Global Brief Vol. 5, Issue 12 Global Taiwan Brief Vol 5. Issue1 12 Fortnightly Review Russell Hsiao Beijing Set to Increase Pressure on Taiwan’s Diplomatc Space in Tsai’s Second Term Ingrid Bodeen ’s Natonal Security Law Strs Taiwanese Resentment Towards I-wei Jennifer Chang Han Kuo-yu Recall: More Than Just About China J. Michael Cole Imagining a New US Military Presence in Taiwan Michael Mazza

Fortnightly Review The Global Taiwan Brief is a bi-weekly publicaton released ev- By: Russell Hsiao ery other Wednesday and provides insight into the latest news on Russell Hsiao is the executve director of the Global Taiwan Insttute (GTI) and editor-in-chief of the Taiwan. Global Taiwan Brief. Editor-in-Chief University Launches Research Insttutons to Promote Cross-Strait Unifcaton Russell Hsiao and the “One-China Principle” Staf Editor Katherine Schultz On June 3, Xiamen University (廈門大學) announced the launch of two new research in- Copy Editor Marshall Reid sttutes focused on cross-Strait unifcaton and applied research on countering Taiwan’s diplomatc eforts. Located in the city of Xiamen (Amoy) in the People’s Republic of China The views and opinions expressed (PRC)—which is less than four miles away from the Taiwan-administered Kinmen Islands in these artcles are those of the authors and do not necessarily (Quemoy)—the Graduate Insttute for Taiwan Studies (台灣研究院) at Xiamen University refect the ofcial policy or positon established the “Cross-Strait Integraton Development and Natonal Unifcaton Policy Sim- of the Global Taiwan Insttute. ulaton Laboratory” (兩岸融合發展與國家統一政策模擬實驗室) and the “Taiwan Diplo- macy Research Center“ (涉台外交研究中心). The Graduate Insttute for Taiwan Research To view web sources cited in the published papers (underlined in at Xiamen University is considered to be among a handful of premier “academic” insttu- printed text), visit tons that support the Chinese government’s Taiwan policy. Other organizatons common- htp://globaltaiwan.org/2020/06/ ly grouped in this class include the infuental Chinese Academy of Social Science ‘s Taiwan vol-5-issue-12/. Research Insttute (中國社會科學院台灣研究所), which is associated with the country’s Global Taiwan Insttute civilian intelligence agency the Ministry of State Security, the Natonal Society of Taiwan 1836 Jeferson Place NW, Studies (全國台灣研究會) coordinated by the ’s (CCP) United Washington DC 20036 [email protected] Front Work Department (中共中央統一戰線工作部), and the Shanghai Taiwan Insttute ( 上海台灣研究所) of the Shanghai Municipal Government. To subscribe, visit htp://globaltaiwan.org/sub- The Graduate Insttute for Taiwan Studies is not the average run-of-the-mill Chinese ac- scribe/. ademic insttuton. Its predecessor, the Taiwan Research Insttute (台灣研究所), was es- tablished in July 1980 by the former director of the CCP Central Commitee Leading Group © 2020 · Global Taiwan Insttute for Taiwan Work, Deng Yingchao (鄧穎超)—the wife of Zhou Enlai (周恩来). The current chairman and deputy party-secretary of the insttute is Li Peng (李鹏, b. 1973), who has Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 12 2 served in that capacity since 2017 and was previously a research platorm focused on promotng the “One-Chi- visitng scholar in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Universi- na Principle” through academic exchanges with vari- ty of Maryland (Li was the recipient of a State Depart- ous countries. The center reportedly intends to expand ment award to study in the United States). The Grad- its cooperaton with the United States by undertaking uate Insttute for Taiwan Research is currently headed research, holding academic seminars, and conductng by another professor, Liu Guoshen (劉國深). academic exchanges. These eforts will be premised on adherence to the “One-China Principle” (一中原 The director of the new insttute is Chen Xiancai (陳 則) rather than the “two Chinas” (兩個中國) or “one 先才), who concurrently serves as director of Xiamen China, one Taiwan” (一中一台) models. Furthermore, University’s Insttute of Politcal Science. Chen has a it will work to establish links with relevant universites long academic career studying Taiwan issues. Afer be- that have think tanks focused on Taiwan in Europe, Ja- ginning his work at Xiamen University in 2007 within pan, Singapore, and elsewhere. the Graduate Insttute of Taiwan Studies, he served as the insttute’s deputy director and as a director of the In a response to the establishment of the new inst- “Collaboratve Innovaton Center for Peaceful Develop- tutes, the Mainland Afairs Council (MAC, 大陸委員 ment of Cross-Strait Relatons” (兩岸關係和平發展協 會)—the Taiwanese government’s cabinet-level agen- 同創新中心), a united front think tank that was jointly cy in charge of cross-Strait policy—issued a statement established by several prominent Chinese universites. highlightng the increasingly aggressive eforts that the Additonally, he serves as the director of the DPP Re- CCP has taken to unify Taiwan since it issued “Xi Five search Center (台灣研究院民進黨研究中心), also lo- Artcles” in early 2019 and proposed the “One Coun- cated within the Graduate Insttute of Taiwan Studies. try, Two Systems Taiwan Plan.” According to the MAC, The mission of this insttuton is to “analyze the his- these new initatves by Xiamen University are intend- torical, social, and realistc roots behind the establish- ed to implement the CCP’s goal of unifying Taiwan. ment, development, and evoluton of the Democratc While the MAC restated the government’s positon in Progressive Party.” In 2018, Chen was also invited to support of healthy cross-Strait exchanges without pre- provide a briefng to trainees at the Eastern Theater conditons, the agency noted that the PRC has been Command (東部戰區)—which would have operaton- contnuously increasing its United Front operatons al control over a Taiwan contngency—on the current against Taiwan. Moreover, it discouraged the island’s status of cross-Strait relatons and domestc develop- academic community from carrying out exchanges or ments within Taiwan. cooperaton actvites with the insttutons and their personnel. According to Xiamen University’s announcement, the new laboratory will serve the goals of Xi’s “new era,” The launch of these new initatves is unlikely to be helping to solve the Taiwan issue and realize the com- greeted with great fanfare in Taiwan, whose popula- plete unifcaton of “China.” To this end, the new inst- ton has hardened its views toward China and the “one tuton will focus on analyzing and predictng the con- country two systems,” especially in light of ongoing ditons for natonal unifcaton, generatng simulatons events in Hong Kong. Yet, given the initatve’s appar- of natonal unifcaton strategies, and investgatng po- ent emphasis on internatonal engagement, they could tental cross-Strait integraton development policies. be used as a platorm for gaining greater internatonal Additonally, it will analyze simulatons of unifcaton acceptance for Beijing’s formula for cross-Strait unif- under “one country, two systems” (一國兩制). Finally, caton based on the “One-China Principle” and “one it will carry out research and teaching initatves, ut- country, two systems.” lizing artfcial intelligence, virtual simulatons, experi- The main point: Xiamen University’s new initatves to mental teaching, and case studies to promote the uni- explore models for cross-Strait unifcaton based on the fcaton process. “One-China Principle” and “one country, two systems” The goals of the new Taiwan Research Cen- are likely to be a non-starter in Taiwan, but appear di- ter are somewhat similar and complementary. Osten- rected at an internatonal audience to gain greater ac- sibly, the mission of this department is to establish a ceptance for China’s policy for cross-Strait unifcaton. Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 12 3

