credits and inputs to cotton farmers than through the old groupements villageois (GVs), which were open to all economically active villagers, including food farmers, merchants and stock- raisers. By setting up groups open only to cotton farmers, it was reasoned, subsidised credits and inputs intended to boost cotton production would not “leak” over into other activities, and the robust incomes from cotton would ensure that the GPCs would be better able to repay their loans than the chroni- cally indebted GVs. The reality has not been so simple, however. During the past season, Sofitex officials have complained that some farmers joined GPCs not in order to produce cotton, but to gain access to loans, fertiliser and

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 Burkina Faso 17

insecticide, which they then diverted to other purposes. As a result, loan repay- ment problems also have re-emerged. In addition, many GPCs lack training, do not manage their inputs properly and are poorly organised.

Applying more stringent criteria, Sofitex has concluded formal credit agreements with only about 2,000 GPCs, one-third of the total number; to qualify, a GPC must have at least 15 members, produce 40 tonnes or more of cotton and have organised technical subcommittees. Some cotton farmers, in turn, have raised com- plaints of their own: that there are still not enough rural roads, that cotton pick-ups and payments are sometimes late, that their cotton is given too low a grade, and that Sofitex agents are frequently corrupt and try to cheat them.

—and about the impact on Coming at the same time as declining cereal output, the revival of cotton has the environment and stirred fears among some local development practitioners and non-govern- food security mental organisations (NGOs) that the government’s push towards cotton production may be excessive or too one-sided. With no comparable incentives for cereal production, many farmers in traditional grain-producing areas are aban- doning their food crops for cotton. In addition, notes Nata Traoré, a Burkinabè official of a Dutch agricultural development NGO, little effort is being made to restore soil fertility in cotton-producing areas, for example, by integrating livestock raising with agriculture in order to produce organic fertiliser, as is done in neighbouring Mali.

Mining and energy

Gold collection falls short In 1997 the state marketing company, Comptoir Burkinabè des métaux of the target— précieux (CBMP), collected 1,213 kg of gold from semi-industrial and artisanal producers, at a value of CFAfr8bn ($13.4m). This was 16% below the 1,450-kg projection for the year. As a significant portion of artisanal gold production is actually smuggled abroad, this shortfall may not reflect an actual decline in production, but simply the CBMP’s inability to collect as much of the gold as it had initially expected.

—but the Poura mine is The surface and underground operations of the Poura gold mine once accounted set to reopen in October for the bulk of Burkina Faso’s official gold production, but for the past two years it has been closed for rehabilitation, at a cost so far of CFAfr3.2bn ($5.4m), largely financed through the European Union’s SYSMIN programme. The operation was taken over last year by the Toronto-based Sahelian Goldfields, which poured its first symbolic gold bar in April to test the processing plant. The mine itself is expected to reopen in October, and Sahelian Goldfields has announced that it will exercise its option to acquire a 90% interest in the Poura mine from Ashanti Goldfields of Ghana (the Burkinabè government holds the remaining 10%).

The Aga Khan backs a In May the Council of Ministers approved an agreement to build a new power new power plant station, named “Ouaga III”, in the Kossodo industrial zone just outside the capital. The new station will be financed, built and run by the Société inter- nationale de promotion des services, an affiliate of the Aga Khan Economic Development Fund, and will have a capacity of 30 mw, which could possibly be expanded later to 50 mw.

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 18 Burkina Faso

Foreign trade, aid and payments

The balance-of-payments The overall balance-of-payments deficit jumped from CFAfr1.7bn ($2.8m) in deficit widens 1996 to CFAfr32.5bn in 1997, according to initial government estimates, in spite considerably of the strong 23.6% increase in export receipts last year. In his speech to parliament in March, the prime minister said that the main factors behind the rising gap were a 45% increase in oil import costs (owing to the strengthened US dollar), a 12.2% rise in industrial equipment imports, a growth in net services payments and declines in both net transfers and long-term capital inflows.

Trade with France According to figures release by the French embassy in Ouagadougou, France’s continues to increase— exports to Burkina Faso reached FFr744m ($1.24bn) in 1997, a 16% increase on the level in 1996. Meanwhile, French imports from Burkina Faso rose by 13.5%, to FFr103m, comprised mainly of agricultural goods (FFr42m) and gold (FFr46m).

—while French aid falls In 1997 Burkina Faso received only FFr100.9m in project assistance and no further structural adjustment aid from the Agence française de développement (AFD, as the Caisse française de développement has been renamed). This marked a significant decline from the 1995 peak of FFr423.4m in both project and structural adjustment aid.

Burkina Faso: French aid to Burkina Faso (FFr m) 1994 1995 1996 1997 Project aid 188.7 283.4 162.0 100.9 Adjustment aid 100.0 140.0 50.0 0 Source: Agence française de développement.

Aid agreements announced this quarter and not mentioned elsewhere in this report include the following.

• A concessional loan of CFAfr15bn ($25m) from the African Development Fund, approved by parliament in March, to help finance Burkina Faso’s educ- ational development programme.

• Canada has given CFAfr2.2bn ($3.7m) towards the cost of technical assistance and other support for co-operative savings and credit unions.

• The Swiss co-operation agency has donated CFAfr1.3bn to support the establishment of 180 cereal banks by Burkina Faso’s Fonds de l’eau et de l’équipe- ment rural.

• An 18-year loan of nearly CFAfr6bn from Spain, repayable after six years’ grace at 1% annual interest, to support electrification of the country’s depart- mental capitals.

• Japan has made a grant of CFAfr6.5bn to combat Guinea worm disease, through the provision of potable water.

