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Issue 12 Global Taiwan Brief Vol 5 Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 12 Global Taiwan Brief Vol 5. Issue1 12 Fortnightly Review Russell Hsiao Beijing Set to Increase Pressure on Taiwan’s Diplomatc Space in Tsai’s Second Term Ingrid Bodeen Hong Kong’s Natonal Security Law Strs Taiwanese Resentment Towards China I-wei Jennifer Chang Han Kuo-yu Recall: More Than Just About China J. Michael Cole Imagining a New US Military Presence in Taiwan Michael Mazza Fortnightly Review The Global Taiwan Brief is a bi-weekly publicaton released ev- By: Russell Hsiao ery other Wednesday and provides insight into the latest news on Russell Hsiao is the executve director of the Global Taiwan Insttute (GTI) and editor-in-chief of the Taiwan. Global Taiwan Brief. Editor-in-Chief Xiamen University Launches Research Insttutons to Promote Cross-Strait Unifcaton Russell Hsiao and the “One-China Principle” Staf Editor Katherine Schultz On June 3, Xiamen University (廈門大學) announced the launch of two new research in- Copy Editor Marshall Reid sttutes focused on cross-Strait unifcaton and applied research on countering Taiwan’s diplomatc eforts. Located in the city of Xiamen (Amoy) in the People’s Republic of China The views and opinions expressed (PRC)—which is less than four miles away from the Taiwan-administered Kinmen Islands in these artcles are those of the authors and do not necessarily (Quemoy)—the Graduate Insttute for Taiwan Studies (台灣研究院) at Xiamen University refect the ofcial policy or positon established the “Cross-Strait Integraton Development and Natonal Unifcaton Policy Sim- of the Global Taiwan Insttute. ulaton Laboratory” (兩岸融合發展與國家統一政策模擬實驗室) and the “Taiwan Diplo- macy Research Center“ (涉台外交研究中心). The Graduate Insttute for Taiwan Research To view web sources cited in the published papers (underlined in at Xiamen University is considered to be among a handful of premier “academic” insttu- printed text), visit tons that support the Chinese government’s Taiwan policy. Other organizatons common- htp://globaltaiwan.org/2020/06/ ly grouped in this class include the infuental Chinese Academy of Social Science ‘s Taiwan vol-5-issue-12/. Research Insttute (中國社會科學院台灣研究所), which is associated with the country’s Global Taiwan Insttute civilian intelligence agency the Ministry of State Security, the Natonal Society of Taiwan 1836 Jeferson Place NW, Studies (全國台灣研究會) coordinated by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) United Washington DC 20036 [email protected] Front Work Department (中共中央統一戰線工作部), and the Shanghai Taiwan Insttute ( 上海台灣研究所) of the Shanghai Municipal Government. To subscribe, visit htp://globaltaiwan.org/sub- The Graduate Insttute for Taiwan Studies is not the average run-of-the-mill Chinese ac- scribe/. ademic insttuton. Its predecessor, the Taiwan Research Insttute (台灣研究所), was es- tablished in July 1980 by the former director of the CCP Central Commitee Leading Group © 2020 · Global Taiwan Insttute for Taiwan Work, Deng Yingchao (鄧穎超)—the wife of Zhou Enlai (周恩来). The current chairman and deputy party-secretary of the insttute is Li Peng (李鹏, b. 1973), who has Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 12 2 served in that capacity since 2017 and was previously a research platorm focused on promotng the “One-Chi- visitng scholar in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Universi- na Principle” through academic exchanges with vari- ty of Maryland (Li was the recipient of a State Depart- ous countries. The center reportedly intends to expand ment award to study in the United States). The Grad- its cooperaton with the United States by undertaking uate Insttute for Taiwan Research is currently headed research, holding academic seminars, and conductng by another professor, Liu Guoshen (劉國深). academic exchanges. These eforts will be premised on adherence to the “One-China Principle” (一中原 The director of the new insttute is Chen Xiancai (陳 則) rather than the “two Chinas” (兩個中國) or “one 先才), who concurrently serves as director of Xiamen China, one Taiwan” (一中一台) models. Furthermore, University’s Insttute of Politcal Science. Chen has a it will work to establish links with relevant universites long academic career studying Taiwan issues. Afer be- that have think tanks focused on Taiwan in Europe, Ja- ginning his work at Xiamen University in 2007 within pan, Singapore, and elsewhere. the Graduate Insttute of Taiwan Studies, he served as the insttute’s deputy director and as a director of the In a response to the establishment of the new inst- “Collaboratve Innovaton Center for Peaceful Develop- tutes, the Mainland Afairs Council (MAC, 大陸委員 ment of Cross-Strait Relatons” (兩岸關係和平發展協 會)—the Taiwanese government’s cabinet-level agen- 同創新中心), a united front think tank that was jointly cy in charge of cross-Strait policy—issued a statement