US-Taiwan- Cooperaton Going Global as GCTF Beginning in March 2019, Japan joined the initatve as Celebrates Anniversary a coordinatng partner, resultng in the forum becom- ing formally known as the “Taiwan-US-Japan Global On June 1, the United States, Taiwan, and Japan cele- Cooperaton & Training Framework.” The three part- brated the fve-year anniversary of the Global Coop- ners co-organized the September 2019 forum in the eraton and Training Framework (GCTF) in Taipei. The Pacifc-naton of Palau, which was the frst tme that a trilateral initatve, which was launched in 2015 by the GCTF workshop took place outside of Taiwan. It is also United States and Taiwan, has emerged as a symbol of notable that Sweden, which is now increasingly feeling the growing partnership between like-minded coun- the politcal pressure from Beijing, was a guest co-host tries in recent years, both in the Indo-Pacifc region for the GCTF workshop in September 2019 focused on and increasingly around the world. The approach was democracy and media literacy. Planning is underway addressed by then-Principal Deputy Assistant Secre- for another GCTF workshop to be held outside Taiwan tary of State Kurt Tong in 2016 at the launch’s frst an- in Latn America—probably in Guatemala—focused on niversary: the digital economy. At a recent virtual forum hosted “The idea is simple: the United States and Tai- by the Center for Strategic and Internatonal Studies wan conduct training programs for experts from (CSIS), Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for throughout the region to assist them with build- the Western Hemisphere Julie Chung stated: ing their own capacites to tackle issues where “There’s so much again that we [United States] Taiwan has proven expertse and advantages. have done with Taiwan in the Indo-Pacifc and These include, but are not limited to, women’s […] our Western Hemisphere has so many chal- rights, humanitarian assistance and disaster re- lenges but opportunites, too. And that’s where lief, democratzaton, global health, and energy we’re really looking to cement those partner- security.” ships and cooperaton, even more than ever. And Beginning as an initatve to expand Taiwan’s inter- we thought this GCTF framework has been so natonal space in the region, GCTF has grown in both successful in Asia, […] and saw how the capacity scope and scale against the backdrop of China’s in- building at the technical level, at the policymak- creasingly aggressive pressure campaign against Tai- er level, was able to help people, whether we’re wan and its rising challenge to the world order. As a talking about infectous disease issues, or water result, it has quickly emerged as a global platorm for issues […] it just was a natural partnership for the countries to promote shared values and interests the United States and Taiwan to work in Asia.” aligned with Taiwan’s core competencies, helping oth- On the occasion of GCTF’s fve-year anniversary, a joint er natons that would otherwise feel intmidated by statement issued by Taiwan’s Minister of Foreign Af- Beijing feel comfortable working with Taiwan, even in fairs, the American Insttute in Taiwan (AIT), and the a semi-ofcial capacity. Japan-Taiwan Exchange Associaton—the later two Since 2015, there has been a total of 17 workshops are the names of the de facto embassies of the US and held under auspices of GCTF, with hundreds of partc- Japan, respectvely—highlighted four areas of future ipants having atended, ranging from senior ofcials cooperaton: to civil society leaders from multple countries. The 1. Expand the frequency, size, and scope of the workshops have covered pressing internatonal secu- GCTF workshops, including holding more events rity issues. For example, the most recent workshop, outside Taiwan; held in April 2020, focused on combatng COVID-19 disinformaton, cybersecurity, and transnatonal crime. 2. Expand the depth and breadth of partcipaton Previous forums have centered on public health, hu- from like-minded countries, including co-hostng manitarian assistance and disaster relief, energy gov- programs; ernance, and the digital economy, among other issues. 3. Establish a GCTF task force under the Depart- ment of North American Afairs, the Ministry of Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 12 4

Foreign Afairs as the GCTF Secretariat; As GCTF celebrates its fve-year anniversary this month, the mechanism has evolved to become an important 4. Establish the GCTF Alumni Network to build vehicle and symbol of the growing partnership be- and expand networks and organize reunions for tween like-minded countries, both in the Indo-Pacifc former GCTF partcipants. region and increasingly around the world. In partcular, Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, high-level ofcials rep- its expansion to involve Japan and insttutonalizaton resentng AIT, the US Department of State, the Taiwan with the creaton of a secretariat are meaningful de- Economic and Cultural Representatve Ofce (TECRO), velopments that refect its importance as a vehicle for and the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Afairs convened in not only helping facilitate Taiwan’s meaningful partci- late March for a virtual forum on expanding Taiwan’s paton in the internatonal community and enhance its partcipaton on the global stage. While the specifc internatonal space but also to beneft the internaton- focus of the discussion was on eforts to reinstate Tai- al community of natons as well. These developments wan’s observer status at the World Health Assembly, it indicate that GCTF is moving in the right directon. As also addressed other avenues for closer coordinaton. the next step, Washington, Taipei, and Tokyo should According to the statement issued by State Depart- work together to fnd other like-minded and reliable ment: partners in other regions to join as coordinatng part- ners to further expand the scope and scale of GCTF. “Countries around the world can beneft from beter understanding the Taiwan Model, as well The main point: The scope and scale of the Global as the generous contributons and impressive ex- Cooperaton and Training Framework has grown in re- pertse Taiwan—a vibrant democracy and force cent years against the backdrop of China’s increasingly for good—brings to the global community.” aggressive pressure campaign against Taiwan and the rest of the world. Indeed, from a long-term perspectve, strategic compe- tton in the Indo-Pacifc region