• The Saudi Development Fund has donated $5m for water pumps in the eastern provinces.

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 Niger 19

Niger

Political structure

Official name République du Niger

Form of state Unitary republic

Legal system The 1992 constitution was suspended following the military coup on January 27th 1996. The constitution of the Fourth Republic was approved by referendum in May 1996

National legislature Assemblée nationale of 83 members

National elections July 1996 (presidential) and November 1996 (legislative); next elections due in 2001 (presidential and legislative)

Head of state Executive president, elected by universal suffrage

National government Council of Ministers, headed by the prime minister, appointed by the president in December 1997

Main political parties The Rassemblement pour la démocratie et le progrès (RDP) was formed in March 1997 by the president, General Maïnassara, to convert the pro-Maïnassara parliamentary alliance into a new political party. In 1996, eight opposition parties formed an alliance under the umbrella of the Front pour la restauration et défense de la démocratie (FRDD); among them are the Mouvement national pour la société de développement (MNSD), the Convention démocratique et sociale (CDS) and the Parti nigérien pour la démocratie et le socialisme (PNDS)

Head of state Brigadier-General Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara Prime minister Ibrahim Hassane Maïyaki

Key ministers Civil service, labour & employment Moussa Oumarou Commerce & industry Ibrahim Koussou Communications & culture Issa Moussa Defence Yahya Tounkara Finance, economic reform & privatisation Ide Niandou Foreign affairs & African integration Mambo Sambo Sidikou Justice & human rights Issoufou Aba Moussa Mines & energy Maï Manga Boukar Planning Yacouba Nabassoua Supply & infrastructure Cherif Chako

Central bank governor Charles Konan Banny

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 20 Niger

Economic structure

Latest available figures

Economic indicators 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997a GDP at market prices (CFAfr bn) 628.8 867.8 823.7 860.3 922.1b Real GDP growth (%) 0.2 2.6 1.7 3.5 3.0 Consumer price inflationc (av; %) –0.4 35.6 10.9 5.3 2.1 Population (m) 8.5 8.7 9.0 9.3a 9.6 Exports fob ($ m) 300 277 288 298a n/a Imports fob ($ m) 312 271 306 331a n/a Current-account balance ($ m) –97 –126 –152 n/a n/a Reserves excl gold ($ m) 192.0 110.3 94.7 78.5 53.8b Total external debt ($ m) 1,551 1,539 1,601 1,557 n/a External debt-service ratio, paid (%) 24.2 23.8 16.7 17.3 n/a Uranium productiond (tonnes) 2,921 2,957 2,974 3,326 3,321 Exchange rate (av; CFAfr:$) 283.2 555.2 499.2 511.6 583.7

July 24th 1998 CFAfr596.5:$1

Origins of gross domestic product 1996 % of total Components of gross domestic product 1996 % of total Agriculture 39.9 Private consumption 84.9 Industry 18.2 Government consumption 11.3 Mining 7.5 Gross domestic investment 9.7 Services 41.9 Exports of goods & services 15.6 GDP at market prices 100.0 Imports of goods & services –21.5 GDP at market prices 100.0

Principal exports 1996 $ m Principal imports 1996 $ m Uranium 136 Consumer goods 211 Raw materials & equipment 64 Cereals 18 Petroleum & products 18

Main destinations of exports 1996e % of total Main origins of imports 1996e % of total Greece 21.2 France 17.1 Canada 17.6 Côte d’Ivoire 6.7 France 11.7 US 5.3 Nigeria 7.1 Belgium-Luxembourg 4.2 a EIU estimates. b November actual. c “African” index, Niamey. d Official figures; may understate production. e Derived from partners’ trade returns, subject to a wide margin of error.

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 Niger 21

Outlook for 1998-99

The threat of social Pressure is increasing for the president, Brigadier-General Ibrahim Baré disorder will preoccupy Maïnassara, to pay the long overdue salary arrears for which public-sector the government— employees and their families are growing desperate, and a new and angry mood is becoming visible in Nigérien society. Students, joined by school pupils and the out-of-work, are becoming increasingly vocal about the non-payment of their grants, and unions, which have been peacemakers of late, will find it difficult to curtail for long their members’ demands for militant action against a government whose unpopularity has been growing by the day. Violence is spreading, as people seek outlets for their frustration. Meanwhile, the death of General Sani Abacha in Nigeria is depriving General Maïnassara of an important ally. Indeed, General Abacha was a major source of financial and diplomatic support for the Nigérien government. President Maïnassara may well need the support of the army in the coming months, if the social situation deteriorates further. For the second time this year, army dissent has been dampened down; truculent soldiers have been given their back pay, and will therefore continue to be loyal to the general for a while longer.

—while attention will be General Maïnassara needs, and is striving to achieve, democratic credentials, in on the next local order to satisfy donors and pacify the opposition. He will do all he can to elections— ensure that the forthcoming local elections, mooted for November, are deemed “transparent” by the international community. If the opposition parties take part in the contest, as they say they will, the tally will probably be less rigged than that of the legislative election of 1996 which they boycotted. However, electoral malpractice will probably continue to occur to some extent, with the electoral watchdog, the Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI), remaining firmly under the control of the government. Meanwhile, opposition parties will grow bolder in their demands, with the addition of two highly influential politicians, Colonel Moumouni Adamou Djermakoyé and Sanoussi Jackou, who recently left the ruling coalition, adding valuable voices to the opposition. With fresh elections now at the top of the national agenda, the president has, however temporarily, weathered a major challenge to his leadership, as opposition militants have retracted their demands for his resignation for the time being.