established by several prominent Chinese universites. highlightng the increasingly aggressive eforts that the Additonally, he serves as the director of the DPP Re- CCP has taken to unify Taiwan since it issued “Xi Five search Center (台灣研究院民進黨研究中心), also lo- Artcles” in early 2019 and proposed the “One Coun- cated within the Graduate Insttute of Taiwan Studies. try, Two Systems Taiwan Plan.” According to the MAC, The mission of this insttuton is to “analyze the his- these new initatves by Xiamen University are intend- torical, social, and realistc roots behind the establish- ed to implement the CCP’s goal of unifying Taiwan. ment, development, and evoluton of the Democratc While the MAC restated the government’s positon in Progressive Party.” In 2018, Chen was also invited to support of healthy cross-Strait exchanges without pre- provide a briefng to trainees at the Eastern Theater conditons, the agency noted that the PRC has been Command (東部戰區)—which would have operaton- contnuously increasing its United Front operatons al control over a Taiwan contngency—on the current against Taiwan. Moreover, it discouraged the island’s status of cross-Strait relatons and domestc develop- academic community from carrying out exchanges or ments within Taiwan. cooperaton actvites with the insttutons and their personnel. According to Xiamen University’s announcement, the new laboratory will serve the goals of Xi’s “new era,” The launch of these new initatves is unlikely to be helping to solve the Taiwan issue and realize the com- greeted with great fanfare in Taiwan, whose popula- plete unifcaton of “China.” To this end, the new inst- ton has hardened its views toward China and the “one tuton will focus on analyzing and predictng the con- country two systems,” especially in light of ongoing ditons for natonal unifcaton, generatng simulatons events in Hong Kong. Yet, given the initatve’s appar- of natonal unifcaton strategies, and investgatng po- ent emphasis on internatonal engagement, they could tental cross-Strait integraton development policies. be used as a platorm for gaining greater internatonal Additonally, it will analyze simulatons of unifcaton acceptance for Beijing’s formula for cross-Strait unif- under “one country, two systems” (一國兩制). Finally, caton based on the “One-China Principle” and “one it will carry out research and teaching initatves, ut- country, two systems.” lizing artfcial intelligence, virtual simulatons, experi- The main point: Xiamen University’s new initatves to mental teaching, and case studies to promote the uni- explore models for cross-Strait unifcaton based on the fcaton process. “One-China Principle” and “one country, two systems” The goals of the new Taiwan Diplomacy Research Cen- are likely to be a non-starter in Taiwan, but appear di- ter are somewhat similar and complementary. Osten- rected at an internatonal audience to gain greater ac- sibly, the mission of this department is to establish a ceptance for China’s policy for cross-Strait unifcaton. Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 12 3 US-Taiwan-Japan Cooperaton Going Global as GCTF Beginning in March 2019, Japan joined the initatve as Celebrates Anniversary a coordinatng partner, resultng in the forum becom- ing formally known as the “Taiwan-US-Japan Global On June 1, the United States, Taiwan, and Japan cele- Cooperaton & Training Framework.” The three part- brated the fve-year anniversary of the Global Coop- ners co-organized the September 2019 forum in the eraton and Training Framework (GCTF) in Taipei. The Pacifc-naton of Palau, which was the frst tme that a trilateral initatve, which was launched in 2015 by the GCTF workshop took place outside of Taiwan. It is also United States and Taiwan, has emerged as a symbol of notable that Sweden, which is now increasingly feeling the growing partnership between like-minded coun- the politcal pressure from Beijing, was a guest co-host tries in recent years, both in the Indo-Pacifc region for the GCTF workshop in September 2019 focused on and increasingly around the world. The approach was democracy and media literacy. Planning is underway addressed by then-Principal Deputy Assistant Secre- for another GCTF workshop to be held outside Taiwan tary of State Kurt Tong in 2016 at the launch’s frst an- in Latn America—probably in Guatemala—focused on niversary: the digital economy. At a recent virtual forum hosted “The idea is simple: the United States and Tai- by the Center for Strategic and Internatonal Studies wan conduct training programs for experts from (CSIS), Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for throughout the region to assist them with build- the Western Hemisphere Julie Chung stated: ing their own capacites to tackle issues where “There’s so much again that we [United States] Taiwan has proven expertse and advantages.
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