and around the world is really between “models” of social, economic, and po- litcal development. The development paths that na- tons take will fundamentally shape the future world Beijing Set to Increase Pressure on Tai- order, especially in the post COVID-19 environment. The United States, Taiwan, and like-minded partners wan’s Diplomatic Space in Tsai’s Sec- should use all tools available to counter China’s au- ond Term thoritarian model and narratve for development. By: Ingrid Bodeen Towards that end, the Yushan Forum was established in 2017 as “a platorm for Asian regional dialogue ini- Ingrid Bodeen is an undergraduate student at George tated by Taiwan, with the purpose of expanding mul- Washington University and a Spring 2020 intern at the tfaceted opportunites for cooperaton and facilitatng Global Taiwan Insttute. the exchange of ideas, talent, technologies, and social Afer President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) took ofce in initatves.” Organized by the non-governmental Tai- 2016, China unilaterally ended a period of suspended wan-Asia Exchange Foundaton and stll likely sched- hostlity—albeit in overt form only—toward Taiwan uled for later this year—barring unforeseen restric- that began under the Kuomintang (KMT) presidency tons due to the COVID-19 pandemic—the forum for of Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九). As its frst order of busi- enhancing connectvity among like-minded natons ness, Beijing resumed the tactc of poaching Taiwan’s within the region is the ideal internatonal platorm diplomatc allies as a means to pressure the island to to showcase the free and open model. Moreover, this accept the “One-China Principle” and the so-called event is the ideal place for like-minded countries, es- “1992 Consensus” that support the concept of even- pecially the United States, to showcase their support tual unifcaton under “One China” but leaves unstated for the Taiwan Model. which “China.” Since the reinstatement of a more ag- Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 12 5 gressive unifcaton agenda, the Chinese government ment and loans, along with an increase in fnancial as- has convinced seven natons—Kiribat, Solomon Is- sistance, including funding for freeway infrastructure lands, Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, and a new natural gas power plant, along with the sale Panama, and São Tomé and Príncipe—to switch dip- of Chinese military vehicles. However, within the frst lomatc recogniton from the Republic of China (ROC) year of the establishment of relatons, it became clear to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the most that these grandiose Chinese promises had been over- recent switch, Kiribat severed tes in September 2019, sold. In partcular, the Dominican Republic’s imports just one week afer the Pacifc island-naton Solomon from China have far exceeded its exports to the PRC. In Islands recognized the PRC. additon, the Chinese gifs of infrastructure and showy projects are meant to pressure the Dominican govern- This pressure campaign spans the globe. Even before ment to vote in China’s favor on internatonal issues, the terminaton of tes between Taiwan and the Solo- partcularly in the United Natons. mon Islands, reports had surfaced that China had made several economic ofers to Hait in exchange for the is- For many countries, the diplomatc switch is a relatvely land-naton’s diplomatc allegiance to the PRC. China easy decision to make, since China ofers the prospect promised interest-free and concessional loans, along of being a more crucial economic partner than Taiwan. with cooperaton on several maters such as trade and However, the case of the Dominican Republic shows educaton, according to reports. Beijing’s implemen- that these promises can be false or deceptve. taton of such “checkbook” or “dollar” diplomacy sug- The Taiwanese Perspectve gests a contnued efort to constrain Taiwan’s presence and partcipaton on the internatonal stage. Unlike her The Tsai administraton and the oppositon KMT have predecessor, President Tsai has contnually refused to repeatedly rejected Beijing’s proposal of the “one publicly recognize the “1992 Consensus,” which the country, two systems” framework for Taiwan that has PRC has adamantly insisted is the only way “the two been implemented in Hong Kong and Macao. The sides can ensure the peaceful and stable development PRC’s management of the recent calls for independent of cross-Strait tes.” With only 15 diplomatc allies lef, civil libertes in Hong Kong has become a further re- Taiwan could lose stll more of its remaining partners minder to Taiwan of the risk of building closer polit- during Tsai’s second term. China’s steadfast “race to ical tes with China, a message that Tsai successfully zero” goal puts Taipei in a tght corner, promptng Tai- pushed home during her re-electon campaign earlier wanese policymakers to discuss what Taipei should do this year. In response to the PRC’s diplomatc poach- to combat this contngency and how it can ensure that ing strategy, Tsai made clear in 2016 that she will not Taiwan remains internatonally relevant even afer it engage in excessive “checkbook diplomacy” as a way loses all formal diplomatc tes. to incentvize diplomatc partners to remain with the ROC. She has since stuck by her word and turned down Beijing’s Strategy several economic ultmatums from diferent allied Although Beijing has used varying tactcs to successful- natons. For example, she rejected the São Tomé and ly woo Taiwan’s diplomatc allies, its most prominent Príncipe government’s 2016 request for USD $210 mil- tool is its checkbook diplomacy. To seal the deal with lion in fnancial aid, resultng in São Tomé and Príncipe the Solomon Islands, Beijing reportedly promised the breaking tes with Taiwan. island-naton USD $500 million to terminate - Afer both Kiribat and the Solomon Island severed ic tes with Taiwan by October 1, 2019. In determining their relatons with Taiwan in 2019, a poll released by the monetary value of their ofers, the Chinese gov- the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundaton (台灣民意基金 ernment ofen uses amounts that Taiwan’s diplomat- 會) found that 53 percent of Taiwanese do not wor- ic allies had previously demanded from Taipei. When ry about losing diplomatc allies, while 43 percent do. it sees that Taipei is unwilling or unable to meet that Interestngly, according to Ming-sho Ho (何明修), a demand, China will then provide a similar ofer. For ex- professor of sociology at Natonal Taiwan University, ample, before the Dominican Republic switched tes in Taiwanese citzens are growing immune to these dip- 2018, Beijing had pledged USD $4.1 million in invest- Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 12 6 lomatc setbacks, as Beijing’s poaching successes are and Japan. [1] Taiwan currently has tes with virtually viewed as of minimal concern. Taiwan’s diplomatc every major power, with existng de-facto embassies losses involve small countries that are not deemed sig- and ofces in almost all major cites abroad. Even if nifcant by the Taiwanese public. Taiwan