—now that the The authorities have been emboldened by the IMF’s decision at the end of April government has secured to release the latest tranche of structural adjustment lending. This has already donors’ backing triggered fresh financial support from the big bilateral donors, Germany, France and Japan. The EU, which had been withholding a second CFAfr5.1bn ($8.5m) tranche of budgetary aid, pending satisfactory progress with the IMF and World Bank reform programme, including the difficult process of privatisation, is expected to resume payments. In July the European Development Fund announced a sizeable loan for Niger, of CFAfr106bn, to tackle poverty and reinforce democracy. Half of the loan will go towards food security in the country. Further aid flows are expected to follow, and government coffers should therefore begin to fill up in the coming months. This should enable the government to settle contentious salary arrears, at least in part, and pay students their grants, thus defusing a steadily worsening social situation. It should

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 22 Niger

allow the government to complete its budgetary programme, which is 43% dependent on external aid.

Inflation is a temporary A sudden surge of inflationary pressures in the past few months stems mainly problem— from the food crisis. Up to one-quarter of the population will face hunger throughout the remainder of 1998, and their situation will be made worse by the continuing steep upward trend in the prices of staple cereal foods. The government should not, however, find it too difficult to attract international food donations in order to make up the shortfall, of about 150,000 tonnes, from the last growing season,. As long as marketplace speculators can be kept under control, this should help to lower consumer price inflation, perhaps not to the remarkably low 1997 level of 2.1%, but to around 2.5% by early 1999, provided that the coming harvest is near normal. Early indications, however, are that the current growing season is not going well, with large numbers of predatory insects and birds present, and the government will be watching the situation with some anxiety.

—and expectations for With the resumption of international aid having a positive impact on the growth are not under budget, and the likelihood that any serious food deficit will be made up by threat international donations, there is every likelihood that budgetary predictions can be fulfilled this year. Real GDP growth in 1998 may be expected to reach around 4%. Privatisation will inevitably fuel further social discontent, and may lose the government the goodwill of the unions, but it will have the positive benefit of improving state revenue, as will the government’s continuing success in eradicating corruption and extending the tax base.

Niger: gross domestic product Niger: real exchange rates (b) % change, year on year 1990=100 6 140 Naira:$ Niger 5 Africa 120

100 3

Cedi:$ 2 80

1 60 0 1993 94 95 96 97(a) CFAfr:$ (a) EIU estimates. (b) Nominal exchange rates adjusted for changes in relative consumer prices. 1990 91 92 93 94 95 96 97(a) Sources: EIU; IMF, World Economic Outlook.

Review

The political scene

Pressure mounts for the The president, Brigadier-General Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara, came under intense president’s resignation— pressure from opposition parties, students and trade unions in the second

quarter of 1998, a period marked by new waves of demonstrations and continued violence. Anger among students and workers was heightened by a mood of desperation resulting from the authorities’ failure to pay months of arrears in salaries and grants. On April 22nd hundreds of students and schoolchildren spilled out onto the streets of the capital, Niamey, setting fire to barricades of wood and tyres. One indication of the anti-government rage was the stoning of the funeral cortège of a pro-Maïnassara deputy, Ada Maïfada, as it passed through the city’s streets. The police, who responded with teargas and a baton- charge, arrested a number of students on charges of “vandalism”. They reported that “about a dozen” vehicles had been wrecked or burned out, as well as the recovery of quantities of Molotov cocktails, slings and rocks from students’ accommodation. The interior minister, Souley Abdoulaye, promised tough action against those arrested and said that a number of suspects were still being sought. He seized the opportunity to enjoin opposition militants not to disturb public order, warning of new curbs on demonstrations. Meanwhile, the presidential palace issued a statement, denying a report that General Maïnassara was about to step down and call fresh elections. The rumours, which followed an opposition demand for the president’s resignation (2nd quarter 1998, page 24), had caused a wave of excitement and interest across the country.

—while the unions call for A group of eight trade unions, joined by some human rights organisations, restraint— issued an appeal on April 25th for an end to “both political and physical” violence. They called for national reconciliation through talks involving all sectors of society. General Maïnassara, who received the unions’ spokesman, Laouali Mamane Danda, on the same day, gave his full support to the unions’ stance. Mr Danda also met officials of the Front pour la restauration et défense de la démocratie (FRDD), the eight-party opposition coalition that has been calling for the president’s resignation since January. He subsequently held talks with student leaders and members of the pro-Maïnassara parliamentary alliance, the Rassemblement pour la démocratie et le progrès (RDP).

—but the warning goes As a gesture of defiance, however, the FRDD leaders vowed to step up their unheeded campaign, by continuing their series of protests launched in mid-April (2nd quarter 1998, page 24). New demonstrations, staged on April 26th in poor quarters of Niamey, quickly turned violent, as police attempted to drive people off the streets. The worst scenes of violence were reported in the central- southern towns of Zinder and Maradi, where crowds beat up supporters of General Maïnassara and wrecked shops and offices. A number of anti-government activists were subsequently arrested and the government announced its decision to ban all public protests. This did not stop the RDP from staging a pro-Maïnassara rally in the capital on the same day, with speakers calling for support for the president’s “desire to build a prosperous country”, and accusing the opposition of “initiating a policy of violence, sabotage and vandalism”. On April 27th the official radio, Voix du Sahel, reported that activists of the former ruling party, the Convention démocratique et sociale (CDS), had attacked a journalist working for the private radio station, Ténéré FM, for no apparent reason. Most protesters were released on April 29th, and this was followed by the release of 8 students on May 13th and 29 opposition militants on June 3rd.

As the pro-Maïnassara General Maïnassara was also hit hard by an unprecedented rift in the ruling coalition crumbles— coalition in the Assemblée nationale (parliament), when two important party leaders, Colonel Moumouni Adamou Djermakoyé and Sanoussi Jackou, announced on April 29th their decision to switch to the opposition. They accused General Maïnassara of being responsible for mounting tension in the country. The first signs of dissent had appeared in February, when the two leaders joined the leader of the Parti pour l’unité nationale et la démocratie (PUND) to form the Alliance des forces démocratiques et sociale (AFDS; 2nd quarter 1998, pages 23-24). Although the new group was to remain within the ruling majority, the three leaders had insisted that they did not consider themselves bound to the pro-Mainassara alliance, which, they complained, had often treated them as opponents.

Colonel Djermakoyé, who leads the Alliance nigérienne pour la démocratie et le progrès (ANDP), has always retained a powerful influence among the sub- stantial lobby of Nigériens who pine for the days of authoritarian, but stable, military rule under the late General Sayni Kountché (1974-87). Colonel Djer- makoyé was president of the Assemblée nationale in 1993-95 and stood unsuc- cessfully for the presidency in the disputed 1996 elections (3rd quarter 1996, pages 21-26). Mr Jackou was vice-chairman of the CDS under the former president, Mahamane Ousmane (1993-96). When General Maïnassara seized power in 1996, he went on to form the Parti nigérien pour l’autogestion (PNA). The PNA has traditionally been close to the general and Mr Jackou’s decision to break away from the ruling coalition brought open challenges to the party leadership, with the deputy secretary-general, Moudy Mohamed, handing in his resignation at the end of May. In a letter in the Niamey daily Le Sahel, Mr Mohamed criticised a lack of “clear-sightedness” on the part of the PNA leadership.

—the general’s response is Harking back to a formula much used by General Kountché, General to harangue the nation— Maïnassara summoned an “executive conference” on April 29th, bringing together, at a moment of perceived national crisis, 2,000 of the country’s religious, political and trade union leaders, as well as representatives of the private sector. The public forum received extensive radio and television coverage. The president blamed opposition parties for trying to make the country ungov- ernable in recent months. He hinted at strong-arm tactics to halt anti-government demonstrations and attendant lawlessness, ordering government officials to take action in their constituencies. In a long monologue, he warned the FRDD that he would never step down, declaring that “I got where I am now through the will of God, and I shall leave only through the will of God”.

—but the opposition Once again, the FRDD parties emphatically ignored General Maïnassara’s or- remains hostile— der. Only three days after the president’s diatribe, they announced their inten- tion to stage another rally in Zinder. Barricades were set up in the town centre and smoke from burning tyres filled the streets. Fearing new clashes with the security forces, however, the opposition call for a “dead town” or general strike was largely ignored, with most shops remaining open. On the same day, un- known attackers machine-gunned the Maradi home of an opposition activist currently in prison, Zeti Maïga, of the Mouvement national pour la société de développement (MNSD). No one claimed responsibility for the attack and,

although there were no deaths or serious injuries as a result, observers described it as contributing to an already tense social and political atmosphere in the country. Meanwhile, the interior ministry put out a statement threatening to ban political parties identified with public order disturbances.

—until local elections are In a bid to defuse tensions, President Maïnassara announced on May 30th that heralded the next municipal council elections would be held on November 22nd. The government described the poll as completing the democratic process it had initiated after the January 1996 coup, while the general spoke of his desire for “faultless transparency, inviolable rigour, and perfect fairness” in the conduct of elections. The chairman of the independent national electoral commission, the Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI), Abdou Tiousso, called on all opposition parties to name their delegates. The FRDD, however, delayed its decision until July 19th, when its spokesman, Mr Ousmane, announced that the opposition had decided to take part in the local elections and send representatives to the CENI. This is a significant U-turn for opposition leaders who had put themselves outside the formal, constitutional political arena by boy- cotting the last legislative election in November 1996. They have, however, already threatened to backtrack on their decision, if the government fails to provide guarantees to ensure “fair, transparent and free” elections. They did not hesitate to demonstrate on July 6th, with some 2,000 militants urging the CENI to revise the voters’ register before the elections. Mr Tiousso subsequently announced that the electoral list was in the process of being overhauled.

The media has been under Over the same period, local media found themselves harassed by the authori- pressure— ties somewhat more than usual. At the beginning of May the government had the privately run FM radio station Anfani closed for a week, after it had broadcast a petition signed by local and foreign journalists, protesting over con- straints on press freedom and accusing the authorities of “intimidation and death threats”. The journalist who read the petition, Moussa Tchangari, who is also the publisher of the independent Niamey weekly Alternative, was subsequently arrested and detained for nearly a week. A number of other journalists, including the BBC Hausa language correspondent in Zinder, Keita Souleymane, and the publisher of the independent weekly Le Républicain, Maman Abou, were also jailed. Mr Souleymane was released after a week in detention on May 11th.

—with ten newspapers Despite a stream of opposition protest over alleged press harassment, 10 of the suspended— 11 privately owned local newspapers in Niger were closed down on government orders on May 13th, officially for non-payment of taxes. Only one news- paper, Le Républicain, with its publisher already under arrest, was unaffected by the order. On May 14th, however, the general intervened personally to resolve matters. He persuaded the publishers to accept a “friendly arrangement”, suggesting that they run free advertisements for the national lottery in return for having their combined tax bill, totalling CFAfr10m ($16m), settled. All the newspapers subsequently resumed publication.