were to face formal diplomatc isolaton, Chi- na will have great difculty in severing these unofcial Role of Diplomatc Allies in Aiding Taiwan on the In- tes, partcularly with the United States. The Trump ad- ternatonal Stage ministraton’s policy on Asia is focused on maintaining China has repeatedly used its clout to prevent Tai- strategic leadership in the Indo-Pacifc region, includ- wanese partcipaton in multple internatonal orga- ing taking on a more confrontatonal posture with Chi- nizatons. Most recently, this has been witnessed in na. Additonally, many members of Congress contnu- Beijing’s adamant exclusion of Taiwan from the World ally emphasize that US leadership in the region could Health Organizaton (WHO) as the internatonal com- be severely compromised if Washington stood idly by munity frantcally works to combat the novel corona- while allowing China’s authoritarian regime to obtain virus (COVID-19) pandemic. Along with blocking Tai- politcal control of a small but vibrant democracy like wan’s partcipaton as an observer in the World Health Taiwan. Therefore, Taiwan’s loss of all formal diplomat- Assembly since 2006, Beijing has shown no compunc- ic tes would likely incentvize the United States to fur- ton in leveraging its power to force the WHO to put ther strengthen tes with Taiwan in order to maintain a symbolic politcs above public health. Additonally, the strong US presence in East Asia. Internatonal Civil Aviaton Organizaton (ICAO) has Although China can ofer greater economic incentves faced internatonal critcism for classifying Taiwan as than Taiwan, the PRC’s distributon of part of China. As canceled fights and travel bans to and in regions such as South Asia, South America, and Af- from China were being initated during the beginning rica has been critcized as exploitatve, while Taiwan’s of the COVID-19 outbreak, the ICAO created interna- approach has been praiseworthy. As Taiwan loses more tonal confusion when it made misleading statements allies, the United States should invest more tme and about Taiwan being a province of China. Consequently, resources into programs such as the Global Coopera- individuals relying on the ICAO had no way to deter- ton and Training Framework to promote Taipei’s tech- mine whether internatonal fights to and from Taiwan nical cooperaton in diferent regions and counter Bei- remained available, causing unnecessary travel disrup- jing’s emphasis on infrastructure investments, thereby tons. In response, several diplomatc allies have spo- strengthening Taiwan’s presence in the Indo-Pacifc ken up on Taiwan’s exclusion from these organizatons. region. Alongside this, the United States and Taiwan Earlier, in September 2019, 12 of Taiwan’s allies sent should engage in more cooperaton on detectng and a leter to the ICAO’s President Olumyiwa Benard Aliu combatng informaton warfare and electoral interfer- and Secretary-General Fang Liu in support of Taiwan’s ence in order to move the US-ROC relatonship toward partcipaton in the internatonal aviaton organizaton. a comprehensive strategic partnership. Doing so would Although such expressions of support from diplomat- beter positon the United States to deter Chinese ag- ic partners have helped raise the profle of Taiwan in gression toward Taiwan. varying insttutons, Beijing’s dominatng presence in transnatonal bodies has hindered Taiwan’s pursuit of The Role of the United States greater internatonal space. Taiwan’s contnued prosperity as a strong Asian de- Possible Outcomes of China’s Big Squeeze mocracy undoubtedly serves the interest of the US and other like-minded partners, especially given its geopo- Beijing’s strategy to whitle Taiwan’s diplomatc part- litcal positon along the “frst island chain.” As Beijing ners to zero could be counterproductve for the PRC. contnues to ramp up eforts to diplomatcally isolate If cornered, Taiwan could declare independence. In Taiwan, it is immensely important for the United States any case, it appears to be already re-focusing more to bolster its support for the island with increased arms atenton on strengthening its informal relatons with sales and actve encouragement of more internatonal more powerful countries, such as the United States engagement. There is already evidence of heightened Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 12 7

US interest. It is already evident that President Tsai’s As Hong Kong residents demonstrated against the second term in ofce is a source of frustraton for Chi- move by China’s Natonal People’s Congress (NPC, 全 nese President . Xi will become increasingly 國人民代表大會) to draf a natonal security law for determined to tghten the PRC’s grip over the island. the semi-autonomous territory, Taiwan’s government Thus, it is likely that Chinese politcal pressure from Tai- has voiced oppositon to the new legislaton. President wan will only grow exponentally in the coming years. Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) wrote on Twiter on May 28: “All politcal partes in Taiwan strongly condemn Chi- It is within this context that the passage and signing na’s decision to bypass Hong Kong’s legal process [and] of the Taiwan Allies Internatonal Protecton and En- push for the passage of today’s natonal security law hancement Initatve (TAIPEI) in late March is all the resoluton. Taiwan’s government [and] people are unit- more meaningful. The Act is aimed at strengthening ed in our support for Hong Kong [and] universal demo- US support of Taiwan in the face of increasing diplo- cratc values.” Indeed, in a rare show of politcal unity, matc pressure from China. Not only does the act ad- lawmakers from Taiwan’s major politcal partes issued vise the Executve Branch to strengthen bilateral rela- a joint statement on May 29 that strongly condemned tons with Taiwan in the economic, politcal, and other the natonal security law in Hong Kong, which they realms; it also calls on the US government to alter its feared would result in “a rapid deterioraton of the sit- engagement with natons in consideraton of their tes uaton in Hong Kong and adversely afect its people’s to Taiwan. As Tsai’s administraton navigates through rights and freedoms.” Beijing’s natonal security law its second term in ofce in an even more precarious for Hong Kong that could further strip the territory of situaton, Beijing is likely to contnue to ramp up pres- its freedoms has dealt a severe blow to Beijing’s prom- sure on Taiwan and use economic means to poach re- ise of a “one country, two systems” model for Hong maining Taiwanese allies—the United States must avail Kong and has intensifed Taiwanese distrust of Beijing. itself of the tools ofered by the TAIPEI Act to shore up Taiwan’s internatonal space. Natonal Security Law for Hong Kong The main point: As Beijing contnues to undermine China’s Natonal People’s Congress voted on May 28 ROC sovereignty by poaching its ofcial allies, the Unit- to authorize the Standing Commitee (常務委員會) of ed States should enact countervailing measures to re- the NPC to draw up a natonal security law for Hong inforce Taipei’s valuable presence in the global space. Kong that would target secession, sediton, terrorism, This will aid American interests in the Indo-Pacifc re- and foreign interference in the semi-autonomous ter- gion and provide Taiwan with the internatonal breath- ritory. The proposed law, which was last put forward in ing room it needs to contnue to thrive as a paragon of 2003 before being derailed by major protests, would democracy in the region. allow Beijing to set up natonal security organs in Hong Kong in the name of safeguarding natonal security. Af- [1] Jacques deLisle, “Internatonal Law and Insttu- ter its enactment, the Beijing-imposed natonal securi- tons,” in Hans Stockton and Yao-Yuan Yeh, eds., Tai- ty law will be writen into Annex III of the Basic Law (基 wan: The Development of an Asia Tiger (Boulder, Colo- 本法) governing Hong Kong, bypassing the city’s Legis- rado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2020), pp. 186-87. latve Council (香港特別行政區立法會). Beijing’s announcement of the natonal security law also came amid other legal moves to rein in the Hong Kong people’s specifc freedoms. Beijing pushed to en- Hong Kong’s Natonal Security Law Strs act a local law based on the Natonal Anthem Bill (國歌 Taiwanese Resentment Towards China 條例草案), which criminalizes insultng or disrespect- ing China’s natonal anthem, “March of the Volunteers” By: I-wei Jennifer Chang (義勇軍進行曲). The Natonal Anthem Bill, which has been implemented in China since 2017, was passed by I-wei Jennifer Chang is a research fellow at Global Tai- Hong Kong lawmakers on June 4, on the somber 31st wan Insttute. anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 12 8

Taipei Supports Hong Kong Protesters change Associaton (中華亞太菁英交流協會), more than half of Taiwanese respondents believed that Hong In light of the new natonal security law, President Tsai Kong’s “one country, two systems” principle will be has asked the Executve Yuan to devise a plan to ofer shatered with the enactment of the natonal securi- humanitarian assistance to Hong Kong residents who ty law. Meanwhile, Taiwanese public support for Hong would like to resetle in Taiwan due to politcal factors. Kong’s resistance against China is strong partcularly Although Taiwan does not have a politcal asylum law, among the younger generaton. A survey found that Tsai argued that the Act Governing Relatons with Hong 85 percent of Taiwanese between the ages of 18 and Kong and Macau (香港澳門關係條例) could be used 34 supported last year’s Hong Kong protests against to handle the current crisis. Artcle 18 of the act states the now shelved extraditon bill (反送中). According that “necessary assistance shall be provided to Hong to some recent debates, Beijing’s latest moves vis-a- Kong or Macau residents whose safety and liberty are vis Hong Kong indicate that “one country, one system” immediately threatened for politcal reasons.” Accord- (一國一制) is China’s intended governance model for ing to Chen Ming-tong (陳明通), minister of the Main- Hong Kong. land Afairs Council (大陸委員會), the semi-ofcial Taiwan-Hong Kong Economic and Cultural Cooperaton Revoking Hong Kong’s Special Trade Status Council (THEC, 臺港經濟文化合作策進會) would as- In antcipaton of the NPC’s decision on the natonal se- sist Hong Kong immigrants in obtaining residency and curity law, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo submit- protecton in Taiwan. Chen also stressed that Hong ted a report to Congress on May 27 statng that Hong Kong “shelter seekers” (尋求庇護者)—avoiding the Kong was no longer sufciently autonomous from term asylum seekers—must undergo stringent screen- Chinese rule for it to contnue enjoying its preferen- ing amid concerns that Chinese spies could infltrate tal trade and fnancial status under US law. President Hong Kong emigraton to the island. In the past year, Donald Trump later announced on May 29 that the nearly 5,000 Hong Kong residents have resetled in United States would revoke Hong Kong’s special sta- Taiwan, and more than 2,300 Hong Kong citzens were tus “as a special customs and travel territory from the granted Taiwanese residency in the frst four months rest of China,” threatening potental sanctons against of 2020. individuals responsible for “smothering” Hong Kong’s Despite assurances from Taiwan’s government, 60 freedom. percent of Taiwanese respondents in a poll released President Tsai is also considering revoking Hong Kong’s on May 31 support amending Taiwan’s laws to beter special trade status with Taiwan. Tsai said on May 24 assist Hong Kong people seeking refuge in Taiwan. A that if the situaton in Hong Kong contnues to dete- key concern is that Taiwan’s laws on investment immi- riorate and endangers Taiwan’s natonal security, she graton may be a barrier to many Hong Kong asylum may invoke Artcle 60 of the Act Governing Relatons seekers. Under current investment immigraton regu- with Hong Kong and Macao, which would suspend latons, the minimum amount needed for investment all or part of the regulatons under the act. Taiwan’s immigraton is around USD $200,000. While past cases government currently ofers preferental treatment to have shown that most Hong Kong residents applying Hong Kong and Macau in the areas of trade and trav- for immigraton to Taiwan have just met the minimum el. Stripping Hong Kong of its special status, however, requirement, members of Hong Kong’s middle class would essentally make the territory no diferent than would likely face signifcant fnancial hurdles if they China. As a result, critcs of invoking Artcle 60 have cannot pass Taipei’s strict screening process for shelter accused the Tsai Administraton of “abandoning Hong seekers and opt for investment immigraton. Kong” (放棄香港). The latest developments in Hong Kong have led to de- Ending Hong Kong’s special trade status could nega- bates in Taiwan and elsewhere around the world that tvely impact not only Hong Kong, but also US and Tai- China’s “one country, two systems” (一國兩制) frame- wanese companies that utlize Hong Kong as a trans- work for governing Hong Kong is efectvely dead. In shipment hub in Asia. Hong Kong’s economy, which a recent poll conducted by the Asia-Pacifc Elite Inter- Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 12 9 sufered from last year’s ant-extraditon protests and efect of making the Taiwanese public more resistant the coronavirus outbreak earlier this year, is expect- to Beijing’s promises for the island. ed to worsen if trade privileges are suspended. The The main point: Beijing’s decision to enact a naton- territory’s loss of its special status would also impact al security law for Hong Kong has further strred Tai- the cross-Strait trade that transits through Hong Kong wanese resentment against China. Ending Hong Kong’s ports. Hong Kong currently hosts around 13 percent preferental trade status in both the United States and of Taiwan’s exports, most of which are re-exports. Tai- Taiwan may end up hurtng the people of Hong Kong wan’s electronics exports, in partcular its semiconduc- and accelerate the territory’s loss of autonomy. posi- tor products, are mostly transshipped through Hong ton. Kong. These exports would likely be afected if Hong Kong’s status