—while the EU has A statement from the EU presidency in the UK on May 29th voiced the EU’s signalled its displeasure “disappointment” at acts of violence in Niger and also at the authorities’

reaction, “especially the restrictions on press freedom”. The EU called on all parties to refrain from violent actions and engage in a “constructive dialogue”. It was hoped that the local elections, scheduled for November, could boost Niger’s progress toward full democracy.

A Republican Guard Three months after a spate of army mutinies caused jitters in Niamey (2nd mutiny gives the quarter 1998, pages 26-27), the government again suffered a serious jolt over authorities a fright— indiscipline in the military ranks, when members of the Republican Guard in Niamey mutinied over pay arrears, taking their second-in-command hostage on May 30th. This spurred into revolt other soldiers and Guardsmen in the north of the country. General Maïnassara’s aide-de-camp, Colonel Amadou Moussa Gros, announced on Voix du Sahel that the Republican Guard barracks had been surrounded by regular army troops and appealed to the public to keep calm. Twenty-four hours later, an army assault force freed the hostages and restored order after a brief exchange. A number of mutineers were reportedly wounded. In a national broadcast the following day, the interior minister, Abdoulaye Souley called on soldiers from the Republican Guard that had joined with the mutineers to return to their units immediately. As in February, the government appears to have assuaged the mutineers’ demands, by settling part of the overdue pay.

—and General Maïnassara Four high-ranking military officers, loyal to the late president Mobutu Sese grants asylum to Seko in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, former Zaire), before he was ex-Zaïrean officers overthrown in May 1997, arrived in Niamey on May 8th, after they had been expelled from Côte d’Ivoire. Three generals—the former chief of presidential security, Baramoto Kpama, the former head of the civil guard, Mukobo Mondense, and the former chief of the presidential militia, Nzimbi Ngbalé— together with the former defence minister, Grand Admiral Mavua Mudima, were granted asylum in Niger on condition that they abstain from political activity. Opposition leaders immediately called for their expulsion.

Niamey airport is hit by Air traffic controllers, demanding settlement of outstanding allowances and strikes protesting against the government’s special income tax, brought Niamey airport to a standstill for 24 hours on April 21st. Incoming Air Algérie and Air Afrique flights were diverted to Bamako in Mali and Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, while an Ethiopian Airlines flight was grounded at Niamey. The union involved, the Syndicat unique de la météorologie et de l’aviation (SUMAC), was said to have won an important concession in persuading a ministerial-level negotiating team to agree to reimburse wage deductions brought in by the special tax (2nd quarter 1996, pages 20-21). Observers feared that this could set off a spate of demands in other sectors of industry.

All Tuareg former rebels As foreseen under the April 1995 peace agreement, the voluntary disarming of have now handed in their former Tuareg rebel groups was completed on June 5th, when fighters loyal to guns— the Union des forces de la résistance armée (UFRA) handed in their weapons at a ceremony near Agadès, the Tuareg capital, 750 km north-east of Niamey. The pacification of the Tuareg had been marked by a succession of relapses, despite most of the groups’ stated attachment to the peace process. The rebellion is

thought to have cost at least 150 lives between 1990 and 1995, turning much of northern Niger into a “no-go” zone.

Some 1,000 Tuaregs who had crossed the border to take refuge in Algeria returned home on May 15th and May 25th, under a repatriation programme jointly organised by the Nigérien and Algerian governments and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Thousands of refugees are still in camps in Algeria and Mali, however.

—and co-operation with The president of Algeria, Liamine Zeroual, visited Niamey on June 10th-11th Algeria continues for talks with General Maïnassara, at the end of which the two leaders jointly appealed for international financing for the long-planned trans-Sahara high- way project. The project has been on hold since 1991, because the rebellion by the Tuareg minority rendered large areas of northern Niger impassable to traffic. Algeria was instrumental in bringing about a new peace settlement between the Nigerien government and Toubou and Tuareg rebels in November 1997 (1st quarter 1998, page 28). During Mr Zeroual’s visit, Algeria agreed to extend its military, transport, health and agricultural assistance, and to increase the number of scholarships to Nigérien students (see The economy).

Economic policy

The IMF disburses new An important indication that the new government appointed on December 1st funds— 1997 was winning the approval of international donors came with the announcement in late April that the IMF had disbursed $13m of the 1996-98 enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF). The government had suffered a major setback in early December 1997 when the Fund decided to withhold payments because of the government’s failure to push through the privatisation of 12 major enterprises (1st quarter 1998, pages 28-29; 2nd quarter 1998, pages 22; 28-29). General Maïnassara had subsequently sacked the then prime minister, Amadou Boubaca Cissé, replacing him with Ibrahim Hassane Maïyaki.

—and congratulates the Meanwhile, talks in connection with the third year of the ESAF that runs from government— July 1st 1998 were said to have made good progress. The Bretton Woods institutions commended the government’s recent track record on reforms at a press conference on July 14th, saying that economic results were “positive” and “encouraging”. They confirmed that the main targets would remain the improvement of internal revenue collection, better control over public spending and the reform of the public sector, entailing either privatisation, restructuring or liquidation. The head of the World Bank team, Theodore Ahler, said that the Bank was negotiating a new structural loan with Niger that would help the government to reform public spending. Mr Maïyaki affirmed that the government was determined to push through “courageous measures”, even though they “obviously entail sacrifices”. Nonetheless, with popular exasperation increasing, and its appeal for calm and dialogue notwithstanding, the powerful trade union organisation, the Union des syndicats des travailleurs du Niger (USTN), may well set its face against privatisation and job losses, by stepping up strikes as it did in the first months of 1998 (2nd quarter 1998, page 24).