changes. Since the 1990s, Hong Kong’s trade and fnancial independence from China helped to preserve its autonomy and foster a distnct local identty; withdrawing US and Taiwanese trade privileg- Han Kuo-yu Recall: More Than Just es for the territory may inadvertently speed up its loss of autonomy. About China In the face of Beijing’s new legal restrictons on Hong By: J. Michael Cole Kong, the city is in need of enormous politcal and J. Michael Cole is a senior non-resident fellow at the moral support. Taipei is stepping up to the plate amid Global Taiwan Insttute perceptons of waning US leadership in the Indo-Pa- cifc region. By sheltering Hong Kong residents, Taipei On June 6, residents of Kaohsiung recalled Mayor Han is enhancing its moral leadership on the issue. When Kuo-yu (韓國瑜, b. 1962), the former frebrand of the Taipei comes under politcal or military siege by Bei- oppositon Kuomintang (KMT), in a much-awaited jing, the hope is that internatonal community will also plebiscite. This extraordinary development—a frst in come to Taiwan’s defense. As Taiwan’s Foreign Minis- the naton’s democratc history—was almost Shake- ter Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) stated in a May 27 interview spearean in its tragic arc: from Han’s rise in the Novem- on Fox News, while Taiwan’s government is trying to ber 2018 local electons, to his seemingly unstoppable protect the freedoms and democratc aspiratons of bid for the presidency, to his fnal crash and burn. Ana- Hong Kong citzens, it is also concerned about a possi- lyzing the drama following the recall vote, a number of ble Chinese military invasion of the island. Taipei thus internatonal outlets posited that the outcome const- needs the support of the United States and like-mind- tuted yet another example of the strong oppositon by ed friends to preserve its sovereignty. At botom, sup- the Taiwanese public to unifcaton with China. While portng Hong Kong is also about protectng Taiwan (撐 Han’s ostensibly close tes to the Chinese Communist 香港就是撐台灣). Party (CCP) indeed factored into voters’ decision in the recall atempt, their motves were not one-dimension- The demise of freedom in Hong Kong would further al: several factors, most of them domestc, created the entrench Taiwan’s status as the only beacon of democ- perfect storm for Han’s removal from ofce. racy and human rights in the Chinese-speaking world. This would, in turn, shif Beijing’s atenton towards Unprecedented Recall targetng Taiwan’s democracy. As the “one country, Han was recalled with 939,090 votes (97.4 percent) in two systems” arrangement fzzles in Hong Kong, Tai- favor and 25,051 (2.6 percent) against. Despite the ex- wanese politcs are likely to become more alienated treme heat and torrental rain on votng day, turnout from Beijing. China’s multfaceted pressure campaigns was a very respectable 42.14 percent. Approximately against Taiwan are likely to fail to change the ant-Chi- 1.3 million eligible voters did not cast a ballot in the re- na attudes of Taiwanese public opinion. If the naton- call, although by no means did all of them oppose the al security law was intended to use Hong Kong to scare recall. This result stands in stark contrast with the No- Taiwan (殺港儆台), then it certainly has created the vember 2018 mayoral electons, when Han garnered Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 12 10

892,545 votes (53.86 percent) against his rival from In reality, the China factor was just one among many the ruling-Democratc Progressive Party (DPP), Chen of the reasons why the recall was initated and suc- Chi-mai, (陳其邁) who received 742,239 votes (44.79 cessfully passed. Undoubtedly, more Taiwan-centric percent) in the four-way race. Turnout in those elec- voters became wary of Han’s intentons soon afer his tons was 73.54 percent. November 2018 electon, when he embarked on a trip across the Taiwan Strait, which took him to Hong Kong, Motvated voters, many of them young people stll reg- Macau, Shenzhen, and Xiamen. During that visit, Han istered as residents of Kaohsiung, traveled from every held closed-door meetngs with CCP ofcials, including corner of the island naton down to the southern port head of the Liaison Ofce Wang Zhimin (王志民), Chi- city to cast their votes in the recall. The successful re- na’s top ofcial in Hong Kong, as well as Hong Kong call and high turnout occurred despite rumors in the Chief Executve Carrie Lam (林鄭月娥). According to weeks preceding the vote that local ofcials were at- Taiwan’s Mainland Afairs Ofce, the agency in charge temptng to sow confusion, intmidate voters, and in- of cross-Strait afairs, Han’s delegaton refused to make terfere with votng. Han and senior ofcials in his ad- its itnerary known to the Taiwanese government, add- ministraton had also called on residents to stay home ing that the fve-day visit was “orchestrated” by the on electon day. Chinese side. Han’s dismissal was the naton’s frst recall atempt Han was widely believed to be Beijing’s favorite during against a sitng mayor. Thresholds for recalls were low- the 2020 presidental campaign. Among the reasons ered in 2016 following amendments to the Public Of- for this percepton were his embrace of the so-called cials Electon and Recall Act (公職人員選罷法). Under “1992 Consensus,” his rhetoric favoring closer tes with the new rules, the recall of a municipal chief requires China, his selecton of a running mate from a secret a turnout of at least 25 percent of eligible voters—or society (Hongmen, 洪門) with close tes across the Tai- 574,996, in Kaohsiung’s case—and a majority in favor wan Strait, and his sustained online support campaign, of the removal. part of which is suspected of having been fnanced by Hyping the China Factor Beijing or Taiwan-based proxies. A number of internatonal outlets analyzed the recall Domestc Factors purely from the angle of cross-Strait relatons. The New Apprehensions over Han’s possible pro-unifcaton ten- York Times, for example, wrote that Han’s removal “re- dencies, however, are insufcient to explain the mo- fects a stunning reversal and a hardening of Taiwan’s bilizaton for his recall. Afer all, similar acton has not attude toward China.” For its part, The Wall Street been taken to target other politcians in Taiwan whose Journal headlined its artcle “Taiwan Voters Throw views are similar to those which Han ostensibly espous- China-Friendly Mayor Out of Ofce.” Such language es. Rather, Han’s many domestc failings contribute to refected a tendency among foreign media to look at his demise. Chief among those was his decision to seek every voter decision and acton through the lens of Tai- his party’s nominaton for the January 2020 presiden- wan’s contentous relatonship with China. tal electons a mere three months afer entering ofce Not to be bested, the CCP mouthpiece Global Times in Kaohsiung. Many residents of Kaohsiung, seeking a ran an artcle ttled “Mainland Unfazed by ‘Mayor’ change in directon for what they regarded as an eco- Recall” in its print editon, in which it alleged that the nomically stagnatng city afer nearly two decades of DPP had used the recall to fuel “separatst” sentment DPP rule, had embraced Han’s vow to revitalize the against China. “Many Taiwan residents who support- metropolis and “make everybody rich,” a slogan that ed Han questoned the legitmacy of the recall online many pro-KMT media outlets and commentators had since they believe the ruling party DPP is incitng the seized upon. For many of those, Han’s run for the pres- ant-mainland [sic] and separatst [sic] sentment to idency looked like abandonment, betrayal, and op- clean its politcal rivals and regain power from the city,” portunism. While in ofce, Han’s ruling style was also it wrote. highly erratc: his administraton’s mockery of interpel- laton sessions at city council; threats by his support- Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 12 11 ers against his detractors and their families; rumored outcome did cost Beijing a potental partner. alcoholism; pathological lateness; self-contradictory Mayor Han’s recall did not consttute a “victory,” as rhetoric; rampant use of disinformaton; odd policy many have termed it. Instead, it was an extraordinary proposals (e.g., a “love ferris wheel” project); and the correctve acton utlizing democratc instruments cancelaton of a highly popular summer concert at which should only be utlized in the rarest of instanc- Kaohsiung Harbor, which Han reportedly described as es. That it came to this indicates that the democratc “low class” all conspired to turn many residents of the electon process had failed, as an ofcial elected by the city against the mayor. A social conservatve, Han had public had failed to meet the minimal requirements for also angered Southeast Asian workers in Taiwan with holding ofce. For the KMT, the recall will compel party alleged racist remarks and showed disrespect to a del- leaders to re-examine the wisdom of allowing outliers egaton of visitng Japanese academics. Furthermore, within the party to seek the highest ofce in Taiwan. several foreign ofcials who have had encounters with Furthermore, it serves as a reminder that its viability as Mayor Han have confrmed privately with this author a politcal party is contngent on its ability to propose the “highly unusual” nature of the politcian. candidates who agree to play by the rules. Unlike what the Global Times and Han himself have The main point: The June 6 recall of the former fre- claimed, the recall atempt was organized by Taiwan- brand Kaohsiung mayor Han Kuo-yu was the result of ese civil society, including groups such as Citzens a sense of betrayal and apprehensions over a patern Mowing Acton (公民割草行動) and WeCare Kaohsi- of behavior which raised questons about his ability to ung, although some politcians from the DPP, the New govern under democratc conditons. While his remov- Power Party, and the Taiwan Statebuilding Party did al ostensibly removes a potental partner for Beijing, show support. Tellingly, three of the four initators of China was only one of many factors contributng to his the movement to unseat Han came from “blue” (i.e., extraordinary demise. pro-KMT) families. Within the KMT itself, Han’s idio- syncratc style, seen as ant-elite and populist, had also alienated an important segment of the KMT, resultng in a rif which led many party pillars to abandon him in the lead-up to the January 2020 electons. Incidents Imagining a New US Military Presence during his campaign which resulted in insults to KMT elders, including former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬 in Taiwan 英九) and former legislatve speaker Wang Jin-pyng ( By: Michael Mazza 王金平) also contributed to an erosion of his appeal among traditonalist blue camp politcians, many of Michael Mazza is a senior nonresident fellow at the whom regarded him as an outlier, upstart, and ama- Global Taiwan Insttute, a visitng fellow with the Amer- teur who could not be controlled by the party central. ican Enterprise Insttute, and a nonresident fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Thus, while Han’s China policy may have been prob- lematc to some residents, it was the sense of betrayal For nearly three decades—untl the severing of diplo- and fears of ant-democratc proclivites which—in the matc relatons between the United States and the Re- aggregate—likely led nearly 1 million people to vote in public of China (ROC) in 1979—American forces were favor of his recall on June 6. To be sure, the public was based in Taiwan. Beginning with the establishment not obsessed with his supposedly pro-Beijing policies, of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in nor did the recall consttute, as the New York Times 1951, Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel contribut- alleged, “a hardening of Taiwan’s attude toward Chi- ed to the defense of Taiwan and strengthened the US na.” Instead, much more pragmatc issues pertaining forward defense perimeter. The departure of US forces to governance and accountability compelled what the from Taiwan created a gap in the US military presence politcal theorist John Keane describes as “monitory in the Western Pacifc, but a manageable one for a democracy” to spring into acton. Nevertheless, the tme: for even with Taiwan Defense Command and the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) things of Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 12 12 the past, Taiwan remained independent from the Peo- put to sea, and would be beter able to contribute ma- ple’s Republic of China (PRC) and possessed a military terially to the defense of Taiwan than the LCS. that outclassed its rival across the Taiwan Strait. Even on its own, Taiwan was able to deter Chinese aggres- sion and deny the People’s Liberaton Army (PLA) open Marine Litoral Regiments access to the Western Pacifc. The US Marine Corps is about to begin experimentng While Taiwan remains independent of the PRC, the with a new unit construct optmized for operatons PLA has advanced by leaps and bounds during the past in the Pacifc theater: the Marine Litoral Regiment two decades. As the use of force to subdue Taiwan be- (MLR). An MLR will consist of 1,800 to 2,000 Marines comes more feasible, a Chinese decision to do so also and sailors, divided into three elements: becomes more likely. Today’s commanders of the US Indo-Pacifc Command (INDOPACOM) must look back “The Litoral Combat Team (LCT) is task-orga- with envy at their Cold War predecessors and their ac- nized around an infantry batalion along with cess to facilites on the island. If in the coming years a long-range ant-ship missile batery…[spokes- the politcal obstacles to force deployments were to man Maj. Josh Benson] said. “The Litoral An- evaporate, what forces might INDOPACOM command- t-Air Batalion is designed to train and employ ers seek to positon in Taiwan? air defense, air surveillance and early warning, air control, and forward rearming and refueling Naval Forces capabilites. The Litoral Logistcs Batalion pro- vides tactcal logistcs support to the MLR by re- The US Navy has an ongoing, rotatonal litoral com- supplying expeditonary advance base sites, man- bat ship (LCS) presence in Singapore. Other American aging cache sites, and