—which vaunts its own The committee in charge of “moralising public life” announced at the end of success in combating May that it had clawed back as much as CFAfr700m ($1.2m) in funds corruption embezzled by officials. The anti-corruption campaign, which was launched in October 1997 (4th quarter 1997, page 29; 2nd quarter 1998, page 29), forms a central part of the government’s IMF-supported three-year adjustment plan. The commission had dealt with 214 cases of alleged corruption in public life by the end of May. Overinvoicing was the most common malpractice, together with fraudulent overseas expenses claims and sale of government property. The commission had found cases where television sets had been purchased at twice their market price, and even chickens, priced at CFAfr750 on the market, had been invoiced at CFAfr5,000.

The economy

The IMF projects 4% real According to IMF estimates released in July, the poor agricultural performance, GDP growth for this year due to extensive drought in the country, slowed down real GDP growth in 1997 to an average of 3%. This means that the economy has not kept pace with population growth, which is estimated at 3.3% per year. It was hoped, however, that, with the release of new structural adjustment funds and continued progress in implementing the recommended measures, real GDP growth could reach 4-4.5% in 1998 and 1999.

Food prices are up sharply Inflation in 1997 was officially put at 3%, which is slightly higher than the estimate by the Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA) of 2.1% (2nd quarter 1998, page 30). Since the beginning of 1998, however, drought has caused scarcity of basic foodstuffs and pushed up prices significantly, resulting in year-on-year inflation of 7.7% in June. The retail price of a 100-kg bag of millet was reported to be CFAfr20,000 ($33) in late April compared with CFAfr15,000 at the same time last year. Meanwhile, the price of a 100-kg bag of maize was reported to have gone up from CFAfr15,000 to CFAfr18,000 in just a week.

Agriculture

Famine alarm bells ring— According to the food warning office, Système national d’alerte précoce (SAP), one Nigérien in four could face famine in the coming months because of the poor harvest in the 1997/98 season. This casts an additional shadow across Niger’s already troubled political economy. The areas worst affected in mid- May were the north-west and south-east of the country, where chronic malnu- trition was rife among children under five and most families were down to one basic meal a day. Aid organisations in France and elsewhere launched an immediate appeal for emergency food deliveries. Food shortages announced late last year had already prompted the government to lift import taxes on staple food (1st quarter 1998, pages 29-30; 2nd quarter 1998, pages 29-30).

—as emergency food Niger’s emergency grain stocks were reported to be down to 4,000 tonnes in stocks dwindle— early May, which is next to nothing compared with the estimated shortfall of 152,000 tonnes in domestic cereal production. Appeals to the international

community earlier in the year appear to have fallen on deaf ears as, by late March, only 18,500 tonnes of cereal donations had arrived from abroad (see Aid news). Corruption and maladministration have also been blamed for such low security stocks. Shortages of food have been compounded by uneven and poor rains at the beginning of the 1998/99 season. In some areas, rain fell two months early, in April, prompting farmers to start planting for the coming season. On May 11th the agriculture ministry made an urgent international appeal for 10,000 tonnes of seed corns, as many families had actually eaten them as staple food.

—and the region’s The agriculture ministry warned at the same time that much farmland could be endemic plagues vulnerable to serious parasite infestations, such as grasshoppers, locusts, cater- continue— pillars, or birds, as national stocks of chemical sprays had fallen to dangerously low levels. Chemicals distributed by the ministry ahead of this planting season were only sufficient for 200,000 ha, compared with a supply covering 500,000 ha in normal times. All in all, the country had only 4,260 tonnes of chemical fertilisers, compared with a requirement of 9,690 tonnes. In early June the ministry duly announced that plagues of parasites had struck in the areas which had enjoyed relatively good harvests last year and where the current crop was already advanced.

—striking the main Plagues of grasshoppers were said to have arrived in the Dosso department, croplands south-west of Niamey, where about 8,000 ha had already been badly infested. Around the central-southern region of Maradi, several hundred hectares of rice, sorghum, and sugar cane had been destroyed by insects, and large numbers of migratory crickets and seed-eating birds were reported in the region bordering Mali and Burkina-Faso. On June 2nd the agriculture minister, Idi Omar Ango, was reported to have told deputies that the food situation would be attenuated by the success of the government’s irrigated agriculture schemes, from which an estimated 144,000 tonnes of crops could be expected this season, although it was not clear whether this meant that the anticipated deficit would be reduced.

Energy

Liberalisation plans are The government announced in late April that it is to liberalise and restructure announced for the the import and distribution of petroleum products and partly to privatise the hydrocarbons sector—- parastatal Société nigérienne de produits pétroliers (Sonidep). The commerce minister, Ibrahim Koussou, said that the import of petroleum would be divided among several private operators. A new 30% government-owned company will be in charge of managing the national stocks, with a view to guaranteeing a 44-day emergency supply at all times. Beyond saying that it would be opened up to private capital, the minister did not elaborate on the divestiture of Sonidep. Consumer prices will remain administered for the time being.

—as petrol prices shoot Pump prices for most petroleum products, already in short supply for many up— months over wide areas of the country, went up by about 10% from May 12th, threatening to fuel inflation and to increase pressure on the cost of living. Regular petrol now costs CFAfr340/litre (60 US cents), a rise of CFAfr30, while Super has gone up from CFAfr340/litre to CFAfr385/litre. This mostly reflects

prolonged shortages in bordering Nigeria, which is Niger’s main provider of petroleum products. Diesel and paraffin prices rose correspondingly. In fact, Niger has not had access to paraffin, the main source of domestic lighting outside major urban centres, for several months. Paraffin was reported in Feb- ruary to be selling for CFAfr1,000/litre on the black market, more than six times the official price of CFAfr150 (2nd quarter 1998, page 30).