connectng to higher-level warships conductng routne operatons or responding logistcs providers,” along with also providing for to crises in the South China Sea, however, must come medical and maintenance capabilites.” from further afeld: namely, Japan, Guam, Hawaii, or the US West Coast. Given the likelihood of sustained One or more MLRs based in Taiwan, besides having tensions in the South China Sea and given China’s frequent opportunites to train with Taiwan’s own ma- growing military presence there, it behooves the Unit- rines, would pose a potent threat to Chinese naval op- ed States to enhance its own presence as well. More eratons in waters north and south of the island and American ships spending more tme in the contested would allow US forces to more easily “seal up” the frst waters would act as a deterrent to all partes, facili- island chain (running from Japan south through Taiwan tate eforts to build partnership capacity via bilateral and to the Philippines) if needed. MLRs, with their an- exercises, create more opportunites for bilateral and t-ship missiles and amphibious training, would also be multlateral patrols, and ensure US forces can respond a force multplier for Taiwan in the event of a block- rapidly to incidents there. ade or cross-Strait invasion. Beyond the Strait, MLRs in Taiwan would also be in close proximity to the South Located at the northeastern terminus of the South China Sea and its litoral states. China Sea, Taiwan would be an ideal site for a perma- nent or rotatonal American naval presence. LCS are Medium- and Intermediate-Range Missiles well-tailored for presence missions and have a relatve- ly light footprint. Based in Taiwan, they would also be Mobile ant-ship missiles might not be the only missiles well-positoned to regularly patrol the waters around the INDOPACOM commander would like to deploy to the island, complicatng the PLA’s ability to carry out Taiwan. In August 2019, the United States withdrew provocatve acts. The LCS’s surface warfare, ant-sub- from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) marine warfare, and mine countermeasures module Treaty, which had banned ground-launched cruise and optons would all have utlity in the event of a cross- ballistc missiles of ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilo- Strait crisis. The new guided missile frigates under de- meters, and quickly began testng new missiles. velopment would be a viable follow-on once they are Secretary of Defense Mark Esper has made clear that Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 12 13 the Pentagon wants to place intermediate-range mis- Missile Defense siles in Asia once they become operatonal (a good With upwards of 1,500 cruise and ballistc missiles overview of these missiles’ utlity in the region can be within range of Taiwan, the PLA poses a substantal found here). If it were feasible, Taiwan would likely be missile threat to Taiwan. Depending on the scenario, on his list of potental host natons. In the event of a the PLA could potentally use those missiles to pound confict, mobile ground-launched medium or interme- military bases, sofen up coastal defenses, take out diate-range missiles placed in Taiwan would allow for critcal infrastructure, or eliminate high value targets. strikes deep into Chinese territory. The presence of Accordingly, missile defense has been a major concern such capabilites in Taiwan, moreover, would help to of Taiwan’s defense planners. The ROC military now deter Beijing from pursuing forceful annexaton. Bei- has 10 Patriot missile bateries—all purchased from jing would know that if it launched an atack on Tai- the United States—and plans to feld 12 indigenous wan, Chinese territory would get hit hard—the war Tiangong III ant-ballistc missile interceptor bateries would extend far beyond the Taiwan Strait, and dam- (which will replace 1960s-era MIM-23 Hawks). age would not be limited to coastal province. Taiwan will never feld enough interceptors to negate Special Operatons Forces the PLA missile threat, but combined with passive de- There are good reasons for INDOPACOM to seek the fenses and electronic warfare operatons, missile de- deployment of special operatons forces (SOF) to Tai- fenses may be able to protect select important targets. wan. With two decades of combat experience under The INDOPACOM commander might want to comple- their belts, SOF units could provide regular, valuable ment Taiwan’s own capabilites by deploying forces to training to their Taiwan counterparts. This could per- provide a more layered missile defense—here, a Ter- haps include training on how to wage irregular war- minal High Alttude Area Defense (THAAD) batery or fare, should it come to that. Recent American opera- an Aegis Ashore installaton might be valuable. Such tons, however, have not provided US forces with the assets would likewise serve to provide a shield for oth- knowledge and experiences necessary to efectvely er US forces based on the island, which would likely grapple with the partcular challenges that they might employ their own medium-range and point defenses. face in a confict between the United States and Chi- In other words, the United States could help to make na. Indeed, American SOF units probably have much to Taiwan a much harder target for the PLA Rocket Force. learn from Taiwan’s own special forces—how to con- Conclusion duct civil afairs in a Taiwan context; how to identfy and counter Chinese politcal warfare; how Chinese In the absence of a mutual defense treaty between special forces operate; and the unique challenges to the United States and Taiwan, it remains difcult to be expected should operatons in China be required. imagine much less implement signifcant, public US Deployment in Taiwan, of course, would also provide force deployments to Taiwan in the coming years. Yet American special operators with an opportunity to en- as the COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated, the world hance their language skills—and not just in Mandarin, can change in a hurry. Indeed, COVID-19 might prove but also in other dialects that could be of use in the to be an infecton point in Washington’s approach to event of a crisis. Taiwan, acceleratng its extant pursuit of a far more normal defense relatonship with Taipei. Deployed to Taiwan, SOF would be poised to respond rapidly should a crisis erupt. Working hand-in-hand Thinking through what a theoretcal US force laydown with their local counterparts, American SOF could in Taiwan would look like is a useful exercise. It pre- contribute to counter-infltraton missions and would pares the United States to move quickly should deploy- be positoned to conduct operatons across the Strait ments become possible. Perhaps more importantly for should the need arise. As with naval and Marine Corps the near-term, the thought exercise highlights poten- deployments, US SOF in Taiwan would also be in prime tal shortcomings of current US force posture in Asia, positon to respond rapidly to crises in Southeast Asia which should prod defense leaders to mitgate them. should their assistance be requested.