—but a new deal with Negotiations between Sonidep and the Algerian authorities over the supply of Algeria may ease petroleum and liquid natural gas (LNG) was at an advanced stage, the weekly shortages Le Démocrate reported on June 2nd. Quoting the head of the Africa department in the Algerian foreign affairs ministry, Rachid Bouguera, the paper said that LNG supplies to Niger could also be routed to neighbouring countries in the subregion. Niger has an annual petroleum requirement of 140,000 cu metres.

Aid news

Germany resumes aid— In April the foreign affairs minister, Mambo Sambo Sidikou, announced that Germany had approved development aid worth CFAfr20.1bn ($33.5m). For- merly one of Niger’s most important donors, Germany had suspended all aid following General Maïnassara’s coup in 1996. Of the total grant, CFAfr9.7bn was earmarked for several projects which had been sponsored by Germany and then frozen. A further CFAfr5.7bn was earmarked for the structural adjustment programme, enabling the government to pay off some domestic debts. The remaining CFAfr4.7bn represents Germany’s 1998-99 technical co-operation programme in Niger, which focuses on “the restoration of peace, health and the management of natural resources”.

—while France gives France announced a budgetary aid package totalling CFAfr3.5bn ($5.9m) on budgetary assistance May 21st, described as a gift by the French news agency, Agence France-presse (AFP), in support of the government’s structural adjustment programme. This allocation was intended to reduce domestic debt arrears and to help pay for the organisation of university exams, the agency said. France allocated CFAfr13bn in budgetary assistance to Niger in 1996 and CFAfr12.5bn in 1997.

The ADF funds a dam The African Development Fund (ADF) approved a CFAfr6.5bn ($11m) grant on study May 7th for a feasibility study on the proposed Kandadji dam project. The proposal involves construction of a hydroelectric power dam at a point 180 km north-west of Niamey on the Niger river, which would have the added func- tion of easing environmental degradation resulting from the river’s seasonal rise and fall.

Japan grants food aid Japan announced two grants totalling CFAfr4.7bn on May 2nd, “to support the Nigériens’ efforts to resolve food problems”, according to a statement from the Japanese embassy. Of this total, CFAfr2bn was for the purchase of rice from Japan and other countries. The remainder was for the purchase of agricultural inputs and machinery.

The FAC provides a French specialists working for the Fonds d’Aide et de Coopération (FAC) valuable geological study handed over to the Nigérien authorities a set of 18 newly completed geological

maps of the gold-bearing Liptako Gourma zone of western Niger, covering 30,000 sq km close to the Mali and Burkina borders. It was hoped that the maps would enable the government to make a convincing bid for investment by foreign mining companies in this potentially rich area.

China announces China announced aid of approximately CFAfr3.9bn ($6.5m) on May 22nd, to CFAfr3.9bn in finance various development projects, and to purchase technical equipment. development assistance Of this sum, CFAfr3bn consisted of a credit tied to the purchase of Chinese- made equipment, the remainder being a grant towards the financing of rural development schemes.

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 32 Quarterly indicators and trade data

Quarterly indicators and trade data

Burkina Faso: quarterly indicators of economic activity

1995 1996 1997 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr Prices Monthly av Consumer prices: 1990=100 137.1 138.0 139.7 142.7 148.0 146.3 146.2 147.4 149.0 146.7 change year on year % 4.6 4.2 5.3 5.1 8.0 6.0 4.6 3.3 0.7 0.3 Money End-Qtr M1, seasonally adj: CFAfr bn 200.3 215.9 224.4 221.9 219.1 230.8 242.6 254.5 269.0 270.7 change year on year % 26.5 25.2 25.5 17.0 9.4 6.9 8.1 14.7 22.8 17.3 Discount rate % per year 8.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.00 6.50 6.25 6.25 6.25a n/a Foreign tradeb Annual totals Exports fob $ m ( 183 ) ( 194 ) ( n/a ) Imports cif “ ( 697 ) ( 783 ) ( n/a ) Exchange holdings End-Qtr Foreign exchange $ m 279.4 328.4 332.9 328.7 338.6 325.6 318.2 315.9 339.2 333.0 Exchange rate Official rate CFAfr:$ 491.5 490.0 503.2 515.3 517.2 523.7 564.4 587.8 593.3 598.8c

Note. Annual figures of most of the series shown above will be found in the Country Profile. a End-August. b DOTS estimate. c End-1st quarter 1998, 618.5; end-May 1998, 598.0.

Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, yearbook.

Niger: quarterly indicators of economic activity

1995 1996 1997 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr Prices Monthly av Consumer prices: 1990=100 136.1 132.7 132.1 137.9 143.7 137.4 138.3 142.5 143.9 142.6 change year on year % 8.4 5.8 4.9 7.1 5.6 3.5 4.7 3.3 0.1 3.8 Money End-Qtr M1, seasonally adj: CFAfr bn 101.6 99.6 93.6 91.1 90.9 90.2 72.6 74.6 78.1 72.8 change year on year % 2.6 9.3 –8.5 –7.5 –10.5 –9.4 –22.4 –18.1 –14.1 –19.3 Discount rate % per year 8.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.00 6.50 6.25 6.25 6.25a n/a Foreign tradeb Annual totals Exports fob $ m ( 168 ) ( 85 ) ( n/a ) Imports cif “ ( 545 ) ( 566 ) ( n/a ) Exchange holdings End-Qtr Foreign exchange $ m 77.7 81.7 50.2 65.1 59.6 64.3 80.3 64.6 59.2 42.1 Exchange rate Official rate CFAfr:$ 491.5 490.0 503.2 515.3 517.2 523.7 564.4 587.8 593.3 598.8c

Note. Annual figures of most of the series shown above will be found in the Country Profile. a End-August. b DOTS estimate. c End-1st quarter 1998, 618.5; end-May 1998, 598.0.

Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; IMF, Direction of Trade, yearbook.

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 Quarterly indicators and trade data 33

Burkina Faso and Niger: main commodities traded ($ ’000) Burkina Faso Niger Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec 1990 1991 1990 1991 Imports cif Food 98,453 104,106 84,002 72,949 of which: dairy products 18,082 18,388 8,602 7,693 cereals & products 42,272 38,638 34,886 31,657 sugar & products 4,643 810 18,508 15,733 Beverages & tobacco 10,493 11,596 11,820 4,651 Petroleum & products 59,514 62,005 25,230 33,571 Chemicals 73,948 99,088 31,584 34,078 Basic manufactures 117,131 125,894 51,224 44,624 of which: cotton fabrics 8,458 16,330 14,084 other textile yarn, fabrics & manufactures 9,021 } 1,948 6,241 3,676 non-metallic mineral manufactures 32,775 23,400a 7,765 6,406 iron & steel 24,261 n/a 6,402 8,848 metal manufactures 18,359 n/a 6,049 5,013 Machinery & transport equipment 133,185 111,722 57,912 48,407 of which: road vehicles 46,335 38,516b 26,736 18,547 Clothing & footwear 2,509c n/a 5,605 3,290 Total incl others 539,582 535,960 388,791 355,333 Exports fob Food 13,784 13,487 20,385 60,538 of which: live animals 10,006 10,553 7,339 52,434• vegetables 1,914 1,830 11,871 7,604 oilseed cakes n/a 568 n/a n/a Hides & skins 8,638 5,109 n/a n/a Cotton, raw 85,699 66,127 4,408 2,088 Non-ferrous metal scrap n/a n/a 234,396 233,300 Vegetable oils 249 1,657 n/a n/a Rubber manufactures 1,614 1,714 n/a n/a Gold 29,382 n/a n/a n/a Total incl others 151,092 105,399 282,597 311,910 a Cement only. b Passenger motor vehicles, excluding buses. c Clothing only.

Source: UN, International Trade Statistics, yearbook.

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 34 Quarterly indicators and trade data

Burkina Faso and Niger: direction of tradea ($ m) Burkina Faso Niger Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec 1993 1994 1995 1996 1993 1994 1995 1996 Imports cif Belgium-Luxembourg 10 9 16 19 14 12 24 22 France 125 94 149 170 111 94 104 97 Germany 11 10 15 14 19 11 13 19 Italy 9 7 8 14 14 8 6 7 Netherlands 14 10 13 11 16 8 12 8 Spain 74894124 UK 81015199 6 7 7 US 198161217134430 Canada 2 13 2 2 n/a 1 1 10 Japan 29141917108107 China 10 1 2 1 16 20 9 2 Hong Kong 5 3 6 5 33 15 19 14 Côte d’Ivoire 97 93 104 111 31 28 34 38 Nigeria 18 18 21 23 3 3 4 4 Togo 18 22 27 31 5 6 7 8 Total incl others 574 542 697 783 466 450 545 566 Exports fob France 27 22 27 18 130 78 119 10 Greece n/a n/a n/a 0 n/a n/a 15 18 Italy 15 13 18 15 n/a n/a n/a 0 Portugal 6 48322113 Spain 4 5 5 4 n/a n/a n/a 0 UK 111156n/a0 Turkey n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1 3 4 US n/a n/a n/a 4 6 2 1 1 Canada n/a n/a n/a 0 6 5 6 15 Japan 51231n/an/a0 Taiwan 12121217n/an/an/an/a Nigeria n/a n/a n/a n/a 5 5 5 6 Togo 4 5 6 7 n/a 1 1 1 Total incl others 162 146 183 216 227 110 168 78 a DOTS estimate.

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade, yearbook, quarterly.

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 Quarterly indicators and trade data 35

Burkina Faso and Niger: French trade ($ ’000) Burkina Faso Niger Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec 1994 1995 1996 1994 1995 1996 Exports fob Food 6,022 12,304 17,320 8,026 17,761 20,856 of which: dairy products 1,915 3,465 4,560 1,002 5,899 7,542 cereals & preparations 3,235 6,391 9,513 2,255 2,376 3,154 sugar & preparations 41 1,035 1,118 3,773 8,227 8,818 Beverages 936 1,638 1,895 328 309 456 Petroleum & products 1,166 422 866 917 814 785 Chemicals 17,126 23,967 27,020 12,761 13,962 10,847 Textile yarn, fabrics & manufactures 708 958 1,417 656 818 946 Iron & steel 509 1,509 1,177 962 1,172 1,031 Metal manufactures 2,072 6,008 5,998 4,100 3,657 3,107 Machinery & transport equipment 40,103 65,672 76,811 40,203 38,368 33,640 of which: road vehicles 8,726 22,367 25,299 8,470 9,677 8,285 Scientific instruments etc 5,883 4,116 4,437 4,771 4,456 4,478 Total incl others 86,021 135,122 156,497 85,603 94,797 88,222 Imports cif Food 7,432 9,782 5,556 403 132 485 of which: fruit & vegetables 7,432 9,775 5,553 215 47 296 Cotton, raw 461 375 0 0 0 0 Chemicals 65 101 99 82,296 136,849 9,559 Non-monetary gold 16,324 18,072 12,388 131 0 0 Total incl others 25,485 30,105 20,597 83,671 137,357 10,842 Source: UN, External Trade Statistics, series D.